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Assassination Report (2)
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Assassination Report (2)
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Records of the Office of the Counsellor to the President (Reagan Administration)
Edwin Meese's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Meese, Edwin III: Files
Folder Title: Assassination Report [2 of 4]
Box: CFOA 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MEESE, EDWIN
Archivist: kdb/srj
FOIA ID: 97-098/3 Phelan
File Folder: Assassination Report (2) CFOA 28
Date: 03/02/00
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. & TYPE
1. report
Advance preparations for March 30, 1981 (partial, p44, 45).
n.d.
FT B7
2. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p48.)
n.d.
F7 B7
3. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p50, 51)
n.d.
F7 B7
4. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p69)
n.d.
PT B7
5. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p71)
n.d.
B7
d73 12/5/00
RESTRICTIONS
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MEESE, EDWIN
Archivist: kdb/srj
FOIA ID: 97-098/3 Phelan
File Folder: Assassination Report (2) CFOA 28
Date: 03/02/00
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. & TYPE
1. report
Advance preparations for March 30, 1981 (partial, p44, 45).
n.d.
F7
2. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p48.)
n.d.
F7
3. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p50, 51)
n.d.
F7
4. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p69)
n.d.
F7
5. report
same item as item 1. (partial, p71)
n.d.
F7
RESTRICTIONS
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
-42-
ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR MARCH 30, 1981
Procedures for Trip Advances
Overview
Procedures for the conduct of security advances are first
presented to prospective Special Agents in training courses,
and are then restated and supplemented in procedures manuals
prepared by each of the primary protective divisions. For the
most part, these procedures are presented in checklist form,
even though all of the items listed will not be applicable to
every advance. The Service emphasizes to trainees that even
those items applicable to a particular advance are to be inter-
preted with some flexibility, leaving room for the judgment of
Special Agents on the scene who must respond to widely varying
circumstances.
Thus, the procedures do not include such matters as how
far from the President crowds should be kept, under what cir-
cumstances doors should or should not be locked or guarded, or
even how many Special Agents should be assigned to a particular
visit. The standards which Special Agents apply in individual
cases seem to be the product of their experience in similar
circumstances, modified by two other factors: the level of
manpower available to the Service; and the need to reach a
practical accommodation -- there being no written agreements
-- with the occasionally conflicting demands of the White House
advance staff for greater exposure of the President to the
press and public.
Because of the unique character of each trip, and the fact
that procedures are not specified in other than general terms,
it is not possible to compare the execution of the Hilton trip
in detail with a given and accepted set of standards.
Moreover, the circumstances of the President's trip to the
Washington Hilton on March 30 did much to shape the way the
Service adapted its procedures that day. The Hilton trip was
uncomplicated; it was to begin and end in the White House, a
highly secure facility; pass along routes with which the
Service's Special Agents were well familiar; and involve a stop
at a location which Presidents and other protected persons had
visited many times.
-43-
In addition, the Metropolitan Police Department and the
United States Park Police, which assist the Service on
Presidential trips within the capital city, are familiar with
the Service's procedures and are able to provide drivers,
motorcycle escorts and crowd control with relatively little
briefing or advance preparation.
Trips within the District of Columbia are also unusual in
another respect: intelligence responsibilities are handled by
the Washington field office rather than the Service's
Intelligence Division. As discussed below, the procedures
followed by the Washington field office for gathering intelli-
gence information are different from those of the Intelligence
Division.
Despite these exceptions, however, the broad outlines of
Service procedures, applicable to all advances, are relatively
clear.
The Advance Team
The advance is headed by a lead advance agent, who is
ordinarily selected from the detail assigned to the protected
person. Depending on the nature of the trip, the lead advance
agent may be assisted by Service advance agents responsible for
transportation, intelligence, technical security, and/or com-
munications. The lead advance agent also coordinates prepar-
ations with Service Special Agents from field offices respon-
sible for the districts to be visited by the protected person,
with local law enforcement agencies, and with the protected
person's staff.
On a Presidential trip, one or more Special Agents from
PPD may be assigned to conduct the advance, depending upon the
magnitude of the itinerary. One of the agents will be desig-
nated lead advance agent, and will coordinate all Service
arrangements, as well as the support efforts of local police
and security personnel. Where appropriate, a transportation
agent may be designated from the Transportation Section of PPD.
Since the Hilton movement was to take place within the
jurisdiction of the Washington field office, intelligence
advance activities were to be performed by Special Agents from
the Washington field office, rather than from the Intelligence
Division. In such an instance, the lead advance agent is
responsible for notifying the Intelligence Division, the oper-
ations desk of the Washington field office intelligence squad,
-44-
which then assigns a Protective Intelligence team (or teams) in
support of the movement; and the Technical Security Division,
which designates a team coordinator, responsible for all phases
of the Technical Security Division mission.
When the lead advance agent contacts the Washington field
office, he should, in addition to requesting Protective
Intelligence assistance, also request the name of his
Washington field office counterpart, and should ask that the
Washington field office make initial contacts with the local
police and fire departments that will be involved in the move-
ment. The purpose of designating a Washington field office
counterpart is to coordinate Washington field office partici-
pation in the advance, and to improve liaison and
communications with local authorities.
The lead advance agent must also contact and work with
other elements of government that have roles in any
Presidential trip: the White House Communications Agency, the
White House Physician's office, and the White House staff,
particularly its advance personnel.
Execution of Procedures for Trip Advances
in Connection with March 30, 1981 Trip
to the Washington Hilton
Wednesday, March 25, and Thursday, March 26
Special Agent Ray Shaddick, Assistant to the Special
Agent in Charge of PPD, notified Special Agent William Green on
Wednesday, March 25, that Green would be the lead advance agent
for the President's March 30 visit to the Washington Hilton.
The White House staff had already designated Rick Ahearn to
conduct the staff advance, and had arranged a security meeting
at the hotel for Friday morning. On either Wednesday or
Thursday, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon of the Transportation
Section of PPD was notified by Special Agent
of her
assignment as transportation agent for the March 30 visit.
Friday, March 27
Early Friday morning, Security Specialist
was informed that he would function as Technical
Security Division Coordinator for the visit; Special Agent
Thomas Lightsey was assigned to assist
in conducting
the advance for training purposes. Both
and Lightsey
-45-
were instructed to attend the 10:30 a.m. security meeting at
the Hilton.
The meeting at the Hilton was attended by
Lightsey, and Green of Secret Service; Rick Ahearn and Rocky
Kounan from the White House staff; John Norton, Hilton
Convention Sales Director, and Al Fury, Hilton Security
Director; Victor Kamber, from the host committee sponsoring the
event; and John Bixler, representing the White House
Communications Agency. The participants at the meeting review-
ed the itinerary proposed for the President. Green asked that
the host committee provide a list of names of the union offic-
ials who would meet the President prior to his speech, and that
the hotel update its employee list kept at the Washington field
office. Following the meeting, those present conducted a
"walk-through" of the President's itinerary.
Little or no consideration was given to the establishment
of a designated press area outside the Hilton. Ahearn and
Green agreed that a rope line would be placed in the vicinity
of the follow-up car, as usual, but Green stated later that
this was put in place primarily to control pedestrian traffic.
Establishment of a designated press area would have required
posting both a Secret Service Special Agent and a White House
representative at the press area to control access; in addi-
tion, such a restricted press area would effectively shut down
the main terrace entrance, which both Green and Ahearn felt was
impractical.
Saturday, March 28
Early Saturday morning, Green prepared a list of names, to
be checked by the Intelligence Division, composed of union
members and those hotel employees who would be in the vicinity
of the President. This function is ordinarily performed by the
intelligence agents assigned to the visit. Since Green had not
yet been given the names of the Washington field office agents
assigned to the advance, he decided to submit the names him-
self, SO that the results would be available as early as pos-
sible. He submitted the list that afternoon to the
Intelligence Division.
Later, Green twice called the Washington field office to
determine who had been assigned as his Washington field office
advance counterpart. Green requested that the Special Agent on
duty contact the Metropolitan Police Department, to inform them
of the Hilton visit and to notify them that a security briefing
-46-
would be conducted at the hotel on Monday. The Special Agent
was not successful in contacting the Metropolitan Police
Department immediately; he decided not to take further action
on Green's request, assuming that the Metropolitan Police
Department would be notified of the visit by agents conducting
the advance.
