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    "ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:\nAgency File: Records\nFolder Title: State INR Morning Summary\n(12/23/1983-12/24/1983)\nBox: RAC Box 8\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-\nsupport/citation-guide\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET\nRonald Reagan Library\nCollection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE\nWithdrawer\nCAS 12/3/2008\nFile Folder\nSTATE INR MORNING SUMMARY VOL. I 11/22-12/31/83\nFOIA\n[12/23/83-12/24/83]\nM08-099\nBox Number\n8\nSTOCKER\n11\nID Doc Type\nDocument Description\nNo of Doc Date Restrictions\nPages\n1. 57287 LIST\nRE 12/24/83 DOCUMENTS (W/NOTATIONS)\n1 12/24/1983 B1\nR\n1/17/2001\nNLSF97-044 #8\n2. 57288 REPORT\nCURRENT REPORTS\n3 12/24/1983 B1\nD\n1/17/2001\nF97-044 #9; PAR 5/7/2010 M08-\n099/1 #57288\n3 57289 REPORT\nRE ANALYSIS\n3 12/24/1983 B1\nPAR 5/10/2001\nNLSF97-044 10; R 9/16/2010\nM08-099/1 #57289\n4.\n57290 LIST\nRE 12/23/83 DOCUMENTS (WITH\n1 12/23/1983 B1\nNOTATIONS)\nR\n1/17/2001\nNLSF97-044 #11\n5.\n57291 REPORT\nCURRENT REPORTS\n3 12/23/1983 B1\nPAR 1/17/2001\nF97-044 #12; PAR 5/7/2010 M08-\n090/1 #57291\n6.\n57292 REPORT\nRE ANALYSIS\n3 12/23/1983 B1\nR\n5/10/2001\nNLSF97-044 #13\nFreedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]\nB-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]\nB-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]\nB-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]\nB-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]\nB-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]\nB-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]\nB-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]\nB-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]\nC. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.\nEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH\nMORNING SUMMARY\nDecember 24, 1983\nCurrent Reports\n1. Terrorism\nA. More Reports of Lebanese Shia Threats\nB. Threat to US and other Embassies in Saudi Arabia\n2. Italy: Pertini Calls for Withdrawal of MNF Troops\n3. Lebanon: INR Military Update\n4. PLO: Arafat Sees Need for a Government-in-Exile\n5. Israel: Shamir Maintains Shaky Coalition\n6. USSR/PRC: An End to Euphoria\n7. USSR: Tough Posture on INF\n8. Nicaragua: Withdrawal of Cubans a Ploy\n9. Vietnam: Reshuffling of High-Level Officials\nAnalysis\n1. Kuwait: More Trouble Ahead\n2. SPD Foreign Relations: Western Fence-Mending, Eastern Dialogue\n3. El Salvador: A Decisive Political Phase Begins\nNLS F97-044 DECLASSIFIED #8 #\nBY CA, NARA, DATE '/17/01'\nClassified by: M. Charles Hill and\nHugh Montgomery\nDeclassify on:\nOriginating Agency's\nDetermination Required\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD\nEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT\nE.0.12958\n57280\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH\nAs Amended\nSec. 3.3(6)(1),\nCURRENT REPORTS\n3.5(c)\n1.4(c)\nDecember 24, 1983\n2. ITALY: PERTINI CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF MNF TROOPS\nItalian President Pertini told journalists December 23 the departure\nof Arafat and the PLO fighters fulfilled the requirement for the\nwithdrawal of the Italian MNF contingent from Beirut, Embassy Rome\nreports. A senior foreign ministry official said that Pertini made\nthe remark, but the official Italian position on the MNF remains the\nsame--no unilateral withdrawal. He said Italy will continue to work\nwith the other MNF members for the earliest possible withdrawal.\nINR Comment: Pertini's comments will embarass the Craxi government\nand further weaken support for the MNF commitment. Nonetheless,\ngovernment leaders will not want to be seen in hasty retreat from the\nMNF. Pertini and key aides earlier had suggested privately that a\nchange in the status of Arafat and the PLO would present Rome with\nadequate rationale for extricating itself an argument Pertini\nemphasized in his comments yesterday.\n(SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)\nDECLASSIFIED IN PART\nNLRR M08-049#57288\nBY RW NARA DATE 5-7-10\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\n- 2 -\n4. PLO: ARAFAT SEES NEED FOR A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE\nIn an interview with a Saudi newspaper, Arafat reportedly said he is\n\"convinced more than ever following the recent events in Beirut and\nTripoli of the need to form a Palestinian government-in-exile.