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Ireland (03/01/1983-03/10/1983)
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518257411
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Ireland (03/01/1983-03/10/1983)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:
Records, 1981-1985
SERIES: III: EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION
Folder Title: Ireland (03/01/1983-03/10/1983)
Box: RAC Box 15
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-
support/citation-guide
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Last Updated: 05/09/2025
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE
Withdrawer
KDB
7/7/2015
File Folder
IRELAND (3/1-83-3/10/83)
FOIA
F03-002/5
Box Number
15
SKINNER
59
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
168233 REPORT
1
8/2/1982 B1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
.560
National Security Council
The White .louse
1
MAR 1220P 0 1 1983
Package # 1106
Bousue
SEQUENCE TO
ACTION
John Poindexter
1
HAS BP SEEN
A
Bud McFarlane
2
m
Jacque Hill
3
Judge Clark
4
A
John Poindexter
5
Staff Secretary
6
D
Sit Room
I-Information A-Action R Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
NOTE
DISTRIBUTION
cc:
VP
Meese
Baker
Deaver
Other DAILEY
COMMENTS
Julyse,
This in its referred to in
Flo: the FBI report. R
\
This letter should have been on
small paper. should be brought to attention
of whomean typed. 20
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WABHINGTON
March 8, 1983
Dear Congressmán untorio Biaggi:
Thank you very much for your letter of February 14 concerning a
meeting on the subject of Ireland. I regret that I will not be
able to meet with you and your delegation. I know that we all
share a commitment to solving the problems of Northern Ireland
through peaceful means based on the will of the people of
Northern Ireland. Americans who love Ireland have the
responsibility of supporting peaceful attempts to solve these
problems and speaking out against the men of violence.
Sincerely,
Bur
William P. Clark
The Honorable
Mario Biaggi
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
3
ID 8301106
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PAGE D01
REFERRAL
DATE: 08 MAR 83
MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: BIAGGI, MARIO
SOURCE: CLARK
DATE: 08 MAR 83
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
CONGRESSIONAL
AC
SUBJ: RESPONSE TO BIAGGI LTR RE REQUEST FOR MTG RE IRELAND
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH TO PETER H. DAILEY
US AMBASSADOR TO IRELAND
DUBLIN
DUEDATE: 11 MAR 83
COMMENTS: ** COURTESY COPY OF CLARK LTR
MICHAEL WHEELER
STAFF SECRETARY
NW
1106
4
MEMORANDUM
ACTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 23, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
SIGNED
FROM:
DENNI DR.S.S BLAIR
SUBJECT:
Response to Congressman Biaggi's Letter
Attached for your signature is a reply to a letter from Mario
Biaggi requesting a meeting with you to discuss the issue of
reunification of Ireland. You have nothing to gain from such a
meeting and the letter for your signature at Tab I politely
turns down the request.
Pear
Peter Sommer concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Ltr signed 3/5/83.
Tab I
Letter to Biaggi
Tab A
Biaggi letter
I om not a member of this org!
send eco of bets DP. Daily
1106
5
MARIO BIAGGI
COMMITTEES:
10TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK
EDUCATION AND LABOR
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
SUBCOMMITTEES:
2428 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
ELEMENTARY, SECONDARY AND
Congress of the United States
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2464
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
house of Representatives
SELECT EDUCATION
DISTRICT OFFICES:
BRONX
VICE-CHAIRMAN
2004 WILLIAMSBRIDGE ROAD
Mashington, D.C. 20515
MERCHANT MARINE AND
BRONX, NEW YORK 10461
FISHERIES
(212) 931-0100
CONGRESSIONAL PORT CAUCUS
QUEENS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
SECOND FLOOR
February 14, 1983
CHAIRMAN,
22-02 STEINWAY STREET
MERCHANT MARINE
QUEENS, NEW YORK 11105
COAST GUARD AND NAVIGATION
(212) 932-4448
SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING
SUBCOMMITTEE:
Hon. William P. Clark
CHAIRMAN, HUMAN SERVICES
Assistant to the President for National
DEMOCRATIC STEERING AND
Security Affairs
POLICY COMMITTEE
The White House
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
Washington, D.C. 20500
(EX-OFFICIO)
CHAIRMAN, AD HOC
Dear Judge Clark:
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR IRISH AFFAIRS
As Chairman of the bi-partisan Ad Hoc Congressional
Committee for Irish Affairs, and on behalf of a delegation
of concerned Irish Americans mostly from the Ancient Order
of Hibernians, I am writing to request a meeting with you to
discuss the issue of the reunification of Ireland.
This meeting would be the direct outgrowth of a meeting
which I attended in New York on January 21, 1983 sponsored by
Mr. James A. Delaney, one of the National Directors of the
Ancient Order of Hibernians. The meeting was called to discuss
strategies aimed at developing a more positive United States
role in the cause of peace and justice in Ireland. Among those
who would attend the meeting is Mr. Joseph A. Roche, National
President of the Ancient Order of Hibernians.
In light of a brief discussion I had with you on the subject
of Ireland and your own trip to Ireland as well as your membership
in the Ancient Order of Hibernians, I hope you will be able to
find time to meet with the delegation. I look forward to hearing
from you at your earliest convenience.
With warm regards, I am
Sincerely,
MARIO BIAGGI, M. C.
P.S. Attached please find a list of names and addresses of
individuals who would want to be included in any meeting you would
agree to. They were in attendance with me on January 21 in New York.
THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS
Clark, William P.
-2-
February 14, 1983
1) Joseph A. Roche, National President, Ancient Order
of Hibernians, 13002 Fork Road, Baldwin, Maryland 21013
2) James A. Delaney, National Director/Chairman, Right to
Life Committee, 247 Patricia Drive, San Antonio, Texas 78216
3) James P. Shannon, National Director/Constitution Ritual and
Progress Committee, 747 Val Sereno, Olivenhain, California
92024
NSC/S OFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8301106
7
RECEIVED 16 FEB 83 17
TO
CLARK
FROM BIAGGI, MARIO
DOCDATE 14 FEB 83
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
CONGRESSIONAL
AC
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ CLARK RE REUNIFICATION OF IRELAND
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK
DUE: 19 FEB 83 STATUS S FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLAIR
SOMMER
FORTIER
MYER
KIMMITT
HILL
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(N/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
COPIES TO
Clark Y ASSIGNED 31, In DUE 3/5
ACTION Signature REQUIRED
C MAR 0 8 1983 Clark spd th
DB
DISPATCH 3/08
W/ATTCH FILE at (C)ants
in cy to AMB Peter Daily done mis
8
MEMORANDUM
DECLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WPC HAS SEEN
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
NLRR 748-15-301-7
October 4, 1982
BY KDB NARADATE 7/7/15
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
DENNIS C BLAIR
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Irish Foreign Minister Collins
October 4, 1982, 10:30 a.m.
Attached is a State briefing paper for Eagleburger giving the
four most important U.S.-Irish issues of the moment. You can
expect that Collins will give you his negative views on the
Prior initiative, and perhaps request that you personally put
pressure on the British to adopt a different approach. In
addition, Collins may ask you to accede to the Irish position
on the Air Lingus dispute. The Irish wish to reply to British our
questions concerning Air Lingus contacts with Libya.
We
prefer to send a Commerce Department official to Dublin.
Tab A
Briefing memo
9
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-15-30-2-6
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S
BY CDB NARA DATE 7/7/15
CONFIDENTIAL (Entire Text)
TO:
Under Secretary Eagleburger
FROM:
EUR - Richard Burt, Designate
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Irish Foreign Minister
Gerard Collins at the UNGA
I.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
1.
Seek Collins' views on the future role of UNIFIL.
2.
Reaffirm US policy on Northern Ireland: that a
lasting solution can be found only through a
process of reconciliation between the two tradi-
11
tions in Northern Ireland and between Britain and
Ireland.
3.
(If Asked) Affirm the US need to obtain information
on transfer of Aer Lingus aircraft to Libya and our
sensitivity to Irish concerns.
4.
(If Asked) Express our commitment to resolve promptly
the rates (real estate tax) issue
II.
SETTING
Collins came to the position of Foreign Minister with no
background or known interest in foreign policy. In New York
and Washington (October 1-5) he will press his government's
announced first political priority -- the unity of Ireland.
Eis schedule includes media appearances and meetings with
rembers of Congress. Collins is sensitive to the kind of
welcome he receives from Administration officials, given the
Fianna Fail perception that the US favors a FitzGerald
Government in Dublin. Collins may continue to seek an
opportunity to meet privately with the Secretary.
III.
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Ireland
Under Secretary Eagleburger
Foreign Minister Collins
Richard Burt - EUR
Attachments:
1. President's Statement of 3/17/82
2. Biographic Sketch
CONFIDENTIAL
DECT OADR
10
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
MP
Drafted : EUR/NE:MBarry
Clearances:EUR:RBlackwill
EUR/NE:MSPendleton
EB/EWT
00
RKirkpatrick
IO/UNP:HSizer
NEA/ARN:EJones
pm
L/M:KMalmborg
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-3-
IV.
DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES
Seek Collins' views on the future role of UNIFIL
As a troop contributor to UNIFIL, the GOI is concerned
about its future role as a peacekeeping force and will want to
know your views. Prior to departing for New York, Collins told
the press that Ireland has no intention of unilaterally
withdrawing troops from Lebanon, but he expressed his concern
about the current "inability of UNIFIL to fulfill its
mandate". Collins is due to meet September 29 with the Foreign
Ministers of Syria and Israel.
Collins has emphasized the need "to put the Security
Council and the Secretary-General on notice about the need to
strengthen the mandate of the peacekeeping forces and improve
their military capacity to ensure that they are allowed to
discharge their role".
Former Prime Minister FitzGerald expressed a similar view
to us during his visit this week, adding that the make-up and
quality of the force, which includes both trained professional
soldiers (Irish) and conscripts, should also be reviewed.
A KEY PART OF OUR EFFORT IN LEBANON IS TO NEGOTIATE A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE SOUTH.
A STRENGTHENED UNIFIL WITH A WIDER MANDATE REMAINS OUR
PREFERRED OPTION AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
WE HOPE IRELAND WILL CONTINUE ITS PARTICIPATION IN UNIFIL.
WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE MANDATE?
CONFIDENTIAL
12
CONFIDENTIAL
-4-
Reaffirm US policy on Northern Ireland: that a lasting
solution can be found only through a process of reconciliation
between the two traditions in Northern Ireland and between
Britain and Ireland.
The British "rolling devolution" proposal, calling for
Assembly elections October 20, appears in serious trouble,
although the major parties will at least field candidates. The
Haughey Government has rejected the proposal. Collins will be
looking to Washington to pressure the British to add an
all-Ireland dimension and will emphasize that the solution
should be worked out directly between Dublin and London.
Specifically, Haughey and Collins want the British to withdraw
its "guarantee" that Northern Ireland's relationship to the UK
can be terminated only with the agreement of the majority
community. Their position contrasts with ours and with that of
Garret FitzGerald, who is convinced any solution requires that
the separate identities of the two communities be guaranteed
and who thinks the Prior plan, with all its defects, should be
given a chance.
Our interest at this time is to avoid any action which
might contribute to an abortion of Prior's efforts. We also
have an interest in encouraging the moderates, including John
Hume's SDLP, to take seats in the Assembly, although this
message to Collins would be more effective if it came from
interested Congressional leaders. If the present limited
political movement in the province breaks down, the IRA and
other extremists may fill the void.
THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 17 STATEMENT CONTINUES AS THE BASIS
OF US POLICY ON NORTHERN IRELAND.
WE HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE PRIOR
PLAN EXCEPT GENERALLY TO ENCOURAGE BRITISH EFFORTS TO WORK OUT
A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE TWO COMMUNITIES.