Gordon contacted the Washington field office to request
that they provide one of the cars for the motorcade.
Sunday, March 29
On Sunday, Green spent the morning working on his pre-
liminary survey report, and completed it except for the names
of the Washington field office coordinator and the intelligence
advance agent.
Gordon made two calls to Green during the course of the
day; she obtained from Green the exact arrival and departure
time for the Hilton trip, and the entrance to be used from the
motorcade. Following the first of these calls, Gordon called
the U.S. Park Police and the Special Operations Division of the
Metropolitan Police Department to request their assistance in
providing support for the motorcade. In addition, Gordon
informed both departments that there would be a "run-through"
of the motorcade routes the following morning.
During the afternoon, both Gordon and Green spoke with the
Special Agent on duty at the Washington field office. Gordon
called to ask that the Washington field office car be sent to
the White House between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. on Monday.
Green called once again to obtain the name of his Washington
field office counterpart, and given the name of Special Agent
Paul Mobley. Green called Mobley that afternoon, and told him
(1) that the Metropolitan Police Department had been contacted,
(2) that name checks had been performed through the
Intelligence Division, (3) which official vehicles would make
up the emergency motorcade, and (4) that Mobley was to meet
with Green the following morning at the Hilton.
Monday, March 30
Gordon called the U.S. Park Police that morning to
determine whether any representatives of the Park Police would
participate in the run-through of the motorcade routes, but was
told that all available Park Police officers were needed to
-47-
assist with morning rush-hour traffic. The supervising Park
Police officer stated later that it was unnecessary for his
officers to run the routes with Gordon, since his officers were
familiar with the designated routes and could be briefed
regarding additional responsibilities at the White House.
Gordon ran the routes as scheduled with a Metropolitan Police
Department sergeant; after this, she called the D.C. Highways
and Traffic Department, and determined that there would be no
construction along the motorcade route.
Green completed the preliminary survey report between 7:30
a.m. and 8:00 a.m. and turned it over to the Presidential
Detail. He then called the Washington field office and was
advised by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the intelligence co-
ordinator, that there was no intelligence information of sig-
nificance to report in connection with this trip. McCarthy
also provided Green with the composition of the intelligence
teams. Shortly after Green spoke to McCarthy, however, illness
caused the Washington field office to make reassignments which
reduced the number of agents available for the intelligence
teams. Green did not learn of this cancellation until the
remaining intelligence team agents arrived at the Hilton for
the noon security briefing.
A Special Agent from PPD gave Green the names of the
Special Agents who would serve as the main security contingent
at the Hilton, and promised that an additional Special Agent
would be assigned later in the morning. Green determined that
the name checks conducted by the Intelligence Division had
revealed that none of the individuals who would obtain access
to the President were "of record" with Secret Service. Before
leaving for the Hilton, Green briefed shift leader Ray Shaddick
on the Hilton visit.
Shortly before 11:00 a.m., Green met with Mobley at
the Hilton; both men conducted a walk-through of the hotel. The
security briefing began a few minutes after noon in the Adams
Room of the hotel. Green met with McCarthy prior to the
briefing, and was informed of the reassignment of some of the
intelligence team agents. No representatives of the police or
fire departments attended the briefing, contrary to usual
procedure.
At the briefing, McCarthy reported that telephone
calls to the Intelligence Division and the Metropolitan Police
Department had revealed no adverse intelligence information.
Green gave a standard security briefing, which covered the
itinerary for the visit, the frequencies to be used for radio
-48-
communications, the location of the security room, the call
signs to be used in connection with the visit, and the system
of identification badges and pins to be used. At the con-
clusion of the briefing, the security contingent agents were
stationed individually at their posts.
That morning, the ballroom was cleared and the Technical
Security Division sweep of the ballroom began. The arrival
area was swept by a canine unit, and nothing unusual was en-
countered. The Metropolitan Police Department detail arrived,
headed by Sergeant Granger; Granger posted his own men around
the VIP entrance and informed Green of the postings.
When the sweep of the ballroom was completed, Green
returned inside and authorized the opening of the ballroom
doors. The crowd entered through two checkpoints, manned by
Special Agents
and
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
personnel were posted at each checkpoint to inspect briefcases
and handbags; also assigned to each checkpoint was a represent-
ative of the host committee. Press personnel used a separate
entrance to the ballroom; an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team
was assigned to check cameras and other equipment. Green
noticed some of the press people straying outside of the desig-
nated press area; he spoke to Ahearn, who had the situation
corrected. Green then returned to the VIP entrance to await
the arrival of the President.
At the White House, Gordon had supervised the co-
ordination of the Presidential motorcade. A Park Police
officer had been instructed to bring a portable Park Police
radio for use in one of the leading motorcade cars, but had
forgotten it; therefore, the motorcade had no radio commun-
ication with the U.S. Park Police motorcycle officers. Gordon
briefed the motorcade participants, and distributed copies of
the Transportation Survey.
The motorcade left the White House at 1:45 p.m.; the
Metropolitan Police Department maintained intersection control
along the route. On the way to the Hilton, Shaddick called
Green for a situation report. Green noted about seven press
people and about ten spectators at the rope line. He was aware
of no difficulties, and advised the motorcade that the arrival
area was clear.
A rope line blocking pedestrian traffic had been posi-
tioned approximately 35-40 feet from the VIP entrance. The
spectators located behind it were not screened by Secret
Service, since the area had not been designated a "press area".
-49-
Metropolitan Police Department officers controlled traffic on
"T" Street. When the motorcade arrived at the Hilton, the
Metropolitan Police Department detail assigned to the arrival
were at their designated posts at the rope line and along the
concrete island separating the driveway from "T" Street. The
limousine moved to a point directly outside the VIP entrance;
the President remained in the limousine until his Secret
Service detail was in position; he then left the limousine, met
Ahearn at the door, and was escorted inside the hotel. The
arrival was uneventful.
After the President had entered the Hilton, Gordon in-
structed the motorcade drivers to reposition the limousine and
the follow-up car, so that the limousine was parked at an angle
to the curb, with the front pointed through the gap on the
concrete island and facing directly onto the street. Placing
the limousine in this position required the President to walk
25-30 feet from the VIP entrance, bringing him to within 15-20
feet of the assembled spectators. This repositioning was
standard procedure for a Hilton visit. The follow-up car was
parked a few feet behind the limousine, under the canopy that
served the main Terrace entrance to the hotel. Four motorcade
vehicles were parked behind the follow-up car, and the other
cars and motorcycles were parked on "T" Street, ahead of the
path to be taken by the limousine during its scheduled
departure.
While the President spoke, Special Agents Unrue and Fabel
sat in the follow-up car, while the military personnel driving
the other motorcade vehicles gathered in another of the follow-
up vehicles. Two Metropolitan Police Department officers moved
the restraining rope a few feet farther away from the VIP
entrance at the order of Sergeant Granger. While they were
parked, some of the motorcade drivers noted the erratic behav-
ior of one individual in the crowd. The Secret Service Special
Agents were familiar with him, had interviewed him on several
occasions, and had determined that he was not dangerous to the
President. News accounts later suggested, incorrectly, that
this indiviual was John W. Hinckley, the man later accused of
the shooting. Special Agent Dennis McCarthy spoke with the
individual and concluded that he was not a danger to the
President.
At 2:20 p.m., Green radioed from inside the hotel that the
President was finishing his speech and would be departing
shortly. Following that transmission, the motorcade drivers
returned to their vehicles. Special Agent Mobley left the
ballroom and surveyed the departure area; he saw nothing out of
-50-
the ordinary. One security car prepared to leave, since its
assignment was to precede the rest of the motorcade by a few
minutes. The military drivers checked their assignments with
each other and returned to their vehicles. The Metropolitan
Police Department officers were stationed at their posts;
Officers Swain and Delahanty were stationed along the rope
line, and Sergeant Granger was between the two officers and the
path to be taken by the President. The motorcade vehicles
started their engines to prepare for departure; the advance
security car moved away from the Hilton as the vanguard of the
Presidential party began to exit through the VIP entrance. The
counter- snipers were on duty, although perhaps not exactly in
their usual positions. Gordon had moved to another of the
advance vehicles and was preparing to get inside as the
Presidential party began its departure. Up to this point, the
visit had been almost entirely routine.
