NSDD 56 Private Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Exchange

UNCLASSIFIED SYSTEM II 90726 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON UBIGLASSIFIES September 15, 1982 National Security Decision Directive Number 56 PRIVATE INF EXCHANGE With respect to the private INF exchange which took place at the close of the last session, I have decided the following: - The U.S. should continue to press for the zero/zero approach. - No actions should be taken to close the private channel. If the Soviets respond in that channel, the following points should be made: -- The U.S. believes the zero/zero proposal is the best approach to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to ensure effective verification. The U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-flight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air-breathing GLCMs*) . If the Soviets continue to be admantly opposed to zero/zero, we should place the responsibility on them to propose alternatives for equitably reducing the total missile force structures. 189 In preparing for the possibility of a Soviet response to the exchange, an NSPG working group should prepare, on a close-hold basis, talking points which outline the specific military and other reasons why the U.S. cannot accept it. (5) R anid Geographical 11/21/92 Declassified/Released on under provisions of E.0. 12356 and shorter range ballistic systems by S Taley. National Security Council UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Declassify on: OADR SECRET