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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Blackwell, Morton: Files
Folder Title: Vietnam Veterans -
Agent Orange Outreach Centers
(3 of 5)
Box: 51
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Office of the Secretary
The General Counsel
Washington, D.C. 20201
2 1 APR 1981
Mr. Martin Anderson
Assistant to the President for
Policy Development
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. Anderson:
I am forwarding the seventh report of the Interagency Work
Group to Study the Possible Long-Term Health Effects of Phenoxy
Herbicides and Contaminants. Enclosed is a current assessment
report on Agent Orange by the Chair of the work Group's Scientific
Panel, Dr. John Moore.
During February and March the Work Group continued to review
efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD) to identify individuals
among ground troops in Vietnam who were exposed to Agent Orange.
Attached is a report from DoD on its records searches concerning
base camp perimeter defoliation operations. DoD has also searched
company-level records of five battalions and has been able to
determine that certain units operated in close proximity to areas
sprayed with Agent Orange. However, DoD has not been able to
identify individuals or even units whose exposure to Agent Orange
is or can be documented reliably. The Work Group believes that
it is reasonable to presume that military personnel entered sprayed.
areas. However, a study based on no more than presumed exposure
would represent such a serious flaw in scientific design as to
be of questionable validity.
The Work Group strongly endorses DoD's recommendation that
the records search efforts by DoD be reviewed by outside records
search experts to insure that no means of possibly identifying
individuals whose exposure to Agent Orange is or can be docu-
mented has been overlooked. The Work Group is aware that General
Accounting Office personnel have reviewed DoD's efforts and it has
been briefed on GAO's work. However, it is our understanding
that presently GAO does not intend to prepare a formal report.
Therefore, the work Group will be discussing this matter with
the Medical Followup Agency of the National Academy of Sciences-
National Research Council. In addition, the Veterans Administra-
tion (VA) will explore the possibility of including such a review
under the contract it will let for the design of the VA's
epidemiology study.
2
Unless such an outside review suggests new approaches
to records searches which are likely to produce sufficiently
specific data, it is the Work Group's view that an epidemiology
study of ground troops which is focused solely on Agent Orange
exposure may be impossible to conduct with an acceptable measure
of scientific validity. The Work Group continues to believe
that an epidemiology study of ground troops should be broadened
to focus on service in Vietnam as the exposure circumstance
being studied.
June Sincerely, has
Juan A. del Real
Acting General Counsel and
Acting Chair, Interagency Work Group
Enclosures (3)
SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Memorandum
Date
April 21, 1981
From
Chair, Scientific Panel
Subject
Progress Report on Herbicide Orange
To
Acting Chair, Interagency Work Group to Study the Possible
Long-Term Health Effects of Phenoxy Herbicides and Contaminants
The health issue still remains broadly defined: Vietnam veterans
remain concerned that as a consequence of Herbicide Orange
exposure they are or may be at increased risk of a broad spectrum
of health decrements that include infertility, birth defects in
children, neurologic disorders, cancer, skin disease or liver
disorders. While it is difficult to accept logically that a single
causative factor -- Herbicide Orange -- could be responsible for such
a diverse set of health effects, there is no definitive evidence that
permits selective exclusion of some of these illnesses. Further,
it is possible that some of these health effects are occurring as a
consequence of Vietnam service but not due to exposure to Herbicide
Orange. The Science Panel is not aware of any data that suggest a
modification of its previous recommendation that the focus of a
study of Vietnam veterans should be broadened to consider Vietnam
service as the exposure factor rather than focus solely on Herbicide
Orange exposure.
The Science Panel has previously concluded that the most direct and
relevant means for determining if there are health effects -- and the
nature of these effects -- as a consequence of Herbicide Orange expo-
sure is a study of Vietnam veterans. The Air Force Ranch Hand Study,
previously reviewed and endorsed by the Science Panel, is representa-
tive of a study of this type. The general objective of the study is
to evaluate the current health status and mortality of approximately
1,100 Air Force personnel who participated in aerial spraying of the
herbicide in Vietnam. Their exposure was documented, of sustained
duration, and of significantly greater magnitude when compared to
ground troop exposure. The need for prompt conduct and analyses of
the study results is clear if we are to gain insight into the nature
of the long-term health effects that may be a consequence of Herbi-
cide Orange exposure.
Page 2 - Acting Chair, IWG
The Science Panel is in receipt of data which indicate that there
is at best a remote chance of accurate identification of specific
ground troops who were exposed to Herbicide Orange. These data
summarize the results of detailed searches by Department of Defense
records experts of five battalion and company records for one year
periods during which there was heavy use of Herbicide Orange. Their
searches failed to establish conclusively levels of exposure for U.S.
ground troops who had entered sprayed areas.
The Panel is therefore of the opinion that design of a scientifically
valid Herbicide Orange study of ground troops may not be possible.
If the focus of a study of Vietnam veterans is broadened to consider
Vietnam service as the exposure factor, a study of ground troops is
necessary and a scientifically valid study can be designed.
The study population should preferentially include those who served
in the field and in combat areas which were sprayed with Herbicide
Orange. Although the DoD records search failed to establish
specifically certain troops at a company level who were exposed to
Herbicide Orange, the records do identify units which were closely
proximate to areas at the time of spraying. Based on the mission
objectives of some troops, it is reasonable to presume that personnel
entered sprayed areas. There should be a conscious bias to include
these personnel since possible exposure to Herbicide Orange was a
major factor associated with Vietnam duty. Further, there is no
reason to presume that such troops were not also representatively
"exposed" to other "factors" that may represent a long-term health
risk.
Epidemiological methods are best applied to a study of ground troops.
The inherent nature of epidemiology studies do not provide quick
answers -- the process is slow and tedious, usually requiring 2-5
years for an initial result. Such studies yield data that define the
degree of association between an exposure circumstance (Herbicide
Orange, Vietnam service) and specific endpoints (cancer, birth
defects, heart disease, suicide, diabetes, etc.). In the Vietnam
issue, any positive association between exposure and long-term health
effects will likely be an increased incidence of disease (s) already
1/ The Science Panel is not composed of individuals competent to
render expert opinion as to the quality of the records search. It
has received briefings as to procedures employed and informal advice
of persons expert in this type of work. It believes the effort has
been thorough and objective. Given that these efforts are crucial
to the Herbicide Orange issue, the DoD and the Science Panel urge
expert review and comments as to adequacy of the records search or
identification of more effective approaches. The Science Panel has
undertaken steps to accomplish this review and further information
will be provided as it develops.
Page 3 - Acting Chair, IWG
prevalent in the human population. Should specific disease
associations be found, a policy decision as to when and under what
circumstances a veteran with that specific disease is eligible for
compensation is required.
It is not practical to perform an epidemiology study that simultane-
ously assesses all health parameters, yet the concerns of veterans
span a wide spectrum of health effects. A critical need is the
development of a logical base from which to define discrete disease
endpoints for definitive epidemiology studies. A sequential epi-
demiological approach deserves detailed consideration. In the first
phase, a proportional mortality study would compare the proportional
causes of death in a Vietnam veteran population to the appropriate
age and sex adjusted rates for the U.S. population. (Comparison
with non-Vietnam veterans should also be considered.) If excess
causes of death are detected, it would provide direction for subse-
quent studies. There are also limitations to proportional mortality
studies: if one or more causes of death are in excess, other
causes of death will by definition appear to be diminished; and
it is possible that the time interval between Vietnam service and
1981 is insufficient for certain fatal diseases (such as cancer)
to develop. The need for definition of disease endpoints is of
sufficient magnitude for this approach to merit serious considera-
tion, particularly if such a study could be performed relatively
quickly. A proportional mortality study requires the ready avail-
ability of death certificates and a computerized file that identi-
fies those veterans of the Vietnam era who served in Vietnam.
Availability of death records in the VA files (submitted in order
to collect burial benefits) must be objectively assessed. The
development of a computerized file that identifies Vietnam veterans
must be developed since it is essential for the conduct of any
proposed ground troop study and also could significantly enhance
the quality of ongoing studies. This need requires priority
attention.
The second and more definitve epidemiological approach is a cohort
study in which a defined population is studied prospectively and
compared to an appropriate control group. Such a study clearly
should include mortality as an endpoint and seriously consider
2/ For example, the incidence of liver cancer in U.S. white males
is about 2.5 per 100,000. Assume that a hypothetical result of an
epidemiology study of veterans detects a rate of 10.4/100,000, a
fourfold increase in risk for this tumor. The risk then would be
scientifically established. Yet, for any particular veteran who
develops this liver cancer, a determination cannot be made as to
whether that tumor represents "normal" population background or a
consequence of Vietnam service. Policy determines the government's
response to a given disease in a veteran in this instance, utilizing
scientific data that are useful but not so definitive as to dictate
a single course of action.
Page 4 - Acting Chair, IWG
morbidity (disease incidence in the living) in at least a portion
of the study population. The inclusion of morbidity data strongly
suggests the essential need for a concurrent control group. The
proper conduct of a cohort study requires a long-term commitment
(up to 20 years). Decisions as to population size and the most
appropriate and meaningful endpoints to be studied should be
strongly influenced by early results of the Air Force Ranch Hand
Study, the CDC Birth Defects Study, and a Proportional Mortality
Study. Emerging data on civilian occupational exposure to phenoxy
herbicides and dioxins currently represent the best data for
defining the nature of long-term health effects. Experimental
toxicity data may also significantly aid in the selection of
appropriate disease parameters.
A health effect of major concern is the possibility of Vietnam
veterans having fathered children with a higher than expected
incidence of birth defects. Progress in addressing this concern
has been made on several fronts. Laboratory studies in male mice,
exposed to high levels of a Herbicide Orange formulation, did not
detect an increased incidence of dead or malformed offspring. The
Air Force Ranch Hand Study will collect data on Vietnam veterans'
fertility and the incidence of birth defects in their children.
The CDC Birth Defects Study, previously recommended by the Science
Panel, represents a sound approach to determining if Vietnam
veterans have fathered children with a higher than expected
incidence of birth defects. However, this study, which is being
implemented, can only establish if Vietnam service, not Herbicide
Orange, is associated with malformed children. A study of ground
troops should gather compatible data on offspring and other ferti-
lity parameters to augment and expand upon the CDC study.
3/ Epidemiology studies of occupational populations involve
exposures of up to 30 years duration, which is sufficient time
for expression of diseases that have a prolonged latency. Some
occupational exposures were, by comparison to Herbicide Orange
exposure, very heavy and therefore enhanced the potential for
development of adverse effects. Utility of these data is exempli-
fied by the recent Swedish studies that correlate phenoxy acid
exposures to the increased risk of developing soft tissue sarcomas.