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Recommendations
1. The advance staff of the White House and the senior
managers of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and
resources are required to develop a single document, on which
both groups can agree, in which they detail the balance that is
to be struck among the security, scheduling, and public expos-
ure requirements of the President. The document should be
updated, at least annually, and should include specific infor-
mation concerning such items as:
a. The distances between the public and the
President during his entrance and exit from areas
with controlled access;
b. The advisability of permitting unscreened
members of the public to have advance notice of an
opportunity for gaining proximity to the President;
C. The circumstances in which the President will
make himself available for questions from the press;
d. The amount of information regarding Presidential
visits to be released to the public;
e. The advisability of locating the press in the
area of motorcade vehicles;
f. Procedures for screening, electronically or
otherwise, members of the public who can get close
enough to the President to threaten his security;
g. The structure and placement of PPD formations
around the President and arrangements with the
-52-
White House staff to avoid interference with
-
those formations.
2. The Washington field office and the protective div-
isions of the Secret Service should commit whatever time and
resources are required to develop detailed procedures for the
conduct of advances in the Washington, D.C. area. The number
of advances conducted in the Washington area, the routine and
repetitive quality of of these advances, and other distinguish-
ing characteristics of Secret Service operations in the
Washington, D.C., area should be taken into account in devel-
oping these procedures. These procedures should provide for
the earliest possible notification to the Washington field
office of proposed trips, preferably simultaneously with the
notification given to the lead advance agent by the protective
divisions, and a statement of the responsibilities of each
member of the Washington field office advance team. In ad-
dition, the Washington field office should conduct a review of
intelligence advance procedures in the Washington, D.C. area,
assisted by the Intelligence Division; this review should
address the categories of advance intelligence data to be
collected by the Washington field office, as well as the pro-
cedures by which it is to be collected.
-53-
PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE DETAIL
Procedures
Presidential Protective Division Structure
The Presidential Protective Division is headed by a
Special Agent in Charge, Jerry Parr, and a Deputy Special Agent
in Charge, Robert DeProspero. The Division is organized into
three major subdivisions, each headed by an Assistant Special
Agent in Charge: (1) Support and Logistics; (2) Operations;
and (3) Training and Special Projects. The Operations sub-
division is further broken down into three separate details for
protecting the President, the First Lady and immediate family
members, and a transportation section.
The Presidential Detail is responsible for protecting the
President at all times. The detail is composed of three
shifts, each headed by a Shift Leader commonly known as an
Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge. Normally when the
President leaves the White House, he is accompanied by a work-
ing shift consisting of Special Agents assigned to his pro-
tective detail, an Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge of
the Presidential Protective Division, and either the Special
Agent in Charge or the Deputy Special Agent in Charge.
The Special Agents on the Presidential detail tend to be
the more experienced, better qualified Special Agents.
Typically, these Special Agents have had three to five years
experience in the field, where each has had experience on
various protective assignments (e.g., intelligence, post stand-
ing, and advance). The Special Agents usually remain in the
Presidential Protective Division for three to four years.
Training
All Special Agents, when first employed, receive seven to
eight weeks of basic law enforcement training at Treasury's
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia.
After completing this basic training, each Special Agent com-
pletes specialized classroom training conducted by Secret
Service's Office of Training in Washington, D.C.
-54-
In this basic classroom instruction the Special Agents are
taught the Secret Service theory of perimeter protection, which
has remained basically unchanged since the Kennedy assassin-
ation. The working shift moves with the President, entering
and leaving a secure area established by Secret Service advance
agents and local law enforcement officers. The Special Agents
learn that during an entrance/exit situation between secure
locations (e.g., the armored limousine to the holding room),
the working shift Special Agents must leave their vehicle, move
to predesignated positions around the President's limousine and
quickly assess whether there is a danger to the President if he
leaves the limousine. This, of course, is in addition to other
security measures and observation being carried out by the
Secret Service and local police.
If no danger is detected, the President leaves the car
and the working shift Special Agents fall into protective
formation around him. Circumstances such as crowd proximity
and density dictate the formation that the working shift em-
ploys. Each formation has its own peculiar strengths and weak-
nesses. During this movement, other protective coverage is
provided by Special Agents and law enforcement officers, who
are not members of the working shift.
If shots are fired, Special Agents in the immediate area
of the President are taught that they should remain in an
upright position, each Special Agent making himself as large a
target as possible.
Supplementing classroom instruction are training exercises
conducted at the Secret Service's facility at Beltsville,
Maryland. These exercises are designed to condition a Special
Agent's response to an attack on the President. The Special
Agents are also drilled on their reactions to medical emer-
gencies such as a heart attack. The Special Agents' reactions
are videotaped and later reviewed with instructors in a class-
room setting.
Special Agents are taught in the classroom, in practical
training, and on the job, that the safety of the protected
person is the primary concern of any protective operation.
Whenever shots are fired in the vicinity of a protected person,
Special Agents are to interpose themselves between the pro-
tected person and the source of the shots, and are to see to
his safety and evacuation before attempting to interdict the
assailant or prevent the assailant's escape.
-55-
Execution on March 31, 1980, of Procedures
Established for Presidential Protective Detail
Trip to the Hilton
At 1:45 p.m. on March 30, 1981, President Reagan left the
White House and went to the South Grounds where the
Presidential limousine was waiting to take him to the
Washington Hilton Hotel. Accompanying the President in his
limousine were Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan and Special
Agent in Charge Jerry Parr.
The Presidential motorcade departed the White House, pro-
ceeded north on 17th Street, veered left onto Connecticut
Avenue, and proceeded directly to the Hilton where it arrived
without incident at approximately 1:50 p.m. During the approx-
imately four-minute ride, Assistant to the Special Agent in
Charge Shaddick radioed lead advance agent Green at the hotel
for a situation report. Green indicated that there appeared to
be no problem. On arriving at the Hilton, the working shift
Special Agents left their vehicles, and proceeded to their
preassigned positions around the Presidential limousine, sur-
veying the surrounding crowd for any signs of trouble. Parr
moved to the right rear door where he awaited the President.
They saw no sign of danger.
The President then got out of the limousine, which was
parked directly opposite the VIP entrance -- a distance of ten
to fifteen feet. He was accompanied on his short walk into the
hotel by the working shift Special Agents. Inside the hotel,
the President was accompanied to the holding room where he met
briefly with ranking members of the Building and Construction
Trades Union. After leaving the holding room, the President
delivered a twenty-minute speech to the 4,000 members of the
Union in the main ballroom. During the speech, the Special
Agents of the Presidential detail were positioned in the ball-
room, scanning the crowd for possible trouble.
Shooting Incident
At the conclusion of his speech, the President retraced
his steps of half an hour earlier and headed outside to the
motorcade for the return trip to the White House. Parr and
Shaddick remained just behind the President as he stepped
through the doors to leave the hotel. In front of the
President were members of his staff and several Secret Service
-56-
Special Agents -- the lead advance agent, the transportation
advance agent, the intelligence advance agents, and the Special
Agents of the working shift.
Because there were a number of members of the press con-
gregated between the Presidential limousine and the follow-up
car, one Special Agent walked directly to this area and at-
tempted to clear these persons from between the parked cars
before moving to his preassigned position at the limousine.
Other working shift agents moved to their preassigned positions
around the limousine and scanned the crowds across "T" Street
and at the hotel for possible trouble.
Special Agent Tim McCarthy opened the right rear door of
the limousine for the President. Having been repositioned for
the departure, the limousine was now parked approximately 25
feet from the hotel entrance, facing the opening onto "T"
Street at an angle toward Connecticut Avenue.
Parr and Shaddick stayed close to the President, although
at one point Shaddick was forced to move around a White House
staff member to maintain his position. The President, with
Parr behind him and slightly to his right and Shaddick directly
to the President's right and slightly in front of Parr, moved
directly toward the waiting limousine. They were closely
accompanied by Presidential aides Fischer and Deaver, Press
Secretary Brady, and Military Aide Muratti.
