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NSDD 165 Instructions for First Round of United States/Soviet Negotiations in Geneva
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- Parte de Numbered National Security Policy Papers, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
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nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relation-
ship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on
earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a
period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly
reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to
deter war based upon the increasing contribution of
non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This
period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination
of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world
free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we,
the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.
(U)
General Guidance to the U.S. Delegation. In implementing the
above, the additional general guidance provided in the draft
instructions cable developed by the Senior Arms Control Group
(SACG) and the U.S. Delegation is approved. This cable should be
redrafted to reference this directive as appropriate and be
promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to release.
(U)
Instructions for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. The
additional guidance provided in the draft instructions cable for
the INF Defense and Space Negotiating Group developed by the
Senior Arms Control Group and the U.S. Delegation is also
approved. This cable should also be redrafted to reference this
directive as appropriate and be promptly resubmitted in final form
for clearance prior to its release. (U)
Instructions for the INF Negotiating Group. The primary U.S.
objective in this area is to press for early progress on INF
consistent with the criteria for agreement previously enunciated.
The U.S. INF negotiating group should make clear that the U.S.
believes that an agreement is possible on the basis of the
willingness to consider a variety of ways to reach the goal of
September 1983 U.S. proposals which signalled flexibility and a
equal global limits on LRINF. The negotiating group should point
out that the U.S. proposals provide for an equal global limit
under which the United States would consider not deploying its
United States also is willing to consider reductions in Pershing
full global allotment in Europe. They also indicate that the
II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major
concerns of the Soviet Union. The negotiating group should stress
that within our basic principles, the U.S. remains prepared and
ready to show considerable flexibility.
(C)
The U.S. INF negotiating group should probe the Soviets for any
signs of corresponding flexibility on their part. While doing so,
the INF negotiating group is authorized to explore Soviet interest
in equal global entitlements at levels other than those previously be
proposed. reported back to Washington, including recommendations for future
Findings as a result of the above actions should
U.S. actions. (C)
UNCLASSIFIED
UCECRET ASSIGIED
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