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Grain Embargo 1981 – USSR (4)
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Grain Embargo 1981 – USSR (4)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: USSR - Grain Embargo 1981 (4)
Box: 27
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/10/2005
File Folder
USSR-GRAIN EMBARGO 81 4/5
FOIA
F06-114/8
Box Number
27
YARHI-MILO
2704
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9990 CABLE
252127Z APR 81
5 4/25/1981 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
9988 CABLE
292345Z APR 81
8 4/29/1981 B1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
9989 CABLE
011925Z MAY 81
2 5/1/1981 B1
9987 PAPER
REACTION TO LIFTING GRAIN EMBARGO
2
ND
B1
B3
PAR
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Hatg Says U.S. Will Cut All Trade.
With Soviet if It Moves Into Poland
New York Times, 4/25/81, Pg, A1
By The Associated Press
WASHINGTON, April 25 - Secretary
of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said today
"Were there to be an internal or exter-
that if the Soviet Union invaded Poland,
nal aggression by the Soviet Union, there
the Reagan Administrat would impose
would be an across-the-board" cut-off in
a ban on all United States trade with the
trade, he said.
Soviet Union and would reimpose the
Mr. Haig's statement was a reiteration
grain embargo.
of the position of the North Atlantic
Mr. Haig said that was President Rea-
Treaty Organization, whose members re-
gan's position. He added that it had been
solved in December that they would halt
made known in "international forums."
all trade with Moscow in the evert of
President Reagan, who lifted the grain
Soviet military intervention in Polarid.,
curbs yesterday, has said he opposes
The Secretary of State discussed the
using a grain embargo alone as punish-
President's decision to end the grain
ment for Soviet aggression because it
curbs during an interview.
burden. made farmers bear the entire economic
Opposed Reagan Action
"Yes, if there was an invasion of Po-
Mr. Haig is known to have arg ed
land, there's no question about it, Mr.
against Mr. Reagan's decision to end the
Haig replied when asked if a new grain
grain embargo, saying it could send a
embargo would be imposed as part of the
wrong "signal" at a time when Soviet
United States response to Soviet military
forces were poised in and around Poland,
intervention in Poland.
But he made clear he supported the move
now that it has been announced.
He said President Reagan had to take
into account "certain domestic consider-
ations." "His farm bill and even his eco-
Continued on Page 12, Column 3
Haig Warns Soviet of Ban on Trade
Continued From Page 1
troops "repressing national sovereignty
in Afghanistan and we cannot accept this
as a normal situation."
nomic program-could be in jeopardy on
"And I don't think the President has
this issue," Mr. Haig added.
any intention of doing so," he declared.
Noting that Mr. Reagan had promised
The Secretary said President Reagan
during the campaign to lift the embargo,
would have lifted the curb on his first day
Mr. Haig said it was "the President's
in office if it had not been for "tensions in
very strong conviction to live by his com-
the international environment, not just
mitments, and in this instance his com-
Afghanistan, but also in Poland."
mitment was to lift that grain embargo."
While the situation in Poland has
"I think the most important thing we
eased, Mr. Haig cautioned against any
must prevent in the wake of lifting the
expectations that the crisis had ended.
'The basic trend has been to get closer
embargo is the perception that it was ex-
and closer to the point of no return of
clusively the consequence of a perceived
Soviet toleration" of events in Poland,"
Soviet moderation in Poland," he added.
he said. "You have an action and a reac-
Mr. Haig added that it would be a mis-
tion, but there is usually a trend."
take to "let Poland exclusively dominate
our assessment of future relations with
the Soviet Union and return to an attitude
Your Money
of normal if the situation in Poland is not
Saturday in Business Day
The New York Times
aggravated." He said there still are 85,000 Soviet
Reagan Expected to End Soviet Grain Curb Today
The limit on grain sales is commonly
metric ton order, but indicated the United
called an "embargo," but that is an im-
States would continue to abide by the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is though
precise term.
to have purchased about 32 million met
agreed 6 to 8 million metric tons permit-
latt
Continued From Page Al
spokesman, said this afternoon that Mr.
The United States and the Soviet Union
ted the Russians.
ric tons, the department said.
recess on Monday, the White House wants
Haig was standing by his previously
have a five-year agreement, expiring
A similar restriction was levied on
Officials said that if Mr. Reagan went
that such a move would "send the wrong
to remove the grain curb as an irritant in
signal" at a time of Soviet military
stated position, pending a "final deci-
Sept. 30, that allows the Russians to pur-
1980-81 exports. The Russians have al-
ahead with plans to end the limitation the
relations with senators and representa-
sion" by Mr. Reagan. Mr. Haig has said
tives from farm states, officials said. The
chase between six and eight million met-
ready bought the eight million tons per-
United States would offer about two mil-
preparations for a possible intervention
ric tons of grain a year, usually divided
mitted them,
lion metric tons of wheat to the Russians
that he never believed the grain curb was
Senate Agriculture Committee is sched-
for delivery by Oct. 1.
"In Poland.
a useful tool but he felt that it would be a
uled to begin putting the finishing touches
between wheat and corn. The accord per-
Russians Buy Grain Elsewhere
Administration officials said Mr. Haig
mits the Soviet Union to buy more grain
So far, no negotiations have been held
mistake to lift the restriction.
on the four-year omnibus farm bill on
The Agriculture Department has esti-
still opposed an end to the grain curb, but
with the permission of the United States.
with the Soviet Union on renewing the
Monday.
mated that the Soviet Union has been
At the time of the Soviet invasion of Af-
long-term grain agreement, but such
"Mr. Reagan apparently chose to accept
The Secretary has said that the situa-
When asked for the State Department's
able to buy enough corn and wheat in
the advice of his White House political ad-
ghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet
talks are expected to take place, accord.
tion around Poland remains potentially
position on ending the curb, an Adminis-
other markets to make up for the grain
Union had been given permission to buy
ing to officials. Soviet diplomats have
visers and Agriculture Secretary John R.
explosive and the Russians have done
withheld by the United States.
hinted, the officials said, that they would
nothing around the world to merit an end
tration official said, "You don't think
25 million metric tons 17 million above
Block.
to the curbs.
anyone with any knowledge of foreign af-
the 8 million limit.
For the 1980-81 purchasing year, the
like any new accord to have a higher ceil-
fairs would support the end to the embar-
Russians were believed to need 35 million
Dean Fischer, the State Department
In retaliation for Afghanistan, Mr. Car-
ing than eight million metric tons, and
With Congress returning from Easter
go, do you?"
metric tons of imported grain to augment
ter canceled the additional 17 million
some guarantee against a new curtail.
185 million metric tons grown in the
ment.
New President Times Is Expected to Act Today
To End Curb on Grain Sale to Soviet
sensitivity about the matter. Several sen-
lor officials who are usually willing to dis-
cuss policy matters on a confidential
basis refused to talk about the pending
decision, even though there have been
persistent reports that it was imminent
Larry Speakes, the acting White House
spokesman, appeared disturbed today
when reporters suggested that he was
less than candid in insisting that the decl
sion had not been made. He said he
sented the line of questioning
Campaign Pledge to Farmers
The senior Administration official said
Mr. Reagan wanted to carry out his cam-
paign pledge to mers to end the export
curb. He said the end to the grain curb
also reflected an easing of Sovlet military
pressure on Poland.
Mr. Reagan had delayed lifting #the
curb on the advice of Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr. Mr. Haig argued
Continued on Page A8, Column 1
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON April President
Reagan is expected to end the 15-month
curb on United States grain exports to the
Soviet Union tomorrow despite the State
Department's reservations about the
move, a senior Administration official
Spokesmen for the White House and the
State Department insisted today that "no
final decision!! had been made on lifting
the export curb, which was imposed by
former President January 1980
after the Soviet Union's incursion in Af-
But ghanistan the senior Administration official
said the action was imminent. He said it
was expected to take place tomorrow un-
less Mr. Reagan changed his mind at the
Cabinet scheduled to meet
last minute.
tomorrow a National Security Coun-
cil session Officials said the grain deci-
sion is expected to be taken at the Cabinet
The meeting. White House has shown unusual
said today
GRAiN EMBARGO3
TAP158
*******C ONF IDENTIA L*******E COPY
IN
OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #7221 1152140
0 252127Z APR 81 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHOC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0000
CONF DENTIAL
IMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 107221
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS:
EAGR, EEWT, EPAP, UR
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO LIFT THE PARTIAL
GRAINS EMBARGO
1. AT 1200 LOCAL TIME, APRIL 24, THE WHITE HOUSE
ANNOUNCED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO LIFT THE PARTIAL
GRAINS EMBARGO. TEXT FOLLOWS:
I AM TODAY LIFTING THE U.S. LIMITATION ON ADDITIONAL
DECLASSIFIED
AGRICULTURAL SALES TO THE SOVIET UNION AS I PROMISED
NLRR F06-114/8#9990
TO DO DURING LAST YEAR'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.
BY Los NARA DATE 9/30/08
MY ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE A FULL AND COMPLETE STUDY
OF THIS SALES LIMITATION, AND I REACHED MY DECISION
AFTER WEIGHING ALL OPTIONS CAREFULLY AND CONFERRING
FULLY WITH MY ADVISERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE
CABINET AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES ON THIS
MATTER.
AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, I INDICATED MY OPPOSITION
TO THE CURB ON SALES BECAUSE AMERICAN FARMERS HAD BEEN
UNFAIRLY SINGLED OUT TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF THIS
INEFFECTIVE NATIONAL POLICY.
I ALSO PLEDGED THAT WHEN ELECTED PRESIDENT I WOULD
"FULLY ASSESS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY
AND AGRICULTURAL NEEDS TO DETERMINE HOW BEST TO
SIT: COL,VP
EOB: EURE,ECON
WHSR COMMENTS:
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39
*******C ONF DENT I A L*******E COPY
TERMINATE" THE DECISION MADE BY MY PREDECESSOR.
THIS ASSESSMENT BEGAN AS SOON AS I ENTERED OFFICE AND
HAS CONTINUED UNTIL NOW.
IN THE FIRST WEEKS OF MY PRESIDENCY I DECIDED THAT AN
IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF THE SALES LIMITATION COULD BE
MISINTERPRETED BY THE SOVIET UNION.
I THEREFORE FELT THAT MY DECISION SHOULD BE MADE ONLY
WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS AND OTHER NATIONS
WOULD NOT MISTAKENLY THINK IT INDICATED A WEAKENING OF
OUR POSITION.
I HAVE DETERMINED THAT OUR POSITION NOW CANNOT BE
MISTAKEN: THE UNITED STATES, ALONG WITH THE VAST
MAJORITY OF NATIONS, HAS CONDEMNED AND REMAINS OPPOSED
TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER
AGGRESSIVE ACTS AROUND THE WORLD.
WE WILL REACT STRONGLY TO ACTS OF AGGRESSION WHEREVER
THEY TAKE PLACE. THERE WILL NEVER BE A WEAKENING OF
THIS RESOLVE.
END TEXT
2. IN DISCUSSING THIS DECISION, YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THE
FOLLOWING GUIDANCE AS APPROPRIATE, IN COORDINATION
WITH PAO'S AND IO'S.