Special Agent Green and Metropolitan Police Department
Officers Delahanty, Swain and Sergeant Granger, all of whom
were standing at the line, turned to see whether the President
had gotten into the limousine.
At approximately 2:27 p.m., as someone in the crowd was
shouting "Mr. President," six shots were fired in the direction
of the President by an assailant in the crowd behind the rope
line. All six shots took less than two seconds.
At the sound of the first shot, Parr pushed the President
the remaining three feet into the limousine, dove in on top of
him and ordered the driver, Special Agent Thomas Drew Unrue, to
leave the scene. The President was hit by one of the six
shots, the bullet apparently ricocheting off the side of the
limousine, passing through the space between the door and the
car body, and hitting him at a point under his left arm.
Special Agent Tim McCarthy turned in the direction of the
shots, spread his arms and legs to protect the President and
-57-
was hit in the abdomen. Of the other four shots, one hit
Officer Delahanty in the back of the neck, one struck Press
Secretary Brady in the head, another hit the limousine, and
another struck a building across the street.
Shaddick helped push the President and Parr into the
limousine and slammed the door. He then jumped into the
follow-up car and radioed the Presidential Protective
Division's command post in the White House, advising that:
we've had shots fired, shots fired, there are some
injuries
No Secret Service Special Agent on the scene saw the
assailant draw or otherwise display his weapon prior to the
actual shots. Once the shots were fired, a number of Special
Agents immediately drew their weapons, but seeing the subject
surrounded, withheld fire. The films of the shooting show that
as the President was being pushed into the limousine by Parr,
the first law enforcement officer to reach the location of the
shots was Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, who ran from his posi-
tion near the curb behind the President's limousine and leaped
onto the suspected assailant, grabbing him by the head and
wrist.
McCarthy, with the assistance of other Secret Service
Special Agents and Metropolitan Police Department officers,
quickly subdued and handcuffed the suspect. A second Secret
Service Special Agent raised his weapon, was unable to shoot
safely, and ran to the scene from across the sidewalk; a third
Special Agent ran to the suspect from a position near the left
front fender of the follow-up car; a fourth Special Agent got
to the suspect from a point near the rope line just behind D.V.
McCarthy; and a fifth Special Agent moved to the suspect from
the other side of the Presidential limousine.
Special Agent Wanko of the working shift looked in the
direction of the gunfire, did not see the gun or the assailant,
and started for the crowd behind the ropeline. He covered the
limousine from the rear with an Uzi submachine gun as it de-
parted. He then moved to the wall between the entrance and the
rope line where he assumed a position facing the crowd. He
tried to ascertain whether any other assailants were involved.
Other Special Agents helped safeguard the limousine's
departure, neutralize the assailant, secure the incident scene,
and get medical assistance. Although several weapons were
drawn, no shots were fired by agents or police.
-58-
The Transportation agent, Mary Ann Gordon, retreated from
her assigned car toward the President's limousine but got into
another motorcade car when she saw that the President was
already in the limousine. That car waited momentarily for the
President's physician and then departed, pulling in behind the
President's limousine.
Transportation of the President to
George Washington University Hospital
Within approximately ten seconds of the first shot the
President's limousine pulled away from the curb and turned onto
"T" Street. It passed another motorcade car (which had stalled
going up the hill) and some of the motorcycles parked on "T"
Street and turned left onto Connecticut Avenue. The follow-up
car left the scene approximately thirteen seconds after the
President's limousine. The remainder of the motorcade, delayed
because of the crowd among the vehicles, followed.
Meanwhile, in the back seat of the President's limousine
the President noticed a sharp pain in his chest and thought
that he had broken a rib. Parr assisted the President to a
seated position in the right rear seat. Parr asked the
President whether he was all right, and the President replied
that he was. Parr then quickly examined the President by run-
ning his hands inside the President's coat and found no sign of
injury. He then examined the back of the President's coat and
once again found no sign of injury. At this point, Parr order-
ed Unrue back to the White House. Parr advised the detail:
"[The President] is o.k., follow-up. [The President] is o.k."
Shaddick replied: "You want to go to the hospital or back to
the White House?" Parr responded "We're going right, we're
going to [the White House]." Shaddick acknowledged this trans-
mission.
Approximately thirty seconds after Parr's initial examin-
ation, the President said that he was having trouble breathing.
The President thought that he might have punctured a lung.
Parr then noticed that the President had blood in his mouth,
and ordered driver Unrue to go to George Washington University
Hospital (the motorcade was then proceeding down Connecticut
Avenue).
Unrue radioed Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon and told her:
"We want to go to the emergency room of George Washington.
After Gordon acknowledged this transmission, Unrue added: "Go
to George Washington FAST." Parr followed this with a trans-
-59-
mission to Shaddick asking if Shaddick knew that they were
going to George Washington. After Shaddick acknowledged this,
Parr added: "Get an ambulance - I mean get - ah - stretcher
out there." Parr indicated that he did not broadcast that the
President was hurt because he did not want everyone who moni-
tors that frequency to know of the President's injury.
Shaddick then asked the Service's White House Command Post
if it had copied Parr's last transmission that the motorcade
was going to George Washington University Hospital. The
Command Post replied that it had and that the call to the
hospital had already been made. The Command Post told the
hospital that the President was enroute and that there were
injuries, but did not say that the President was injured or
that a stretcher should be available.
Special Agent Gordon attempted to notify the police
vehicles that the motorcade was going to the hospital, but was
unable to do so because of heavy radio traffic on the police
frequency. Therefore, in order to keep a car in front of the
President's limousine, Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon ordered
the car in which she was riding to pass the President's limou-
sine. When the motorcade turned onto Pennsylvania Avenue, the
leading car and the four motorcycles failed to make the turn;
the other advance cars then led the motorcade to the hospital.
Arrival at the Hospital
After the Command Post notification, the hospital emer-
gency room announced over its loudspeaker that the President
was enroute to the hospital. On hearing this announcement,
various hospital medical, administrative and security personnel
reported to the emergency room.
The President's limousine reached the hospital at approx-
imately 2:30 p.m., about three minutes after the shots were
fired. When the President's limousine pulled up at the hos-
pital emergency room entrance, there were no stretchers or
medical personnel present.
Secret Service Assistant Director for Administration, Fred
White, who was in the emergency room on a personal matter,
heard the announcement, went outside, directed that the emer-
gency room doors be locked open and, when the motorcade arriv-
ed, directed where the limousine should park. The President
got out of the car and started to walk into the emergency room.
He was closely preceded by Special Agent McIntosh with Parr to
-60-
the President's right and Shaddick to his left. Inside the
emergency room, the President's knees began to buckle, and he
was carried by Parr, Shaddick, and two paramedics the remainder
of the distance to Trauma Bay Number 5. At this point, the
President appeared to be in the initial stages of shock.
In the trauma bay, medical personnel immediately started
to administer standard emergency treatment. They removed the
President's clothes, placed him on oxygen, started him on an
intravenous solution, and took blood to determine the type.
One of the medical staff asked Parr, who had remained with the
President, what was the President's blood type. Parr responded
correctly that it was 0-positive.
It was after the President's clothes had been removed that
the medical staff first realized that the President had been
shot. Dr. Giordano, with the assistance of other medical per-
sonnel, inserted a tube into the President's chest and drained
1300 CC of blood. Within ten minutes of arrival the President
was started on a transfusion of universal donor (o negative)
blood. The President remained conscious during this time.
Dr. Giordano later stated that there was no medical his-
tory file on President Reagan (with blood types, etc.) avail-
able in the emergency room. While he did not deem this absence
to be critical to the treatment of the President, he neverthe-
less believes that the President's medical file should be
available in the emergency room, and that the emergency room
staff should be familiar with it. Dr. Giordano further stated
that because the President received prompt medical treatment in
a fully equipped trauma center the chances that the President's
injuries were life threatening were substantially minimized.
Even so, the President's condition was much more serious than
initially reported.
The President's personal physician, as well as Dr.
