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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Green, Max: Files 1985-1988
Folder Title: "America: 1986" (RNC
Publication)
Box: 03
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-
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National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
America:
1986
Our Strength Restored,
the Peace Sustained
Five Years of Achievement:
A Fact Book of the Reagan Administration's Foreign and Defense Policies
A publication of The Republican National Committee
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN *** MITTER
America:
1986
Our Strength Restored,
the Peace Sustained
Five Years of Achievement:
A Fact Book of the Reagan Administration's
Defense and Foreign Policies
Prepared by the:
Communications Division, Research Department, Republican National Committee
310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Chairman
Betty Heitman, Co-Chairman
Robin Carle, Chief of Staff
Philip Kawior, Director of Research and Editor
William I. Greener, III, Deputy Chief
Vivianne Schneider, Defense and
of Staff for Political Operations
Foreign Policy Analyst
Terry Wade, Director of Communications
Debra Krauss, Assistant Editor
January 1986
After a decade of steady decline, the Reagan Administration pledged to restore our
nation's "margin of safety," restore respect for the United States abroad, strengthen our
alliances, promote democratic values and human rights, and assist the economic
development of lesser-developed nations. This the President's leadership has accomplished.
The Reagan Administration halted the decline of America's defenses and restored its
credibility as a reliable ally.
President Reagan and the American people believe that the peace can only be secured
through the strength necessary to keep it. Peace cannot be achieved by wishful thinking about
our adversaries or unilaterally weakening our defenses and alliances. The challenges to world
peace must be met by strength, for history has shown us that weakness and vacillation invite
aggression.
The Reagan Administration has set into motion a comprehensive, affordable and
realistic defense modernization program of our conventional and nuclear forces.
Progress has been made in restoring America's deterrent capability during the first five
years of the Reagan Administration. The MX Peacekeeper missile has continued its
successful flight test program, the first B-1B strategic bombers rolled off the assembly line and
began flight testing, substantial progress has been made toward the goal of a 600-ship Navy,
military re-enlistments are up, and the readiness capability of our forces has increased. This
Administration proudly promotes the values of democracy both at home and abroad. These
values have served to cement our alliances and secure our friendship with democratic
nations. Who can forget the pride Americans felt for the liberation of the island of Grenada,
and which American does not walk just a little taller because of how our naval aviators
captured the terrorists of the Achille Lauro?
Indeed, world peace is more assured because this Administration has restored America's
credibility as a world power.
Dialogue and a willingness to resolve fundamental differences with our adversaries
through peaceful means is the cornerstone of the Administration's defense and foreign
policies. To this end, the President has not only sought real arms reductions, but has also
proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative to lower the threshold of the nuclear threat.
A safer world, one in which democratic values, human rights, and economic
development can flourish, will not be achieved without effort. The challenges and threats to
our democratic way of life are real. They cannot be simply wished away. Under Ronald
Reagan's leadership, America has not, and will never, abdicate its responsibility as the leader
of the free world.
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman
Republican National Committee
DEFENSE POLICY
C
O
N
T
E
N
T
S
Defense
1
Rebuilding American Defenses, Regaining Worldwide Respect:
Achievements of the Reagan Defense Program
1
America's Security Threatened
2
Rebuilding Our Defenses
2
Comparing U.S. and Soviet Arsenals
2
U.S.S.R. Outspends U.S. On Strategic Forces
2
Growing Soviet Forces
3
Soviets Lead in Production and Modernization
3
Soviet Forces-Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)
4
Soviet Forces-Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)
6
Soviet Forces-Strategic Bombers
6
Strengthening the NATO Alliance
7
The Threat from the Warsaw Pact
7
Chemical Weapons-Soviets Prepare for Chemical Warfare
9
The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program
11
ICBM Modernization: The MX "Peacekeeper" and Midgetman Missiles
11
SLBM Modernization
12
Modernization of Strategic Bombers
12
Improvement in Command, Control and Communications Systems
12
Improvement in Strategic Defenses
13
Conventional Forces
14
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
14
Assuring Our Survival: An Overview
14
The Strategic Defense Initiative: Key Elements
14
The Soviet Militarization of Space
15
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)
16
Soviet ASAT Capability
16
The Reagan Administration's Defense Budget
17
A Leaner Defense Budget
19
Arms Control
20
Previous Arms Contol Efforts: A Legacy of Failure
20
Reagan Arms Control Agenda Enhances U.S. Security
21
Proposals
21
Soviet Failure to Respond to U.S. Arms Control Proposals
22
New Soviet Proposal Presented
23
U.S. Compliance with Existing Agreements
23
The Soviet Response: A Record of Non-Compliance
24
The Nuclear Freeze
25
Glossary
27
(Note: Terms explained in glossary are noted with an asterisk [*] in text.)
Rebuilding American Defenses, Regaining Worldwide Respect: Achievements
of the Reagan Defense Program
Today America walks tall and proud; her honor and prestige restored throughout the world
because President Reagan revitalized our nation's ability to deter aggression against ourselves,
our friends, and our allies. The quest for world peace and regional stability can be accomplished
only through the pursuit of peace through strength. This was President Reagan's mandate, first
given to him in the landslide of 1980, and reaffirmed by an even greater landslide in 1984.
The following points highlight the achievements of the President's defense modernization
program:
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE*: To protect the American people from
nuclear attack, President Reagan authorized research for a new anti-ballistic missile
defense system.
MX* PEACEKEEPER DEPLOYMENT: The first 42 Peacekeeper missiles are in produc-
tion. The MX continued its successful test program, and the first missiles will be deployed
beginning in late 1986-the first new U.S. ICBMs in 15 years.
MIDGETMAN* DEVELOPMENT: The development of a small ICBM, the Midgetman,
has begun for a possible deployment in the early 1990s.
B-1B* DEPLOYMENT: The first B-1B bombers rolled off the assembly line and began
flight testing. The first squadron will be operational in 1986. Research on the Stealth* or
advanced technology bomber is on or ahead of schedule.
THE TRIDENT* SUBMARINE AND THE D-5* MISSILE: The U.S. has begun to deploy
the new Trident ballistic missile-carrying submarine at the rate of about one each year.
Beginning in 1989, these submarines will carry the D-5 (Trident II) missile-a larger, more
accurate missile, able to attack all types of Soviet targets, including hardened or fortified
military targets.
CRUISE MISSILES*: The deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles began on
a variety of attack submarines and ships.
PROTECTING U.S. SATELLITES: To protect satellites which are vital to our nation's
security, President Reagan ordered the testing of anti-satellite weapons*, resulting in the
first successful U.S. test against a target in space.
PERSONNEL UPGRADED: The quality of our manpower forces increased. In fiscal 1984,
more than 93 percent of our recruits were high school graduates, compared with less than
70 percent in fiscal 1980.
REENLISTMENTS UP: With a rising rate of reenlistment, our armed forces are retaining
more experienced people. The overall reenlistment rate has increased from 55 percent in
fiscal 1980 to 68 percent in fiscal 1984.
SPARE PARTS AND TRAINING: Improvements in the quantity and the acquisition of
spare parts have led to better-trained forces.
FLEET MODERNIZATION: Substantial progress has been made toward the goal of a
600-ship fleet-a goal that will be achieved by fiscal 1989. The fleet will have grown to 555
ships by the end of fiscal 1986, up from 479 at the end of fiscal 1980.
A FIFTH NUCLEAR CARRIER: The fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier was launched.
IMPROVED READINESS*: The number of Navy ships rated "fully" or "substantially"
ready has grown by more than 25 percent since January 1981.
1
AIR FLEET MODERNIZATION: The Air Force is continuing to modernize its F-15
and F-16 aircraft. Since 1980, the Air Force has more than doubled its inventory of F-15s
and F-16s to nearly 1,400 aircraft.
A LEANER DEFENSE BUDGET: Efforts to weed out waste, fraud, and abuse in defense
spending have been pursued vigorously.
MANAGEMENT REFORMS: A new 10-point parts acquisition policy was issued, which
reforms the spare parts procurement process.
The safety and security of our people and the pursuit of global stability and world peace
require that President Reagan's defense program, as outlined in 1981, be fully implemented.
America's Security Threatened
When President Reagan took office five years ago, the United States' defense capability had
serious problems.
STRATEGIC FORCES: Our strategic deterrent capability, which is based on the credibility
of our nuclear forces to prevent attack, had been allowed to deteriorate.
A decade of underfunding of U.S. military forces had resulted in the loss of U.S. strategic
superiority and the survivability of our ICBM forces was seriously threatened.
CONVENTIONAL FORCES: Five years ago, many American planes could not fly and
some American ships could not sail because they lacked spare parts, trained personnel, and
sufficient ammunition for essential training.
The morale of U.S. servicemen was exceedingly low; the All-Volunteer Army had declined
to the point of failure.
GROWING SOVIET THREAT: While U.S. military forces had been allowed to deteriorate,
the Soviet Union undertook a massive military buildup. The Reagan Administration was quick to
realize that if the disparity between the Soviet and U.S. military capabilities continued to widen,
the threat against our nation, our friends and allies would grow and the risk of war would
increase. Weakness would invite aggression.
Rebuilding Our Defenses
The Reagan Administration embarked on a twofold program embodied in the principle of
peace through strength-rebuilding U.S. defenses and an arms control agenda that seeks to obtain
significant, verifiable, and mutual arms reductions to equal force levels.
Keeping the American people safe and at peace is, as President Reagan has stated, his "most
sacred trust."
Comparing U.S. and Soviet Arsenals
During the 1970s the Soviets moved from strategic parity to a position where they were well
ahead of the United States in most measures of military capability. *
U.S.S.R. Outspends U.S. On Strategic Forces
Since 1965, the Soviets have spent $260 billion more on strategic forces than the U.S. Since
SALT I* was signed in 1972, they have spent about $167 billion more than the U.S. Since
SALT II* was signed in 1979, they have spent about $53 billion more. Soviet spending on
strategic forces will continue to outstrip U.S. spending.
2
U.S. and Soviet Spending on Procurement of Strategic Forces
(1965-1988)
35
SALT I
1983
1972
Projected
Spending
30
25
Soviet Spending
Constant FY 83 Dollars (Billions)
20
15
$260
Billion
10
5
US Spending
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1988
Fiscal Year
The Soviets spend more on strategic forces and are projected to continue to do so.
Since 1965, they have spent $260 billion more.
Since SALT I, they have spent $167 billion more.
Since SALT П, they have spent about $53 billion more.
Soviet spending estimated in equivalent dollars. Procurement includes strategic offensive forces,
strategic defense, surveillance and command, control and communications systems.
Growing Soviet Forces
The Soviets now have 2,832 strategic missiles and bombers; the U.S. has 1,893.
The U.S. had deployed no new type of land-based strategic missile (ICBM)* since 1970,
undertaking only a warhead improvement for a proportion of its Minuteman force.
The Soviets, by contrast, deployed at least three new types of systems involving over 800 mis-
siles and are testing two more new types, one of which has just been deployed.
Soviets Lead in Production and Modernization
The Soviets have more modern strategic forces than the U.S. The aging U.S. arsenal makes
modifications mandatory if we are to continue to field an adequate deterrent.
OVERALL STRATEGIC COMPARISON: About three-quarters of U.S. weapons are on
launch systems at least 15 years old or older. By contrast, over one-half of total Soviet
weapons are on launch systems less than five years old (only 4 percent are on systems over
15 years old).
3
LAND-BASED MISSILES: About 20 percent of U.S. weapons are on ICBMs. Of these, 20
percent are on systems 15 years or older. By contrast, about 65 percent of Soviet weapons
are on ICBMs, of which about 50 percent are on systems with an average age of less than
five years, and over 90 percent are less than 10 years old.
SUBMARINE-BASED MISSILES: About half of the U.S. strategic arsenal is on sub-
marines. Eighty-five percent are on submarines that are over 15 years old. By contrast, the
Soviet Union has placed only about 25 percent on its submarines, 85 percent of which are
10 years old or less.
BOMBERS: About 30 percent of the U.S. strategic arsenal is on bombers, all of which are
over 20 years old. By contrast, the Soviet Union has placed about 10 percent of its strategic
arsenal on bombers. Of these, over half are on Backfire* bombers, which on average are
less than five years old.
Soviet Forces-Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)
The Soviet Union has a monopoly on the largest and most powerful missiles-the so-called
heavy missiles*.
US-USSR
Inventory Warheads By Age of Launch Systems, 1984
0-5 Years
USSR Legend Weapons are on newer launch 6-10 systems. Years
11-15 Years
US
ICBM
USSSR
16-20 Years
SLBM
Bomber
US Weapons are on older launch systems.
20 Years
4
Of the 1,398 Soviet ICBMs, 308 are SS-18* heavy missiles, each of which have twice the
payload or destructive potential as the projected U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile.
Each Soviet SS-18 missile, which can carry 10 warheads, has more explosive power than
all the bombs dropped in World War II.
These 308 SS-18s alone can deliver more destructive power than all U.S. strategic missiles
combined.
