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8 statement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher in December, to the effect that: first, the United States and Western aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking account of Soviet developments; -- second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations; third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine deterrence; and, -- fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. (U) This common understanding is also reflected in other statements since then -- for example, the principles suggested recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that: -- the existing NATO strategy of flexible response must remain fully valid for the Alliance as long as there is no more effective alternative for preventing war; and, -- the Alliance's political and strategic unity must be safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of security in the Alliance, and Europe's security must not be decoupled from that of North America. (U) Presenting the SDI Program (U) In presenting the SDI research program, U.S. officials must draw upon the information provided above to ensure that U.S. intentions are correctly understood. In addition, all U.S. officials describing the SDI research program should stress the following themes. (U) 1. The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority, but to maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable deterrence. (U) A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI is designed to secure military superiority for the U.S. Put in the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the increased contribution of defenses -- defenses that threaten no one. (U) SECRET A SECRET / 9

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