O
WE THINK A SOLUTION DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF LEADERS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND, BRITAIN AND IN THE REPUBLIC.
WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SEE YOUR RELATIONS WITH LONDON BACK ON AN
EVEN KEEL.
O
IF THE MODERATES MAKE A GOOD SHOWING IN THE ELECTION, THEY
WILL HAVE MORE CREDIBILITY BOTH HERE AND IN LONDON.
CONFIDENTIAL
13
CONFIDENTIAL
-5-
(If asked) Affirm the US need to obtain information on the
transfer of Aer Lingus aircraft to Libya and our sensitivity to
Irish concerns.
Since October 1981 Commerce has been investigating the sale
of three Boeing 707's by Aer Lingus to Libya's United African
Airlines (UAA). The aircraft were sold without reexport
licenses required by US law. The sale of a fourth Aer Lingus
aircraft was cancelled after Commerce issued a temporary denial
order in September 1981 against Aer Lingus and its agents. A
request for information on the transfers and for Aer Lingus
cooperation in the investigation was presented to the Irish in
a December 3, 1981 diplomatic note. The Irish have cooperated
by terminating a servicing contract for the aircraft between a
partially-owned subsidiary, ATEL, and UAA.
We have confirmed to the Irish that statutorily we are
obligated to continue through the information gathering phase
of the investigation, despite Irish complaints that the issue
should not be "re-opened". We have proposed to make available
Commerce DAS Ted Wu to travel to Dublin to review the issue
with Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
Sean Gaynor. The Irish have countered with a proposal that we
provide the GOI a questionnaire or specific list of
docucentation required. Wu has told us he strongly prefers not
to specify the documentation or prepare a questionnaire for
presentation to the Irish but prefers to travel to Dublin as we
had proposed. You should confirm to Collins our interest in
resolving this issue promptly, and if pressed, reaffirm our
desire to send Wu to Dublin for informal consultations in late
October or early November.
The Irish are anxious to resolve this matter quickly and
quietly. Ambassador Dailey has assured Secretary General Sean
Donlon that we are sensitive to that interest.
O
WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THIS MATTER AND HAVE CONCLUDED
TEAT STATUTORILY WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO RENEW OUR REQUEST TO
AER LINGUS TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION ON THE SALE.
CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF US LAWS AND REGULATIONS REQUIRES
THAT OUR INVESTIGATION CONTINUE.
WE ARE ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER PROMPTLY.
O
(If Pressed) WE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE COMMERCE DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY WU TRAVEL TO DUBLIN FOR INFORMAL
CONSULTATIONS, RATHER THAN TO MAKE A MORE FORMAL, WRITTEN
SUBMISSION.
CONFIDENTIAL
14
CONFIDENTIAL
6-
(If asked) Express our commitment to resolve promptly the
rates (real estate taxes) issue.
The Dublin Corporation has assessed real property taxes
(rates) against various US Government-owned properties since
1948. We have refused to pay these taxes on the ground that
the affected properties are entitled to exemption based on
international law, treaties in force between the two countries
and reciprocity. Negotiations since 1948 have been relatively
unproductive. Recently, the Dublin Corporation mounted a media
campaign to embarrass the USG on this issue. The key issue
underlying the dispute is whether the USG is obliged to pay the
so-called "beneficial portion" of the rates.
We believe that agreement between the two governments is
near and that the USG will end up agreeing to a payment between
20% (the rate we pay in London) and 80% of the beneficial
portion (claimed by the Dublin Corporation). Fil Shamwell from
L/M will travel to Dublin in November for discussions with the
Irish and will be prepared to make a concrete offer.
O
WE ARE ANXIOUS TO SETTLE THE RATES ISSUE AS QUICKLY AS
POSSIBLE.
O
WE WILL BE SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO DUBLIN IN NOVEMBER
WHO WE HOPE WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BOTH THE BACK
TAXES AND A SCHEDULE FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS.
CONFIDENTIAL
15
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 17, 1982
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
St. Patrick's Day reminds us of the power of joy. It is a
day when spirits are lifted, when millions join together in
friendship; when strangers greet each other with affection.
The spell cast on us by a small island 3,000 miles away
began more than a century ago when Irish immigrants first
came to this land -- immigrants whose sweat and labor built
our economy, whose hearts and minds shaped our literary and
intellectual history, whose smiles and mirth gave us the
gift of laughter, whose conscience and spirituality reminded
us of the importance of religious faith in our lives.
Today all Americans -- of Irish descent and honorary Irish
descent -- celebrate one of the happiest days of the year in
our country -- a day marked by peace, friendship and harmony.
Yet today our thoughts cannot be entirely joyful -- we who
owe SO much to the "land across the Irish sea" cannot help
but reflect on a tragic irony: Northern Ireland is troubled
by conflict and violence. We in America who owe so much to
our kinsmen of both Irish and British heritage, Protestant
and Catholic alike, can never be indifferent to the problem
of violence in Northern Ireland. That is why we seek to
contribute in any way we can to a lasting, peaceful solution
that will bring to an end years of conflict and violence.
The twelve months since last St. Patrick's Day have brought
both hope and sorrow in Northern Ireland. There have been
grounds for optimism for the future. The level of violence
continued its generally downward trend. In this country,
U.S. law enforcement authorities confiscated a large number
of weapons intended for terrorist hands in Ireland. Perhaps
most important despite the sorrows of the past year, there
are signs that the climate has improved for moderate political
solutions.
We will continue to stand by our policy -- to urge the parties
in Northern Ireland to come together for a just solution and
to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence. We believe a
-MORE-
-2-
16
lasting solution can be found only through a process of
reconciliation between the two traditions in Northern
Ireland and between Britain and Ireland. We encourage
and applaud such efforts. We particularly welcome the
British and Irish governments' widening of the framework
of their cooperation to this end.
But as much as we wish for a just and peaceful settlement,
we in the United States cannot chart a course for the people
of Northern Ireland. If solutions are to endure, they must
come from the people themselves.
We stand unalterably opposed to the forces of violence and
discord in Northern Ireland, which obstruct the process of
reconciliation so necessary to peace. Those who advocate
violence or engage in terrorism will have no welcome in the
United States.
Last year, I called on all Americans to question closely any
appeal for financial or other aid from groups involved in
the Northern Ireland conflict to ensure that contributions do
not end up in the hands of those who perpetuate violence, either
directly or indirectly. Today, I renew that request. Continued
violence, even by a misguided few, can only frustrate the desire
for peace of the overwhelming majority of the entire community
of Northern Ireland.
As we look to the future, we can be proud that the United States
already is making an important contribution toward economic and
social progress in Ireland. We are proud of our role in
strengthening the Irish economy. There are over 300 American
companies with manufacturing plants in Ireland. This investment
by American industry shows a clear commitment to a future based
on peace and well-being for the people who live in Ireland, North
and South.
This Administration will maintain the U.S. committment to facilitat
growth of additional job-creating investment -- investment that wil
benefit all the people of Ireland. In the meantime, we encourage
the American private sector to continue to assist in creating more
job opportunities in Ireland.
In affirming these principles of our policy toward Northern Ireland
I wish to add my appreciation and support for the many true friends
of Ireland in this country, in the Congress and among the public,
who continue to speak out against violence and in support of peace
and reconciliation. Their efforts are among the most important
contributions to the cause of peace in Northern Ireland, and I joir
them in the prayer that our hopes will soon be realized. It is by
assisting in commercial development, combating terrorism and
encouraging the process of peaceful reconciliation that we in
America can do our part to bring peace to Northern Ireland.
###
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE
KDB 7/7/2015
File Folder
FOIA
IRELAND (3/1-83-3/10/83)
F03-002/5
SKINNER
Box Number
15
59
ID
Document Type
No of Doc Date Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
168233 REPORT
1
8/2/1982
B1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
13
National Security Council
RECEIVED House
Page
Package # 368
82 OCT 4 A10: 05
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN
ACTION
John Poindexter
Bud McFarlane
Jacque Hill
Judge Clark
John Poindexter
Staff Secretary
Sit Room
I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
DISTRIBUTION
cc:
VP
Meese
Baker
Deaver
Other
COMMENTS
For 10:30 am mtg
NSC/S PROFILE
CONFIDENTIAL
ID 8206898
UNCLASSIFIED UPO
MOVA
OF CLASSIFIED RNCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 04 OCT 82 13
TO
CLARK
FROM BLAIR
7/7/15600
DOCDATE 04 OCT 82
19
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
AC
COLLINS, GERARD
SUBJECT: CLARK MTG W/ IRISH FOMIN 4 OCT
ACTION: FOR INFORMATION
DUE:
STATUS IX FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
CLARK
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(N/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
C 10/4 noted by Clark- DB
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE PA I (C)
RH
CONFIDENTIAL
20
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023191
SIT586
DATE 10/21/82
TOR: 292/1406Z
3. THE HAUGHEY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PROPOSALS IN
MARCH 1982 AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GET A GREATER
"IRISH DIMENSION" INCLUDED. THAT EFFORT BECAME
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
ENMESHED IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND BY
LATE SPRING, RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
SIT: CKLS
HAD REACHED THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR TEN YEARS. THUS,
EOB: COMMENTS: CHECKLIST
WHILE THE GOI DID NOT NECESSARILY WANT THE SDLP TO
WHSR COMMENT:
TAKE THE LATE AUGUST DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT SEATS
IN THE ASSEMBLY DUBLIN OFFICIALS ACCEPT THAT, FROM
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
DECLASSIFIED
THE NATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW, THE PARTY HAD LITTLE
OPTION. THERE ARE FEARS IN DUBLIN, HOWEVER, THAT
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
NLRR 748-15-30-4-4
A FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY COULD, AT BEST, LEAD TO
A CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL STERILITY OF DIRECT
MESSAGE:
RULE OR, AT WORST, TO MOVES FOR NORTHERN
BY
EDB
NARA
PRIORITY
DATE
7/7/15
IRELAND'S FULL INCORPORATION INTO THE UK.
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921356
4. AT THIS POINT, OTHER THAN THEIR INCREASINGLY
P 191340Z OCT 82
DIMINISHED HOPE FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN "IRISH
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
DIMENSION" IN PRIOR'S NORTHERN PLAN, THE GOI SEES
FEW OPTIONS STILL OPEN. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9404
GAMBIT FOR THE MOMENT SEEMS TO BE THE TIME-HONORED
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
APPROACH OF TURNING TO THE USG FOR HELP TO
PRESSURE LONDON EITHER TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4061
AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AS THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1100
TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND OR EVEN
BT
BETTER IN DUBLIN'S VIEW TO ALTER OR ELIMINATE
CONFIDENTI SECTION 01 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
THE BRITISH "GUARANTEE" ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/15/88
BELIEVE THAT, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME (PERHAPS BY
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, EI, UK
MARCH OR APRIL), AND IF NEEDED, THE USG MIGHT PLAY A
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE EVOLUTION OF DUBLIN'S
QUIET BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN GETTING LONDON AND
-
POLICY
DUBLIN TALKING AGAIN. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT
REF: A) DUBLIN 3697; B) DUBLIN 3436; C) DUBLIN 3291;
REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982 STATEMENT THAT IF NORTHERN
D: DUBLIN 1851; E) DUBLIN 1641; F1 DUBLIN 1562;
IRELAND SOLUTIAHNOJT TO "ENDURE THEY MUST COME
G) DUBLIN 1045; H) DUBLIN 892; I) 81 DUBLIN 4584
FROM THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES" SHOULD REMAIN VERY
MUCH THE BASIS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ULSTER
1. C-ENTIRE TEXT
PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.