\" He\nsaid that he will submit his proposal to the Palestinian National\nCouncil at its February meeting in Algiers.\nINR Comment: The creation of a Palestinian government-in-exile has\nlong been urged by Egypt but resisted by Arafat. If correct, this\nreport would suggest that Arafat now counts on the creation of this\ngovernment, his selection as its head, and its recognition by the\nmoderate Arab governments to maintain his leadership of the\nPalestinians and to discredit his Syrian-supported rivals.\n(CONFIDENTIAL)\n5. ISRAEL: SHAMIR MAINTAINS SHAKY COALITION\nPM Shamir's low-key leadership and his successful Washington visit\nhave bolstered his prospects for maintaining his coalition throughout\nthe winter Knesset session, Embassy Tel Aviv reports. Nonetheless,\npolitical maneuvering within the coalition and deep public concern\nabout the economy still threaten his government. Labor Party\nleaders, muting their own rivalries, are confidently attacking the\ngovernment's economic policy while the government trails in public\nopinion polls.\nEmbassy Comment: Shamir does not have much time remaining to\ndemonstrate progress on economic issues. Unless he does so, the\npublic will lose confidence in his government. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)\n6. USSR/PRC: AN END TO EUPHORIA\nSino-Soviet relations failed to progress during 1983 at the pace\nforeshadowed in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, Embassy\nMoscow reports. The Soviets are increasingly disillusioned with\nChina's policy of \"equidistance\" between the superpowers, seeing\nChina tilt westward on key issues like INF. Moreover, the growth of\nUS-Japanese-South Korean military cooperation has convinced the\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\n- 3 -\nSoviets that they must reinforce their military capability in the Far\nEast and bolster their Vietnamese ally, to the detriment of\nSino-Soviet relations. Finally, Andropov has a more skeptical and\nideological view of China than Brezhnev. Thus the Soviets, while\npursuing cooperation with the PRC in areas that serve Soviet\ninterests, will show new willingness to criticize Chinese policies.\nThe possibility of substantive Soviet concessions on important\nbilateral issues is more remote than ever. (CONFIDENTIAL)\n7. USSR: TOUGH POSTURE ON INF\nFour Soviet political-military specialists told French Embassy\nofficers that the INF talks are dead, Embassy Moscow reports. Soviet\nsecurity is now the paramount issue, according to these specialists,\nand the Soviet Union will match new US INF missiles one-for-one. The\nSoviets carefully differentiated between INF and START and spoke of\nthe need to reevaluate the Soviet position on strategic arms. They\ngave the impression that the delay in resuming START talks might be\nlengthy, lasting until the US election or longer. (CONFIDENTIAL)\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\n57289\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 24, 1983\n1. KUWAIT: MORE TROUBLE AHEAD\nThe Kuwaiti government believes the December 12 bombings were\npart of a broader threat to its survival. It is implementing\nstrong security measures, but they are not likely to prevent\nfurther trouble. The government needs a lull to assimilate the\nlessons of the first round, but the Shia militants and their\nforeign sponsors will probably keep up the pressure.\n*\n*\n*\nDECLASSIFIED\nNLRR M08-D94#57889\nNARA DATE1/16/10\nThe bombings targeted not only foreign embassies, but also\nfacilities critical to the operation of the state. While the\nattacks on power, desalinization, and oil installations largely\nBY RW\nmisfired, the bombing of the airport tower disrupted radar cover-\nage for the air-defense system, as well as for civilian traffic.\nArrests since then have uncovered Shia \"Da'wa\" party cells\npossessing large quantities of small arms apparently brought in\nfrom Iran.\nThe government believes it faces a continuing threat to its\nsurvival. It is implementing a get-tough policy long advocated\nby security officials. Suspected troublemakers face arrest and\nsummary deportation.\nThe government's ability to carry out this policy effec-\ntively is questionable. While most residents have a stake in its\nsurvival, Kuwait is not a well-integrated society with a leader-\nship enjoying broad and unquestioning loyalty. Government\nsuspicions focus on the 30 percent (290,000) of Kuwaiti citizens\nwho are Shia, as well as on the 105,000 expatriate Shia (65,000\nIranians and 40,000 Iraqis and others). Most of the Shia who are\nKuwaiti citizens are reportedly sympathetic to Khomeini, and a\ngovernment clean-up of Shia troublemakers would probably increase\nthat propensity.