U.S. LAND-BASED STRATEGIC FORCES IN JEOPARDY: Because of the massive
buildup of the Soviet ICBM forces, the Soviet Union is capable of destroying virtually all of
our land-based ICBMs. The U.S. has no comparable capability, because our missiles lack
comparable destructive power and accuracy.
This has resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union has modernized its missiles over the
last decade while the U.S. has not.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS: To meet the threat to our land-based
ICBM force, the Reagan Administration has ordered the deployment of 100 MX
Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a smaller, mobile, single-warhead missile,
the so-called Midgetman.
USSR ICBMs
Meters
SS-18
30
SS-19
SS-X-24
SS-11
SS-13
SS-16
SS-17
SS-25
20
10
0
00
11
MOD
MOD
MOD
MOD
MOD
In
1
2
3
2
3
4
3
Development
Number Deployed:
100
420
60
Undetermined
150
308
360
45
Warheads:
1
1
3 MRVs
1
1
4 MIRVs
10 MIRVs
6 MIRVs
Up to 10 MIRVs
1
Max. Range (KM):
11,000
13,000
10,600
9,400
9,000
10,000
11,000
10,000
10,000
10,500
Launch Mode:
Hot*
Hot
Hot
Hot
Cold*
Cold
Cold
Hot
Cold
Cold
US ICBMs
Meters
Titan II
30
Peacekeeper
Minuteman II
Minuteman III
20
10
0
8
Number Deployed:
26*
450
550
In Development
Warheads:
1
1
3
Up to 10
Max. Range (KM):
12,000
12,500
14,000
14,000
Launch Mode:
Hot
Hot
Hot
Cold
"As of early 1985.
5
Soviet Forces-Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)
THE SOVIET THREAT: The Soviet Union has built up a very large force of ballistic missile
submarines that exceeds that of the United States in every characteristic except number of
warheads.*
Between 1967 and 1982 the United States did not build a single ballistic missile submarine.
The Soviets deployed six new classes involving 62 new strategic submarines during the
same period.
The U.S. deployed only one new strategic submarine missile (SLBM) during the past 12
years, while the Soviets deployed five new types during the same period.
The Soviet Union now has more than twice the number of nuclear-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarines (68 VS. 37) carrying almost twice (982 VS. 616) the number of missiles as we
do.
The Soviets have introduced the Typhoon, a new missile submarine, which is about 50 per-
cent larger than our new Trident submarine, with larger and more powerful missiles.
The Typhoon missile may be the first submarine-launched missile capable of destroying
protected or fortified military targets, a capability that we do not presently have.
The missile carried by the Typhoon is roughly comparable to the U.S. Trident II missile,
which will not become operational until 1989.
The Soviets are also preparing to deploy a second new SLBM, the SS-NX-23, on
improved Delta-IV submarines.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS: To meet the expanding Soviet threat, the
Reagan Administration has ordered the production of the submarine-launched cruise mis-
sile. Initial emplacement of submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)* began in June
1984. The deployment of these weapons makes it more difficult for the Soviets to launch a
surprise attack, because they would have to target every potential Naval vessel that could
carry these weapons.
While the survivability of the U.S. sea-based force is presently not threatened by the Soviet
Union, current trends show that such a threat could soon develop unless we keep upgrad-
ing our forces.
Soviet Forces-Strategic Bombers
THE SOVIET THREAT: The Soviets now have 480 heavy bombers compared to 263 for the
United States. Since the number of Soviet bombers is increasing steadily, the threat to the
United States can be expected to increase significantly over the next decade.
The Soviet Union has deployed more than 250 modern intercontinental Backfire bombers
and is soon expected to deploy the Blackjack* bomber as well.
The Backfire was introduced in the mid-1970s and is being produced at a rate of at least 30
per year. The Blackjack will be introduced in 1986. The Soviets are now building Bear H
bombers which carry long-range cruise missiles.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS: To meet the Soviet bomber threat, the
Reagan Administration has ordered the development and deployment of 100 B-1B bombers
and the development of the Stealth aircraft, an advanced technology bomber.
The current U.S. bomber force consists of 263 B-52s, which were designed in the late 1940s
to meet the threat of the 1950s. While some of the equipment on the B-52s has been
upgraded, it basically remains a 1950s vintage aircraft. Today, our entire heavy bomber
force consists of these aging and increasingly vulnerable B-52s, the last of which was
deployed in 1962.
6
The B-1B is an advanced, multipurpose heavy bomber capable of delivering a wide variety
of nuclear and conventional munitions and long-range cruise missiles. The first B-1B
squadron will be operational in 1986, with all 100 operational by 1988.
The Stealth aircraft is an advanced bomber designed primarily for nuclear strike missions
against very advanced enemy air defenses. Stealth aircraft will be operational in the early
1990s.
Strengthening the NATO Alliance
A secure Western Europe is of vital importance to the United States. The security of Western
Europe rests on the ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain conventional, theater, and
strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend themselves if attacked. The
Soviet threat to Western security and political independence is real and serious.
NATO is a defensive alliance which seeks to prevent war, and will use its weapons only in
response to attack. The Warsaw Pact, by comparison, maintains military strength on a scale
well in excess of that reasonably justifiable for defense.
The Threat From The Warsaw Pact
PERSONNEL: The Warsaw Pact nations have a standing force of some 6 million personnel
of which some 4 million face NATO in Europe. The standing forces of NATO total 4-5
million personnel, of which nearly 2.6 million are stationed in Europe.
NATO-Warsaw Pact
Force Comparison
*FULLY REINFORCED FORCES-include North American reinforcements
Fully reinforced forces*
and all Warsaw Pact forces located West of the Ural Mountains.
Forces in place in Europe reinforced
by rapidly deployable force**
4.0Mil
26,900
2.6Mil
115
53,000
88
19,900
13,470
18,400
1,135
33,000
12,340
Total Including Military
Naval Forces
Division
560
Equivalents
Main
Battle Tanks
Armoured Personnel
Carriers &
**RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES-include those U.S. forces
whose equipment is stored in Europe and high-readiness
Vehicles & other
Infantry Fighting
Guided Launchers Anti-Tank Weapon
Artillery/
Soviet forces located in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian,
Odessa, Kiev and North Caucasus military districts.
Armoured Vehicles
Mortars
Attack
Helicopters
7
Warsaw Pact forces consist of about 192 active and mobilisable divisions, of which some
115 divisions are positioned "well forward" or considered ready to fight on very short
notice.
NATO has 115 divisions, of which 88 are considered active or rapidly deployable.
TANKS AND ARMORED WARFARE: Soviet-Warsaw Pact nations have more than an
almost 13-to-1 advantage in battle tanks, an almost 2-to-1 advantage in anti-tank guided
weapon launchers, an almost 3-to-1 advantage in artillery and mortars, and a 2.5-to-1 advan-
tage in armed personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, even if U.S. and Canadian
forces are included.
TACTICAL INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT: The Warsaw Pact has a more than 5-to-1 advan-
tage in tactical interceptor aircraft (4,195 interceptor aircraft VS. 795 for NATO).
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES: "Theater nuclear forces" include short-and intermediate-
range nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft used in support of ground forces.
Missiles: The Warsaw Pact maintains about 2,000 delivery systems as opposed to 300 for
NATO, an almost 7-to-1 advantage. The Warsaw Pact retains a very substantial advantage
in the longer-range intermediate-range missiles even following initial deployments of
ground-launched cruise missiles* and Pershing IIs* in Europe.
Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles
USSR
NATO
Meters
24
SS-4
SS-20
18
12
Pershing II
GLCM
6
0
Reentry vehicles:
1
3 MIRVs
1
1
Range (KM): 2,000
5,000
1,800
2,500
Deployed: about 565.
140 as of December 1985.
8
Aircraft: NATO has about 700 intermediate-range nuclear-armed aircraft. It is estimated
that overall the Warsaw Pact could employ about 3,000 of its operational INF aircraft in a
nuclear role, a more than 4-to-1 advantage in their favor.
In sum, the Warsaw Pact shows a continuing buildup of its nuclear forces across the entire
spectrum. In Europe, the Warsaw Pact has an advantage over NATO in all major categories
of nuclear forces.
THE SOVIET SS-20* THREAT: In 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-20
intermediate-range ballistic missile. This weapon was far more capable in every characteris-
tic than other existing Soviet missiles. The destructive capability of the Soviet intermediate-
range nuclear force increased dramatically with the deployment of the SS-20. These missiles
represented an enormous new threat to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
The Soviet Union has more than 565 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, 441 of which are
three-warhead SS-20s.
The Soviet Union is adding one SS-20 missile launcher every week.
Evidence of the existence of "reload missiles"* for the SS-20 substantially raises their
overall number of warheads, according to NATO officials.
NATO'S RESPONSE: To meet the threat posed by the massive Soviet buildup of
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO requested in 1979 that the United States deploy
108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe.
Deployment began in late 1983. As of December 1985, NATO had deployed 140 Pershing IIs
and GLCMs. When fully deployed, the Pershing IIs and the ground-launched cruise missiles
will allow NATO to respond in kind to an attack by Soviet intermediate-range missiles-a
capability NATO does not now possess.
Chemical Weapons-Soviets Prepare for Chemical Warfare
SOVIETS EXPAND AND MODERNIZE THEIR STOCKPILES: The Soviet Union has
continued to expand and modernize its enormous chemical weapons arsenal. It has invested
large sums in chemical warfare equipment and personnel with which it regularly conducts
large-scale military exercises. The Soviet modernization of its chemical weapons capability
has created an imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in their favor. As of
January 1984, the Soviets had a 12-to-1 advantage in personnel, a 25-to-1 advantage in
decontamination equipment, a 5-to-1 advantage in ground-based delivery systems, and an
11-to-1 advantage in training facilities.
SOVIET CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION: The Soviet Union has 14 operating chemi-
cal agent production facilities; the U.S. has none. There is overwhelming evidence that the
Soviets have used chemical agents on defenseless men, women and children in Afghanistan
and Southeast Asia.
U.S.-NATO POLICY: The U.S. has a policy of no first use of chemical weapons and aims
to ban chemical weapons from the world's arsenals.
In April 1984, Vice President Bush presented a bold initiative for a comprehensive world-
wide ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. The Soviets have
wrongfully rejected the Administration's plan as a propaganda trick.
9
U.S. Restraint: The U.S. has refrained from producing chemical weapons since 1969,
unilaterally freezing production. This approach has not worked. The current U.S. stockpile
is old, the average age is 26 years. Some of these munitions are obsolete. Some are well
past their shelf life and are leaking. Most of our stockpiled chemical munitions can no
longer be delivered effectively on the battlefield.
Nato-Warsaw Pact
Chemical Warfare Comparison
1:12
Dedicated
1:25
Personnel
Decontamination Equipment
1:5
Group-Based
1:11
As of 1 January 1984
Delivery Systems
Training
Facilities
10
THE REAGAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
To redress the imbalance created by the unprecedented Soviet buildup of the 1970s and to
correct the deficiencies of our aging forces, on October 31, 1981, the Reagan Administration
announced a comprehensive five-part strategic modernization program. The program calls for:
1. ICBM modernization;
2. SLBM* modernization;
3. Modernization of strategic bombers;
4. Improvement in command and control communications systems*;
5. Improvement in strategic defenses.
ICBM Modernization: The MX "Peacekeeper" and Midgetman Missiles
THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION: U.S. ICBMs are currently obsolete and vulnerable
to nuclear attack because they lack the necessary accuracy and power to attack the most
important Soviet military targets, which have been hardened to withstand nuclear attack.
THE SOVIET THREAT: The Soviet ICBM force grew enormously in numbers and destruc-
tive power during the past two decades. By contrast, the United States has not deployed a
new land-based strategic missile in 15 years. During that time, the Soviets deployed three
new missiles and are currently testing two additional systems, one of which has just been
deployed.
U.S. SECURITY AT RISK: In January 1983, President Reagan established the Presidential
Commission on Strategic Forces (also known as the Scowcroft Commission) to review how
best to proceed with strategic modernization. The Commission, which issued its final report
in March 1984, noted:
The Soviets
now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers,
reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all
U.S. ICBM silos, using only
a portion of their ICBM force. The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot inflict similar
damage, even using the entire force. (Emphasis added).
RESTORING RETALIATORY EFFECTIVENESS: To solve the problem of retaliatory effec-
tiveness, the Reagan Administration called for a limited deployment of 100 MX Peacekeeper
missiles in Minuteman III silos.
The MX missile will reestablish our hard-target capability; i. e. , the MX will restore our
ability to destroy hardened or strengthened Soviet military targets.
The deployment of the MX will decrease the Soviet Union's confidence that an attack
against our strategic systems would succeed.
SURVIVABILITY OF OUR LAND-BASED MISSILES:
In the short term, survivability of the MX Peacekeeper will depend on its interaction with
the other components of the Triad-the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the
strategic bombers.
In the longer run, ICBM modernization will be achieved through the development and
deployment (in the early 1990s) of a new small ICBM called the Midgetman, as well as
through research and development on new techniques to harden silos and shelters or
underground basing.
11
MX IS VITAL FOR ARMS CONTROL: A U.S. failure to deploy its programmed force of
100 MX Peacekeeper missiles will be viewed by the Soviet Union as a unilateral concession
ceding another decade of superiority in land-based missiles-those weapons the Soviets have
always valued most and regarded as the ultimate yardstick of relative military power.
