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NSDD 232 Preparations for Next Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) Negotiating Round
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- Parte de Numbered National Security Policy Papers, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
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acceptable level of verification. At the same time, I request
the Department of Defense, assisted by the Department of State,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, to resolve the policy issues associated with this scheme,
as identified in the ACSG work, and to assess its potential
impact upon the ability of the United States to meet its national
security requirements. Both studies should be conducted on a
close-hold basis and completed by September 8, 1986. Guidance on
this point supercedes the suspense directed for such studies in
NSDD 233 (distributed on a limited basis only) (S)
SALT II Numerical Limits
I remain fully committed to my May 27 decision that, in the
future, the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards
contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by
Soviet noncompliance. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was
never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified,
and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union.
The SALT I interim offensive agreement was unequal, has expired
and is also being violated by the Soviet Union. (U)
I indicated on May 27 that I intended to continue deployment of
U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft
as an appropriate response, without dismantling additional U.S.
systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty.
Since the United States is retiring two Poseidon submarines this
summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of
the SALT II Treaty until that event near the end of this year. (U)
The Secretary of Defense is requested to inform me in advance of
the exact timing of any action which would result in exceeding
SALT II limits. (S)
SCHEDULE
In order to permit time for review and allied consultation as
appropriate, specific proposals for instructions to the NST
delegation, based on the foregoing guidance, should be submitted
for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)
Ronald Riagan
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