NSDD 39 United States Policy on Foreign Reprocessing and Use of Plutonium Subject to United States Control

DECLASSIFIED SECRET SYSTEM II 90353 THE WHITE HOUSE BY as NARADATE 3/3./88 CHRON FILE WASHINGTON June 4, 1982 SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 39 UNITED STATES POLICY ON FOREIGN REPROCESSING AND USE OF PLUTONIUM SUBJECT TO U.S. CONTROL I have reviewed the interagency report on United States policy on foreign reprocessing and use of plutonium subject to U.S. control, as forwarded by the Department of State's memorandum of May 26 , 1982, and have approved the policies recommended in that report and as set forth below. With respect to Japan, the United States will offer (1) an advance consent arrangement for certain reprocess- ing, retransfers for reprocessing and use of U.S .-controlled material in programs for which available information allows the United States to make the necessary statutory determinations, and (2) a statement of intention to approve use of such material in future programs in Japan and retransfers for reprocessing to EURATOM or other mutually agreed countries in future facilities when sufficient information is available to allow the United States to make the necessary statutory determinations. It is under- stood that an advance consent arrangement could include retransfer of -spent fuel from Japan to facilities in France and the United Kingdom for reprocessing; reprocessing at the Tokai-Mura plant for its operative life; use of plutonium in Japan's breeder, advanced reactor and thermal recycle programs and return of separated plutonium from France and the United Kingdom for these programs. These approvals will be subject to the conditions in the agreement continuing to be met, including necessary non- proliferation and statutory conditions such as those on safeguards and physical security, and to a continued strong commitment by Japan to non-proliferation efforts. The United States will offer the above in the context of seeking a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation in traditional form or, if that form is not acceptable to Japan, in another appropriate form containing equivalent provisions. The United States will be flexible on the form an agreement might take, if it contains equivalent provisions in substance, and will seek to complete negotiations at an early date, if possible within one year. If Japan proves unwilling to accept equivalent provisions, the Senior Interagency Group will reassess the matter. CHARLY rV CARON NSI 15 copies