Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
135840935
label
Assassination Report (1)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
135840935
contentType
document
title
Assassination Report (1)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
373
collections
Records of the Office of the Counsellor to the President (Reagan Administration)
Edwin Meese's Office Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
135840935
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1985-12-31
year
1985
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1981-01-01
year
1981
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
30cb427f7a9e7c61
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Meese, Edwin III: Files
Folder Title: Assassination Report [1 of 4]
Box: CFOA 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
09 JUE part
OF
THE
THE 1789 TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
y
July 9, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN W. THOMAS
ASSISTANT COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Assassination Report
When Ed Meese and Secretary Regan met a couple of
days ago, the Secretary gave him an initial copy of the
Department's assassination report. At the time, the
Secretary indicated that a subsequent version of the
report would be available in early July. I am attaching
a copy of the latest version for Ed Meese. Again, we
consider this to be very confidential and have limited
distribution in Treasury to less than a half-dozen
individuals.
DL
David L. Chew
Executive Assistant
to the Secretary
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE
OF
DEPARTMENT THE THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
1789
June 26, 1981
Dear Ed:
I thought you might like to see the most recent draft
of the report I requested from the General Counsel of the
Treasury on the performance of Treasury Department agencies
in connection with the attempted assassination of the
President on March 30, 1981.
In general, the report concludes that the Secret Service
and other Treasury agencies performed very well indeed, but
as in all such reports a scrutiny of events and responses
illuminated certain deficiencies. These are noted in the
Conclusions section of the report and are followed up with
specific recommendations for change.
I should note that the report has great praise for the
performance of four individual agents -- Jerry Parr, Tim
McCarthy, Dennis V. McCarthy, the agent who was first to
reach and subdue the President's assailant, and Ray Shaddick,
the agent who pushed Parr and the President into the car
and ran the security at the hospital. Appropriate awards are
recommended for these men.
The Department's General Counsel is now working on a
version of this report which, without classified information,
can be made public and submitted to appropriate Congressional
committees.
Sincerely,
Wm
Donald T. Regan
The Honorable
Edwin Meese III
Counsellor to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Enclosure
CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
Dated: July 2, 1981
Report on the Performance of the
United States Department of the Treasury
In Connection With the
March 30, 1981, Assassination Attempt
On President Ronald Reagan
Prepared by the
General Counsel,
United States Department
of the Treasury
June , 1981
-2-
Table of Contents
-
I.
Introduction
4
II. Narrative of Events of March 30, 1981,
Presidential Trip to Hilton Hotel
7
III. Treasury Performance: Procedures and
Execution
13
A. United States Secret Service
14
Basic Authority
14
Crisis Management
18
Protective Intelligence
26
Advance Preparations for
March 30, 1981
42
Presidential Protective Detail
53
Security at the Hospital
63
Hilton Hotel Aftermath
68
Protection of the Vice President
73
General Conclusions and Recommendation
75
B. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
76
Legal Authority
76
Procedures for Emergencies.
78
C. United States Customs Service
82
Legal Authority
82
Procedures for Emergencies.
83
D. Office of the Secretary
86
Emergency Notification and
Crisis Management
86
-3-
Responsibilities With Respect to
Capital and Financial Markets
92
Building and Personnel Security
100
I
-4-
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1981, the President of the United States was
fired upon and wounded while leaving a meeting of the Building
and Construction Trades Union at the Washington Hilton Hotel.
This was the first apparent attempt on the life of a President
since 1975, and the first time that a President had been in-
jured in such an attempt since the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, nearly eighteen years ago.
Perhaps more troubling than the incident were its impli-
cations. As one more act of violence in a continuing pattern
of physical attacks on Presidents and other prominent figures,
it raised again the question of how free institutions can
defend themselves and still remain free.
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan, who oversees
the Presidential protection activities of the United States
Secret Service, responded to the incident by directing the
General Counsel of the Department to investigate "all aspects
of the incident, including the adequacy of procedures, facil-
ities and personnel for (i) ascertaining the existence and
assessing the seriousness of threats to the President, (ii)
protecting the President in his public activities, and (iii)
responding promptly and effectively to this and similar
incidents." He observed that "[o]n March 30, 1981, this nation
narrowly avoided a tragedy; your report should focus not only
on the event itself, but also on its lessons for the future.'
In response to this instruction, the General Counsel of
the Treasury established a working group of attorneys, drawn
primarily from the law enforcement area, but with support in
international affairs and domestic finance. Those attorneys
were given full access to the personnel and papers of the
Department and its bureaus, including the U.S. Secret Service,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the U.S.
Customs Service. In addition, Secretary Regan requested, and
the working group received, the cooperation of the Attorney
General, the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Finally, on
a less formal level, the working group was assisted by person-
nel in the White House, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and the Federal Reserve System.
As Secretary Regan suggested, the inquiry went beyond the
-5-
question of whether Treasury agencies responded well-to the
incident of March 30. In many ways, that transfixing encounter
with fate was an easy case: the gunman acted alone; on a week-
day; with a low-caliber weapon; in Washington, D.C.; while the
President was at the door of his limousine; within a mile or
two of a fully equipped and staffed metropolitan hospital;
above all, the President's wound was not mortal. Anyone can
imagine less favorable circumstances, and it is for these that
Treasury and other agencies must be prepared.
For this reason, the report focused on the procedures or
plans which each Treasury agency involved had in place on March
30 for dealing with an assassination attempt or similar crisis,
and compared the agency's performance with the standard estab-
lished by its plans. Where plans or procedures did not exist,
the agency's performance was assessed in light of what profes-
sional judgment or common sense would suggest. The report's
conclusions evaluate performance in relation to procedures,
evaluate procedures for their efficacy, and, in some cases,
recommend the establishment of procedures or plans where none
existed on March 30.
But the report also had significant limits:
*
First, the report does not attempt to suggest an
appropriate level of protection for the President. This is
fundamentally a political and policy question, suitable ulti-
mately for resolution by the President alone. The means exist
fully to protect the President; unfortunately, he must decide
whether in availing himself of these means he will reduce his
ability to lead and his effectiveness in the office.
* Second, the inquiry was made necessary by a crim-
inal act for which an accused person has not yet come to trial.
Accordingly, the inquiry was conducted and the report drafted
in such a way as to minimize any possible threat to the pro-
cedural rights of the accused. To this end, no interviews of
persons who had been at the Washington Hilton on March 30 were
conducted without the approval of the United States Attorney
for the District of Columbia, and no such person was inter-
viewed about his observations of the crime itself.
*
Third, in conformity with the Secretary's direct-
ion, the report is about the Treasury Department and its con-
stituent agencies. The inquiry did not attempt to review or
evaluate security plans or procedures of the White House or of
the intelligence agencies, or indeed to determine whether such
plans exist or were implemented on March 30.
-6-
*
Fourth, the inquiry was concerned solely with
institutional preparedness for, and response to, an attempted
assassination of the President. The performance of individuals
in conditions of crisis was not relevant to these purposes.
Although questions arose concerning the performance of a few
individuals during the inquiry, the details of these matters
are known to officials who can act appropriately upon them and
do not appear in the report.
*
Finally, certain agencies may already have eval-
uated their performance on March 30, 1981, and plan to
implement changes based on that evaluation. The inquiry did
not attempt to review, and the report does not assess the
efficacy, of these changes.
Even with these limitations, however, the report was com-
pelled in some cases to deal with major issues of national
policy, issues which require the balancing of competing values
or objectives. The report does not presume to strike this
balance, but seeks only to make somewhat more clear the impli-
cit choices which underlie current policies. What is already
clear is that a democratic system which values an orderly
transfer of authority through free elections cannot allow the
results of these processes to be redirected or reversed by
violence.