3. REASON FOR DECISION:
--- BEFORE TAKING OFFICE THE PRESIDENT UNDERTOOK A
COMMITMENT TO LIFT THE GRAINS EMBARGO WHICH WAS A
LEGACY FROM THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. IT HAS BEEN
HIS CONCERN THAT THE EMBARGO WAS IMPOSING AN UNFAIR
BURDEN ON THE U.S. FARMER AND THAT THE EMBARGO WAS NOT
EFFECTIVE. THUS BY LIFTING THE EMBARGO THE PRESIDENT
IS FULFILLING HIS PLEDGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
-- THE PRESIDENT DELAYED ACTION UNTIL NOW TO ALLOW HIM
TO COMPLETE HIS REVIEW OF THE EMBARGO POLICY AND
BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT AN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF
THE EMBARGO WOULD BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE SOVIET
UNION.
4. EFFECT ON AFGHANISTAN POLICY:
PAGE 02
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*******C ONFIDENT I A L*******E COPY
4
clearly not indication
of changed
*******CONFIDENTIA L*******E COPY position on
Afqhar rebels
1
1) position vis-a-vis
-- THE DECISION TO LIFT THE GRAINS EMBARGO DOES NOT
INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN THE OPPOSITION OF THE U.S. TO
Afghanistan not
changed
THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN OR THE ACCEPTANCE
OF THE STATUS QUO THERE. WE WILL PERSEVERE IN OUR
2) other sanctions
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PREDICATED
measures are still
UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.
in place (technology)
3) package - Pakistan
2
THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION COVERS ONLY THE LIFTING OF
& Afghan rebels
THE PARTIAL EMBARGO ON AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND THE
RELATED EMBARGO ON PHOSPHATES. OTHER AFGHAN-RELATED
SANCTION MEASURES REMAIN IN PLACE.
5. POLAND:
OUR LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A
"REWARD" FOR SOVIET GOOD BEHAVIOR, I.E., NON
-INTERVENTION IN POLAND. THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED
HIS COMMITMENT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO MANY MONTHS AGO.
-OUR POSITION ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND IS
UNCHANGED. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS FACING
POLAND REMAIN SERIOUS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE CAN AND SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE OF
ANY KIND.
--WE RECOGNIZE THE CONTINUING HIGH STATE OF READINESS
OF SOVIET FORCES IN AND AROUND POLAND AND THEIR
CAPABILITY TO MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE.
THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT
THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND WOULD EVOKE A
PROFOUND AND LASTING RESPONSE FROM THE US THAT WOULD
JEOPARDIZE THE ENTIRE RANGE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
6. U.S. POSTURE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION:
THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED
AS A WEAKENING OF OUR POSITION TOWARDS THE SOVIET
UNION. DURING ITS TERM IN OFFICE, THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION HAS COMMUNICATED CLEARLY TO THE SOVIET
UNION THAT WE WILL RESIST SOVIET AGGRESSION AND INSIST
ON SOVIET RESTRAINT.
THE USSR SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT AGGRESSIVE
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49
*******C ONF DENTI A L*******E COPY
BEHAVIOR IN POLAND OR ELSEWHERE WILL MEET WITH
ANYTHING BUT THE MOST PROMPT, FIRM AND UNIFIED
RESPONSE.
-THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN AND IS TAKING. CONCRETE
STEPS TO ENABLE THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES TO DETER
SOVIET THREATS TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO RESPOND TO
CHALLENGES SHOULD THEY ARISE.
7. US-SOVIET GRAIN TRADE:
--IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE VI OF THE EXISTING GRAINS
AGREEMENT, ADDITIONAL SALES OF CORN AND WHEAT FOR THIS
FISCAL YEAR WOULD BE DETERMINED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS, SHOULD THE SOVIETS DESIRE ADDITIONAL
PURCHASES.
DECISIONS ON A NEW LONG-TERM GRAINS AGREEMENT WITH
THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MADE.
8. EFFECT ON OTHER US-SOVIET TRADE ISSUES:
THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AN should not be
INDICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FUTURE TRADE POLICY viewed as an
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF
indicat. of the Admin's
EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION'S
policy toward USSR.
STUDY OF US-SDVIET TRADE POLICY AND EAST-WEST
RELATIONS HAS NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED.
THE POLICY TOWARD TRADE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL GOODS
HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED. AS IN THE PAST, EXPORT LICENSES
FOR OTHER GOODS AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE REVIEWED AS
NECESSARY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO DOES NOT SIGNAL OUR
ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSED SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE
PROJECT. WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PROJECT. THESE
IMPLICATIONS ARE BEING CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT REVIEW OF EAST-WEST
ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
9. ALLIES:
-FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WHICH WERE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED
WERE CONSULTED IN ADVANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
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*******C ONFIDENTI A L*******E COPY
5
*******C ONF IDENTI A L*******E COPY
ANNOUNCEMENT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO.
--WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT LIFTING THE EMBARGO WILL
AFFECT ALLIED READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH US IN
RESTRAINING SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND
ENHANCING WESTERN DEFENSE POSTURE.
10. THE SECRETARY'S SUPPORT OF THE DECISION:
SECRETARY HAIG FULLY SUPPORTS THE PRESIDENT'S
DECISION.
--HE HAS CONSISTENTLY AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT
THE EMBARGO WAS IMPOSING AN UNFAIR BURDEN ON THE U.S.
FARMER. HIS CONCERN WAS ONLY THAT THE DECISION NOT
SEND A WRONG SIGNAL CONCERNING OUR FOREIGN POLICY
POSTURE TOWARD THE USSR.
11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HAIG
BT
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*******C ONF 10 DENTIA L*******E COPY
THE WASHINGTON POST
Saturday, April 25. 1981
Reagan Ends Ban
On Selling Grain
To Soviet Union
By Lee Lescaze
Washington Post Staff Writer
President Reagan lifted the embar-
go on grain sales to the Soviet Union
yesterday and said he is certain the
Soviets and others around the world
will not mistakenly think he has
weakened his stand against Soviet ag-
gression.
"We will react strongly to acts of
aggression wherever they take place,"
Reagan said in his statement an-
nouncing that he was wiping out the
most serious action the Carter admin-
istration took to punish Moscow for
its invasion of Afghanistan.
Reagan entered office determined
to establish a tough and consistent
posture from which to deal with the
Soviet Union. The lifting of the em-
bargo, an action Moscow has sought,
was Reagan's first major act bearing
directly on the U.S.-Soviet relation-
ship.
It stands in apparent contrast to
the president's anti-Soviet rhetoric -
including his Jan. 29 charge that So-
viet leaders will lie, cheat and commit
any crime to achieve their goals - as
well as such minor harassment of
Moscow as depriving Ambassador
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin of his unique
State Department parking privilege
and abruptly refusing a visa extension
to Georgy Arbatov, Moscow's chief
America-watcher.
One day earlier, a White House of-
ficial told reporters that one reason
for the administration's decision to
sell sophisticated AWACS radar
planes to Saudi Arabia was the in-
creasing Soviet threat in the Persian
Gulf region.
An administration official said the
.
decision to lift the grain embargo was
made possible in part by lessened ten-
sion in the world, including in Poland,
where fears of a Soviet invasion have
lessened.
The official, who spoke to reporters
on the understanding that he not be
Reagan Ends Ban on Sales of Grain to Soviet Union
PRESIDENT, From A1
from Secretary of State Alexander M.
yesterday's statement, which was read
"I have determined that our posi-
identified. said he sees no contradic-
Haig Jr. and others that lifting the
for reporters and the television cam-
tion now cannot be mistaken: The
tion or inconsistency in the two ac-
embargo would send the wrong signal
eras by deputy White House press
United States, along with the vast:
to the Soviets.
secretary Larry Speakes.
majority of nations, has condemned
tions.
Senate Minority Leader Robert C.
From Jan. 4, 1980, when President
and remains opposed to the Soviet oc-
Byrd (D-W.Va.) said the decision
Carter imposed the embargo in re-
Reagan stressed that his action was
cupation of Afghanistan and other ag-
"gives our nation an image of softness
sponse to the Soviet invasion of Af-:
taken in fulfillment of his campaign
gressive acts around the world. We
ghanistan, Reagan has been critical of
promise, and called the embargo an
and vacillation."
will react strongly to acts of aggression
it on the grounds that it asks Ameri-
"ineffective national policy." He said
Byrd added: "What we are being
wherever they take place. There will
can farmers to bear an unfair burden.
that lifting the embargo has been
told now, basically, is that the Soviets
never be a weakening of this resolve."
under constant review.
should be rewarded for being good for
At one point during the campaign,
Neither. the unnamable administra-
a few days. Lifting the embarga in no
Reagan suggested that more appro-
"In the first few weeks of my pres-
tion official- nor Reagan. who made
way enhances the security of Poland,
priate and effective way. to punish
idency, I decided that an immediate
the decision on his first day back in
and makes the United States appear
Moscow might have been to blockade
lifting of the sales limitation could be
the Oval: Office since he was shot
weak and lacking in resolve."
Cuba.
misinterpretad by the Soviet. Union,"
March 30, explained what action or
Since taking office, Reagan has
He has said repeatedly that the em-
Reagan said "I therefore felt that my
actions had led him to determine that
been caught between his. campaign
bargo did not hurt the Soviet Union,
decision should be made only when it
conditions now permitted him to lift
piedge to eliminate the embargo - a
which was able to buy the grain it.
was clear that the Soviets and other
the embargo.
pledge that helped him win farmer's'
needs from other nations.
nations would not mistakenly think it
The absence of a Soviet crackdown
votes last November and warnings
Reagen returned: to these themes in
indicated a weakening of our position.
against the Polish labor unions was
only a partial factor in the decision,
this official said, but he would not list
other factors:
"I would not peg the president's de-
cision to lift the embargo to any spe-
cific action." the official said, adding,
"This is a principled decision and we
insist that you accept it as such."
He rejected the suggestion that the
Soviets were being rewarded.
Several diplomats who deal with
the Soviet Union let it be known that
they believe that lifting the embargo
will make it harder to raily support
for criticisms of the Afghanistan sit-
uation and other Soviet actions.
They also said that the decision will
strengthen the hand of those Soviet
Associated Prem
leaders who argue that if Moscow
Entering the Cabinet meeting, Reagan is cheered by (from left) Secretaries Watt and Haig, Deputy Secretaries Cariucci and Wright.
stands firm the United States will ei
ther change administrations or change
policies and cave in.
Even before the embargo officially
ended at 4 p.m., Soviet officials were
in the Agriculture Department build-
ing here discussing grain purchases,
Agriculture Secretary John R. Block
said.
If the Soviets appear eager to buy,
the Americans appear no less eager to
sell. By happy coincidence, USDA of-
ficials discovered that about 6 million
metric tons of corn that hadn't been
noticed before are available for sale.
In addition, officials said, there is
plenty of wheat, and a handsome new
crop is on the horizon.
"I'm happy beyond comprehension.
It has been a long 100 days," said
Block, who had pushed for an end to
the embargo.
Wash Post, April 26, 1981, Pg C6 Editorial
Changing the Rules of the Game?