Giordano and various Secret Service officials, believe that the
chances of the President surviving a medical emergency can be
enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled, paramedic team
that moves with the protective motorcade. The doctors support-
ed the paramedic team concept even though they believe that, in
the March 30 shooting incident, paramedics would probably not
have found time to contribute to the President's survival. His
quick evacuation to a fully equipped and staffed trauma unit
was the key element.
At some time after 3:00 p.m., the President was moved from
the emergency room to the operating room where Dr. Giordano
-61-
initially performed a "peritoneal lavage" to determine whether
there was any internal bleeding in the abdomen. The results
were negative.
Dr. Benjamin Aaron headed the surgical team which treated
the President's chest wound and, after considerable explor-
ation, removed a bullet lodged in the President's left lung.
The bullet was removed at approximately 5:45 p.m. Surgery was
completed and the President moved to the recovery room at
approximately 6:45 p.m.
At approximately 7:00 p.m., after the President was out of
surgery, Secret Service Special Agents at the hospital received
information that Hinckley had purchased explosive .22 caliber
ammunition, with the brand-name "Devastator", at the same time
he had purchased the weapon allegedly used in the assault on
the President. This information was not given to the phys-
icians treating the President, Special Agent McCarthy or Press
Secretary Brady, who was still in surgery, or to the physicians
treating Officer Delahanty at Washington Hospital Center.
The President remained in the recovery room the rest of
the night. He was moved from there to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) early the next morning.
Conclusions
1. The Secret Service procedures in place on March 30,
1981, for the movement of the President from the hotel to the
Presidential limousine by the Presidential Protective Detail
were followed by the Detail's Special Agents.
2. Once shots were fired, the Special Agents on the scene
reacted, as trained, to cover and evacuate the President, neu-
tralize the assailant, and determine whether multiple assail-
ants were involved. Four of the Special Agents performed in an
exemplary manner: Special Agent in Charge Jerry Parr in react-
ing precisely as trained to cover and evacuate the President by
pushing him into the limousine; Assistant to the Special Agent
Charge Ray Shaddick in pushing both Parr and the President into
the limousine; Special Agent Timothy McCarthy in placing him-
self between the assailant and the President; and Special Agent
D.V. McCarthy in quickly jumping onto the assailant and, with
the help of others, subduing him.
3. During the evacuation of the President to the hospital
there were a number of minor incidents such as the initial con-
-62-
fusion with motorcade vehicles leaving the hotel, and the
failure to notify the hospital emergency room that the
President was injured. These incidents did not affect the
evacuation of the President in this case but could have pre-
sented serious problems in less fortuitous circumstances.
4. The chances of the President surviving a medical emer-
gency would be enhanced by the presence of a highly skilled,
paramedic team that moves with the protective motorcade.
Recommendations
1. Based on their exemplary performance immediately
following the shots at the hotel, Special Agents Jerry Parr,
Ray Shaddick, Tim McCarthy and D.V. McCarthy should receive
special recognition and an appropriate monetary award.
2. A fully trained paramedic team should be regularly
included in the Presidential motorcade.
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SECURITY AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
Procedures
The Secret Service Manual provides that the detail leader
is responsible for the protection of the President during an
emergency. It is the practice of the Secret Service, however,
that in the event of an emergency the senior member of the
working shift remains with the President, and the responsi-
bility for establishing contingency plans is delegated to the
next most senior member of the shift on the scene. This
Special Agent must assess the situation, establish security
perimeters, request extra Special Agents (if needed), plan for
any movement of the President, and establish lines of
communication.
There were no contingency plans for security at George
Washington University Hospital. In July 1980 the Secret
Service's Washington field office had surveyed George
Washington University Hospital's emergency room and surgical
capabilities, but security arrangements, such as the number of
Special Agents needed to provide security in the event of an
emergency, the placement of post standers, or the location of a
command post, were not covered because Secret Service hospital
survey procedures do not call for such information. Basic
security arrangements for the President at the hospital com-
menced with his arrival. The hospital did maintain its own
"hospital disaster plan" which was activated by the Hospital
Administrator; the plan provided for increased hospital secur-
ity through limiting access.
Execution of Procedures
Manpower
When the President arrived at the hospital, he was being
protected by the Special Agents who had accompanied him from
the Hilton. The senior agent, Special Agent in Charge Parr,
followed the President into the trauma bay of the emergency
room. Under Secret Service procedures, authority for estab-
lishing security for the President was transferred without
formal delegation at this point from Parr to Assistant to the
Special Agent in Charge Shaddick. The remaining agents at-
tempted to secure the emergency room. On arrival at the hos-
-64-
pital, Shaddick had instructed the follow-up driver, -Special
Agent Dennis Fabel, to radio the White House Command Post for
more manpower. Fabel had radioed and asked: "Would you con-
tact Washington field office or some other division and get
some additional people sent to this location [hospital]?"
With the assistance of members of the hospital adminis-
tration, the Special Agents present then began to establish
check points at the entrance to the emergency room, excluding
all persons except those identified as necessary medical per-
sonnel.
Special Agent Mary Ann Gordon had arrived with the motor-
cade and remained outside the emergency room entrance attempt-
ing to set up security around the hospital. As the press and
public began to gather, she asked for the assistance of the
Metropolitan Police Department and Park Police officers on the
scene to establish crowd control and keep people clear of the
area.
Shortly after the President entered the emergency room,
Special Agents from the Presidential Detail's 4:00 p.m.-to-
midnight working shift arrived at the hospital. They had been
driving to work at the time of the shooting and were ordered to
report to the hospital by the White House Command Post. They
arrived approximately five to ten minutes after the President
and were assigned by Shaddick to assist in securing the emer-
gency room, locating a command post, establishing communica-
tions, and preparing for the President's expected move to the
operating room and his later move to the Intensive Care Unit.
Within half an hour after the shooting a Special Agent
from the Technical Security Division arrived at the hospital
and conducted a technical security check of the operating room.
He remained throughout the evening and conducted other checks
of the recovery room and Intensive Care Unit. There were no
technical security checks of the emergency room.
While Shaddick was coordinating the security in the im-
mediate proximity of the President, Assistant to the Special
Agent in Charge Pat Miller arrived from the Washington field
office. Without being assigned the task, Miller assumed re-
sponsibility for coordinating the security arrangements in the
emergency room and the operating room. At about 5:00 p.m.,
Miller concluded that considerably more Special Agents would be
needed to stand post during the President's movements after he
left surgery. Miller attempted to telephone the Washington
field office but was unable to get through. He then called
-65-
Secret Service headquarters instead and asked for additional
Special Agents, who reported to the hospital between 5:00 p.m.
and 6:00 p.m.
Two officers from the Service's Uniformed Division, who
arrived at the hospital at approximately 3:00 p.m., were the
first people from that Division on the scene. After evaluating
the situation, they requested additional personnel, and by
about 3:30 p.m., several other officers had arrived at the
hospital. In the following hour, Uniformed Division strength
was increased and the officers who arrived relieved
Metropolitan Police Department officers at posts inside the
hospital; the Metropolitan Police Department officers then
moved to points outside the hospital. Later that evening,
canine and counter-sniper teams also reported to the hospital.
The Uniformed Division continued to maintain a sizeable con-
tingent of officers at the hospital throughout the remainder of
the President's stay.
When Deputy Special Agent in Charge DeProspero and
Assistant Director (Protective Operations) Simpson arrived
around 3:30 p.m., there were Special Agents posted at the door
to the operating room, Special Agents guarding the hall to the
operating room and Special Agents in the operating room with
the President. In addition, checkpoints had been established
at the entrances into the hospital, and at the entrances into
the operating room area. Simpson and DeProspero spoke with
Miller and concluded that security arrangements at the hospital
were sufficient.
After surgery on the President was completed, he was moved
to the recovery room. At this point there were security posts
both inside and outside the President's room, and the requisite
security perimeters were in place at the hospital. A technical
search of the recovery room had been conducted and preparations
initiated for the President's anticipated move to the Intensive
Care Unit. This level of security was continued throughout the
President's stay at the hospital.
Communications
George Washington University Hospital, even though it was
the primary emergency hospital for trips by the President in
the downtown Washington area, was not considered by the White
House Communications Agency to be the primary hospital for
medical treatment of the President in the Washington area. A
military hospital in the area served this role, and as a
-66-
result there were only limited communication capabilities in
place at George Washington for immediate use by the White House
Communications Agency and the Secret Service.