II
/
-7-
II. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS OF MARCH 30, 1981,
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO HILTON HOTEL
President Ronald Reagan was scheduled to visit the
Washington Hilton Hotel on March 30, 1981, to speak to rep-
resentatives of the Building and Construction Trades Union,
AFL-CIO. The President was to arrive by motorcade from the
White House, reaching the hotel at approximately 1:50 p.m.
After entering the hotel, the President would have his picture
taken with fifteen union leaders, and then go into the main
ballroom to speak briefly to approximately 4,000 members of the
union. Following the speech, the President would return to his
motorcade, parked on the "T" Street side of the hotel, and
depart for the White House, where he was to arrive at about
2:30 p.m. The visit was expected to be routine.
Since the President had been making similar trips to the
Hilton approximately once every other week, the White House
staff and the Secret Service had developed a standard drill for
Hilton visits. In accordance with that procedure, the White
House designated a staff advance man, in this case Rick Ahearn,
and provided him with the President's itinerary. The staff
then informed the Secret Service's Presidential Protective
Division (the "PPD") of the scheduled visit. On Wednesday,
March 25, the PPD notified Special Agent William Green that he
would be the lead advance Special Agent for the March 30 visit.
Ahearn was responsible for arranging the President's schedule
during the Hilton visit, while Green was responsible for co-
ordinating all security preparations.
On the morning of Friday, March 27, Ahearn, Green, and
members of their respective advance teams met with Hilton
representatives and with union officials to make arrangements
for the visit scheduled for the following Monday. By Friday
evening, the entire Secret Service advance team had been noti-
fied of their assignments. Over the weekend, Green and Special
Agent Mary Ann Gordon, who was in charge of transportation,
arranged for the participation of other Secret Service Special
Agents and police officers in providing security for the
President for the entire time he would be outside the White
House.
On Monday, the day of the visit, Gordon drove through the
routes to be taken to and from the Hilton with a representative
of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. Later that morn-
ing, Green and an agent from the Service's Washington field
-8-
office went through the hotel looking for security problems.
The Special Agents assigned to guard particular posts in the
hotel, a counter-sniper team, and an intelligence team were
then briefed and placed at their stations. Personnel from the
Service's Technical Security Division conducted searches inside
the hotel and around the arrival area, looking for explosive
devices or any similar threat to the security of the President.
Remaining security preparations for the President's arrival
were completed.
The President's motorcade left the White House at 1:45
p.m., and arrived at the Hilton at 1:50 p.m., as scheduled.
The limousine pulled into a driveway parallel to "T" Street and
stopped directly outside the VIP entrance; the President waited
for his Secret Service escort to surround the limousine, and
then got out of the car and went inside the hotel. There were
no unusual incidents during the trip from the White House to
the Hilton.
Rick Ahearn met the President at the entrance to the hotel
and conducted him inside. President Reagan had his picture
taken with several union leaders in a "holding room," and then
was escorted to the main ballroom for his speech. The speech
began at approximately 2:00 p.m.
In accordance with usual procedure, the motorcade cars
were backed up, after the President had gone into the hotel, so
that the Presidential limousine was parked at an angle to the
curb, with the front of the limousine facing onto "T" Street.
A follow-up car was parked a few feet behind the limousine; the
rest of the motorcade was parked either behind that follow-up
car, or out on "T" Street itself.
At approximately 2:20 p.m., Green informed the agents that
the President was concluding his speech and would be out mo-
mentarily. The motorcade drivers returned to their vehicles,
and the Metropolitan Police Department officers resumed their
assigned posts. The President concluded his speech shortly
thereafter, and left the main ballroom. He was accompanied to
the holding room, and from there to the VIP entrance, by Secret
Service Special Agents and members of his staff.
As the President prepared to depart from the Hilton
through the VIP entrance, members of the press pool who had
covered the speech left the hotel through the terrace entrance
on "T" Street, and began to make their way alongside the motor-
cade and up the hill toward the VIP entrance. Their way was
blocked by the other press and bystanders restrained by the
-9-
rope line, so the press pool began to move around that group
and filter between the cars of the motorcade. When the
Presidential party came through the VIP entrance, there were
more than 200 people on hand. Most of these spectators were
across "T" Street, blocked off by James Brady, Deputy Chief of
Staff Michael Deaver, Military Aide Jose Muratti, and advance
Special Agent Green. Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the
right rear door of the limousine. The President responded to
calls of "Mr. President" from the crowd, and waved first with
one hand, then the other.
The Secret Service protective detail exited, and went to
take up positions around the limousine. The President exited
accompanied by Special Agents Parr and Shaddick, Press
Secretary James Brady, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver,
Military Aide Jose Muratti, and advance Special Agent Green.
Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of the
limousine. The President responded to calls of "Mr. President"
from the crowd, and waved first with one hand, then the other.
At that moment, John Warnock Hinckley is alleged to have
stepped from the second row of the crowd behind the rope bar-
rier, held a .22 caliber handgun in front of him with both
hands, and fired six shots at the President.
At the sound of the shots, Special Agent Parr immediately
pushed the President toward the back seat of the limousine. As
he fell toward the seat of the limousine with Parr on top of
him, the President was apparently struck beneath the left arm
by one bullet which ricocheted off the side of the limousine
and passed through the small space between the door and the
limousine's body. Shaddick pushed Parr and the President into
the limousine, and closed the door behind them. The limousine
moved off in less than ten seconds, dodged a stalled
Metropolitan Police Department car, drove up "T" Street and
turned left onto Connecticut Avenue. Most of the rest of the
motorcade was blocked for several seconds by spectators, so
only one motorcade car (now carrying Special Agent Gordon) and
one motorcycle policeman accompanied the limousine as it turned
onto Connecticut Avenue.
The six shots had been fired by the assailant in a period
of less than two seconds. One shot struck Press Secretary
Brady in the head, and he fell to the ground immediately.
Another struck Officer Delahanty in the neck; a third struck
Special Agent Tim McCarthy in the upper torso as he turned,
screening the President with raised arms, toward the sound of
the shots. Two more shots ricocheted off the armored lim-
-10-
ousine, one of which struck the President. A sixth shot
traveled across the street and passed through a window.
The first individual to reach the assailant was Alfred
Antenucci, a civilian who jumped on him from behind as the last
shot was fired. Reacting to the shots, Special Agent D.V.
McCarthy moved along the rope line in front of the crowd and
was the first law enforcement officer to reach Hinckley, diving
on him as he continued to pull the trigger on an empty gun.
McCarthy was followed immediately by Sergeant Granger and
Officer Swain of the Metropolitan Police Department. The
assailant had his weapon quickly shaken from him; this weapon
was eventually retrieved by Special Agent Thomas Lightsey.
After some seconds, D.V. McCarthy was able to handcuff
Hinckley, as other Secret Service Special Agents and police
officers moved to surround them. Although several Secret
Service Special Agents drew their weapons, no shots were fired,
and only the persons struck by the assailant's bullets were
injured. As the Secret Service and the police began to clear
the scene of bystanders, the rest of the motorcade was able to
leave, several seconds behind the limousine.
One of the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers left his
motorcycle and ran to assist the agents struggling with
Hinckley. As he arrived at the crowd of Special Agents, he
lost his .38 caliber revolver, which fell alongside the
prostrate Brady. For some minutes, this revolver was mistaken
for the weapon used by the assailant, causing considerable
confusion. The officer subsequently retrieved his revolver,
and assisted in moving Hinckley toward the Metropolitan Police
Department cruiser brought to the scene by Sergeant Granger.
When the rear door of Granger's vehicle would not open, the
crowd of Special Agents and policemen moved to a second
Metropolitan Police Department cruiser. Hinckley was pushed
into this vehicle, and was taken to the Metropolitan Police
Department Central Cell Block.
