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Speeches [Presidential Address to European Parliament in Strasbourg 05/08/1985] (8)
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Speeches [Presidential Address to European Parliament in Strasbourg 05/08/1985] (8)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Speeches [Presidential Address to
European Parliament in Strasbourg 05/08/1985] (8)
Box: 35
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/24/2005
File Folder
SPEECHES [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO EUROPEAN
FOIA
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG 5/8/85 (8/12)
F06-114/10
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
35
3515
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11547 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 4/25/1985 B1
REDRAFT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO
GORBACHEV
[66 - 66 ]
R
6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10
11548 LETTER
REDRAFT PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
14
ND
B1
GORBACHEV
[ 68 - 81 1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
1-44
NSC
April 29, 1985
1330 hrs
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:
TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
STRASBOURG, FRANCE
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1985
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be with
you on this day.
We mark today the anniversary of the liberation of Europe
from tyrants who had seized this continent and plunged it into a
terrible war. Forty years ago today, the guns were stilled and
peace began -- a peace that has endured to become the longest of
this century.
On this day 40 years ago, they swarmed onto the boulevards of
Paris, rallied under the Arc de Triomphe, and sang the
"Marseillaise" in the free and open air. In Rome, the sound of
church bells filled St. Peter's square and echoed through the
city. On this day 40 years ago, Winston Churchill walked out
onto a balcony in Whitehall and said to the people of Britain,
"this is your victory" -- and the crowd yelled back, "no, it is
yours," in an unforgettable moment of love and gratitude.
Londoners tore the blackout curtains from their windows, and put
floodlights on the great symbols of English history. And for the
first time in six years Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St.
1
Paul's Cathedral were illuminated against the sky.
Across the ocean, a half million New Yorkers flooded Times
Square and, being Americans, laughed and posed for the cameras.
In Washington, our new president, Harry Truman, called reporters
into his office and said, "the flags of freedom fly all over
Europe." And, he added, "it's my birthday too
On day 40 years ago, I was at my post at the Army Air Corps
installation in Culver City, California. And as I passed a
radio I heard the words, "ladies and gentlemen, the war in Europe
is over, and like so many people that day I felt a chill, as if
a gust of cold wind had just swept past, and-even though, for
America there was still a war on the Pacific Front- I realized:
I will never forget this moment.
This day can't help but be emotional, for in it we feel the
long tug of memory; we are reminded of shared joy and shared pain
and the terrible poignance of life. A few weeks ago in
California an old soldier touched on this. With tears in his
eyes he said, "it was such a different world then. It's almost
impossible to describe it to someone who wasn't there but, when
they finally turned the lights on in the cities again, it was
like being reborn."
2
46
If it is hard to communicate the happiness of those days, it
is even harder to remember Europe's agony.
So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities had been destroyed.
children played in the rubble and begged for food.
By this day 40 years ago, 40 million lay dead, and the
survivors composed a continent of victims. And to this day, we
wonder: how did this happen? How did civilization take such a
terrible turn? After all the books and the documentaries, after
all the histories, and studies, we still wonder: How?
Hannah Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil" -- the banality
of the little men who did the terrible deeds. We know what they
were: totalitarians who used the state, which they had elevated
to the level of "God," to inflict war on peaceful nations and
genocide on innocent peoples.
We know of the existence of evil in the human heart, and we
know that in Nazi Germany that evil was institutionalized --
given power and direction by the state, by a corrupt regime and
the jack-boots who did its bidding. And we know, we learned,
that early attempts to placate the totalitarians did not save us
from war. In fact, they guaranteed it. There are lessons to be
learned in this and never forgotten.
3
47
But there is a lesson too in another thing we saw in those
days: perhaps we can call it "the commonness of virtue." The
common men and women who somehow dug greatness from within their
souls-- the people who sang to the children during the blitz, who
joined the resistance and said 'No' to tyranny, the people who
hid the Jews and the dissidents, the people who became, for a
moment, the repositories of all the courage of the West -- from a
child named Anne Frank to a hero named Raoul Wallenberg.
These names shine. They give us heart forever. And the glow
from their beings, the glow of their memories, lit Europe in her
darkest days.
