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135840941
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Assassination Report (4)
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135840941
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Assassination Report (4)
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373
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Records of the Office of the Counsellor to the President (Reagan Administration)
Edwin Meese's Office Files
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1985-12-31
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Meese, Edwin III: Files
Folder Title: Assassination Report [4 of 4]
Box: CFOA 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
F
ALL
ASAICS
U. S. SECRET SERVICE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DATE:
April 23, 1979
memorandum
TO
TN OF:
Deputy Director
File: 610.0
X 110.1
SUBJECT:
Secret Service/FBI Procedures Following an
Attempted Assassination of a Protectee
X130.3 X
TO:
See Distribution Below
I. INTRODUCTION
The Secret Service has entered into an agreement with
the Federal Bureau of Investigations regarding joint
agency procedures following an attempted assassination
of a protectee of this Service. The agreement (attached)
outlines the responsibilities of the respective agencies
during all phases of the subsequent investigation.
It will be the responsibility of the Secret Service to
assume initial control of a post attack situation and
exercise "Interim Federal Presence" until such time as
a logical and coordinated transition of responsibilities
can be made, to the FBI in those instances where they have
jurisdiction. (Title 18, Sections 1751, 245, 112, USC)
All personnel should be aware that in the event of an
attack on a protectee, that 'the FBI should be given
immediate access to all parts of the investigation under
our control to provide for a coordinated effort leading to
the transition of control.
II. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
A. Office of Investigations - The Director has
delegated overall responsibility for the
Secret Service's role in any investigation
following an attack on a protectee to the
Assistant Director (Office of Investigations)
The Assistant Director will establish liaison
with appropriate FBI headquarters personnel in
order to reach an agreement as to when the Secret
Service should turn its control of the investiga-
tion over to the FBI. The Assistant Director
will send a representative to the scene of the
attack who will have the overall responsibility
for this Service's participation in any subsequent
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- 2 -
investigation. The representative will coordinate
this Service's investigative efforts with the FBI
counterpart, who has a similar responsibility for
that Agency.
B. Office of Protective Research - The Assistant
Director (Protective Research) has the responsibility
to determine the nature of the attack and the
potential for additional threats to protectees of
this Service. The Assistant Director will send a
representative to participate in a headquarters
command post established by the FBI in accordance
with their existing procedures.
C.
Intelligence Team - In the event of an attack on a
principal, the first Intelligence Team present will:
1. Effect immediate "Interim Federal Presence"
at the site with the responsibility of
conducting the preliminary interview of
witnesses, the collection and preservation
of evidence, the taking into custody of
suspects, and doing those things which will
insure a complete and successful investigation.
The Intelligence Team will utilize available
manpower in carrying out the above.
2. Will cooperate fully with FBI and local law
enforcement officials in order to establish
a coordinated effort. Service personnel should
appreciate that the Service has the responsibility
for the Federal Government to control the
investigation until it is assumed by the FBI at
the direction of AD Investigations.
3. Will maintain control of the situation until
such time as the local SAIC or his designee
can assume command.
D. Field Office SAIC Upon an attack on a protectee,
the SAIC or his designee has the immediate
responsibility to assist the protective detail
leader in the safety and evacuation of the protectee.
Once having relocated and provided necessary security
for the protectee, the field office SAIC will:
- 3 -
1. Assume command of "Interim Federal Presence"
from the Intelligence Team.
2. Establish contact with appropriate local FBI
officials and coordinate the investigative
effort with all involved law enforcement
agencies.
3. Establish joint field command post with the
FBI, giving consideration to the initial use
of the protectee's command post. At such time
as the FBI may establish its own command post,
the SAIC will select a Secret Service representa-
tive to be in that command post.
4. Provide constant information and notification
to the Intelligence Division Duty Desk, who
will in turn disseminate information to the
appropriate headquarters offices.
5. Will retain command of the investigation on
behalf of the Federal Government until otherwise
directed by the Assistant Director (Investigations)
or his designee.
