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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Agency File: Records
Folder Title: State INR Morning Summary
(12/17/1983-12/20/1983)
Box: RAC Box 8
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE
Withdrawer
SMF 10/14/2008
File Folder
STATE INR MORNING SUMMARY VOL. I 11/22-12/31/83
FOIA
[12/17/83-12/20/83]
M2008-098/6
Box Number
8
STOCKER
2
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
56171 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
4 12/20/1983 B1 B3
D
1/17/2001
F97-044/1 #15; PART. M098/6
5/9/2011 #56171
56172 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS (PARTIAL)
3 12/19/1983 B1 B3
PAR 1/17/2001
F97-044/1 #18; PART. M098/6
5/9/2011 #56172
56173 REPORT
ANALYSIS
3 12/19/1983 B1 B3
PAR 5/9/2011
M098/6
56174 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/17/1983 B1 B3
D
1/17/2001
F97-044/1 #21; PART. M098/6
5/9/2011 #56174
56175 REPORT
ANALYSIS
3 12/17/1983 B1 B3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information complied for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:
Archivist: kdb
Agency File
File Folder: State INR Morning Summary Vol. I 11/22-12/31/83
Date: 3/11/99
[12/17/83-12/20/83] Box 91375 8
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. list
re 12/20/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/20/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-044/, #14
2. report
Current Reports, 4p
12/20/83
P1, F1
A
u
3
15; Part. 5/9/11
M08-098/6#
171
3. report
re analysis, 3p
12/20/83
P1, F1
R 5/10/01 F97-044 #16
4. list
re 12/19/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/19/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-044/, #17
5. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/19/83
P1, F1
Part:
n
* 18; Part. 5/9/11
M08-098/6#561
72
6. report
re analysis, 3p
12/19/83
P1, F1
Part. 5/9/11 m08-098/6#56173
7. list
re 12/17/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/17/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-0441, # 20
8. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/17/83
P1, F1
n
и
9. report
re analysis, 3p
21; Part. 5/9/11
M08-048/6
#56174
12/17/83
P1, F1
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy ((a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:
Archivist: kdb
Agency File
File Folder: State INR Morning Summary Vol. I 11/22-12/31/83
Date: 3/11/99
[12/17/83-12/20/83] Box 91375 8
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. list
re 12/20/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/20/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-044/, # it
2. report
Current Reports, 4p
12/20/83
P1, F1
A
3
15
3. report
re analysis, 3p
12/20/83
P1, F1
R 5/10/01 F97-044 #16
4. list
re 12/19/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/19/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-044/, #17
5. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/19/83
P1, F1
Part:
n
18
6. report
re analysis, 3p
12/19/83
P1, F1
7. list
re 12/17/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/17/83
P1,F1
R 1/17/01 F97-0441, # 20
8. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/17/83
P1, F1
n
n
# 21
9. report
re analysis, 3p
12/17/83
P1, F1
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information ((a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office ((a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRA).
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA).
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 20, 1983
RR
Current Reports
1. Kuwait: Betrayal by a Senior Military Officer
2. Jordan: King Hussein's Address to the European Parliament
3. Cuba: Ready To Fire on US Reconnaissance Plane
4. Lebanon: INR Update
5. USSR: Impact of INF Debate on Relations with Eastern Europe
6. Chad: Habre Discusses the Negotiating Process
7. Angola: South African Attacks
8. Ivory Coast: Debt Rescheduling Request
9. El Salvador
A. Guerrillas Now Using Truck Convoys
B. Guerrillas Punish Army Battalion at Cerro Cacahuatique
10. Bolivia: Assassination Plot against US Ambassador
11. Nicaragua: Soviet Deliveries of Petroleum Products
Analysis
1. Lagos: Security Relationship with Vietnam
2. El Salvador: Additional Measures Needed To Defeat the
Insurgents
3. The Kremlin's Courtship of Willy Brandt
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-044 ø 14
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
BY CAS NARA, DATE 1/17/01 Declassify on: Hugh
Montgomery
Originating Agency's
Determination Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
AND
BY RW NARA DATE 5/9/11
CURRENT REPORTS
December 20, 1983
2. JORDAN: KING HUSSEIN'S ADDRESS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
King Hussein provided a comprehensive view of Jordan's role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process during his recent speech to the European
Parliament, Embassy Amman reports. He emphasized the need to focus
E.0.13526
13526
As Amerided
on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question, as well as
the importance of a US-Soviet dialogue on the Middle East and Soviet
participation in the peace process. Although Hussein praised the
Reagan initiative and reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to it as a
concept, he criticized the US for concentrating on Lebanon and
supporting Israel's "expansionist policy." Finally, Hussein said
that Jordan intends to continue its dialogue with the PLO and to
pursue the proposal that would link the occupied territories in
confederation with Jordan. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Luanda
X
ZAIRE
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ANGOLA
Menongue
Lubango
ZAMBIA
Namibe
Caiundo
Mulondo
Chibemba
Cuvelai
Cahama
Mupa
Area Occupied
Cunene
Ngiva
by South Africa
Rio
Ondangwa
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
o
100
200 kilometers
0
100
200 miles
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 2 -
5.
USSR: IMPACT OF INF DEBATE ON RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE
Soviet moves over the past year to defeat INF deployment may have
generated tensions between the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies which
were unexpected by the Soviet leadership, Embassy Moscow reports.
The USSR does not appear unduly concerned, and the difficulties the
Soviet Union faces probably will not translate into changes in
dealing with deployment in the months ahead. Implementation of
announced countermeasures to NATO deployment, however, is likely to
compound problems within the Pact, and Eastern bloc nations may now
be privately lobbying to ensure that repeated Soviet references to
"additional steps" do not mean any break in political or economic
relations with Western Europe. The Soviets may ultimately be able to
ease East European concerns over military countermeasures by agreeing
to keep ties to the West essentially intact. (CONFIDENTIAL)
6. CHAD: HABRE DISCUSSES THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
Chadian President Habre has not yet decided whether to attend the
January 9 negotiating conference in Addis Ababa despite assurances
given by Foreign Minister Miskine, Embassy Ndjamena reports. In
addition to concerns about personal safety in Ethiopia, Habre is
angry that Ethiopian leader Mengistu has also invited representatives
of eleven Chadian factions, thus leaving his status in doubt. Habre
doubts the Libyans will allow any progress in the negotiations, but
is under heavy French pressure to continue the process.
(SECRET/EXDIS)
7. ANGOLA: SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS
Luanda claims that the South African Defense Force (SADF) engaged
Angolan forces at Mulondo (see map) on December 14, that 17 Mirage
aircraft bombed that city on December 17, and that another SADF
bombing attack hit the town of Caiundo on December 19.
INR Comment: The Angolans often exaggerate the scale of South
African attacks, but their claims of such attacks usually prove to be
valid.
8. IVORY COAST: DEBT RESCHEDULING REQUEST
On December 17, Ivory Coast announced its decision to request
rescheduling of payments falling due between December 1, 1983 and
December 31, 1984 on all medium- and long-term. debt, Embassy Abidjan
reports. Interest payments are to be kept current, and short-term
debt will not be affected. Ivory Coast also announced that it will
need "new" money from private banks and international financial
institutions. Although a figure was not set, speculation is that it
will be in the range of $100-200 million. The French, the local IBRD
chief, and a representative from the IMF applauded the Ivorian
decision and implied full support. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS
our
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 20, 1983
1. LAOS: SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM
As a result of its close ties with Vietnam, Laos is troubled
by foreign-supported resistance activities and Chinese hostility.
Laos has in turn sought and received increasing Vietnamese assis-
tance, currently including 45,000 troops. Soviet military and
economic aid is also important and expanding. Although the
resistance does not now pose a threat to the regime's stability,
it continues to preoccupy Vientiane. Hanoi and Vientiane also
are increasingly concerned over a possible Chinese threat in
northern Laos.
*
The Vietnamese military's ties with their Lao counterparts
are long-standing and intimate. Besides training and logistics,
the Vietnamese military provides extensive guidance and dictates
basic security policies. Hanoi's troops have augmented Lao
troops in border surveillance operations and in the suppression
of Lao insurgents. Soviet assistance is mostly material and
technical.
Vientiane has become increasingly concerned about resistance
activities and has stepped up its military operations and begun
drafting more Lao youth into the army. Vientiane reportedly soon
plans to launch a resistance-suppression operation that will be
the "largest of its kind ever conducted in Laos." Despite some
increase in the resistance and in attempts to unify its disparate
parts, the insurgents remain disorganized and factionalized, and
their efforts alone do not seem to warrant the heightened Lao
countermeasures. Kong Le, a major resistance leader located in
China, allegedly is frustrated with resistance progress and will
return permanently to France.
Vientiane's concern may stem more from the threat of in-
creased Chinese activity on Laos' northern border. The Laotians
also see the resistance as a Chinese "fifth column" inside Laos.
Beijing has, in fact, for several years trained and supplied
resistance elements in northern Laos. The Vietnamese may fear
that if the Chinese decide to administer another "lesson," it may
in part be directed at northern Laos. China's military attache
in Bangkok recently stated that any "second lesson" against Viet-
BY LOS NARA, DATE 6/18/01
NLS
nam could include attacks along the Lao-China border.
Laos and Vietnam have conducted three major combined exer-
cises this year in northern Laos using scenarios that involved
F97-044 #16
DECLASSIFIED
repelling attacks by the Chinese and resistance forces. Hanoi's
forces have recently taken even greater responsibility for
defending the northern Lao border and now probably provide most
of its defense. Although realistically the tortuous terrain in
this region would make major military ground movements extremely
difficult, Hanoi and Vientiane clearly take this Chinese option
seriously.
SESPET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 2 -
2. EL SALVADOR: ADDITIONAL MEASURES NEEDED TO DEFEAT THE
INSURGENTS
The defeat last week of a newly trained battalion in east-
ern El Salvador highlights deficiencies in the war effort that
the government must remèdy in order to overcome the persistent
stalemate. Improvements in military manpower and equipment,
resolution of organizational and attitudinal problems in the
officer corps, preservation of economic and political reforms,
and neutralization of the extreme right are all necessary for a
successful outcome to the war.
*
*
*
The deployment of the newly trained Tecana anti-subversion
battalion to Morazan department on December 13 indicates the
frequent lack of planning in El Salvador. The Tecana was
inserted into highly contested Morazan, where insurgents have
moved freely for several years, after only five weeks training
and with no prior combat experience. The green battalion thus
became easy prey for seasoned guerrillas and is the third such
unit to be mauled in recent weeks.
The guerrillas appear to be specifically targetting these
battalions in order to damage further the army's morale and
weaken its confidence in US training. The error of rushing
these new units into heavy combat is now compounded by increased
guerrilla capabilities. Though total insurgent numbers are not
believed to have increased significantly during the course of
the war, more insurgents are now fully armed and able to be
effective in operations. Consequently, they can better exploit
mistakes of the Salvadoran military.
There is evidence that the government is nevertheless making
some progress against its many-dimensional insurgency problems.
The new constitution gives the reforms initiated in 1980 a multi-
party endorsement and helps pave the way for the presidential
election next March. The visit of Vice President Bush reportedly
resulted in a high degree of consensus among senior Salvadoran
officers that action must be taken against right-wing extremists.
This possible progress notwithstanding, the army itself
still has considerable difficulties to overcome before it can
optimally pursue the war. The sweeping command changes success-
fully effected by Defense Minister Vides Casanova are only
beginning to be reflected in field operations. Even if the
changes bring greater dynamism to prosecution of the war, con-
straints on mobility and logistics will remain, as will resis-
tance to change among many officers, With armed forces of
37,500 facing a seasoned guerrilla force of 9,000 to 11,000, the
Salvadoran military has a manpower ratio of only four to one
with the guerrillas, a far cry from the ten to one ratio often
believed necessary to quell an insurgency.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 3 -
3. THE KREMLIN'S COURTSHIP OF WILLY BRANDT
Three times in recent months the Soviet leadership has sent
personal letters to Willy Brandt appealing for his support on
key international issues. In playing up to Brandt, an old
political interlocutor and an influential Western political
figure who generally accords them sympathetic hearings, the
Soviets hope to encourage other "realistic" forces, especially
in Bonn, to be more responsive, especially on security issues.
*
*
*
On December 2, Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Vladimir Semenov
delivered Brandt a letter from Yuri Andropov which spelled out
in some detail the Soviet position on arms control. (In this
letter, Andropov essentially repeated the message from the
Soviet party's Central Committee to the SPD which Semenov had
delivered to Brandt on November 30.) In his personal message to
Brandt, Andropov extended an informal leadership invitation to
visit Moscow, tentatively in February.
Andropov's letter was the follow-up to a September 9 letter
bewailing US attitudes toward the INF talks and citing the US
"provocation" over the KAL incident as evidence of US disinter-
est in reaching an agreement. Andropov had noted that "the time
has now come for you to commit once again your prestige to the
cause of bridling the arms race. I would ask you to express
your thoughts on what we can do together to change the dangerous
course of events.'
A third letter to Brandt, dated December 9, this time in
the name of the Central Committee, warned that the US might
participate in an invasion of Nicaragua. Though framed somewhat
less personally, this missive noted that "we would welcome and
pay great attention to your thoughts on what might be under-
taken to counter the dangerous developments around Nicaragua."
As the former German chancellor and a statesman of world
standing, Brandt is seen by Moscow as a person whose views carry
weight with the electorate and hence with the government and who
might be able, as Andropov put it in his September letter, "to
exert appropriate influence on the U.S. Administration."
Moscow's appeal is also directed. to Brandt's role as chairman of
the Socialist International. While seeking to enlist Brandt's
influence with the Nordic socialists in the cause of Nicaragua,
Moscow also clearly has an eye to his resonance in the European
peace movement. As the Central Committee told the SPD, the
peace forces "must not relax the pressure just when it is needed
the most.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 19, 1983
Current Reports
1. Kuwait: Bombing Investigation Results Announced
2. Lebanon: INR Military Update
PR
3. Japan: Election Results
4. Nicaragua: Ortega's Call for Negotiations
5. USSR: Mixed Signals on Gromyko CDE Attendance
6. Egypt: Concern about Southern Sudan
7. Morocco: Dissatisfaction in the Army
8. USSR: More Arms to Iraq
9. Afghanistan: Regime Harasses Iranian Diplomats
10. USSR: Submarine Training of Special Forces
Analysis
1. East Asian Arms Assistance to the Iran-Iraq Conflict
2. El Salvador: Land Reform Compromised?
3. Nigeria: Balking at Economic Reform
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-044 # 17
Hugh Montgomery
Declassify on:
Originating Agency's
BY CAS NARA, DATE 1/17/01 Determination Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
56172
CURRENT REPORTS
December 19, 1983
1.
KUWAIT: BOMBING INVESTIGATION RESULTS ANNOUNCED
13526
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(8)(1)(6)
The Kuwaiti government has identified 12 persons, all members of the
extremist Shia "Al-Dawa" party, as responsible for the December 12
bombings, Embassy Kuwait reports. Ten people taken into custody have
confessed to planning and executing the bombings. According to the
the Kuwaitis believe that fewer than 20 persons
were involved in the crime and that Kuwaiti Shia may also be
implicated in the bombings. (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. LEBANON: INR MILITARY UPDATE
Israeli gunboats again shelled Tripoli yesterday. Although Greek
ships are still scheduled to evacuate Arafat and his fighters, press
reports indicate that the ships remain in Cyprus. The Syrians
publicly claimed responsibility for yesterday's antiaircraft fire on
US F-14 reconnaissance aircraft over Lebanon. Intermittent exchanges
continued in the Shuf, and another 500 civilians were evacuated from
Dayr al-Qamar. (SECRET)
3. JAPAN: ELECTION RESULTS
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a major defeat in
Sunday's lower house election with a possible loss of 36 seats. To
retain its parliamentary majority of 256 seats, the LDP reportedly
has recruited nine newly elected conservative independents. Early
returns show the largest opposition gains going to the Buddhist
Komeito "Clean Government" party and the Socialist Party.
Former Prime Minister Tanaka scored his biggest victory ever in his
home district. His well-organized faction within the LDP lost only
four seats. The Suzuki and Fukuda factions lost nine and seven
seats, respectively. Nakasone's faction lost five seats.
INR Comment: Low voter turnout, due in part to severe winter
weather, was a major factor in LDP losses, which occurred even in
normally conservative rural areas. A coalition with independents
would weaken seriously the LDP's authority in the Diet, particularly
on trade and defense matters. The setback greatly jeopardizes
Nakasone's political future. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4. NICARAGUA: ORTEGA'S CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Chief of State Daniel Ortega told a US Congressional delegation
December 15 that Nicaragua recognizes US security interests in
Central America and is ready to come to an agreement, Embassy Managua
reports. Ortega reaffirmed his commitment to the Contadora process
and added that Nicaragua would not allow its territory to be used as
a conduit for arms supply to other states, provided other Central
American countries did the same. Progress toward agreement now
depends on the US, whose contribution SO far has been limited to
propaganda, Ortega said.
DECLASSIFIED PART
NLRR Mo 8-098/6#56172
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
5/9/11
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
- 2 -
Embassy Comment: The Sandinistas have clearly decided to emphasize
explicit recognition of US security interests in their effort to find
a starting point for future negotiations. (CONFIDENTIAL)
6. EGYPT: CONCERN ABOUT SOUTHERN SUDAN
President Mubarak told Ambassador Rumsfeld that Egypt is deeply
concerned that Nimieri's efforts to enforce Islamic law have
exacerbated serious problems in southern Sudan, Embassy Cairo
reports. The communists are benefiting by using this issue to
alienate Sudanese Christians further, Mubarak said. During Nimieri's
recent visit to Cairo, Mubarak emphasized the dangers of this policy
and Nimieri reportedly agreed to "slow down" efforts to implement
Islamic law. Egypt's defense minister will soon visit Khartoum to
stress Mubarak's concern. (SECRET/EXDIS)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
- 3 -
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-098/6#56173
56173
BY RW NARA DATE 5/9/11
SECRET
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 19, 1983
1. EAST ASIAN ARMS ASSISTANCE TO THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT
Since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, East Asian
E.O. 13526
As Amended
arms have assumed increasing importance in the fighting. East
Asian arms deliveries, mainly North and South Korean and Chinese,
now constitute about 15 percent of Tehran's and Baghdad's global
Sec.
arms imports. Indeed, their combined shipments to Iran since 1980
almost equal those from the entire free world. North Korea has
become Tehran's largest supplier, exceeding even the Soviet Union,
and South Korea is one of Iran's largest noncommunist suppliers.
*
*
*
From 1980 through mid-1983, North and South Korea, China,
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan shipped almost $2 billion in arma-
ments to Iran and Iraq:
In million $
Iran
Iraq
Total
North Korea
771
0
771
PRC
97
611
708
South Korea
171
140
311
Japan
18
56
74
Singapore
14
NA
14
Taiwan
2
0
2
Total 1,073
807
1,880
While the Soviet Union and France remain Iraq's main suppliers,
North Korea's $771 million in deliveries to Iran during the
conflict considerably exceed Moscow's $475 million.
Ground forces receive the great bulk of these armaments,
including small arms, ammunition, explosives, mortars, trucks and
jeeps, radios, and quartermaster materials. However, North Korea
has sent tanks, antitank missiles, and sea mines to Iran, and
China has shipped F-7 fighter aircraft, antiship missiles, and
tanks to Iraq.
SECRET
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 2 -
2. EL SALVADOR: LAND REFORM COMPROMISED?
The National Assembly's newly approved constitution raises
the upper limit on landholdings from 150 to 245 hectares. The
far right ARENA party and its sometime ally, the National Con-
ciliation party, joined forces to achieve the new compromise.
The action will not, however, roll back the very extensive land
reform already carried out, which has helped to win rural sup-
port against the violent left.
*
*
*
The increased maximum limit applies mainly to the 1,700
farms of 100-500 hectares still dangling in the limbo of the
reform's never-carried-out Phase II. Phase II had been expected
to make another 73,000 hectares of land available for additional
reform beneficiaries. With the larger maximum, less than
30,000 hectares now will be available. However, the new limit
may reduce rightist opposition enough to permit Phase II to be
carried out. This would release 50,000 hectares of Phase II
farmland already claimed by renters under Phase III's land-to-
the-tiller program.
The ARENA-led coalition may try to block new land-to-the-
tiller claims after the end of this year. Campesino groups,
supported by the Christian Democrats, have vowed to keep appli-
cations open into a fifth year. About 53,000 individuals so far
have claimed ownership of land which they previously rented.
There are probably at least another 30,000 potential claimants,
but the majority are in the least secure areas, where filing is
risky.
The land reform stopped the ground swell of campesino
support for the violent left, removing its most effective
issue. Crop yields have held up remarkably well, given the
problems of violence, low world prices, and shortages of pro-
duction inputs. Yields in the reformed sector are now better
than in the traditional sector, except for cotton and rice.
The Salvadoran military continues to play an ambivalent
role in the land reform: the army helped the campesinos take
over the big farms but often turned its back when smaller land-
owners evicted land-to-the-tiller applicants. In the spring of
1982 a wave of violence and evictions threatened to overturn the
whole land reform until some of the regional military commanders
stepped in to return 2,300 campesinos to their claims. In
recent weeks, however, campesino leaders again have been threat-
ened with violence by the far right as the debate over the new
constitution's land reform provisions heated up.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
3. NIGERIA: BALKING AT ECONOMIC REFORM
President Shagari remains unwilling to take the stringent
measures necessary to achieve an agreement with the IMF. While
oil income has risen from the low levels of early 1983, foreign
exchange earnings remain depressed and Nigeria's international
credit standing is sinking due to poor performance in meeting
short term obligations. As the economy deteriorates, Shagari's
pleas for Western assistance to "save Africa's largest democ-
racy" will become more insistent.
*
*
*
The key obstacle to agreement with the IMF on a $2.5 bil-
lion extended fund facility (EFF) is the Fund's demand for a
large devaluation. The IMF wants Nigeria to devalue its cur-
rency from $1.35 to $1.00; the black market rate is only $0.40.
Related reforms on tariffs, subsidies, and producer prices--as
well as a proposed $300 million World Bank loan designed to
complement the EFF--are keyed to the exchange rate adjustment.
Lagos, however, is concerned over the political reaction to a
large devaluation in its import-dependent economy. Furthermore,
Shagari evidently is convinced that political leverage can force
the IMF to back down, as was evidenced by his aborted proposal
to ask President Reagan for US help.
Relations with international banks are strained because of
Lagos' failure to process letters of credit promptly in accor-
dance with recent agreements that rescheduled $2 billion of an
estimated $7.5 billion in short term arrearages. The banks in
effect are rolling over short term obligations, but they are not
willing to provide new money. The poor payment performance
could hinder ongoing efforts to reschedule the remaining $5.5
billion in short term arrearages, another likely precondition to
an IMF agreement. Nigeria remains current in servicing its
medium and long term debt.
Bankers believe Lagos' inability to make timely payments on
short term debt stems more from bureaucratic ineptitude than
from foreign exchange shortages. CIA trade data indicate
exports are averaging $950 million a month in 1983 and imports
$750 million a month. Oil production, which provides 95 percent
of foreign exchange earnings, recently has been holding near the
OPEC quota of 1.3 million b/d. Lagos is willing to exceed its
quota, but the soft oil market offers little prospect for an
increase in the near future. Moreover, government restrictions
and the freezing of credit lines by international banks have
squeezed imports indiscriminately, starving the import dependent
manufacturing sector. Luxury goods remain available in quantity
due to smuggling and bureaucratic corruption.
CONFIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 17, 1983
Current Reports
1. Lebanon
RR
A. INR Military Update
B. INR Update of PLO Evacuation
2. USSR/MBFR
A. Implications of Eastern Walkout
B. Pravda Links MBFR, INF
3. Kuwait: Steps toward Martial Law?
4. South Africa
A. Offer To Pull Out of Angola
B. Plans To Reduce Apartheid
5. USSR: Did Andropov Attend Politburo Meeting?
6. Italy: Arms Sales to Iran
7. Poland: Demonstrations Suppressed
Analysis
1. Nicaragua: Evaluating the "Concessions Offensive"
2. Election Prospects in Japan
3. Assad's Syria: Vulnerability Assessment
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
DECLASSIFIED
Hugh Montgomery
NLS F97-044 #20
Declassify on: Originating Agency's
BY Cts
Determination Required
NARA, DATE 1/17/01 TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
56174
CURRENT REPORTS
December 17, 1983
1. LEBANON
A. INR Military Update
E.O.7296- 13526
There were minor LAF-Druze clashes December 16 along the Alayh
AsAmended
3.3(B)(1)
ridgeline, and fighting continued between pro- and anti-Arafat forces
in Tripoli. Beirut Airport reopened yesterday as a "neutral" zone
under the National Salvation Front's ceasefire agreement, after a
17-day closure. However, small arms and mortar fire erupted near the
airport less than an hour after the ceasefire took effect. This
morning, US Marines at the airport came under small arms and mortar
fire, and a USMNF convoy returning from the US Embassy received and
returned small arms fire. No casualties were reported.
B. INR Update of PLO Evacuation
Plans for the evacuation appear to be proceeding smoothly. Reuter
reports that the first of five evacuation ships left Piraeus on
December 16, and that the rest were expected to follow soon.
Seriously wounded fighters would be taken on an Italian ship to
Cyprus and then flown to Cairo, according to Embassy Rome. Reuter
also reports that the Greek government claims it has all the
"necessary guarantees" for a safe evacuation. (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. USSR/MBFR
A. Implications of Eastern Walkout
The East's withdrawal has created uncertainty about the future of the
negotiations and contributed to European concerns over Western
defense policy. Moscow is now in a position to end an arms control
forum it never really wanted, and it may believe the West will be
forced to work for the resumption of the talks.
MBFR Vienna Comment: The Soviet position on MBFR is more cryptic
than on START and presents a more difficult target for Western
criticism. Our allies want to maintain the MBFR forum, but will
differ on how to do so. The Soviets have kept their options open by
attaching no specific conditions to resumption of the talks.
(SECRET/EXDIS)
B. Pravda Links MBFR, INF
In a brief article sandwiched between two parts of a long, unsigned
piece on INF, Pravda reported December 16 that a date for the
resumption of the MBFR talks "will be fixed later."