Who can forget the days after the war? They were hard days,
yes, but we can't help but look back and think: life was so
vivid then. There was the sense of purpose, the joy of shared
effort, and, later, the incredible joy of our triumph. Those
were the days when the West rolled up its sleeves and repaired
the damage that had been done. Those were the days when Europe
rose in glory from the ruins.
Old enemies were reconciled with the European family.
Together, America and Europe created and put into place the
Marshall Plan to rebuild from the rubble. Together we created
4
the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which proceeded not from
transient interests of state but from shared ideals. Together we
created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense system
aimed at seeing that the kind of tyrants who had tormented Europe
would never torment her again. NATO was a triumph of
organization and effort, but it was also something new, very
different. For NATO derived its strength directly from the moral
values of the people it represented. It was infused with their
high ideals, their love of liberty, their commitment to peace.
But perhaps the greatest triumph of all was not in the realm
of a sound defense or material achievement. No, the greatest
triumph of Europe after the war is that in spite of all the
chaos, poverty, sickness, and misfortune that plagued this
continent --in spite of all that, the people of Europe resisted
the call of new tyrants and the lure of their seductive
ideologies. Europe did not become the breeding ground for new
extremist philosophies. Europe resisted the totalitarian
temptation. Instead, the people of Europe embraced democracy,
the strongest dream, the dream the fascists could not kill. They
chose freedom.
Today we celebrate the leaders who led the way-- Churchill
and Monnet, Adenauer and Schuman, de Gasperi and Spaak, Truman
and Marshall. And we celebrate, too, the free political parties
5
49
that contributed their share to greatness: the Liberals and the
Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and Labour and the
Conservatives. Together they tugged at the same oar, and the
great and mighty ship of Europe moved on.
If any doubt their success, let them look at you. In this
those
room are the sons and daughters of soldiers who fought on
and their sons and daughters.
opposite sides 40 years ago, and perhaps some of the soldiers
themselves. Now you govern together and lead Europe
democratically. You buried animosity and hatred in the rubble.
There is no greater testament to reconciliation and to the
peaceful unity of Europe than the men and women in this room.
In the decades after the war, Europe knew great growth and
power. You enjoyed amazing vitality in every area of life, from
fine arts to fashion, from manufacturing to science to the world
of ideas. Europe was robust and alive, and none of this was an
accident. It was the natural result of freedom, the natural
fruit of the democratic ideal. We in America looked at Europe
and called her what she was: an Economic Miracle.
And we could hardly be surprised. When we Americans think
about our European heritage we tend to think of your cultural
influences, and the rich ethnic heritage you gave us. But the
industrial revolution that transformed the American economy came
6
50
from Europe. The financing of the railroads we used to settle
the West came from Europe. The guiding intellectual lights of our
democratic system--Locke and Montesquieu, Hume and Adam
Smith--came from Europe. And the geniuses who ushered in the
modern industrial-technological age came from-well, I think you
know, but two examples will suffice. Alexander Graham Bell,
whose great invention maddened every American parent whose child
insists on phoning his European pen pal rather than writing to
him--was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo Marconi, who invented the
radio--thereby providing a living for a young man from Dixon,
Illinois, who later went into politics- I guess I should explain
that's me - now you know it's Marconi's fault--Marconi was born,
as you know in Italy.
Tomorrow will mark the 35th anniversary of of the European
Coal and Steel Community, the first block in the creation of a
united Europe. The purpose was to tie French and German -- and
European- industrial production so tightly together that war
between them "becomes not merely unthinkable but materially
impossible." Those are the words of Robert Schuman; the Coal and
Steel Community was the child of his genius. And if he were here
today I believe he would say: We have only just begun!
I am here to tell you America remains, as she was 40 years
ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a
7
strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger
partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his ringing "Declaration of
Interdependence" in the freedom bell city of Philadelphia 23
years ago, explicitly positioned this objective among the key
tenets of post-war American policy, a policy which foresaw the
New World and the Old as twin pillars of a larger democratic
community. We Americans still see European unity as a vital
force in that historic process. We favor the expansion of the
European Community; we welcome the entrance of Spain and Portugal
into that Community, for their presence makes for a stronger
Europe, and a stronger Europe is a stronger West.