P
ERHAPS President Reagan's lifting of the grain
bargo and took related steps at the time of the Soviet
embargo is an aberration, a one-shot exception
invasion of Afghanistan in order to bring to bear on
to a general policy of considering matters relating to
the Soviet Union a range of sanctions at the peaceful
the Soviet Union as parts of a strategic whole. This
end of the spectrum. The idea was that, in this in-
makes it quaint, even a bit touching, that he should
stance, as serious as it was, peaceful measures were
honor a campaign promise by taking a step that cuts
to be preferred over others more toward the military
so embarrassingly across the main thrust of his ap-
end of the spectrum The idea behind that was es-
proach to Soviet power.
sentially gradualism: responding to reprehensible
The scale of the administration's embarrassment
Soviet behavior by starting small, taking one step at
remains immense: President Reagan is helping Mos-
a time, adding pressures as necessary and feasible,
cow out of a grain pinch, breaking faith with the Af-
making Soviet aggression costly, bringing the allies
ghans and the Poles, setting a nothing-for-something
along, giving diplomacy time to work, playing by the
precedent in diplomacy, announcing that he caves to
rules. This concept has been applied by successive
domestic pressure groups, and licensing all manner
American administrations in all situations where 8
of other would-be exporters, American and foreign,
recourse to force has not been thought necessary,
to try to sell to Moscow what they will. Still, if the
and even in some situations where it has.
lifting of the embargo is the exception that proves
Now comes Ronald Reagan, who is taking out of
the rule of American strategic determination, all is
his own hands-conceivably, not just in this incident
not lost.
-the principal lever, trade, available for peaceful
It occurs to us, however, that there is another pos-
and gradual response to Soviet actions of which the
sible explanation for Mr. Reagan's decision. Perhaps
United States disapproves. By doing this he is point-
he does not regard his anti-embargo assurances to
ing himself toward, and to a degree committing him-
the farmers so much as a "campaign promise" as an
self to, a whole other manner of response, one in
expression of a deeply felt free-market philosophy
which he would conceivably reply to the Soviet
that disposes him to resist controlling normal civilian
Union more abruptly, more forcefully, more "effec-
commerce, however that might be defined. This
tively" and in a more unpredictable and unorthodox
would lead not to a transient or accidental contradic-
way.
tion but a permanent one between his economic
The lifting of the embargo could be the opening
policy and the demands of a prudent conventional
signal of a startling and radical new approach to
foreign policy designed to contain Soviet expansion.
Soviet power in which the perceptions and risks on
It -would be, in our view, a politically costly and
both sides would be quite different from what they
strategically distracting contradiction, the more so
have been until now. There have been hints of this
for being witting and continuous. Can it be that this
between some of Mr. Reagan's lines but nothing of
is what Mr. Reagan has in mind?
real substance. It will be interesting, not to say sur-
If he is at all inclined in that direction, there is yet
passingly important, to see if this is what the presi-
another factor that must be worked into the equa-
dent really has in mind-changing the rules of the
tion. Jimmy Carter imposed the partial grain em-
game-so that others can fairly discuss and judge it.
8
REUTER 1250 NL
R128R A0545)12QTBYLRYR
AM-GRAIN
BY JAMES VICINI
WASHINGTON, APRIL 27, REUTER -- THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK
TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT SOLD TO THE SOVIET UNION UNDER
A GRAIN DEAL TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, DEPUTY
AGRICULTURE SECRETARY RICHARD LYNG SAID TODAY.
THE TWO COUNTRIES OPENED TALKS ON POSSIBLE NEW GRAIN SALES
IMMEDIATELY AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN ON FRIDAY LIFTED THE GRAIN
RA
EMBARGO, IMPOSED IN RETALIATION FOR THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN
AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979.
MR LYNG TERMED THE INITIAL DISCUSSIONS VERY PRELIMINARY BUT
ADDED: "WE ARE HOPING FURTHER TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE
MOMENTARILY.
DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID LATER NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT RESUME
THIS WEEK, POSSIBLY AT SOME UNDISCLOSED OVERSEAS LOCATION SUCH
AS LONDON OR ROTTERDAN.
THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR GRAIN PACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, DUE
TO EXPIRE SEPTEMBER 30, PROVIDES FOR MINIMUM SALES OF SIX
MILLION TONS A YEAR, DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN WHEAT AND CORN.
""IF WE COULD, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A HIGHER MINIMUM ON
WHEAT, ## NR LYNG TOLD A MEETING OF FARM EDITORS.
MORE 1253 JV
R129R A0552)22QTBYLIYC
AM-GRAIN 2 WASHINGTON
MR LYNG PREDICTED A NEW GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW WOULD
BE SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT PACT.
BUT PROBLEMS MAY EMERGE DURING. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE
KREMLIN'S DEMAND THAT ANY NEW GRAIN DEAL PROVIDE FOR FINANCIAL
GUARANTEES AGAINST A FUTURE POLITICAL EMBARGO.
SOVIET OFFICIALS EARLIER THIS MONTH TOLD U.S. CONGRESSMAN
JAMES SENSENBRENNER THAT MOSCOW WOULD RENEW THE AGREEMENT IF
CONVINCED THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A RELIABLE, COMPETITIVE
SUPPLIER AND IF IT INCLUDED THE FINANCIAL GUARANTEES.
NOW THAT THE GRAIN EMBARGO HAS ENDED, MR LYNG ALSO
EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT CONGRESS WOULD APPROVE THE
ADMINISTRATION"S PROPOSALS FOR NEW FARM LEGISLATION.
ONE FACTOR BEHIND ENDING THE EMBARGO WAS CONCERN THAT
KEEPING THE TRADE CURBS WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE ADMINISTRATION"S
FARM BILL AND MR REAGAN'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM.
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID THE RECENT EASING OF TENSIONS
IN POLAND ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE END OF THE EMBARGO.
MORE 1255 JV
R130R A0560)LZQTZYRCZC
AM-GRAIN 3 WASHINGTON
IN A TELEVISED INTERVIEW YESTERDAY ON ABC, COMMERCE
SECRETARY MALCOLM BALDRIGE SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD RECEIVED
NO PRIVATE ASSURANCES FROM MOSCOW WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION
IN POLAND.
BUT HE DISCOUNTED THE IDEA THE SOVIET UNION WOULD INTERPRET
LIFTING THE GRAIN EMBARGO AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS, SAYING THE
ADMINISTRATION HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR ITS HARD-LINE POLICY
AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION.
REUTER 1256 JU
No 'Quid Pro Quo'
Given U.S. for End
Washington Post, 4/27/81, Pg.A1
Of Grain Embargo
By Jane Seaberry
Washington Post Staff Writor
The Reagan administration received
no "quid pro quo" from the Soviet
Union in return for lifting a partial
embargo on U.S. grain exports, Com-
merce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
said yesterday, but he discounted the
idea that the Soviets might read the
decision as a sign of weakness.
"I think there is no mistake in our
intentions vis-a-vis the Soviets," Bal-
drige said in an interview on "Issues
and Answers" (ABC, WJLA), citing
"hard signals, tough signals" from both
the president and Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig Jr.
During the campaign, President
Reagan frequently criticized the em-
bargo, imposed in January, 1980, by
former President Carter in retaliation
for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
as being a disproportienately severe
sacrifice for farmers. But it was not
MALCOLM BALDRIGE
lifted until Friday, partly because
U.S. sent Soviets "tough signals"
Haig had persuaded the president
that it would be inappropriate to lift
and even his economic program could
the embargo while the possibility ex-
be in jeopardy on this issue.
isted of Soviet intervention in Poland
But Baldrige dismissed the idea
and that prema are lifting of the em-
that domestic politics, in an effort to
bargo would be inconsistent with the
win support for the administration's
administration's efforts to put across a
economic recovery plan or its pending
hard line to Moscow.
farm bill, played the major part in the
decision. "Political reasons in this
That line has been put down, Bal-
drige indicated yesterday. Asked how
town have to be considered, along
with everything else, but that was far
he thought the Soviet Politburo would
away from the major reason, he said.
read the decision-on the embargo, he
Baldrige said Reagan decided to
said, "I would not take that as a sig-
end the embargo because "it was not
nal of weakness in any way, shape or
his embargo in the first place
It
form. I would take it as a sense of
was Jimmy Carter's embargo.
security that this president feels
Baldrige said the president never
strong enough to be able to do that
said he would lift the embargo if he
and withstand a minor amount of
received some concession from the
criticism."
Soviets, nor did the administration
Haig reportedly still thinks lifting
receive any private assurances from
the embargo is a mistake, and he told
the Soviets regarding the situation in
the Associated Press Saturday that
Poland.
the administration would impose an
"He's never stated it would take a
across-the-board ban on trade with
quid pro quo," Baldrige said. "The
the Soviet Union including a new
fact is he didn't think it was an ef-
grain embargo if the Soviets inter-
fective enough tool, a kind of retribu-
vene in Poland.
tion against a move in Afghanistan
"I think the most important thing
when it was first imposed.
we must prevent in the wake of lifting
"The question is to send the right
the embargo is the perception that it
kind of signal to the Russians 80
was exclusively the consequence of a
there's no mistake about our policy
perceived Soviet moderation in Po-
and our intentions, so they under-
land," Haig said. He said it would be
stand that," Baldrige said. "Once
a mistake to "let Poland exclusively
that's done, and it's been done in the
dominate our assessment of future
last. three months, there's no real rea-
relations with the Soviet Union and
son to keep that embargo on."
return to an attitude of normal if the
Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary
situation in Poland is not aggravated."
Donald T. Regan told reporters yes-
Haig acknowledged that tensions in
terday that the administration didn't
Poland had eased, but he warned the
lift a high-technology embargo against
crisis is not past. He also said Reagan
the Soviets, imposed shortly after the
took into account "certain domestic
grain embargo, because high-
considerations" in his decision to lift
technology goods have defense and
the embargo, noting "this farm bill
political overtones.
Re 2323
10
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 28, 1981
TO:
ALLEN LENZ
FROM:
GEOFF KEMP
I would like to see your draft
letter to RVA re attached.
Thank you.
Aliank on
This is the package you
gave to Paula to work up
for you. I called with Kemp's
request.
Carol C.
To: Doula Dobriansky.
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8102323
RECEIVED 27 APR 81 15
TO
ALLEN
FROM MOSER, CHARLES
DOCDATE 24 APR 81
MCKAY, KAREN
24 APR 81
KEYWORDS: GRAIN EMBARGO
AFGHANISTAN
USSR
SUBJECT: COM FOR FREE AFGHANISTAN PROTESTS LIFTING OF GRAIN EMBARGO
ACTION: PREPARE REPLY FOR ALLEN SIG DUE: 04 MAY 81 STATUS S FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR COMMENT
FOR INFO
Kemy
LENZ
KEMP
STEARMAN
COLSON
PIPES
GREGG
1 would henz's who Is dall see with for IS
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(c/)
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
Committee for a Free Afghanistan
2323
A Project of the Council for the Defense of Freedom
(Member of the Coalition for Peace through Strength)
Executive Director
721 Second Street, N.E.
Karen McKay
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-7577
Board of Directors
General Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.)
Marx Lewis
April 24, 1981
Dr. Charles Moser
HAND DELIVERED
Theodora Bond
Hon. Richard Allen
National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Allen:
The Committee for the Free Afghanistan, formed in January 1981 to work for
the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet occupation, is distressed to learn
that the Reagan Administration is giving serious consideration to lifting the
grain embargo imposed upon the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979.
As weak as that response was, it remains virtually the only concrete thing
the United States has done for the purpose of showing its support for the courageous
Afghan freedom fighters who are opposing, almost with bare hands, the might of
Soviet arms under the direction of a regime which seems bent upon inflicting
upon Afghanistan the same sort of genocidal destruction which has been visited
upon the Cambodian people. Events in Afghanistan are among the most horrendous
in world history. The United States cannot simply stand idly by while a tragedy
of such historic proportions occurs which it is probably within its power to prevent.