It has subsequently been observed in a review of several U.S.
studies that the aggregate incidence of this tumor type is also
increased. Clearly, a study of Vietnam veterans should include a
focus on this type of tumor. Experimental toxicity data also
associated TCDD exposure to carcinogenic response with most potent
effects due to tumor promotion capabilities. There is a similar
correlation between experimental and occupational studies dealing
with altered lipid metabolism.
Page 5 - Acting Chair, IWG
In summary, several studies of an epidemiological nature are needed
to best address the concern as to long-term health effects in Viet-
nam veterans. However, except for the Air Force Ranch Hand Study,
a scientifically valid study to determine if Herbicide Orange is
associated with long-term health effects may not be possible. A
study which associates Vietnam service as a causal factor appears
to be feasible.
Two studies are in progress; however a variety of factors are
impeding progress when measured against original completion targets.
Further slippage will negate the opportunity to capitalize on early
results in the design of the additional studies.
Additional studies should involve ground troops. Although this type
of study has not significantly progressed, ancillary activities
critical to design and execution have moved forward, i.e., military
records searches and evaluation of occupational exposures. It is
expected that a ground troop study will be the central theme of the
VA epidemiology study. Under the best circumstances, the first data
will not emerge for an additional twenty-four months and forty-eight
months may well be a more realistic expectation.
The results may provide data that do not establish an association
between Herbicide Orange or Vietnam service and certain long-term
health effects. To this extent, such study results will help
define which health effects appear not to be of valid health
concern. Where results are equivocal or establish an association,
the policy making process is benefited by data rather than the
current state of knowledge which is based on opinions that are
often contradictory. Unfortunately and regrettably, relevant data
remain two or more years into the future. Accordingly, it is
critically important that the current and planned research proceed
as expeditiously as possible, consistent with sound scientific
principles.
DEPARTMENT
OF
DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
AMERICA
HEALTH AFFAIRS
1 April 1981
Leslie A. Platt, Esquire
Acting Chairman, Interagency Work Group
to Study the Possible Long-Term Health
Effects of Phenoxy Herbicides and Contaminents
Office of the General Counsel
Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Dear Mr. Platt:
In accordance with our conversation at the Interagency Work
Group meeting on 26 March 1981 this is to confirm that
Dr. Peter Beach, of your Department may arrange for interested
veterans group representatives to visit the Department of
Defense records management offices (Army and Marine Corps) which
have been involved in developing the battalion studies. We
will endeavor to make the records fully available subject only
to Privacy Act limitations on individual personal records. The
records management personnel are willing to discuss the metho-
dology used in the search process and provide access to the
records searched in achieving the five battalion reports previ-
ously forwarded.
We might suggest that maximum benefit to the veterans groups
would result from selection of representatives who have had a
background and experience in personnel and/or administration
while in the military service. Particularly beneficial would
be persons having Army or Marine Corps experience in tactical
unit operations and the preparation of daily operational
journals at the company or battalion level of command.
The Army records office has moved from the Forrestal Building
on 23 March 1981 to the Hoffman Building No. 1 in Alexandria
and hence they are still in the process of moving the large
complement of Vietnam operation records. We, therefore, would
not be able to accept visiting groups until after the records
are all transferred which is expected to be completed by
20 April 1981.
RF4/20/51
66C-81-37
2
We would appreciate at least a weeks notice (after 20 April)
prior to an expected visit SO that we may make the necessary
records personnel and necessary battalion records readily
available. My staff contact for such arrangements will be
Dr. Jerome G. Bricker who may be reached by calling 697-8973.
Sincerely,
William
Will S. Augerson S. Auge
Major General, MC,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Resources and Programs)
DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON DC 20301
AMERICA
HEALTH AFFAIRS
MAR 1061
Leslie A. Platt, Esquire
Acting Chairman, Interagency Work Group
to Study the Possible Long-Term Health
Effects of Phenoxy Herbicides and
Contaminants, Office of the General Counsel
Department of Health and Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Dear Mr. Platt:
Subsequent to our submission in December of the additional Army
and Marine Corps Battalion Studies, the Department of the Army
Records Management staff continued their search of new Vietnam
records sources with the discovery of additional information
pertaining to base camp perimeter defoliation operations with
subsequent burning and defoliation of areas which had previously
been cleared by Rome Plows. The types of defoliants employed
are, however, usually omitted. Apparently the same vehicular
spray and tankage was used to spray either defoliants or just
diesel fuel in large quantities prior to most burning operations.
(Enclosures 2 and 3)
The first capability to use high performance aircraft (Phantom
F-4's) is documented in Enclosure 4. This limited capability
did not come about until the early part of 1969, and we under-
stand it was not an effective method of spraying defoliants.
Further documentation is not yet available.
The U.S. Army Advisory Group Herbicide Evaluation Report
(Enclosure 5) describes in considerable detail the effectiveness
of various herbicide spray missions in improving tactical
situations and reducing our casualties due to ambushes and
operational attacks from thick jungle areas controlled by the
Vietcong.
Enclosure 6 concerning the AGAVECO helicopter defoliation
apparatus points out the limited helicopter spray capability
available as late as 1969 and the problems incident to its
operational use.
The final enclosure pertaining to Project Pink Rose also
relates to an operation in which herbicides and desicants were
2
applied to a free strike target area (Vietcong controlled
stronghold) prior to B-52 incendiary bomblet raids. The hope
was to clear dense jungle enemy strongholds through the
generation of a fire storm. It unfortunately proved to be a
rather ineffective technique and was abandoned.
The attached report in duplicate with aforementioned enclosures
is submitted for review and consideration by the Interagency
Work Group.
Sincerely,
William S. Augerson
Major General, MC, USA
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Health Resources and Programs)
Enclosures
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310
MAR 2
1981
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
DAAG-AMR-S
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Amendment to Battalion Studies of Vietnam Units Which may
have been Exposed to Agent Orange
1. Reference:
a. Memorandum from OASD (HA) dated 23 October 1980, subject: Request for
additional information concerning units believed to have been heavily exposed to
Herbicide Orange.
b. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs dated 22
December 1980, subject: Army Units and their Possible Exposure to Agent Orange.
2. New studies of Vietnam joint services records, revealed that there was
burning of defoliated vegetation areas. The 266th Chemical Platoon (DS) provided
a limited ground base herbicide spray capability for the 1st Infantry Division.
This support consisted of burning vegetation in Rome plowed areas, base camp
perimeters and along main traffic routes. In addition, some perimeters were first
defoliated and then burned (Incl 1). The 184th Chemical Platoon burned brush and
grass vegetation within the perimeter of Phuoc Vinh (same location as ref b).
Ground based defoliation was performed by track vehicles, mounted with 600 gallon
POL pods and a 50 POL pump, and 3/4 ton trucks mounted with a 40 GPH sprayer
(Incl 2). Defoliation of plants along waterways was achieved by LCM-8's and 17
foot half-pontoon boats (Incl 3). There is also reference to the utilization of
F-4 aircraft in defoliation missions (Incl 4). F-4 aircraft carried 278 gallons
of herbicide agents in each of two tanks.
3. In addition, we located a US Army advisory Group, Herbicide Evaluation Report,
dated 3 September 1968, which provides an overview of both C-123 and helicopter
herbicide operations specifically encompassing aerial defoliation.
4. Attached at Incl 6 is a MACV Chemical Operations Division Memorandum for
Record, concerning helicopter defoliation apparatus. The record concerns AGAVENCO
helicopter defoliation apparatus used to spray herbicide targets were allocated
within MACV on the basis of two per corps advisory group headquarters, indicating
that MACV conducted herbicide spraying as well as Army units.
5. A project known as Pink Rose was undertaken to determine whether it would be
possible to clear large areas by first using Agent Orange and then igniting the
areas with incendiary bomblets. Even though the project was unsuccessful it
might account for some of the observations of burning of vegetation (Incl 7).
MAR 9 1981
DAAG-AMR-S
SUBJECT: Amendment to Battalion Studies of Vietnam Units Which may
have been Exposed to Agent Orange
6. The information in this memorandum substantiates some of the issues raised
at the open hearing concerning the burning of vegetation treated with Agent
Orange on 22 September 1980.
FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:
7 Incl
for
JOHN Guy
as
LTC, GS
Director of Admin Mgt
MAR 9
1985
DAAG-AMR-S
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HEALTH AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Amendment to Battalion Studies of Vietnam Units Which may
have been Exposed to Agent Orange
1. Reference:
a. Memorandum from OASD (HA) dated 23 October 1980, subject: Request for
additional information concerning units believed to have been heavily exposed to
Herbicide Orange.
b. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs dated 22
December 1980, subject: Army Units and their Possible Exposure to Agent Orange.
2. New studies of Vietnam joint services records, revealed that there was
burning of defoliated vegetation areas. The 266th Chemical Platoon (DS) provided
a limited ground base herbicide spray capability for the 1st Infantry Division.
This support consisted of burning vegetation in Rome plowed areas, base camp
perimaters and along main traffic routes. In addition, some perimeters were first
defoliated and then burned (Incl 1). The 184th Chemical Platoon burned brush and
grass vegetation within the perimater of Phuoc Vinh (same location as ref b).
Ground based defoliation was performed by track vehicles, mounted with 600 gallon
POL pods and a 50 POL pump, and 3/4 ton trucks mounted with a 40 GPH sprayer
(Incl 2). Defoliation of plants along waterways was achieved by LCM-8's and 17
foot half-pontoon boats (Incl 3). There is also reference to the utilization of
F-4 aircraft in defoliation missions (Incl 4). F-4 aircraft carried 278 gallons
of herbicide agents in each of two tanks.
3. In addition, we located a US Army advisory Group, Herbicida Evaluation Report,
dated 3 September 1968, which provides an overview of both C-123 and helicopter
herbicide operations specifically encompassing aerial defoliation.
4. Attached at Incl 6 is a MACV Chemical Operations Division Memorandum for
Record, concerning helicopter defoliation apparatus. The record concerns AGAVENCO
helicopter defoliation apparatus used to spray herbicide targets were allocated
within MACV on the basis of two per corps advisory group headquarters, indicating
that MACV conducted herbicide spraying as well as Army units.
5. A project known as Pink Rose was undartaken to determine whether it would be
possible to clear large areas by first using Agent Orange and then igniting the
areas with incendiary bomblets. Even though the project was unsuccessful it
might account for some of the observations of burning of vegetation (Incl 7).
MAR 9 1981
DAAG-AMR-S
SUBJECT: Amendment to Battalion Studies of Vietnam Units Which may
have been Exposed to Agent Orange
6. The information in this memorandum substantiates some of the issues raised
at the open hearing concerning the burning of vegetation treated with Agent
Orange on 22 September 1980.
FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:
7 Incl
JOHN L. RAFFERTY
as
LTC, GS
Director of Admin Mgt
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2211
HEADOUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Chemical Officer
APO 96345
VA
AVDB-CM
Been August 1969
1
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for
Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U)
Clerk
1. (c) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
a. General:
(1) During the period 1 May 1959 through 31 July 1969, the 1st Infantry
Division Chemical Section continued to perform personnel detection, defoliation,
burning of vegetation and employment of CS in support of combat operations.