\nSome 60 percent of the population and about 78 percent of\nthe labor force are expatriates. Most of the 350,000 Pales-\ntinians are quiescent, fearing deportation. Recent arrests of\nPLO members, however, could provoke retaliation by Syrian- or\nLibyan-backed groups.\nThe security forces are hobbled by concern about the many\nShia in their ranks (rarely in command positions). Evidence of\ntreason by one or more senior military officers has already\nsurfaced. Army ranks are 80 percent or more composed of Saudi\nand Iraqi Bedouin whose loyalty is nearly exclusively to self,\nfamily, and tribe.\nFacing these problems, the leadership above all needs time\nto make realistic security adjustments and recover its confi-\ndence. We believe, however, that the Shia militants and their\nforeign sponsors scent the government's weakness and will press\nahead to keep it off balance.\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\n- 2 -\n2. SPD FOREIGN RELATIONS: WESTERN FENCE-MENDING,\nEASTERN DIALOGUE\nSPD leaders agree they must cultivate ties to other social-\nists and to ruling communist parties if they are to influence\nworld affairs, maintain pressure on Kohl, and recoup electoral\nsupport. The SPD agenda now is to better contacts with the\nSoviet, East German and Polish parties, mend fences with the\nFrench socialists, and strengthen the Socialist International.\n*\n*\n*\nINF has cost the SPD dearly--as much for associating with\ncommunists to oppose deployment as for the policy turnabout.\nClandestine reporting reveals a very concerned SPD inner-\ncircle: critics warn of the party's isolation over INF and\ndemand renewal of ideological tension with communism; they see\nWilly Brandt looming over an ineffectual Vogel. With French\nalienation rising, SPD leaders have met with Mitterrand and the\nPSF several times since November--with little agreement on\nsecurity or EC issues. Egon Bahr winced when the PSF hinted it\nwas seeking a security dialogue with southern European social-\nists commensurate with that of the SPD in the north. The SPD\nhas sought Swiss and other assistance in ameliorating party-to-\nparty tensions.\nThe small European socialist parties, often taking their\ncue from the SPD on security issues, are alarmed over the\nparty's INF flip-flop and its potential damage to overall\nsocialist credibility. Their concern is borne out by the\nItalian communists' positive assessment of the SPD's and\nBrandt's role in the peace movement as a way to rid it of its\ncommunist stigma.\nIn the East, the SPD fuels Ostpolitik through its own con-\nduits. Within the SI it hopes to revitalize East-West dialogue\nby having socialist prime ministers lobby the superpowers to\nresume arms talks and by endorsing Palme's nuclear-free-zone\nproposal. The party's pessimism in the security arena--and\nBrandt's own gloom--make them ideal targets for Soviet wooing.\nMoscow couples prophecies of doom with its high-level courtship\nof Brandt and deliberately contrasts its red-carpet treatment of\nSPD leaders with that which the US accords.\nA recent internal SPD study concludes that SPD ties with\nEast German and Polish parties are second only to those with the\nCPSU, but ties with the Romanian and Czech parties are virtually\nuseless. Embryonic ties with the PRC are to be aided by a\nBrandt visit next year. In its informal exchanges with Havana,\nthe Cubans--like the Soviets--play on the SPD's SI role. Prior\nto last month's SI meeting, Havana made its case on Central\nAmerica and Grenada to a Brandt aide--paralleling Moscow's\nwarning to Brandt of an imminent US invasion of Nicaragua.\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\n- 3 -\n3. EL SALVADOR: A DECISIVE POLITICAL PHASE BEGINS\nWith the promulgation of the new constitution and the selec-\ntion of a spate of presidential candidates, El Salvador enters\ninto a decisive political phase. No candidate has the strength\nto capture the presidency in a first ballot, and coalitions are\nexpected to form for a run-off election among the top two vote-\ngetters. The plans of the guerrillas for disrupting or discred-\niting the elections remain unclear.\n*\nAfter an 18-month gestation, El Salvador's new constitution\nentered into force on December 20. Its mandate achieved, the\nconstituent assembly transformed itself into a legislative\nassembly which will sit until April 1985. Coincident with the\nnew constitution, three political parties nominated presidential\ncandidates, bringing the total number of aspirants to five.