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1931
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
March 29, 1993
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
FROM:
EILEEN CLAUSSEN
SUBJECT:
Pacific Salmon Treaty Negotiations with Canada
Although I do not think that this subject, the U.S. - Canada
Pacific Salmon Treaty, should reach the President, I do know that
Canadian concerns have already reached the Prime Minister, and
that an information memorandum was sent to the Secretary of
State. In light of this, I thought it might be useful for you to
understand the issue and where I believe we are headed.
Background
Salmon that originate in U.S. rivers are often caught
(intercepted) in Canadian fisheries and vice versa. While the
U.S. and Canada have often argued about the balance of these
interceptions, the U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty was
concluded in 1985 to establish management and allocation schemes
from Southeast Alaska to Oregon. Most of the regimes established
by the Treaty have now expired, and are being renegotiated within
the Commission created by the Treaty. However, the U.S. side of
the Commission operates by consensus, and there is a wide range
of opinion between U.S. northern interests (Alaska) and U.S.
southern interests (Washington, Oregon, Idaho and the Treaty
Tribes). The result has been a process that has essentially
stalemated, and a request from the Congressional delegations of
Oregon and Washington to initiate government to government
discussions to break the deadlock. Ambassador Fortier from
Canada briefed Katie McGinty and I Friday morning, expressing his
concerns about the Treaty and what will ensue if no agreement is
reached. He also favors intervention on a government to
government basis.
Discussion
We agree with Canada that the Salmon Treaty is important, and
that we need an agreement for 1993. It is also important that we
establish an improved and equitable management scheme with the
Canadians, as well as a habitat enhancement protocol to help us
with our Endangered Species Act problems with west coast salmon.
A possible compromise with the Canadians would be a roll over of
existing regimes for 1993, coupled with a government to
government exploration of an equitable management scheme and a
habitat protocol. The only additional short term requirement
would be for the Canadians to give us some relief from their west
coast coho salmon fishery, an economic necessity for some
2
Washington State fisheries. This can probably be negotiated, and
Katie and I have discussed this with our Ambassador, David
Colson, who will proceed with this agenda in mind.
In the longer term, it appears that reaching agreement on a
management scheme with Canada will require us to negotiate among
the different U.S. interests on this issue, and to make some
decisions this fall that affect the economic interests of Idaho,
Oregon, Washington, Alaska and the tribes.
CC:
Katie McGinty
Barry Lowenkron
Process
girds intus
- We agree with Canada that the Salmon Treaty is important
and that we need an agreement for 1993. We also need to
get agreement on where we are going over the long-term.
Substance
- On fishing regimes, we can probably live with a roll-over
of the status quo for one year (the Tribes are the
uncertain factor) if Canada gives us some relief in their
West coast coho fishery (a must for Washington State). We
need a Canadian coho catch of 1.4 million instead of 1.8.
- What Canada gets for this is a promise to begin serious
negotiations on an "equity process" -- a process to ensure
that salmon interceptions remain in balance in some agreed
way.
- I have told Fortier that I am seeking authority to proceed
with "equity" negotiations government to government
outside the PSC framework if the Commission can not get
its act together. This is a big deal for Canada and our
concession to get into a negotiation is worth something.
- We also want Canada to agree with us on a general habitat
and enhancement protocol to the Treaty. The implementing
legislation for such a protocol would give us the
opportunity to develop a region wide salmon plan that
could help with west coast salmon ESA problems. (A
habitat protocol would give us a handle with Canada on
such issues as Windy Craggy).
- The ESA problem with Snake River Fall chinook is
manageable for 1993 if the PSC does not agree on a chinook
package; the Canadians will restrain their fishery that
impacts this stock for their own reasons; we will use ESA
regs to manage our fishery.
It would help me if you:
Apr. 1
- Suggest that west coast fish managers get together
states take
immediately (like the next day) to begin planning to
manage responsibly for 1993;
-
stress the importance of Canada providing us with some
relief on west coast Vancouver Island coho and mention the
need for a 1.4 million catch ceiling;
- indicate you support a government to government
exploration of the equity issue if the PSC can not get its
act together;
- indicate strong interest in a habitat protocol; perhaps
one to be negotiated within the next few months.