I. SUMMARY
11. MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER DIALOGUE
2. EVEN THOUGH THE CURRENT FREEZE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
5. EVEN BEFORE THE IRISH SHIFT ON THE FALKLANDS
DUBLIN AND LONDON EXACERBATED THE IRISH SHIFT
SANCTIONS QUESTION IN MAY, 1982, LONDON-DUBLIN
ON THE FALKLANDS SANCTIONS, THE FREEZE'S REAL
RELATIONS HAD COOLED PERCEPTIBLY. IN LARGE
ORIGINS LIE IN DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE TWO COUNTRIES
MEASURE THE DECLINE WAS STARTED BY A RIFT OVER
INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BEST
NORTHERN IRELAND AND SIMPLY ACCELERATED BY
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN
DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLANDS. INDEED, NEWLY
PART, STEMS FROM CLEARLY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS
ELECTED PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY LITERALLY FROM
HIS FIRST DAY BACK IN OFFICE DESPITE THE FACT
MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :
OF WHAT THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE SIGNIFIES AND
WHAT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF
THE PROCESS. FOR DUBLIN THE DIALOGUE ITSELF IS
BASED UPON A RECOGNITION BY LONDON OF AN IRISH
DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023191
RIGHT TO A ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF NORTHERN
IRELAND'S FINAL STATUS. FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS
PROCESS, THE IRISH BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD WON
AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL AND REGULAR
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS.
FROM THE IRISH POINT OF VIEW THERE WERE INADEQUATE
CONSULTATIONS OVER THE PRIOR PLAN AND WHAT THERE WERE
RAISED FALSE HOPES IN DUBLIN THAT WERE DASHED BY THE
FINAL PRODUCT A DOCUMENT THAT THE GOI
BELIEVES TO BE VOID OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AND
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NORTHERN NATIONALISTS
CONF DENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECALLED
21
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023198
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TOR: 292/1413Z
DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001
PRIORITY
DE RUFHDB *3815/02 2921404
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9405
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4062
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1101
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A CAMPAIGN ISSUE DECLARED
NORTHERN IRELAND HIS PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PRIORITY
(REF H). TWO WEEKS LATER. ON MARCH 22, HE
REJECTED THE PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND - - THEREBY SETTING THE GOI ON A
SEEMINGLY INEVITABLE COLLISION COURSE WITH THE
BRITISH (REF G).
6. THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRISH AND
THE BRITISH - - - AS VIEWED FROM DUBLIN -- STEMS
FROM A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OVER THE NATURE OF
THE UNDERSTANDINGS WORKED OUT DURING THE ANGLO-IRISH
DIALOGUE. THAT DIALOGUE STARTED IN DECEMBER 1980
WITH A MEETING IN LONDON BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER
HAUGHEY (THEN IN HIS FIRST TERM IN OFFICE) AND PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER. THE IRISH VIEW THE PROCESS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECALLED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
22
PAGE 02 OF 03 DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023198
WHICH STARTED WITH THAT FIRST MEETING AS BASED
UPON A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE BY LONDON THAT DUBLIN
WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN ANY FUTURE NORTHERN IRELAND
SETTLEMENT AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL TO THAT ROLE
WOULD BE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO -
GOVERNMENTS OVER PROPOSALS SUCH AS NORTHERN
IRELAND SECRETARY JAMES PRIOR'S DEVOLUTION PLAN.
7. SOURCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CONCEDE THAT THE
DIALOGUE PROCESS HAD ALREADY COME CLOSE TO
DERAILING IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1981 OVER
THE HUNGER STRIKE ISSUE. INDEED, MANY POLITICAL
OBSERVERS IN DUBLIN SUGGEST THAT CHARLES HAUGHEY'S
DEFEAT IN THE JUNE 1981 GENERAL ELECTIONS WAS
PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS VERY VISIBLE INABILITY
TO PERSUADE MRS. THATCHER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER
THE HUNGER-STRIKE ISSUE. HAUGHEY HAD STAKED A
GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL CAPITAL UPON THE
RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH LONDON AS PART
OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE PROCESS, BUT WHEN
THAT RELATIONSHIP COULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO SOMETHING
IN POLITICAL TERMS HAUGHEY WAS SEEN AS BEING
UNABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. DENNIS COGLAN, THE
IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDANT, TOLD AN
EMBOFF THAT THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE "BAD BLOOD"
BETWEEN HAUGHEY AND THATCHER WHICH HAS MADE THE
DETERIORATION IN LONDON-DUBLIN RELATIONS SOMETHING
NOT ONLY POLITICAL BUT QUITE PERSONAL. ACCORDING
TO COGLAN, HAUGHEY IN PRIVATE BLAMES MRS. THATCHER
PERSONALLY AND DIRECTLY FOR HIS 1981 DEFEAT.
111. ORIGINS OF THE PRIOR PLAN - - TOO MUCH RATHER
THAN TOO LITTLE CONSULTATION
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECALLED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
23
PAGE 03 OF 03 DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023198
8. RELATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN STARTED OFF
SHAKILY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF GARRET FITZGERALD'S
ADMINISTRATION IN JULY 1981. IN PARTICULAR,
FITZGERALD'S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
ASSISTANCE IN PRESSURING PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO
ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE OVER THE HUNGER
STRIKE DID NOT. ACCORDING TO DFA OFFICIALS.
"SIT WELL" WITH LONDON. NONETHELESS. THE
APPOINTMENT OF JAMES PRIOR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND
OFFIM IN SEPTEMBER AND HIS INITIAL OPENNESS TO
DUBLIN GAVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS AND
CREATED A NEW OPTIMISM AT DFA.
9. THIS NEW OPTIMISM WAS CAPPED IN NOVEMBER 1981
WHEN PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD AND PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER MET IN LONDON FOR A NEW ROUND OF THE
DIALOGUE AND AT THE END OF A CORDIAL AND
SUCCESSFUL ROUND OF TALKS ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
WHICH CALLED FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO
TRADITIONS IN IRELAND AND FOR CONTINUING EFFORT
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
(REF 1). ALREADY BY THEN PRIOR, WHO HAD BEEN ON
THE JOB LESS THAN TWO MONTHS, WAS PUTTING TOGETHER
A NEW INITIATIVE ON NORTHERN IRELAND.
10. IN MARCH OF 1982 PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY
SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE REJECTED THE
DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN PROMULGATED
WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH DUBLIN. IN CONVERSATIONS
WITH THE DFA. AND GOI POLITICAL LEADERS, HOWEVER,
EMBOFF WAS TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT PROBLEM WAS TOO
MUCH CONSULTATION - - FALSELY RAISING EXPECTATIONS --
RATHER THAN TOO LITTLE. FROM NOVEMBER 1981 TO
JANUARY 1982 PRIOR. HIS DEPUTY LORD GOWERY. OR
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
24
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 3815
DTG:1913402 OCT 82 PSN: 023211
SIT585
DATE 10/21/82
TOR: 292/1422Z
POTENTIAL DEVOLUTION PLAN. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN
IS A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE PRINCIPAL
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
WESTMINISTER OPPOSTITION WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HERSELF.
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
13. FROM JANUARY ONWARD, WHEN THE SHIFT ON THE
ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS OCCURRING,
SIT: MCF
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN SEEM TO
EOB:
HAVE COME TO AN END. IN DFA'S VIEW, IT WAS WHEN
WHSR COMMENT:
PRIOR RAN INTO WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION TO HIS
MORE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN THAT CONSULTA-
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
TIONS BETQEEN PRIOR'S TEAM AND THOSE DEALING
WITH NORTHERN IRELAND IN DUBLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
AT THEIR HEIGHT. INSTEAD, JUST THE OPPOSITE
OCCURRED. PRIOR SEEMS TO HAVE "HUNKERED-DOWN"
MESSAGE:
AND PUSHED THROUGH WHAT HE COULD GET AT
WESTMINISTER WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THOSE
PRIORITY
HE HAD SO ACTIVELY CONSULTED IN THE INITIAL STAGES
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921412
OF THE PROCESS. AS ONE GOI OFFICIAL PUT IT, "HE
P 191340Z OCT 82
RAISED EXPECTATIONS, WHETTED APPETITES, AND THEN
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
SNATCHED IT ALL AWAY."
IV. DUBLIN'S EARLY REJECTION OF THE PLAN--A TACTIC
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9406
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
WHICH FAILED.
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4063
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1102
14. IT IS, PERHAPS, THIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION AND
BT
DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH LED TO HAUGHEY'S EARLY
C ONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
REJECTION OF THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN WHEN HE
SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
MANAGED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN MARCH. THAT
POSSIBLE ASPECTS OF A DEVOLUTION PLAN WITH THE
REJECTION FROM THE OUTSET WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY
LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
COORDINATED WITH THE SDLP. IT IS BY NO MEANS
AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) AND DUBLIN OFFICIALS.
CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REJECTION WAS MEANT
TO BE FINAL. RATHER, AS ONE FIANNA FAIL DEPUTY TOLD
11. THE SDLP LEADERSHIP IN TURN -- AS CUSTOMARY
EMBOFF, IT WAS INTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
DISCUSSED PRIOR'S APPROACHES QUITE REGULARLY
"AS A WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOW" TO JIM PRIOR
WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
WITH THE HOPE--PERHAPS IN RETROSPECT FORLORN--
FIGURES, INCLUDING BOTH THEN PRIME MINISTER
THAT ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS COULD BE ADDED TO THE
GARRET FITZGERALD AND THEN OPPOSITION LEADER
DEVOLUTION PLAN.
CHARLES HAUGHEY. FROM THE QUESTIONS BEING ASKED
BY PRIOR AND HIS PEOPLE, FROM THE IDEAS THAT
15. MOST NOTABLY, THE SDLP REPRESENTATIVES, IN
EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THE SEEMING
THEIR TALKS IN DUBLIN, SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING
READY ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ONE DFA OFFICIAL
FOR DUBLIN SUPPORT TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN THE
DESCRIBED AS SOME "TRUELY INNOVATIVE IDEAS", MOST
PLAN THAT WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY SATISFY
GOI OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS BELIEVED THAT
THEIR NATIONALIST CONSTITUENCY IN THE NORTH THAT
PRIOR FULLY INTENDED TO MAKE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD
SOME ASPECT OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" HAD BEEN
CONTAIN A VERY REAL "IRISH DIMENSION", POSSIBLY
INCLUDED. VARIOUS PROVISIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS ARE
INCLUDING SOME FORM OF POWER-SHARING THOUGH
MENTIONED AND CERTAINLY SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
POWER SHARING WOULD HAVE COME THE CLOSEST TO
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
SATISFYING DUBLIN. MOST NOTABLY, HOWEVER, THE
CONCEPT OF A PARLIAMENTARY TIER TO THE ANGLO-IRISH
PERHAPS NOT UNDER THAT EMOTIONALLY CHARGED NAME.
PROCESS IS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED IN DUBLIN
AS THE FACTOR WHICH COULD HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE
12. FROM JANUARY 1982 ONWARDS, HOWEVER, IT
IN NATIONALIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN.
BECAME APPARENT TO OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN THAT PRIOR
WAS BACKING AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE INNOVATIVE
MEASURES HE AT FIRST HAD SEEMED TO BE ADVOCATING
AND MOVING TOWARD WHAT ONE IRISH OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS THE "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR"
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION. THE REASONS FOR PRIOR'S
DUBLIN 3815
DTG:1913402 OCT 82 PSN: 023211
SHIFT TO A DEVOLUTION PLAN THAT, IN THE VIEW OF
MANY SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS NOW COMPLETELY IGNORES
THE IRISH DIMENSION, HAVE BEEN VERY ABLY REPORTED
BY BELFAST (REF C. FOR MOST HERE IN DUBLIN
THE "BOTTOM LINE" IS THAT PRIOR "CHICKENED-OUT"
WHEN HE SAW THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AT WESTMINISTER
TO A FULL IRISH DIMENSION BEING INCLUDED IN ANY
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
25
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01
DUBL 3815
DTG:191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023222
SIT579
DATE 10/21/82
TOR: 292/1430Z
MAINTAIN THAT-WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE SDLP'S
REASONS FOR THE DECISION--IRISH OFFICIALS,
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY, WOULD HAVE BEEN
HAPPIER IF THE SDLP HAD ENTERED THE ASSEMBLY.