E. Protective Detail Leader - Has the ultimate
responsibility to evacuate and provide necessary
security for the protectee. Based on needs of
safety for the protectee, the Detail Leader should
begin to make contingency plans as the situation
warrants. In the event of an assassination, the
Detail Leader should provide necessary security
for the deceased and preserve any evidence under
his immediate control.
III. CONCLUSION:
The implementation of this policy follows the general
Secret Service procedures regarding shooting incidents
(Secret Service Manual Section 266.31) and jurisdictional
authority during hostage and assault situations (Memorandum
of Deputy Director dated July 27, 1978 under 610.0). These
procedures should be reviewed.
- 4 -
Following an assassination or an assassination attempt,
all personnel should work to provide for the safety of
the protectee and for an orderly and systematic investi-
gation. Each agent should take such action as necessary
to insure a coordinated and complete effort at every level:
All employees should review this memorandum and a copy of
this policy should be available in any command post being
operated for a protectee of this Service.
Myron I. Weinstein
Deputy Director
Distribution:
All Assistant Directors
All Assistants to the Director
All Protective SAIC's
All Field Office and Headquarters SAIC's
All RA's
SATS Williams
Legal Counsel
Attachment
AGREEMENT OF PROCEDURES
This agreement between the U.S. Secret Service and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation is to confirm our
procedures to be followed in the event that a violation
of law occurs involving a person or persons protected
by the U.S. Secret Service pursuant to law and which
falls within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.
I. In the event of the killing of a protectee of
the U.S. Secret Service for which the FBI has
investigative jurisdiction:
IA. The U.S. Secret Service during the im-
mediate period thereafter will exercise
control as an interim Federal presence until
such time as the Director of the Secret Service
and the Director of the FBI, or their designees,
agree to an orderly transfer of responsibilities.
In most instances, this should occur before or
no later than the time of the autopsy. It is
understond that concurrent with the transfer of
responsibilities the Secret Service will release
custody and control of the deceased protectee
to the FBI, but may maintain a presence as
deemed necessary by the Secret Service. During
- 2 -
this period of time the FBI shall have presence
in all situations to fully carry out their
investigative responsibilities pursuant to
law.
B. During the immediate period following the
killing of a protectee, the U.S. Secret Service
will maintain and preserve any suspects, witnes-
ses, and evidence under its control until such
time as the FBI assumes its investigative
responsibilities.
C.
The Secret Service and the FBI will coordinate
all phases of the subsequent investigation or
investigations into the killing of a protectee,
and the Secret Service will have presence in all
phases of the investigation, pursuant to the
responsibilities of the Secret Service under law.
This shall include mutual presence in any Command
Post or Co-ordinating Center established by the
FBI or Secret Service.
II. In the event of anv other violation of law
involving a protectee of the Secret Service for which
the FBI has investigative jurisdiction:
A. The same procedures shall be followed
- 3 -
concerning control and presence as outlined
above. The Directors of the Secret Service
and the FBI, or their designees, shall agree
to an orderly transfer of responsibilities.
B. The Secret Service during the immediate
period following the violation will maintain
and preserve any suspects, witnesses, and evi-
2,
dence under its control until such time as the
FBI assumes its investigative responsibilities.
C. The FBI and the Secret Service will co-
ordinate the subsequent investigation or
investigations and the Secret Service will have
presence in all phases of the investigations
pursuant to its responsibilities under law.
III. Internal Procedures
The FBI and the Secret Service will create internal directives
to fully effect this agreement of procedures.
In order to provide for an orderly and systematic investi-
gation of the above described violations of law involving
a Secret Service protectee where the FBI has investigative
jurisdiction, the FBI and the Secret Service will construe
the terms of this agreement liberally and will take such
- 4 -
action as is necessary to insure a coordinated and complete
Federal effort at every level.
This agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives
of the FBI and the Secret Service, or at such other times
as the FBI or the Secret Service may request, to insure
that the agreement is both practical and productive.
Revisions may be made with the mutual concurrence of the
Directors of the FBI and the Secret Service.
BY Wilham H with
BY Director IS
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Secret Service
DATE Du 11,1978
DATE Wec.8,1978 Wee. 8,1978
DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTICATIONS
I.