(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CBRC) assigned to augment the Chemical
Section, continued to process defoliation requests, monitor the status of
defoliation projects in the division TAOI and provide personnel for other
chemical operations. During the period 1 May 1969 to 23 June 1969, 1LT Jon G
Fisher was the detachment commander. CPT Gary L Stair commanded the detachment
from 24 June 1969 to 31 July 1969.
3D90-902
(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon provided chemical support to the 1st Infantry
Division. This support consisted of burning vegetation along stream lines where
Rome Plow operations were not possible; dropping of persistent CS, employment of
1 fougasses; defoliation and burning of base camo perimeters, and operating the
airborne personnel detector on "Bloodhound" missions. During the period i Mey
1969 to 31 July 1969 the platoon was commanded by CPT William R Dias.
b, Operations:
(1) Personnel Detection Missions (Bloodhound): Missions continued to be
flown for the Division G-2 on a daily basis in a large area surveillance role.
A total of 235 missions were flown in this role during the reporting period.
In addition, on 16 July 1969, a three man crew and detector was placed with the
Air Cavalry Troop to be used in conjunction with their hunter-killer search
teams. Results of this type operation are inconclusive at this time but are
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
BY ORDER
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
THE SEC 30521/3 ARMY BY TAG
DOD DIR 5200.10
AVDB-CM
1 August 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U)
expected to contribute significantly as the Air Cavalry Troop develops and
improves their techniques of employment. Considerable difficulty was experienced
with the take-up reel on the recorder of the XI4-3 Airborne Personnel Detector.
An equipment improvement report has been submitted to modify the design of the
take-up reel.
(2) Riot Control Agent CS:
(a) Nonpersistent CS: A total of 45 E-158 CS clusters were dropped on
3 missions. The employment of these munitions was on post B-52 strikes after
"last bomb" end on exploitation of the Bloodhound detector sensings. Although
a light-fire team and hunter-killer team were over the CS targets there were no
known cases of the enemy being affected by the CS. During the month of July,
the "Mity Mite" was used on several occasions upon discovery of extensive tunnel
and bunker complexes. Using the M7 series CS grenades with the "Mity Mite" was
successful in driving unprotected personnel out from cover and in one instance
asphyxiating several of the enemy with protective masks.
(b) Persistent CS: A total of 260 drums or 20,800 pounds of CS were
dropped during the report period. The bulk CS was used in conjunction with the
road opening and large convoy operations from SONG BE to PHUOC VINH. The CS
was dropped into suspected ambush routes two days prior to the convoy movements.
Defoliation: Only limited C-123 aerial defoliation missions were
flown in the division's TAOI due to the size of the AO and the division's
extensive pacification program. During this period only 244 sorties were flown.
The only defoliation operations conducted by the division consisted of LAI KHE,
DI AN and DAU TIENG Base Camp perimeters. These operations were conducted
using a tracked vehicle mounted with a 600 gallon POL pod and 50 GPM POL pump.
The same field expedient rig was used to dispense diesel fuel for burning
onerations where defoliation was not permitted. Approximately 120,000 gallons of
diesel fuel were sprayed using this method.
(4) Personnel haricing and Identification System (PMIS): During the period
1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the 266th Chemical Platoon assisted Major John P
Sanders, WPN D.V & ENG LAB, GML, EDG ARS, in the employment and evaluation of
the PMIS with the 1st Infantry Division. The item consists of a helicopter
mounted Agavenco sprayer, which sprays a suspension of zinc sulfide in mineral
oil. An ultraviolet light source was available for detection of the zinc sulfide,
Areas to be spruyed were VC/NVA infiltration routes and/or staging areas used by
the enemy to move into villages and hamlets on food resupply and forced lahor
missions. These areas were remote from the villages so as not to mark innocent
civilians. M desired characteristic of the area to be sprayed was low vegetation,
such as grasses and low shrubs, so as to allow the zinc sulfide to settle to 3
level that would insure contact with personnel traveling through the area. Spray
DECLASSIFIED BY ORDER
2
OF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
PER 03058115
AVDE-CH
1 August 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U)
operations were planned a few days in advance of seal and search operations
conducted against target villages. During the conduct of the village seal,
personnel to be examined were walked into a darkened building, blindfolded and
examined individually for the lime colored luminous spots of the zinc sulfide
visible under the ultraviolet light. All operations were successful in identi-
fying marked personnel. In each operation the personnel were turned over to the
National Police and/or ARVN investigation channels. During the period 4 PMIS
spray missions were flown and 66 persons were identified as having been in
uneuthorized areas. It was noted the zinc sulfide remains in an area for several
weeks. Clothes laundered after contact with spriyed areas remained marked
sufficiently to be detected by the ultraviolet light source,
2. (c) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.
Personnel Marking and Identification System (PMIS).
a. Observation: The Personnel Marking and Identification System been
used during its test and evaluation period with the 1st Infantry Division with
notable success in identifying VC suspects.
o. Evaluation : This system is effictive in marking personnel when there is
a degree of isolation between enemy base camp areas and areas traversed by the
general populace. A wide variety of employment means would be availableto the
intelligence gathering system if this system were presently in Vietnam for use.
The characteristic of this suspension remaining in the area for several weeks
makes it feasible only if a system is made available for identifying witen and
from which area the person has been marked. This limitation is most likely to be
present if regular use is mide of the system in the area. If intensive interro-
gation of marked personnel wie promptly evaluated, a large quantity of data could
be mude available for intelligence channels.
C, Recommendations: That a system of dye be added to the present
suspension to provide a capability for continued use of this system in = ...
HubitJeo HERBERT JEO
LTC, CM
Division Chemical Officer
DECLASSIFIED BY ORDER
3
OF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
PER ( 531/5
Ch. Cal Spac Giv
DEPARTMENT OF THE ANY
HEADQUANTERS 1ST INFALTRY DIVISION
rH
Office of the Chemical Officer
APO 96345
VA
AVDE_CM
May 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U).
Cml Cits SE:
Clerk
1. (c) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities
Clerk
a. General:
(1) During the period 1 February 1969 through 30 April 1969, the 1st Infentry
Division Chemical Section continued to perform personnel detection, defoliation,
burning of vegetation and employment of CS. Riot Control Agent munitions in support
of combat operations.
(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (CBPC) assigned to augment the Chemical
Section, continued to process defoliation requests, monitor the status of defol-
iation projects in the Division Tactical Area of Interest, and provided personvel
for other Chemical Operations. The detachment was commanded by 1LT Jon G Fisher.
(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon (DS) provided chemical support to the 1st
Infantry Division. This support consisted of burning vegetation in Rome Flowed
reas, base camp perimeters and clong main traffic routes. The platoon also
conducted bulk persistent CS drum drops in two major operations, Bowie Winner and
Red Lightning. The platoon provided a limited ground base herbicide spray cap-
ability for the division. During the period 1 February 1969 to 10 March 1969 the
platoon was commanded by 1LT Michael L Clements and from 10 March 1969 to 30 April
1969 by Captain William R Dias.
b. Operations:
(1) Personnel Detector Missions (Eloodhound): Bloodhound missions were flown
daily basis for the Division G2. A total of 267 missions were flown during
reporting period. The large are. surveillance technique was employed using the
--3 Airborne Personnel Detector, one UH1_D slick and AGR1 Gunship. "Поtзроts"
were reported to the G2 Air in flight for appropriate action is determined by the
Ga2 AII Section. Difficulty continued to be experienced in determining which
sensings were produced by the numerous fires burning throughout the TAOI as opposed
to sensings created by enemy activity. Because the dry senson extends through the
report period this problem is especially significant. The value of sensings in
this type of an environment is dependent upon the skill and ability of operating
personnel to isolate valid sensings through visual observation. On 10 April 1969
the Division received a new and improved version of the Xi.3 Airborne Personnel
Detector. Although the detection sensitivity of the new machine was greatly
improved, no significant changes were made that would require 1 change in the
operating concept or training required by operating personnel. Technical
DOMNCRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
DECLASSIFIED BY ORDER
OF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
AVD3-CM
2 May 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational deport 1st Infantry Division fcr Period
Ending 30 April 1969
representatives of the Limited Warfare Labratory and Edgewood Arsenal visited the
division on 23 and 24 April 1969 to introduce the new modified detector.
(2) Riot Gontrol Agent, CS:
(a) Nonpersistent, CS: A total of 99 E-158 clusters were dropped on 18 seperate
missions. The primary effect desired, in the use of nonporsistent CS, was to flush
the enemy out from under cover into the open. There were no known incidents in the
division TAUI where the use of nonporsistent CS actually caused the enemy to expose
himself.
(b) Persistent, CS: A total of 730 drums or 58,400 pounds of CS wure dropped
during the report period. Bulk CS was employed in a persistent form to deny the
enemy use of base camps and suspected storage sites. In addition bulk CS was
dropped during two major tactical operations to assist in the canalizing and
blocking operations. Both of those operations involved the exclusive use of Air
Delivered Ammunitions. Bavic Winner was a II Field Force operation conducted in
war zone "D" by the 1st Air Calvary Division and the 1st Infantry Division. During
this operation the 1st Infantry Division dropped 270 drums of CS along critical
trails or avenues of approach to block the cnemy from the target arca. A similar
oporation Red Lightning, was conducted in the vicinity of the Trapezcid. This
involved the usc of 180 drums of CS. The CS tended to canalize the encmy into the
target arca, disoriented him and made him more susceptable to the effects of Air
Force delivered CBU munitions which werc also used in this operation.
(c) 40-MM CS Cartridges: Approximatoly 4000, 40-MM CS Cartridge were received
by the 1st Infantry Division. The 40-MM Cartridge are used primarily in 2 recom-
naissance by firo role. They are particullarly usuful in the southern portion of
the division TACI because of the population density.
(3) Defeliation: Chly limited G-123 delivered defoliatior has been
accomplished in the division TACI because of the size of the AO and the
division's extensive pacification program. Luring this period approximately 90
sorties have been flown. The Chemical Section received a helicopter mounted
AGAVENCO spray rig B 15 March 1969. The spray apparatus was used on a small
project involving the use of six drums of defoliant. It has since been hand
receipted to II Field Force Wietnam. Depending upon the availibility of aircraft,
it is anticipated that it will be uscd to defoliate approved projects in Rome
Plowed areas. The AGAVENCO spray apparatus was originally designed for spraying
insCcticides. However, t':ere were по insecticide spray nozzlës furnished with the
couipment to give it a dual capability. The ground base spray of herbicides has
been limited to the LAI KHE BASU Camp perimeter. This was accomplished with the
usu of a 55 gallon per rinute PCL pump and a 600 gallon steel tank mounted on 3.
carrier. There are no sati sfactory ground base spray means available to the
division. The expedient spray rig described above is unsatisfactory cecause there
is no Leans of controlling the application Date OI defoliants. an excessive amount
of defoliant is dispensed by this system. There was little to no hand spraying CI
2
20 BY ORDER
or THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
AVD6-CM
2 May 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Livision for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U).
hurbicides. A small portable power driven spray apparatus would be useful for
this purpose. Herbicides could then be usud on a controlled basis in built up
areas.