IF THE SDLP'S WORST FEARS HAD BEEN REALIZED AND
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
THE ASSEMBLY BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE AS WHAT ONE
COMMENTATOR DESCRIBED AS "STORMONT REDIVIVUS,"
SIT: MCF
THE SDLP COULD HAVE BROUGHT IT DOWN BY THEN
EOB:
WITHDRAWING. ONE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY TOLD EMBOFF
WHSR COMMENT:
THAT, THOUGH HE SHARED THE SDLP'S PESSIMISM OVER
THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY, IT WOULD
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SDLP IF THEY
HAD "AT LEAST APPEARED WILLING TO TRY AND MAKE
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
IT WORK."
MESSAGE:
19. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT THE PATH
THE SDLP ELECTED TO FOLLOW, DUBLIN, THEREFORE,
PRIORITY
NOW FACES BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM
DE RUEHDBA #3815 2921420
"UNPLEASANT REALITIES." WITH THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION
P 191340Z OCT 82
LESS THAN TWO DAYS AWAY THE DFA AND THE
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
POLITICAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE
THAT THE SDLP ITSELF FACES A MAJOR CRISIS OVER
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9407
THIS ELECTION. THE PARTY HAS ASKED ITS SUPPORTERS
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
FOR AN ELECTORAL MANDATE ENDORSING THEIR DECISION
NOT TO TAKE THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA FEARS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4064
THAT SUCH A MANDATE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1103
THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MODERATE NATIONALIST
BT
POSITION IN THE NORTH WILL BE SEVERELY DAMAGED.
CON
SECTION 04 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
DFA IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A
CHANCE (ALBEIT-THEY HOPE--A SMALL ONE) THAT THE
16. SUCH A TIER WOULD HAVE CREATED A COMMITTEE
UNIONIST PARTIES OF THE NORTH WILL--WITH THE
(NOT CALLED A COUNCIL OF IRELAND BECAUSE THAT TOO
POSSIBILITY THAT MOST NATIONALIST VOTERS WILL SIMPLY
is AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TERM) MADE UP OF MEMBERS
STAY AWAY FROM THE POLLS--BE ABLE IN THEIR OWN
FROM THE NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, THE IRISH
RIGHT TO GARNER THE 70 PERCENT OF THE SEATS NEEDED
PARLIAMENT, AND PRESUMABLY THE WESTMINISTER
UNDER THE PRIOR PLAN TO VOTE FOR THE DEVOLUTION TO
PARLIAMENT AS WELL. REACTING TO JAMES PRIOR'S
THE ASSEMBLY OF CERTAIN REAL POWERS MAKING IT
RECENT CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCH A TIER AS MERELY A
INDEED A NEW STORMONT.
"TALK SHOP," A DFA OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT "IT
WOULDN'T MATTER IF AT FIRST IT WAS ONLY A TALK
20. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS DUBLIN'S
SHOP BECAUSE EVEN "TALKING" BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS
FEAR THAT FOR NOW THE PRIOR INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY
FROM DUBLIN AND BELFAST WOULD REPRESENT MORE
BELIEVED WAS DOOMED FROM THE BEGINNING, WILL LEAVE
PROGRESS THAN WE HAVE MADE IN THE FULL 60 YEARS
THE BRITISH IN THE POSITION OF AT LEAST SEEMING
SINCE THE TREATY."
TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL
CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN TURN, WILL
17. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE OF DUBLIN
THEREBY LESSEN ANY PRESSURE THAT MIGHT BE APPLIED
REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN AS A BARGAINING PLOY
TO MRS. THATCHER'S GDVERNMENT UNTIL THE BRITISH
WITH LONDON WAS NEVER REALLY PUT TO THE TEST.
GENERAL ELECTION WHICH MOST NOW EXPECT NEXT AUTUMN.
WITHIN A FEW WEEKS LONDON WAS ENMESHED IN THE
IN THE LONG TERM, IF THOSE ELECTIONS ARE CLOSE--AS
SOME EXPECT-THERE IS REAL FEAR IN DUBLIN THAT THE
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
12 OR 13 SEATS WHICH THE UNIONISTS WILL LIKELY
HAVE IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENT WILL EXERT FAR MORE
FALKLANDS CRISIS AND DUBLIN, FOR MANY REASONS,
INFLUENCE THAN NOW--MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE WANING
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PIQUE OVER THE
DAYS OF THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 70'S.
DEVOLUTION PLAN (SEE REF A FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE
IF MRS. THATCHER WINS OUTRIGHT, DFA IS EVEN MORE
SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH LED TO DUBLIN'S BREAK) HAD
BROKEN WITH THE EC OVER THE ARGENTINE SANCTIONS
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON HAD
REACHED THE "DEEP-FREEZE" LEVEL. NO "THAW" IN
RELATIONSHIPS HAS OCCURRED SINCE THAT POINT.
DUBL 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023222
18. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY
AND THE SDLP WERE COORDINATING CLOSELY AT THE
TIME OF HIS INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN,
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN--AND INDEED STOUTLY
DENIED IN DUBLIN--THAT THE GOI WAS BEHIND THE
SDLP'S DECISION TO CONTEST THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION
BUT NOT TAKE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA OFFICIALS
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF DENTIAL
26
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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DUBL IN 3815
DTG:191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 013236
SIT578
DATE 10/21/82
TOR: 292/1437Z
UNIONISTS THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN A PART OF
THE UK SO LONG AS THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE WISH
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
IT TO BE. DUBLIN, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ENDING
THE GUARANTEE, WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT PHRASED IN A
MORE POSITIVE FASHION THAT WOULD IMPLY SOME
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
ACCEPTANCE FROM LONDON OF AN EVENTUAL
REALIGNMENT IN THIS ISLAND--PERHAPS TO THE EFFECT
SIT: MCF
THAT "HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT
EOB:
TO A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND SO
WHSR COMMENT:
LONG AS THAT CHANGE CAME ABOUT BY THE WILL OF THE
MAJORITY."
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
23. FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS, BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
FOR THE US, PUBLICALLY STATED THAT NORTHERN
IRELAND WOULD BE THE CENTRAL THEME OF HIS VISIT
MESSAGE:
TO THE US (REF B). REPORTS ON THAT VISIT INDICATE
THAT HE LOOKED FOR AS MUCH SUPPORT AS HE COULD
PRIORITY
MUSTER BOTH FROM THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921428
BRANCH IN GENERATING THE KIND OF PRESSURE DUBLIN
P 191340Z OCT 82
BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL CHANGE
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND USED THE OCCASION OF
THE VISIT TO GENERATE AS MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION AS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9408
POSSIBLE TO THIS END.
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
24. COMMENT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4065
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1104
A RENEWED ATTEMPT BY THE GO: TO ENLIST AMERICAN
BT
SUPPORT FOR HELPING TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN NORTHERN
CON IDENTI SECTION 05 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
IRELAND BY BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON LONDON
CONCERNED THAT, GIVEN HER OWN INCLINATIONS, SHE
NEEDS TO BE APPROACHEO AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS.
WILL SIMPLY DROP ALL PRETENSE AT TRYING TO FORM
FIRST, ON THE QUESTION OF OVER-ALL US POLICY, WE
A DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND
BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982
MOVE FOR FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE UK. (DFA
STATEMENT STILL OFFERS THE BEST AND WISEST AMERICAN
DOES NOT REALLY ENTERTAIN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LABOR
APPROACH TO THE GENERAL NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION.
WINNING NEXT YEAR. IN ADDITION, THE GOI TAKES
SPECIFICALLY, WHILE URGING THE DISPUTANTS TO COME
LITTLE COMFORT FROM VARIOUS LABOR PARTY
TOGETHER "THROUGH A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND NOTING THAT
THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BETWEEN
WHAT LABOR SAYS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF OFFICE
BRITAIN AND IRELAND," THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR
DIFFERS GREATLY FROM WHAT THEY DO WHEN IN GOVERNMENT.)
THAT "WE IN THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CHART A
VI. NEXT STEPS FOR DUBLIN--LOOK TO WASHINGTON
COURSE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. IF
SOLUTIONS ARE TO ENDURE THEY MUST COME FROM THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES."
21. FACED WITH THESE RATHER UNPLEASANT REALITIES
AND NO NEAR TERM HOPE OF MUCH MOVEMENT IN THE
25. AS TO THE SECOND AND MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTION
ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE, DUBLIN SEEMS TO BE ACCELERATING
OF WHAT ROLE THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY TO HELP
ITS EFFORT TO GAIN US SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION
RE-ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN,
OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" IN LONDON'S THINKING ON
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT HERE THE USG MIGHT BE OF
ULSTER. CERTAINLY, FROM HIS FIRST DAYS IN DFFICE,
SOME ASSISTANCE, BUT ONLY RPT ONLY AT THE APPROPRIATE
TIME. AS FOR NOW, SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE THIS AN
MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :
INAUSPICIOUS TIME TO TRY TO PLAY SUCH A BRIDGING
ROLE. SPECIFICALLY:
THAT WAS PART OF PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY'S
HOPE--AS BEST EVIDENCED BY HIS STATEMENTS AT THE
TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON ST. PATRICK'S
DAY AND HIS EFFORTS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
FRIENDS OF IRELAND IN JUNE. AS ONE ASSOCIATE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF, HOWEVER, "IN MARCH THAT
DUBLIN 3815
DTG:191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023236
WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ARROWS IN THE TAOISEACH'S
PRIME MINISTER'S QUIVER-TODAY ITS THE ONLY ONE
LEFT."
22. SPECIFICALLY, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE
TO SEE WASHINGTON PRESSURE LONDON--AT A MINIMUN--TO
REEXAMINE THE PRIOR PROPOSALS AND THINK MORE IN
TERMS OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION." EVEN BETTER IN
DUBLIN'S VIEW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE US PRESSURE TO
END--OR AT LEAST MODIFY-THE GUARANTEE TO NORTHERN
CONF DENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 0:
DUBLI 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023258
SIT577
DATE 10/21/82
TOR: 292/1441Z
THE BALLOT BOX.)
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
26. AS TO WHEN SUCH A RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE IS
POSSIBLE, THE DFA VIEW, WHICH WE SHARE, IS THAT IT
MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY HAS HAD FIVE OR
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIX MONTHS TO FUNCTION. THUS, PERHAPS BY MARCH OR
APRIL THE TIME WILL AGAIN BE RIGHT FOR A RENEWAL
SIT: MCF
OF DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN DUBLIN'S AND
EOB:
LONDON'S MUTUAL INTEREST TO SEE THE DIALOGUE RENEWED
WHSR COMMENT:
AND EXPECT THAT FORCES ALREADY AT PLAY WILL HAVE
THE TWO CAPITALS TALKING TO EACH OTHER AGAIN
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
BY THEN. IF NOT, HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE
GOOD OFFICES OF THE USG MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
EXTENDED--BEHIND THE SCENES AND WITH ZERO
VISIBILITY--TC URGE BOTH SIDES TO AGAIN SIT DOWN
MESSAGE:
TOGETHER. DAILEY
PRIORITY
DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023258
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921436
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9409
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4066
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1105
BT
MFIDENTI SECTION 06 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
-- THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IS TETTERING
ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE AND SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS
THINK THAT A NEW GENERAL ELECTION COULD BE CALLED
BY FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1983. SOME PREDICT IT COULD
COME AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 1982. EVEN THOUGH PRIME
MINISTER HAUGHEY SURVIVED A CHALLANGE TO HIS
LEADERSHIP OF THE MEETING ON OCTOBER 6 (REF A)
THAT CHALLENGE ONLY INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF
NEW ELECTIONS.