03-24-93 06:56PM FROM Rep. Dicks Wash D.C. TO 96470217
P003/003
Congress of the United States
Mashington, DC 20515
March 24, 1993
Secretary Warren Christopher
Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We have been following closely the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) negotiations with
Canada. We already have expressed to you the importance of these negotiations toward positive
actions to restore the health of Northwest salmon stocks and avoid future listings under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) while maintaining viable Indian and non-Indian fisheries on Frascr
River stocks.
We are concerned about a lack of progress. Nothing has been done within the Pacific
Salmon Commission to address the 1993 conservation concerns for chinook stocks listed under the
ESA or for coho stocks returning to Northwest streams.
While we would have preferred action within the Commission, we do not share the
conclusion that the lack of progress is the inevitable outcome of the voting requirements of the
U.S. Section to the Commission. We believe you and U.S. Commissioner Ambassador David
Colson have been provided ample authority to address conservation concerns and U.S. Treaty
obligations.
While we are convinced that a bilateral agreement through the Commission is in the best
interest of both countries, it is imperative that the United States provide the required leadership that
results in an acceptable agreement with Canada. Moreover, we believe that the structure of the
Commission and the U.S. Section were never intended to allow the frustration of international
commitments by the U.S. or serious domestic conservation efforts.
We urge you to use your authorities, including government-to-government action if
necessary, to break any impasse so that an acceptable 1993 regime on stocks returning to the
Northwest is in place prior to completion on April 9, 1993, of our domestic management process.
5
Ord wash.
We understand that the U.S. Section is discussing a promising long-term and
del.ok
comprehensive approach to salmon management under the Treaty. Such an approach would
include commitments to improve the productivity of natural stocks thereby addressing future ESA
on
concerns, development of harvest regimes that respond to changes in abundance of stocks, and
baketat
needed changes in the process of decision-making with the Commission. We are prepared to
consider favorably reasonable proposals requiring Congressional action to put into place a long-
protection
term, comprehensive regime. However, we will be very disturbed if the opportunity to address
1993 concerns is lost due to inaction of the Commission or the United States.
Unsocld Patty Muney Sincerely,
on this
Norm
Vicks
abrat grry Marka Marin Contacce
Thomas Mahe Kreidlen
kin THE
process
Conshisns wed have defficulty u/
I products in Wash of Or. can't wonsculdare come
'Cause of BC/fed.
-
from agracalture- -
gi pressure.
MAR
05
193
02:27PM
December 3, 1992
PLENARY STATEMENT REGARDING THE CANADIAN POSITION
1.
The intent of this paper is to explain the basic philosophy underlying Canada's approach
to the Pacific Salmon Treaty and to summarize Canadian proposals for renegotiation of expiring
provisions of Annex IV of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This past year has been a difficult one,
in large part as a consequence of the dispute over the Fraser River, which has diverted us from
our main course of creating a dependable and workable system for improving salmon fisheries
on a coast-wide basis. I believe we must quickly solve the short-term problems so that we can
resume our quest for creation, in the long term, of a positive environment for restoration and
expansion of our valuable salmon resources.
2.
The Treaty is based on two principles. The first is aimed at conservation and
management of shared stocks. The second provides for each Party to derive benefits from
Pacific salmon stocks equivalent to their production.
3.
The commitment of both countries to the first principle, conservation, is well exemplified
by our joint efforts in the chinook rebuilding program, which, though not perfect, have provided
a vastly improved framework for both of us to restore badly depleted stocks. Canada remains
strongly committed to such joint efforts.
4.
Cooperation is a two-way street and our joint efforts must result in a fair distribution of
benefits - that is what the "Equity" principle is all about. The Treaty simply won't work if one
side or the other considers the results of Treaty implementation to be unfair.
5.
It is Canada's fundamental belief that both principles of the Treaty are made more
achievable if each side works toward depending on their own resources rather than on salmon
bound for rivers in the other country. Over the years, this position, which we believe is shared
by the United States, has been the centrepiece of Canadian international policy regarding
fisheries on both coasts. Moreover, it is an obligation of the Parties under the Treaty to reduce
interceptions.