We, the undersigned members of the Committee for a Free Afghanistan, protest
against the raising of the grain embargo so long as Soviet invasion armies con-
tinue to occupy Afghanistan and slaughter its people.
We understand that as a candidate for the presidency, President Reagan com-
mitted himself to the lifting of the embargo, and that he no doubt feels strongly
about carrying out his campaign promises if he possibly can.
Although we believe it would be a mistake for him to modify the grain embargo,
that mistake might not be irreparable if it were coupled -- along the lines of the
President's statement to Frank Reynolds on ABC Television -- with a statement
that the necessary financial or other aid would be immediately dispatched to
the Afghan freedom fighters. We have reason to believe that there is great
support for such aid in the Congress.
We appeal to the President not to inflict mortal discouragement upon those
valiant Afghans who are fighting with so little help for their freedom -- and
ours -- by lifging the grain embargo without any accompanying sign of direct
support for their struggle.
Karen MaKay Karen McKay
Charles
Charles A. Moser
81 APR 24 P5: 53
JANET COLSON
gr
BUD NANCE
la
to staffing 4/27
DICK ALLEN
IRENE DERUS
JANET COLSON
BUD NANCE
KAY
CY TO VP
SHOW CC
CY TO MEESE
SHOW CC
CY TO BAKER
SHOW CC
CY TO DEAVER
SHOW CC
CY TO BRADY
SHOW CC
E0B365
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IN
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0 2923452 APR 81 ZFF6
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TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 9462-5 IMMEDIATE
INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 7235/8
ZEN/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6823-6
ZEN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1992-5
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 5372/5
ZEN/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1474/7
ZEN/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2875/8
ZEN/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0827/30
SECRET STATE 110748
NODIS
CO RRECTED COPY (LEFT OUT WORD "ON")
E.O. 12065: XGDS-L, 3 4/22/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER), S
TAGS: PEPR, MASS, EAID, PARM, PK, US, IN, UR, AF, SA
SUBJECT: U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: FOREIGN MINISTER
SHAHI'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SECRETARY HAIG MET WITH PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER AGHA
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/8#9988 #9988
SHAHI ON APRIL 20 AND 21 FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO AND ONE-HALF
HOURS TOTAL IN TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS. UNDER SECRETARY
BY her NARA DATE 9/30/08
BUCKLEY ALSO MET SEPARATELY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND
DELEGATION. SHAHI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CHIEF OF STAFF TO
PRESIDENT ZIA, LT. GEN. ARIF, PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE,
YAQUB KHAN, AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS. THE HIGH-
LIGHTS OF THE MEETINGS ARE SUMMARIZED TOPICALLY BELOW.
TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS WILL
BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.
3. THE SETTING: SECRETARY HAIG IN WELCOMING THE MINISTER
SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE
SIT:
EOB: ECON, SEA, PRC, ASIMET, NEA, EEUR, WEUR
WHSR COMMENTS:
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WAY PAKISTAN HAD WITHSTOOD THE PRESSURES OVER THE PAST 16
MONTHS AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE
SECRETARY SAID THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS DETER-
MINED TO STOP SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS
FULLY APPRISED OF PAKISTAN'S CONCERNS AND COMMITTED TO
SUPPORTING PAKISTAN. THROUGH PRUDENT DIPLOMACY, WE ARE
HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN MEET PAKISTAN'S NEEDS AND COMMON
SECURITY PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED ON HIS RECENT
TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST NOTING HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT
EVEN IF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WERE TO BE RESOLVED,
THERE WOULD STILL BE A MAJOR SOVIET PROBLEM. HE
BELIEVED BOTH PROBLEMS MUST BE DEALT WITH IN TANDEM;
PROGRESS IN ONE AREA HELPS PROGRESS IN THE OTHER. THE
SOVIETS DEMAND SUBSERVIENCE, AND ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH
AN EQUAL RELATIONSHIP AS HAS BEEN SHOWN IN SEVERAL
COUNTRIES THAT HAVE ESCAPED, OR WANT TO ESCAPE FROM A
SOVIET EMBRACE. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THERE IS A
NEW CONSENSUS IN THE U.S. WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES AND PUBLIC OPINION.
NOW THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ACCEPT SOVIET AGGRESSION,
ESPECIALLY IN THE VITAL SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION. THE
UNITED STATES IS NOT, AS SOME THOUGHT, SOLELY CONCERNED
OVER MOVEMENT OF OIL SUPPLIES THROUGH THE STRAITS OF
HORMUZ; WE ARE CONCERNED OVER SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND
THE SECURITY OF OUR FRIENDS.
4. SHAHI SAID THE WARM AND SINCERE TONE OF VARIOUS
COMMUNICATIONS FROM WASHINGTON SUCH AS PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER AND THE MARCH 21 PROPOSALS MADE BY
AMBASSADOR HUMMEL WERE A WELCOME CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS
DISCUSSIONS IN 1980. PAKISTAN COULD NOT ACCEPT LAST
YEAR'S ASSISTANCE OFFER BECAUSE OF A LACK OF CONFIDENCE
IN ITS DURABILITY AND CREDIBILITY. THE MAGNITUDE OF
ASSISTANCE OFFERED AT THAT TIME WOULD HAVE MERELY
PROVOKED THE SOVIETS AND INDIA WITHOUT OFFERING
SECURITY TO PAKISTAN. THE PRESENT PROPOSALS WERE A
MAJOR IMPROVEMENT, NOT ONLY IN THEIR MAGNITUDE, BUT
ALSO BECAUSE OF THE INTANGIBLES EMBODIED IN THE
ATTITUDES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY HAIG, AND THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT, WHICH ARE ALL FAR MORE CREDIBLE THAN
THOSE OF A YEAR AGO. SHAHI SAID PAKISTAN IS IN A
VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION. SOVIET PRESSURES AND THREATS
HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST PAKISTAN; BUT PAKISTAN HAD
NOT SUCCUMBED. HE EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND FOR THE
STATEMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THAT OFFER.
5. REGIONAL SECURITY: SHAHI SAID IT WOULD BE PREFER-
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ABLE FOR THE U.S. TO CONSTRUCT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
WITH GULF STATES RATHER THAN AN OVERALL, MULTILATERAL
ARRANGEMENT. WITH REGARD TO RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS™
PAKISTAN WAS ALREADY STANDING FIRM AT CONSIDERABLE RISK
ON AFGHANISTAN. PAKISTAN HAD MADE SOME COMPROMISES IN
FORMULATING PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THESE WERE
ESSENTIAL TO AVOID TOTALLY ALIENATING THE SOVIETS. THE
SECRETARY SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO ESTABLISH
STRONGER BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH FRIENDLY STATES IN
SOUTHWEST ASIA. PAKISTAN COULD BE ASSURED THAT THERE IS
NO U.S. INTENT TO RE-CONSTITUTE ANY MULTILATERAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS ALONG THE LINES OF CENTO. NOR WAS THERE
ANY U.S. INTENT TO SET UP ANY FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD
DETRACT FROM PAKISTAN'S SOVEREIGNTY. THE U.S. HAS NO
STRINGS OR HIDDEN DESIRES IN MIND, WHETHER RELATING TO
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS OR ANY OTHER AREA. THE
UNITED STATES DOES NOT SEEK ANY BASES OR FACILITIES IN
PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVE THAT A STRONGER PAKISTAN IN ITSELF,
IS IN U.S. INTERESTS. THE U.S. SEEKS A DURABLE RELATION-
SHIP WITH PAKISTAN ON A BILATERAL BASIS.
6. INDIA: SHAHI SAID WE CAN AGREE THAT THE U.S.-
PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA AND
ITS SOLE OBJECTIVE IS TO NEUTRALIZE THREATS AGAINST
PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO REDUCE
TENSIONS WITH INDIA. HE RECALLED THAT PAKISTAN HAD
ALREADY ASSURED INDIA THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT A THREAT AND
HAD EVEN OFFERED TO DISCUSS WITH INDIA A MUTUALLY AGREED
RATIO OF ARMS IN WHICH PAKISTAN WOULD NOT ASK FOR ANY-
THING APPROACHING PARITY; INDIA HAD REJECTED THIS. NOW
INDIA IS TRYING TO STOP U.S. MILITARY SALES. PAKISTAN IS
CONCERNED IF IT ENTERS INTO A RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD BE
DESCRIBED AS A MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIP, EVEN INDIAN
OPPOSITION LEADERS SUCH AS DESAI WHO HAD BEEN HELPFUL
IN THE PAST, WOULD JOIN WITH MRS. GANDHI IN CRITICIZING
PAKISTAN. SHAHI WAS CONCERNED THAT A DECLARATION BY THE
U.S. CONGRESS THAT U.S. MILITARY CREDITS ARE IN THE U.S.
NATIONAL INTEREST" WOULD PRECIPITATE AN INDIAN BACKLASH.
SECRETARY HAIG SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD EARLIER,
THROUGH AMBASSADOR HUMMEL, MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD NOT GIVE INDIA A VETO OVER U.S. POLICIES
TOWARDS PAKISTAN OR OVER SPECIFIC MILITARY HARDWARE
WHICH PAKISTAN MIGHT WISH. IN HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS
WITH INDIAN MEA SECRETARY GONSALVES, HE HAD LEFT THE
INDIANS IN NO DOUBT ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS TOWARDS
PAKISTAN. WE HAVE MADE IT EQUALLY CLEAR THAT WHAT WE
SELL PAKISTAN IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA BUT WAS AN
ASPECT OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP.
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7. SECURITY ASSURANCES: SHAHI SAID THAT PRESIDENT ZIA
BELIEVED THAT SOLID SECURITY WOULD REQUIRE A NEW U.S.-
PAKISTAN TREATY. WERE THIS IMPOSSIBLE, ZIA WANTED THE
U.S. TO CONSIDER A FRIENDSHIP AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES
OF THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY. FINALLY, SHOULD A FRIENDSHIP
AGREEMENT NOT BE FEASIBLE, PAKISTAN was PREPARED TO
STICK TO THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH PAKISTAN
WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE REAFFIRMED BY CONGRESS. UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, PAKISTAN IS SATISFIED WITH THE 1959 ASSUR-
ANCES. PAKISTAN DOES NOT WISH TO SPARK ANY DEBATES IN CONGRESS.
THE AGREEMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINSTRA-
TION CARRY GREAT WEIGHT WITH PAKISTAN AND THEREFORE
IT IS BEST TO LEAVE THE 1959 AGREEMENT AS IS, RATHER
THAN TO CREATE CONTROVERSY. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT
AGREEMENTS ARE NOT NEARLY AS IMPORTANT AS RELATIONS
BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE. THE GREATEST
DETERRENCE TO THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A SOLID RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN.
8. ASSISTANCE: SHAHI HAD A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT
OUR PROPOSED. PACKAGE AND SUGGESTED A. NUMBER OF
ALTERNATIVE "MIXES". HE SAID PAKISTAN IS NOT CLEAR
ABOUT USG PROCEDURES, BUT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT
OF A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON PAKISTAN'S NON-
ALIGNMENT. IF THE USG MUST CERTIFY TO THE CONGRESS
THAT A MILITARY AID PROGRAM SERVES U.S. POLICY
INTERESTS", THEN INDIA AND OTHERS WOULD USE THIS AS
A PRETEXT TO DEFAME PAKISTAN AND UNDERMINE ITS NON-
ALIGNED STATUS. THE MINISTER BELIEVED THAT MILITARY
CREDITS WOULD COME UNDER A SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT
WHICH WOULD CALL PAKISTAN'S NON-ALIGNMENT INTO QUES-
TION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PAKISTAN WOULD LIKE THE
FIVE-YEAR PACKAGE EXTENDED TO EIGHT YEARS. GENERAL
ARIF SAID THAT PAKISTAN ALSO WOULD LIKE US TO CON-
SIDER A TWO YEAR APPROPRIATION AS HAD BEEN PROPOSED
BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.
