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GALLISNES/LTHJES
SECRET
2
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE WEST AND AVOIDS PUTTING CORRESPONDING
PRESSURE ON THE EAST. IN SHORT, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE OFTEN TRIED
TO DO, THIS ATTEMPTS TO SET AN UNFAIR PUBLIC FOCUS AND AGENDA.
THE SOVIET "PLAN" ALSO CALLS FOR US TO ACCEPT MANY UNACCEPTABLE
ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST
PHASE, FRONT-LOADING THE DEAL, IN ORDER TO GET CERTAIN BENEFITS
IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES. MANY OF THE "BENEFITS" (E.G., THE TOTAL
ELIMINATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS) PROMISED IN SUBSEQUENT
SOVIET PHASES PLAY MORE TO PUBLIC OPINION THAN TO REAL BENEFITS
FOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES.
THE DIRECT IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET PROVISIONS WOULD BE TO
DERAIL WESTERN MODERNIZATION. MOREOVER, SOME OF THESE
PROVISIONS, BY SIMPLY BEING GIVEN THE STATUS OF REAL
"POSSIBILITIES", COULD ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT. IT IS NOT IN US
INTEREST TO LET THE SOVIETS GAIN LEVERAGE BY MAKING THEIR OUTYEAR
DETAILS APPEAR TO BE LIKELY POSSIBILITIES.
5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, US DEL, IN CARRYING OUT AGENDA OF REFTEL,
SHOULD:
(A) MAINTAIN FOCUS AND PRIORITY ON EXECUTING THE MANDATE AGREED
AT THE LAST SUMMIT TO PURSUE AREAS OF COMMON GROUND--50 PERCENT
REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED AND AN
INTERIM INF AGREEMENT;
(B) CONTINUE TO REJECT ELEMENTS OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT
HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN OFFERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AND REJECTED BY
THE US;
(C) WITH THE SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS NOTED IN THE INF AREA, REJECT
ANY IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE STEPS OR PHASES, NOTING THAT
THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE AND WASTE TIME, AT BEST;
(D) MAKE CLEAR THAT IN US VIEW THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS REQUIRES CONDITIONS THAT INCLUDE CORRECTING CONVENTIONAL
AND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES AND PROBLEMS, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION
FOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR TREATY
OBLIGATIONS (FYI. AT POLITICAL LEVEL WE WILL BE RAISING OTHER
IMPORTANT CRITERIA SUCH AS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL
CONFLICTS IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE
INTERFERENCE AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ORIENTATION AND
AMBITIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. END FYI);
SECRET/SENSTTIVE
SECRET
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"ocrText": "GALLISNES/LTHJES\nSECRET\n2\nMAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE WEST AND AVOIDS PUTTING CORRESPONDING\nPRESSURE ON THE EAST. IN SHORT, AS THE SOVIETS HAVE OFTEN TRIED\nTO DO, THIS ATTEMPTS TO SET AN UNFAIR PUBLIC FOCUS AND AGENDA.\nTHE SOVIET \"PLAN\" ALSO CALLS FOR US TO ACCEPT MANY UNACCEPTABLE\nELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS DURING THE FIRST\nPHASE, FRONT-LOADING THE DEAL, IN ORDER TO GET CERTAIN BENEFITS\nIN SUBSEQUENT PHASES. MANY OF THE \"BENEFITS\" (E.G., THE TOTAL\nELIMINATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS) PROMISED IN SUBSEQUENT\nSOVIET PHASES PLAY MORE TO PUBLIC OPINION THAN TO REAL BENEFITS\nFOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES.\nTHE DIRECT IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET PROVISIONS WOULD BE TO\nDERAIL WESTERN MODERNIZATION. MOREOVER, SOME OF THESE\nPROVISIONS, BY SIMPLY BEING GIVEN THE STATUS OF REAL\n\"POSSIBILITIES\", COULD ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT. IT IS NOT IN US\nINTEREST TO LET THE SOVIETS GAIN LEVERAGE BY MAKING THEIR OUTYEAR\nDETAILS APPEAR TO BE LIKELY POSSIBILITIES.\n5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, US DEL, IN CARRYING OUT AGENDA OF REFTEL,\nSHOULD:\n(A) MAINTAIN FOCUS AND PRIORITY ON EXECUTING THE MANDATE AGREED\nAT THE LAST SUMMIT TO PURSUE AREAS OF COMMON GROUND--50 PERCENT\nREDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED AND AN\nINTERIM INF AGREEMENT;\n(B) CONTINUE TO REJECT ELEMENTS OF THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT\nHAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN OFFERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE AND REJECTED BY\nTHE US;\n(C) WITH THE SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS NOTED IN THE INF AREA, REJECT\nANY IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE STEPS OR PHASES, NOTING THAT\nTHIS WOULD BE PREMATURE AND WASTE TIME, AT BEST;\n(D) MAKE CLEAR THAT IN US VIEW THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR\nWEAPONS REQUIRES CONDITIONS THAT INCLUDE CORRECTING CONVENTIONAL\nAND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES AND PROBLEMS, EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION\nFOR FUTURE AGREEMENTS, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR TREATY\nOBLIGATIONS (FYI. AT POLITICAL LEVEL WE WILL BE RAISING OTHER\nIMPORTANT CRITERIA SUCH AS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL\nCONFLICTS IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE\nINTERFERENCE AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ORIENTATION AND\nAMBITIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. END FYI);\nSECRET/SENSTTIVE\nSECRET"
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