Within five minutes of the President's arrival the White
House Communications Agency began to set up communications.
Shortly thereafter, White House Communications Agency portable
communications equipment arrived. The room in which the equip-
ment was installed, Room 2500, became the Secret Service
Command Post, from which drop lines were installed and open
lines were established with the Intelligence Squad duty desk at
the Washington field office. Within an hour to an hour and
one-half after the President's arrival, the Command Post was
fully operational. It served as a communications and security
coordination center at the hospital for the duration of the
President's stay.
Conclusions
1. The Secret Service has procedures in place for con-
ducting surveys of the adequacy and accessibility of medical
care for the President at local hospitals in the event of an
emergency. Those procedures appear to have been properly
followed, and a Hospital Protective Survey Check List had been
prepared for George Washington University Hospital.
2. The Special Agents arriving at the hospital with the
President had no overall assessment of the protective manpower
needs at the hospital. Such an assessment was not included in
the hospital survey, which in any event did not arrive at the
hospital until after the initial crisis had passed.
3. While with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that
security at the hospital was adequate, there is some question
whether the Service should have procedures to assure that an
adequate level of personnel is available to protect the
President in the immediate aftermath of an attempted assassin-
ation -- at least until it is known whether that attempt was
part of a larger threat.
4. Hospital personnel have concluded that, although it
was not critical to the treatment of the President in this
case, it would be helpful in the future if the President's
medical file were to be available in the hopsital emergency
room.
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Recommendations
-
1. Hospital protective surveys should include a segment
assessing the security needs at any hospital for which emer-
gency use is contemplated, including manpower, posts, a room
designated as a command post and all access routes to the
emergency room, operating room, recovery room and intensive
care unit; this survey should be placed in the President's
limousine.
2. A copy of the President's medical history (including
blood type) should be carried with the hospital survey in the
President's limousine, so that it can be made promptly avail-
able to hospital emergency room staffs.
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HILTON HOTEL AFTERMATH
Procedures
Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that they
should not assist individuals injured during an assault on a
protected person until the protected person has been evacuated
from the scene or the scene has been secured. In addition,
they learn that the scene of the assault should be secured as
soon as possible by agents not directly involved in the phys-
ical safeguarding of the protected person.
The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over assassination
attempts (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1751). The Secret Service and the FBI
have entered into an agreement delineating the responsibilities
of each agency in the event of an assassination of, or an
assassination attempt on, a protected person, including the
President. The agreement provides that it is the responsi-
bility of the Secret Service to assume and maintain control of
the situation (exercise an "interim federal presence") until
the Director of the Secret Service and the Director of the FBI
or their respective designees have arranged a logical and
coordinated transition of control of an investigation. The
agreement further provides that the FBI should be given immed-
iate access to all parts of the investigation by the Secret
Service. Responsibility for working with the FBI, to determine
when to transfer control of an investigation to the FBI, is
assigned to the Assistant Director, Office of Investigations.
In addition to the agreement with the FBI, each Secret
Service Special Agent has received basic law-enforcement train-
ing and has normally had on-the-job experience with the pro-
cedures for preserving a crime scene and evidence and for
establishing the chain of custody of the evidence.
Execution of Procedures
From the shooting, the evacuation of the President took
less than ten seconds. Thereafter, attention turned to crowd
control and dealing with the assailant.
As the suspect was being subdued by Special Agent D.V.
McCarthy, Special Agent Wanko, a member of the Presidential
detail who had remained on the scene, readied his submachine
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gun and surveyed the crowd for other possible assailants. He
ultimately moved to a position against the wall of the hotel
where he continued to survey the area. He also directed the
crowd to move back.
At this point, members of the public trained in emergency
medical treatment and other Special Agents in the vicinity
moved to render assistance to Press Secretary Brady, Special
Agent Tim McCarthy and Metropolitan Police Department Officer
Thomas Delahanty.
Special Agent William Green, the lead advance agent, was
near Officer Delahanty at the rope line when he heard the
shots. He moved away from the rope line and toward the depart-
ing Presidential limousine, radioing that there had been an
attack on the President. After the limousine left, he attempt-
ed to radio the emergency ambulance which was pre-positioned on
Connecticut Avenue above the hotel. The ambulance did not
respond, so Green moved up the hill and motioned for the ambu-
lance to come to the area of the shooting.
The Special Agents and police officers in the area of the
wounded effectively kept the crowd back. Within a few minutes
of the shooting, Special Agent Tim McCarthy and Press Secretary
Brady were loaded into the first two ambulances in the scene
and Officer Delahanty was loaded into the third. Secret
Service Special Agents got into the ambulances with Special
Agent McCarthy and Press Secretary Brady. They accompanied
them to the George Washington University Hospital and there
assisted with hospital security.
A number of Special Agents and police officers tried to
control the crowd and preserve the crime scene until the FBI
arrived. Special Agent Tom Lightsey picked up the .22 caliber
weapon used by the assailant with his handcuffs, was later
advised of the FBI's assumption of jurisdiction by the
Assistant Director for Investigations, and turned the weapon
over to the FBI. Eight officers from the Uniformed Division,
responding to a radio transmission requesting assistance,
arrived within seven minutes of the request and assisted in
preserving the integrity of the crime scene.
In the Security Room monitoring the radios was Special
Agent
After hearing that the crime scene was
under control,
ordered the post standers to report to
the Hilton briefing room for interviews with the FBI.
also called the Washington field office and asked for case
agents, required whenever there is a shooting incident, to
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report to the scene. Shortly after 2:30 p.m., two Special
Agents from the Washington field office were dispatched to the
hotel to work with the FBI.
By 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., the FBI had interviewed most of
the post standers, who were then told that they could return to
their respective offices. Most returned to the Washington
field office and remained there working the telephones or were
ordered home with instructions to rest and return with a later
shift.
Movement of the Suspect
Procedures
Secret Service Special Agents are instructed that steps
should be taken to protect those in custody from physical harm
and from overexposure to news reporters and photographers. Any
suspects taken into custody are to be informed immediately of
their rights as outlined in the Miranda decision of the Supreme
Court.
Execution
After being subdued by Special Agent D.V. McCarthy, the
suspect, later identified as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr., was
transported to the Metropolitan Police Department Central Cell
Block. After the ride, Hinckley was searched for weapons. On
arrival, McCarthy covered the subject as he entered the cell
block; another Special Agent, Carlton Spriggs, searched
Hinckley, and McCarthy informed him of his rights. Hinckley
was placed in a cell, and McCarthy stayed at the entrance.
Spriggs took Hinckley's belongings and called the
Washington field office to inform the Secret Service of their
contents. The Washington field office then assigned a response
team of two Special Agents from the Protective Intelligence
Squad and they, plus a Special Agent from the Command Post,
went to the Central Cell Block. Secret Service Special Agents
who were present during questioning of the subject by
Metropolitan Police Department homicide detectives reported
pertinent information (name, date of birth, etc.) back to the
Washington field office.
Hinckley was transferred to the FBI Washington field
-71-
office at Buzzard's Point by Secret Service armored car. On
arrival at the FBI Washington field office, Hinckley was inter-
viewed by FBI agents with Secret Service Special Agents pre-
sent. Information from the interview was forwarded to the
Secret Service Washington field office and from there to the
Intelligence Division.
Intelligence information was also coming from a variety of
other sources. The State Department, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and Office of Special Investigations (Department of
Defense), the CIA and the Capitol Police, all reported that
they had no record of Hinckley. ATF called to offer its ser-
vices and provided information on the weapon used within one-
half hour after receiving the correct serial numbers, as is
further explained below.
At about 5:00 p.m., Special Agent
the Secret Service
liaison to the FBI, advised the Intelligence Division's
Command/Control Center that the FBI had a record of Hinckley's
arrest at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. Later, at
about 9:00 p.m., the FBI confirmed this information.
Secret Service personnel transported Hinckley during the
evening of March 30 from the FBI Washington field office to the
Federal Courthouse using an armored car. Later that night he
was again moved with the aid of Secret Service personnel to the
Quantico Marine base.