MIDGETMAN: The deployment of a new small missile will add to flexibility and overall
capability of the ICBM force.
The Midgetman can be placed in super-hardened underground facilities and can also be
made mobile.
The greater survivability of the Midgetman will enhance strategic stability by discouraging
the Soviet Union from attacking its silos, thereby increasing the risk of effective American
retaliation.
SLBM Modernization
THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION: The current fleet of U.S. missile submarines is old.
Except for the five Trident missile submarines that have just recently become operational
and two others on sea trials, all other U.S. ballistic missile submarines were built before 1967
and will have to be retired in the 1990s.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE:
Trident missile construction will continue, and a larger, more accurate sea-launched ballis-
tic missile-known as Trident II or D-5-will be developed and deployed on Trident sub-
marines in 1989.
The Trident II and the submarine-launched cruise missile will improve our ability to des-
troy hardened Soviet military targets-something that our existing submarine-launched
missiles are unable to achieve.
DETERRENCE: As a result of SLBM modernization, the U.S. will have a survivable force
that can attack the things the Soviets value most: their strategic nuclear missiles, their for-
tified military facilities, and their civilian and military leadership. This capability will serve
as a major deterrent to a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S.
Modernization of Strategic Bombers
THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION: All U.S. heavy strategic bombers are already more
than 20 years old. They face a vast and sophisticated array of Soviet defenses that are con-
tinually being improved. If not replaced soon, our B-52 bombers will not be able to penetrate
Soviet air defenses and attack their targets. Additionally, the B-52 bomber is vulnerable to
Soviet attack on its air bases.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE: A new version of the B-1, the B-1B, will
be developed and 100 aircraft will be operational by 1988. Research and development will con-
tinue on the advanced technology bomber (ATB) or "Stealth" bomber aircraft.
Both aircraft will have a dramatically improved capability to penetrate Soviet air defenses
and to survive a Soviet attack on their air bases.
Improvement in Command, Control and Communications Systems
THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION: An absolutely vital element of our deterrent is the
ability to communicate with our forces. We take extensive measures that make it impossible
to launch an attack without authorization from the President. Today, our command, control
and communications network has many deficiencies. There are real doubts that some
elements of it can perform under enemy attack.
12
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE: The U.S. will deploy improved radar
and satellite systems to enhance early warning capabilities and to assess more accurately and
reliably the size and scope of a Soviet missile attack. To ensure that presidential orders can
be passed from command centers to commanders in the field, development of new satellite
communications systems will also take place.
Improvement in Strategic Defenses
THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION: Strategic defenses are defenses against bomber or
missile attack. These consist of anti-missile defenses of various types, of which the U.S. has
none; surface-to-air missiles, of which the U.S. has none, and only 300 interceptor aircraft.
By comparison, the Soviets have 100 anti-ballistic missile launchers, 10,000 surface-to-air
missiles, and 1,200 interceptor aircraft of which 600 are modern aircraft capable of intercept-
ing low-altitude bombers. The Soviet Union is also upgrading and expanding its Moscow
ABM* system.
US-USSR
Comparison of Forces Dedicated to Strategic Defense
10,000
8,000+
1,200
0
300
SAM
Launchers
Modern
116
100
Interceptor
0
Aircraft
Air Defense
Radars
ABM
Launchers
13
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE: The Administration's program involves
the construction of radars to detect bomber attack, the procurement of airborne warning and
control aircraft (AWACS), and five squadrons of F-15 fighter interceptors. The Administra-
tion has also authorized a very substantial increase in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) research
and development.
Conventional Forces
To improve the readiness and sustainability* of our conventional forces, the Reagan
Administration's defense program proposed to:
provide our ground forces with additional quantities of both weapons systems and support
equipment;
modernize Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps tactical aircraft;
increase the Naval construction program;
replenish stocks of supplies and ammunition; and
meet recruitment standards and retain qualified personnel in our armed forces.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Assuring Our Survival: An Overview
President Reagan has said many times that a "nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought." Even while nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. has kept world peace for
over 35 years, the President believes that our nation must find a better way to assure a credible
deterrence than holding one another's populations hostage.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a broad-based research program which promotes
the development of technologies which would shield the United States and its allies from a Soviet
ballistic missile attack. Included are such non-nuclear technologies as lasers, particle-beam
weapons, and guided interceptor missiles, as well as certain nuclear-based technologies.
In a historic speech to the American people on March 23, 1983, President Reagan proposed
his Strategic Defense Initiative, which would enable America's best minds to research reliable
defenses for the U.S. and its allies against ballistic missiles-that is, to develop a "Peace Shield."
The ultimate decision regarding the feasibility of this project and its deployment will be made in
the future, by some other president.
The Strategic Defense Initiative reflects the high value Americans place on human life. Sim-
ply stated, the moral and ethical foundation of the Strategic Defense Initiative is this: It is better
to destroy incoming missiles than to annihilate populations.
The Strategic Defense Initiative: Key Elements
The SDI research program will provide a future President and Congress with the technical
knowledge necessary to support a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy
such advanced defensive systems.
14
ASSURING SURVIVAL: The SDI would move the United States from a doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD)* to a posture of Mutual Assured Survival (MAS)*. This would
be accomplished by the development of defensive systems, including space-based systems,
that would allow the U.S. to defend itself from nuclear attack by ballistic missiles and bomb-
ers. With such defenses, enemy missiles would be destroyed in space before they could
reach American soil.
RATIONAL AND MORAL: The Strategic Defense Initiative is a rational and moral
approach to enhancing our security and that of our allies as well as of strengthening inter-
national stability and peace. Should our efforts to prevent a nuclear war fail, it is far more
rational and moral to have a policy that will enable us to destory missiles in space than to
kill people on earth.
The proposal will not initiate the militarization of space. Space has been militarized for offen-
sive purposes for more than a generation.
THE SDI IS NOT DESTABILIZING: A successful program will deter the possibility of war,
as well as reduce the offensive value of ballistic missiles.
THE PROGRAM IS COST-EFFECTIVE: The Strategic Defense Initiative research program
will cost about $26 billion over five years (FY 1985-FY 1990) or only about $20 a year for
each American citizen.
THE PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ABM* TREATY: The Strategic Defense
Initiative research program ordered by President Reagan does not violate our country's arms
control treaty obligations under the ABM Treaty.
The 1972 ABM Treaty explicitly permits the kind of research envisaged by the Strategic
Defense Initiative.
The current U.S. research program does not constitute a decision to fully develop and
deploy defensive systems.
While the U.S. is living up to its ABM Treaty commitments, the Soviet Union is not.
The Soviet Militarization of Space
The Soviet Union is actively engaged in its own massive program to develop and deploy
defenses against missiles and bombers. Most were undertaken before the president's decision in
1983 to engage in research in defensive technologies. There is no reason to believe the Soviets
would stop now if the U.S. decided to cease its research activities.
The Soviets have upgraded the capability of the only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) system in the world today-the Moscow ABM system; and
The Soviets have built a large phased-array radar in Siberia, which violates the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. As the President noted in a February 1, 1985 report to Con-
gress, the Soviet Union "may be preparing" a missile defense of its homeland in violation of
the ABM Treaty.
In 1985, some 80 percent of Soviet space launches were purely military in nature, with much
of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. The Pentagon report, Soviet
Military Power, 1985, notes:
This is an increase from 70 percent in previous years. The Soviet military space pro-
gram dominates the U.S.S.R.'s overall space effort.
Testing and deployment of the Soviet Union's ground-based laser system could begin by the
early-to-mid 1990s.
15
The Soviets could have a prototype of space-based anti-ballistic missile system ready for test-
ing in the late 1990s.
The Soviets have begun to develop at least three types of high-energy laser weapons for air
defense.
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATS)
For more than 25 years the security of U.S. satellites has been vital to the defense of this
nation. They bolster our national security by gathering electronic intelligence data, which allows
the U.S. to monitor compliance with arms control agreements, and serve as an early-warning sys-
tem to detect hostile ballistic missiles.
The Soviet Union began testing anti-satellite weapons over 15 years ago.
The diversity of Soviet anti-satellite weapons and their efforts to conceal their capabilities
have precluded the United States and the Soviet Union from negotiating a verifiable anti-
satellite weapons agreement.
President Reagan directed the Defense Department to test anti-satellite weapons, and in Sep-
tember 1985, the U.S. Air Force destroyed an old satellite 290 miles above the Pacific Ocean,
the first test of an anti-satellite weapon against a target in space.
Soviet ASAT Capability
The Soviet Union, which has been testing anti-satellite weapons for 15 years, has developed
the capability to destroy U.S. satellites in near-earth orbit, and has developed the only operational
anti-satellite weapons system in the world. Moreover, the Soviets may have at this time three sys-
tems capable of destroying U.S. satellites.
Despite much rhetoric about the "primitiveness" of the Soviet ASAT system, there is no ques-
tion that the Soviets have the capability today to destroy all or nearly all U.S. low-altitude
satellites. The U.S. has no comparable capability.
16
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE BUDGET
PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH: To correct the deficiencies in the U.S.'s defense
capability caused by years of declining funding for our military forces, the Reagan Administration
developed an affordable, multi-year defense program.
DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS: In 1960, defense comprised 45 percent of federal budget
expenditures; by fiscal year 1978 it had declined to 22, 5 percent of the budget.
The Administration has asked Congress for $277.5 billion in outlays for fiscal year 1986,
representing only about 30 percent of total federal expenditures, and 6.6 percent of GNP.
Even with the continuing buildup, defense spending will account for less than 33 percent
of the federal budget in fiscal 1990 and will average only slightly more than 7 percent of
GNP over the next five years (FY 1986-1990). It has been estimated that Soviet defense
expenditures, by contrast, could reach 20 percent of its GNP in the not-too-distant future.
Despite all the criticism of a massive defense buildup, U.S. defense spending then will
represent roughly the same share of federal spending as it did in 1972.
FEDERAL BUDGET TRENDS
DoD Outlays as a %
DoD Outlays as a %
Fiscal Year
of Federal Outlays
of GNP
1950
27.4
4.4
1955
51.3
9.2
1960
45.0
8.3
1965
38.7
7.0
1970
39.4
8.0
1971
35.4
7.2
1972
32.6
6.7
1973
29.8
5.8
1974
28.8
5.6
1975
25.5
5.7
1976
23.6
5.4
1977
23.4
5.1
1978
22.5
4.9
1979
22.8
4.9
1980
22.5
5.2
1981
23.0
5.4
1982
24.5
6.0
1983
25.4
6.4
1984
25.9
6.2
1985
25.7
6.4
How the defense budget is spent:
The largest share of the FY 1986 defense budget goes for manpower costs; it does not go
for procurement of new weapons systems. Only 11.9 percent of defense spending in the FY
1986 budget will be available for new programs compared to an estimated 43 percent for
manpower costs. (By contrast, the Soviet Union spends between 10-15 percent of its
defense budget on manpower).
17
Despite the great attention they receive, strategic nuclear forces-our intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers-do not consume most of
the budget. Spending on strategic forces now represents less than 1 percent of our GNP,
under 6 percent of our total federal budget, and less than 15 percent of the U.S. defense
budget.
SPENDING ON HUMAN NEEDS: This Administration spends more than ever on human
needs. Direct payments to individuals alone represent 41 percent of total budget outlays.
During the decade of the 1970s, a Democrat-controlled Congress and the Carter Administra-
tion worked hand-in-hand to increase social service spending at the expense of national
security. Defense spending was effectively cut, as its budget was ravaged by inflation.
For those who measure "fairness" in terms of expenditures on human services, the budget
of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which spends more than two-
thirds of 1 billion dollars every day, is the third largest of any governmental body in the
world; only the budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union are larger.
U. S.-SOVIET BUDGET TRENDS: Soviet military expenditures grew during the 1960s and
1970s while U.S. expenditures declined after accounting for inflation.
Today, the Soviet Union spends 15 percent of its GNP on defense. In fiscal 1985 U.S.
defense expenditures comprised 6.4 percent of GNP.
The Federal Budget, National Defense, and Strategic Forces
1950-1984
(As of November 1983)
900
800
Federal Budget
700
Billions of $ Constant FY 84
600
500
400
300
National Defense
200
100
Strategic Forces
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
Fiscal Years
18
Percent of Budget
50
Defense
Social
Spending
35
20
1960
1970
1980
A Leaner Defense Budget
WEEDING OUT WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE: The Reagan Administration came into
office pledging to weed out waste, fraud, and abuse in government programs, including in the
defense area. While the President pledged to restore the nation's military strength, he also sought
to obtain more defense from each defense dollar. To achieve this goal, the Administration under-
took a comprehensive program of management reform.
THE CARTER-MONDALE LEGACY: When the Administration took office, it inherited
billions of dollars worth of contracts-many of which were poorly written and SO provided
opportunity for waste, fraud, and abuse. Likewise, the Administration inherited many pro-
grams which were already over budget and behind schedule. However, the Administration's
commitment to reform the acquisition process and to identify and eliminate waste, fraud,
and abuse remained undaunted despite the scope of the challenge it faced.