Yet despite Europe's Economic Miracle which brought so much
prosperity to so many, despite the visionary ideas of John
Kennedy and the European leaders who preceded him, despite the
enlargement of democracy's frontiers within the European
continent, I am told that a more doubting mood is upon Europe
today. I hear words like Europessimism" and "Europaralysis." I
am told that Europe seems to have lost the sense of confidence
that dominated that postwar era. I cannot believe this is
so--but if there is something of a "lost" quality these days, I
suspect it is connected to the fact that some, in the past few
years, have begun to question the ideals and philosophies that
have guided the West for centuries. Some have even come to
question the moral and intellectual worth of the West.
8
I wish to speak, in part, to that questioning today. And
there is no better place to do it than Strasbourg-- where Goethe
studied, where Pasteur taught, where Hugo first knew inspiration.
This has been a lucky city for questioning and finding valid
answers. It is also a city for which some of us feel a very
sweet affection. You know that our statue of Liberty was a gift
from France, and its sculptor, F.A. Bartholdi, was a son of
France. I don't know if you have ever studied the face of the
Statue, but immigrants entering New York Harbor used to strain to
see it, as if it would tell them something about their new world.
It is a strong, kind face; it is the face of Bartholdi's mother;
and she was a woman of Alsace. And so, among the many things we
Americans thank you for, we thank you for her.
The Statue of Liberty - made in Europe, erected in America -
helps remind us not only of the past ties but present realities.
It is to those realities. It is to those realities we must look
in order to dispel whatever doubts may exist about the course of
history and the place of free men and women within it. The fact
of the matter is, we live in a complex, dangerous, divided world,
yet a world which can provide all of the good things we require,
spiritual and material, if we but have the confidence and courage
to face history's challenge.
9
53
Some of the doubts about the West are directly connected to
the performance of the West's economies, others relate to our
relationship with the USSR and others relate to our resolve to
meet international commitments to support the democratic way of
life.
We in the West have much to be thankful for -- peace,
prosperity and freedom. If we are to preserve these for our
children, and for theirs, today's leaders must demonstrate the
same resolve and sense of vision which inspired Churchill,
Adenauer, DeGasperi and DeGaulle. Their challenge was to rebuild
a democratic Europe under the shadow of Soviet power. Our task,
in some ways even more daunting, is to keep the peace with an
evermore powerful Soviet Union, to introduce greater stability in
our relationship with it, and to coexist in a world in which our
values can prosper.
The leaders and people of postwar Europe had learned the
lessons of their history from the failures of their predecessors.
They learned that aggression feeds on appeasement and that
weakness itself can be provacative. We, for our part, can learn
from the success of our predecessors. We know that both conflict
and aggression can be deterred, that that democratic nations are
capable of the resolve, the sacrifices and the consistency of
policy needed to sustain such deterrence.
10
From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's,
Soviet power was effectively deterred and Soviet ambitions
effectively limited. The strength of Western economies, the
vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy, all
contributed to such restraint; but certainly the decisive factor
must have been the countervailing power -- ultimately, military,
and above all, nuclear power -- which the West was capable of
bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.
It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that
superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons
which had characterized the postwar era. In Europe, the effect
of this loss was not quickly perceptible. But seen globally,
Soviet conduct changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola
in 1975, then, when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in
South Yeman, in Kampuchea and ultimately in Afghanistan, the
Soviet Union began courting more risks, and expanding its
influence through the indirect and direct application of Soviet
military power. Today, we see similar Soviet efforts to profit
from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.
The ineffectual Western response to Soviet adventurism of the
late 1970's had many roots, not least in the crisis of
self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the
11
55
Vietnam experience. But just as Soviet decision-making in the
earlier postwar era had taken place against the background of
overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of the
late 1970's were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout
Europe, against the background of growing Soviet and stagnating
Western nuclear strength.
One might draw the conclusion from these events that the West
should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union
upon which our security and our strategy rested through the
postwar era. That is not my view. I am certain that we cannot
and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually
upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.
