NSDD 106 United States Approach to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations VII
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OCR Page 1 of 5DEVALT
Additional Guidance on the Treatment of Bombers
Bomber delivered weapons are clearly retaliatory arriving, weapons and
inherently more stabilizing than rapidly
ballistic missile warheads. Encouraging basic
a
objective greater and an essential element in the basic position.
non-recallable dependence on more stable systems is a U.S. U.S.
The U.S. as has a part of the basic U.S. package in a manner
placed both bombers and ALCM limits on the fully table in
START the basic U.S. objective of encouraging
consistent with within the context of the build-down initiative
outlined However, the U.S. remains slow-flying
stability. above, the approach to bombers directed firm on also the supports point
that that objective. we will not treat the weapons carried Soviet by our defenses,
bombers which have to penetrate being negotiated extensive on the table in Geneva,
defenses in the same which way are that not we treat more destabilizing ballistic
missile warheads.
Importance of Verification
Current issues verification is an essential part of START
of non-compliance reinforce the requirement and the that
build-down effective initiative incorporated into the U.S. START position
during Round V.
Previous Directives on START
This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33, NSDD-36, NSDD-44,
NSDD-53, NSDD-78, and NSDD-98.
R onold Reagan
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