The wounded were given some limited medical assistance at
the hotel by two paramedics who identified themselves to Secret
Service agents on the scene. McCarthy, Brady, and Delahanty
were removed, in that order, by ambulances. McCarthy and Brady
were taken to George Washington University Hospital, while
Delahanty was taken to the Washington Hospital Center.
This activity was taking place as the Presidential motor-
cade traveled along Connecticut Avenue. Once the Presidential
limousine had cleared the area of the Hilton, the President
asked Parr to get off him, and complained of pain in his ribs.
-11-
Parr radioed, "[The President] is OK," and instructed the
motorcade to proceed to the White House. Parr continued to
examine the President and found no evidence of external injury,
but noticed that the President was bleeding from his mouth.
The President suggested that he might have broken a rib; Parr
was unsure of the precise nature of the President's injury, but
he decided nonetheless to divert the motorcade to George
Washington University Hospital (the hospital designated for
emergency use on the Hilton trip).
Special Agent Unrue, driving the President's limousine,
informed the motorcade by radio and Secret Service agents moni-
toring the broadcast notified the hospital of the change in
plan. Hospital personnel were not told that the President was
injured, however, since no one in the motorcade had said that
the President had been hurt (Parr radioed a request for a
stretcher, but not until after the hospital had been notified).
When the President reached the hospital, the emergency trauma
staff inside was assembling, but no stretcher was brought
outside for his use.
Special Agents Parr and Shaddick escorted the President
through the doors of the emergency entrance. After the
President got inside, his knees buckled; Parr and Shaddick
assisted him inside the emergency room, where he was placed on
a cart and moved to the trauma area. A team of seven or eight
emergency personnel, headed by Dr. Joseph Giordano, removed the
President's clothing. It was only after the President's shirt
had been removed that the medical personnel attending the
President realized that he had been shot.
The President spent approximately forty minutes in the
trauma area being prepared for surgery. He remained conscious
throughout this preliminary treatment, and was able to speak
with Mrs. Reagan and emergency personnel. The President was
moved to an operating room at some time between 3:15 p.m. and
3:30 p.m.
Dr. Benjamin Aaron assumed command of the President's
operating team. Dr. Giordano conducted the initial procedure,
known as a "peritoneal lavage," which involved an incision into
the abdomen and the insertion of a small tube to determine
whether any of the major internal organs had been damaged. No
damage was found. Dr. Aaron then performed the surgery to
remove the bullet. He encountered a great deal of bleeding
from the President's chest; later estimates indicated that the
President lost almost one-half of the volume of blood in his
body before going into surgery. Initially, Dr. Aaron was
-12-
unable to trace the path of the bullet; although he reportedly
decided at least once to terminate the surgery without locating
the bullet, he continued and was able to locate the bullet
shortly before 6:00 p.m. The bullet had been flattened, and
upon removal appeared to be roughly the shape of a dime.
Following surgery, the President was moved to a recovery room
after 6:30 p.m.
Chief of Staff James Baker and Presidential Counselor
Edwin Meese were informed of the shooting within minutes of its
occurrence. Baker and Meese went to the hospital, while
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security
Adviser Richard Allen, CIA Director William Casey, and Attorney
General William French Smith met in the White House Situation
Room.
Vice President Bush was notified that shots had been fired
as his Air Force plane left Fort Worth, Texas, destined for
Austin. Bush decided to allow the plane to be refueled in
Austin, and then to return to Washington. The return to the
White House occurred without incident. He landed at Andrews
Air Force Base at approximately 6:30 p.m. From there, he was
taken by helicopter to his official residence at the Naval
Observatory, and then by motorcade to the White House. Bush
went directly to the Situation Room, and was briefed by the
officials there. The Vice President made a brief statement to
the press at approximately 8:00 p.m., and then returned to the
Situation Room, where he remained until 9:45 p.m.
While the President was being treated for his injuries and
senior government officials were taking steps in response to
the shooting, law enforcement agencies, headed by the BRI,
initiated an investigation of the incident. The man appre-
hended at the Hilton was interviewed by representatives of the
FBI, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Secret
Service; his wallet and personal belongings were searched for
investigative leads. Shortly after 3:00 p.m. he was identified
as Hinckley, and Federal Agencies began cross-checking records
for any information on the suspect. When his identity was
announced by the national news services, field offices in
geographic areas Hinckley had been known to frequent did the
same. By 4:30 p.m., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms had successfully traced the handgun used in the
assault to a pawnshop in Dallas, and had learned that Hinckley
had purchased other weapons and ammunition at that shop and at
other locations.
-13-
The Washington field office of the FBI took custody of
Hinckley shortly before 5:00 p.m., after having begun efforts
to obtain a warrant to search Hinckley's room at the Park
Central Hotel. At 9:45 p.m., a warrant was obtained from U.S.
Magistrate Arthur L. Burnett, authorizing a search of
Hinckley's hotel room; this search began at 9:55 p.m. and
continued until 4:15 a.m. the following morning. At 11:00
p.m., criminal complaints were sworn against Hinckley for
assaulting the President and assaulting Federal officers.
After a preliminary hearing, Hinckley was moved to a Marine
Corps brig at Quantico, Virginia.
-14-
III. TREASURY DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE:
PROCEDURES AND EXECUTION
Although the Treasury Department's interest in the safety
of the President begins with one of its bureaus, the United
States Secret Service, it extends beyond that single juris-
dictional nexus. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
a Treasury agency, has jurisdiction over Federal regulation of
many of the weapons which may be used in an attempt on the
President's life, and the U.S. Customs Service has intelligence
resources and authority to interdict movements of persons and
things which could give it a role in preventing or limiting the
damage caused by such an incident.
Moreover, as the lead agency of the United States
Government on economic matters, Treasury has a legitimate
concern for protecting and fostering the stability of domestic
and international financial markets, and maintaining a capacity
to discharge numerous other Federal responsibilities. Finally,
the Secretary of the Treasury both has the responsibility for
directing the exercise of these varied authorities and stands
fifth in line of succession to the Presidency. Thus, the
procedures for keeping him advised of events assume great
importance.
Each agency or unit of the Treasury Department which had a
role in the incident of March 30 will be examined in this
report for the purpose of evaluating both its preparations for
dealing with an assassination attempt and its responses to the
attempt on President Reagan that occurred on March 30, 1981.
The report will assess agency procedures in effect on that
date, the adequacy of those procedures, and the performance of
these agencies as measured against whatever procedures were in
place.
The conclusions arising out of these evaluations, and our
recommendations based thereon, are set forth at the end of each
section of this report.
-15-
A. United States Secret Service
BASIC AUTHORITY
The United States Secret Service is an agency of approx-
imately 3,500 employees, organized into a Washington, D.C.,
headquarters and 61 domestic (and two foreign) field offices.
While the Service is charged with protection of the President
of the United States under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056, it must also
perform a number of other protective responsibilities 1/ and
investigate violations of the laws against counterfeiting of
coin, currency, and stamps, and forgery and fraudulent negotia-
tion of Government checks, bonds and other securities.
The performance of the Secret Service on March 30, 1981,
must be reviewed against a background of budget constraints.
Secret Service officials point out that over the past four
years their force of Special Agents has declined by 72 (to
1,544) and the force of Uniformed Division officers has declin-
ed by 97 (to 800). Concurrently, Service officials estimate
that protective responsibilities assigned to the Service during
the same period would require 217 additional positions. While
all government agencies claim to be understaffed, certain of
1/ The responsibilities include protection of: the
President's immediate family; the Vice President or other
officer next in the order of succession to the Office of the
President; the President- and Vice President-elect; the members
of their immediate families, unless the members decline such
protection; the visiting head of a foreign state or foreign
government and, at the direction of the President, other dis-
tinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official
representatives of the United States performing special mis-
sions abroad; persons who are classified as major Presidential
or Vice Presidential candidates unless such protection is
declined; former Presidents and their spouses; the Executive
Residence and grounds and any building in which the White House
offices are located; the temporary official residence of the
Vice President and grounds in the District of Columbia; foreign
diplomatic missions in the Washington metropolitan area and
such areas in the United States, its territories and posses-
sions, as the President may direct on a case-by-case basis;
protection of foreign diplomatic missions located in metro-
politan areas in the United States where there are located
twenty or more such missions headed by full-time officers (only
under certain enumerated circumstances); and the Main Treasury
Building and its Annex in Washington, D.C.
-16-
the responses of the Service on March 30 suggest that centinual
shortages of manpower may have created a reflexive response
against commitment of excessive personnel to any incident, even
a crisis.
ORGANIZATION
An understanding of the methods used by the Secret Service
to provide protection for the President requires some working
knowledge of its organizational structure, and the ways in
which it divides responsibility.
Functioning under a Director, H. Stuart Knight, and a
Deputy Director, Myron J. Weinstein, the Secret Service has
five Assistant Directors whose responsibilities generally
reflect the structure of the organization: Investigations,
Protective Operations, Protective Research, Administration, and
Inspection. The last two are support functions, with no direct
management role in a crisis situation. Only the roles of the
first three, and their subordinate offices and units, will be
covered in this report.
*
The Office of Investigations, under Acting Assistant
Director Robert R. Burke, has line authority over the 63 field
offices of the Secret Service located throughout the United
States and abroad. Those offices are staffed with most of the
1,544 Special Agents of the Secret Service, who investigate
incidents of counterfeiting and forgery when they are not per-
forming intelligence investigations or direct protective
duties. Of these 63 field offices, the one with the largest
protective mission by far, and the one on which this report
will focus, is the Washington, D.C., field office.
*
The Office of Protective Operations, under Assistant
Director John R. Simpson, supervises the Uniformed Division and
the protective details -- those units of Special Agents
assigned full-time to the protection of specific persons,
traveling with them and drawing on the field offices for sup-
port and supplementation as necessary. The Uniformed Division,
composed of 800 officers, is trained as a police force and
assigned to guard the White House and foreign missions within
the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia.
*
The Office of Protective Research, under Acting
Assistant Director Robert R. Snow, is responsible for the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of protective
intelligence information for the entire Secret Service; it
-17-
provides policies and procedures relating to data systems and
communications; and it develops and conducts scientific and
technical programs in support of the protective and invest-
igative responsibilities of the Secret Service. Located only
at the Service's Washington, D.C., headquarters, the Office of
Protective Research consists of six divisions, and is staffed
with approximately 66 Special Agents and a number of tech-
nicians and specialists.
In addition, the Director has Assistants for Public
Affairs and Training, and a Legal Counsel, who provides advice
to him but reports directly to Treasury's General Counsel. Of
these, only the Public Affairs Assistant has a role in a crisis
involving the President of the United States. Therefore,
although Public Affairs is not a part of the Service's protect-
ive staff, it will also be covered in this report.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
This report's analysis of the performance of the Secret
Service follows, as closely as possible within the constraints
of the Service's structure, the sequence in which the Service's
various constituent organizations had their most intense
involvement in the process of protecting the President on March
30 --
* The Office of Protective Intelligence, which has its
greatest impact on the President's safety in the work that it
does long before any particular trip;
* The "advance" group -- the Special Agents and special-
ists drawn from a cross section of the Service's protective
organizations who prepared the way for the President at the
Washington Hilton;
* The "protective detail" of specially trained Special
Agents who accompanied the President throughout the day,
covered him with their bodies, and evacuated him to George
Washington University Hospital;
* The Special Agents who went to George Washington
University Hospital to aid in establishing security for the
President after the evacuation from the Hilton;
* The Special Agents who remained at the Hilton Hotel to
coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and gather
intelligence for the prosecution of the suspect and for evalu-
-18-
ation in connection with the Service's protective functions;
and
* The protection that the Service maintained for the Vice
President as the possibility arose that he might have to assume
the Presidency.
-19-
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Within the Secret Service crisis management scheme there
are three principal assigned areas of responsibility, roughly
corresponding to the three line Assistant Directors. As is set
forth below in more detail, within the Intelligence Division of
the Office of Protective Research, an intelligence Command/
Control Center is established for coordination of all intelli-
gence and alert notifications. Within the Office of
Investigations, the Assistant Director, operating primarily
through his subordinate field office in the geographical locale
of the crisis, is responsible for preserving the security of
the crime or incident scene until the arrival of the FBI, and
for working with the FBI on the subsequent criminal
investigation. Within the Office of Protective Operations, the
head of the protective detail involved in the crisis is respon-
sible for continuing emergency coordination of protection. On
March 30, 1981, all three of these emergency procedures went
into operation.
Intelligence Division's Command/Control Center
Procedures
In a May 20, 1980, memorandum, titled "Headquarters
Emergency Situation Response", Deputy Director Weinstein set
out procedures for the establishment of a "top level command
and/or control facility where emergency situations can be
coordinated" at headquarters and in the Service's Washington
field office. Within the Secret Service this procedure is
understood to cover emergency "incoming and outgoing
information/communications" together with initial emergency
personnel notification. Actual command responsibility for the
discharge of the protective and criminal missions of the
Service is covered in another memorandum, discussed below.
Under the procedures set out in the Headquarters Emergency
Situation Response memorandum, the Operations Desk Supervisor
of the Intelligence Division is responsible for notifying all
affected offices, working from a published list contained in
the memorandum. Personnel in each office are in turn respon-
sible for ensuring that the head of the office and all others
with a need to know are promptly notified.
-20-
Any Assistant Director may activate the headquarters
Command/Control Center. If more than one Assistant Director is
directly involved, the Director or Deputy Director is required
to designate which Assistant Director will be in charge at the
Center. That Assistant Director is then responsible for in-
suring that all incoming and outgoing information and commun-
ications concerning the emergency situation are channeled
through the Center. A representative from the office of each
Assistant Director which has a role in the emergency and a
representative of the Office of Public Affairs (depending on
the nature of the emergency) are expected to report to the
Center and to serve as contact points for communication of
information in either direction.
Beyond the establishment of the Center and the requirement
for accomplishing appropriate notifications, the May 20, 1980,
memorandum does not contain procedures to govern the conduct of
the Center. The personnel available to staff the Center, how-
ever, are experienced Special Agents who staff the duty desk as
a routine matter. There is a substantial similarity between
their daily responsibilities and the intelligence and communi-
cations functions that they are likely to be required to per-
form during a crisis.
Execution of Center Procedures
With written instructions in place for establishing a
headquarters Command/Control Center, the Secret Service re-
sponded quickly in setting up a Center on March 30. Acting
Deputy Assistant Director Richard E. Keiser took charge of the
Center, but left the principal command to the Intelligence
Division's Special Agent in Charge, Edward Walsh.
Walsh assumed overall supervision of the Command Center
within a minute or two of the receipt of the initial radio re-
ports that there had been an attack on the President. Person-
nel from the Office of Protective Operations, the Office of
Investigations, and the Public Affairs Office quickly assembled
at peripheral desks around the duty desk operation and Walsh
installed senior Special Agents in the key positions at the
desk. Communications were immediately established with the
Hilton Hotel Security Room and with the Intelligence Squad at
the Washington field office. In addition, telephone arrange-
ments were established between the duty desk and the Protective
Operations and Investigations Offices.
-21-
The Command/Control Center was not intended to handle the
deployment of physical protection. Its demands on field
offices are for the development of intelligence -- and to the
extent this requires additional manpower the Office of
Investigations transfers personnel among field offices as
needed.
Operational Crisis-Management
Operational Crisis-Management Procedures
The Secret Service also has written procedures governing
crisis response by operational personnel. These are set out in
an April 23, 1979, memorandum issued by Deputy Director
Weinstein. Among other things, that memorandum directs that
the first Intelligence Team present at the attack site is to
establish an "interim federal presence" and maintain that
presence until relieved by the FBI or the Special Agent in
Charge of the local field office.
The Assistant Director (Office of Protective Research) is
assigned responsibility for determining the nature of the
attack and the potential for additional threats to protected
persons; the protective detail leader "[h]as the ultimate
responsibility to evacuate and provide necessary security for
the protectee"; and the Special Agent in Charge of the field
office (which was the Washington, D.C., field office in the
March 30 crisis) is responsible for assisting the protective
detail leader in insuring the safety and evacuation of the
protected person. The memorandum contains no provisions re-
quiring an automatic increase in the level of protection around
the President.
Except for Special Agents assigned to the protective
details for specific protected persons, in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area there are approximately 280 Special Agents
(of whom 110 are assigned to the Washington Field Office) and
800 Officers of the Uniformed Division. As a practical matter,
on any given day these Agents and Officers handle regular
protective and other assignments, or may be in leave status,
effectively reducing the number available to protect the
President.
-22-
Execution of Operational Crisis-Management Procedures
-
No Secret Service Special Agent or Uniformed Division
Officer had been posted at George Washington Hospital on March
30, 1981. Immediately upon learning that the President had
been taken to this hospital, Acting Special Agent in Charge
Andrew Berger of the Washington field office sent one super-
visor (Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Pat Miller) and
a small group of Special Agents to the hospital. When
it
arrived at the hospital, the Presidential motorcade radioed a
request for more manpower, within a few minutes, Berger sent
another Special Agent followed at approximately 3:00 p.m. by a
small group of additional Special Agents.
Information prepared later by the Washington field office
suggests that some other agents may have gone on their own or
been sent over during this period, but between 3:00 p.m. and
5:00 p.m., no additional agents were requested by Pat Miller,
and none were sent spontaneously by Berger. Throughout these
hours, Berger recalls receiving no communications from the
Presidential detail concerning the situation at the hospital,
and recalls no significant communications from headquarters
concerning manpower needs. A reserve of Special Agents was
gathered in the Washington field office conference room, and
was parcelled out on other assignments during the course of the
afternoon.
Most of the attention of supervisory Washington field
office personnel was directed to the arrangements concerning
the custody of Hinckley; the transmittal of information derived
from Hinckley's personal effects (the first significant intel-
ligence accumulated to help determine the nature and extent of
the crisis) to the Command/Control Center at headquarters and
to the appropriate field offices; and coordination with other
protective details in the Washington, D.C., area.
In the meantime, Gerald Bechtle, acting as Assistant
Director of Protective Operations, sent instructions to the
Washington Hilton to hold the original security contingent at
the hotel in order to execute his understanding of the "interim
federal presence" requirements of the April 23, 1979 memo-
randum. That memorandum actually assigned the responsibility
for maintaining that presence to the first intelligence team on
the scene and did not, at least in its express terms, require
that the intelligence team keep other Special Agents there.
Just after 4:00 p.m., Bechtle directed the Uniformed
Division to send as many officers as possible to the hospital.
-23-
Then, a little after 5:00 p.m., Bechtle received a call from
Miller at the hospital asking for a substantial number of
Special Agents. This call had been diverted from the
Washington field office because Miller could not get through on
the telephone lines. Miller was anticipating the President's
removal from surgery, and he expected to need additional man-
power to station in a couple of additional areas of the hos-
pital. In response, Bechtle had the Office of Training at
headquarters queried to see if Special Agents could be located
in the in-service training classes that were being conducted in
downtown Washignton.
During the first hour and a half the Office of
Investigations received no requests for help from the
Presidential detail at the hospital, or from Bechtle in
Protective Operations, from whom they would have expected any
requests to come. Assistant Director Burke recalls calling
Berger at the Washington field office around 6:00 p.m. to ask
whether Inspection should provide manpower to the hospital, and
Berger said no.
While additional numbers of Special Agents were mustered
to the hospital site by accumulating them from parts of the
Presidential Protective Division, as will appear in the discus-
sion of the situation at the hospital below, it does not appear
that supervisory Secret Service agents away from the hospital
had any specific information concerning the number of Secret
Service personnel at the site. With the exception of the
limited numbers of Special Agents sent by Washington field
office personnel, largely on their own initiative, and the
Uniformed Division officers who arrived around 5:00 p.m., it
does not appear that those off-site supervisors attempted to
increase manpower on the site during the first two hours or so.
In effect, headquarters crisis managers followed the
implications of existing procedures, and assumed that the
Presidential detail personnel on site, and the Washington field
office personnel sent there shortly afterward, would request
whatever assistance was necessary. The requests they received
from the hospital site were few, and took some period of time
to fulfill; as a consequence, the number of Service personnel
at the hospital did not reach a level substantially greater
than the security that had been established at the Hilton prior
to the shooting until late in the afternoon of March 30.
-24-
Office of Public Affairs: Crisis Response
-
Procedures
The Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service has no
written procedures which prescribe how office functions are to
be performed under either routine or emergency conditions.
However, the Assistant to the Director (Public Affairs), Jack
Warner, has held that position for a number of years and has
developed a routine for office operations when an event occurs
which attracts substantial media interest. In addition, he is
required to provide a representative to the Command/Control
Center that is set up in the Intelligence Division whenever a
crisis arises.
Personnel assigned to the Office of Public Affairs are
instructed that only Warner will handle wire service calls and
audiotaping for radio and television. Determinations of what
information will be released are also made by Warner. The gen-
eral policy is that information not injurious to the mission of
Secret Service will be released.
Action of Public Affairs Personnel on March 30
The Office of Public Affairs received notification of the
assassination attempt from the Command/Control Center in the
Intelligence Division offices almost immediately. The Center
remained the primary source of information for Public Affairs
throughout the afternoon.
Public Affairs immediately took steps to inform the
Director and Deputy Director, and assigned staff to the
Command/Control Center. The assumption was made that the
Center would not be able to reach Public Affairs by telephone,
SO a messenger system was arranged to deliver information to
the Public Affairs office.
The major activity that took place in Public Affairs was
responding, to an overwhelming number of inquiries from the
press. Wire service calls and taping for radio and television
were handled personally by Warner. There was an initial effort
to have him respond to all the network inquiries as well, but
there were too many.
There was little, if any, contact between Secret Service
Public Affairs and the public affairs offices of the Treasury
Department or its other bureaus. There were some calls between
-25-
Secret Service Public Affairs and the White House press office
to coordinate their information, primarily through Deputy Press
Secretary Larry Speakes. Although the hospital and the White
House had established a press room in a hospital auditorium,
the Secret Service Public Affairs operation had no contact with
it.
During the afternoon, a large number of media personnel
congregated in the eighth floor lobby area at Secret Service
headquarters. Warner periodically went out and spoke to them
as information became available. Although his responsibility
is to answer questions related to Secret Service, he was
routinely asked other questions as well, but he did not
respond.
Conclusions
1. The Secret Service system for establishing a Command/
Control Center at the duty desk of the Intelligence Division is
a sound and effective method of ensuring that emergency notifi-
cation is provided to the appropriate personnel, and that
intelligence is collected and disseminated throughout the
Service. This system was implemented in an effective and
timely manner on March 30, 1981.
2. While the Secret Service has regular procedures for
maintaining security around the President, in a crisis situ-
ation such as the aftermath of an attempted assassination the
procedures do not contemplate an increase in security unless
the head of the President's protective detail makes a decision
to request additional assistance. This may not be the most
reasonable allocation of responsibility. The principal agent
on the scene may not know the dimensions of the threat that
produced the attempt; his attention is likely to be focused on
the immediate physical welfare of the President, and he may
hesitate to call for increased security simply because he is
not aware that the threat which places the President in
jeopardy extends beyond a single assassin.
The key question appears to be whether the Service should
act first and risk over-manning or await a more comprehensive
view of the circumstances before increasing security around the
President. On the facts of March 30, viewed with hindsight,
there was no need for special precautions. But in the first
hour at the hospital the Service could not have known this.
The prudent course would appear to be the establishment of
-26-
procedures which will rapidly increase security in the immed-
iate aftermath of an assassination attempt. These procedures
should contain special provisions to accommodate the special
situations that arise in the Washington, D.C., area.
3. Despite the absence of written procedures on March 30,
the Office of Public Affairs at Secret Service functioned
satisfactorily.
The Office has followed a policy of attempting to confine
its press contacts to matters peculiarly within the knowledge
of, and related specifically to, the Secret Service. Based on
a review of press clippings and an interview with the Assistant
to the Director (Public Affairs), there is no indication that
the office went beyond its mandate in providing information to
the public.
Recommendation
The Secret Service should consider whether to establish
procedures for substantially and rapidly increasing security
around the President in any crisis situation -- such as that at
the hospital on March 30, 1981 -- in which the degree of con-
tinuing danger to the President is largely unknown. These pro-
cedures should take account of variations in the level of man-
power available to the Secret Service due to such factors as
the time of day, and the location of the President.
-27-
PROTECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
Procedures
The Secret Service responsibility for developing intelli-
gence for protective purposes is assigned to the Office of
Protective Research. Within that office are six divisions.
The primary intelligence collection and analysis functions are
assigned to the Intelligence Division and the Liaison Division.
In the Washington, D.C. area, these two divisions are substant-
ially augmented by personnel of the Washington field office
intelligence squad.
Intelligence Received Via The White House
White House personnel turn over to the Secret Service
letters and telephone calls that appear threatening to the
President or another official. If the matter requires further
investigation a field investigation is authorized. Individuals
who come to the White House complex are interviewed, and then
referred to the protective intelligence squad of the Washington
field office for possible investigation.
Intelligence Received From the Field
Intelligence in the field is collected through field
office investigations, from state and local agencies, and from
the field offices of other Federal agencies. Intelligence from
state and local agencies will include information elicited from
or volunteered by law enforcement groups, local mental hosp-
itals, and state and local government offices.
The degree to which the field is successful at gener-
ating intelligence is solely attributable to informal field
liaison efforts aimed at either requesting information and
assistance, or educating local agencies to the Service's intel-
ligence needs. These efforts are informally monitored and
encouraged by the Intelligence Division at headquarters.
Secret Service Director Stuart Knight has stated on sev-
eral occasions that the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act have contributed to a decrease over the last sev-
eral years in intelligence information received from various
sources, including other law enforcement agencies and foreign
-28-
countries. For example, in testimony before committees of both
the House and Senate following the March 30 assassination
attempt, Knight testified that foreign law enforcement organ-
izations as well as state and local police are reluctant to
pass on information to the Secret Service and other federal
agencies. They believe that, because of the Freedom of
Information Act and Privacy Act, United States government
agencies do not have the ability to maintain the confident-
iality of the information they receive.
The Secret Service's view is almost universally shared by
other law enforcement officials. In a report entitled "Impact
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts on Law
Enforcement Agencies," dated November 15, 1978, the Comptroller
General stated that "law enforcement officials at all levels of
government have stated in congressional testimony that the
proliferation of access and privacy laws has been instrumental
in creating a restrictive climate which affects their ability
to obtain information from the public and institutions, to
recruit and maintain informants, and to exchange information
with other law enforcement agencies."
Law enforcement officials reported, according to the GAO
Report, that the Privacy Act has had some of its most severe
effects on their ability to obtain information from institu-
tions such as hospitals, banks and telephone companies. While
law enforcement agencies could previously obtain records from
these institutions on an informal basis, an increasing number
require the agencies to get a subpoena before providing the
information. Secret Service officials told the GAO that since
most of the threats against the President come from mentally
unstable individuals, timely access to records maintained by
mental institutions is critical when the President or other
dignitaries travel around the country.
Intelligence Received from other Federal Agencies
The Service has entered into memoranda of understanding or
agreements with other Federal agencies, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency.
These agreements describe in broad, general terms the intelli-
gence sought by the Service, and an examination of various ed-
itions of these agreements used over the past ten years shows
little substantive evolution in the description of information
the agencies are to furnish.
2/ Footnote on next page]
-29-
Neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division
has any procedures for monitoring whether Federal agencies have
internal guidelines implementing the agreements and educating
their personnel as to Service intelligence needs, although the
Intelligence Division itself tries to use its limited staff to
perform these functions informally with respect to some
2/ [Footnote from previous page] Agreements commonly
specify seven "types" of information to be referred to the
Service:
1. Information concerning attempts, threats, or con-
spiracies to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by
the USSS or other U.S. or foreign officials in the U.S.
or abroad.
2. Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a
grievance against any public official by other than legal
means, or attempts personally to contact such officials
for that purpose.
3. Information concerning threatening, irrational, or
abusive written or oral statements about U.S. Government
or foreign officials.
4. Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U.S.
demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against
foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-
making; concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or
other implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
6. Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a
desire to defect from the United States and who demon-
strate one or more of the following characteristics:
a. irrational or suicidal behavior or other
emotional instability.
b. strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiment.
C. a propensity toward violence.
7. Information concerning persons who may be considered
potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS
because of their background or activities, including evi-
dence of emotional instability or participation in groups
engaging in activities inimical to the United States.
-30-
agencies. Infrequently, Liaison arranges meetings with rep-
resentatives of other Federal agencies in which Intelligence
Division personnel can describe their intelligence require-
ments.
Liaison Division agents maintain informal relations with
the rest of the Federal community, and will serve as a conduit
for Intelligence Division requests to these agencies for spec-
ific information. Some agencies provide formal liaison con-
tacts while others do not, forcing Liaison Division agents to
establish their own contacts on an informal basis. Liaison
Division agents also distribute to their Federal agency con-
tacts boilerplate descriptions, similar to those in the formal
agreements, of Service intelligence needs. How these handouts
are utilized by the Federal agencies is not monitored.
Federal agencies provide the Service with intelligence in
response to a direct request for specific information from the
Intelligence Division, or in response to a request from the
Liaison Division. Federal agencies, especially the FBI and
the CIA, unilaterally provide intelligence they judge to be of
interest to the Service. Intelligence suppliers have not been
assessed or evaluated with a view to improving their perform-
ance.
Information collected and disseminated by the FBI is the
most important source of Secret Service intelligence on potent-
ial domestic threats to the President, and has a significant
impact on the ability of the Service to fulfill its mission.
As a general matter, intelligence received from the FBI will be
of two types: information about the intentions and objectives
of individuals and groups, and information about what
individuals and groups have actually done.
Since the Service is interested in predictive information
-- that is, intelligence which will enable it to assess pos-
sible threats to the President -- information about intentions
is a good deal more valuable to the Service than information
about completed acts, from which future intentions may only be
inferred.
This distinction has led the Service to become increas-
ingly concerned in recent years about a decline in the FBI's
domestic intelligence activities, and the almost exclusive
emphasis which the FBI has begun to place on its role as an
agency engaged in investigation for purposes of assisting
prosecutorial authorities. Generally speaking, much domestic
intelligence investigation may be usefully characterized as the
-32-
stronger suggestion on the face of the data that an invest-
igation should be undertaken, the most the Service could
reasonably do with raw arrest information would be store it for
later correlation with other facts. If, for example, the same
person were arrested in another city the President is visiting,
the coincidence might suggest that he is "stalking" the
President and justify a more thorough investigation. Today,
the Service's resources do not permit such data correlation.
The data processing and intelligence resources required
just for that, quite limited, correlative system would be
massive, and even then there could be no assurance that the
linking of circumstantial data to support an inference of
danger would be more than mere chance. Normally, follow-up
investigation would still be needed.
Limitations on resources -- and indeed effective use of
resources by the Service -- compel the Service to concentrate
its efforts on collecting, analyzing and investigating infor-
mation which more directly indicates a threat to the President.
This is information about the overtly or covertly expressed
intentions of individuals or groups.
From the protection-oriented perspective of the Service,
therefore, the decline in FBI domestic intelligence activities
has caused a critical overall decline in the useful information
the Service receives from the FBI. In November 1979, Secret
Service Director Stuart Knight testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee that the Service was, at that time, receiv-
ing only about 40 percent of what it had previously received
from the FBI, and that this reduced intelligence product had
deteriorated in quality. Explaining what he meant by quality,
he referred to the loss of information concerning motives and
plans.
Knight repeated these statements in the aftermath of the
March 30 assassination attempt, in testimony before other com-
mittees of the House and Senate, specifically attributing this
loss of useful intelligence to the Attorney General's Domestic
Security Guidelines.
On March 10, 1976, then Attorney General Edward Levi
issued Domestic Security Guidelines which, in effect, prevented
the FBI from engaging in domestic intelligence gathering unless
it was in possession of "specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be
engaged in activities which (1) involve the use of force or
violence and which (2) involve or will involve the violation of
-33-
federal law for one or more of [certain] purposes [related to
the overthrow of the government or abridgement of civil
rights].
The Domestic Security Guidelines define three stages of
investigation: preliminary, limited and full. Preliminary and
limited investigations are confined to determining whether a
full investigation is warranted. They may be undertaken only
on the reasonable belief that a violation of federal law, by
way of force or violence, is involved, and they may only be
carried on for short periods of time A limited investigation
allows a somewhat greater range of investigative techniques
than is available in a preliminary investigation, but it must
be authorized in writing by a Special Agent in Charge or FBI
Headquarters. Full investigations must be authorized by FBI
Headquarters based on specific and articulable facts concerning
the use of force or violence in committing certain crimes.
The Guidelines limit the period during which a full
investigation may be conducted to one year, extendable only if
the Department of Justice gives written authority. 4/
3/ Attorney General's Guidelines for domestic security
investigations, issued by Attorney General Edward Levi,
April 5, 1976, Subparagraph II.I.
/ [Id., II.E. Preliminary investigations are limited
to: ]
(1) examination of FBI indices and files;
(2) examination of public records and other public sources
of information; [Footnote continued on next page]
(3) examination of federal, state, and local records;
(4) inquiry of existing sources of information and use
of previously established informants; and
(5) physical surveillance and interviews or [sic] persons
not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for the limited purpose of
identifying the subject of an investigation.
[II.F. Investigative techniques for limited investigations
may also include:]
(1) physical surveillance for purposes other than
identifying the subject of the investigation;
(2) interviews of persons not mentioned in E(1)-E(4) for
purposes other than identifying the subject of the
investigation, but only when authorized by the Special
Agent in Charge
[Footnote continued on next page]
-34-
The Service's criticism of these guidelines raises serious
questions which cannot be ignored in any study of the Service's
performance. As the March 30 incident reveals, physically sur-
rounding the President is not sufficient protection. The
President's ultimate shield must be the ability of the Secret
Service to keep him out of dangerous environments. This the
Service cannot do without adequate intelligence resources --
information about the intentions and plans of potentially
dangerous people.
Despite its significance to the Service's performance, the
Service has done little to document or analyze the decline in
FBI intelligence dissemination which it attributes to the
Domestic Security Guidelines. Circumstantial data, however,
appears to confirm the Service's view that the decline has been
very substantial.
In interviews conducted for this report, FBI officials
have estimated that more than 20,000 so-called domestic secur-
ity cases were open shortly prior to the promulgation of the
Attorney General's Domestic Security Guidelines. While some of
those cases were converted into standard criminal investiga-
tions when the necessary information was developed, very few of
the remainder produced criminal prosecutions. Some officials
at the Bureau state that all but about 7,000 of those cases
were terminated by the FBI for reasons other than the restrict-
ions imposed by the Domestic Security Guidelines, but they
nonetheless appear to accept the estimates of the number of
domestic security cases which the FBI was handling before 1976.
Whatever the reason for termination of these cases, the
decline in their number since publication of the Attorney
General's Domestic Security Guidelines has been precipitous.
According to a 1976 report by the General Accounting Office,
the ten FBI field offices studied by the Comptroller General
during 1974 actively investigated 19,659 domestic intelligence
cases, which the report asserted to represent 35 percent of a
total of 55,500 cases on "subversives and extremists" opened or
reopened by the FBI during 1974.
4/ [Footnote continued]
[II.I. Investigative techniques for full investigations may
also include:]
(1) use of informants
subject to review [after] 180
days;
(2) 'mail covers'
(3) electronic surveillance
-35-
In a 1977 follow-up investigation, the GAO again _counted
cases and reported:
[w]e believe that the FBI's domestic intelligence
effort has declined substantially. Although it is
impossible to attribute the decline to any one reason, a
major factor, particularly since April 1976, would be the
interpretation given to the Attorney General's domestic
security guidelines.
As of June 30, 1977, a total of 642 domestic intel-
ligence investigative matters were pending, compared to
9,814 at the same date in 1975. Similarly, the number of
domestic intelligence matters initiated declined from
1,454 in June 1975 to 95 in June 1977.
As of early October 1977, 17 organizations and
approximately 130 individuals were under domestic intel-
ligence investigation. 5/
Interviews for this report with FBI and Secret Service
personnel indicated that the total number of preliminary,
intermediate, and full domestic security investigations involv-
ing both individuals and groups which were open at the time of
our inquiry was far less than at any time covered by the GAO
report. Ultimately, the question is whether the Secret Service
can adequately perform its mission without a regular flow of
information about the intentions of individuals or groups who
may be a threat to the President. An answer to this question
is beyond the scope of this report, but one of the lessons of
March 30 is that physical protection of the President cannot be
considered a substitute for an adequate warning of danger.
Intelligence Storage
All nonclassified intelligence kept by the Intelligence
Division is accessed by computer; the computer contains only
case file abstracts and serves as an index to more detailed
information located elsewhere in paper files.
5/ FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations: An Uncertain Future
(November 9, 1977), at 15.
-36-
Although reworked to fit a new computer acquired in 1978,
the Service's current computer software does not make full use
of the new computer's capacity. Both the Data Systems Division
and the Intelligence Division Programming and Planning Branch
agree that the software should undergo major upgrading in order
to be able to make optimal utilization of the data bank, but
cost and personnel limitations have constrained their efforts.
The system incorporates data files on about 20,000 persons
investigated in the past by the Service, on events, incidents,
organizations and groups, and a name index. These data are
accessed through two limited data retrieval search systems.
One system searches through all information coded into each of
about 100 fields in the data bank; the other searches every
word in each case abstract looking for key words suggested by
the operator. The coded search requires about 45 minutes and
20 such searches can be run simultaneously. The time taken by
the key word search is negligible, but the key-word indexing
system is expensive to set up and maintain.
Intelligence Analysis
Intelligence Analysis is primarily directed toward ident-
ifying dangerous individuals. As already noted, the field
agent, along with his supervisor and the field Special Agent in
Charge, evaluate the information on a subject provided by the
Intelligence Division and generated by the field investigation.
No "dangerous person" indicia have been generated from the
Intelligence Division data pool, and no statistical analysis is
used to identify patterns or correlations in the data. Conse-
quently, the entire dangerousness determination is based wholly
on agent judgment. Consistency is sought through Intelligence
Division review of each determination.