(4) Lurning of Vegetation: This reporting period covers the dry scason.
Consecuently, considerable effort was made by the Chemical Section to burn off
areas to improve security in support of tactical operations. The primary means
of burning involved the use of a 600 gallon fuel tank mounted in a carrier with
a 55 gallon per minute POL pump. Diescl fuel is sprayed on foliage and ignited.
Approximately 115,000 gallons of diesel fuel was sprayed on vegetation by this
cuthod. Considerable difficulty is encountered in accuiring the necessary Scuipment
to support an operation of this type.
2. (c) Section 12, Lessons Learned: Cbsurvations, Evaluation and ducommendations.
a. Airborne Personnel Detector.
(1) Observation: The Airborne Personnel Detector is boing used extensively
as an intelligence collecting medium and can become more useful as refinements are
developed to improve its reliability.
(2) Evaluation: The original concept of personnel detection was based on the
machines ability to detuct human beings because of some product emitted sololy by
man (ammonia). Although there has been much doubt in the commanders mind concurn-
ing the reliability of the instrument, he was willing to accept it on the basis of
its theoretical operating concept. A considerable effort has been made by the
laboratory to disprove the basic theory of operation. Subsequently, a new model
has been developed which is anly more sensitive to the normal conditions that exist
in a battlofield environment.
(3) Recommendation: Research should be contained in the development of a
true human detector. The original theorectical concept should be explored to
determine scm other things that are solely peculier to man end which can bc
detocted by a machine.
b. Defoliants:
(1) Observation: In the Victnam environment a considerable effort is made
to rid specific areas of vugetation. This is particularly true in any arca
involving security such as traffic routes and defense perimeters.
(2) Evaluation: Defoliants have been used around base camps to kill vegutatic
The standard defoliants available in-country do not fulfill the commanders recuire-
mnts. Approved projects have been obtained to dufoliate base camp perimotors.
Perimaters are sprayed with a defoliant and burned off. within 30 to 60 days
almost complete regrowth occurs. In accition to the standard defoliants insbility
to produce semi-permanent kill'to foliage there is the inherent danger of run off
3
ORDER
GEO ARMY BY TAG
AVDC-CM
2 May 1969
SUBJECT: Foder Report to Cocrational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969.
or suepage into the local waterways which can cause damage to crops during the
rainy scason which is also the growing scason.
(3) Recommendation: h contact kill chemical spray should bc developed. The
spray must not possess any residual effects nor present hazards to vegotation other
than that to which it is directly applied..
Higher HERBERT JEO
ITC, CM
Division Chemical Officer
DECLASSIFIED BY ORDER
OF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
PER c 030551/5
4
1 TOENTIAL /
CONFIDENTIAL
Cal
Cono
DAY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
25
HEADQUARTERS, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
SP
APO 96383
8C
AVDG-CM
Das
B
IV
SUBJECT: 101ST -IRBORNE DIVISION CHEMICAL ACTIVITIES SUMMARY - CY 1968
Cal Opns SEE
Clork bile
TO: See Distribution
Clerk
1. (U) INTEGDUCTION: The purpose of this report is to present a summary
of chemical operations conducted by the Division Chemical Section and at-
tached units in support of 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) operations
during calendar year 1968. This annual report also represents the com-
pletion of one year for the Division Chemical Section in Vietnam since
its arrival on 26 Dec 67.
2. (U) MISSION AND CAPABILITIES:
20605 2
3. The mission of the 101st Airborne Division Chemical Section is as
follows:
(1) Advise Commanding General and Staff on CBR training, equip-
ment, employment and defense.
(2) Exercise technical supervision over CBR activities throughout
the Division, to include planning and coordinating the use of CBR munitions
and employment of chemical troops.
(3) Provide advice and recommendations pertaining to the use of
smoke, flame, riot control agents, and herbicides in support of tactical
operations.
(4) Prepare CER portion of the training program and exercise
staff supervision over CBR training throughout the command.
(5) Exercise operational control over chemical units assigned
to the division.
(6) Employ and maintain personnel detection equipment (APD/MPD)
used in the intelligence collection effort; advise the G2 on the proper
use of this equipment and conduct the actual missions under the guidance
of the G2.
DECLASSIFIED BY ORDER
OF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
PER 36 581/5
JUNNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS!
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DD 5200.10
AVDC-CM
SUBJECT: 101st Airborne Division Chemical Activities Summary - CY 1968
b. AS of the close of this report, the Division Chemical Section
can provide support in the following areas:
(1) Flame Field Expedients: Mix, distribute and emplace flame
mines and flame fougasse, to include arming, wiring and inspection of
these emplacements; develop new types of flame field expedients as re-
quired.
(2) Defoliation: Operate and maintain a locally fabricated 110
gallon helicopter spray apparatus for aerial defoliation of small areas
such as fire bases, perimeters and rocket belt locations; operate and
X
maintain a 3/4 ton truck mounted 40 GPH sprayer for ground based defoliation
of small areas accessible by road; monitor the Air Force "Traildust"
defoliation missions flown by "Ranchhand" elements of the 7th Air Force
in Da Nang.
(3) PDDA Operations: when available, provide the Power Driven
Decontaminating apparatus (PDDA) to units for showers during stand-downs
in the field; fill fixed shower locations as designated by the GL; employ
the PDDA as a backup fire fighting apparatus in case of emergency.
(4) Insecticide Operations: Provide an operator and the 110
gallen spray apparatus for aerial insecticide missions to fire bases
inaccessible by road, as requested by the Division Surgeon; conduct
ground based insecticide spray missions using the vehicular mounted 40
GPH spray apparatus at fire bases as requested by the Division Surgeon.
(5) Persistent CS, Rict Control Agent Operations: Support all
units in the Division by fuzing, loading and dropping 55 gallon drums
filled with RCA CS-1, from CH-47 helicopters, to restrict enemy access
to base areas, lines of communications and similar targets; provide bunker
steding teams with equipment to contaminate bunker complexes with persistent
C3-1. Operate the M-5 Helicopter/Vahicular Mounted RCA disperser for
employing persistent CS-1 on targets suitable for this type of delivery
system.
(6) Non-persistent (tactical) CS Riot Control Agent Cperations:
Provide operator personnel, OIC and equipment for employment of E-158
Tactical CS Canister Clusters in close air support of combat operations;
operate and maintain locally fabricated grenade racks for the employment
of M7n3 or XM54 CS grenades in close air support of combat operations;
provide technical assistance and advice on the employment of the E-8 16-
Tube Tactical CS launcher and pyrotechnic CS grenades.
(7) Combat Flame Operations: Conduct flame drops using twenty
55 gallon drums of 1% and 48 thickened fuel, slung under a CH-47 helicopter,
in close air support of ground combat operations, to clear booby trapped
areas, and to prepare closed fire bases for reoccupation.
2
AVDB-CM
1 August 1969
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report 1st Infantry Division for Period
Ending 30 April 1969 (U)
expected to contribute significantly as the Air Cavalry Troop develops and
improves their techniques of employment. Considerable difficulty was experienced
with the take-up reel on the recorder of the XM-3 Airborne Personnel Detector.
An equipment improvement report has been submitted to modify the design of the
take-up reel.
(2) Riot Control Agent CS:
(a) Nonpersistent CS: A total of 45 E-158 CS clusters were dropped on
3 missions. The employment of these munitions was on post B-52 strikes after
"last bomb" and on exploitation of the Bloodhound detector sensings. Although
a light-fire team and hunter-killer team were over the CS targets there were no
known cases of the enemy being affected by the CS. During the month of July,
the Tity Mite" was used on several occasions upon discovery of extensive tunnel
and bunker complexes. Using the M7 series 3 grenades with the "Mity Mite" was
successful in driving unprotected personnel out from cover and in one instance
asphyxiating several of the enemy with protective masks.
(b) Persistent CS: A total of 260 drums or 20,800 pounds of CS were
dropped during the report period. The bulk CS was used in conjunction with the
road opening and large convoy operations from SONG BE to PHUOC VINH. The CS
was dropped into suspected ambush routes two days prior to the convoy movements.
(3) Defoliation: Only limited C-123 aerial defoliation missions were
flown in the division's TAOI due to the size of the AO and the division's
extensive pacification program. During this period only 244 sorties were flown.
The only defoliation operations conducted by the division consisted of LAI KHE,
X
DI AN and DAU TIENG Base Camp perimeters. These operations were conducted
using a tracked vehicle mounted with a 600 gallon POL pod and 50 GPM POL pump..
The same field expedient rig was used to dispense diesel fuel for turning
operations where defoliation was not permitted. Approximately 120,000 gallons of
diesel fuel were spreyed using this method.
(4) Personnel Marking and Identification System (PMIS): During the period
1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969 the 266th Chemical Platoon assisted Major John P
Sanders, WPN DEV & ENG LAB, GML, EDG ARS, in the employment and evaluation of
the PMIS with the 1st Infantry Division. The item consists of a helicopter
mounted Agavenco sprayer, which sprays a suspension of zinc sulfide in mineral
oil. An ultraviolet light source was available for detection of the zinc sulfide.
Areas to be spruyed were VC/NVA infiltration routes and/or staging areas used by
the enemy to move into villages and hamlets on food resupply and forced lahor
missions. These areas were remote from the villages so as not to mark innocent
civilians. n desired characteristic of the area to be sprayed was low vegetation,
such as grasses and low shrubs, so as to allow the 7inc sulfide to settle to a
level that would insure contact with personnel traveling through the area. Spray
2
THE
SEC
FER
TAG
Ch. C-1 Opns Div
114
Cml Cpno off. I
RP
Cal 0000 Ct:, II
107 INFANTRY DIVISION
Office C: the Chemical Officer
Cal Optio ors. III
190 96345
Call Cons 322. IV
AVDB-CH
Februaryoj
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operational Report, 1st Infantive DivisCol Cuns C-*
for Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)
Clerk
bills
Clerk
1. (c) Section 1, Oberations: Significant Activities.
a. General:
(1) During the reporting period, the 1st Infantry Division Chemical
Section continued to perform personnel detection and defoliation missions and
employ Riot Control Agent 05. LTC Herbert P Chm served as Division Chemical
Officer until 23 January 1969 when LTC Herbert Jeo assumed the position.
