NSDD 136 United States Initiative to Ban Chemical Weapons

SECRET 2 To enhance the prospects for successful negotiation , the United States will continue to pursue as a high priority the current program for modernizing the US short and long range chemical weapon retaliatory capability. Until the threat posed by chemical weapons is effectively eliminated by treaty, the United States must maintain a modern and credible deterrent. The importance of such a deterrent and of seeking the most effective possible verification and enforcement provisions has been illustrated by the use in several parts of the world of prohibited chemical and biological weapons. An integral part of our effort to rid the world effectively of this threat must include the continued condemnation of the use of chemical weapons wherever such use occurs. We must continue to seek to strengthen international procedures for investigating suspected use of chemical or toxin weapons. M Success in our endeavor will require close consultation and coordination with the Congress, with our allies, and with other nations and organizations. An active public diplomacy effort should be implemented to explain and gain support for our proposed CW treaty and for the continued modernization program. To implement this directive, the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Arms Control Interdepartmental Group (IG) shall: (1) Prepare a draft treaty for presentation to allies for consultation. (2) Develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive strategy for public diplomacy, allied consultation, and congressional cooperation designed to strengthen our chances for successful negotiation of a CW treaty which promotes the security interests of the United States and its allies. (3) Develop as an ongoing process a program to further improve the verifiability of the proposed prohibition on chemical weapons under negotiation. (4) Develop a program of measures and safeguards, military and diplomatic, designed to achieve an environment wherein the risks associated with the possible existence of a covert CW capability, and the incentive to create one, are reduced to the lowest possible level. SECRET