9. THE SECRETARY URGED THE MINISTER NOT TO LET
MECHANICAL PROBLEMS BECOME ROADBLOCKS. OUR PROCEDURES
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OVERSHADOW THE MAIN ISSUES.
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY CLARIFIED THAT THE SAME RULES
APPLY TO THE VARIOUS TYPES OF ASSISTANCE OFFERED, ALL
FALL UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, WHETHER DIRECT
CREDITS OR FMS GUARANTEED LOANS: NAMELY THAT THE
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED WOULD ENHANCE U.S. SECURITY
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INTERESTS. HE INDICATED THAT WE HAVE FMS CREDIT
ARRANGEMENTS WITH A VARIETY OF ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED
COUNTRIES SUCH AS MOROCCO, TUNISIA, NORTH YEMEN, JORDAN
SUDAN, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND OTHERS. THESE ARRANGE-
MENTS HAVE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED THEIR NON-ALIGNED
STATUS. SHAHI LATER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
PAKISTAN'S APPREHENSIONS REGARDING USE OF FMS CREDITS
HAD BEEN MISTAKEN. UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY SAID THAT AN
EIGHT YEAR PACKAGE AND A TWO YEAR COMMITMENT WOULD RAISE
QUESTIONS IN CONGRESS SINCE THESE WOULD CONSTITUTE
VARIANTS FROM THE CUSTOMARY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS. THEY
WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY DIFFICULT TO SELL. IN TESTIFYING
BEFORE CONGRESS, WE WOULD JUSTIFY ANY AID REQUEST FOR
PAKISTAN ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET THREAT THROUGH
AFGHANISTAN.
10. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO EVERY-
THING POLITICALLY POSSIBLE TO TRY TO SHAPE AN ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE WHICH MEETS PAKISTAN'S OBJECTIVES. A U.S.
DELEGATION WOULD VISIT PAKISTAN TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE
OUT-YEAR ASSISTANCE QUESTION. SHAHI SAID THAT HE HAD
BEEN AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT ZIA TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER OF
$100 MILLION IN ESF FOR FY 82, BUT PAKISTAN PREFERRED
THAT THIS DECISION REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE TIME
BEING.
UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY POINTED OUT THAT ALL ASSISTANCE
REMAINED CONTINGENT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO
GAIN CONGRESSIONAL ASSENT TO THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE
WAIVER PROVISION OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT.
11. AIRCRAFT: SHAHI SAID PAKISTAN WAS ABOUT TO ENTER
A DANGEROUS PERIOD AFTER THE START OF A NEW RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE U.S. AND BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF SUBSTANTIAL
AMOUNTS OF EFFECTIVE WEAPONRY. PAKISTAN BELIEVED THAT
ITS FIRST PRIORITY MILITARY PURCHASE SHOULD BE TWO
SQUADRONS OF F-16S. PAKISTAN ADDITIONALLY WANTS
SPEEDED UP DELIVERY AND QUICK CONVERSION COURSES FOR ITS
PILOTS. TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN NOW AND THE ACTUAL
DELIVERY DATE, PAKISTAN REQUESTS THAT THE U.S. PROVIDE
ON HOT LEASE TWO SQUADRONS OF F-16S. THE SECRETARY
SAID THAT A LEASE ARRANGEMENT WOULD PRESENT REAL
PROBLEMS SINCE A LEASE COULD ONLY BE MADE BY DIVERTING
THE AIRCRAFT FROM U.S. INVENTORIES. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT
WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO OUR CONGRESS. HE
SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE
PRESIDENT AND WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER TO SEE WHAT
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MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. WE WOULD HAVE TO GET BACK LATER TO
PAKISTAN ON THIS.
12. MILITARY SALES: UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY SAID THAT
WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO PAKISTANI
REQUESTS FOR ARMS PURCHASES. WE HAVE RECEIVED MANY
UNCOORDINATED PRICE AND AVAILABILITY REQUESTS OVER THE
PAST YEAR FROM THE PAKISTAN SERVICES. WE WOULD HOPE THAT
IN THE FUTURE PAKISTAN COULD PRESENT US WITH ALL-SERVICE
COORDINATED LISTS WHICH ALSO REFLECT PAKISTAN'S BUDGET
RESOURCES.
13. IMET: SHAHI SAID THAT PAKISTAN UNDERSTOOD WHY ONLY
$600 THOUSAND FOR IMET IN FY 82 HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED. HE
REQUESTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS FIGURE BE SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED IN OUT-YEARS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE U.S.
WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INCREASE IMET DURING OUT-YEARS.
14. CONTINGENCY PLANNING: SECRETARY HAIG SAID WE
SHOULD START JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON INTERMEDIATE
LEVEL SOVIET THREATS. WE COULD FOCUS ON DANGEROUS
THREATS OF AN AMBIGUOUS NATURE SUCH AS A JOINT SOVIET-
AFGHANISTAN INCURSION. THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO
SEND A DELEGATION HEADED BY COUNSELOR MCFARLANE.
WE UNDER-
STOOD THE AGREEMENTS REACHED BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION,
I.E., THAT PAKISTAN WOULD HANDLE LOW-LEVEL BORDER
INCURSIONS WHILE, OF COURSE, OUR 1959 AGREEMENT WOULD
COME INTO PLAY IN THE EVENT OF A MASSIVE SOVIET
INCURSION. WE WOULD PROPOSE DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE
RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS. GENERAL ARIF RECALLED
THE 1980 CONTINGENCY DISCUSSIONS. SHAHI AND GENERAL
ARIF INDICATED THAT A U.S. DELEGATION WOULD BE WELCOMED
IN ABOUT MID-MAY TO DISCUSS THIS AND OTHER MATTERS.
15. SAUDI ASSISTANCE: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD
DISCUSSED PAKISTAN DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO RIYADH AND
FOUND THE SAUDIS WANT TO HELP. IT IS CLEARLY IN THE U.S.
INTEREST THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD RETAIN VERY CLOSE RELATIONS
WITH THE SAUDIS AND OTHER FRIENDS. WE HOPE TO WORK
TOGETHER TO OPTIMIZE ASSISTANCE FROM THE SAUDIS AND
OTHERS. (IN A SIDE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR YAQUB TOLD
ASST. SECRETARY DESIGNATE VELIOTES THAT SA'DI FOREIGN
MINISTER SAUD HAD URGED PAKISTAN LAST WEEK TO ACCEPT THE
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U.S. AID OFFER WHICH YAQUB SAID REPRESENTED A HISTORIC
OPPORTUNITY FOR PAKISTAN TO SEIZE A STRATEGIC OPTION).
16. AFGHANISTAN: THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT WE WERE
WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN VERY CLOSELY AND
CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE BEST APPROACH WAS TO KEEP
UP PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. WE WANT TO SUPPORT
PAKISTAN WITHOUT ADDING TO PAKISTAN'S RISKS. THE
SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER SHAHI SAW THE GISCARD PROPOSAL
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS USEFUL AT SOME LATER
STAGE. SHAHI REVIEWED THE DE CUELLER MISSIONAND SAID
THAT HE DIDNOT BELIEVE IT WOULD ACHIEVE MUCH. PAKISTAN
LAUNCHED ITS INITIATIVE INVOLVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
REPRESENTATIVE LAST DECEMBER BECAUSE IT PERCEIVED A
WEAKENING OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE AFGHAN
PROBLEM. HE RECALLED THAT THERE WAS APPREHENSION ABOUT
DE CUELLAR'S EVEN TALKING WITH THE BABRAK REGIME. SHAHI
SAID THAT SHOULD THE DE CUELLAR MISSION PRODUCE SOME
MOVEMENT, PAKISTAN WOULD INSIST THAT HE TALK WITH AFGHAN
NATIONALISTS. FOR THIS REASON, PAKISTAN WAS SEEKING TO
FORM A UNITED FRONT OF NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO, AT
PRESENT, WERE so DIVIDED THERE WAS NO ONE DE CUELLAR
MIGHT CONTACT. IN THE LONGER TERM, PAKISTAN WAS HOPEFUL
THAT IN A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT THE UNITED STATES AND THE
USSR COULD AGREE TO SOME SOVIET FACE SAVING FORMULA
WHICH WOULD PERMIT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN.
IF A NEUTRAL AFG'AN LEADER COULD BE FOUND ACCEPTABLE TO
THE USSR PERHAPS THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO REPLACE
THE BABRAK REGIME. IN THE MEANTIME, PAKISTAN HAD NO
OPTION BUT TO CONTINUE WITH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE
RECALLED THAT PAKISTAN TOO HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SURPRISE BY
THE GISCARD PROPOSAL WHICH PAKISTAN HAD EARLIER RAISED
AS ONE POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. PAKISTAN DID
NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. IF THEY DID, PAKISTAN
WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE THE GISCARD INITIATIVE SERIOUS
CONSIDERATION. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE
TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT REGARDING AFGHANISTAN.
17. NUCLEAR ISSUE: THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE DID
NOT WANT TO MAKE PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM THE CENTER-
PIECE OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN DIALOGUE, BUT THE PAKISTANIS
SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS ISSUE COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT
FOR THE U.S. TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN. WE WOULD NOT BE MAKING
PUBLIC STATEMENTS, NOR WOULD WE HARANGUE THE PAKISTANIS
PUBLICLY, BUT IT WAS A VERY REAL ISSUE. UNDER SECRETARY
BUCKLEY IN DISCUSSING ASSISTANCE AND OUR PROPOSED CHANGE
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IN THE WAIVER LANGUAGE OF THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT SAID
THAT THE LATTER DID NOT MEAN THAT WE HAVE ABANDONED OUR
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. HE REITERATED THAT A
CHANGE IN THE SYMINGTON AIVER WAS ESSENTIAL FOR US TO
PROCEED WITH AN ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN.
HE POINTED OUT THAT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WOULD NOT
COME EASILY.
18. FUTURE STEPS: SHAHI EXTENDED ON BEHALF OF
PRESIDENT ZIA AN INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO VISIT
PAKISTAN. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE
VERY MUCH TO MAKE SUCH A VISIT WHEN HIS SCHEDULE
PERMITTED. THERE WAS INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION ABOUT
FUTURE TALKS IN ISLAMABAD BY VISITING AMERICAN DELE-
GATIONS TO DISCUSS THE NATURE AND SHAPE OF OUT-YEAR
ASSISTANCE AND PERHAPS A POSSIBLE
PAKISTANI MILITARY TEAM COMING HERE TO DISCUSS
PROCUREMENT MATTERS. HAIG HAIG
BT
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1981
Pg. A6
Soviet Union after the lifting of the United
SuzukiSays U.S. Did Not Consult on Ending Grain Ban
States' grain embargo, to which he re-
turned at the end of the hourlong meeting
The Japanese Government has held
By HENRY SCOTT STOKES
that "there was no move to coordinate
democracies."
firm in its refusal to do business with the
Special to The New York Times
with whatever action Japan may take on
Mr. Suzuki referred briefly to the auto
Soviet Union. One result of this firmness,
our economic sanctions against the Soviet
issue, implying that Tokyo news reports
Foreign Ministry officials said, was the
TOKYO, April 28 - Prime Minister
Union."
that Japan will announce a program for
loss last year of a $350 million order for a
Zenko Suzuki, who will visit Washington
"Therefore, I am bewildered,' said the
voluntary restraint of auto shipments to
steel plant for the Soviet Union.
next week, criticized the United States
today for not having consulted with
70-year-old Prime Minister. "Frankly, I
the United States on Saturday are likely
The plant was to be jointly supplied by
am bewildered."
to be correct.
the Armco Steel Corporation of the
Japan before ending the 15-month curb on
Asked about Japanese plans for de-
United States and Nippon Steel. But after
grain shipments to the Soviet Union.