Critics who accuse the Administration of wasting the American taxpayer's defense dollar
overlook the fact that it is the Administration's efforts to root out waste, fraud, and abuse
which have brought horror stories of $400 hammers or $9,000 wrenches to light. These same
critics also overlook the corrective steps that have been taken to deal with these problems.
Secretary Weinberger has stated:
Yes, the horror stories will probably continue, as long as we continue to do our job of
searching out the skeletons in our own closet and finding and reporting these stories
We
are committed to giving the American taxpayer a stronger defense that makes use of every
dollar.
19
MANAGEMENT REFORMS: The Reagan Administration has implemented a wide range
of management reform programs. Among these are:
A sweeping review of the defense acquisition process, which was ordered by the Secretary
of Defense in March 1981.
A new Review and Oversight Office, established in April 1981, to ensure better coordina-
tion of the Pentagon's audits and investigations. Since then, over 68,000 internal audits
have been completed with a potential savings of over $7.9 billion.
A 10-point program for ending spare parts abuses, issued by the Secretary of Defense in
July 1983, which included incentives for employees who discover cost savings; stern dis-
ciplinary action against those who allow abuses to continue; debarring of contractors who
refuse to meet contracting standards; and a strong commitment to greater competition for
spare parts acquisition.
An independent, bipartisan Commission on Defense Management, appointed by Presi-
dent Reagan in June 1985, to provide recommendations for continued management and
procurement reforms.
ARMS CONTROL
Previous Arms Control Efforts: A Legacy of Failure
Past efforts to achieve strategic arms control agreements failed to prevent the Soviet Union
from engaging in the largest military buildup in history. This buildup occurred because of
loopholes and ambiguities in previous arms control agreements, including SALT I and
SALT II.
SALT I: This treaty failed to put any effective restraint on Soviet military capabilities.
In 1969, when the SALT I negotiations began, the Soviets had over 1,500 strategic nuclear
warheads; in 1972 when SALT I was signed, they had 2,300.
By 1980, the Soviets were threatening U.S. ICBM survivability with more than 5,000
warheads.
SALT II: This treaty is seriously flawed because it allows for dangerous and destabilizing
asymmetries which favor the Soviet Union. The SALT II treaty:
Allows the Soviet Union to retain a monopoly on modern heavy missiles-SS-18 ICBMs.
Excludes the Backfire bomber, which is capable of striking the U.S. homeland, from effec-
tive limitation.
Contains many ambiguities, particularly those related to provisions for verification.
Would allow a doubling in the number of Soviet nuclear warheads or bombs targeted
against the U.S.
In 1979, when SALT II was signed, the Soviets had 5,500 warheads. The present Soviet total
of 8,900 strategic nuclear warheads could grow to more than 15,000 within the guidelines
of the SALT II treaty.
The Reagan Administration has endorsed the Senate Armed Services Committee's 1979 con-
clusion that the unratified SALT II treaty is "not in the national security interest of the United
States of America."
20
Reagan Arms Control Agenda Enhances U.S. Security
Having set into motion a program to reverse the decline in our nation's defenses, the Reagan
Administration set forth a wide range of arms control proposals that have sought to obtain signifi-
cant, verifiable, and mutual arms reductions to equal force levels.
REAL ARMS REDUCTION: The Reagan Administration has revolutionized the conduct of
arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. For the first time since the beginning of the
strategic arms negotiations in 1969, the negotiations agenda has been dominated by the con-
cept of actual reductions. The Reagan Administration has rejected "cosmetic" arms control
agreements that allow large increases in nuclear weapons.
NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH: The Soviet Union is negotiating for the first time
with a serious partner who does not make unilateral concessions or deludes itself about the
Soviet willingness to exploit loopholes to expand its military capabilities or even violates
agreements.
REALISTIC NEGOTIATIONS: The Reagan Administration has been the first Administra-
tion to face up to the reality of Soviet arms control violations and has developed a policy to
deal with these violations.
STRENGTHENING OUR ALLIANCES: Despite repeated attempts to destabilize the
NATO alliance, the United States continued its initial deployment of cruise missiles and
Pershing II missiles. Moreover, NATO pledged to make basic improvements in its conven-
tional forces. Today, NATO unity and support for the President's approach to European
security remains strong.
Proposals
The Administration began arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on a wide range of
issues in late 1981 and early 1982. These included both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons systems, conventional and chemical weapons. The Soviet Union walked out of the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations in 1983 and refused to set a date for the
resumption of the START talks. On January 7-8, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz met with
then-Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. At this meeting, agreement was reached to resume
arms talks on strategic, intermediate-range and space weapons. The following are the major arms
control proposals made by the Reagan Administration:
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). In 1982, the United States proposed to reduce the
number of and the destructive power of strategic missile warheads-from the then-Soviet
number of 8,000 to 5,000. No more than half of these would be land-based.
ADMINISTRATION SHOWS FLEXIBILITY: In order to facilitate an agreement, the
Reagan Administration made substantial adjustments to its initial position. In October
1983, the Administration, with congressional backing, incorporated the mutual build-down
concept into our START negotiation position. A mutual build-down would require the
U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce their respective arsenals by 5 percent each year, and
to destroy two old weapons for each new one deployed.
The Administration also proposed a concurrent build-down of bombers, as well as
negotiation of additional limits on air-launched cruise missiles.
In 1985, the Reagan Administration offered to trade-off areas of U.S. advantage against
areas of Soviet advantage provided that the resulting agreement brought about substan-
tial force reductions to equal and verifiable levels.
21
US-USSR
Strategic Ballistic Missile Warheads
8,900
7,500
5,000
5,000
Under a Freeze
1985
Under START
INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces). In 1981, the United States proposed the complete
abolition of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and the establishment of certain
limits on shorter-range forces that could substitute for them. Specifically, the United States
proposed, with procedures for verification, the dismantling of the SS-4, SS-5*, and SS-20
ballistic missiles in exchange for U.S. cancellation of its plans to deploy Pershing II ballistic
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe to counter these Soviet missiles. This
proposal is designed to eliminate first-strike weapons.
Soviet Failure to Respond to U.S. Arms Control Proposals
From 1981-83 at the INF talks, the Soviets proposed agreements that were blatantly one-
sided: they would have prohibited any NATO deployment of Pershing IIs and ground-
launched cruise missiles, while allowing the Soviets to retain their very substantial monopoly
in long-range intermediate nuclear forces. The Soviets have proposed:
counting British and French missiles as belonging to the United States. These missiles not
only do not belong to us, but they are of a different type from the ones under discussion at
the negotiations;
excluding the Asian part of the Soviet Union from the limitations, even though
intermediate-range Soviet missiles launched from Asia can easily reach Western Europe;
and
22
counting U.S. but not Soviet fighter bombers.
In 1982-83 at the START negotiations, the Soviets proposed a series of limitations that would
terminate critical U.S. programs such as the Trident submarine and the Trident II missile
while allowing most Soviet programs to continue without effective limitations.
New Soviet Proposal Presented
SOVIETS RESPOND TO U.S. FIRMNESS: In September 1985, the Soviet Union revealed
an arms control proposal before the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. The Adminis-
tration stated that the Soviet proposal could be the start of a "successful process" in the effort
to reduce nuclear weaponry on both sides. The Administration noted that the Soviet proposal
shows that the President's "strategy has worked, that firmness and allied solidarity, which
has been demonstrated over the past five years, have paid off."
PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSAL: Preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposal
indicated that it contained some major flaws.
It is unequal in the Soviet favor, allowing the Soviets to retain major advantages in nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, and ballistic missile throw-weight.
Prevents modernization of U.S. weapons.
Seeks to remove the U.S. nuclear deterrent from our friends and allies in Europe and Asia.
Key elements are not verifiable.
Has preconditions attached to it since it calls for the elimination by the U.S. of research
into strategic missile defense.
U.S. Compliance with Existing Agreements
Despite evidence of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, the
Reagan Administration is meeting all of its arms control treaty obligations.
In June 1985, President Reagan announced that he would "go the extra mile" to establish a
framework of mutual restraint, i. e., a framework by which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. limit
their forces pending an arms control agreement.
To comply with SALT II Treaty obligations, the Reagan Administration decided to dismantle
a missile submarine, despite Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty.
The President also ordered that the Department of Defense provide him with a report no
later than November 15, 1985 on "appropriate and proportionate" responses to Soviet
violations of the SALT II Treaty.
The Reagan Administration is concerned about Soviet arms control treaty violations. In his
June 1985 report to the Congress dealing with arms control compliance, President Reagan stated:
The U.S. will continue to pursue vigorously with the Soviet Union the resolution of our
concerns about Soviet non-compliance. In this effort, we cannot impose upon ourselves a
double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance, and, in effect, unilateral
disarmament." Soviet violations, the President said, are "very crucial issues
The pattern of
Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security and raises uncertainty about the
forces the U.S. will require in the future.
23
The Soviet Response: A Record of Non-Compliance
OVERALL TREATY VIOLATIONS: In a report to Congress issued in December 1985, the
Administration stated that is has determined that the Soviet Union has violated the Geneva
Protocol on Chemical Weapons*, the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, the
Helsinki Final Act*, the SALT I Agreement, the SALT II Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty*. The Administration also stated that the Soviet Union has likely
violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty*.
SPECIFIC VIOLATIONS: Specifically, the Administration has determined that the Soviet
Union:
has used chemical and biological agents in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in violation of
the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Con-
vention.
has violated the Helsinki Final Act which prohibits large troop movements without
advance notification, when it conducted the Zapad-81 exercise in September 1981.
has encrypted (encoded) missile telemetry (radio signals which transmit technical informa-
tion during missile flight test) in violation of SALT II.
has tested and deployed a new ICBM, the SS-25*, which violates the SALT II Treaty. (The
SS-25 is either an impermissible modification of an existing type of Soviet ICBM or it is a
prohibited new type of missile.) Moreover, the Soviets have concealed SS-25 missiles.
has violated the SALT II Treaty limit by deploying more bombers and missiles than is
permitted.
has deployed SS-25 missiles in former SS-7 missile sites in violation of the SALT I
Agreement.
has likely violated the 150-kiloton underground testing yield limit by conducting tests with
yields of up to twice the limit allowed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
has probably deployed the SS-16* ICBM which is forbidden by the SALT II Treaty.
has violated the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty by discharging radioactive debris from
underground nuclear tests beyond its borders into the atmosphere.
has violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by constructing a large and powerful
phased-array radar* near the city of Krasnoyarsk in southern Siberia. This phased-array
radar is deployed deep within Soviet territory. The ABM Treaty requires that such radars
either be limited to the Moscow area or be located on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and be
oriented (aimed) outward.
has probably tested surface-to-air missile radars in a manner prohibited by the ABM
Treaty.
24
The Nuclear Freeze
The Reagan Administration strongly opposes the nuclear freeze because it would preserve
the dangerous imbalance between U.S. and Soviet military forces, and would codify its further
erosion over time. If a freeze went into effect now, the advantages the Soviets enjoy (as illustrated
in the following graph) would be sealed.
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
Land-based missiles
1,030
1,398
Sea-based missiles
600
954
Nuclear missile submarines
37
62
Heavy missiles
0
308
Missile warheads
7,500
8,900
ABM missile launchers
0
100
Surface-to-air missiles
0
10,000
Strategic bombers
263
480
Strategic missile throw-weight*
4. 4 m. lbs
11. 9 m. lbs
Under a nuclear freeze, the U.S. would be prevented from modernizing its strategic forces.
The nuclear freeze would entail a breach of promise between the United States and its
NATO allies, by preventing us from deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe
to counter the threat posed by the ever-growing SS-20 missile force, as we have promised our
NATO allies.
Key elements of the nuclear freeze proposal are simply not verifiable. The key defect of the
nuclear freeze is that it seeks to limit a very wide range of systems without serious considera-
tion as to whether these limitations can be effectively verified. For example, U.S. satellites
cannot verify that which is being produced inside Soviet factories or hidden in warehouses.
This is particularly important in view of the Soviet record of violating key provisions of
many arms control agreements.
Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings, the Democrat Party in 1984 called for a mutual and
verifiable freeze to serve as an integral part of U.S. policy.
25
Comparison of US and Soviet Long-Range INF Weapons
How Today's LRINF Imbalance Developed
and Soviet Public Descriptions of US-USSR Force Posture
1,400
1,300
Apr 85
Gorbachev
Feb 81
calls for
1,200
Breshnev:
Apr 83
moratorium
"There is approximate
1,100
Tass
Oct 79
equality now. "
.Currently
1,000
Breshnev:
existing parity"
A "balance of forces.
900
has taken shape
Aug 82
in Europe"
Ustinov:
Dec 77
800
SS-20
Oct 80
"Approximate parity of
USSR negotiators:
forces. .continues to
Mar 85
Deployment
700
"A balance
exist today.
New
begins
now exists"
Nov 83
negotiations
600
Soviets walk
begin
USSR
out of
500
Nov 81
negotiations
INF negotiations
400
begin
Dec 79
300
Nato decision*
200
100
US
0
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
*US decision called for LRINF deployments at end of 1983 unless an arms control agreement was reached which made them unnecessary.