In the short run, we have no alternative but to compete with
the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of
superiority, but merely of balance. It is thus essential that
the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear
capability in each leg of the strategic triad -- sea, land and
air based. It is similarly important that France and Britain
maintain and modernize their strategic capabilities. In all
these countries, our publics appreciate the need for nuclear
deterrence, and will support its sustenance.
The Soviet Union, however, has not been content to sustain,
12
weapons by developing defenses against these weapons. It is to
investigate this possibility that in 1983 I launched a new
research program -- the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The state of modern technology may soon make possible for the
first time the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat
ballistic missiles. It will take time, and will be for my
successors to reach decisions with our Allies as to the
desirability and feasibility of deployment. It is essential now
that a prudent research program be sustained. The Soviets
themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems
and have invested heavily. Indeed, they have spent as much on
defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than
20 years.
As we proceed with this research program, we will remain
within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the
closest possible fashion with our Allies. And when the time for
decisions on the possible production and deployment of such
systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these
issues with the Soviet Union. We, for our part, have no
intention of unilateral deployment.
Both for the short and long term I am confident that the West
can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the
14
57
fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we
can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce
in international politics. Rwe We in the U.S. have thought so.
During the 1970's we went to considerable great lengthsto restrain
unilaterally our strategic weapons programs out of the conviction
that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its
conduct--rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral
advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the
early 1970's resulted in some improvements n Europe, the Berlin
Quadripartite Agreement being the best example. But the hopes
for a broader and lasting modernization of the East-West
competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and
Nicaragua.
The question before us today is whether we have learned from
those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the
Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the
reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. I
believe we have learned that successful cooperation with the
Soviet Union must b eaccompanied by successful competition in
areas- particularly Third World areas--where the Soviets are not
yet prepared to act with restraint. I believe we have learned
the importance of conducting our trade with the Soviet Union
within the broader framework of our security interests, avoiding
decisive dependence upon Soviet energy sources, curtailing
15
preferential credit arrangements, and bringing our regulations in
restraint of strategic trade in military relevant goods and
technologies up to date.
INSER
A
It is in this belief hope that I have directed the Secretary of
State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of
problem solving with the Russians.
Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a
productive dialogue with the Soviet Union, we are reminded of the
obstacles imposed by our so fundamentally different concepts of
humanity, of human rights, of the value of a human life. The
murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany,
and the Soviet Union's refusal to accept responsibility for this
act is only the latest reminder.
INSERT
B
We have much to do-- and we must do it together. We must
remember anew that the road to peace does not run through Munich.
We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us. We
must remain strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we
must remember that our unity and our strength are not a mere
impulse of like-minded allies, not a mere geopolitical
calculation. Our unity is the natural result of our shared love
for liberty.
INSERT
16
59
I am here today to reaffirm to the people of Europe the
constancy of the American purpose. We were at your side through
two great wars; we have been at your side through 40 years of a
sometimes painful peace; and we are at your side today. It is
not mere sentiment that dictates this, though sentiment we feel.
We are here because, like you, we have not veered from the ideals
of the West -- the ideals of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no
one -- no one -- doubt our purpose.
The United States is committed not only to the security of
Europe- we are committed to the recreation of a larger and more
genuinely European Europe. The United States is committed not
only to a partnership with Europe-- the United States is
committed to an end to the artificial division of Europe.
INSERT
A Europe undivided will make for a more peaceful world; and
God knows it will make for a happier one. And this is not a
dream; we can make it into reality, if we work together with
commitment and trust and patience.
All of us in this room want to preserve and protect our own
democratic liberties -- but don't we also have a responsibility
to encourage democracy throughout the world? Only in an
atmosphere of democracy can man peacefully resolve his
differences through the ballot, through a free press, through
17
free speech and free political parties and the right to redress
injustice.
More and more of the countries of the world are turning to
democracy--turning each day, turning at great price, turning with
great effort. In the past 10 years alone
countries that
did not know political freedom, for whatever reason, have become
democratic. As we seek to encourage democracy, we must remember
that each country must struggle for democracy within its own
culture; emerging democracies have special problems and require
special help. Those nations whose democratic institutions are
newly emerged and whose confidence in theprocess is not yet
deeply rooted need our help. They should have an established
community of their peers, other democratic countries to whom they
can turn for support or just advice.