BASES OF INVESTIGATION
A. Domestic security investigations are conducted, when
authorized under Section II(C), II(F). or II(I), to
ascertain information on the activities of individuals,
or the activities of groups, which involve or will
invoive the use of force or violence and which involve
or will involve the violation of federal law, for the
purpose of:
(1) overthrowing the government of the United States
or the government of a State;
(2) substantially interfering. in the United States,
with the activities of 2 foreign government or
its authorized representatives;
(3) substantially impairing for the purpose of
influencing U.S. government policies or decisions:
(a) the functioning of the government of
the United States;
(b) the functioning of the government of a
State; or
(c). interstate commerce.
(4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
II. INITIATION AND SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS
A. Domestic security investigations are conducted at three
levels -- preliminary investigations, limited investi-
gations, and full investigations -- differing in scope
and in investigative techniques which may be used.
B. All investigations undertaken through these guidelines
shall be designed and conducted so as not to limit the
full exercise of rights protected by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
Preliminary Investigations
C. Preliminary investigations may be undertaken on the
basis of allegations or other information that an
individual or a group may be engaged in activities
which involve or will involve the use of force or
violence and which involve or will involve the
C. Techniques such as recruitment or placement of
informants In groups, "mail covers," or electronic
surveillance, may not be used as part of a
preliminary or a limited investigation.
H. All preliminary and limited investigations shall be
closed within 90 days of the date upon which the
preliminary investigation was initiated. However,
FBI Headquarters may authorize in writing extension
of a preliminary or limited investigation for periods
of not more than 90 days when facts or information
obtained in the original period justify such an
extension. The authorization shall include a state-
ment of the circumstances justifying the extension.
Full Investigation
I. Full investigations must be authorized by FBI Head-
quarters. They may only be authorized on the basis
of specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that an individual or 1 group is or may be
engaged in activities which involve the use of force
or violence and which involve or will involve the
violation of federal law for one or more of the
purposes enumerated in IA(1)-IA(4). The following
factors must be considered in determining whether a
full investigation should be undertaken:
(1) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
(2) the likelihood it will occur;
(3) the immediacy of the threat; and
(4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed
by a full investigation.
Investigative Techniques
J. Whenever use of the following investigative techniques
are permitted by these guidelines, they shall be
implemented as limited herein:
(1) use of informants to gather information; when
approved by FBI Headquarters, and subject to
review at intervals not longer than 180 days;
provided,
(a) when persons have been arrested or charged
with a crime, and criminal proceedings are
still pending. informants shall not be. used'
to gather information concerning that crime
from the person (s) charged; and
(b) informants shall not be used to obtain
privileged information: and where such
information is obtained by an informant
on his own initiative no record or use
shall be made of the information.
(2) "mail covers," pursuant to postal regulations,
when approved by the Attorney General or his
designee, initially or upon request for
extension; and
(3) electronic surveillance in accordance with the
requirement of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Provided that whenever it becomes known that
person(s) under surveillance are engaged in
privileged conversation (e.g., with.
attorney), interception equipment shall be
immediately shut off and the Justice Department
advised as soon as practicable. Where such a
conversation is recorded it shall not be
transcribed, and a Department attorney shall
determine if such conversation is privileged.
NOTE: These techniques have been the subject
of strong concern. The committee is
not yet satisfied that all sensitive
areas have been covered (e.g., inquiries
made under "pretext;" "trash covers,"
photographic or other surveillance
techniques.)
III. TERMINATING INVESTIGATIONS
A.. Preliminary, limited, and full investigations may
be terminated at any. time by the Attorney General,
his designee, or FBI Headquarters.
B. FBI Hcadquarters shall periodically review the
results of full investigations, and at such time
as it appeirs that the standard for a full
investigation under II(I) can no longer be
satisfied and all logical leads have been exhausted
or are not likely to be productive, FBI Headquarters
shall terminate the full investigation.