Search of the Park Central Hotel
Special Agent Spriggs determined from Hinckley's belong-
ings that he was registered in Room 312 at the Park Central
Hotel. Spriggs relayed this information to the Washington
field office, and two Special Agents were assigned there. At
about 5:45 p.m., a search warrant was requested by FBI agents,
and was signed by a Magistrate at 9:45 p.m. Approximately ten
minutes thereafter, the search of Room 312 began. The luggage
was screened for explosives, and the room was dusted for
fingerprints. Among the items of interest in the room was the
newspaper listing of the President's schedule (time and loca-
tion) for Monday, March 30, 1981. At approximately 4:15 a.m.
the next morning the search was completed.
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Conclusions
1. The Service's agreement with the FBI for the preservation
of an "interim federal presence" at the Hilton Hotel did not
require that the post standers remain at the hotel for inter-
views with FBI agents. What the agreement did require was the
presence of a Secret Service intelligence team, who were in
turn authorized to use available personnel. The decision to
keep the post standers at the hotel was questionable under
circumstances in which the dimensions of the danger to the
President -- who was then in the hospital -- were still largely
unknown. A determination should have been made at headquarters
to transfer these Special Agents to the hospital.
2. The control, protection and transportation of the
suspected assailant to the Metropolitan Police Department
proceeded in accordance with Secret Service procedures.
3. Available information suggests that the accused in
this case was materially aided in his attempt on the life of
the President by a newspaper publication of the daily itinerary
of the President.
Recommendations
1. The agent coordinating communications at the scene of
any assassination attempt should be responsible for obtaining
instructions from Secret Service headquarters as to the subse-
quent assignment of the agents remaining at the site. These
agents should be made available to protect the President at
another location, if advisable, before they are assigned to any
other duties.
2. Consideration should be given to withholding from
publication information concerning the times and locations of
the President's public activities outside the White House.
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PROTECTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
Procedures for Protection of the Vice President
There were apparently no written procedures in place for
automatically increasing the protection of the Vice President
in the event of an assassination attempt on the President.
Secret Service Protection of the Vice President
On March 30, 1981
The Vice President was enroute to Austin, Texas, by air-
plane when he learned that the President had been shot.
Although it is unclear whether other landing sites were con-
sidered, the Vice President decided to land in Austin for
refueling, and did so for refueling at 2:25 p.m., C.S.T. It is
unclear whether the Service made a special check to determine
whether trouble might be anticipated at this stop, which had
been scheduled well in advance. In any event, there is some
question as to the security of the communications facilities on
the Vice President's plane; any transmission of the decision to
land in Austin could have been overheard by members of the
public.
In Austin, the Vice President did not leave the plane.
Special Agents remained on the aircraft with the Vice
President, guarding the door with automatic weapons. Other
Special Agents were posted outside the plane. The plane de-
parted Austin at 3:10 p.m., C.S.T.
The Washington field office ordered protective intelli-
gence agents who were at Andrews Air Force Base for the arrival
of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to remain there pend-
ing the arrival of the Vice President. In addition, several
other Special Agents were assigned by the Washington field
office to assist in security arrangements at Andrews Air Force
Base.
The Vice President landed at Andrews at 6:25 p.m., E.S.T.,
and the plane taxied directly into a hangar adjacent to that
housing Air Force One. The Vice President was then flown by
helicopter to the Naval Observatory grounds where he landed at
6:41 p.m. At the Naval Observatory, he was transferred to an
armored limousine and escorted by an augmented motorcade to the
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White House (after the attempt on President Reagan's life, the
Vice President received additional Secret Service protection).
Upon arrival at the White House, the Vice President went
directly to the Situation Room. He later went to the Press
Room and made a short statement. About 9:50 p.m., the Vice
President returned from the White House to his residence at the
Naval Observatory grounds.
Conclusion
The protective detail with the Vice President at the time
of the shooting responded with good judgment to his protective
needs. Nevertheless, the written procedures for responding to
an assassination attempt on the President do not provide a very
specific system for upgrading protection for the Vice President
or other successors to the Presidency. Although the President
already has the authority to order such protection, given the
circumstances in which a decision may be required, statutory
authority for the Secretary of the Treasury may be appropriate.
Recommendations
1. The Secret Service should review and formalize its
unwritten procedures for an immediate increase in protection
for the Vice President and other successors to the Presidency
in the event of an attempted assassination of the President.
2. The security of communications with the Vice
President's traveling party should be enhanced.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE SECRET SERVICE
General Conclusions
1. As a whole, the United States Secret Service performs
its protection role with great effectiveness and profession-
alism. Moreover, from the Director down through each of the
agents interviewed, the Service was entirely cooperative and
forthcoming with what was in effect the most searching manage-
ment review it has undergone since the Warren Commission.
2. Over the last few years there has been an increase in
the number of individuals the Secret Service is charged by law
with protecting, and a decrease in the number of Special Agent
and Uniformed Division personnel the Service has to discharge
those responsibilities. Even after offsetting the decreases
against an increase in support personnel, the Secret Service
still puts its effective loss in strength since 1977 at 280
positions, with about a 15 percent overall decline in the
Special Agent and Uniformed Division categories.
General Recommendations
1. In its 1964 report on the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, the Warren Commission recommended improvements
in the Treasury Department's daily supervision of the opera-
tions of the Secret Service and that "the Secretary of the
Treasury appoint a special assistant with the responsibility of
supervising the Service." Continuous outside management super-
vision can improve the responsiveness and flexibility of gov-
ernment agencies, especially those -- such as the Service --
whicha re headed by career officials. Consideration should be
given to increasing the reporting responsibilities of the
Secret Service to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Enforce- ment and Operations, and the supervisory authority
which this officer can exercise over the Service's activities.
2. If the Secret Service is to continue to provide the
level of protection equivalent to that which it has histori-
cally achieved, the manpower and financial resources available
to the Service for the performance of this function must be
significantly increased.
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B. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
LEGAL AUTHORITY
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is
responsible for enforcing and administering the firearms and
explosives laws of the United States. Much of ATF's authority
derives from the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 921,
et seq.), which imposes a number of record-keeping requirements
on importers, manufacturers, and dealers who are licensed to
engage in the firearms business by the Act.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 923(g), licensees must maintain
records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or
other disposition of firearms and ammunition "at such place,
for such period, and in such form as the Secretary [of the
Treasury] may by regulations prescribe."
In addition, licensees must make their records available
for inspection at all reasonable times and must submit to the
Secretary such reports and information with respect to the
records as the Secretary may by regulations require. And
finally, licensees must allow the inspection, during business
hours and on their premises, of any records required by regula-
tion to be kept as well as the inspection of any firearms or
ammunition stored on the premises.
When a firearm is sold or otherwise disposed of by a
licensee to an unlicensed person, the transaction must be
recorded on a firearms transaction record (Form 4473). Each
licensee must retain as a part of his permanent files each Form
4473 and must file the forms in one of three ways: alphabet-
ically (by name of purchaser), chronologically (by date of
disposition), or numerically (by transaction serial number).
In an over-the-counter sale of a firearm to a non-licensee
who is a resident of the state in which the licensee maintains
his business, the Form 4473 will contain the purchaser's name,
address, date and place of birth, height, weight and race, as
well as a certification by the purchaser that he is not prohib-
ited by law from receiving a firearm in interstate or foreign
commerce. It will also contain the name of the manufacturer of
the firearm, the name of the importer (if any), the type,
model, caliber or gauge, and the serial number.
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Forms 4473 are not forwarded to ATF, but are maintained by
the licensees. However, if two or more pistols or revolvers
are sold to a single person within a five-day period, the
licensee must file with ATF a Report of Multiple Sale or Other
Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers.
In the Federal Register of March 21, 1978, ATF published a
notice containing several proposals concerning recordkeeping
and reporting requirements under the firearms regulations.
Specifically, the notice proposed that (1) licensed manufact-
urers and licensed importers put a unique serial number on each
firearm imported into or manufactured in the United States; (2)
each Federal firearms licensee report to ATF any theft, loss,
or recovery of a firearm; (3) each licensed manufacturer submit
to ATF a quarterly report of firearms manufactured; and (4)
each licensed manufacturer, licensed importer, and licensed
dealer submit to ATF a quarterly report of firearm disposi-
tions.