-- THE BRITISH ARE COMMITTED TO THE PRIOR
DEVOLUTION PLAN AND UK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS STILL
ASSERT THAT THE PLAN HAS A CHANCE OF WORKING.
MANY HERE IN DUBLIN DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW BUT
MOST READILY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL BE SERVED
BY FURTHER TALKS WITH LONDON UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY
ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD, THE ASSEMBLY CONVENED,
AND THE END RESULT OF THE PROCESS MORE APPARENT.
-- DUBLIN HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC BY WAY OF
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFER. THEY EXPECT THAT AFTER
MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :
THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS THE VARIOUS NATIONALIST
PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE EXPLORING
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM. DFA EXPECTS
THAT THE SDLP WILL WANT TO DISCUSS SOME OF THESE
IDEAS AND THE GOI WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PROPOSE
ALTERNATIVES UNTIL THE DUST SETTLES. SOME OF THE
RUMORED ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL
FOR AN "ALL IRELAND" ASSEMBLY BASED IN DUBLIN,
COULD HEIGHTEN RATHER THAN LESSEN THE TENSIONS.
-- MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PERSONAL ANOMOSITIES
BETWEEN MR. HAUGHEY AND MRS. THATCHER ARE NOW SO
GREAT THAT--IF IT WILL EVER BE PDSSIBLE FOR THEM
TO WORK IN HARMONY AGAIN--AT A MINIMUM A GOOD DEAL
MORE TIME MUST ELAPSE FOR "COOLING OFF." (THOUGH
GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF_ NEW IRISH ELECTIONS IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THIS PROBLEM WILL RECOLVE ITSELF AT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
7334
28
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
ODECLASSIFIED
WPC HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
NLRR 15-30-5-3
FROM:
DENNIS BLAIR
BY (SDI3 NARA DATE 7/7/15
SUBJECT:
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
and the United States (U)
As you know, the results of last week's Assembly elections in
Northern Ireland were a disappointment to Jim Prior. Sinn
Fein took 5 seats, the SDLP won 13, and both parties have
reaffirmed their intention not to participate. Paisley will
take his seats, and will work for majority rule. Prior has
vowed to convene the Assembly, to treat the absentee members
as if they were participating, and to attempt to establish some
credibility for the Assembly. The "failure" of the elections
has set rumors loose in London that Prior's days are numbered,
and that Mrs. Thatcher is looking for the opportunity to let
him go. How all of this will work out is anyone's guess. (C)
As you know from Foreign Minister Collin's visit, the Republic
of Ireland's fear is that with the Prior initiative stalled,
there will be no more motion on Northern Ireland from this
Thatcher government, which means at least another year of
immobility. As the attached excellent cable from Dublin makes
clear (hilited for skimming), the lever which Haughey will
attempt to use to produce motion is the U.S. connection. We
can expect Irish messages requesting us to prod the British
to work together with Dublin for some "all-Ireland" solution. (C)
Unfortunately, Dublin has no better ideas than London how to
reach a solution that would be acceptable to both communities
in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the best course for the
United States, as Ambassador Dailey makes very clear in his
cable, is to continue our policy of "concerned neutrality"
which was laid out most clearly in the President's statement
of last St. Patrick's day. (C)
Tab A
Cable on Irish election results
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
ONFIDENTIAL
29
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023191
EOB942
AN007534
TOR: 292/1406Z
CSN: CRI162
HAD REACHED THE LOWEST LEVEL FOR TEN YEARS. THUS,
WHILE THE GOI DID NOT NECESSARILY WANT THE SDLP TO
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
TAKE THE LATE AUGUST DECISION NOT TO ACCEPT SEATS
IN THE ASSEMBLY DUBLIN OFFICIALS ACCEPT THAT, FROM
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-00 ISEC-01 MYER-00 /001 A3
THE NATIONALIST POINT OF VIEW, THE PARTY HAD LITTLE
OPTION. THERE ARE FEARS IN DUBLIN, HOWEVER, THAT
A FAILURE OF THE ASSEMBLY COULD, AT BEST, LEAD TO
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
A CONTINUATION OF THE POLITICAL STERILITY OF DIRECT
SIT: CKLS
RULE OR, AT WORST, TO MOVES FOR NORTHERN
EOB: COMMENTS: CHECKLIST
IRELAND'S FULL INCORPORATION INTO THE UK.
4. AT THIS POINT, OTHER THAN THEIR INCREASINGLY
DIMINISHED HOPE FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN "IRISH
PRIORITY
DIMENSION" IN PRIOR'S NORTHERN PLAN, THE GOI SEES
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921356
FEW OPTIONS STILL OPEN. ESSENTIALLY, THE MAIN
P 191340Z OCT 82
GAMBIT FOR THE MOMENT SEEMS TO BE THE TIME-HONORED
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
APPROACH OF TURNING TO THE USG FOR HELP TO
PRESSURE LONDON EITHER TO THINK MORE IN TERMS OF
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9404
AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AS THE BASIS FOR A SOLUTION
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND OR EVEN
BETTER IN DUBLIN'S VIEW - TO ALTER OR ELIMINATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4061
THE BRITISH "GUARANTEE" ON NORTHERN IRELAND. WE
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1100
BELIEVE THAT, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME (PERHAPS BY
MARCH OR APRIL), AND IF NEEDED, THE USG MIGHT PLAY A
CONFISENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
QUIET BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE IN GETTING LONDON AND
DUBLIN TALKING AGAIN. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, PRESIDENT
BELFAST BY POUCH
REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982 STATEMENT THAT IF NORTHERN
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
IRELAND SOLUTIAHNOJT TO "ENDURE THEY MUST COME
E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/15/88
FROM THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES" SHOULD REMAIN VERY
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, EI, UK
MUCH THE BASIS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ULSTER
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND: THE EVOLUTION OF DUBLIN'S
PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.
POLICY
11. MISUNDERSTANDINGS OVER DIALOGUE
REF: A) DUBLIN 3697; B) DUBLIN 3436; C) DUBLIN 3291;
D) DUBLIN 1851; E) DUBLIN 1641; F) DUBLIN 1562;
G) DUBLIN 1045; H) DUBLIN 892; I) 81 DUBLIN 4584
5. EVEN BEFORE THE IRISH SHIFT ON THE FALKLANDS
SANCTIONS QUESTION IN MAY, 1982, LONDON-DUBLIN
1. C-ENTIRE TEXT
1. SUMMARY
RELATIONS HAD COOLED PERCEPTIBLY. IN LARGE
MEASURE THE DECLINE WAS STARTED BY A RIFT OVER
NORTHERN IRELAND AND SIMPLY ACCELERATED BY
2. EVEN THOUGH THE CURRENT FREEZE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
DIFFERENCES OVER THE FALKLANDS. INDEED, NEWLY
DUBLIN AND LONDON EXACERBATED THE IRISH SHIFT
ELECTED PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY LITERALLY FROM
ON THE FALKLANDS SANCTIONS, THE FREEZE'S REAL
HIS FIRST DAY BACK IN OFFICE -- DESPITE THE FACT
ORIGINS LIE IN DISAGREEMENTS OVER THE TWO COUNTRIES
BT
INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BEST
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN
PART, STEMS FROM CLEARLY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS
OF WHAT THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE SIGNIFIES AND
WHAT AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED AS A RESULT OF
THE PROCESS. FOR DUBLIN THE DIALOGUE ITSELF IS
BASED UPON A RECOGNITION BY LONDON OF AN IRISH
RIGHT TO A ROLE IN THE DETERMINATION OF NORTHERN
IRELAND'S FINAL STATUS. FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS
PROCESS, THE IRISH BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD WON
AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL AND REGULAR
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS.
FROM THE IRISH POINT OF VIEW THERE WERE INADEQUATE
CONSULTATIONS OVER THE PRIOR PLAN AND WHAT THERE WERE
RAISED FALSE HOPES IN DUBLIN THAT WERE DASHED BY THE
FINAL PRODUCT -- A DOCUMENT THAT THE GOI
BELIEVES TO BE VOID OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" AND
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NORTHERN NATIONALISTS.
3. THE HAUGHEY GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS
INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PROPOSALS IN
MARCH 1982 AS A BARGAINING CHIP TO GET A GREATER
"IRISH DIMENSION" INCLUDED. THAT EFFORT BECAME
ENMESHED IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE, HOWEVER, AND BY
LATE SPRING, RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
30
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBLI IN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023198
EOB947
AN007535
TOR: 292/1413Z
CSN: EHA807
BETWEEN HAUGHEY AND THATCHER WHICH HAS MADE THE
DETERIORATION IN LONDON-DUBLIN RELATIONS SOMETHING
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
NOT ONLY POLITICAL BUT QUITE PERSONAL. ACCORDING
TO COGLAN, HAUGHEY IN PRIVATE BLAMES MRS. THATCHER
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
PERSONALLY AND DIRECTLY FOR HIS 1981 DEFEAT.
111. ORIGINS OF THE PRIOR PLAN - TOO MUCH RATHER
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
-
THAN TOO LITTLE CONSULTATION
SIT: MCF
EOB:
8. RELATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN STARTED OFF
SHAKILY IN THE EARLY DAYS OF GARRET FITZGERALD'S
ADMINISTRATION IN JULY 1981. IN PARTICULAR,
PRIORITY
FITZGERALD'S ATTEMPT TO ENLIST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DE RUFHDB #3815/02 2921404
ASSISTANCE IN PRESSURING PRIME MINISTER THATCHER TO
P 191340Z OCT 82
4
ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE OVER THE HUNGER
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN-
STRIKE DID NOT, ACCORDING TO DFA OFFICIALS,
"SIT WELL" WITH LONDON. NONETHELESS, THE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9405
APPOINTMENT OF JAMES PRIOR TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
OFFIM IN SEPTEMBER AND HIS INITIAL OPENNESS TO
DUBLIN GAVE A NEW IMPETUS TO THE PROCESS AND
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4062
CREATED A NEW OPTIMISM AT DFA.
AMCONSUL BELEAST PRIORITY 1101
9. THIS NEW OPTIMISM WAS CAPPED IN NOVEMBER 1981
CONFI DENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
WHEN PRIME MINISTER FITZGERALD AND PRIME MINISTER
THATCHER MET IN LONDON FOR A NEW ROUND OF THE
BELFAST BY POUCH
DIALOGUE AND AT THE END OF A CORDIAL AND
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SUCCESSFUL ROUND OF TALKS ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A CAMPAIGN ISSUE - DECLARED
WHICH CALLED FOR THE RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO
NORTHERN IRELAND HIS PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PRIORITY
TRADITIONS IN IRELAND AND FOR CONTINUING EFFORT
(REF H). TWO WEEKS LATER, ON MARCH 22, HE
BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL
REJECTED THE PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR DEVOLUTION IN
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND
NORTHERN IRELAND THEREBY SETTING THE GOI ON A
(REF 1). ALREADY BY THEN PRIOR, WHO HAD BEEN ON
SEEMINGLY INEVITABLE COLLISION COURSE WITH THE
THE JOB LESS THAN TWO MONTHS, WAS PUTTING TOGETHER
BRITISH (REF G.
A NEW INITIATIVE ON NDRTHERN IRELAND.