C. The Department of Justice shall review the results
of full domestic intelligence investigations at
least annually. and shall determine in writing whether
continued investigation is warranted. Full investi-
gations shall not continue beyond one year without the-
written approval of the Department. However, in the
absence of such notification the investigation may continue
for an additional 30 day period pending response by
the Department.
IV. REPORTING. DISSEMINATION, AND RETENTION
A. Reporting
1. Preliminary investigations which involve a 90-day
extension under IIH and limited investigations
under IIF, shall be reported periodically to the
Department of Justice. Reports of preliminary
and limited investigations shall include the
identity of the subject of the investigation,
the identity of the person interviewed or the
person or place surveilled, and shall indicate
which investigations involved a 90-day extension.
FBI Headquarters shall maintain, and provide to
the Department of Justice upon request, statistics
on the number of preliminary investigations
instituted by each field office. the number of
limited investigations under IIF, the number of
preliminary investigations that involved 90-day
extensions under IIH, and the number of preliminary
or limited investigations that resulted in the
opening of a full investigation.
2. Upon opening a full domestic security investigation
the FBI shall, within one week, advise the Attorney
General or his designee thereof, setting forth
the basis for undertaking the investigation.
3. The FBI shall report the progress of full domestic
security investigations to the Department of
Justice not later than 90 days after the initiation
thereof, and the results at the end of each year
the investigation continues.
4. Where the identity of the source of information
is not disclosed in a domestric security report,
an assessment of the reliability of the source
shall be provided.
B. Dissemination
1. Other Federal Authorities
The FBI may disseminate facts or information
obtained during a domestic security investigation
to other federal authorities when such information:
(a) falls within their investigative jurisdiction;
(b) may assist in preventing the use of force
or violence; or
(c) may be required by statute, interagency
agreement approved by the Attorney General,
or Presidential directive. All such
agreements and directives shall be published
in the Federal Register.
2. State and Local Authorities
The FBI may disseminate facts or information
relative to activities described in paragraph IB
to state and local law enforcement authorities
when such information:
(a) falls within their investigative jurisdiction;
(b) may assist in preventing the use of force or
violence; or
(c) may protect the integrity of a law enforcement
agency.
3. When information relating to serious crimes not
covered by paragraph IA is obtained during a
domestic security investigation, the FBI shall
promptly refer the information to the appropriate
lawful authorities if it is within the jurisdiction
of state and local agencies.
4. Nothing in these guidelines shall limit the
authority of the FBI to inform any individual (s)
whose safety or property is directly threatened
by planned force or violence, so that they may
take appropriate protective safeguards,
5. The FBI shall maintain records, as required by
law, of all disseminations made outside the
Department of Justice, of information obtained
during domestic security inves tigations.
C. Retention
1. The FBI shall, in accordance with a Records
Retention Plan approved by the National Archives
and Records Service, within
years after
closing domestic service investigations, destroy
all information obtained during the investigation,
as well as all index references thereto, or
transfer all information and index references
to the National Archives and Records Service.
NOTE: We are not yet certain whether empirical data
exists to help define a period of retention
for information gathered in preliminary or
full investigations. Whatever period is
determined should take into account the
retention period for other categories of
information (c.gt, general criminal,
organized crime, and background checks)
since we have not yet considered these
arcas we cannot fix a period for retention
at this time.
NOTE: It may also be possible to establish a
scaling procedure to preserve investigative
records for an interim period prior to
destruction. After being sealed, access
would be permitted only under controlled
conditions.
2. Information relating to activities not covered by
paragraph IA obtained during domestic security
investigations, which may be maintained by the FBI
under other parts of these guidelines, shall be
retained in accordance with such other provisions
3. The provisions of paragraphs one (1) and two (2)
above apply to all domestic security investigations
completed after the promulgation of these guidclines,
and apply to investigations completed prior to
promulgation of these guidelines when use of these
files serves to identify them as subject to destruction
or transfer to the National Archives and Records
Service.
4. When an individual's request pursuant to law for
access to FBI records identifies the records as
being subject to destruction or transfer under
paragraph one (1), the individual shall be furnished
all information to which he is entitled prior to
destruction or transfer.
15