26
GLOSSARY
ground-launched cruise missile-a small, jet-propelled
pilotless vehicle launched from a mobile truck
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system-system composed of
launcher that carries a 200 kiloton warhead. The
radars, guided interceptor missiles designed to
ground-launched cruise missile has a range of 1,550
intercept and destroy incoming warheads.
miles. Although it would require at least four to five
hours to reach its target, it has a unique advantage-
ABM Treaty-The 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (as
its guidance system allows it to follow the contour of
modified in 1974) bans deployment of ABM systems
the land. It can thus evade enemy radar by flying
except that it allows the U.S. and the Soviet Union to
below the "radar floor" at minimum altitude of only
deploy one ABM system around the nation's capital or
50 feet.
at a single ICBM deployment area.
heavy missile-the largest, most destructive missile that
anti-satellite systems (ASATs)-systems designed to des-
now exists. Each Soviet SS-18 heavy missile has
troy or incapacitate satellites in orbit. Soviet anti-
twice the payload or destructive potential as the pro-
satellite systems can destroy low-altitude military
jected U.S. MX ICBM. Each SS-18 can deliver 10
and civilian satellites.
warheads each with the destructive potential of one
Backfire bomber-a modern supersonic bomber similar
million tons of TNT, i. e., 1,000 kilotons of TNT.
in design to the U.S. B-1A, which was cancelled by
Helsinki Final Act-The Final Act of the Conference on
President Carter. The Backfire bomber is capable of
Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in
striking targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and
1975. All signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act
the United States.
are committed to give prior notification of, and other
binary chemical weapons-chemical weapons composed
details concerning, major military maneuvers, defined
of two non-lethal agents which when combined
as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops.
form a lethal agent. This increases safety because the
hot launch-igniting a missile's rocket motor inside the
probability of both tanks leaking is low.
silo launcher. Hot launch makes it more difficult to
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention-the 1972
rapidly reload missile silos.
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention bans
Limited Test Ban Treaty-ratified by Congress in 1963,
the development, production, stockpiling or posses-
the treaty prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere,
sion, and the transfer of biological agents or toxins.
under water or in outer space as well as the dis-
Blackjack bomber-a large supersonic Soviet heavy bom-
charge of radioactive materials from underground
ber designed to penetrate advanced air defense.
nuclear tests beyond national boundaries.
cold launch-ejecting a missile from its launcher by com-
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-a missile cap-
pressed air prior to igniting a missile's rocket motor.
able of reaching the U.S. or Soviet homeland or dis-
This allows for easier reload of launchers. Reload
tances greater than 3,000 miles.
and launching of additional missiles from silos is a
measure of military capability-by this we mean yield,
means of circumventing or evading arms control
payload, throw-weight, number of weapons, etc.
limits.
Minuteman ICBMs-a three-stage solid fuel ICBM. Two
command, control and communications systems-an intri-
versions are currently deployed-the Minuteman II
cate web of satellites, sensors, communications gear,
and the Minuteman III. The Minuteman II was
computers, etc., that enables our strategic forces to
introduced in 1966 and the Minuteman III was
carry out their assigned missions in peacetime or in
introduced in 1970. There are 450 Minuteman IIs in
case of war.
the U.S. ICBM force and 550 Minuteman IIIs. The
cruise missile-a small, jet-propelled pilotless vehicle
Minuteman II is a small, solid fuel ICBM which car-
with an advanced guidance system that gives it high
ries a single warhead. The Minuteman III is slightly
accuracy. Cruise missiles can be launched from
larger than the Minuteman II and carries three
ships, submarines, aircraft, or ground vehicles.
warheads. The Minuteman III has approximately
D-5 or Trident II missile- a larger, more accurate missile
one-eighth the size and destructive potential as the
able to attack all types of Soviet targets, including
Soviet SS-18.
hardened or fortified military targets.
Midgetman-small, mobile intercontinental ballistic mis-
encryption-encoding of radio signals or telemetry of
sile that carries one 300 kiloton warhead.
missiles so that information is denied as a source of
multiple independently launched targetable reentry vehicles
verifying arms control agreements. Encryption that
(MIRVs)-warheads dispensed from a single missile that
impedes verification is prohibited by the SALT II
can be aimed at a number of widely separated
treaty.
targets.
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons-the 1925
Geneva Protocol prohibits the first use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and prohibits
the use of bacteriological methods of warfare.
27
mutual assured destruction (MAD)-theory that deterrence
Stealth bomber-an advanced bomber designed to incor-
is based solely on a nation's ability to attack and
porate advanced technology (even more advanced
destroy urban populations in a retaliatory attack.
technology than that incorporated into the B-1B)
Under this theory, mutual vulnerability to nuclear
that will be able to penetrate the most advanced air
attack is desirable and efforts to limit damage stimu-
defense systems. The Stealth aircraft will be
late the arms race.
operational in the early 1990s. The Stealth bomber is
mutual assured survival (MAS)-the antithesis of mutual
an advanced technology bomber (ATB).
assured destruction. This theory holds that the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. SALT I-an arms con-
essence of defense and arms control policy should
trol treaty ratified by Congress in 1972. SALT I froze
be to reduce the vulnerability of both sides to
submarine- land-based ballistic missiles at then-
nuclear attack. This can be accomplished by
existing and unequal levels in the Soviet favor. Also
increased emphasis on the development of defensive
included in the SALT I negotiations was the ABM
systems against nuclear attack.
Treaty, also ratified by Congress in 1972. SALT П-ап
MX Peacekeeper missile-a large intercontinental ballis-
arms control treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union
tic missile which can deliver ten 300 kiloton
and signed (though not ratified by Congress) in 1979.
warheads. It will be the first new U.S. ICBM since
SALT II carried over most of the unequal features of
1970.
SALT I.
payload-the weight a missile can deliver to a given
strategic defenses-defenses against ballistic missiles and
distance.
other potential types of intercontinental nuclear
strike forces. President Reagan has termed research
Pershing II missile-an intermediate-range nuclear mis-
into this area the Strategic Defense Initiative.
sile. It has a range of 1,000 miles; it carries a single
100 kiloton warhead and its speed enables it to reach
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)-a ballistic
Soviet targets within 15 minutes from launch time.
missile launched from a submarine. This missile is
capable of performing the same missions as an
phased-array radar-a sophisticated electronically-steered
ICBM even with missiles of much shorter range
radar that can track a vast number of targets
because of a submarine's mobility.
simultaneously.
sustainability-groups together items needed by forces to
readiness-the ability of forces, units, weapons systems,
sustain combat in the event of war. It includes
or equipment to deliver the output for which they
replacement equipment, spare parts and ammuni-
were designed. Readiness depends on having the
tion, and other essential consumables. Sustainability
required quantities of equipment in the hands of the
also includes the manpower required to maintain
units on a day-to-day basis, and on having the
combat strength-to rotate, replace and reinforce as
required number of adequately trained personnel
the course of battle demands.
assigned to ensure that people and machines can
work together.
telemetry-radio signals which transmit technical infor-
mation during missile flight tests.
reload missiles-extra missiles to be reloaded and fired
from existing missile launchers.
theater nuclear forces-short- and intermediate-range
nuclear weapons. These range from battlefield
SS-5-a first generation Soviet intermediate-range ballis-
nuclear weapons to weapons of almost ICBM range.
tic missile with a range of about 2,000 miles. Has
recently been phased out by the Soviet Union.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty-signed in 1974, the Threshold
SS-16-a Minuteman III-sized solid fuel ICBM first test-
Test Ban Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear
weapons test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.
ed by the Soviet Union in 1972 and probably covert-
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty has not been ratified
ly deployed in the late 1970s. Its deployment is
by Congress.
prohibited by the SALT II Treaty.
throw-weight-the total weight of nuclear explosives a
SS-18-the largest, most destructive missile in the world.
missile can deliver to either the U.S. or the Soviet
Each missile has twice the destructive potential of
Union.
any missile that was allowed the U.S. under the
SALT II agreement (see heavy missile).
Trident missile submarine-a large, long-range missile-
carrying submarine designed to replace missile sub-
SS-20-a very powerful intermediate-range nuclear mis-
marines built in the 1960s. It carries 24 nuclear
sile capable of delivering three nuclear warheads up
missiles.
to a 5,000 kilometer range with great accuracy. The SS-
20 has a reload capability. In other words, the
warhead-the nuclear explosive device carried by a missile
Soviets have two missiles for each of the 441 SS-20
yield-roughly speaking, the amount of energy or des-
missile launchers.
tructive potential of a nuclear weapon. It would be
SS-25-a second new type of Soviet solid fuel ICBM
roughly proportional to the payload or throw-weight.
which has been tested and deployed in violation of
In other words, the heavier the weapon, the more
the SALT II Treaty.
powerful it tends to be.
28
FOREIGN POLICY
C
O
N
T
E
N
T
S
Reagan Administration Inherits Weak and Vacillating Foreign Policy
1
America is Back under Reagan Leadership
1
Soviet Union
3
U.S. - Soviet Policy Based on Three Principles
4
Soviet Challenges
4
Hopes for the Future of U.S. - Soviet Relations
4
Direct Dialogue: President Reagan Meets Gorbachev
4
Meeting with Gorbachev Ends on Positive Note
5
President Reagan and Gorbachev to Meet Again
5
China
6
Sino - U.S. Relations
6
Sino - U.S. Relations Continue to Grow
6
Taiwan
6
Central America/Caribbean
7
The Economic and Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Sea Lanes
7
Potential Immigration Problems
7
The Soviet Presence: The Cuban Threat
8
Soviet - Cuban Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean
8
The Administration's Central America Policy
8
Administration Initiatives Foster Progress
9
Building Democracy: A Record of Progress
9
Grenada: President Reagan Acts to Ensure the Safety of Americans
10
Background
10
The Rescue Mission
10
Repression and Militarization in Nicaragua
10
Nicaraguan Armed Forces: Largest Ever in Central America
11
Aggression and Subversion
12
The Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters
12
Administration Efforts to Resolve the Nicaraguan Conflict
12
President Orders Trade Embargo
12
Reagan Policy Objectives: Democracy, Stability, and a Restoration of Human Rights
13
The Middle East
13
Objectives of U.S. Policy
13
The Search for Peace-The Administration's Middle East Peace Initiative
13
U.S. Policy and the Arab - Israeli Conflict: Search for a Lasting Peace
14
Israel
14
The Strategic Relationship
14
Egypt
15
A Continued Partnership in the Peace Process
15
Jordan
15
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States
16
Terrorism
16
U.S. Policy: No Concession to Terrorists
16
Reagan Administration Efforts to Combat Terrorism
16
Africa
17
Reagan Administration Policy
17
Humanitarian Aid
17
Refugee Assistance
17
South Africa
18
The Reagan Administration Rejects Apartheid
18
Constructive Engagement
18
The Reagan Administration Opposes Economic Sanctions
18
Reagan Administration Policies Helping to Promote Change
19
Administration Will Continue to Urge for Peaceful Change
19
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INHERITS WEAK AND VACILLAT-
ING FOREIGN POLICY
Four years of the Carter-Mondale Administration saw American power and prestige dwindle
broad. Soviet adventurism was encouraged by policy failures which made this country appear as
if it were a paper tiger-unwilling and unable to fulfill its commitments to its allies.
Vacillation and weakness in the face of aggression and a malaise in leadership caused our
allies to question our commitment to honor our treaty obligations. The Democrat adminis-
tration's failure to respond to blatant anti-Americanism helped to promote the perception
that they were reluctant to protect American interests and citizens.
Iran was lost to the militant anti-American followers of the fanatical Ayatollah Khomeini.
Not only was the U.S. embassy seized in Iran, but 52 Americans were held hostage for 444
days. This national humiliation and the aborted Desert-1 rescue attempt served as a
graphic and tragic reminder of the degree to which U.S. military readiness had declined.
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; the Democrat response was an ill-conceived grain
embargo which only hurt American farmers, who have yet to recover from its devastating
impact.
The Soviet Union increased its presence in Cuba, thereby increasing the threat to the
United States and its Caribbean Basin and Central American allies.
The government in Nicaragua was overthrown and supplanted by a Marxist totalitarian
dictatorship, which is supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba-despite the Carter-
Mondale Administration's provision of enormous amounts of aid to the Sandinistas.
Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said it best:
At home and abroad, our country slid into real deep trouble. North and South,
East and West, our relations deteriorated. The Carter Administration's motives were good, but
their policies were inadequate, uninformed and mistaken. They made things worse, not bet-
ter. Those who had least, suffered most. Poor countries grew poorer. Rich countries grew
poorer, too. The United States grew weaker. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union grew stronger.
(Address to the Republican National Convention, 1984)
AMERICA IS BACK UNDER REAGAN LEADERSHIP
Ronald Reagan's election reaffirmed America's commitment to its historic ideals of peace
and freedom. As our economy was restored, SO too was confidence in traditional American values
and institutions. At home and abroad, people no longer lament about the inevitable decline of
America's greatness, but proclaim that democratic institutions and values can succeed and that
our adversaries' challenges can be answered. Today, under Ronald Reagan's leadership, the world
applauds America's freedom, marvels at her achievements, and respects its new-found strengths.