(2) The 242d Chemical Detachment (TRC) assigned to augment the Chemical
Section, continued to process defoliation requests, menitor the status of
defoliation projects in the Division Tactical Area of Interest, and provide
personnel for chemical operations. The detachment was commanded by 1LT Jon
= Fisher.
206-05
(3) The 266th Chemical Platoon (DS) provided support for chemical
operations. Sarticular emphasis was placed on #round and river. defoliation and
burning. The platocn was commanded by 1LI Michael = Clerents.
b. Operations:
(1) Personnel Detector Missions: During the cericd 200 "Bloodhound"
missions were flown by the Division Chemical Section. = the majority of these
issions the II:-3 Airborne Personnel Detector was used. However, that instru-
ent continued to pose problems with the valve, valve seat and at the end of
the period with the electronic circuitry. The installation of a nulon valve
-eat cover has helped considerably. The "Eloodhound" missions continue in the
cin, to be large area surveillance missions. The elimination of the ammonia
converter per USARV instructions makes the instrument strictly a condensation
nuclei detector. Fewer sensings have been obtained since the removal of the
converter prohably indicating the elimination of self-zenerated internal noises
Hich gave false sensings. Further, during the dry season it again becomes
parent that careful in-flight observation and detailed post mission enalysis.
1st be accomplished to exclude sensings produced by forest and grass fires
at as a result of enemy activity.
GY ORDER
DOVIGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAIS
ARMY BY TAG
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DCD DIR 5200.10
FER C 3: 581/5
Taics #3
AVIC-CH
2 Febr any 1959
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Cperational Report, 1st Infantry Division
for Period Inding 31 January 1969
(2) Riot Control Agent CS: (a) Non-persistent CS: Ver" few targets
were acquired which were suitable for engagement with non-persistent CS. !
total of 99 E158 clusters were employed in the "reconnaissence by CS" techricue
working with an air cavalry troop.
(b) A division bounds. y line change eliminated that portion of the
Division TADI most suited for the employment of persistent CS. However, on
19 January 1969, a 30 drum CS drop was made to test the -1-925 fuze and hurster
system. The drop was conducted at 3200 fect and resulted in 4 drums that
failed to detonate. Cause of the failures is not known. Use of the III-925
system will not be considered for tactical employment without future testing.
In the remaining area, povulation centers and troop locations mitigate against
its use because of downwind effects hazard. This brohlem in one case gave rise
to the development of a different employment technique. In early December, an
infantry battalion commander requested a as interdiction line in the southwest
ortion of the TACI. Initially it appeared that 3-4 CH-47 Helicopter sorties
would be required. However, the target was only 6 kilometers from Saigon, less
that 3 kilometers from a major highway and only 500-700 reters from a village
involved in the pacification program. Considering the airborne downwind travel
which occurs on CE-47 drops, such a delivery method could not be recommended.
As a last resort, the installation of the CS interdiction 'ine by demolition
tcchniques on the ground was considered and accepted as ti:e only means
available. II FFV cleared the operation using these techniques. Using 10
personnel from the Division Cherical Section and the 266th Chemical Flatoon
transported to the site by 17 foot half-pontons operated by 1st Ingineer
Battalion personnel, 400 eight pound bags of IS were employed and Flown on a
line 1800 meters long by 60 meters wide during the period 15-17 December 1968.
Feedback from the tactical cormander indicated that the enemy was forced around
the interdiction line into our ambushes. Based on the apparent initial success,
en extension 2800 meters long by 100 meters wide using 830 bags of 23 was
emplaced and blown during the period 27-30 December 1968. A sketch of the
interdiction line indicating details of employment is at inclosure :.
(3) Defoliation: (a) The Catcher's "itt area northeast of T'M UYTN
continued to receive C-123 large area defoliation missions until the end of
December 1968 when priority was requested and received for the Iron Triangle
area west of LAI KHC. During the reporting period 429 sorties were flown in
our TACI.
(b) Defoliation of nipa palms along the waterways southeast of CHU DUC
in CIA DINH province continued with a total of 74 Vilometers of river bank
X treated. Along the larger waterways more efficient production was achieved by
lacing the equipment aboard an LCN-8 which could easily carry considerably
ore defoliant then the 17 foot half-ponton boat. Doth agent
and
agent
turned the palm fronds brown. However, the fronds did not fall off.
2
DECLARATIED BY OFFICE
OF THE SEC ARMY
FER 531/55
3 February 1969
SUNJUCT:
Feeder leport to Operational Deport, 1st Infant:- Divi :on
for Period Inding 31 January 1969
Vertical observation was L' prover slightly and horizontal discruption 145
improved 50% It became obvious that the nip palms would have to be burned.
Iven though the fronds were brown and apparently dry, little success was achiem
in burning them even when portable flamethrowers were used. :.s a result of
experience on base camp perimeters, attempts were made to ignite the defoliated
regetation after spraying with diazel fuel. These attempts were unsuccessful.
Spraying with JF-4 and ther. igniting proved successful but only where the fuel
X
was deposited. To reduce the saf CV hazards caused by the volatility and low
flash point of JF-4 a fifty percent JP-4 - fifty percent diesel fuel myture
was used. Again the means of transport was the 17 foot half-pontons. The fuel
mixture was sprayed on the vegetation using 55 gallon per minute FCL TIMP. The
spray boat then moved out of the mediate area and the sprayed area was ignited
with trip flares.. The nif: pal: fronds burned leaving on '7 the stalk. This
was 6 Laborious process rec Iring heavy application of fuel and Posulting in
" ly 200-300 meters of bank burned in a davof operations. Because of the
tactical importance of clearing the nipa palms, this operation continued in
priority areas selected hr the tactical unit commander until 6. January 1969 when
in accident occured in which three personnel of the 266th Therrical Platoon were
severely turned. There is a need for burning ecuipment which will provide
Teater safety for the operators.
(c) Ground based defoliation continued over 1043 acres of Pome Plowed
jungle. Cne of the ~round based defoliation missions was particularly interest-
ing in that it was a joint operation with the 266th Chemi cal Flatoon and the
5th NAVE! Livision Chemical Team. As Home Flow operations continued, it herame
necessary to defoliste in these areas on a priority basis. The area was cleared
37 burning the defoliated vegetation. There are often dr.ws or millies which
cannot be Rome flowed and these remain as booby trap havens in the middle of a
cleared area. It is these draws and gullies which are now the crime targets for
defoliation and burning. In fact the direct aprlication of diesel fuel to the
esetation and igniting it has been successful without prior defoliation. This
= cuires a heavy logistic effort and can only be used aclectively on high
priority targets.
(c) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Inservations. Evaluations and
Recommendations.
a. Employment of Persistent CS:
(1) Observation: Persist nt = can be employed when the constraints
gertaining to friendly troops, highways and population centers exist.
(2) Ivaluation: It was found that when constraints ber the air crop
: persistent CS, it can be emplaced by devolitions technicues in the actual
3
DECLASSIFIED SY ORDER
AVD
-CI.
3 icáa
SUBJECT: Feeder Report to Operat cnal Report, 1st Infant: Division
for Feriod Ending 31 J: !uar" 1969
target area. This employment re lires the ability to enter the t-rget by some
means of transportation, security and considerable Labor. It does, however,
reduce sirborno effects and can be used in interdictory or denial operations in
relatively large targets.
(3) Recommendati n: : at ti employment of persiste: CS by demolition
technicues (Inclosure 1) in the a cual t-rget area be consudered as the employ-
ment technique of choice when con traints bar the use of air drop techniques.
b. Vegetation Turning:
(1) Observation: There is = requirement in RVN for equipment to burn Large
areas of jungle vegetation
(2) Evaluation: It has beer noted that defoliated tarrets -ist be followed
by burning except where the target consists of large leafy trees. Erush, crass,
bomboo and similar growths merely turn brown. Flamethrowers do not provide
sufficient area coverage. Field expedient techniques such as purming and
igniting diesel fuel on the target foliage are successful but are laborious and
time consuming. Additionally there are occasions where gr.ss and undergrowth
are required to be removed without dest: oving rubbe trees or other money crops.
It appears that small, rough terrain grass and brush cutters are required for
the latter areas and high production brush burners where constraints do not
exist.
(3) Recommendations: (a) That a rough terrain grass and brush cutter be
investigated.
(b) That a high production brush burner system be investigated.
Incl
HERBERT JFO
3
LTC, C:
Division Chemical Officer
4
DECLARATIED
CY
ORDER
CF THE SEC ARMY BY TAG
PER 3. 52115
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASS STANCE COMMAND. VIETNAM
APO SANIFRANCISCO 96222
Chemical Operations Division
MACT3-09
19 April 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: High Speed Defoliation (U)
Office of
1. (c) On 25 Mar LTC Holder, Director of Air Operations, HQ 7th Air Force,
briefed the Chemical Operations Division on the Air Force's capability to
spray herbicides from high performance aircraft.
2. (s) The system uses F4 aircraft. Standard 370 gallon F4 wing tanks are
modified at a cost of $406.00 each. No modification of the aircraft is
required meaning the aircraft can switch from herbicide to conventional use
by merely dropping the modified tanks. When in the herbicide role the center
portion of the tank is not used so capacity is 278 gallons of agent in each
of two tanks. Planes fly at 500 knots and 200' above the vegetation. Herbi-
cide is expended in one minute and ten seconds covering an area of ten miles
by sixty to 100 feet wide. Rate of application is approximately 4.3 gallons
per acre. Missions are controlled by a FAC in another F4.
3. (s) The Air Force prefers to run three ship missions which results in an
201-481(1)
average swath width of 240 feet. Aircraft range is 150-175 miles. There are
currently eight tanks modified with work progressing to bring that number to
20. 7th Air Force has authority to modify up to 100 tanks. F4's are currently
available at DaNang and Cam Ranh Bay with employment at Phu Cat expected in mid
April.
'to (c) LTC Holder was apprised of the control over herbicide operations main-
tained by J3-09 and requested to work within 7th Air Force to assure adequate
reporting to ES MACV or herbicide operations conducted by the high performance
system.
7.
Bymed
GRAHAM F. BYRNES
Major, USA
by furn:
Cml Opns Officer
Cndr 12SCS
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HEAD WARTERS
US ARIY ADVISORY GROUP, IV CTZ
ADVISORY TEAM 96, APO 96215
201-30(1) Not hos Actual 65
03
MACV-IVC-3
SEP .983 CO 3-69
SUBJECT: Herbicide Evaluation (U)
COMUSMACV
ATTN: COC-7
APO 96222
1. (c) Reference: COMUSMACV msg 23818, DTG 150805Z AUG 68 (s).
2. (6) Referenced message requests a one-time evaluation of the effect of
defoliation on allied combat operations to include specific examples as
appropriate.
3. (c) This report will encompass aerial defoliation conducted within IV
Corps and covers the period 1965 through 20 August 1968. Both helicopter and
C-123 defoliation operations are discussed.