\nThere are no surprises in the candidates selected; each party's\ntitular leader received the nod. The two leading candidates are\nJose Napoleon Duarte for the center-left Christian Democratic\nParty (PDC), and Roberto D'Aubuisson for the rightist Nation-\nalist Republican Alliance (ARENA). Party members and\nSalvadorans abroad reportedly attempted unsuccessfully to derail\n'Aubuisson's candidacy on account of his poor international\nreputation.\nNone of the parties has selected a vice-presidential candi-\ndate, probably in anticipation of coalition offers from rivals.\nHowever, it is unlikely that coalitions will coalesce before\neach party has tested its strength with the electorate in the\nfirst round of a presidential contest, and vice-presidential\ncandidates will probably be initially selected from the ranks of\neach party. The only such candidate bruited so far is Foreign\nMinister Fidel Chavez Mena, who has been reluctant to accept his\nselection by a PDC nominating convention.\nSpecific actions the guerrillas may take to discredit the\nelection remain uncertain. Their experience in March 1982\nprobably has convinced them that they cannot stop the balloting\non a country-wide basis. Guerrilla forces, however, are likely\nto continue to intensify military operations in eastern El\nSalvador in order to render the electoral climate there\nextremely tenuous. In a September meeting, Cuban President\nCastro reportedly urged such an intensification on guerrilla\nleaders, according to a clandestine report. In addition,\ninsurgent military successes might prompt the long-rumored\nproclamation of a \"liberated zone under insurgent control\" as a\nmeans to discredit the voting.\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\nEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH\nMORNING SUMMARY\nDecember 23, 1983\nCurrent Reports\nPR\n1. Lebanon: INR Military Update\n2. Jordan: Preparing To Deal with a Post-Tripoli Arafat\n3. Egypt: Arafat's Visit\n4. Kuwait: Arrests of Palestinians\n5. Greece: Progress Possible toward Cyprus Settlement\n6. France: Planning Rapprochement with Soviet Union\n7. USSR: Dobrynin To Skip Party Plenum\n8. Afghanistan\nA. Mujahidin Abandon Border Post\nB. Soviets Lukewarm about Cordovez Mission\n9. Bulgaria/USSR: Differences Grow during Andropov Era\n10. Nicaragua/El Salvador: Arms Traffic Continues\nAnalysis\n1. South Africa/Angola: Few Risks in the Military Withdrawal\n2. USSR: Waiting for Andropov\n3. Argentina: Fast Start for Alfonsin\nDECLASSIFIED\nNLS F97-044 #11\nClassified by: M. Charles Hill and\nHugh Montgomery\nBY Co NARA, DATE 1/17/11 Declassify on: Originating Determination\nAgency's\nRequired\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD\nDECLASSIFIED IN PART\nNLRR M08-099 #57291\nEXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT\n57291\nBY\n3\nNARA\nDATE\n5-7-10\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH\nE.O. 12958\nCURRENT REPORTS\nAs Amended\nSec. 3.3(b)(1) 3.5(c).1.4(e)\nDecember 23, 1983\n1.\nLEBANON: INR MILITARY UPDATE\nThere was a brief exchange of gunfire yesterday involving the\nMarines. The evacuation of the Christian enclave of Dayr al Qamar\ncontinued with only one incident when a motar round struck a vehicle,\ncausing one injury. Most of the Phalange personnel have now\ndeparted, but an estimated 2,000-3,000 civilian refugees are still to\nleave. Before leaving Tripoli on Monday, Fatah forces turned over\nmost of their heavy weapons to the Islamic Unification Movement, a\nLebanese Sunni group. Five hundred Fatah evacuees are in Iraq, and\nthe majority of Arafat's forces are en route to North Yemen, with a\nsmaller contingent destined for Tunisia.\n2.\nJORDAN: PREPARING TO DEAL WITH A POST-TRIPOLI ARAFAT\nArafat's willingness to cooperate with King Hussein to revive the\npeace process will have a profound effect on Jordan's future, Embassy\nAmman reports. Hussein had hoped either to co-opt Arafat in his\npresent weakened state or to circumvent a Syrian-dominated PLO by\nenlisting non-PLO Palestinian representatives in talks with Israel.\nHussein must prevent a PLO-Syrian rapprochement which could destroy\nthe chance of Arafat's joining his peace effort. The king will\ntherefore try to resume the dialogue with Arafat, seeking the\nPalestinian cover he needs to go forward in the peace process. If\nHussein fails, he will have to explore other options regarding the\nWest Bank and Gaza. (CONFIDENTIAL)\n3. EGYPT: ARAFAT'S VISIT\nArafat's visit to Cairo and meeting with President Mubarak was\nformally denounced by the PLO's Executive Committee in a statement\nissued in Tunis. The PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, and Fatah dissidents also\ncondemned the move.\nINR Comment: Arafat's decision to meet with Mubarak, after his\nmilitary defeat in Tripoli, may be meant to counterbalance the\nSyrians and reassert his importance as a key player in inter-Arab\npolitics. He also has alerted his Palestinian colleagues that, on\nsome issues, he is ready to take a more independent line in the\npost-Lebanon political environment. (CONFIDENTIAL)\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\n- 2 -\n5. GREECE: PROGRESS POSSIBLE TOWARD CYPRUS SETTLEMENT\nPrime Minister Papandreou told Ambassador Stearns December 22 that\nmovement is possible toward a Cyprus settlement despite the tense\nsituation there. UN Secretary General de Cuellar must take the\ninitiative, Papandreou said, because Turkey's recognition of Northern\nCyprus prevents useful discussions among the guarantor powers.\nPapandreou, who is preparing for discussions with Cypriot President\nKyprianou, said the essential elements of a settlement should be:\ndeparture of Turkish and Greek forces, reduction of the land area\ncontrolled by Turkish Cypriots to perhaps 25 percent of the island,\nand a government with a loose federal structure.\nAmbassador Stearns' Comment: Papandreou is aware that most observers\nbelieve he exerts pressure on Kyprianou not to compromise. It is\npossible that Papandreou wished to record his \"flexibility\" in\nadvance of Kyprianou's arrival. (SECRET/EXDIS)\n6. FRANCE: PLANNING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION\nFrance plans to strengthen political contacts with the Soviet Union,\ninviting First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Arkhipov\nto visit France early next year, Embassy Paris reports. In a number\nof recent statements, President Mitterrand has signaled a desire for\nimproved dialogue with the Soviets. The INF debate and the explusion\nof 47 Soviet diplomats weakened the ties that Paris formerly main-\ntained with Moscow. Now that the first deployments have taken place,\nthe French have decided to move. The government does not want to let\nthe FRG take the lead in promoting East-West dialogue.\nEmbassy Comment: The rapprochement will be limited, at least for the\ntime being. INF and the question of UK/French forces will not go\naway, and the Mitterrand government's tough-minded view about dealing\nwith the Soviets is unlikely to change. (CONFIDENTIAL)\n7. USSR: DOBRYNIN TO SKIP PARTY PLENUM\nThe Soviet Embassy has requested the customary VIP arrangements for\nDobrynin's arrival at Dulles Airport on December 23.\nINR Comment: Dobrynin has missed the year-end plenum and Supreme\nSoviet session several times in the past. During his month in\nMoscow, he presumably reviewed US-Soviet relations with his\nprincipals and may have contributed to the drafting of a Gromyko\nspeech for the Supreme Soviet session which begins on December 28.\n(SECRET)\n8.\nAFGHANISTAN\nA. Mujahidin Abandon Border Post\nReports from Peshawar indicate that Afghan mujahidin have departed\nSECRET/EXDIS/\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\n- 3 -\nthe Afghan border complex at Torkham. Reportedly, Pakistan--which\nnow holds a number of Afghan soldiers from Torkham, deposited by the\nmujahidin--pressured the mujahidin to leave the town.\nINR Comment: The mujahidin's departure will relieve Pakistan, which\nfeared that insurgent action so close to its border would invite\ndirect Soviet retaliation against its territory. (CONFIDENTIAL)\nB. Soviets Lukewarm about Cordovez Mission\nThe Soviet Union sees limited prospects for success in the resumption\nof UN representative Cordovez's mission, a foreign ministry official\ntold. Embassy Moscow. Middle Eastern Department Counselor Ozhegov\nblamed Pakistan for hampering Cordovez's effort by continuing to\nprovide a \"haven for bandits\" against the Karmal regime.\nEmbassy Comment: Ozhegov's emphasis upon Pakistan's role in blocking\nCordovez is a departure from past Soviet statements which held the US\nresponsible for Pakistan's unwillingness to compromise. The Soviets\nmay have concluded that President Zia is not, as they had earlier\nhoped, prepared to come to terms with Karmal. Moscow does not seem\ninclined to encourage Cordovez to undertake a new round of talks.\n(CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)\n9.\nBULGARIA/USSR: DIFFERENCES GROW DURING ANDROPOV ERA\nThe Soviet-Bulgarian differences which existed at the time of\nBrezhnev's death have become more evident under Andropov, Embassy\nSofia reports. The Bulgarians are trying to fend off Soviet requests\nfor INF counterdeployments on Bulgarian soil, and President Zhivkov\nhas shown interest in closer ties with the West at a time when the\nUSSR is stressing the negative impact of NATO deployments on\nEast-West relations. This trend toward more independent action may\ncontinue, though not at the cost of Bulgaria's loyalty to central\naspects of the Moscow line. Ultimately, Bulgaria remains dependent\non the USSR. (CONFIDENTIAL)\nTOP SECRET/EXDIS/\nSECRET/NOFORN\nBUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 23, 1983\n1. SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA: FEW RISKS IN THE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL\nSouth Africa has little to lose by withdrawing its military\nforces from southern Angola for 30 days. In putting forward this\nproposal, it is trying to be responsive to US insistence that\nPretoria move to higher diplomatic ground. Its choice of March\n1984 as the provisional limit of \"disengagement\" further reduces\nthe small risk the move entails.\n*\n*\n*\nThe South African proposal is similar to proposals dis-\ncussed by Angolan and South African negotiators at Cape Verde in\nDecember 1982 and February 1983, and comes at a time when South\nAfrican forces are engaged in deep air and ground penetrations in\nsouthern Angola. The extent of their present operations is not\nyet clear: they have moved well outside the salient occupied\nsince 1981 and may be attempting to destroy the remaining SWAPO\nbases in the area or to drive SWAPO (and Angolan) forces farther\nnorth. The operations coincide with UNITA'S move into parts of\nthe South African salient where UNITA is not normally present.\nThe South African proposal to withdraw does not address the UNITA\nproblem, but a withdrawal of South African troops to northern\nNamibia would leave UNITA elements in the salient, with resupply\nbases across the border.\nThe South African stipulation that \"disengagement\" begin on\nJanuary 31 and last for 30 days means that the SADF is being\ngiven six to eight weeks to wrap up its ongoing military cam-\npaign. This corresponds roughly to the duration of previous\nSouth African cross-border operations of similar magnitude. It\nis possible that civilian policy makers in Pretoria agreed to\nallow the present operation to run its course to secure South\nAfrican military acquiescence to the proposal.\nWith UNITA forces serving as a tripwire, the SADF is not\nrisking a quick Angolan/Cuban occupation of the salient. Also,\nby warning that remaining outside Angola for 30 days will be con-\ntingent on the FAPLA not exploiting its absence, the South\nAfricans have left the door open for reentry. They can deploy\nquickly from their bases just across the Namibian border.\nFinally, the present rainy season, which favors SWAPO's guerrilla\nwarfare and restricts vehicular movement, will end in March in\ntime for preparations for a new cycle of incursions, if needed.\nWhether the Angolans accept or reject the South African\novertures, there is no way they can exploit them to South\nAfrica's disadvantage. In the meantime, South Africa continues\nto hold a clear strategic advantage and now has advanced a\ndiplomatic pawn as well.\nDECLASSIFIED\nNLS F97-044 #13\nBY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/18/01\nSECRET/NOFORN\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\n- 2 -\n2. USSR: WAITING FOR ANDROPOV\nAndropov is expected to chair next week's party plenum and\nto appear at the Supreme Soviet session opening on December 28.\nBoth meetings will approve the 1984 plan and budget, and Gromyko\nprobably will address the legislature on foreign affairs. If\nthere are personnel changes, they will most likely involve\njunior politburo members and party secretaries.\n*\n*\n*\nThe latest indications of Andropov's ability to function in\npublic are mixed. He has reportedly postponed meetings with\nTrudeau and Armand Hammer. The continuing police purge of\ncorrupt officials and several honorable retirements recently of\naged local party leaders suggest, however, that his programs are\nbeing implemented under his supervision. But Andropov must\nchair the party plenum (opening next Monday or Tuesday), or\ngrave doubts will be cast on his ability to function in office.\nBecause of his prolonged absence, he may already be less able to\nmanipulate the current party elections in his favor. To date,\nno personnel changes have occurred at the oblast party-election\nmeetings now in progress.\nThe prospects seem poor for leadership changes at the\nplenum. The new Uzbek party boss could be given a candidate\nmembership on the politburo, although recent precedent argues\nagainst it. Andropov's choice to head the party personnel\ndepartment, Ligachev, might rise to the rank of CPSU secretary\nat the expense of Ivan Kapitonov, but Chernenko is not likely to\nmove from his job as ideology secretary despite the December 15\nattack on him via party criticism of his former bailiwick in\nMoldavia.\nAndropov's duties at the three-day legislative session are\nless demanding; he could skip some of the sessions at which the\nplan and budget are discussed. However, he will be expected to\nattend opening day, when Gosplan chief Baybakov and Finance\nMinister Garbuzov speak and Gromyko surveys the international\nscene.\nGarbuzov's announcement of the 1984 defense budget may con-\ntain a message: the formal figure of 17.05 billion rubles has\nheld steady for the last three budgets; if raised now, as some\nSoviet spokesmen have threatened, it would constitute a symbolic\nresponse to US defense spending without saying anything about\nactual Soviet outlays.\nAndropov's attendence at the closing day of the session\n(probably December 30) is also expected. After that, he has no\nmore scheduled public duties until January 27, when he should\nattend the Moscow city party elections.\nSECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 3 -\n3. ARGENTINA: FAST START FOR ALFONSIN\nBacked by a strong electoral mandate, President Alfonsin\nhas moved quickly to fulfill promises on human rights, military\nrestructuring, and labor-union reform. The armed forces are in\nno position to resist Alfonsin's attempts to curb their internal-\nsecurity role and assert civilian dominance. Economic recovery\nremains Alfonsin's biggest challenge. Announced austerity\nmeasures would probably satisfy IMF negotiators, but appear at\nodds with other facets of the government's program.\n*\n*\n*\nAlfonsin moved swiftly and dramatically against the\nmilitary--retiring generals and admirals, cutting budgets,\nsubjecting former junta members to trial for human rights\nabuses, and altering the hierarchical structure of the services.\nThere has been no forceful response from the armed forces. Many\nyounger officers probably sympathize with measures against their\nerstwhile commanders, whom they hold responsible for the sad\nstate of the military. Also, Alfonsin has acted with relative\nmoderation. He retired about 25 army generals, but rumors had\nit that he would axe twice that many. Moreover, while nine\nformer junta members will be tried, the vast majority of\nofficers guilty of abuses during the \"dirty war\" against\nterrorism will almost certainly escape penalties.\nOrganized labor is a more likely source of near-term oppo-\nsition than the military. Not only are policy differences\nlikely, but Alfonsin's promise to democratize the unions poses a\npersonal and political threat to the long-time Peronist bosses\nwho dominate the national labor scene. By demanding court-\nsupervised union elections, Alfonsin is gambling that his\nelectoral support from labor will surface on the factory floor.\nThe government's early economic measures suggest internal\ninconsistency. Intended dramatic reduction of the fiscal\ndeficit, primarily through increasing and improving tax collec-\ntions, conflicts with a projected five-percent growth rate and\nreduced unemployment. Only a surge in foreign investment or\ncapital repatriation--unlikely over the next six months at\nleast--could balance the deflationary impact on consumers of the\ntaxes. Full implementation of the announced Alfonsin program\nwill bring contraction rather than the promised expansion.\nGovernment spokesmen, including Alfonsin, have promised to\nhonor Argentina's international obligations. However, Economics\nMinister Bernardo Grinspun has asked the country's commercial-\nbank creditors for a moratorium until mid-1984 on payments on\npublic sector debt. It is unclear whether the moratorium would\ncover interest as well as principal payments.\nCONFIDENTIAL"
}