The Reagan Administration has based its foreign policy on the principle of peace through
strength. The administration has worked during the past five years to promote economic develop-
ment and democratic values, to strengthen relations with friends and allies. After five years of
Reagan at the helm, America has regained its moorings. Under this President's leadership, the
U.S. has regained its role in international affairs. Today, America is respected abroad and peace
is more secure.
1
The Reagan Administration can point proudly to its foreign policy accomplishments.
HALTING SOVIET EXPANSION: Under Reagan's leadership, Soviet expansion has been
checked, and even rolled back on a small Caribbean island, Grenada.
STRENGTHENING THE NATO ALLIANCE: The Reagan Administration has improved
relations with the NATO alliance. Despite massive propaganda campaigns by the Soviet
Union and the European left, Alliance solidarity remained strong. NATO's commitment to
deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles is firm and proceeding on
schedule.
NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL FROM STRENGTH: The Soviet Union returned to the
arms control bargaining table after a year-long walkout. The Administration reaffirmed its
commitment to equal and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.
DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP: President Reagan and Soviet leader
Gorbachev met in Geneva where the President laid the groundwork for improved U.S.-
Soviet relations.
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS IMPROVE: Ties between the People's Republic of China and the
U.S. have been strengthened as trade, technology transfers, and scientific, cultural and
educational exchanges have grown. Relations with Taiwan continue to be warm.
PROMOTING STABILITY AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: In the Middle East, the
Administration worked with Israeli and Arab leaders to promote peace and regional
stability.
The U.S.-Israeli relationship was strengthened in a variety of ways. Economic, political
and military ties were enhanced, prompting Israeli leaders to laud this new level of har-
mony and understanding between our two nations.
The U.S. has supported efforts to prevent a widening of the Iran-Iraq war. The Administra-
tion has also remained committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet their legitimate
self-defense needs.
PROMOTING HEMISPHERIC STABILITY: The Reagan Administration continued its
efforts to resolve the crisis in Central America, working on bilateral and multilateral bases to
stabilize the region.
Based on the recommendations of the Kissinger Commission, the Administration submit-
ted legislation in support of an $8 billion economic aid program for Central America.
The Administration worked with the Contadora nations to find a peaceful solution to the
Nicaraguan crisis. It gained congressional support for non-lethal aid for the democratic
resistance forces.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative showed signs of success as American business explored
investment opportunities there and trade from the Basin to the U.S. increased.
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: The Administration supports the growth of democratic
institutions throughout the world. It is particularly heartened by the progress made by
nations in Central and South America. It has fostered this growth through the "Democracy
Project."
Project Democracy emphasizes leadership training in the theory and practice of demo-
cracy and the skills necessary to build basic institutions of democracy as well as to counter
the actions of anti-democratic forces. The program seeks to educate leaders and strengthen
democracies through the exchange of ideas and information and the development of long-
term ties between American institutions and their foreign counterparts.
2
The program recognizes that the proponents of democracy need an international network
which will provide them with moral support, intellectual stimulation, practical and techni-
cal assistance, and protection against their adversaries.
COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: The Administration has worked to
combat international terrorism, submitting legislation that addresses the problem at home
and abroad.
Intense diplomatic negotiations and President Reagan's strong and effective leadership led
to the successful freeing of 39 American hostages held during the hijacking of a TWA air-
liner in June 1985.
At the President's direction, U.S. military forces intercepted an aircraft over international
airspace that was transporting the hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. The Pre-
sident's bold and decisive action was cheered by the American people and met with strong
bipartisan congressional support.
HUMANITARIAN AID: Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. continued to be the
largest food-aid donor to Africa, providing nearly as much food as all other donors com-
bined.
The Administration remained committed to helping Africa cope with long-term develop-
ment, working on programs in more than 20 African countries.
SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: President Reagan spoke out forcefully against human
rights abuses, condemning South Africa's policy of apartheid. The Administration made it
known privately and publicly that it remains unalterably opposed to apartheid. To reinforce
its views, the Administration imposed a variety of measures designed to convey to the South
African government the need to redress the inequities of the apartheid system.
STANDING FIRM AT THE U.N.: The Administration defended U.S. interests in the United
Nations and other international organizations. The U.S. withdrew from the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) whose policies frequently ser-
ved anti-U.S. political ends.
SOVIET UNION
The Reagan Administration does not accept the inevitability of an endless, dangerous con-
frontation with the Soviet Union. The avoidance of nuclear war lies at the core of America's
relationship with the Soviet Union. President Reagan's leadership has committed America
towards rebuilding its defenses, restoring its economic greatness, and recapturing its moral
leadership so that it may engage the Soviets in constructive dialogue from a position of strength
and not weakness and vacillation.
President Reagan has stated that:
The differences between America and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding. The
United States is a democratic nation. Here the people rule. We build no walls to keep them
in, nor organize any system of police to keep them mute. We occupy no country. The only
land abroad we occupy is beneath the graves where our heroes rest. What is called the West
is a voluntary association of free nations, all of whom fiercely value their independence and
their sovereignty. And as deeply as we cherish our beliefs, we do not seek to compel others to
share them.
3
We Americans do not accept that any government has the right to command and order
the lives of its people, that any nation has a historic right to use force to export its ideology.
This belief-regarding the nature of man and the limitations of government-is at the core of
our deep and abiding differences with the Soviet Union, differences that put us into natural
conflict-and competition-with one another.
U.S.-Soviet Policy Based on Three Principles
U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union is based on three principles: realism, strength, and
dialogue. The U.S. does not overstate the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge, but neither
can it overlook the existing dangers.
The Reagan Administration believes the U.S. must have the necessary strength-military,
economic, or social-to counter Soviet objectives.
The United States does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union. In dealing with the Soviet
Union, the overriding challenge is to preserve peace while protecting freedom. To do this, the U.S.
must strengthen deterrence by maintaining a strong defense.
Soviet Challenges
The Soviet Union and the United States have sharply divergent political goals and moral
philosophies, which will not soon disappear. The nuclear age impels us, however, to work toward
a dialogue through which political solutions to outstanding issues can be solved. Nevertheless,
numerous Soviet actions have given the U.S. cause for concern. These include:
a continuing quest for military supériority;
a continued involvement in efforts to destabilize certain regions of the world and to support
international terrorism;
the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet
clients and allies;
violation of both the letter and spirit of certain treaties and agreements; and
a consistently poor human rights record.
Hopes for the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations
The United States desires a more stable and satisfactory relationship with the Soviet Union.
U.S. goals include:
equal and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms;
the cessation of Soviet interference in the affairs of sovereign states;
respect for human rights.
Direct Dialogue: President Reagan Meets Gorbachev
In November 1985, President Reagan met with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Dialogue focused
on four areas:
Arms control;
Human rights;
Regional conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and
Angola; and
Economic and trade issues.
4
Meeting With Gorbachev Ends on Positive Note
Addressing Congress and the American people on his return from Geneva, President
Reagan said that he had accomplished his goal of initiating a dialogue with the Soviet Union,
saying he had called for a "fresh start-and we made that start."
President Reagan termed the meeting "constructive," although he noted that serious differ-
ences separate our two nations. "I can't claim that we had a meeting of the minds on such fund-
amentals as ideology or national purpose-but we know each other better and that's a key to
peace."
President Reagan and Gorbachev to Meet Again
President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev agreed to meet again. Gorbachev will visit
the U.S. sometime in 1986; President Reagan will go to the Soviet Union sometime in 1987.
Among the other areas of agreement resulting from the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting:
SECURITY: The two leaders agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought; that neither nation will seek to achieve military superiority; and that they would seek
to accelerate the work at the arms control talks;
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
CHEMICAL WEAPONS: President Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral
discussions on a chemical weapons ban;
RISK REDUCTION CENTERS: The U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to study the creation
of a joint crisis center and other procedures to reduce the risk of nuclear war;
PROCESS OF DIALOGUE: The President and the Soviet leader agreed to regular meetings
between U.S. and Soviet officials in different fields, such as agriculture, housing, and the
environment;
NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY: Agreement was reached to set into place measures to
promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific;
CIVIL AVIATION: A tentative agreement was reached to resume direct commercial airline
service between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.;
CONSULATES: The two nations agreed to simultaneously open consulates in New York
and Kiev;
EXCHANGE INITIATIVES: The U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an academic and cultural agree-
ment.
The President and Gorbachev also agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and con-
tacts. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the two leaders at their next meeting.
5
CHINA
Sino-U.S. Relations
President Reagan supports strengthened Sino-U.S. ties, viewing such a relationship as vital to
our long-term national security interests and as contributing to stability in East Asia. This fun-
damental approach is predicated on the belief that a stable and prospering China can be an
increasing force for peace, both in Asia and the world. A revitalized China, open to the outside
world, offers enormous promise and challenge. While there are differences in policy between our
two nations, the Administration believes that a core of common strategic interests combined with
the growing benefits of economic cooperation facilitated by China's economic reforms, provide
Americans with ample grounds for a strengthened U.S. relationship with the People's Republic of
China.
Sino-U.S. Relations Continue to Grow
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER UP: Technology transfer has become the touchstone of Sino-
U.S. relations. The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-technology products
such as computers and laboratory instruments to China.
Trade in high-tech products has substantially increased. Export licenses in 1984 were up
100 percent from 1982; 35 percent from 1983.
EXCHANGES INCREASE: Scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges have also
increased.
More than 10,000 Chinese students now study in U.S. universities.
Every month, 150 Chinese scientific or commercial delegations come to the U.S.
ENERGY COOPERATION: Thirteen American companies are collaborating with the
Chinese in the search for oil. Americans have invested almost $700 million, as of early 1985
in joint ventures and offshore oil exploration in China. This makes the U.S. China's largest
foreign investor.
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT CONCLUDED: An agreement to
sell nuclear materiel and equipment for peaceful nuclear energy uses was initiated by Presi-
dent Reagan in 1984. The Administration conducted negotiations for two years to ensure that
China would not use material and equipment purchases from the U.S. for any nuclear
explosive or military purpose.
TRADE INCREASES: China has become the U.S.' fourth largest supplier of textiles.
TAX TREATY CONCLUDED: A tax treaty between the U.S. and China concluded during
President Reagan's trip to China in 1984 reduced China's tax rates on U.S. business profits,
investment income, capital gains, and pensions.
Taiwan
The U.S. has sought to enhance relations with China in cultural, economic, and trade areas,
without compromising our moral and legal commitments to the people of Taiwan. President
Reagan has reiterated his deep concern for the well-being of Taiwan.
ARMS SALES CONSISTENT WITH TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT: U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan will be consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act which calls for the maintenance of
a self-defense capability sufficient to meet Taiwan's military needs, but with the understand-
ing that China will maintain a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question which will permit
gradual reductions in arms sales.
6
SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TAIWAN ISSUE: The Administration
believes that the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people in Taiwan and the PRC
to resolve. The U.S. will not exert pressure on Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing.
The Administration supports a peaceful resolution of this issue.
CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN
The Economic and Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Sea Lanes
The Caribbean Basin forms our "third border." Many major U.S. cities are closer to Central
America than they are to each other.
Cuba is a mere 90 miles away; El Salvador is closer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts.
Washington, D.C., for example, is closer to Costa Rica than to San Francisco.
The very proximity of these nations ensures that their interests and ours are intertwined.
Nearly half of U.S. trade and more than one-half of U.S. imported petroleum as well as
many strategic minerals pass through the Caribbean sea lanes.
In times of war, almost two-thirds of the resupply and reinforcements needed by NATO
would have to go through this area.
The crucial strategic and logistic link provided by the Panama Canal, which can be used
by virtually all U.S. naval vessels except the large attack carriers, is vulnerable. It could be
bottled up by hostile air and naval power in or near the sea lanes. Nicaraguan airfields, for
example, are only 400 miles away. Some of these airfields are being upgraded to accom-
modate sophisticated jet fighters, such as Soviet MIGs.
Potential Immigration Problems
The Caribbean region has become the main source of immigration to the U.S. By 1984, one
out of every eight persons born in the Caribbean lived in the U.S.
Concerns about the prospect of hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Communist
oppression by seeking entry into our country are well-founded. In May 1984, President
Reagan stated that Communist guerrilla warfare had caused 800,000 people to flee their
homes.
Politically-motivated influxes of people to the U.S., such as the Mariel exodus from Cuba
and Central America, impose excessive strains on our law enforcement systems and on
our local economies.
The U.S. shares an 1,800-mile border with Mexico, a country that is potentially threatened by
the instability and violence in Central America.
The Reagan Administration recognizes that vital U.S. interests are at stake in Central
America and the Caribbean. In addition to basic humanitarian concerns for the people of the
region, the Administration believes that it is in our national self-interest to prevent the economic
collapse or penetration of Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regimes into the Caribbean Basin
countries.
As President Reagan stated in April 1985:
If we provide too little help, our choice will be a Communist Central America with Com-
munist subversion spreading southward and northward. We face the risk that 100 million
people from Panama to our open southern border could come under the control of pro-Soviet
regimes and threaten the United States with violence, economic chaos, and a human tidal
wave of refugees.
7
The Soviet Presence: The Cuban Threat
The Soviet Union, through its Cuban surrogate, has established a permanent presence in the
Western Hemisphere, thereby constituting the greatest threat to U.S. security in the Caribbean
Basin and Central America. Armed and economically supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba is
providing training and materiel assistance to radical revolutionaries in this hemisphere and the
world over. Each year the Soviets provide more than $4 billion in economic aid to Cuba. Military
aid in the last four years alone has totaled almost $3 billion.
THE MILITARY PRESENCE: The Soviets have 7,000 civilian advisers and a 2,800-man
combat brigade in Cuba. To spy on the U.S., the Soviet Union established its most sophis-
ticated electronic intelligence facility outside of its borders at Lourdes, which is staffed by
2,100 technicians.
DESTABILIZING THE REGION: Cuba has the largest armed force in the Caribbean Basin
and the second largest in Latin America. In 1982, the Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as
many military advisers in Latin America as the U.S. had sent.
THE STRATEGIC THREAT: Soviet long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft are also
deployed in Cuba.
Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean
Castro has provided indispensable logistical and financial assistance to guerrilla movements
in Latin America.
DESTABILIZING EL SALVADOR: For more than five years, El Salvador has been a target
of Cuban and Nicaraguan violence. Leftist guerrillas, with the active support of the San-
dinista regime, the Soviet Union, and its Cuban surrogate, have been subverting the reforms
of President Jose Napoleon Duarte and his democratically-elected government.
GRENADA: The Soviets used the Cubans to funnel military, economic and technical assis-
tance to Grenada in an attempt to turn the island into a springboard for spreading
insurgency and revolution.
NICARAGUA: Cuba is actively engaged in converting Nicaragua into a communist,
totalitarian regime such as itself.
The Administration's Central America Policy
President Reagan has repeatedly called for a peaceful resolution to the conflicts in Central
America. Toward this end, the Administration has sought to:
FOSTER DEMOCRACY: Bolster democratic systems where they already exist and help
countries in the process to reach democratic goals quickly. Elections must be fair, safe, and
open to all. The Administration has worked vigorously to correct-human rights problems;
SUPPORT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Seventy-eight cents out of every dollar of U.S.
aid to Central America in the past four years has been economic. Programs such as those
facilitated by the Caribbean Basin Initiative foster regional trade, investment, and economic
development. U.S. technological assistance has focused on the modernization of the
agricultural and industrial sectors, as well as improving health care;
PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE: Security assistance is a shield for democratization,
economic development, and diplomacy. No amount of political or economic reforms will
bring peace so long as Cuban-backed leftist insurgents believe they will win by force. In the
past four years, twenty-two percent of U.S. aid to the region has been in the form of security
assistance; and
8
FOSTER DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS: The U.S. government supports dialogue and
negotiations among the countries of the region and the factions within each country, forging
political solutions within the context of the democratic process.
Administration Initiatives Foster Progress
RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH: Economic decline has been stemmed. After a
decline of 4 percent in 1982-83, gross domestic product (GDP) for Central America as a
whole grew by 1.2 percent in 1984.
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION: U.S. economic assistance in the amount of $274 million
from the FY 1984 supplemental budget and $607 million from the FY 1985 Continuing
Resolution provided balance-of-payment support for vital imports and other assistance for
economic stabilization.
A trade credit insurance program was established to provide guarantees for up to $300
million in trade credits in fiscal 1985.
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), a 12-year U.S. pro-
gram of preferential duty-free treatment for 20 countries from the Caribbean Basin, went into
effect on January 1, 1984.
Proposed by the Reagan Administration in 1982, the Caribbean Basin Initiative was
designed to stimulate investment and trade in Caribbean Basin countries.
As of January 1985, U.S. imports from Central America had risen by $220 million, an
annual growth rate of 12 percent for the region as a whole.
Millions of dollars have been allocated for improved health care and housing, humanitarian
relief, and educational opportunities.
$50 million was obligated for health services.
Some 1,200 Central American students were studying in the U.S. by the end of FY 1985.
FOREIGN AID: For FY 1986, the Administration's economic assistance request for Central
America totaled $1 billion; the military request was $261 million.
Building Democracy: A Record of Progress
EL SALVADOR: In March and May 1984, nearly 80 percent of the Salvadoran electorate
turned out in the presence of hundreds of international observers to elect their president,
Jose Napoleon Duarte.
Nine political parties representing a broad range of opinion campaigned in the March
1985 legislative and mayoral elections, despite guerrilla attacks and harassment.
Political murder by "death squads" declined dramatically from the level of previous years.
GUATEMALA: On July 1, 1984 Guatemala held a nationwide election to select delegates to
a Constitutent Assembly. More than 72 percent of eligible voters turned out. National elec-
tions were held in November, 1985. Because no candidate received 51 percent of the vote, as
required by the Guatemalan Constitution, a run-off election was held in December, 1985. A
new Congress was also seated in December, and the new president will be inaugurated in
January, 1986.
HONDURAS: Honduras continued to consolidate the democratic system begun with the
1981 Constitution. Presidential and congressional elections were held in November, 1985,
marking the first transfer of power from one elected president to another since 1927.
9
COSTA RICA: Costa Rica has remained steadfastly democratic, and President Monge's
strong economic policies produced the highest economic growth rate in Central America in
1984.
While much remains to be done, the Reagan Administration's policies have produced
beneficial results. The Reagan Administration will continue to strengthen democratic institutions,
promote economic development, improve human rights, and help "foster the infrastructure of
democracy around the world."
Grenada: President Reagan Acts to Ensure the Safety of Americans
Americans can be proud of the swift response of our country together with Grenada's
democratic Caribbean neighbors, in liberating more than 110,000 people from the terror and
tyranny of a Communist/totalitarian dictatorship. Today, Grenada is free and America is helping
to rebuild its economy.
Background
With Soviet assistance, Cuba planned to turn this tiny island-nation into one of the largest
military forces, person-for-person, of any country in the world. The island of Grenada, only twice
the size of Washington, D.C. and with a population of 110,000, had more armed forces and more
weapons and military supplies than all of its Eastern Caribbean neighbors combined.
THE THREAT: In October 1983, 1,000 Americans in Grenada were endangered when a
small group of insurgents even more radical and more pro-Cuban than the island's leader,
Maurice Bishop, staged a bloody coup. There was fear, not only of regional destabilization,
but also of a replay of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.
The Point Salines airport, built primarily by "armed Cubans", was designed to accom-
modate military aircraft, including Soviet long-range bombers. This, in a country which
did not even have an air force.
The rescue operation uncovered five secret military agreements signed by Grenada-three
with the U.S.S.R., one with Cuba, and one with North Korea.
The Rescue Mission
In response to an urgent formal request from members of the Organization of Eastern Car-
ibbean States, the United States, joined by Jamaica and Barbados, assisted in a military operation
to restore order and democracy to Grenada. The legitimacy of the OECS request and the concern
for the safety of American citizens led the Reagan Administration to mount a rescue mission.
This rescue mission succeeded and the American forces were greeted as liberators.
Repression and Militarization in Nicaragua
Over the past five years, the nations of Latin America have moved towards democracy.
Notably, there is one exception. Nicaragua has continued to move away from the democratic
principles of the revolution which overthrew the government of Anastastio Somoza in 1979. The
Sandinista regime reneged on its written promise to the Organization of American States to
establish a real democracy, hold free elections and respect human rights.
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: Nicaragua has become a communist totalitarian regime,
abusive of human rights and seeking to destabilize the emerging democracies of the region. The
Sandinista regime refuses to hold free elections; has militarized the nation and supports armed
insurrection in other countries in ways that serve Soviet goals of destabilization and conflict.
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In October, 1985, the Sandinista regime formally suspended all civil rights, including
freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.
The right to dissent is denied, religious freedom has been curtailed and entire cultures
have been denied their homes or livelihoods.
The Sandinistas control all media outlets through censorship.
Neighborhood watch committees, informant networks, rationing of basic necessities and
enforced participation in Sandinista organizations are all used to control and intimidate
the people.
REPRESSION AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL: Since 1979, the Sandinistas have con-
solidated control over the government and the armed forces, and the private economy.
Nearly half of Nicaragua's industry and 40 percent of its agriculture have been placed under
direct state control.
Nicaraguan Armed Forces: Largest Ever in Central America
In their six years of power, the Sandinistas have followed Cuba's example in developing a
massive military establishment.
Nicaragua, a country of less than three million people, has developed the largest, most
powerful armed force in the history of Central America. Since 1979 its military manpower
forces have increased from 10,000 to 120,000 (as of mid-1985), a force level far beyond that
required for legitimate security needs. By contrast, next-door Costa Rica has no army and in
Honduras the armed forces stand at 16,000.
THE CUBAN PRESENCE: As of mid-1985, Cuban forces in Nicaragua numbered 7,500 (up
from 165 in 1979), some 3,000 of whom are military or security personnel attached to the
armed forces, internal security and intelligence organizations.
In December 1985, Secretary of State Shultz said that there was "incontrovertible evidence"
that large numbers of Cuban soldiers are heavily involved in combat against the
Nicaraguan freedom fighters. According to Sandinista defectors, Cuban advisers wear
Sandinista uniforms, pilot Soviet-built helicopters, and sometimes engage in combat.
An additional 30 to 40 Soviet and more than 60 East German military/security advisers
also operate in Nicaragua.
THE REGIONAL THREAT: The total value of tanks, helicopters, and other war materiel
shipped to Nicaragua approached $500 million by early 1985.
More than 40 new military bases and support facilities have been constructed since 1979,
representing a Soviet investment of $70 million.
The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete airfield, when completed, will be the longest
military runway in Central America and will be able to accommodate any aircraft in the
Soviet-bloc inventory. The potential threat to Nicaragua's neighbors would then increase
dramatically.
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Aggression and Subversion
REGIONAL INSTABILITY: Since 1979, the Sandinista regime has engaged in aggression
and subversion against its neighbors-El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
It has supported leftist Guatemalan insurgents, and its forces have raided Honduras and
Costa Rica. The leftist Salvadoran guerrillas, which are seeking to overthrow the
democratically-elected government of President Duarte, receive the bulk of their arms,
ammunition, and supplies from Nicaragua.
A HAVEN FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: Nicaragua has become safe haven for
international terrorist groups such as the German Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Italian
Red Brigade. The Sandinista connection with the PLO and radical Middle Eastern states is
more than a decade-and-a-half old.
The Sandinista government has issued Nicaraguan passports to radicals and terrorists
from the Middle East, Latin America, and Europe, thus enabling them to travel in West-
ern countries without disclosing their true identities.
The Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters
Economic mismanagement, human rights violations, and abuse of governmental authority
have driven more than 120,000 Nicaraguans into exile. By 1982 many of them had taken up arms
against the Sandinista regime, and by 1985 these armed forces had grown to 15,000.
THEIR GOALS: The freedom fighters support democracy, and are calling for national
independence, and for the fulfillment of the original promises of the anti-Somoza revolution.
They are against the subversion of these ideals by the Sandinista regime.
THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS DESERVE U.S. SUPPORT: The freedom fighters deserve
U.S. support, since vital U.S. strategic interests are at stake.
Nicaragua's freedom fighters are not asking for troops but only for technical and financial
support and supplies.
Administration Efforts to Resolve the Nicaraguan Conflict
U.S. policy toward Nicaragua since the Sandinistas' ascent to power has consistently sought
a peaceful resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict. The Reagan Administration has not sought to
overthrow the Sandinistas.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS: The Reagan Administration has made numerous attempts to
engage the Sandinistas in serious diplomatic negotiations, both bilaterally and through the
multilateral Contadora peace process. Senior U.S. diplomats have traveled to Nicaragua
repeatedly to discuss U.S. concerns directly with the Sandinistas.
THE REAGAN PEACE PROPOSAL: The Sandinistas rejected President Reagan's peace
proposal, which called upon both the Nicaraguan government and the freedom fighters to
lay down their arms and accept an offer for church-mediated talks, internationally super-
vised elections, and an end to the suppression of civil rights.
President Orders Trade Embargo
In response to Nicaragua's aggression in Central America, President Reagan, by Executive
Order in May 1985, imposed a trade embargo. All imports and exports to Nicaragua were pro-
hibited. All goods and services originating in Nicaragua were banned from our shores, as were
that country's air carriers and merchant ships.
12
Reagan Policy Objectives: Democracy, Stability, and a Restoration of
Human Rights
Restoring genuine democracy;
A definitive end to support for terrorism and insurgency;
The removal of foreign forces, including the thousands of Soviet-bloc, Cuban, PLO, Libyan
and other military and security personnel; and
Regional stability through reductions in Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would re-
store the military balance between itself and its neighbors.
Despite Sandinista rejections, the Reagan Administration remains committed to a peaceful
resolution of the Nicaraguan threat. The Sandinista government has bargained in bad faith and
engaged in grandstand diplomacy, seeking only a propaganda advantage.