Strategy for Meeting Weakened
fense cooperation with the United States,
Japan and the United States halted
"We were informed about this lifting
Mr. Suzuki's remarks on the lifting of
for which American officials have high
credits for the project, the Creusot Loire
before the action was taken," said Mr.
the grain embargo appeared to reflect
hopes, the Prime Minister gaye no hint of
Group of France went ahead, using state
Suzuki at a news conference with report-
ers for American news organizations,
embarrassment that his overall design
any major rearmament and denied that
credits from Paris, to win the deal.
for his meeting with President Reagan
Japan would play a defense role in the In-
"I cannot help but point out that public
"but we were not consulted sufficiently in
has been seriously weakened. He has
dian Ocean.
opinion has come to the viewpoint after
advance or asked our views on the timing
of the move."
hoped to get away from contentious bilat-
"We cannot be expected by other na-
the U.S. action that we should re-examine
eral issues, notably the dispute over
tions to make military contributions for
sanctions against the Soviet Union," Mr.
The Prime Minister also said that
Japanese automobile exports to the
the peace and stability of the world," he
Suzuki said. But Foreign Ministry offi-
Japan was not given "any explanation as
United States, and to stress lofty goals
declared.
cials denied that there would be any swift
to the reason for the action" and he added
such as the "solidarity of industrial
His main topic was relations with the
change of policy.
4/29/81m Page A1
Japan Wash Post Bluntly Critical of Reagan's Lifting of Soviet Grain Embargo
By William Chapman
Reagan in Washington. It added an-
Japan would now "reexamine our own
we took this into account both in the
consulting Japan. However, the
Washington Post Foreign Service
other complication to relations already
economic sanctions" because of the
timing and substance of our prior no-
Japanese leaders at the time did not
TOKYO - Prime Minister Zenko
burdened by disputes over automobile
U.S. move.
tification to them." He declined to
resort to a news conference to make
Suzuki, in a public move highly un-
exports and defense spending.
"Frankly speaking, [ was somewhat
elaborate further.]
known their views.
characteristic for a Japanese leader,
Suzuki said the Reagan administra-
perplexed about the timing of this
The Japanese have frequently
Suzuki, speaking through an inter
today accused the Reagan adminis-
tion had not sought Japan's views
lifting," Suzuki told foreign reporters
voiced their annoyance about the lack
preter to about 20 reporters gathered
tration of failing to consult Japan be-
before the embargo was lifted and
in a news conference this afternoon.
of consultation, but such views were
in his official residence, also indicated
fore it lifted the grain embargo against
that there had been no consideration
[In Washington, State Department
normally. expressed indirectly in the
he would draw a sharp line when he
the Soviet Union.
as to what Japan might do about its
spokesman Jack Cannon said, "We
press. Relations between the United
meets Reagan on what Japan can or
The Japanese leader's blunt criti-
own sanctions against Moscow.
gave the Japanese prior notification of
States and Japan were strained in the
cannot do to increase its defense
cism was particularly sharp coming as
He questioned the embargo lifting
our decision. We were aware that the
early 1970s by the so-called "Nixon
forces.
it did only days before he is to meet
in view of continued "uncertainties"
Japanese would want to be as fully
shocks," especially Washington's move
He said specifically that Japan
for the first time with President
about Poland But he hinted that
informed as possible on this issue and
to open relations with China without
See SUZUKI, A18, Col. 3
23
SUZUKI, From A1
that he was aware of Reagan's pres-
no details. But he said that "by the
"we will not conceive of any such no-
would not act to "fill the void" left by
idential campaign statements prom-
time of my visit to Washington you
tion as filling the void created by the
the movement of some elements of
ising to lift the embargo.
will have seen the happy end" to the
7th Fleet moving to the Persian Gulf
the 7th Fleet to the Persian Gulf re-
"But we were not consulted suffi-
problem. There was speculation here
or Indian Ocean, even if requested
gion or the Indian Ocean.
ciently in advance or asked for our
that the government would formally
We will defend our own land and
So far as is known, the United
view as regards the timing of such a
announce details about "voluntary"
territorial sea without depending ex
States has not made such a request,
lifting or [given] any explanation as tc
restraint by Japanese car makers later
cessively upon the United States and
although it has consistently suggested
the reasons for such an action.
this week.
any move into the Indian Ocean for
that Japan do more to assure the
"There was no move to coordinate
On defense matters, the prime min-
the protection of sea lanes — in other
safety of waters near its shores
with whatever action Japan may take
ister said he would tell Reagan in
words, any such moves beyond our
through stepped-up antisubmarine
in regard to our economic sanctions
exact terms what Japan can and can-
immediate territorial land and periph-
and air-defense systems.
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. All these
not do under the restrictions of its
eral waters would not be permissible
The U.S. ambassador to Japan,
had not been touched on. Therefore,
constitution, which is interpreted here
under our constitution."
Mike Mansfield, recently called on
frankly speaking, I was somewhat per
to bar any military activities except
Suzuki said he was aware of the
Japan to assume more responsibility
plexed about the timing of the lifting.
those in defense of the Japanese
general idea of a joint force of anti-
for sea defense in the light of move-
Questioned about the dispute with
mainland and adjacent waters.
Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean, but
ments into the Indian Ocean by parts
the United States over Japanese car
Japan will continue to improve its
added that he has received no specific
of the 7th Fleet. But he was not spe
exports, the prime minister provided
defense capability, Suzuki said, but,
suggestions that Japan join in it.
cific and the exact area the United
States wants Japan to defend has
been left vague.
His comments reflect a lingering
unhappiness with what Japan consid-
ers unfair application of sanctions
against the Soviet Union for its inva-
sion of Afghanistan. At the U.S. urg
ing early last year, Japan grudgingly
agreed to certain economic sanctions
including holding up loans and credits
for several projects of considerable
value to both Japan and the Soviet
Union.
But for months, Japanese business-
men have complained that some Eu-
ropean nations principally France
and West Germany - were abrogat-
ing an understanding on sanctions to
get Soviet business for their own com-
panies. The Japanese government also
has expressed displeasure on occasion
but has not made it a major public
issue.
"Japan has rather sincerely, serious-
ly, and steadfastly cooperated with the
United States in carrying out econom-
ic sanctions against the Soviet Union,
he said.
Japanese officials said later there
has as yet been no change in the pol-
icy of reviewing each Soviet request
for development loans and credits on
a case by case basis.
Suzuki said his government was
informed in advance of Reagan's an-
nouncement. He also acknowledged
GKHIN
(Link w/ PAKISTAN,
AFGHANISTAW)
OF THE PRESIDENT ENT
OF STRUTIVE PATION UNITED TOFFICE THE OFFICE OF OFTHE
The White House
and
Executive Office of the President
Information Center
June
"www
IIIIIII
KHIII IIIIIII 118100
wash. Post
N.Y. Times (4 one Business Week art.)
2332
file grain 26
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Pipes:
April 30, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
ALLEN J. LENZ att
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
Richard Pipes and I have reviewed the attached talking points
(Tab A), provided by both White House Communications and
Richard Darman's office, which deal with lifting the grain
embargo.
At Tab I are two memoranda for your signature. The first
is to Frank A. Ursomarso, Director, White House Communications;
the second to Richard G. Darman. Both memoranda approve dis-
tribution of the talking points to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memoranda at Tab I approving distribution
of subject talking points.
Approve
Disapprove
CC: Richard Pipes
27
MEMORANDUM
2332
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
28
2332
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK A. URSOMARSO
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
you
Document No.
29
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
STAFFING MEMORANDUM
NOON
DATE: 4/29/81
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
4/30/81
SUBJECT:
GRAIN EMBARGO
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
JAMES
MEESE
MURPHY
BAKER
NOFZIGER
DEAVER
WEIDENBAUM
STOCKMAN
CANZERI
ALLEN
FULLER (For Cabinet)
ANDERSON
HICKEY
BRADY
HODSOLL
DOLE
MC COY
FIELDING
WILLIAMSON
FRIEDERSDORF
URSOMARSO
GARRICK
GERGEN
HARPER
Remarks: The attached draft talking points have been prepared by
the Communications Office. Would you please review for
accuracy/prudence -- and edit/approve accordingly. Thank you.
Response needed by Thursday, noon.
Richard G. Darman
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x-2702)
30
Talking Points On The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo fulfills
a commitment of his campaign:
-- The President has always been committed to its lifting when
conditions would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy factors
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without any
risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective policy
tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being given
to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under consideration
The embargo had proved ineffective:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months of
the embargo but over the first year, total imports from all
sources were higher than ever, though imports from the U.S. were
the lowest since 1977.
-- American agriculture had to forego a large market for its products
which remained available to producers of many other countries
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
31
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place; export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on U.S. position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both U.S. and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
-- 8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the Soviets
by April 1
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in export
trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the domestic
economy resulting from this decision.
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected since
any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of total
supplies available
-- Planting intentions of American farmers promise another record
crop in 1982. Weather and general inflationary conditions in the
economy would affect food prices more than any decision affecting
1982 exports
-- Farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for their
export trade
The lifting of the grain embargo does not, in and of itself, indicate
change in basic U.S.-Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions there should
be resolved by Polish people without outside intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response of Soviets
should act against Poland
32
24 APR 1981
April 24, 1981
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO: DICK ALLEN
FROM:
FRANK A. URSOMARSO RSOPON
Director of Communications
Information
X
Action
If you approve, we will put the enclosed
in distribution.
33
Talking Points on The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo
fulfills his campaign commitment to do so:
-- Has always been committed to its lifting when conditions
would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in
office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy
factors
-- On taking office, determined immediate lifting risked being
misread by Soviets and others
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without
any risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective
policy tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being
given to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under
consideration
Assessments of the impact of the embargo have been mixed:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months
of the embargo but over the first year, total imports from
all sources were higher than ever, though imports from the
U.S. were the lowest since 1977.
American agriculture had to forego a large market for its
products which remained available to producers of many other
countries
34
-2-
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place and export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on US position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both US and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
in:
6 million ton minimum sales requirement
Provision voiding minimum requirement if domestic crop
below 225 million tons
-- 8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the
Soviets by April 1.
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in
export trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the
domestic economy resulting from this decision
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected
since any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of
total supplies available
-- in 1982, planting intentions of American farmers promise
another record crop. Weather and general inflationary
conditions in the economy would affect food prices more than
any decision affecting 1982 exports
-- farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for
their export trade
Promised by the President, the lifting of the grain embargo does
not, in and of itself, indicate change in basic U.S. -Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
35.