4. (c) In early 1961, the Republic of Vietnam Combat Development Test Center
11c-002294-68
(1)05-105
was established. This was supported by a United States Research and
Development Field Unit of the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Advance
Research Projects Agency (OSD/ARPA). Among the projects assigned this unit,
were Task 2 and 20, which dealt with the evaluation of crop destruction and
defoliation materials and techniques. Based on the promising results of
early tests, approval was sought for expanded aerial defoliation trials.
Approval was granted and C-123 aircraft made available in December 1961.
Tests were conducted in January and February 1962, and an evaluation report
submitted in May 1962. Following Department of Defense and State Department
approval, aerial deroliation operations began in Cau Mau, An Kuyen Province.
These trials began on 3 September 1962, and were completed on 11 October 1962.
Based on the results of this operation, action was taken to establish an
aerial herbicide operational capability in the Republic of Vietnam.
5. (c) Since the inception of aerial herbicide ocerations, the results
have proven favorable and the yearly frequency of these operations has
greatly increased. The purposes of these aerial herbicide operations in
IV Corps are manifold:
a. Clear the vegetation bordering jungle roads, paths, trails, and
waterways, thereoy reducing possible sites from which friendly forces may be
ambushed.
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b. Clear the vegetation from fields of fire and avenues of approach.
C. Significantly reduce vegetation growing in minefields and wire
barriers.
d. Clear the vegetation surrounding critical installations, communica-
tion complexes, air defense sites, railroad and pipeline rights-of-way,
petroleum warehouses, bridges and air fields.
e. Clear field training firing ranges and mark the boundaries of
firing lanes and impact zones.
f. Clear "kill lanes" which channalize enemy approach and withdrawal
during attacks.
g. Clear large areas of dense vegetation for major construction projects
or for health and sanitation reasons. Herbicides may be used to mark areas
in jungle terrain through which roads are to be built.
O. (c) The proximity of friendly populations and the abundance of food
crops in IV Corps makes crop destruction operations undesirable in IV Corps.
For that reason, no crop destruction missions have been conducted in this
Corps area. Defoliation operations conducted by fixed or rotary wing air-
craft are designed to eliminate foliage along friendly or enemy lines of
communication and in areas used by the Viet Cong such as base camps, infil-
tration routes, training centers, prison stockades, supply and ammunition
caches, and communication-liaison routes. The result of these IV Corps
defoliation operations has been the exposure of Viet Cong routes and storage
areas to aerial observation and surveillance which has thus had a tremen-
dous effect on the enemy's activity and his freedom of movement.
T. (C) = I7 Corps, defoliation iз usually complete in less than two weeks
and lasts from 9 to 12 conths. The psychological effects of these opera-
tions on the enemy is increased by his own propaganda that the herbicide is
harmful to humans. Occasional unintentional crop damage is the only adverse
effect on the friendly civilian population. These incidents have been in-
frequent and result from unusual meteorological conditions.
3. (c) Some of the earliest defoliation (C-123 aerial defoliation code
name TRAILDUST) missions were flown in Vinh Binh Province, Long Toan dis-
trict. Initial planning began in the first quarter of 1966 and approxi-
mately 7.2 square kilometers of vegetation in a known VC base area was sprayed
in November 1966. Vinh Binh Province requested aerial spray missions for the
districts of Chau Than, Cau Ke, Tieu Can and Cang Long. Cau Ke and Tieu Can
missions were directed at 10.4 square kilometers of dense vegetation along
canals in known Viet Cong storage and base areas. A total of 2.1 square
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kilometers of foliage was sprayed along a district road and the adjacent
canal in the South Western portion of Chau Thanh District. These missions
in Vinh Binh Province, completed during the month of February 1957, repre-
sent 20% of the total areas sprayed in 1967 in the 9th ARVN Infantry Divi-
sion area of responsibility.
9. (c) The Cang Long base area of Vinh Binh Province at this time began to
draw increasing interest of Division and Province officials. Viet Cong
harassment and interdiction was becoming more intense and large numbers of
GVN-oriented civilians became refugees in Cang Long, Tieu Can and Tra Vinh
cities in their escape from the VC. Cang Long District received the first
mission in the month of March, spraying a total 123 square kilometers (of
the total 21 2 km²) of vegetation in a VC base area. An infiltration route
and base area of 13 square kilometers was sprayed in the Cau Ngan District
along the Co Chien River. Missions in Long Toan District during the month
of March produced a total sprayed area of 42 square kilometers. The targets
consisted of VC rest and base areas and infiltration, supply and communication
routes. The result of the missions flown in Vinh Binh during March 1967 repre-
sented 50% of the total area sprayed in the calendar year 1957. The total
sprayed area (78 km2) in Vinh Binh Province represents 70% of that accomp-
lished in 1967. Until regrowth of sprayed areas began in mid-1963, incident
rates in Cang Long were reduced by 50%
10. (c) In December 1957, 13 square kilometers were sprayed in Chau Thanh
district, Vinh Binh Province, North East of Tra Vinh city along the Co Chien
River and on Long Hoa Island at the mouth of the Co Chien As an added note,
during January 1968, the defoliation program in Vinh 3inh continued with addi-
tional spray missions for the area previously mentioned along the Co Chien and
Long Hoa Island. The Viet Cong had been able to take advantage of the dense
and impenatrable undergrowth along the Co Chien River. Water shipments were
stopped, taxed, and confiscated. River traffic was reduced to almost 10% of
normal. After deroliation by C-123, horizontal visibility was increased to 100
teters and sniper fire and Viet Cong initiated incidents were greatly reduced.
11. (c) In Duc Tou District, Sadec Province almost 5 square kilometers of
overgrown canal was sprayed in January 1967. This area in western Sadec Pro-
vince was completely closed to civilian traffic by the Viet Cong and had
been declared a free-fire zone for more than 10 months prior to defoliation
The Viet Cong had installed 50 caliber machine guns in the area and shot
down one (1) jet fighter and two (2) UH-1D helicopters from this sanctuary.
12. (c) The "!" canal base area was originally requested for spraying in
March 1967, but due to the backlog of C-123 aerial defoliation in IV Corps
and in the PVN, this spray mission was not possible until 10 months after
3
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being requested. Because of the request backlog for C-123 defoliation, this
delay is not unusual. In asking for the initial defoliation mission for
this VC base area, Mr. James T. Smith, Province Senior Advisor wrote: "The
requested area includes the most active areas of VC activity in Sadec Province.
There are daily sightings and agent's reports of VC units in these areas and
these free-fire zones absorb by far the greatest percentage of airstrikes
flown in the Province. The approval of this request will have a great impact
on the success of the Sadec Province Pacification Plan for 1968. By defolia-
ting this target, our Ap Doi Moi's for 1968 will not be affected directly by
the defoliant but the main access for the enemy into the Revolutionary Develop-
ment areas will be taken from him thus protecting the American and GVII
investment in terms of money and lives."
13. (c) A significant helicopter defoliation mission was conducted on ó
August 68. This operation was conducted in the "Triangle" base area, center
of mass WS7842, Due Thinh District, Sadec Province. The target area consisted
of five main converging canals which formed one of the strongest VC base
areas in the 9th ARVN Infantry Division area. This area was sprayed with
approximately 735 gallons of the herbicide WHITE and over 90% of the area
was defoliated in less than two weeks. Because of the danger to low flying
aircraft, 4 Battalions of ARVN troops and a light fire team (2 Cobra gunships)
were necessary to secure the target for this one day spray operation. From
this base area, the VC were constantly Launching assaults against surrounding
GVN-oriented hamlets and towns and caused the migration of pro-government
civilians. This had caused a refugee problem in the city of Sadec. The
operation was successfully conducted and negligible drift damage to surrounding
vegetation outside the target area was observed. Since the time of defoliation,
there has been no VC provcked incidents in the entire area and VC presence
has decreased to the point that only resident RF/PF forces are now necessary
for local security.
14. (c) Cn 9 July 1968, a base area in Due Ton District, Sadec Province was
defoliated, again using the AGAVENCO helicopter-mounted system. 770 gallons
of herbicide WHITE was used to spray an area where three canals converged.
The vegetation in the target area was extremely dense and horizontal visi-
bility was reduced to 10-15 meters. Horizontal visibility was almost nil from
the canal edge into the wooded area for more than 200 meters, providing
excellent cover for storage of FOL and anno, and supplies. This "Triangle"
area has been the scene of numerous bloody battles over the last five years.
In each case, the ARTN troops involved were the victims of booby traps and
murderous ground fire coming from the all but invisible camouflaged bunker
and trench systems constructed by the Viet Cong. Again, in less than 12 days
the area was opened to aerial observation and horizontal visibility has
been increased to more than 1CO n. CPT Allen Nason, Ranger in Senior Adv, came to
OF
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IV Corps Headquarters on 25 July 68 to express his thanks and appreciation
to the G-3 staff who had assisted in this defoliation mission. He stated
at that time that his Ranger Battalion has just been in the "Triangle" base
area for a three day operation and had not had to fire one shot in self-
defense. The Ranger Battalion had also stayed overnight in this base area
for the first time in memory without attack. All of the previously camouflaged
bunkers were exposed to view and aerial observers orbiting overhead were
able to trace the movement of ground troops for the first time. For the
next six months, only local security forces (EF,TT) should be necessary for
hamlet security.
15. (c) The Mang Thit-Nicholai Canal forms one of the most important
North-South water routes in IV Corps. It is situated south of Vinh Long
city in Vinh Long Province. Due to VC taxation and ambushes, this important
waterway had fallen into disuse. Both the CG, IV Corps and the Province
Chief of Vinh Long were concerned that this canal route to Saigon and
III Corps would be closed completely in the near future. The target area
was 4 lou of the canal in Tan 3inh-Tra On Districts, Vinh Long Province. The
canal in this area is heavily wooded and overgrown to a depth of 300 meters
on both sides. The VC were using B-40 rockets and machine gun fire to harrass
and interdict water traffic. Because of the narrowness of the canal, boats
taken under fire were usually destroyed. This situation continued until
early May 1968, at which time the Executive Officer of the Can Thio based VII
RAG was wounded in an ambush in the target area. In addition, 4 VII RAG IN
were killed, 1 US KIA, 5 US VIA, 13 VN RAG EM VIA, and 2 RAG boats damaged.
Cn 3 Hay 1968, the CG, IV Corps ordered an emergency defoliation mission to
reduce the VC cover and concealment on this area on the Mang Thit Canal. An
operation was organized and a HFT (4 HueyCobra gunships) and 1 ARVN: an and
4 companies of PF: troops were used to provide ground security. Even with this
concentration of troops on the ground, the spray plane came under intense
enemy ground fire. This action resulted in award of the VN Cross of Gallantry
with Silver Star to two US Advisors and 3 VII Officers. 5CO gallons of the
herbicide ORANGE were used and 95% of the target was covered before darkness
rain caused a halt to the mission. Within 10 days vertical visibility
TAB almost perfect and horizontal visibility yas increased to more than ICO
meters as contrasted to an original 5-10 meters before defoliation. Incident
rates which averaged 3-4 per week before defoliation have dropped to zero.