THE MIDDLE EAST
Objectives of U.S. Policy
The peace, security, and well-being of the nations of the Middle East are critical to a broad
range of American interests. The U.S.' comprehensive and balanced approach in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf is aimed at protecting these interests, which include:
protecting U.S. national security through the preservation of a global strategic balance which
will permit free and independent societies to pursue their aspirations;
checking the spread of Soviet influence in this strategic region;
working towards the resolution of regional conflicts which threaten international security;
assuring the security and welfare of Israel and other important friendly nations in the region;
preserving and fostering the U.S.' critical interest in access to the region's oil; and
supporting other major economic interests, including access to markets for American goods
and services, cooperation with the wealthier states in the region to maintain a sound inter-
national financial order, and assisting the orderly economic development of the region.
The Search for Peace-The Administration's Middle East Peace Initiative
In September, 1982, the Reagan Administration called for a "fresh start" in the Middle East
peace process. In pursuit of a lasting solution to the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Reagan Administration outlined seven essential points upon which American policy towards the
conflict would be based. Included are the following:
The Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 242, with its concept of an exchange of territory for peace, and the Camp David
Accords, which provide for Palestinian autonomy with full guarantees for Israel's security.
The U.S. opposes any proposal that threatens the security of Israel. As President Reagan has
stated, "America's commitment to Israel is ironclad."
The U.S. will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West
Bank or Gaza. Neither will the U.S. support annexation or permanent control of these
territories by Israel.
13
The Administration's Middle East Peace Initiative is balanced and fair. It is an "initiative,"
not a "plan" to be imposed on the parties of the region. The U.S. is prepared to support these
positions in the course of negotiations.
U.S. Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Search for a Lasting Peace
SUPPORT FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS: The U.S. will continue to seek a lasting peace
that respects the legitimate concerns of all parties. The U.S. will always insist on Israel's right to
exist in peace behind secure and recognized borders. The only way to achieve a genuine, lasting
peace is through direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states.
OPPOSITION TO TERRORISTS: The U.S. opposes governments or terrorist organizations
which seek to undermine Israel and Arab friends.
U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is unchanged: the U.S.
will never recognize or negotiate with any group that espouses violent solutions or refuses
to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 or recognize Israel's right to exist.
ISRAEL
The United States has an historic commitment to Israel's security dating back almost four
decades. U.S. assistance to Israel provides a tangible demonstration of the strength and durability
of that commitment.
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE: From 1981 to 1984, the U.S. provided almost
$9.8 billion in aid to Israel-more than has been provided by any previous Administration
over a comparable time.
In 1984, aid to Israel made up more than a quarter of our entire foreign aid program.
In FY 1985, Israel received $1.5 billion in supplemental economic aid.
For FY 1986, the Administration requested $1.8 billion in military assistance in forgiven
loans for Israel, and $1.2 billion in economic aid, also in forgiven loans, making Israel the
largest U.S. foreign aid recipient.
The Strategic Relationship
Under the Reagan Administration, the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship has been
strengthened. President Reagan has stated that the U.S. and Israel will continue to work together:
"Our friendship is closer and stronger today than ever before. And we intend to keep it that way."
MILITARY COOPERATION: President Reagan has pledged repeatedly to maintain Israel's
qualitative military edge. As the President stated, Israel and the U.S. are "allies in the defense of
freedom in the Middle East."
A joint political-military group has been created to discuss expansion of U.S.-Israeli military
cooperation.
The U.S. renewed a U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement that provides for cooperation in
military research and development, procurement, and logistics. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, the U.S. has already purchased Israeli-manufactured radios, remote piloted vehicles,
anti-tank weapons, and sophisticated aircraft components. The U.S., in turn, has made avail-
able the latest technology for the development of the Israeli-designed Lavi aircraft and a new
class of missile attack boat, the SAAR 5.
The U.S. and Israel agreed to coproduce three conventional submarines for the Israeli Navy.
The U.S. also agreed to acquire a second squadron of Kfir fighter aircraft. The U.S. Navy will
join Israel's Navy in building missiles and spy drones.
14
Joint anti-submarine exercise took place and the U.S. Sixth Fleet made regular port calls in
Haifa.
Israel has agreed to the Reagan Administration's offer to participate in research and
development for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
The U.S. and Israel agreed to use each other's medical facilities in emergencies. This involves
U.S. utilization of Israeli hospitals; the prepositioning of U.S. medical supplies in Israel; and
the exchange of visits by U.S. and Israeli military physicians.
ECONOMIC COOPERATION: A Joint Economic Development Group was created to dis-
cuss problems of the Israeli economy and to find ways where U.S. cooperation can help Israel
overcome its economic difficulties.
The U.S. and Israel concluded a free trade agreement in April 1985 which grants Israel open
access to U.S. markets.
POLITICAL SUPPORT: President Reagan called on Arab leaders to negotiate directly with
Israel.
The Reagan Administration reaffirmed that the U.S. would not deal with the PLO.
U.S. support for Israel continued in the United Nations and other international arenas. In
turn, Israel voted with the U.S. in the U.N. more than it did with any other country.
Of the 153 issues which came to a vote in the 1984 General Assembly, Israel and the U.S.
agreed on 88.5 percent of them. Jerusalem concurred on nine of 10 issues regarded by the
U.S. as key questions.
EGYPT
The Reagan Administration has worked with Egypt and other friends in the Middle East to
build relationships which will protect and advance our mutual interests. The Reagan Administra-
tion has sought to strengthen bilateral relations with Egypt.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: The Administration requested $1.3 billion in military aid, all
of it in forgiven loans, and $815 million in economic aid, also in forgiven loans for FY 1986.
Egypt will also receive $227 million under PL 480. Egypt is the U.S.'s second largest foreign
aid recipient.
Egypt received $500 million in supplemental economic aid in FY 1985.
A Continued Partnership in the Peace Process
U.S.-Egyptian relations are marked by continued partnership in the peace process. Our
countries consult on other regional issues. The Administration will continue to work with Egypt
for Middle East peace and stability.
JORDAN
Jordan is a key participant in the search for an Arab-Israeli peace. As such, its continued
security is fundamentally important to U.S. objectives in the Middle East. Jordan is a bulwark of
stability and moderation in the area.
Over the past year, King Hussein of Jordan has met with President Reagan on a number of
occasions, and has taken steps to advance the peace process.
15
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF STATES
As the anti-communist leader of the conservative Gulf states and as the largest oil producer
in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to outside interferences. These include military
threats arising out of the Iran/Iraq conflict, from radical states in the area, and particularly from
Soviet or Soviet-inspired direct and indirect military action.
AWACS: In response to these threats, the Administration offered to provide Saudi Arabia
with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and other air defense enhancement
equipment. The sale was approved by Congress in late 1981. Delivery of the AWACS system is
scheduled to begin in 1986.
The sale of AWACS and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia serves the vital interest
of the U.S. by enhancing Saudi Arabia's capacity to defend itself, and demonstrating our
credibility as a reliable ally.
Assurances and safeguards have been instituted to prevent these aircraft from compromis-
ing Israel's security.
U.S. REGIONAL OBJECTIVES: The United States has four primary objectives in the Per-
sian Gulf region. These include:
the continuation of stable and secure access to regional oil;
the prevention of the spread of Soviet influence;
assuring the security of friendly states in the region; and
the demonstration of U.S. reliability and resolve in supporting overall regional security.
TERRORISM
U.S. Policy: No Concession to Terrorists
Terrorism is a worldwide problem, whose primary targets are the U.S. and the democratic
nations of the West. The U.S. government will not be intimidated by terrorist threats or demands.
The U.S. refuses to concede to terrorists' demands and encourages its allies to do likewise.
Acquiescence to terrorist demands only encourages more terrorism, further endangering innocent
lives.
Reagan Administration Efforts to Combat Terrorism
DECISIVE ACTION CAPTURES HIJACKERS OF ACHILLE LAURO: President Reagan
ordered U.S. military forces to intercept an aircraft over international airspace that was transport-
ing the terrorist hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro. As the President noted, "We will not
tolerate terrorism in any form. We will continue to take every appropriate measure available to us
to deal with these dastardly deeds. There can be no asylum for terrorism or terrorists."
OTHER EFFORTS: Efforts to combat terrorism have been at the forefront of the Reagan
Administration's foreign policy agenda.
The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism signed by the President authorized a total
FY 1985 expenditure of $356 million for enhanced security at high-threat diplomatic posts
abroad.
The U.S. Anti-Terrorism Program was established by the Administration to help friendly
governments counter terrorism. Using U.S. facilities, foreign delegations are trained in anti-
terrorist policy, crisis management, hostage and barricade negotiations, airport security
measures and bomb disposal methods.
16
The formation of the Overseas Security Advisory Council which brings together public and
private officials to exchange information on security issues;
Control of trade with states which are supporters of terrorism;
Improvements in intelligence-gathering capabilities; and
Increased security at U.S. airports and aboard U.S. aircraft.
AFRICA
Reagan Administration Policy
The Reagan Administration's policy toward Africa is based on several key principles:
FOREIGN AID: Increased economic freedom, especially for agriculture, is essential to the
health of most African economies. U.S. development assistance programs are cast for the
long term. They are tailored to promote self-sufficiency and local initiative, and to decrease
dependency on foreign assistance.
U.S. economic assistance has grown from $787 million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1985,
not counting emergency assistance.
The Administration requested $1.2 billion in foreign assistance for FY 1986. Of the total
FY 1986 request, only 17 percent is military-related assistance; 83 percent is economic.
Humanitarian Aid
In response to the widespread famine in Africa, the U.S., at the request of the Reagan
Administration, is providing unprecedented levels of assistance. The U.S. is attempting to
alleviate the immediate needs of millions of starving people as well as to promote long-term
solutions to Africa's food production problems.
The U.S. has long been the largest food aid donor to Africa, providing almost as much aid as
all other donors combined.
On January 3, 1985, President Reagan announced a comprehensive African Hunger Relief
Initiative, in which he directed the U.S. government to provide more than 1.5 million metric
tons of emergency food (at a cost of more than $1 billion) during fiscal year 1985-three times
the record amount from the previous year.
Through international organizations and regional programs, the U.S. is supporting such
efforts as agricultural development projects, land reclamation, and other programs to
develop agricultural land and to train farmers in soil conservation techniques.
Refugee Assistance
The number of refugees and displaced persons in Africa has increased by 20 percent since
mid-1984, to 2,500,000. Total U.S. government assistance to African refugees from all sources,
including food and in-kind contributions, was expected to reach at least $150 million in FY 1985
(compared to $105 million in FY 1984).
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SOUTH AFRICA
The Reagan Administration Rejects Apartheid
The Reagan Administration rejects the South African government's policy of apartheid
which denies basic rights to South Africa's 23 million blacks. The Reagan Administration
believes apartheid is an abhorrent, repugnant policy, totally against the ideals of the American
people.
The U.S. relationship to South Africa is far from a "normal" one. Significant embargoes and
restrictions are already in place on U.S. trade and cooperation, in military and nuclear areas, as
well as in U.S. commercial relations. President Reagan continued to disassociate the U.S. from
the apartheid machinery when he signed an executive order in September, 1985. The president
ordered the following steps:
A ban on bank loans, with the exception of those which improve economic opportunities or
support educational, housing and health facilities that are open to all races.
A formal ban on the sale of computers to South African agencies that enforce apartheid.
A ban on U.S. sales of the Krugerrand gold coin.
A denial of export assistance to American companies that do not adhere to the principles of
non-discrimination.
An increase in scholarships for South Africans and funding for programs to promote
human rights.
Creation of an advisory committee to monitor the situation in South Africa and recommend
steps that encourage peaceful change.
Constructive Engagement
The Reagan Administration believes that the best means to encourage the white government
of South Africa to enact a policy away from apartheid and toward a system based on the
consent of the governed is through a policy of "constructive engagement."
The Administration's policy of constructive engagement is based on the belief that positive
change is more likely to occur through dialogue and negotiation than through confronta-
tion.
The Reagan Administration Opposes Economic Sanctions
President Reagan opposes economic sanctions against South Africa. The President believes
that punitive economic sanctions or trade restrictions against South Africa will injure those we
profess to help-South Africa's black population.
If new investment in South Africa were prohibited, black South Africans would lose job
opportunities. The South African economy must create 250,000 new jobs for young blacks
each year, and twice that many people will be entering the job market by the turn of the cen-
tury. Such an economy needs more jobs, not less.
18
Reagan Administration Policies Helping to Promote Change
The Reagan Administration has undertaken a number of programs designed to directly aid
black South Africans. Included are:
A multimillion dollar scholarship program to bring black South African students to U.S.
universities.
Training programs in cooperation with the AFL/CIO for black South African trade
unionists.
Scholarship support for university-level study in South Africa.
Support for small business development in black South African communities.
The provision of $30 million over three years to give South African blacks better training
and educational opportunities.
Administration Will Continue to Urge Peaceful Change
While the process which moves the South African government away from apartheid has
begun, the Reagan Administration does not endorse nor is it satisfied with the limited changes
that have been made.
The Reagan Administration is committed to using its limited influence to promote peaceful
change in South Africa and will continue to voice its condemnation of apartheid's evils.
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