In my address to the British Parliament in 1982. I spoke of
the need for democratic governments to come together and spread
the democratic word throughout the world. Soon after, the
Council of Europe brought together delegates from four
continents, and I congratulate these European Members of
Parliament for what is now known as the "Strasbourg Initiative."
I would hope that this initiative could be continued,
gathering not only Europe's own, but all the emerging democracies
18
to craft a sense of common purpose to help move the world forward
to social justice, human dignity, economic growth and political
democracy. In the three years since my speech at Westminster, we
in our country have engaged in a broad bipartisan effort to
strengthen and promote democratic ideals and institutions.
Following a pattern first started in democratic West Germany, two
years ago, the United States Congress approved the National
Endowment for Democracy. This organization subsequently
established institutes of labor, business, and political parties
dedicated to programs of cooperation with democratic forces
around the world. I can report to you that the Endowment is off
to a fine start. I would encourage other European democracies to
create similar organizations to foster democracy.
[But I believe we need more. I believe we need a formal
community to which nations can look for help as they try to
strengthen their institutions. Let us establish an Association
of Democracies. We should establish such a democratic forum, in
which alll democracies are free to participate, to strengthen and
foster democracy among both the developed and the developing
countries, arrange for exchanges of the democratic experience,
promote free communications and media, foster human rights,
combat terrorism, and examine the impact of social and economic
problems on democratic systems. Such as Association, working
closely with parallel efforts in teh nongovernmental sector,
19
could provide practical training, moral encouragement, and
financial support to pro-democratic political, labor, business,
and civic organizations. Whether this forum is begun here in
Strasbourg, or elsewhere, let us begin. And let us use as our
byword a simple phrase-- but one that carries within if all the
best of our past and the promise of our future: Freedom Works !]
And as we work, we will remember those who have for now, but
only for now, lost out on the long fight for freedom.
The force of the democratic ideal does not stop short because
there are arbitrary borders, some with barbed wires and control
towers. Here in Western Europe, you have created a Europe for
yourselves in which there is a free flow of people, of
information, of goods and of culture. It is the natural bent of
all Europeans to move freely in all directions. sharing and
partaking of each other's ideas and culture. It is my hope, our
hope, that in the 21st century-- which is only 15 years away--
all Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon can travel without a
passport and the free flow of people and ideas will include the
other half of Europe. It is my fervent wish that in the next
century there will once again be one, free Europe.
There are those who say the West lacks energy the moral
and spiritual energy to carry forth these hopes and plans. But
20
63
that it not true. As Churchill said, "we have not come this far
becasue we are made of sugar candy
I do not believe those who say the people of Europe today are
paralyzed and pessimistic. But And if this J would is so, then say all to I those can say who
think this:
as an objective friend who has observed you for over 40 years is:
Europe, beloved Europe, you are greater than you know. You are
the treasury of centuries of Western thought and Western culture,
you are the father of Western ideals and the mother of Western
faith.
Europe, you have been the power and the glory of the West,
and you are a moral success. In fact, in the horrors after World
War II, when you rejected totalitarianism, when you rejected the
lure of new "Superman," and a "New Communist Man," you proved
that you were -- and are -- a moral triumph.
You in the West are a Europe without illusions, a Europe
firmly grounded in the ideals and traditions that made her
greatness, a Europe unbound and unfettered by a bankrupt
ideology. You are, today, a New Europe on the brink of a new
century -- a democratic community with much to be proud of.
We have much to do. The work ahead is not unlike the
building of great cathedral. The work is slow, complicated, and
21
painstaking. It is passed on with pride from generation to
generation. It is the work not only of leaders but of ordinary
people. The cathedral evolves as it is created, with each
generation adding its own vision -- but the initial spark of
vision remains constant, and the faith that drives the vision
persists. The results may be slow to see, but our children and
their children will trace in the air the emerging arches and
spires and know the faith and dedication and love that produced
them. My friends, Europe is the Cathedral, and it is illuminated
still.