-3- -
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions
there should be resolved by Polish people without outside
intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response if Soviets
should act against Poland
Pipes 36
2332
MEMORANDUM
file grain
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 30, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
ALLEN J. LENZ off
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
Richard Pipes and I have reviewed the attached talking points
(Tab A), provided by both White House Communications and
Richard Darman's office, which deal with lifting the grain
embargo.
At Tab I are two memoranda for your signature. The first
is to Frank A. Ursomarso, Director, White House Communications;
the second to Richard G. Darman. Both memoranda approve dis-
tribution of the talking points to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memoranda at Tab I approving distribution
of subject talking points.
Approve
Disapprove
CC: Richard Pipes
37
MEMORANDUM
2332
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
38
MEMORANDUM
2332
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK A. URSOMARSO
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
der
Document No.
39
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
STAFFING MEMORANDUM
NOON
DATE:
4/29/81
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
4/30/81
SUBJECT:
GRAIN EMBARGO
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
JAMES
MEESE
MURPHY
BAKER
NOFZIGER
DEAVER
WEIDENBAUM
STOCKMAN
CANZERI
ALLEN
FULLER (For Cabinet)
ANDERSON
HICKEY
BRADY
HODSOLL
DOLE
MC COY
FIELDING
WILLIAMSON
URSOMARSO
FRIEDERSDORF
GARRICK
GERGEN
HARPER
Remarks: The attached draft talking points have been prepared by
the Communications Office. Would you please review for
accuracy/prudence -- and edit/approve accordingly. Thank you.
Response needed by Thursday, noon.
Richard G. Darman
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x-2702)
40
Talking Points On The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo fulfills
a commitment of his campaign:
-- The President has always been committed to its lifting when
conditions would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy factors
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without any
risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective policy
tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being given
to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under consideration
The embargo had proved ineffective:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months of
the embargo but over the first year, total imports from all
sources were higher than ever, though imports from the U.S. were
the lowest since 1977.
-- American agriculture had to forego a large market for its products
which remained available to producers of many other countries
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
41
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place; export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on U.S. position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both U.S. and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
-- 8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the Soviets
by April 1
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in export
trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the domestic
economy resulting from this decision.
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected since
any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of total
supplies available
-- Planting intentions of American farmers promise another record
crop in 1982. Weather and general inflationary conditions in the
economy would affect food prices more than any decision affecting
1982 exports
-- Farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for their
export trade
The lifting of the grain embargo does not, in and of itself, indicate
change in basic U.S.-Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions there should
be resolved by Polish people without outside intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response of Soviets
should act against Poland
24 APR 1981
April 24, 1981
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO: DICK ALLEN
FROM:
Director FRANK of A. Communications URSOMARSO Pen
Information
X
Action
If you approve, we will put the enclosed
in distribution.
43
Talking Points on The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo
fulfills his campaign commitment to do so:
-- Has always been committed to its lifting when conditions
would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in
office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy
factors
-- On taking office, determined immediate lifting risked being
misread by Soviets and others
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without
any risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective
policy tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being
given to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under
consideration
Assessments of the impact of the embargo have been mixed:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months
of the embargo but over the first year, total imports from
all sources were higher than ever, though imports from the
U.S. were the lowest since 1977.
-- American agriculture had to forego a large market for its
products which remained available to producers of many other
countries
44
-2-
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place and export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on US position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both US and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
in:
6 million ton minimum sales requirement
Provision voiding minimum requirement if domestic crop
below 225 million tons
-- 8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the
Soviets by April 1.
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in
export trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the
domestic economy resulting from this decision
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected
since any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of
total supplies available
-- in 1982, planting intentions of American farmers promise
another record crop. Weather and general inflationary
conditions in the economy would affect food prices more than
any decision affecting 1982 exports
-- farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for
their export trade
Promised by the President, the lifting of the grain embargo does
not, in and of itself, indicate change in basic U.S. -Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
as
-3- -
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions
there should be resolved by Polish people without outside
intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response if Soviets
should act against Poland
FROM: DOBRIANSKY
# 2323
STEARMAN
46
COMMENTS
> DRAFT LETTER: SUBJECT TO REVISION AND COMPRESSION
Dear Ms. McKay:
Thank you for your letter of April 24 expressing your concern
about this Administration's plans to uplift the grain embargo.
As you know, the President's decision to end the Soviet grain
embargo fulfills a commitment of his campaign. It has been his
concern that the embargo was imposing an unfair burden on the U.S.
farmer and that it has not been effective. Thus, by lifting the
embargo, the President is fulfilling his pledge to the American
until now
people. Until now, the President delayed action, ^ to allow for
Administration review of the embargo policy and because he believed
presently
the embargo could be lifted without any risk of misinterpretation by
the Soviet Union.
You should not perceive the lifting of the embargo as a weakening
of our position towards the Soviet Union. That is, this decision does
not reflect a change in U.S. opposition to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, diminished U.S. resolve to seek a political solution
or an acceptance of the status quo there. Rather, it is the intent
of this Administration to persevere in those efforts which will
achieve a political settlement founded upon the withdrawal of Soviet
troops.
First, the President's decision encompasses only the lifting of
the partial embargo on agricultural products and the related embargo
on phosphates. However, other Afghan-related sanction measures
remain in place. For example, the embargo on sales of high technology
47
industrial items will be enforced and export licenses for other
goods and equipment will continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.
Second, President Reagan has not excluded possible U.S. military
assistance to the rebels, which is currently under this
Administration's review. However, differences remain between
the Pakistanis and us regarding the aid to the Afghan resistance.
The Pakistanis have maintained that such involvement on their part
would foster reprisals from the Soviet Union. Thus, we are
in the midst of concluding a 5-year program of American aid to
Pakistan to strengthen it as a bulwark against the Soviets
in Afghanistan. Approximately, $500 million per-year of economic
assistance and arms sales credits will be extended each year.
In sum, the lifting of the grain embargo should clearly not
be taken as any indication of the Administration's neglect toward
the Afghan freedom fighters.
48
Thank you very much for your letter of march April 24
(1)
Thank you for your letter of April 24 expressing your
concern about this Administration's plans to pight yolift
the grain embango.
(2)
As you know the President's decision to end the Souiet grain
embargo fulfills a commitment of his campaign. It has been
his concern that the embargo was imposing an unfair burden
on the U.S. farmer & that it has not been effective. Thus,
by cifting the embango, the Pres. is Fulfilling his pledge to
the American people,
for Administr.
The Pres. delayed action until now to allow reviewal of
the embargo policy of because he believed that the embargo
mis
could be lifted w/out any risk of interpretation. That is,
he believed an immediate termin. of the embargo would be
misintenpreted by the USSR,
The decision to lift the grain embargo however, does not
(does
not
indicate any change in the opposit
diminish
US resolve)
GRAiN EMBARGE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/8*9987
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
Follo)
Addendum
Reaction to Lifting the Grain Embargo
''''
Elimination of the US grain embargo has provoked more
response from US allies than from the USSR. The next step for
Moscow is to figure out how best to capitalize on the US
ennouncement.
Allied Response: Although some Western governments have
questioned the timing of the US decision, they have all acted
quickly to protect their commercial interests. The EC has
eliminated restrictions on sales to the USSR and will resume
subsidles.
who were taking advantage of the US
embargo to pry better terms out of Moscow for grain, have dropped
that tactic and reportedly rushed to sign 8 5-year agreement last
week.
with no grain of its own to sell now, has
stayed out of the picture.
The lifting of the grain embargo is beginning to affect
other aspects of the post-Afghanístan sanctions.
already
1s erguing that US lifting of the grain embargo gives
a
freer hand in selling high-technology products to the USSR. The
credit restrictions imposed after Afghanistan are also at risk,
but nothing has yet happened on this front. West European
decisions on whether or not to extend credits depend more on the
terms Moscow demands than on what Washington does.
Soviet Response: Initial Soviet reaction to the lifting of
the US grain embargo has been low key. As it has since the
embargo was first imposed in January 1980, Soviet media are
portraying the sanctions as ineffective. Moscow has cited the
costs suffered by US farmers as being instrumental in the
President's decision. The USSR has also asserted that the
embargo has hurt prospects for US foreign trade by showing the
United States to be an unreliable trading partner.
The Soviet leadership probably does not view the grain
decision as a weakening of the US Administration's stance toward
the USSR. Rather they view It as 8 response to domestic
political pressures and AS a resolve to carry through on the
campaign pledge. In this regard, Moscow may now believe other
campaign pledges--ineluding a tough stance by the US other Issues
such as SALT negotiations and an increase In US military
expenditures--are a distinct possiblitv. Nor does Moscow
probably exaggerate its Influence on US decisions.
The leadership realizes that Soviet Iobbying and
protestations of nondamage to the Sovlet economy have little or
no Influence on political constituencies In the United States.
Nevertheless, it probably believes that whatever efforts the USSR
-1-
SECRET
Sr
SECRET
can muster--private high-level letters, access to US media,
contacts in Washington, and official Sovlet statements--are
worthwhile. The Soviets regard the US Administration as pro-
business And will continue their efforts to enlist US firms to
Lobby for an easing of the technology sanctions.
The Grain Question: Whether the end of the embargo will
soon result in additional sales of US grain to the Soviet Union
is TAP from certain.
Although Moscow could
increase handling capacitv slightlv bv taking more US grain, it
would have to defer deliveries of grain already purchased
elsewhere. Argentina would be the likely candidate.
Long Term Issues: In considering a long-term grain
agreement, Moscow believes its negotiating position is stronger
now than it was when the first such agreement was concluded in
1975. Their thinking is influenced by the fact that they are
completing a year of record grain imports even though purchases
from the US were constrained.
In negotiating a new LTA, the USSR would no doubt demand B
US guarantee of grain deliveries. Rut Moscow does not have all
the high cards.
the United
States would he needed as R safetv value even if it is regarded
AS A residual supplier.
-?-
SECRET
- GRAIN EMBARGO
MEMORANDUM
2332
53
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SPAPS
May 4, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN 100
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
associment
5/4 is Ursomars 700 54
2332 (win main)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 4, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK A. URSOMARSO
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN for
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
The NSC Staff has reviewed the attached talking points and
has approved distribution to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
2302
55
Document No.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
STAFFING MEMORANDUM
NOON
DATE:
4/29/81
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
4/30/81
SUBJECT:
GRAIN EMBARGO
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
JAMES
MEESE
MURPHY
BAKER
NOFZIGER
DEAVER
WEIDENBAUM
STOCKMAN
CANZERI
ALLEN
FULLER (For Cabinet)
ANDERSON
HICKEY
BRADY
HODSOLL
DOLE
MC COY
FIELDING
WILLIAMSON
URSOMARSO
FRIEDERSDORF
GARRICK
GERGEN
HARPER
Remarks:
The attached draft talking points have been prepared by
the Communications Office. Would you please review for
accuracy/prudence -- and edit/approve accordingly. Thank you.
Response needed by Thursday, noon.
Richard G. Darman
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x-2702)
Talking Points On The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo fulfills
a commitment of his campaign:
-- The President has always been committed to its lifting when
conditions would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy factors
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without any
risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective policy
tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being given
to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under consideration
The embargo had proved ineffective:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months of
the embargo but over the first year, total imports from all
sources were higher than ever, though imports from the U.S. were
the lowest since 1977.
-- American agriculture had to forego a large market for its products
which remained available to producers of many other countries
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
-2-
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place; export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on U.S. position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both U.S. and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
-- 8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the Soviets
by April 1
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in export
trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the domestic
economy resulting from this decision.