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
NLRR 108-098/4*56174
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
5/9/11
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 2 -
Embassy Moscow Comment: There are no signs the USSR intends to end
the MBFR talks permanently. Pravda's apparent linkage of INF and
MBFR, its remarks on resumption of the MBFR talks, and its closing
emphasis in the INF piece on Moscow's firm commitment to end the arms
race, suggest the Soviets will return to Vienna. (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. KUWAIT: STEPS TOWARD MARTIAL LAW?
Press reports indicate Kuwaiti forces have imposed round-the-clock
roadblocks and are patrolling the country's beaches and coastal
waters. Special troops surround the Shu'aybah port and oil
installation, target of one of the December 12 bombings and the major
transshipment point for Iraqi war supplies. The government has
reportedly taken control of all operations there, deploying 1,000
troops with heavy equipment and drastically slowing work with
security precautions.
INR Comment: Kuwaiti leaders appear determined to meet the
continuing threat with an "iron hand." Stern measures toward the
country's Shia minority, whose loyalty is suspect, could be
counterproductive because Shiites constitute a large segment of the
city-state's total population.
4. SOUTH AFRICA
A. Offer To Pull Out of Angola
South Africa has told the UN it will withdraw its forces from Angola
January 31 for 30 days if Luanda can guarantee that SWAPO, Angolan,
and Cuban troops will not exploit the withdrawal, Embassy Pretoria
reports. The offer is an effort to defuse the upcoming Angola debate
in the Security Council and to accommodate UN Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar, whom Pretoria considers even-handed on Namibia.
Embassy Comment: This offer has the potential to neutralize the
Security Council debate and to focus the Namibian question on the
issue of Cuban withdrawal. A decision on South Africa-Angola talks
is now up to Luanda. (SECRET/EXDIS).
B. Plans To Reduce Apartheid
The government may be preparing major moves to reduce racial dis-
crimination, Embassy Pretoria reports. Significant revisions in the
Mixed Marriages, Immorality, and Group Areas Acts may be introduced
in 1984 despite recent anti-black incidents. The regime may feel the
need to attract new English voters into a reformist nationalist
party, to assure coloreds and Asians that their participation in the
new constitutional system will not bolster apartheid, and to start
bringing blacks into the political system.
Embassy Comment: The regime wants to move promptly to eliminate the
more notorious aspects of apartheid with efforts that appeal to both
internal and international audiences. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
- 3 -
5. USSR: DID ANDROPOV ATTEND POLITBURO MEETING?
The press report of the regular Thursday Politburo meeting referred
to Andropov's remarks on balancing the 1984 economic plan, but did
not say specifically that he spoke at the meeting.
INR Comment: The artfully worded communique appears intended to
suggest that Andropov was present.
6. ITALY: ARMS SALES TO IRAN
Italy does not appear ready to accede to the US request to block all
military sales to Iran, Embassy Rome reports. The foreign ministry
said that such a ban would endanger the 3,000 Italians working in
Iran, that the Italian government would bear responsibility for
preexisting contracts, and that a coordinated Western cutoff would
only drive the Iranians into the arms of the Soviets. Rome believes
that the "Afghanistan effect" has worn off among the Iranians, who
would feel little compunction about turning to Moscow to replace lost
Western arms. (SECRET/EXDIS)
7. POLAND: DEMONSTRATIONS SUPPRESSED
A massive nationwide security operation yesterday thwarted
underground attempts to stage major demonstrations, although
protesters clashed with water cannon reinforced riot police in at
least five cities. In Warsaw, some 4,000 people marched peacefully
but police later used clubs to disperse churchgoers after evening
masses. Walesa, bedridden with the flu, sent his wife to place a
wreath at the shipyard workers monument in Gdansk.
INR Comment: A widespread sense of futility, sub-zero temperatures,
and the regime's massive display of force contributed to the
relatively low turnout. Although the regime will use this as further
proof of dwindling support for the underground, it is not taking
unnecessary chances and has apparently postponed the introduction of
food price hikes from January 1 until late February. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/
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