And if you doubt your will, and your spirit, and your
strength to stand for something, think of those people 40 years
ago -- who wept in the rubble, who laughed in the streets, who
paraded across Europe, who cheered Churchill with love and
devotion, and who sang the "Marseillaise" down the boulevards.
May I tell you: spirit like that does not disappear; it cannot
perish; it will not go away. There's too much left unsung within
it.
Thank you, all of you, for your graciousness on this great
day. Thank you, and God bless you all.
22
Dis
I
National Security Council
147
The White House
II
System #
85 APR 25 P3:41
Package # 90419
1727
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
/
P
Bob Kimmitt
2
K
John Poindexter
3
of
Paul Thompson
Wilma Hall
4
5
Bud McFarlane
m
A
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
Matlock
6
A
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP Meese Regan Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
ASAP
(Date/Time)
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90419 re-do
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 25, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 95
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev
I have redrafted the President's letter to Gorbachev to take
account of the Soviet action Monday in disavowing an essential
part of what we had understood to be the Otis-Zaitsev agreement.
So that you can quickly see what I have done, I have put a red
line to the right of those paragraphs added, and a dotted line
where there was some revision.
As you can see, I have tried to couch the comments on Nicholson
in terms of principle that the Soviets can understand, and have
toughened the tone of some other comments. I tried to focus on
the nub of the issue, and to state it very plainly. I have also
included a few implicit hints that Gorbachev may not be in a
position to control his own military. I believe this is done in
a way as not to seem provocative, but rather to challenge
Gorbachev to demonstrate that he is in control. I believe these
comments by the President will be a useful backdrop for other
actions we might take on this matter.
Since the letter contains other points which I believe it is
useful to get on the record at the highest level, I would hope
that the President would be willing to sign it tomorrow so that
we can get it to Hartman for delivery early next week. I have not
yet attempted to clear the revised text with State, but will do
so if you approve.
Recommendation:
That you approve or amend the attached text, following which I
oh
will clear with State (if you instruct) and send a memorandum Tpb. to
the President requesting his signature.
Approve RCM
Disapprove
Attachment:
sex incols
Tab I -- Redraft of President's Letter to Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/10 #11547
BY G NARA DATE 6/25/09
I
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Redraft of Letter to Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/16 +11548
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
BY Gr NARADATE' /2/08
As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker
O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24
and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you
raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention.
Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace
in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will
agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly
so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I
write in that spirit.
I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving
relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment
that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding
interest in avoiding war between us, and -- as you pointed out --
the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a
political impetus to move these relations in a positive
direction.
Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on
the desire of your government to improve relations. In
particular, I have in mind the public retraction of what we
understood to be the commitment made earlier by a responsible
Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force
is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison
Mission in Germany.
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Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the
tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental
principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our
differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations.
For this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The
principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of
equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes
neither of these principles.
Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not
reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they
do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political
authorities to take appropriate corrective action.
For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions
in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement
without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken
when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet
soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and
in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use
lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison
Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces have never done
so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended
repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet
officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days
before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted
courteously and safely from the area.
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The position which your Government most recently presented to us,
therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it
reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting
the responsibility to insure that members of the United States
Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we
accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we
see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under
certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet
side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.
Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing
subordinate officials -- and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers
-- to make decisions which can affect relations between great
nations. If you choose to permit this, that is your prerogative.
But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility
for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with
standing orders.
I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has
taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your
military personnel guarantee the safety of their American
counterparts in Germanyjust as American military personnel
guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your
Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this
elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced
to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other
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issues. After all, this is not the first time American lives
have been lost as the result of a policy on the Soviet part of
using lethal force without determining whether the circumstances
justified it. And no agreements will be possible between us if
one of the sides insists on preserving unitateral advantages.
Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but
here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has
not been observed on the Soviet side. For example, I could not
agree more with your statement that each social system should
prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition,
and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without
imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to
think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your
country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other
countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation
by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important
principle?
Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to
engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but
simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is
one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we
seem to agree on many principles, we must devote our main effort
to closing the gap between principle and practice.
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In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in
agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on
various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would
hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the
development of situations which might bring us to dangerous
confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at
present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected,
given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The
important thing is to make sure we each have a clear
understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner
which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.