An individual who has been determined to be dangerous to a
protected person is interviewed at regular intervals, and his
whereabouts are periodically monitored. This periodic review
status continues until the field office determines, and the
Intelligence Division agrees, that the subject no longer pre-
sents a danger. Approximately 400 persons are listed in this
category, and most of them are incarcerated in either mental or
penal institutions.
Intelligence data is also utilized to identify dangerous
groups. The Analysis and Control Branch has a desk devoted to
domestic groups, while the Foreign Intelligence Branch deals
almost exclusively with international terrorist groups that may
-37-
present a threat to a protected person. Files are kept only on
those groups which, in the view of the Service, may pose a
threat to a protected person at some future time. Certain
groups considered the most dangerous are constantly monitored;
others are only occasionally reviewed. As with individuals,
there are no "dangerous group" indicia; all assessments are
based on agent judgment, supported by and analysis done by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
A third major use of intelligence data is to identify dan-
gerous environments. For any trip by a protected person, the
Intelligence Division advance agent will attempt to obtain all
available information in the computer with which to assess the
general "dangerousness" of the environment into which the pro-
tected person is going. The advance agent's assessment and
conclusions are communicated to Protective Operations.
While the files described above have not been analyzed in
order to identify indicia of "dangerousness", the Service has
made a number of efforts to develop a model that might support
such analysis. During the 1960's and 1970's, a number of
outside studies were commissioned to develop a "profile" of the
type of individual likely to be dangerous to a protected per-
son. These efforts produced little useful information. The
Service now seems interested in pursuing broader concepts of
statistical significance. Perhaps most promising to date is a
symposium that the Service conducted under the auspices of the
National Academy of Sciences in March 1981. The results of
that symposium are expected in July.
Efforts to develop statistical tools for using the infor-
mation now contained in the protective intelligence files have
suffered from the Service's failure to follow advice, provided
as early as 1969 in a study by the Bioengineering Corporation,
to bring the effort in-house. Studies made in the past under
contract with outside groups have not been based upon a com-
plete or accurate understanding of how proposals would actually
be used by agents in the field, nor has there been sufficient
follow-up to permit evaluation and assessment of proposals
actually put into use.
-38-
Conclusions
Intelligence Division
1. Since the Secret Service has no formal authority to
direct other agencies as to the gathering or dissemination of
intelligence to the Service, its intelligence collection activ-
ities have relied on the voluntary furnishing of information by
Federal and state agencies, police departments, and mental hos-
pitals. This voluntary process has been affected by recent
legislation on privacy and information access, such as the
Right to Financial Privacy Act, amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act, and state medical privacy laws. Information
required by the Service is no longer volunteered by sources now
concerned about transgressing privacy protections or about
being revealed as a source.
2. The Secret Service's protective capabilities have been
impaired by the decline in the quantity and quality of intel-
ligence collected by the FBI, which is the primary source of
the Service's domestic intelligence. This decline is attrib-
utable primarily to the Attorney General's Domestic Security
Guidelines and their effect in cutting off non-criminal dom-
estic intelligence investigations.
3. The Intelligence Division has a fairly efficient
system for storing, retrieving, and disseminating to Secret
Service users the intelligence information it receives. The
Division is failing, however, to make use of advances in sta-
tistical methods and data processing to improve its analytic
abilities. In view of the fact that a similar criticism was
made of the Intelligence Division in a 1969 outside study
prepared by the Bioengineering Corporation, this failure may
reflect an institutional problem within the Office of
Protective Research.
There appears to be an improved receptivity to such an
enterprise in the Intelligence Division under current manage-
ment. The results of the Service's most recent outside study,
a symposium conducted under the auspices of the National
Academy of Science, may provide the theoretical base on which
to begin in-house efforts at testing and verifying hypotheses.
Such an effort would require at a minimum additional per-
sonnel with data-processing-related skills, and additional per-
sonnel with professional training in statistical methods and
-39-
behavioral psychology or psychiatry. The Service has no pro-
fessionals in the latter two areas at this time, other than
outside consultants, who are available for very limited amounts
of time.
4. While the Intelligence Division does a good job of
identifying and monitoring would-be assassins who make their
intentions known, it is not able to do enough toward ident-
ifying dangerous groups.
Liaison Division
1. The Liaison Division was formed pursuant to a Warren
Commission recommendation, ostensibly to generate intelligence
and intelligence sources. However, the Division spends most of
its resources on protective operations assignments or activ-
ities other than intelligence support. This resource alloca-
tion does not carry out the Warren Commission recommendation
and was criticized earlier in the 1969 Bioengineering
Corporation Criteria Study.
2. Insofar as the Liaison Division is involved in intel-
ligence support, the process is largely ad hoc. Liaison agents
operate in an informal manner and, by and large, take their
intelligence support roles to be passive ones, responding to
Intelligence Division requests rather than generating more and
better intelligence and sources.
3. The Service's agreements with other agencies as to the
furnishing of intelligence were proposed by the Warren
Commission as an aid to the Service's intelligence collection.
The agreements are very general and appear to have become
largely pro-forma documents.
4. While the Secret Service conscientiously attempts to
encourage other agencies to provide it with intelligence,
neither the Liaison Division nor the Intelligence Division has
a formal procedure that adequately monitors the quality and
quantity of intelligence received from other Federal agencies,
and the current informal monitoring is not a sufficient substi-
tute.
Recommendations
1. Because of the apparent effect of privacy and govern-
ment information disclosure laws on the ability of the Secret
Service to collect useful intelligence on a voluntary basis,
-40-
consideration should be given to narrowing the scope of these
laws as they relate to the release of information furnished to
the Secret Service, and to protecting the right of the Secret
Service to have access to information in the hands of private
organizations and state and local governmental authorities.
2. The Secret Service should be given an executive man-
date, perhaps in the form of an Executive Order or proclama-
tion, to require greater assistance from other Federal agencies
in the collection of intelligence.
3. Consideration should be given to permitting the FBI to
pursue domestic security investigations where no criminal
predicate is available; this may be done through appropriate
modifications of the Attorney General's Domestic Security
Guidelines for the FBI.
4. The Secret Service has not developed indicators to
help identify "dangerous" individuals, either by associating
and correlating intelligence that might reveal the intentions
of individuals and groups from their prior activities or by
using so-called "profiles". Using data in the files of its
Intelligence Division, the Service should attempt to develop
useful indicators to assist it in identifying "dangerous"
individuals, groups, and personality types. The Service should
create within the Intelligence Division a more sophisticated
planning and research operation, including five to ten non-
agent employees with professional training in statistical
methods and behavioral sciences. This group should be respon-
sible, on an ongoing basis, for analyzing the intelligence data
base in order to identify what types of information the
Intelligence Division should be looking for, and what it should
be doing with it.
5. The problems with maintaining Liaison Division as an
intelligence-gathering group are compounded by its location
outside the Intelligence Division. Liaison Division should be
restructured and placed within the Intelligence Division. The
resulting Liaison Branch should become aggressively involved in
soliciting intelligence from other agencies and monitoring the
amount and quality of intelligence generated. This Liaison
Branch should take the lead in redrafting the agreements with
other agencies so that they are more useful guides to the
Service's intelligence needs that draw on the information
developed by the recommended planning and research operation.
If a liaison unit is needed to conduct work that facilitates
advances and trips, it should be staffed through a separate
liaison unit that does not compete for resources directly with
-41-
the intelligence liaison function.
6. The Intelligence Division planning and research oper-
ation should also work closely with Data Systems Division to
better define the data systems needs of the Intelligence
Division, to insure that adequate computer programming and data
processing support is provided to this enterprise, and to
insure that the computer is being optimally applied to routine
Intelligence Division needs.