10. IN MARCH OF 1982 PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY
6. THE BASIC DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRISH AND
SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS HE REJECTED THE
THE BRITISH AS VIEWED FROM DUBLIN -- STEMS
DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN PROMULGATED
FROM A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OVER THE NATURE OF
WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH DUBLIN. IN CONVERSATIONS
THE UNDERSTANDINGS WORKED OUT DURING THE ANGLO-IRISH
WITH THE DFA, AND GOI POLITICAL LEADERS, HOWEVER,
DIALOGUE. THAT DIALOGUE STARTED IN DECEMBER 1980
EMBOFF WAS TOLD REPEATEDLY THAT PROBLEM WAS TOO
WITH A MEETING IN LONDON BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER
MUCH CONSULTATION -- FALSELY RAISING EXPECTATIONS --
HAUGHEY (THEN IN HIS FIRST TERM IN OFFICE) AND PRIME
RATHER THAN T00 LITTLE. FROM NOVEMBER 1981 TO
MINISTER THATCHER. THE IRISH VIEW THE PROCESS
JANUARY 1982 PRIOR, HIS DEPUTY LORD GOWERY, OR
WHICH STARTED WITH THAT FIRST MEETING AS BASED
BT
UPON A CLEAR ACCEPTANCE BY LONDON THAT DUBLIN
WOULD HAVE A ROLE IN ANY FUTURE NORTHERN IRELAND
SETTLEMENT AND THAT FUNDAMENTAL TO THAT ROLE
WOULD BE ONGOING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
GOVERNMENTS OVER PROPOSALS SUCH AS NORTHERN
IRELAND SECRETARY JAMES PRIOR'S DEVOLUTION PLAN.
7. SOURCES AT THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(DFA) ANGLO-IRISH DIVISION CONCEDE THAT THE
DIALOGUE PROCESS HAD ALREADY COME CLOSE TO
DERAILING IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1981 OVER
THE HUNGER STRIKE ISSUE. INDEED, MANY POLITICAL
OBSERVERS IN DUBLIN SUGGEST THAT CHARLES HAUGHEY'S
DEFEAT IN THE JUNE 1981 GENERAL ELECTIONS WAS
PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS VERY VISIBLE INABILITY
TO PERSUADE MRS. THATCHER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE OVER
THE HUNGER-STRIKE ISSUE. HAUGHEY HAD STAKED A
GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL CAPITAL UPON THE
RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH LONDON AS PART
OF THE ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE PROCESS, BUT WHEN
THAT RELATIONSHIP COULD HAVE AMOUNTED TO SOMETHING
IN POLITICAL TERMS HAUGHEY WAS SEEN AS BEING
UNABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS. DENNIS COGLAN, THE
IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDANT, TOLD AN
EMBOFF THAT THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF THE "BAD BLOOD"
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
31
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023211
E0B948
AN007536
TOR: 292/1422Z
CSN: CRI165
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN SEEM TO
HAVE COME TO AN END. IN DFA'S VIEW, IT WAS WHEN
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
PRIOR RAN INTO WESTMINISTER OPPOSITION TO HIS
MORE INNOVATIVE ASPECTS OF HIS PLAN THAT CONSULTA-
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A3
TIONS BETQEEN PRIOR'S TEAM AND THOSE DEALING
WITH NORTHERN IRELAND IN DUBLIN SHOULD HAVE BEEN
AT THEIR HEIGHT. INSTEAD, JUST THE OPPOSITE
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
OCCURRED. PRIOR SEEMS TO HAVE "HUNKERED-DOWN"
SIT: MCF
AND PUSHED THROUGH WHAT HE COULD GET AT
EOB:
WESTMINISTER WITHOUT FURTHER REFERENCE TO THOSE
HE HAD so ACTIVELY CONSULTED IN THE INITIAL STAGES
OF THE PROCESS. AS ONE GOI OFFICIAL PUT IT, "HE
RAISED EXPECTATIONS, WHETTED APPETITES, AND THEN
PRIORITY
SNATCHED IT ALL AWAY."
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921412
IV. DUBLIN'S EARLY REJECTION OF THE PLAN--A TACTIC
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY OUBLIN
-
WHICH FAILED.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9406
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
14. IT IS, PERHAPS, THIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION ANO
DISAPPOINTMENT WHICH LED TO HAUGHEY'S EARLY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4063
REJECTION OF THE PRIOR DEVOLUTION PLAN WHEN HE
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1102
MANAGED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT IN MARCH. THAT
REJECTION FROM THE OUTSET WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY
PENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
COORDINATED WITH THE SDLP. IT IS BY NO MEANS
CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS REJECTION WAS MEANT
BELFAST BY POUCH
TO BE FINAL. RATHER, AS ONE FIANNA FAIL DEPUTY TOLD
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
EMBOFF, IT WAS INTENDED BY THE PRIME MINISTER
SENIOR NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
"AS A WARNING SHOT ACROSS THE BOW" TO JIM PRIOR
POSSIBLE ASPECTS OF A DEVOLUTION PLAN WITH THE
WITH THE HOPE--PERHAPS IN RETROSPECT FORLORN--
LEADERS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
THAT ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS COULD BE ADDED TO THE
AND LABOR PARTY (SDLP) AND DUBLIN OFFICIALS.
DEVOLUTION PLAN.
11. THE SDLP LEADERSHIP IN TURN -- AS CUSTOMARY
15. MOST NOTABLY, THE SDLP REPRESENTATIVES, IN
DISCUSSED PRIOR'S APPROACHES QUITE REGULARLY
THEIR TALKS IN DUBLIN, SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LOOKING
WITH SENIOR IRISH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
FOR DUBLIN SUPPORT TO OBTAIN SOMETHING IN THE
FIGURES, INCLUDING BOTH THEN PRIME MINISTER
GARRET FITZGERALD AND THEN OPPOSITION LEADER
PLAN THAT WOULD AT LEAST PARTIALLY SATISFY
CHARLES HAUGHEY. FROM THE QUESTIONS BEING ASKED
THEIR NATIONALIST CONSTITUENCY IN THE NORTH THAT
BY PRIOR AND HIS PEOPLE, FROM THE IDEAS THAT
SOME ASPECT OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" HAD BEEN
EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THE SEEMING
INCLUDED. VARIOUS PROVISIONS TO ACHIEVE THIS ARE
READY ACCEPTANCE OF WHAT ONE DFA OFFICIAL
MENTIONED AND CERTAINLY SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
DESCRIBED AS SOME "TRUELY INNOVATIVE IDEAS", MOST
POWER SHARING WOULD HAVE COME THE CLOSEST TO
GOI OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS BELIEVED THAT
SATISFYING DUBLIN. MOST NOTABLY, HOWEVER, THE
PRIOR FULLY INTENDED TO MAKE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD
CONCEPT OF A PARLIAMENTARY TIER TO THE ANGLO-IRISH
CONTAIN A VERY REAL "IRISH DIMENSION", POSSIBLY
-
PROCESS IS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED IN DUBLIN
INCLUDING SOME FORM OF POWER-SHARING THOUGH
AS THE FACTOR WHICH COULD HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE
PERHAPS NOT UNDER THAT EMOTIONALLY CHARGED NAME.
IN NATIONALIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLAN.
BT
12. FROM JANUARY 1982 ONWARDS, HOWEVER, IT
BECAME APPARENT TO OFFICIALS IN DUBLIN THAT PRIOR
WAS BACKING AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE INNOVATIVE
MEASURES HE AT FIRST HAD SEEMED TO BE ADVOCATING
AND MOVING TOWARD WHAT ONE IRISH OFFICIAL
DESCRIBED AS THE "LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR"
APPROACH TO DEVOLUTION. THE REASONS FOR PRIOR'S
SHIFT TO A DEVOLUTION PLAN THAT, IN THE VIEW OF
MANY SENIOR GOI OFFICIALS NOW COMPLETELY IGNORES
THE IRISH DIMENSION, HAVE BEEN VERY ABLY REPORTED
BY BELFAST (REF C). FOR MOST HERE IN DUBLIN
THE "BOTTOM LINE" IS THAT PRIOR "CHICKENED-OUT"
WHEN HE SAW THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AT WESTMINISTER
TO A FULL IRISH DIMENSION BEING INCLUDED IN ANY
POTENTIAL DEVOLUTION PLAN. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN
IS A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE PRINCIPAL
WESTMINISTER OPPOSTIION WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HERSELF.
13. FROM JANUARY ONWARD, WHEN THE SHIFT ON THE
ACTUAL CONTENT OF THE DEVOLUTION PLAN WAS OCCURRING,
CONF JENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
32
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 3815
DTG:191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023222
EOB969
AN007537
TOR: 292/1430Z
CSN: CR|166
THE SDLP COULD HAVE BROUGHT IT DOWN BY THEN
WITHDRAWING. ONE PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY TOLD EMBOFF
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
THAT, THOUGH HE SHARED THE SDLP'S PESSIMISM OVER
THE POLITICAL VIABILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY, IT WOULD
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR THE FUTURE OF THE SDLP IF THEY
HAD "AT LEAST APPEARED WILLING TO TRY AND MAKE
IT WORK."
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: MCF
19. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THAT WAS NOT THE PATH
EOB:
THE SDLP ELECTED TO FOLLOW, DUBLIN, THEREFORE,
NOW FACES BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM
"UNPLEASANT REALITIES." WITH THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION
LESS THAN TWO DAYS AWAY THE DFA AND THE
PRIORITY
POLITICAL LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN DUBLIN IS WELL AWARE
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921420
THAT THE SDLP ITSELF FACES A MAJOR CRISIS OVER
P 191340Z OCT 82
THIS ELECTION. THE PARTY HAS ASKED ITS SUPPORTERS
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
FOR AN ELECTORAL MANDATE ENDORSING THEIR DECISION
NOT TO TAKE THE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA FEARS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9407
THAT SUCH A MANDATE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
THAT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE MODERATE NATIONALIST
POSITION IN THE NORTH WILL BE SEVERELY DAMAGED.
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4064
DFA IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1103
CHANCE (ALBEIT--THEY HOPE--A SMALL ONE) THAT THE
UNIONIST|PARTIES OF THE NORTH WILL--WITH THE
CONFI DENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
POSSIBILITY THAT MOST NATIONALIST VOTERS WILL SIMPLY
STAY AWAY FROM THE POLLS--BE ABLE IN THEIR OWN
BELFAST BY POUCH
RIGHT TO GARNER THE 70 PERCENT OF THE SEATS NEEDED
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
UNDER THE PRIOR PLAN TO VOTE FOR THE DEVOLUTION TO
THE ASSEMBLY OF CERTAIN REAL POWERS MAKING IT
16. SUCH A TIER WOULD HAVE CREATED A COMMITTEE
INDEEO A NEW STORMONT.
(NOT CALLED A COUNCIL OF IRELAND BECAUSE THAT TOO
IS AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED TERM) MADE UP OF MEMBERS
20. OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS DUBLIN'S
FROM THE NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, THE IRISH
FEAR THAT FOR NOW THE PRIOR INITIATIVE, WHICH THEY
PARLIAMENT, AND PRESUMABLY THE WESTMINISTER
BELIEVED WAS DOOMED FROM THE BEGINNING, WILL LEAVE
PARLIAMENT AS WELL. REACTING TO JAMES PRIOR'S
THE BRITISH IN THE POSITION OF AT LEAST SEEMING
RECENT CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCH A TIER AS MERELY A
TO HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL
"TALK SHOP," A DFA OFFICIAL OBSERVED THAT "IT
CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. THIS, IN TURN, WILL
WOULDN'T MATTER IF AT FIRST IT WAS ONLY A TALK
THEREBY LESSEN ANY PRESSURE THAT MIGHT BE APPLIED
SHOP BECAUSE EVEN "TALKING" BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS
TO MRS. THATCHER'S GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE BRITISH
FROM DUBLIN AND BELFAST WOULD REPRESENT MORE
GENERAL ELECTION WHICH MOST NOW EXPECT NEXT AUTUMN.
PROGRESS THAN WE HAVE MADE IN THE FULL 60 YEARS
IN THE LONG TERM, IF THOSE ELECTIONS ARE CLOSE--AS
SINCE THE TREATY."
SOME EXPECT-THERE IS REAL FEAR IN DUBLIN THAT THE
12 OR 13 SEATS WHICH THE UNIONISTS WILL LIKELY
17. IN THE EVENT, HOWEVER, THE PRESSURE OF DUBLIN
HAVE IN THE NEXT PARLIAMENT WILL EXERT FAR MORE
REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN AS A BARGAINING PLOY
INFLUENCE THAN NOW--MUCH AS THEY DID IN THE WANING
WITH LONDON WAS NEVER REALLY PUT TO THE TEST.
DAYS OF THE CALLAGHAN GOVERNMENT IN THE LATE 70'S.
WITHIN A FEW WEEKS LONDON WAS ENMESHED IN THE
IF MRS. THATCHER WINS OUTRIGHT, DFA IS EVEN MORE
FALKLANDS CRISIS AND DUBLIN, FOR MANY REASONS,
BT
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO PIQUE OVER THE
DEVOLUTION PLAN (SEE REF A FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE
SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH LED TO DUBLIN'S BREAK) HAD
BROKEN WITH THE EC OVER THE ARGENTINE SANCTIONS
AND RELATIONS BETWEEN DUBLIN AND LONDON HAD
REACHED THE "DEEP-FREEZE" LEVEL. NO "THAW" IN
RELATIONSHIPS HAS OCCURRED SINCE THAT POINT.
18. WHILE IT IS CLEAR THAT PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY
AND THE SDLP WERE COORDINATING CLOSELY AT THE
TIME OF HIS INITIAL REJECTION OF THE PRIOR PLAN,
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN--AND INDEED STOUTLY
DENIED IN DUBLIN--THAT THE GOI WAS BEHIND THE
SDLP'S OECISION TO CONTEST THE ASSEMBLY ELECTION
BUT NOT TAKE SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY. DFA OFFICIALS
MAINTAIN THAT-WHILE UNDERSTANDING THE SDLP'S
REASONS FOR THE DECISION--IRISH OFFICIALS,
INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY, WOULD HAVE BEEN
HAPPIER IF THE SDLP HAD ENTERED THE ASSEMBLY.
IF THE SDLP'S WORST FEARS HAD BEEN REALIZED AND
THE ASSEMBLY BEGAN TO TAKE SHAPE AS WHAT ONE
COMMENTATOR DESCRIBED AS "STORMONT REDIVIVUS,"
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
33
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBL 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023236
EOB970
AN007538
TOR: 292/1437Z
CSN: CR1168
TO A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF NORTHERN IRELAND so
LONG AS THAT CHANGE CAME ABOUT BY THE WILL OF THE
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
MAJORITY."
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
23. FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS, BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE
FOR THE US, PUBLICALLY STATED THAT NORTHERN
IRELAND WOULD BE THE CENTRAL THEME OF HIS VISIT
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
TO THE US (REF B). REPORTS ON THAT VISIT INDICATE
SIT: MCF
THAT HE LOOKED FOR AS MUCH SUPPORT AS HE COULD
EOB:
MUSTER BOTH FROM THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH IN GENERATING THE KIND OF PRESSURE DUBLIN
BELIEVES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL CHANGE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND USED THE OCCASION OF
PRIORITY
THE VISIT TO GENERATE AS MUCH MEDIA ATTENTION AS
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921428
POSSIBLE TO THIS END.
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
24. COMMENT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9408
A RENEWED ATTEMPT BY THE GOI TO ENLIST AMERICAN
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
SUPPORT FOR HELPING TO ACHIEVE CHANGES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND BY BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4065
NEEDS TO BE APPROACHED AT TWO DIFFERENT LEVELS.
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1104
FIRST, ON THE QUESTION OF OVER-ALL US POLICY, WE
BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MARCH 17, 1982
CONFISENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
STATEMENT STILL OFFERS THE BEST AND WISEST AMERICAN
APPROACH TO THE GENERAL NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION.
BELFAST BY POUCH
SPECIFICALLY, WHILE URGING THE DISPUTANTS TO COME
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
TOGETHER "THROUGH A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION BETWEEN
CONCERNED THAT, GIVEN HER OWN INCLINATIONS, SHE
THE TWO TRADITIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND BETWEEN
WILL SIMPLY DROP ALL PRETENSE AT TRYING TO FORM
BRITAIN AND IRELAND," THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR
A DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THAT "WE IN THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CHART A
MOVE FOR FULL INTEGRATION WITH THE UK. (DFA
COURSE FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND. IF
DOES NOT REALLY ENTERTAIN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LABOR
SOLUTIONS ARE TO ENDURE THEY MUST COME FROM THE
WINNING NEXT YEAR. IN ADDITION, THE GOI TAKES
PEOPLE THEMSELVES."
LITTLE COMFORT FROM VARIOUS LABOR PARTY
PRONOUNCEMENTS ON NORTHERN IRELAND NOTING THAT
25. AS TO THE SECOND AND MORE IMMEDIATE QUESTION
WHAT LABOR SAYS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF OFFICE
DIFFERS GREATLY FROM WHAT THEY DO WHEN IN GOVERNMENT.)
OF WHAT ROLE THE UNITED STATES CAN PLAY TO HELP
VI. NEXT STEPS FOR DUBLIN--LOOK TO WASHINGTON
RE-ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN,
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT HERE THE USG MIGHT BE OF
SOME ASSISTANCE, BUT ONLY RPT ONLY AT THE APPROPRIATE
21. FACED WITH THESE RATHER UNPLEASANT REALITIES
TIME. AS FOR NOW, SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE THIS AN
AND NO NEAR TERM HOPE OF MUCH MOVEMENT IN THE
INAUSPICIOUS TIME TO TRY TO PLAY SUCH A BRIDGING
ANGLO-IRISH DIALOGUE, DUBLIN SEEMS TO BE ACCELERATING
ROLE. SPECIFICALLY:
ITS EFFORT TO GAIN US SUPPORT FOR THE INCLUSION
BT
OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION" IN LONDON'S THINKING ON
ULSTER. CERTAINLY, FROM HIS FIRST DAYS IN OFFICE,
THAT WAS PART OF PRIME MINISTER HAUGHEY'S
HOPE--AS BEST EVIDENCED BY HIS STATEMENTS AT THE
TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON ST. PATRICK'S
DAY AND HIS EFFORTS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL
FRIENDS OF IRELAND IN JUNE. AS ONE ASSOCIATE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF, HOWEVER, "IN MARCH THAT
WAS ONE OF SEVERAL ARROWS IN THE TAOISEACH'S
(PRIME MINISTER'S) QUIVER--TODAY ITS THE ONLY ONE
LEFT."
22. SPECIFICALLY, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE
TO SEE WASHINGTON PRESSURE LONDON--AT A MINIMUN--TO
REEXAMINE THE PRIOR PROPOSALS AND THINK MORE IN
TERMS OF AN "IRISH DIMENSION." EVEN BETTER IN
DUBLIN'S VIEW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE US PRESSURE TO
END--OR AT LEAST MODIFY--THE GUARANTEE TO NORTHERN
UNIONISTS THAT NORTHERN IRELAND WILL REMAIN A PART OF
THE UK SO LONG AS THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE WISH
IT TO BE. DUBLIN, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ENDING
THE GUARANTEE, WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT PHRASED IN A
MORE POSITIVE FASHION THAT WOULD IMPLY SOME
ACCEPTANCE FROM LONDON OF AN EVENTUAL
REALIGNMENT IN THIS ISLAND--PERHAPS TO THE EFFECT
THAT "HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT
CONF DENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
34
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
DUBL IN 3815
DTG: 191340Z OCT 82 PSN: 023258
EDB971
AN007539
TOR: 292/1441Z
CSN: CRI169
OF DIALOGUE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN DUBLIN'S AND
LONDON'S MUTUAL INTEREST TO SEE THE DIALOGUE RENEWED
DISTRIBUTION: BLAR-01 MYER-01 /002 A2
AND EXPECT THAT FORCES ALREADY AT PLAY WILL HAVE
THE TWO CAPITALS TALKING TO EACH OTHER AGAIN
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
BY THEN. IF NOT, HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE
GOOD OFFICES OF THE USG MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE
EXTENDED--BEHIND THE SCENES AND WITH ZERO
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
VISIBILITY--TO URGE BOTH SIDES TO AGAIN SIT DOWN
SIT: MCF
TOGETHER. DAILEY
EOB:
BT
PRIORITY
DE RUFHDBA #3815 2921436
P 191340Z OCT 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9409
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4066
AMCONSUL BELFAST PRIORITY 1105
CONFIDENT AL SECTION 06 OF 06 DUBLIN 03815
BELFAST BY POUCH
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
-- THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN DUBLIN IS TETTERING
ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE AND SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS
THINK THAT A NEW GENERAL ELECTION COULD BE CALLED
BY FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1983. SOME PREDICT IT COULD
COME AS EARLY AS NOVEMBER 1982. EVEN THOUGH PRIME
MINISTER HAUGHEY SURVIVED A CHALLANGE TO HIS
LEADERSHIP OFTHE MEETING ON OCTOBER 6 (REF A)
THAT CHALLENGE ONLY INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF
NEW ELECTIONS.
-- THE BRITISH ARE COMMITTED TO THE PRIOR
DEVOLUTION PLAN AND UK GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS STILL
ASSERT THAT THE PLAN HAS A CHANCE OF WORKING.
MANY HERE IN DUBLIN DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW BUT
MOST READILY CONCEDE THAT NOTHING WILL BE SERVED
BY FURTHER TALKS WITH LONDON UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY
ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD, THE ASSEMBLY CONVENED,
AND THE END RESULT OF THE PROCESS MORE APPARENT.
-- DUBLIN HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC BY WAY OF
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFER. THEY EXPECT THAT AFTER
THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS THE VARIOUS NATIONALIST
PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL BE EXPLORING
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM. DFA EXPECTS
THAT THE SDLP WILL WANT TO DISCUSS SOME OF THESE
IDEAS AND THE GO! WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO PROPOSE
ALTERNATIVES UNTIL THE DUST SETTLES. SOME OF THE
RUMORED ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL
FOR AN "ALL IRELAND" ASSEMBLY BASED IN DUBLIN,
COULD HEIGHTEN RATHER THAN LESSEN THE TENSIONS.
-- MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PERSONAL ANOMOSITIES
BETWEEN MR. HAUGHEY AND MRS. THATCHER ARE NOW so
GREAT THAT--IF IT WILL EVER BE POSSIBLE FDR THEM
TO WORK IN HARMONY AGAIN--AT A MINIMUM A GOOD DEAL
MORE TIME MUST ELAPSE FOR "COOLING OFF." (THOUGH
GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF NEW IRISH ELECTIONS IT IS
POSSIBLE THAT THIS PROBLEM WILL RESOLVE ITSELF AT
THE BALLOT BOX.)