One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our
relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue
to reach a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot
believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects
the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan
people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing,
and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border
is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's
effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see
a political solution that will deal equitably with the related
issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and
guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course
will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I
am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if
you desire.
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Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan
does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States
and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue
from any political or military threats against that country.
Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am
perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will
not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two
languages
" Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be
candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and
actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same
language. But I know that this is not what you intended to
suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that
expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions
taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to
improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party
which you head which has always insisted not only on the right
but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological
struggle.
However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to
act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In
this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made
publicly on April 7 -- and particularly the manner in which it
was made -- unhelpful. As for the substance of the proposal, I
find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in
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the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter
with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your
experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what
the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in
its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to
provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not
foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to dif-
ficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to
solve such issues is to work them out privately.
have begun
This brings me to the negotiations which have now been underway
in Geneva® for several weeks. They have not made the progress we
had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political
impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly
and directly how I view them.
First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin
new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the
terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met,
even though each side may in some instances interpret the wording
of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to
specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have
not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our
commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into
concrete, practical agreements.
-8-
A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet
negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban
research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are
dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the
Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet
position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have
explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on
research efforts can be verified, nor do we think such a ban
would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the
negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an
insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that
this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of
either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your
own actions -- with the strategic defense you already deploy
around Moscow and with your own major research program in
strategic defense.
In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our
Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting
with Speaker O'Neill's delegation -- that this research program
has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I
can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point.
The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is
important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive
systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to
protect our people more safely than do those we have at present,
and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of
16
-9-
nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask
you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if
nations have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear
weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life
provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his
hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already,
unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot
be erased from human minds.
This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by
the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told
the United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile
defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing
offensive missiles. They would, he said then, "guard against the
eventuality
of someone deciding to violate the treaty and
conceal missiles or combat aircraft.' "
Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of
effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment charac-
terized by large numbers of "first-strike" weapons could be con-
sidered as potentially threatening by the other side. Never-
theless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality,
at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our
scientists tell me that the United States will require some years
of further research to determine whether potentially effective
defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of
consideration for deployment. If some options should at some
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time in the future be identified, development of them by the
United States could occur only following negotiations with other
countries, including your own, and following thorough and open
policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision
to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until
the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no
possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the
United States. During the research period our governments will
have ample time to reduce systems which could pose a
"first-strike" threat and to develop a common understanding
regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more
stable, arrangement.
If such defensive systems are identified that would not be
permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the
procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in
1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty
calls upon the party developing a system based upon other
physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to
Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations
which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to
Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of
the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the
long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy
weapons were to have favorable results.
78
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I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search
for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva.
One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our
negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems
to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the
numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention
to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators
dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures
which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the
role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move
toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this
fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open
the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns
of both sides.
I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations
and discussions underway in the security and arms control field.
We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm
Conference toward narrowing our differences. An agreement should
be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have
discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing
to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the
principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to
negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that
principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives
to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we
may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and
19
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toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies
have proposed.
One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical
weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the
importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I
suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our
experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on
this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible
weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you
therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have
advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important,
not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves
can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to
a more confident working relationship in general.
Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For
example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving
safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move
to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move
forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York
and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement
have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of
issues remain to be resolved. But if I had to characterize these
remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on
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our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer,
exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this
area? I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial
Holdis
Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which
this
trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is
4/27mg
til
on
likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political
mt
atmosphere.
Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to
all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we
believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an
important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we
suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy
Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we
might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am
also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice
President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such
meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we
can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to
resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate
the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will
have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere
conducive to solving many other problems.
I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of
us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to
-14-
justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me
when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that
arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be
able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned
as well as others on the broad agenda before us.
As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor.
I
believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate
directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will
give me your frank view of these questions and call to my
attention any others which you consider require our personal
involvement. I sincerely hope that we can use this
correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of
efforts to build confidence and to solve the critical problems
which have increased tension between our countries.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow