NSDD 251 Arms Control Discussions

90843 UNCLASSIEIED BECRET TI WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTS Dedimbe 24, 86 NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE NUMBER CON' ROL DIS USS ONS (U The Soviet Union has recenti given us ndic tions that it may be ready to offer reas or supw addition flexibility with respect to the ma r clear arm ontrol reas addressed at Reykjavik and those under megotiation at enre Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva. Based upon the advice of my most senior advisors, I would like to probe this possibility quietly if appropriate opportunities present themselves. (TS) The U.S. objective in any such activity is to secure reductions in nuclear arms by means of verifiable agreements and to see if the Soviet Union wishes to offer any new ideas to that end. The primary task is to determine whether the Union has additional flexibility that would progre to be made at the negotiating table Assuming that the Souret Union is Incer e in ffort, we should anticipate thit it V. 11 take time toastessith confidence the ns hat haw beer provided by the Soviets and to achieve the tiv S outlined bove. Thei efore, the pace of U.S. actions sh uld be adj sted to thi jucgment. Our first task is to elicit listen aremully t what Soviet Union may have to offer. In loin so, and necessary to understand fully the range f Soviet (lexibility Soviet interest in a CO mit ent not t' deploy a anced defenses for a period shorter th e 10-year uggested at Reykjavik. Any probing should be done in a manner that cannot be construed to commit the U.S. to any specific course of action at this time. (TS) At the same time, we should be prepared to indicate that the U.S. still believes the best course of action for both sides would be to agree upon and implement the 50% reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in five years as discus d agreed at the highest levels, in Reykjay During uch perio of reductions, the United States would repared D continue ne rotiations in the appropriate fora on the full rar e o U.S. and Soviet proposals -- from r duction in nucleai off nsive forces with a transition to an incl easing eli nce on, and deployment of, advanced defen 6, b al sociate issues inv lvi g conventional and che. ferces. If a ked, we sho 1d make it clear that we also befic 7e bat the intl rests 9 ba sides would be served by moving fort rd vith an gre ment in th INF area as soon as possible, indepe idei of pro ress ther areas. (TS) onald Regun on 3/19/16 under provisions of E.O. 12958 by J. Saundera, National Security Council