Only local ?F troops now are used in this area. The success of this mission
caused the District and Province officials in Vinh Long to submit 32 additional
canal targets for defoliation operations in that province. TAB A.
15. (c) A 4 Im section of National Highway 4 adjacent to the village of
Long Thanh in Phong Dinh Province was the site for a defoliation operation on
24 June 1968. Since January 1958, a series of ambushes were conducted against GTI
cenvoys and troop movements which resulted in the following casualties: 20
HIA, 71 VIA, 5 missing in action, 10 trucks destroyed, 2 APC's destroyed and
10 weapons missing. Because of the tal inability of ground troops to keep
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this area clear of Viet Cong, a defoliation mission was requested by Phing
Dinh Province Chief. This area was sprayed using 685 gallors of the herbicide
WHITE. The target area consisted of coconut palm and banana trees
that had been abandoned by their owners for several years. During this
neriod of abandonment, the vegetation had become so dense that convoy secur-
ity elements were not able to see more than 5 meters into the underbrush and
had to rely on reconnaistance by fire to discover the hidden enemy. This
method of protection had proved ineffective. 3 RF/PF companies with US ad-
visors were used to secure the target for the helicopter operation in addition
to an Armored Cavalry troop. As usual, troops remained on the ground
during the scray mission with the chemical spray cloud drifting over the
troops with no damage being done to clothing, skin, or weapons. Since the
completion of this defoliation mission, convoys have used this highway 2-3
times per week without attack or harrasment. Only one PF platoon has remained
in the area to provide local security to the hamlet and highway.
17. (c) The My Thanh River forms the border between Ba Xuyen and Bac Lieu
Provinces. During the period from January 1968, to 30 June 1968, more than 21
RAG personnel have been WIA and 2 KIA. In addition to the loss of lives, boats,
tugs, and RAG barges have been sunk or damaged. Neither Province nor the
21st ARVN- Infantry Division have been able to provide adequate security for
these weekly convoys. Additionally, more than $200,000 worth of ammunition
is being expended each month in reconnaissance by fire along the canal sides.
This reconnaissance is largely ineffective and has rot reduced the ambush
incident rate. Both the Province Chiefs from Ba Kuyen and Bac Lieu Province
have requested a defoliation mission in this area. This request has been
reinforced by the CG, 21st ARVN Inf Div and CG, IV Corps in addition to the
CC, VII RAG, IV Corps. The target area from Ben Pha to Van Leo is now
scheduled to be done by the USAF C-123 aircraft and has the highest priority in
I7 Corps. It is e pected that when this project is completed, convoys will
enjoy freedom from attack as has happened in other Provinces in IV Corps. A
significant savings in money and lives will be the result. See Fact Sheet,
TAB B.
IS. (c) Without exception, successful deroliation missions have Led to 2
daluge of requests for other areas in a given Province. Each successful
mission on the average has caused the submission of 4-5 other targets for
C-123 and helicopter defoliation in IV Corps. At the present time, in June
1968, more than 108 helicopter targets were pending in IV Corps in addition
to more than 20 C-123 projects.
19. (c) Tropical vegetation in the IV CTZ appears to be more resistant to
herbicide sprays than are the temporate climate species found in the
continental United States. This resistance of tropic vegetation has chal-
lenged the creative talents of scores of military and industrial plant physiol-
ogists, biochenists, formulators, and spray system designers for the last
decade and a half. Little vegetation analysis and species identification
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has been done in Southeast Asia, and only one pioneering study has attempted
to relate genera and species response to chemical application in SEA. A
need exists both for quicker acting herbicides and for agents that will
kill or defoliate a broader spectrum of tropic species at low concentrations.
20. (c) The butyl esters of 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-Tri-
chlorophenozyacetic acid are the most effective on the tropic species of
IV Corps. These esters are, however, diesel oil soluble and will dissolve
and destroy the paint of Army helicopters. For this reason only, the amine
ester of 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (code name WHITE) is being used in
helicopter spray work in IV Corps. There is, however, a marked resistance
of several dominant species to this water soluble ester(viz. Nipa palm).
Nipa palm is notoriously resistant to WHITE and little or no kill results.
A requirement exists for a herbicide in the Republic of Vietnam which
contains the esters of 2,4-D and especially 2,4,5-T which will not harm
the finish of metals and paint surfaces of the US Army UH-1B/D series of
helicopter.
21. (c) The natural dense vegetation in jungle areas of Southeast Asia is
ideal for the illusive hit, run, and fade-away tactics of the guerrilla. If
this dense growth can be defoliated, he may then be pursued by friendly
forces and destroyed by aerial and/or ground means. The guerrilla is known to
habitually leave a treated target area even before the effect is visible
on the plants. The defoliation operation then has some immediate effect.
The Viet Cong experience with defoliation operations in the Republic of
Vietnam is so extensive that the guerrilla does not wait for the inevitable
effects of the defoliation mission. He begins an immediate removal of
supplies and manyower to more remote locations. In addition, his propaganda
that the agents used are poisonous has back-fired on his own troops and the
Viet Cong soldier is afraid to stay in a sprayed area or eat food affected
in any way by the spray materials.
22. (c) Defoliation operations have proved to be a useful tool in Vietnam.
Herbicides have deprived the Viet Cong of cover and concealment, safeguarded
waterways and highways, improved outpost security, and cleared fields of
fire around fixed installations. It has also significantly reduced the
need for large numbers of troops in areas adjacent to sprayed areas. in
certain dense Vist Cong base areas, for example An Xuyen Province, defoliation
operations provide virtually the only GVN pressure on the Viet Cong because
of the lack of ARVN mobility, high water, and density of vegetation
which makes ground military operations prohibitive in terms of manpower
losses and assets required to sustain an operation.
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Defoliation operations are able to concentrate the Viet Cong and restrict
him to more accessible areas where the ARVN can find, fix, and destroy the
guerrilla.
FOR THE SENIOR ADVISOR:
Jary L. Hammons
2 Incl
JERRY L. HAMEIONS
TAB A - Map of Vinh Long Defol Area
1/LT, ARMOR
TAB B - Fact Sheet on My Thanh Project
Act Asst AG
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8.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASE STANGE COMMAND. VIETNAM
APO SANIFRANCISCO 96222
Chemical Cherattons Division
MACJ3-09
4 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: AGAVENCO Helicopter Defoliation Apparatus (U)
1. (c) The AGAVENCO helicopter defoliation apparatus is used to spray
herbicide targets which are too small for spray by C-123 aircraft.
Eight AGAVENCO's are allocated within MACV on the basis of two per corps
advisory group headquarters; however, at present only five of these units
are on hand. The I CTZ has never received an AGAVENCO; II CTZ has two;
201
III CTZ has one; IV CTZ has two, only one of which is operational.
The two units programmed for I CTZ were lost in transit. A third unit,
which was to be transferred from III CTZ to I CTZ, also was lost in transit.
I CTZ and III CTZ have requisitioned replacements for their lost units.
2. (c) Cn 5 Jan 69 SA I CTZ requested the loan of one AGAVENCO from
one of the other corps advisory groups (Incl 1). On 12 Jan 69 HQ MACV
responded by requesting the SA II CTZ to transfer one AGAVENCO to the
SA I CTZ (Incl 2). This decision was based on the need for a helicopter
defoliation capability in I CTZ, and the fact that of the other corps,
only II CTZ had two operational units. Due to a country-wide lack of
spare parts, one of these units was operational only because of a locally
fabricated replacement for a missing spray boom. This field expedient
has worked satisfactorily. The apparatus is under the operational control
c ? the DSA II CTZ who had further loaned it to the US 4th Inf Div.
The rield expedient spray boom was fabricated by the 4th Div and :: is
the intention of the DSA II CTZ to transfer the AGAVENCO without this
boom since the 4th Div plans to use it again. SA IV CTZ has an extra
field expedient boom which could be furnished to I CTZ to use with the
AGAVENCO.
3. (c) On 22 Jan 69 the DSA I CTZ, who would ultimately have operational
control over the transferred unit, refused the AGAVENCO offered by SA II
CTZ, stating that it was unserviceable because of the missing spray bocm,
and requesting that the transfer be cancelled (Incl 3).
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SUBJECT: AGAVENCO Helicopter Defoliation Apparatus (U)
4. (c) On 26 Jan SA I CTZ dispatched a message to MACV stating that the
AGAVENCO was unserviceable and requested further assistance in obtaining
a helicopter defoliation capability (Incl 4). In addition to the two
AGAVENCO's due in to fill the DSA I CTZ requisition, 21 AGAVENCO's are
now scheduled to be received by US Army units throughout RVN within the
next 60 days. A portion of these will go to units operating in I CTZ;
this will provide SA I CTZ a helicopter spray capability. In addition,
the 101st Abn Div currently has an operational field expedient helicopter
defoliation apparatus (not an AGAVENCO) which is available to SA I CTZ.
4 Incl
HAROLD
as
Colonel, USA
C, Cml Opas Div
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ÉPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADCEAFTERS SEVENTHEAR FORSERPACAF)
CONTIS CRITIAL
REPLY TO
ATTN OF :
DPLR
5 MAY 1987
SUBJECT: Final Report of the Operational Evaluation of Project Pink Rose (U)
TO:
See Distribution List
The enclosed report is the final 7th Air Force evaluation of
Project Pink Rose conducted in Southeast Asia between October
1966 and April 1967, and is forwarded for your information.
FOR THE COMMANDER
a Hilpert
A. L. HILPERT, Colonel, USAF
1 Atch
Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans
Final Report (S), Project
Pink Rose, 9 Pgs
CF The SEC BY TAG
CY 21 OF 50 COPIES /
PER c3058115
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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
THIS DOCUMENT CAN BE
DOD DIR 5200- 10
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SPART
DPLR 67-0369
SECRETIAL
FINAL REPORT
OPERATIONAL EVALUATION
OF
PROJECT PINK ROSE
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INDEX
Page
Acknowledgements
i
Abstract
ii
Background
1
Target Preparation
1
Target Ignition
1 and 2
Effectiveness of Burn
2
Probable Causes of Ineffectiveness
3
Support
3 and 4
Operational Conclusions
5
Recommendations
5
Distribution List
6 and 7
CONFID
ENTIAL
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C3C581/5
SECRIT
CONFIDENTIAL
ACKNOWL EDCEMENTS
Project Pink Rose required extensive planning and coordination
with many organizations between October 1966 and April 1967.
Specific acknowledgement of the support, work and effort contributed
by the many individuals associated with this program is impossible.