26. AS TO WHEN SUCH A RENEWAL OF DIALOGUE IS
POSSIBLE, THE DFA VIEW, WHICH WE SHARE, IS THAT IT
MUST WAIT UNTIL THE ASSEMBLY HAS HAD FIVE OR
SIX MONTHS TO FUNCTION. THUS, PERHAPS BY MARCH OR
APRIL THE TIME WILL AGAIN BE RIGHT FOR A RENEWAL
CONF IDENTIAL
398
National Security Council
The White House
Package # 7334
"82 OCT 26 P1:07 P1
NRF
SEQUENCE TO
ACTION
John Poindexter
1
HAS R SEEN
I
2
Bud McFarlane
m
3
Jacque Hill
4
Co
g
Judge Clark
3
John Poindexter
Staff Secretary
Sit Room
I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
DISTRIBUTION
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
35
NSC/S PROFILE
CONFIDENTIAL
ID 8207334
NCLASSIFIED JPON REMOVAL
OF
CLASSIFIED FNCLOSUE
RECEIVED 26 OCT 82 15
TO
CLARK
FROM BLAIR
7/7/15/2003
DOCDATE 26 OCT 82
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
PRIOR, JIM
FEIN, SINN
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
ACTION: FOR INFORMATION
DUE:
STATUS IX FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
CLARK
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(H/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
NOV 1 7 1982
clark noted
DB-
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE DA DA (d; (C)
CONE IDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
36
DECLASSIFIED
PAGE 01
SECSTATE WASHDC 11 6194
DTG:011610Z NOV 82 PSN: 043166
SIT803
DATE 11/01/82
TOR: 305/1652Z
NLRR 748-15-30-6-2
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
BY LCD3 NARA DATE 7/7/15
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SECSTATE WASHDC 11 6194 DTG:011610Z NOV 82 PSN: C43166
SIT:
EOB:
WHOR COMMENT:
MECCAGE ANNOTATIONS:
NC MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHO #6194 3051652
0 0116102 NOV 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMEASS DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 2428
INFO DEMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3592
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 306194
E.O. 10356: DECL: 10/28/88
TAGS: 1S, LE, E1, FORG, MOPS, PSCD
CLEJECT: LETTER CF CONDOLENCE ON DEATH OF THREE IRISH
UNIFIL COLDIERS
1.
ENTIRE TEXT)
2. EMB#CSY 10 REQUESTED 10 DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE CECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER COLLINS.
BEGIN TEXT.
DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:
i WAS CADDENED TO LEARN OF THE DEATH OF THREE COLDIERS
OF THE RISH EATTALION OF UNIFIL IN SOUTHERN-LEBANON.
KNOW THAT THEY ARE NOT THE FIRST IRISH TROOPS OF
UNIFIL WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN THE SERVICE OF
PEACE IN LEE-NON. THE SACRIFICE OF THESE BRAVE MEN IS
ANOTHER REMINDER OF HOW MUCH IRELAND HAS CONTRIBUTED TO
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
THIS IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT.
MAY EATEND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND TO THE FAMILIES OF
THE DECEASED MY DEEPEST AND MOST HEARTFELT CYMPATHY.
SINCERELY YOURS,
GEORGE P. CHULTZ
END TEXT. SHULTZ
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
37
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01
DUBLIN 4738
4136
DTG:231400Z DEC 82 PSN: 049538
SIT775
DATE 12/27/82
TOR: 357/1619Z
CHURCH LEADERS, INCLUDING THE POPE AND IRELAND'S
HIERARCHY, HAVE DENOUNCED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS
DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001
VIOLENCE AND THE GUNMEN. THESE CHURCH LEADERS HAVE
CALLED FOR A HALT TO THE SENSELESS VIOLENCE WHICH
EXACERBATES THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH. SURELY, THOSE WHO SUPPPOT
SUCH VIOLENCE WITH FUNDS HAVE A HEAVY BURDEN OF
SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB BLAR
CONSCIENCE TO BEAR.
E OB: /COMMASSIST/
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, I THINK YOUR DECISION TO ATTEND
WHSR COMMENT: FYICKLISTST-- T
DECLASSIFIED
THE NORAID DINNER IS MOST UNFORTUNATE. I HOPE
YOU WILL RECONSIDER. END QUOTE. DAILEY
MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:
NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS
NLRR 748-15-30-7-1
MESSAGE:
BY
COB
NARA
DATE
7/7/15
PRIORITY
DUBL IN 4738
4136
DTG:231400Z DEC 82 PSN: 049538
DE RUFHDB #4738 3571401
P 231400Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9713
INFO AMCONSUL BELFAST 1160
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4161
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DUBLIN 04738
PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINT, US, EI
SUBJECT: ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS TO ATTEND
FUND-RAISING DINNER
REF: 4729
1. REFTEL REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT ROCHE OF ANCIENT
ORDER OF HIBERNIANS (AOH) PLANS ATTEND NORAID ANNUAL
FUND-RAISING DINNER.
2. IF NO OBJECTIONS PERCEIVED, AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE
FOLLOWING TRANSMITTED TO MR ROCHE:
BEGIN QUOTE.
DEAR MR ROCHE: THE IRISH PRESS RECENTLY REPORTED YOU
HAVE AGREED TO BE GUEST DF HONOR AT NORAID'S ANNUAL
DINNER.
I REGRET THIS VERY MUCH. LENDING YOUR PRESENCE AS
PRESIDENT OF THE ANCIENT ORDER OF HIBERNIANS (AOH) TO
THIS DINNER DOES A DISSERVICE TO BOTH THE CAUSE OF
SECURING A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS IN
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE IMAGE OF THE AOH.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED THAT FUNDS
CHANNELED THROUGH NORAID GO TO SUPPORT TERRORISM.
AS YOU KNOW, THE USG HAS TAKEN LEGAL STEPS TO HAVE
NORAID REGISTERED AS A FOREIGN LOBBY. AT A RECENT
ARMS TRIAL IN NEW YORK, NORAID OFFICIALS STATED THAT
NORAID WAS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ARMS TRANSFERS TO
NORTHERN IRELAND. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND CONSIDERS
NORAID A PRINCIPLE CHANNEL FOR ILLEGAL ARMS PURCHASES
WHICH ARE SENT TO NORTHERN IRELAND WHERE THEY CONTRIBUTE
TO THE SICKENING SPIRAL OF ARMED VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL
POLARIZATION. THESE SAME ARMS MAY CONVULSE THE
REPUBLIC TOMORROW.
PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND CARTER AND U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS HAVE DENOUNCED VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT IT.
PANE
NSC/S PROFILE
CONFINENTIAL UPON REMOVA.
ID 8301604 38
OF
CLASSIFIED FNCLOSURE(S)
RECEIVED 10 MAR 83 19
TO
BREMER
FROM WHEELER
DOCDATE 10 MAR 83
BLAIR
10 MAR 83
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
AP
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKING POINTS FOR PRES ATTENDANCE AT THE IRISH EMBASSY
ON MAR 17
ACTION: WHEELER SGD MEMO TO BREMER
DUE: 10 MAR 83 STATUS D FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
STATE
FORTIER
TYSON
WHEELER
COMMENTS ** DISPATCHED VIA LDX.
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(M/)
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
2 3/12 Reed s/s 8307179
Blan
S 3/12
Prepare Mend to class
DF,CT
C
please 3/17 close out puDC Blain 3/12/83
NAR
DISPATCH.
W/ATTCH FILE
is
ic)
DECLASSIFIED
1604
S/S 8307179
NLRR
748-15-30-8-0
United States Department of State
39
BY 1013
NARA DATE
7/7/15
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
March 11, 33 N 1983
A12 14
SIT
TON
100M
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: President's Reception at the Irish Embassy,
March 17
The Department submits herewith a draft toast for the
President to use at the March 17 reception at the Irish Embassy
and talking points for use in his telephone conversation with
Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald.
In the draft toast, the President again condemns those who
want to use violence to resolve the problems of Northern
Ireland. In the draft talking points with FitzGerald, the
President reminds the Prime Minister of his continuing interest
in the problem of Northern Ireland and reaffirms his support
for FitzGerald's efforts to achieve reconciliation.
Attachments:
1. Draft Presidential Toast
2. Telephone Talking Points
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL OADR
40
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
1604
March 10, 1983
VIA LDX
MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
President's Reception at the Irish Embassy,
March 17
At the invitation of the Irish Ambassador, the President will be
attending an afternoon reception at the Irish Embassy on March
17. He will be presented a bowl of shamrocks and will receive a
phone call from Prime Minister FitzGerald. The State Department
is requested to provide by close-of-business, Friday, March 11 a
briefing paper for the reception. A draft toast and draft
talking points for the telephone conversation.
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
1604
41
MEMORANDUM
ACTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 10, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER
FROM:
DENNIS B BLAIR
SUBJECT:
President's Reception at Irish Embassy, March 17
Attached for your signature is a memo to State requesting
materials for the President's visit to the Irish Embassy next
Thursday.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Tab I
Memo to Bremer
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8301598
RECEIVED 10 MAR 83 12
TO
CLARK
FROM BLAIR
DOCDATE 10 MAR 83 42
TYSON
10 MAR 83
KEYWORDS: IRELAND
AP
SUBJECT: PRES LUNCHEON AT IRISH EMBASSY ON MAR 17
ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE
DUE: 12 MAR 83 STATUS X FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
CLARK
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG 8301142 8301580 NSCIFID
(C/)
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
C 3/11
Clark Agd memo
DB,CT
DISPATCH
3/11
3/11 cen
cen
W/ATTCH FILE PA Clean (C).
43
MEMORANDI \1
THE WHITE HOUSE
1598
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEAVER
FROM:
WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT:
President's Activities on St. Patrick's Day,
March 17
Following lunch on Capitol Hill the President will go to the
Irish Embassy for a reception, accompanied by Speaker O'Neill.
At the embassy reception he will receive a bowl of shamrocks,
propose a toast, and will talk by telephone with Prime Minister
FitzGerald. My staff is working with the State Department and
speechwriters to prepare the papers and statements for the
President's use.
1598 Re-do
44
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
March 10, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THROUGH:
CHARLES P. TYSON
FROM:
DENNIS & BLAIR
SUBJECT:
President's Reception at the Irish Embassy
Attached for your signature is a memo to Mike Deaver outlining
the events in which the President will participate at the Irish
Embassy on St. Patrick's Day.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Tab I
Memo to Deaver
National Security Council
574
The White House
1825P
Package # 1598
Redo
MAR 1 0 1983
SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN
ACTION
John Poindexter
b
Bud McFarlane
Jacque Hill
3
X he
Judge Clark
4
A
John Poindexter
Staff Secretary
Sit Room
I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
DISTRIBUTION
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
46
573
National Security Council
The White House
Package # 1598
1242
MAR 1 0 1983
SEQUENCE TO
ACTION
John Poindexter
/
HAS g SEEN
A
Bud McFarlane
2
Jacque Hill
3
Judge Clark
4
A
John Poindexter
Staff Secretary
Sit Room
I-Information A-Action R Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
DISTRIBUTION
cc:
VP
Meese
Baker
Deaver
Other
COMMENTS
CPT To Ravid to and Virsion zhiobe
MW
1598
47
MEMORANDUM
of
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
March 10, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THROUGH:
CHARLES P. TYSON CNT
FROM:
DENNIS C. BLAIR
SUBJECT:
President's Luncheon at the Irish Embassy
The plans for the President's St. Patrick's Day luncheon at the
Irish Embassy has just now fallen into place. They include
lunch, a toast and a phone call with Prime Minister FitzGerald
in Dublin. Attached for your signature is a memo to Deaver
informing him of the events to take place during the lunch.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Tab I
Memo to Deaver
48
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
1598
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEAVER
FROM:
WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT:
President's Luncheon at Irish Embassy
During the luncheon at the Irish Embassy on St. Patrick's Day,
March 17, the President will make a toast and receive a phone
call from Prime Minister FitzGerald in Dublin. My staff will
provide necessary papers for the President and will work with
speechwriters to write the toast.