6.
This position is firmly based in customary international law. The 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention makes it clear that the state of origin should be the principal recipient of benefits
accruing from use of their own salmon, providing that such States shall have the primary
interest and responsibility for [stocks originating in their rivers]". The Convention also provided
for a de facto ban on development of new fisheries for salmon on the high seas.
7.
This "ownership" concept has received its most emphatic and specific expression in the
present Pacific Salmon Treaty which provides for each Party to receive benefits equivalent
to the production of salmon originating in its wasers". The Treaty recognized that it was not
practical for the two Parties to completely eliminate all interceptions, but that for those
unavoidable interceptions, there should be a balance of interceptions to both sides.
2
8.
Based on the fundamental principles of the Treaty, supported by emerging international
law, the Canadian position favours efforts to reduce the extent of interception by both Parties,
provided it is done in a manner that is consistent with the equity principle.
9.
In Canada's view reducing interceptions has many advantages:
fishermen of the producing country directly receive the benefits of production
from their own rivers, encouraging sound management;
attention is focused on the need to protect the aquatic environment. Thus a
premium is provided for maintaining habitat in fit condition for salmon
production; and,
domestic harvest allocation is facilitated when the needs of the other Party do not
have to be taken into account. Reducing interceptions provides flexibility for
both sides in developing improved allocation schemes, particularly with respect
to new sharing arrangements with native Indian communities which by tradition
and practice harvest salmon near the streams of origin.
10.
Canada believes that the United States, as a signatory to the PSC Treaty, fundamentally
shares Canada's approach. In this regard, we note that:
With Canada, the United States spearheaded the negotiation of the "ownership"
Article dealing with anadromous species in the Law of the Sea Convention;
elimination of interception of salmon is the centrepiece of United States and
Canadian initiatives within the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization;
the United States has strong reasons to allow greater escapements inshore and up
the rivers to meet the needs of native Indian communities; and,
the United States considers the management of chinook and coho salmon bound
for United States rivers to be rendered much more difficult because of the impact
of intercepting Canadian fisheries. The U.S. sees a reduction in this intercepting
fishery as a significant way of improving the well being of U.S. stocks.
11.
Accordingly, it should be absolutely clear that Canada's position in the forthcoming
negotiations will strongly oppose increases in interceptions and will not accept proposals that do
not move towards providing each Party with "benefits equivalent to [each country's salmon]
production".
12.
It is our understanding that the United States wants to harvest significantly increased
numbers of Fraser sockeye, will be pressing for alternative arrangements for chinook and coho
which would have the effect of reducing harvests by Canadian fishermen, and is opposed to
making any adjustments to fisheries regimes in S.E. Alaska to address Canadian concerns for
northern fisheries. At the same time, in Canada, we are undertaking a difficult transition to
address our obligations to Aboriginal people. This imposes new requirements for allocation and
harvest of Canadian fish stocks. In this context, Canada intends to advance the following
positions:
3
NORTHERN BOUNDARY
13.
Renegotiation of the northern boundary provisions is not due until 1993-94. However,
we believe that the present situation of the northern boundary fisheries is clearly inconsistent
with the Treaty, and that the northern boundary chapter should be reopened in order to permit
actions to be taken during the 1993 season.
14.
Canada is extremely concerned by the escalation of interceptions by Alaskan fisheries
harvesting salmon bound for Canadian rivers. Specifically, we are concerned about:
United States interceptions of sockeye from the Nass and Skeena Rivers are at
record levels;
-
the increased emphasis on the winter troll fishery has resulted in increased
interceptions of Canadian origin stocks;
-
the shortened summer troll fishery for chinook has shifted the troll effort on to
coho salmon, increased the interceptions of northern British Columbia stocks and
has greatly increased incidental mortalities of chinook;
-
increased interception of steelhead, early coho and northern chum stocks have
contributed to conservation problems in the area; and,
-
the full accounting for U.S. interceptions of Fraser River sockeye wherever
caught.
Increased interceptions in Alaska have required Canada to place restrictive constraints on
important Canadian fisheries, particularly in years of low stock abundance.
15.
Canada believes that Alaska can better control its interceptions of Canadian sockeye
salmon while at the same time fully harvesting its own abundant pink stocks. In this regard,
Canada is seeking alterations to the early season District 104 annex arrangement to include one
additional week (week 31). Canada also proposes implementation of a "clockwork" management
approach which would establish management rules that would restrict the duration of District 104
fisheries based on the ratio of sockeye to total salmon catch.
16.
The United States has expressed concern about the catch of pink salmon in Canada's Area
3 fishery. In this regard, we would point out that there have been very large parallel increases
in production on both sides of the boundary with consequent increases in harvest. These have
resulted in an escalation of Alaskan interceptions of Canadian pinks. In our judgement, these
have exceeded Canadian interceptions of Alaskan pinks in Area 3 and elsewhere. As a part of
the overall negotiation, Canada is proposing to discuss the Area 3 annex arrangements in order
to address concerns of both the U.S. and Canada. Discussions must include the adjacent Area
101 (Tree Point) fishery, as it is Canada's position that the arrangements in U.S. Area 101 and
Canadian Area 3 are linked.
17.
Canada has been disappointed in the past with an apparent unwillingness on the part of
the U.S. to consider changes in its fisheries management plans in Alaska to respond to Canadian
concerns. At last year's plenary session, we expressed views on the significance of the "undue
4
disruption" qualifying clause in Article III (para. 3b). pointing out that the qualifying clause
exhorting the Parties to reduce interceptions (Article m, para. 3a) had every bit as much force
as the "undue disruption" clause. We also pointed out that the United States has from time to
time made major changes in the structure of its fisheries for domestic purposes. We remain
strongly of the view that the implementation of the principles of the Treaty regarding
conservation and equitable sharing must not be frustrated by unwillingness to implement changes
to fisheries as required. If the U.S. is prepared to make allocative changes in its southeast
Alaska fisheries between gears and areas, Canada would be prepared to consider ways of
augmenting production to particular Alaskan fisheries in order to help resolve some important
management problems, in return for limitation of Alaskan intercepting fisheries.
18.
Canada has increasing conservation concerns about the condition of steelhead stocks in
northern British Columbia. In this regard, in cooperation with industry, we have launched a
program requiring Canadian fishermen to release steelhead caught incidentally in important
northern British Columbia commercial fisheries. We are encouraged that this season these
measures have contributed to a significant increase in steelhead escapements. To follow up on
this program, we will seek your cooperation in developing a process to initially document and
then reduce steelhead interceptions.
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS
19.
With regards to the Transboundary Rivers, Canada believes that current catch sharing
arrangements do not provide Canada with a reasonable share of Canadian production. Canada
attaches particular importance to improved economic opportunities for aboriginal peoples and
other fishermen on the Taku, Stikine and Alsek Rivers.
20.
To effect such improvements Canada proposes adjustments to the management regimes
on the Stikine and Taku Rivers that would allow higher catches of coho, directed fisheries for
chinook when there are demonstrable surpluses, and on the Taku River greater sockeye harvest
shares. In addition, Canada wishes to settle the outstanding issue of deeming.
CHINOOK AND COHO SALMON
21.
Improved chinook conservation is a principal goal of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The
rebuilding program that was agreed to in 1984 has been successful for some stocks, but not for
others. Our technical experts are concerned that at current rates of recovery some stock groups
will not rebuild by 1998. Under these circumstances, Canada can see no basis for considering
any increases to the chinook cellings that are identified in the annex. Indeed, the U.S. needs
to take measures in their S.E. Alaska all-gear chinook fishery to reduce its harvest rate on
chinook.
22.
The United States is calling on Canada to develop limitations more stringent than are
already imposed by the Treaty in the chinook and coho fisheries on the west coast of Vancouver
MAR
202
682
5
Island. These fisheries are of great importance to the people of the west coast of Vancouver
Island and are fundamental to Canada as a counterbalance to U.S. interception fisheries.
23.
Canada understands the United States desire to implement alternative approaches for
chinook coastwide and coho on the west coast of Vancouver Island. We are prepared to
consider United States requests for changes in Canadian fisheries, even though in the case of
chinook Canada has effectively lowered harvest rates to target levels. As we have stated
repeatedly in the past, however, we cannot be expected to reduce our catches without offsetting
compensation. Any United States proposals must contain not only a mechanism for the United
States to compensate Canadian fishermen for further sacrifices but also a parallel U.S. actions
to expedite stock rebuilding.
24.
I would like to expand on our concerns regarding the issue of compensation. We believe
that in the near term there is little likelihood that United States stocks from Washington, Oregon
and Idaho, both enhanced and wild, will rebuild. Thus an abundance driven approach for
managing west coast fisheries is unlikely to provide tangible benefits to Canada in the
foreseeable future. If survivals continue to decline, disruption of Canadian fisheries will worsen,
and the balance of benefits accruing to the two countries from intercepting fisheries will tilt
overwhelmingly to the United States side. This is the reason why Canada insists that any
changes to current arrangements for the west coast of Vancouver Island fisheries must be
directly tied to compensatory reductions in interceptions by United States fisheries.
25.
Although we are sympathetic to United States concerns about chinook and coho stocks
of the northwest States, we must point out that the present conservation problems are not of
Canada's making and the implication that Canada is the cause of the declines is without factual
basis. Nonetheless, Canada is prepared to assist the United States in addressing their stock
conservation problems subject to our stipulation about compensation.
26.
Canada also has great concern for the high interception of northern B.C. coho salmon
stocks in South East Alaska, especially in light of conservation problems in recent years by
upper Skeena coho. Canada proposes that both countries endorse the recommendations of the
Coho Technical Committee with respect to additional technical work to be done to develop new
management approaches.
CHUM SALMON
27.
Canada believes that the current arrangements for southern chum stocks are working
reasonably well. While we have some specific concerns regarding current management regime
on Fraser River chum salmon stocks, Canada will propose to extend existing arrangements at
this session. We are prepared to explore alternative management arrangements within the Joint
Objectives and Goals process.
6
FRASER SOCKEYE AND PINK SALMON
28.
Canada believes that the present arrangements on Fraser sockeye and pink salmon are
more than generous for the U.S. In the eight years since the Treaty was signed United States
fishermen have intercepted over 15 million Fraser sockeye, one of the highest eight year totals
for the United States since 1913. These interceptions reflect the favourable terms of the Treaty
with respect to the United States interest in Fraser stocks. Such terms are less limiting than
those that have been applied by the Treaty to west coast of Vancouver Island fisheries. First,
Canada agreed that the U.S. would share proportionately in Frascr production from 1985 to
1988 in recognition of past United States involvement in the International Pacific Salmon
Fisheries Commission (IPSFC). Second, Canada provided higher escapements in the first four
years of the Treaty. As a consequence, the United States had greater assurance of achieving
(and in fact exceeding) its 1989-92 cap of 7 million sockeye.
29.
We are aware that there are sectors in Washington State who are demanding increases
in the level of United States harvest of Fraser sockeye and pink salmon. We would remind
those demanding more that the present increases in production are due to Canadian management
efforts over the past eight years, to Canadian investment to maintain the environment in fit
condition for the production of salmon, to Canadian willingness to forego the use of the
watershed for other purposes, and to sacrifices by Canadian fishermen who have foregone catch
to increase escapement.
30.
To make matters worse, the poor returns of United States chinook stocks have resulted
in Canada failing to reap comparable rewards from its intercepting west coast of Vancouver
Island fishery. The calls from certain elements within the United States fishing community for
increased shares of Fraser fish are totally unjustified and it is Canada's position that the U.S.
catch should be reduced.
31.
Furthermore, Canada intends to obtain compensation in 1993 for the 1992 U.S. overage
of 337,000 in excess of the negotiated ceiling. Canada reminds the U.S. that the specified limits
for harvest by United States fishermen of Fraser sockeye include all sockeye caught by the
United States, regardless of area of capture. All United States catches of Fraser bound sockeye
must be taken into account.
32.