Indicative of the professional functioning of a skillful team is
the fact that at the designated time each of three targets was
saturated with incendiary bomblets. In each case, all prestrike
preparation was complete; all strike support was available as
requested; and poststrike follow-up was accomplished according to
plan.
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CONNENTIAL
An operational evaluation known as Project Pink Rose was
conducted in South Vietnam to determine the reasibility of
clearing a typical Southeast Asia forest by use of fire. Three
free strike target areas were treated with herbicides and a
desiccant to induce drying. Ignition was accomplished by
incendiary bomblets dropped from B-52 aircraft. A poststrike
ground reconnaissance team evaluated each of the three strike
areas. It was concluded that the technique of a planned
forest fire using this specific method is ineffective as an
operational method for clearing forest areas in South Vietnam.
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1. Background:
a. History of Concept : In September 1965, CINCPAC recommended
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an immediate requirement be
established to develop a capability to destroy by fire large areas
of forest and jungle growth in Southeast Asia. This request was
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering directed the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) to accomplish the required research tasks. The
Forest Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, was requested by
ARPA to undertake this research task. A test operation, HOT TIP,
was conducted at Chu Pong mountain near Pleiku on 11 March 1966.
A fifteen plane B-52 strike dropped incendiaries on a defoliated
area. Results were inconclusive but sufficient fire did develop to
indicate that this technique might be operationally feasible.
b. Pink Rose: In May 1966, COMUSMACV was requested by CINCPAC
to plan for a similar test, PINK ROSE, in early 1967. This operation
was to be conducted in conjunction with existing planned defoliation
programs. On 6 November 1966, three specific free strike target
areas were selected - one in War Zone D and two in War Zone C. Each
target box was a square seven kilometers on a side. The target areas
chosen were heavily covered with two and three canopy forest.
2. Target Preparation: The three target areas designated in the
Pink Rose Test Plan were defoliated on schedule by Ranch Hand aircraft
of the 12th Air Commando Squadron according to the procedures specified
by the Chemical Division, MACV-COC7. Coverage was complete and aerial
reconnaissance indicated results were equal to or better than
expectations. Those areas actually inspected by ground parties showed
good drying throughout the forest. However, many areas lacked the
desired fuel between the ground layer and the canopy crown necessary
to carry the fire upward. Also, ground litter was relatively sparse.
It should be emphasized that approximately 255 sorties and 255,000
gallons of herbicide/desiccant were expended. No operational problems
were encountered during this phase.
3. Target Ignition: Target C was ignited between 14:10H and 14:46H
on 18 January 1967; target A was ignited between 14:10H and 14:46H
on 28 January 1967; and target B was ignited between 14:00H and 14:12H
on 4 April 1967. The order and dates of strikes were changed to
properly phase Pink Rose operations with concurrent ground operations.
Thirty B-52 aircraft from the 3d Air Division on Guam were used on
each of the first two strikes. On the third strike, the.B-52 force
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was reduced to fifteen aircraft and the target box was compressed
to provide a density of incendiary bomblets.three times greater
than that used on the first two strikes Coordination of Arc
Light (B-52) strike requests. between Seventh Air Force, MACV Combat
Operations Center and 3d Air Division was excellent and was
accomplished with no operational complications. All strike air-
craft arrived on target as planned and were properly spaced and
time-phased by MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot radar. MSQ-77 control was
alternated between the Bien Hoa and the Dalat sites to provide
minimum time-spacing between B-52 cells. Targets were adequately
saturated by incendiary bomblets within the time interval
requested.
4. Effectiveness of Burn:
a. Target C: Burn in this area was ineffective. The only free
burning outside the immediate vicinity of the incendiary bomblets
was in well-drained grass areas. Most fires did not spread farther
than two feet from the ignition source. Intense smoke emanated
from the target and topped out at approximately 5,000 feet. During
subsequent visual observations of the target area from the air,
it was difficult to determine that the area had ever been saturated
with incendiaries.
b. Target A: Poststrike reconnaissance was limited to close-in
aerial observations from helicopters. No landings were made as ground
fire was encountered and the landing zones appeared to be booby-
trapped. Open areas had burned vell--approximately 75%. Under double
canopy, fire spread only about six feet on either side of ignition
source--3 to 5% of the area. Under single canopy, fire spread in
ground litter for about fifteen feet-9 to 12% of the area. Crown
canopy removal was negligible. Smoke was very intense and a strong
convective column was established early and rose to 9,000 feer.
Excluding the open burned-out areas, it was again difficult to note
any canopy change during subsequent visual observation flights.
C. Target B: Bomblet spacing was very tight, varying from three
feet between impacts to fifty feet. About 50% of the ground fires
met each other; however, ground cover was very thin and fire did not
carry upward. Fire spread in ground cover appeared to stop for no
apparent reason. Upper canopy was dead and dry but unburned. Crew
of infrared reconnaissance aircraft reported that a towering cumulus
developed over target and that its estimated height was 50,000 feet.
Many dead trees, both fallen and upright, burned but the overall
effectiveness of burn was negligible.
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5. Probable Causes of Ineffectiveness: This subject will be
thoroughly analyzed by technical personnel assigned to the Porest
Service, U. S. Department of Agriculature and whild be the subject
of a technical report to them. However, the
following observat alie associated reasoning for the lack
of effective burn are presenced as possible causes:
a. Target C: Incendiaries were dropped at a time when target
was covered by a thick, high overcast. Overcast clouds create
stable air conditions which prevent effective radiation drying
during the day. Also, the target area appeared to have a high
natural moisture content.
b. Target A: Prestrike and strike weather criteria were
tightened and six days of 3/8 or less cloud cover provided as
nearly optimum conditions for burn as can reasonably be expected
in Vietnam. This target was better than average in vertical
fuel continuity and it had been effectively defoliated with
visually satisfactory results. Incendiary spacing was adequate
to produce reinforcing fires. From an operational viewpoint,
failure to remove crown canopy can only be attributed to
ineffectiveness of the Pink Rose technique. Possible causes
could be: (1) moisture content in twigs and leaves is still too
high; (2) even more dense incendiary spacing is required; and
(3) insufficient fuel exists between ground and canopy crown to
carry fire.
c. Target B : Density of bomblets was increased by a factor of
three. Two additional months of maximum drying were provided.
Timing between B-52 cells was reduced from four to three minutes
to provide a more nearly simultaneous ignition. Reasons for the
failure under these optimum conditions to achieve a crown fire will
be left for explanation by the technical experts. Every known
possibility from an operational capability was exploited to achieve
a crown fire and every approach failed.
6. Support:
a. Defoliation: Target areas were properly prepared by Ranch
Hand aircraft of the 12th Air Commando Squadron under the direction
of the MACV Chemical Division, CCC7.
b. Strike Aircraft: Incendiary patterns and density were more
than adequate and were accurately placed within the designated target
boxes as scheduled when temperature was at a maximum and rèlative
humidity was at a minimum. Coordination of Are Light requests between
3d Air Division, the MACV Control Center and SACADVON was excellent.
The coordination, command and control of these rissions in-country was
accomplished by 7th Air Force Tactical ALL Control Center.
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C. Weather: For the last two strikes, weather conditions were
considered to be optimum. In retrospect, it can be logically deduced
that the overcast, stable weather conditions was not.a major factor
in preventing effective barn in the area. The support
rendered by the 1st Cherl Group and associated squadrons and
detachments was complete end Simely.
d. Documentiar Photography: Photography (color motion picture
and color and black and white still) was accomplished professionally
by the 600th Photographic Squadron when and where it was requested.
e. Technical Assistance: Highly qualified representatives from
the OSD/ARPA Washington office and their Research and Development
Field Unit-Vietnam provided invaluable technical assistance both
during the planning phase and the operational phase. Each of the
members of the field team from the Forest Service, U. S. Department
of Agriculture, repeatedly demonstrated his expertise and provided
invaluable assistance.
£. Reconnaissance: Crews and aircraft from the 460th Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing provided complete and professional aerial
reconnaissance. Black and white infrared photography, simultaneous
color and camouflage detection photography, and infrared recordings
were furnished as requested before, during and after each strike.
All of this information was processed efficiently and delivered
rapidly by the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron.
8. Forward Air Controller Operations: Support provided through
III DASC from Xuan Loc and Tay Ninh East based 0-1 aircraft enabled
documentary photographers to perform their mission.
h. Reentry Ground Reconnaissance: The 5th Special Forces Group
provided outstanding support to the technical teams which entered
the strike areas each day following the strikes. The B Team at
Bien Hoa and the A Teams at Xom Cat and Trai Bi Special Forces Camps
provided complete security in a highly professional manner for the
technical teams. In addition, the A Team ar Trai Bi provided
facilities and security for Forest Service personnel gathering fuel
samples in the field.
1. Airlift: The Army Concept Team in Vietnam provided a U-6A
aircraft during Pink Rose I and II for transportation of combat
photographers and technical personnel between Tan Son Nhat and remote
Special Forces camps. This same support was: provided bir Army
Aviation under MACV for Pink Rose III This support was an invaluable
aid in meeting tight scheduler.
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7. Operational Conclusions:
a. The Pink Rose technique is ineffective as a means of removing
the forest crown canopy.
b. The Pink Rose technique 13 too rastrictive for use as a normal
operational taction recause
(1) Target area aust be chosen 2 - 3 months prior to strike.
(2) Target area must be prepared by expenditure of excessively
large quantities of herbicide/desiccant and associated Ranch Hand
sorties.
(3) Drying and ignition are restricted to a few months of the
year and, even if effective, proper burn would be overly dependent
upon actual local weather.
C. In terms of resources expended, results do not warrant further
exploitation of this specific technique.
d. A similar technique may be useful in other applications such
as:
(1) Small incendiary raids against dried grass areas similar
to the A Shau valley.
(2) Small incendiary raids against areas of low, thick and dry
vegetation.
(3) Small incendiary raids in mountainous areas that have been
defoliated (DMZ).
e. This technique may be feasible and have an operational
application at some other location -- one where conditions are lass
favorable than the California pins forests but more favorable than
the Vietnam hardwood forests.
8. Recommendations:
a. Further testing of the Pink Rose technique in South Vietnam
under the existing concept be terminated.
b. Research should be continued on a small scale. to determine
other geographical areas where thes technique: (without defol iation)
might be successful.
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Department of Dafense INFIDENTIAL
Office of tHe Secretary of Defense, Advanced Research
Projects Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301
3
Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research
and Development Field Unit, Vietnam
3
United States Air Force
AFRDQR
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Pacific Command
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Scientific Advisory Office
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Pacific Air Forces
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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
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Air Force Advisory Group
ONEIDENTIAL
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AFSC Liaison Officer (DAFSC)
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Army Concept Team in Vietnam
Washington Headquarters, Dept of the amy
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