Congress halted any action on the proposals by providing,
in the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-74), that no funds
appropriated for the salaries and expenses of ATF:
"shall be available for administrative expenses in con-
nection with consolidating or centralizing within the
Department of the Treasury the records of receipt and
disposition of firearms maintained by Federal firearms
licensees or for issuing or carrying out any provisions of
the proposed rules of the Department of the Treasury,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, on Firearms
Regulations, as published in the Federal Register, volume
43, number 55, of March 21, 1978."
COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
The National Firearms Tracing Center at ATF Headquarters
traces firearms for federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies, conducting approximately 3,000 to 4,000 traces per
month. Law enforcement agencies may call 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, and request a gun trace. The trace request call
is recorded and the trace is done when the personnel of the
are at work -- usually from around 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday.
When the Center receives a request for a trace, the name
of the requester, a description of the firearm (including the
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serial number, manufacturer, etc.) and other available infor-
mation is recorded. Center personnel call the manufacturer and
obtain the first disposition of the weapon; the manufacturers
usually sell to wholesalers. The wholesaler receiving the
weapon is then called, and the next disposition of the weapon
is identified. The entire transfer history of the weapon is
obtained in this manner and provided to the requester.
EMERGENCY PERFORMANCE
Procedures
While ATF has no written plans or procedures to be put
into effect in case of an assassination or attempted assassin-
ation of the President, such an event would be treated in a
fashion similar to other more common emergency situations
(bombings, bomb threats, etc.).
Because information on firearms ownership is maintained by
manufacturers, wholesalers and dealers, and not by ATF, there
is only limited tracing capability after business hours. If an
emergency gun trace is requested after the National Firearms
Tracing Center has closed for the day, the ATF Communications
Center (which is open 24 hours a day) will call the Chief of
the National Firearms Tracing Center at his residence. He has
the names and the home telephone numbers of all the major
manufacturers' representatives who could be called and asked to
initiate a trace. If the firearm was not manufactured by one
of the major firms, it is likely that no trace can be effected
after business hours. Moreover, reaching the ultimate dealer
(who actually sold the firearm and has the Form 4473 indicating
the name of the individual purchaser) after business hours is
likely to be difficult in any case.
Execution on March 30, 1981
At approximately 2:40 p.m. on March 30, 1981, the ATF
Liaison Branch, upon the instruction of the Acting Assistant
Director (Criminal Enforcement), contacted the U.S. Secret
Service Liaison Office and offered to provide assistance,
including the ATF gun tracing capability. At about the same
time, the National Firearms Tracing Center was ordered to stand
by for an urgent trace. At approximately 3:20 p.m., a liaison
agent from the Secret Service contacted the ATF Liaison Branch
and provided a description and the serial number of the firearm
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recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination.
The ATF Liaison Branch immediately passed the information
along to the Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center for
an urgent gun trace. The Chief of the Tracing Center called
the ATF Liaison Branch a few minutes later and advised that the
serial number given was missing one digit (the number of digits
in a serial number varies according to the manufacturer so it
would not be immediately apparent that a digit had been
dropped). Contact was again initiated with the Secret Service
and at about 4:00 p.m. the correct serial number was furnished
and the trace was begun.
The Chief of the National Firearms Tracing Center tele-
phoned the manufacturer, RG Industries, in Miami, Florida, and
gave them a description of the weapon and the serial number.
In a few minutes RG Industries advised that the weapon had been
shipped on July 27, 1979, to Scott Wholesale, Indian Trail,
North Carolina. The Chief then called Scott Wholesale and they
advised him that the weapon had been shipped to Rocky's Pawn
Shop, 2018 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas, on October 11, 1979.
Finally, the Chief called Rocky's Pawn Shop, and was told
that the weapon had been purchased on October 13, 1980, by an
individual identifying himself as John Warnock Hinckley, Jr.
Hinckley provided the dealer with his Texas driver's license
number, his date of birth, and his Lubbock, Texas address.
Rocky's Pawn Shop also advised that Hinckley had purchased a
second identical firearm on the same day.
At about 4:30 p.m., the Acting Assistant Director of ATF's
Office of Criminal Enforcement telephoned the Office of the
Director of the Secret Service and spoke with the Deputy
Director. The trace information was passed along to the Deputy
Director, including the information that Hinckley had purchased
a second identical firearm. The Deputy Director of the Secret
Service asked that ATF notify the ATF Dallas office that the
weapon had been traced to Rocky's and that the ATF Dallas
office inform the Secret Service Dallas office of the trace
information. This was done and at about 4:55 p.m. agents from
ATF, the FBI and the Secret Service went to Rocky's and ob-
tained the original Forms 4473 that Hinckley had signed when
purchasing the two RG Industries .22 caliber revolvers.
While ATF headquarters was conducting the gun trace on the
weapon recovered from the scene of the attempted assassination,
the Lubbock field office, after learning from television re-
ports that the suspect John Hinckley was from the Lubbock area,
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began calling dealers in Lubbock and asking them to- review
their records for purchases by Hinckley.
The office also began checking its files of multiple sale
forms (described above), and found one indicating that the two
handguns described above had been purchased by Hinckley at
Rocky's Pawn Shop in Dallas. The Lubbock office passed this
information along to the ATF Dallas District Office shortly
before Dallas was advised by ATF Headquarters of the successful
trace of the weapon by the National Firearms Tracing Center.
Subsequently, the Lubbock investigation revealed that
Hinckley had made several other purchases of firearms and
ammunition in the Lubbock area. The ammunition purchased
included one box of "Devastator" ammunition. In explosive
bullets, such as the "Devastator" brand, an explosive is in-
serted into each bullet in order that the bullet will fragment
upon impact with a target. The Lubbock information, which
included the purchase of the Devastator ammunition, was passed
to the Dallas District Office and on to ATF headquarters at
about 5:30 p.m. or 6:00 p.m. The information concerning the
Devastator ammunition was given to the Chief of ATF's Firearms
Technology Branch and he began a search of his files for infor-
mation concerning the Devastator ammunition.
Shortly thereafter, at about 6:30 p.m., the FBI requested
(through the ATF Nashville field office) a gun trace on three
firearms which had been seized from Hinckley when he was
arrested at the Nashville Airport on October 9, 1980. ATF had
not previously been notified of this arrest and seizure. The
three seized weapons turned out to be the revolvers purchased
in Lubbock, and ATF Headquarters was able immediately to advise
the FBI of the purchase information on the weapons.
The fact that Hinckley had purchased Devastator ammu-
nition, the full significance of which was not then apparent,
was provided to Main Treasury and to the Liaison Office of the
Secret Service by ATF Headquarters at about 7:00 p.m. on the
evening of March 30. Later, at approximately 9:00 p.m., after
the Chief of the Firearms Technology Branch had found a de-
scriptive advertisement for Devastator ammunition in his files,
ATF Headquarters again called the Liaison Office of the Secret
Service and provided further information on the nature of the
ammunition.
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Conclusions
1. ATF was able to conduct the gun trace on the weapon
recovered from the scene of the assassination attempt in less
than half an hour. Such a rapid trace could, of course, be of
crucial importance in identifying a suspect in circumstances
where the weapon is recovered, but the suspect escapes or S
second person is involved. ATF also swiftly gathered infor-
mation on other weapons and ammunition purchased by Hinckley
and provided that information to the appropriate authorities.
Through its own investigation, and prior to a request from the
FBI, ATF obtained the purchase information on the three weapons
seized from Hinckley in Nashville.
2. It is noteworthy that the gun trace of the suspect's
weapon and the other investigative activities carried out by
ATF were initiated during the normal working day. It would be
difficult to conduct such an emergency gun trace if the weapon
were not made by one of the major manufacturers, and it is
likely to be difficult in any case to reach the ultimate dealer
(who actually sold the weapon and has the name of the retail
purchaser) during non-business hours.
Recommendation
Consideration should be given to methods or mechanisms,
acceptable to the Congress, by which ATF would be enabled to
effect gun sales traces during non-business hours.