It is Canada's view that new catch sharing arrangements for Fraser sockeye and pink
salmon must have harvest rates that are more closely integrated. The U.S. catch objective for
Fraser pink salmon stocks should be consistent with the U.S. Fraser sockeye catch objective so
that management plans can be developed that are feasible for both species. In light of these
concerns, Canada is considering options that would reprofile the U.S. catch of sockeye stocks
to meet the U.S. pink catch objective.
33.
This returns us to the "Equity" principle. Canada realizes that the Commission has not
yet reached conclusions regarding the extent of benefits being provided under the terms of
Article 3 para. 1b. On the basis of our technical analyses, we are convinced that, under present
7
Treaty arrangements, the United States is currently receiving benefits exceeding those equivalent
to its own production. Accordingly, a further shift in the balance of benefits in the United States'
favour is unacceptable to Canada. This is why we are concerned about the escalation of Alaskan
interceptions of both Fraser sockeye and of sockeye bound for other Canadian rivers, and why
we are only willing to entertain measures for changes in the management of fisheries on United
States-bound chinook if their are balancing changes to U.S. interceptions. Reductions in United
States sockeye interceptions on both the north and south boundaries will be required.
CONCLUSION
34.
I have outlined Canada's position in the forthcoming negotiations with some frankness.
Canada recognizes that United States difficulties with the protection and management of its
southern chinook and coho resources have caused internal problems. We stand ready to do what
we can to help you grapple with these problems, problems which, as I said earlier, were not of
Canada's making. While expressing willingness to cooperate, it seems to us that solutions will
be slow in coming. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that to ask Canadian fishermen to
make adjustments, we will have to have means for compensating them. The United States
should be prepared to make internal adjustments and trades, in order that Canada can be
provided with fair compensation through specific and limited reductions in United States
interceptions.
35.
Although we realize the present stage of Treaty implementation create difficulties for both
sides we are convinced that, in both the long and the short term, both Parties are far better off
with a Treaty than without one. The impact of failure of the Treaty: competitive overfishing
such as that occurring in pre-treaty days prior to 1985, would surely be unacceptable to us both.
36.
Keeping the Treaty alive and progressive to ensure our joint aspirations are met will be
hard work but with pragmatism, willingness to consider each other's problems and compromise
we are sure progress will be possible. We invite you to join us in stepping back from present
controversies, to review the problems both of us have and, together to attempt to formulate
options for practical solutions.
United States Department o! State
Washington, D. C. 20520
OES
FEB I 2 1993
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
OFA
S/S
UNCLASSIFIED
9302673
log
TO:
The Secretary
93 FEB-12 9:18 AM
FROM:
OES - Curtis Bohlen 03
SUBJECT: U.S. -- Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty
KEY POINTS
0
Interested groups in the Pacific Northwest are calling
upon their congressional delegations to urge the
Department to adopt their particular perspective of
fairness regarding salmon allocation issues now under
negotiation.
0
However, these matters are not decisions for the
Department of State or other federal agencies, but rather
for the U.S. Section of the Pacific Salmon Commission.
The U.S. Section consists of representatives of the
states of Alaska, Oregon, Washington, the Treaty
Indian tribes and the Federal Government. The
Federal representative has no vote and plays a
conciliatory role among the various U.S. interests.
SUMMARY
Salmon which originate in U.S. rivers are often caught
("intercepted") in Canadian fisheries before returning to
U.S. waters, and vice versa.
The U.S. and Canada have argued for many years about the
balance of these interceptions.
The U.S. - Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty was concluded in
1985 to reconcile and balance interceptions by
establishing agreed management and allocation regimes from
Southeast Alaska to Oregon.
-2-
Most fishing regimes established by the Treaty in 1985
have expired and are being renegotiated within the
Commission created by the Treaty,
There is a wide range of differences between U.S. Northern
(Alaska) and U.S. Southern (Washington, Oregon, Idaho and
the Treaty Tribes) interests.
0
Under U.S. law, decisions within the U.S. Section of the
Commission are reached by consensus; the Federal
Government does not have a vote.
U.S. differences with Canada are no less than those that
exist within the U.S. Section.