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected since
any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of total
supplies available
-- Planting intentions of American farmers promise another record
crop in 1982. Weather and general inflationary conditions in the
economy would affect food prices more than any decision affecting
1982 exports
-- Farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for their
export trade
The lifting of the grain embargo does not, in and of itself, indicate
change in basic U.S.-Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions there should
be resolved by Polish people without outside intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response of Soviets
should act against Poland
Talking Points on The Presidential Decision
To Lift The Grain Embargo
President Reagan's decision to end the Soviet grain embargo
fulfills his campaign commitment to do so:
-- Has always been committed to its lifting when conditions
would permit
-- Began in-depth assessment of embargo during first days in
office
-- Considered trade, national security, and foreign policy
factors
-- On taking office, determined immediate lifting risked being
misread by Soviets and others
President Reagan decided embargo could now be lifted without
any risk of misinterpretation because:
-- U.S. resolve to condemn and oppose aggression and intervention
is now clear and unambiguous
-- Evidence has mounted that the embargo had not been effective
policy tool
-- Evidence also mounting that adverse impact on American farmers
was not improving
-- Has been some easing of tensions in Eastern Europe
The decision was made on the day announced, Friday, April 24, 1981,
but international consultations were conducted to keep appropriate
nations advised:
-- Allies were notified at the time of decision and had been kept
informed throughout previous week of considerations being
given to the subject
-- Soviet Union had been advised that the action was under
consideration
Assessments of the impact of the embargo have been mixed:
-- U.S.S.R. imports of grain were disrupted in the early months
of the embargo but over the first year, total imports from
all sources were higher than ever, though imports from the
U.S. were the lowest since 1977.
-- American agriculture had to forego a large market for its
products which remained available to producers of many other
countries
-2-
The lifting of the embargo applies only to agricultural products:
-- The embargo on sales of high technology industrial items
remains in place and export licenses for other goods and
equipment will continue to be reviewed on case-by-case basis.
The long-term grain sales agreement negotiated with the Soviets in
the fall of 1975 expires on September 30th.
-- Decision remains to be made on US position with respect to
extension or renegotiation of the agreement
-- A new agreement is possible. Both US and Soviets agree
current agreement has served well but changes could be considered
in:
6 million ton minimum sales requirement
Provision voiding minimum requirement if domestic crop
below 225 million tons
--
8 million tons committed to be sold to Soviets under the
agreement have been sold and most of it shipped to the
Soviets by April 1.
-- Not known how much additional will be sold now. Record wheat
harvest of 1980 can accomodate several extra million tons in
export trade
There is no reason to expect any major adverse impact on the
domestic economy resulting from this decision
-- Domestic food prices in 1981 should be relatively unaffected
since any additional tonnage sold will be a small fraction of
total supplies available
--
in 1982, planting intentions of American farmers promise
another record crop. Weather and general inflationary
conditions in the economy would affect food prices more than
any decision affecting 1982 exports
-- farmers should be aided by the addition of this market for
their export trade
Promised by the President, the lifting of the grain embargo does
not, in and of itself, indicate change in basic U.S.-Soviet relations:
-- No change in our opposition to invasion of Afghanistan
-- No implication of willingness to accept status quo there
62
-3- - -
-- We remain concerned about Poland and believe conditions
there should be resolved by Polish people without outside
intervention
-- U.S. and allies remain committed to firm response if Soviets
should act against Poland
63
MEMORANDUM
2332
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 30, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
ALLEN J. LENZ oft
SUBJECT:
Talking Points on Presidential Decision
to Lift the Grain Embargo
Richard Pipes and I have reviewed the attached talking points
(Tab A), provided by both White House Communications and
Richard Darman's office, which deal with lifting the grain
embargo.
At Tab I are two memoranda for your signature. The first
is to Frank A. Ursomarso, Director, White House Communications;
the second to Richard G. Darman. Both memoranda approve dis-
tribution of the talking points to White House Senior Staff and
public affairs officials of the Cabinet.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memoranda at Tab I approving distribution
of subject talking points.
Approve
Disapprove
SIGNED 5/4/81
CC: Richard Pipes
5/4/81 64
FROM THE DESK OF
SHARON KISSEL
Paula-
This is in today's
NY Times
I
1 Room 368)
65
EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION
Shifting Patterns
EXPORTS TO ALL OTHER COUNTRIES
Of Argentine
TOTAL EXPORTS
Grain Exports
Exports to the Soviet Union
and all other countries in millions
1977
of metric tons. Data are for year
harvest was concluded and
include oilseeds.
1978
1979
Source: Argentine Grain Board. 1981
data are New York Times
estimates.
1980
1981
16
12
8
4
0
4
8
12
16
New York Times, 5/4/81 Pg.Di
The New York Times/May 4, 1981
End of Grain Curb
Worries Argentina
Boutell, chief economist at the Argen-
By EDWARD SCHUMACHER
tine Grain Board.
Argentina last year sold 7.6 million
Special to The New York Times
metric tons of grain to the Soviet
BUENOS AIRES, May 3- It is now
Union, about four times as much as the
autumn in the Southern Hemisphere
year before. This year, it expected to
and Argentine farmers are just com-
sell the Soviet Union up to 15 million
pleting the largest harvest in their
tons, or almost 80 percent of its total
country's history: some 35 million met-
grain exports.
ric tons of corn, wheat and other
Argentine grain suppliers largely
grains.
stepped into the breach created by the
The ports here are backed up for
grain curb, an opportunism that United
weeks as ships stream in to carry away
States officials charged largely under-
the valuable food cargo from the
mined the American action. The Ar-
world's third-largest grain exporter.
gentines say, however, that the Soviet
Argentina has benefited tremen-
trade was crucial to their economy làst
dously from its decision 15 months ago
year. They say it prevented a poor year
to ignore an appeal by the United
of zero growth from turning into a dis-
States to join in a curtainment of grain
aster. Moreover, they say, they were
shipments to the Soviet Union. But
not consulted before the curtailment
President Reagan's decision last week
was imposed and they had predicted
to end the grain curb casts a shadow of
that it would be futile anyway.
apprehension over the booming ports.
President Reagan's announcement
Increased Sales Sharply
ending the curb was met with some
smugness here. "Politics has a lot to
"We have to wait and see what is
say in international economic affairs,"
going to happen on the Chicago futures
said one grain trader. "If I were the
market and what the Russians are
going to do," said Carlos P. Chevallier-
Continued on Page D4
Argentina Is Concerned
About Grain Curb End
Continued From First Business Page
determine how the companies rank in
relation to each other.
Russians, I would now teach the Ameri-
Argentine traders say they still ex-
cans a lesson and not buy from them."
pect the Soviet Union to buy the bulk of
But the Argentines are not the Rus-
their harvest and that the Russians are
sians and they now face new competi-
going slow in order to judge the size of
tion for the lucrative Soviet market
their own projected large harvest this
from the United States and from Cana-
year. The Argentines, nonetheless, are
da, Australia and other Western coun-
anxiously waiting to see what new
tries that joined the grain curb. France
agreement the United States will ne-
has announced that it would sell 600,000
gotiate with the Soviet Union to replace
tons of grains to the Soviet Union.
the one that expires in September.
But if American farmers are pleased
Argentina has a disadvantage of
with the lifting of the curb, they will
being far from the major world mar-
find that the Argentines have been
kets, creating a transportation cost
preparing for a fight. Argentina con-
that is aggravated by poor port facili-
cluded a five-year agreement with the
ties, creating the current logjam.
Soviet Union last year to provide a
Argentina traditionally sells its
minimum of 4.5 million tons of feed
grains at a little below world prices to
grains a year. Argentina has already
make up for the transportation. Last
sold that much plus 2.2 million tons
year, it forced the Soviet Union to pay
more in wheat to the Soviet Union so far
well above world prices, but already
this year, Mr. Chevallier-Boutell said.
Argentine prices have fallen to their
The Argentines, however, are rely-
old relative levels. The Soviet Union is
ing on selling much more to the Soviet
buying Argentine corn, for example, at
Union, and the Russians are not buy-
roughly $10 a ton below world prices,
ings as much as the Argentines had
forcing the Argentine Grain Board to
hoped. This year's huge harvest adds to
step in and set a floor price of roughly
the fear that the country could be stuck
$110 a ton.
with a glut of grains that it may have to
Despite last year's boom, farmers
sell at low prices.
have been hurt by interest rates of up to
"It's all part of the risks you have to
150 percent a year that reflect the coun-
run in this business," said Carlos
try's virulent inflation. Almost three-
Guietz, trade manager of Bunge y
fourths of the nation's export earnings
Born, one of the big five grain trading
are from agriculture, and the country
companies here that have prospered as
ended last year with a balance-of-pay-
a result of the grain curb.
ments deficit of almost $5 million. A 30
The leading grain trading companies
percent currency devaluation to help
are the Continental Grain Company,
increase exports was announced last
Cargill Inc., Dreyfus, Bunge y Born
month.
and La Plata. Because they are pri-
The Government also has renewed a
vately held, no revenues or profits fig-
ures are available, and it is difficult to
grain export agreement with China for
one million tons of wheat and soybeans
a year and signed an agreement with
Mexico for one million tons of sorghum
and soybeans a year. Last week, it an-
nounced a five-year agreement to ex-
port up to 100,000 tons of beef a year to
the Soviet Union, an agreement that
could bring in as much as $1 billion.
The Government hopes that these
measures - and attempts to recapture
some smaller markets that it dropped
to sell to the Soviet Union - will help it
overcome the re-entry of the United
States into Soviet grain trade.
Parila Dobriansky Rm 368
MEMORANDUM
2772 GRAiN 67
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EMBARGO
May 15, 1981
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
DOUGLAS FEITH
Pix
SUBJECT:
The US Grain Embargo and Economic Threats
No one in the administration, I assume, is eager to enter
further discussions of the decision to lift the grain embargo
against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some such discussions
are inevitable and what follows will aid administration offi-
cials in using grain embargo queries to promote a diplomatically
useful point of view regarding economic threats against the
United States and its allies.
The grain embargo against the Soviet Union was an empty gesture
(as such, it symbolized the previous administration's approach
to dealing with the Kremlin). It distressed U.S. farmers, who
resented the disruption of their business, but it had insubstan-
tial economic effect on the Soviet Union. It neither restricted
the amount of grain the Soviets could import nor increased sub-
stantially the costs of such imports. The embargo was economi-
cally insignificant because (1) a number of nations besides the
United States export wheat, (2) a simple declaration that one
exporter refuses to sell to a given country does not affect the
total amount of wheat in the international export "pool", hence
the market clearing price of that wheat does not change, and
(3) in any event, it is impossible to monitor and prevent re-
sale of a fungible commodity like wheat. In short, the U.S.
grain embargo demonstrated once again that selective embargoes
of basic commodities do not work (i.e., do not penalize the
"target" nation).
This analysis applies to oil as well as wheat, as was proved
by both the 1973-74 Arab embargo of the United States and the
Netherlands and the 1979 Iranian embargo of the United States.
By publicly displaying that they understand the economics of
selective embargoes of commodities like wheat and oil, U.S.
officials would (1) put potential sources of embargo threats
on notice that Washington will not be cowed by bluster,
68
2
(2) educate our allies, and (3) reduce the likelihood of costly
panic here in the United States in the event of an announced
anti-US embargo in the future. Overall, the effect would be
to free the administration of the constraints placed upon its.
diplomacy by ungrounded fears of embargo.
CC: Norman Bailey
Richard Pipes
PaulaDobriansky