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statement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher
in December, to the effect that:
first, the United States and Western aim was not to
achieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking
account of Soviet developments;
-- second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of
treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;
third, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to
undermine deterrence; and,
-- fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve
security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both
sides. (U)
This common understanding is also reflected in other
statements since then -- for example, the principles suggested
recently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:
-- the existing NATO strategy of flexible response must
remain fully valid for the Alliance as long as there is no
more effective alternative for preventing war; and,
--
the Alliance's political and strategic unity must be
safeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of
security in the Alliance, and Europe's security must not be
decoupled from that of North America. (U)
Presenting the SDI Program (U)
In presenting the SDI research program, U.S. officials must
draw upon the information provided above to ensure that U.S.
intentions are correctly understood. In addition, all U.S.
officials describing the SDI research program should stress the
following themes. (U)
1.
The aim of SDI is not to seek superiority, but to
maintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable
deterrence.
(U)
A central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI
is designed to secure military superiority for the U.S. Put in
the proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies
face, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is
certainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in
nature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking
better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the
increased contribution of defenses -- defenses that threaten no
one. (U)
SECRET A
SECRET
/
9
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"ocrText": "8\nstatement issued following my meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher\nin December, to the effect that:\nfirst, the United States and Western aim was not to\nachieve superiority, but to maintain the balance, taking\naccount of Soviet developments;\n-- second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of\ntreaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations;\nthird, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to\nundermine deterrence; and,\n-- fourth, East-West negotiations should aim to achieve\nsecurity with reduced levels of offensive systems on both\nsides. (U)\nThis common understanding is also reflected in other\nstatements since then -- for example, the principles suggested\nrecently by the Federal Republic of Germany that:\n-- the existing NATO strategy of flexible response must\nremain fully valid for the Alliance as long as there is no\nmore effective alternative for preventing war; and,\n--\nthe Alliance's political and strategic unity must be\nsafeguarded. There must be no zones of different degrees of\nsecurity in the Alliance, and Europe's security must not be\ndecoupled from that of North America. (U)\nPresenting the SDI Program (U)\nIn presenting the SDI research program, U.S. officials must\ndraw upon the information provided above to ensure that U.S.\nintentions are correctly understood. In addition, all U.S.\nofficials describing the SDI research program should stress the\nfollowing themes. (U)\n1.\nThe aim of SDI is not to seek superiority, but to\nmaintain the strategic balance and thereby assure stable\ndeterrence.\n(U)\nA central theme in Soviet propaganda is the charge that SDI\nis designed to secure military superiority for the U.S. Put in\nthe proper context of the strategic challenge that we and our allies\nface, our true goals become obvious and clear. Superiority is\ncertainly not our purpose. Nor is the SDI program offensive in\nnature. The SDI program is a research program aimed at seeking\nbetter ways to ensure U.S. and allied security, using the\nincreased contribution of defenses -- defenses that threaten no\none. (U)\nSECRET A\nSECRET\n/\n9"
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