DISCUSSION
The Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada
entered into force in 1985 after 14 years of negotiation. The
Treaty established bilateral cooperation in management,
research and enhancement of salmon stocks that originate in
one country but pass though the fisheries of the other. The
Pacific Salmon Commission is the decision-making body for
matters covered by the Treaty.
The Commission's deliberations for 1993 are particularly
contentious because: 1) almost all the rules established in
the Treaty expired at the end of 1992 and are open for
negotiation; and 2) Snake River fall chinook salmon have been
listed as a "threatened" species under the Endangered Species
Act.
It is the latter fact which is drawing inordinate polítical
attention to the Commission. The stock is caught coast-wide,
particularly in Canadian fisheries off the West Coast of
Vancouver Island. U.S. interests (fishermen, power companies,
and forest and agricultural industries) want Canada to make
substantial reductions in its fisheries so that U.S. interests
need not do as much to protect the threatened stock. Canada
has said it would help but it wants something in return, and
there is the rub.
Canada firmly believes that the equity balance strongly favors
the U.S., and is not prepared to do more for the U.S. unless
we make moves in its direction. We contest Canada's views,
but they are a reality in our negotiations.
At present, no U.S. interest is prepared to pay the price for
Canada's apparent willingness to reduce the take from its
fisheries. The issue may not be resolved through the spring,
putting at risk the management regimes governing salmon
harvests along the Pacific coasts of both nations.
UJ/ 087
Drafted: OES/OFA: JJFinnegan, Jr.
02/09/93 SEOFAA 3180 X7-2883
Cleared:OES/O:DACOlson
L:AKreczko
EUR/CA:JBauman
H:CRaether
S/TT: DHarwood (info)
C:KVolker (info)
United States Department of State
Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Washington, n.c. 20520
DATE 3/9/93
TIME
TELEFAX COVER SHEET
NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: 3
TO: Mr. David Cottingham
TEL.# 456-6224
White House Ofc. on
OFFICE: Environmental Policies
FAX#: 456-2710
FROM: Mr. David Colson
TEL.: # 647-2396
OFFICE: Oceans & Fisheries Affairs FAX#: 647-0217
MESSAGE:
1. Attached is a briefing memo we sent to the Secretary on Pacific Salmon
Commission (PSC) issues. FYI
2. Be mindful of the fact that there is a relationship between PSC and Windy
Craggy in which the VEEP is said to be very interested. Alsek River Salmon
management is covered by the PSC since it is a transboundary river. A habitat
protocol could be a back-door way of getting at the Windy Craggy issue. If I
have my way, I'd also try to bring Victoria's dumping of raw sewage into the
Strait into the ambit of a habitat protocol. I'd like to see the White House
push Canada on these issues.
3. I plan to see Fortier briefly or the 19th, and I have several conference
calls with the U.S. Commissioners scheduled including today. If Katy is
inclined to Fortier, it would be better done during the week of the 22nd than
earlier. The issue will have ripened a bit by then. I'd like an opportunity
to sit-in on a meeting or, at least, brief her. The State and tribal politics
are fierce.
12:00 intg w/ David Colson
to brief you for Fri intq
w/ Amb. Yves Fortier.
-
Canadian Embassy
Ambassada in Canada
501 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
U.S.A.
ENVIRONMENT SECTION/SECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
FACSIMILE TELECOPIE
Date:
05 March 1993.
No.
To/A:
Mr David Cottingham
From/De:
David Angell
White House Office of
Second Secretary
Environmental Policy
City/Ville:
city/Ville:Washington, D.C.
Fax No. /
Fax No./
No. de télécopie: 456-2710
No. de télécopie: (202)682-7792
Number of pages including cover/Nombre de pages avec couvert: 08
COMMENTS/COMMENTAIRES: Canada's opening statement on the PST
negotiations follows, for your reference. All good wishes.
Fourtier is pvt citizen, former UN ambassador .
3/19/26
1926
If there is any problem with the receipt of this fax, please
call/S'il ya des problèmes à la réception de cette télécopie,
prière d'appeler le: (202) 682-1740.