Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
158700528
label
Cabinet Weekly Reports: Immigration Visa Waiver [2]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
158700528
contentType
document
title
Cabinet Weekly Reports: Immigration Visa Waiver [2]
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Domestic Policy Council (Clinton Administration)
Irene Bueno's Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
158700528
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
otherTitles
42-t-7367472-20171120S-006-010-2019
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b837cc3045a610f3
ocrText
97-309 EPW
Updated December 29, 1998
CRS Report for Congress
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Immigration: Visa Waiver Pilot Program
Ruth Ellen Wasem
Specialist in Social Legislation
Education and Public Welfare Division
Summary
The Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) allows aliens traveling from certain
designated countries to come to the United States as temporary visitors without having
the immigration documents normally required to enter the United States. Some maintain
it fosters international travel to the United States and eases the workload of the consular
offices abroad. Others observe that it by-passes the most important screening step of
who is permitted to enter the United States, cautioning that it may inadvertently stimulate
immigration violations. The program was scheduled to expire on September 30, 1997,
but temporary extensions were included in both Continuing Resolutions passed in the
105th Congress. The Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary (CJS) FY1998
appropriations act (P.L. 105-119) also contained an extension through April 30, 1998.
When Congress enacted legislation amending the Immigration and Nationality to extend
the VWPP through April 30, 2000 (P.L. 105-173), it also modified the qualifications for
the pilot program.
Program Features
Nonimmigrants (i.e., aliens legally in the United States for a specific purpose and a
temporary period of time) as a general rule must present valid travel documents to enter
the United States. Not presenting valid documents or having no documents at all are
grounds for inadmissibility, as specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Travel
documents consist of a passport and either a nonimmigrant visa or - in the case of
Canadians or Mexicans - a border crossing card. Aliens seeking to visit the United
States obtain their nonimmigrant visa at consular offices abroad.
The VWPP authorizes the Attorney General to waive the visa documentary
requirements for aliens traveling from certain countries as temporary visitors for business
or temporary visitors for pleasure (tourists), typically referred to as "B visas" because of
CRS
CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress
CRS-2
the letter denoting the subsection of the law. Nationals from participating countries simply
complete an admission form before their arrival and are admitted for up to 90 days.¹
Although the VWPP greatly eases the documentary requirements for nationals from
participating countries, it has important restrictions. Normally aliens entering with a B visa
may petition to extend their length of stay in the United States or may petition to change
to another nonimmigrant or immigrant status. Aliens entering through the VWPP may
only be authorized to extend their stay for emergency reasons and are not permitted to
change status. An alien entering through the VWPP who violates the terms of admission
becomes deportable without any judicial recourse or review (except in asylum cases).
Issues
How VWPP Countries Were Selected. In addition to extending reciprocal privileges
to U.S. citizens, countries must have met the following qualifications to participate: have
a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate for 2 years (averaging no more than 2% over both
years and not exceeding 2.5% in any one year); have or be developing a machine readable
passport program; and, not compromising U.S. law enforcement interests. Countries must
maintain a low visa refusal rate to continue in the program.
Some maintain the nonimmigrant visa refusal rate is too arbitrary because it is based
on decisions made by consular officers rather than by the actual behavior of the
nonimmigrants; instead, some say a country's rate of nonimmigrants who violate the terms
of their visas offers a better criteria for participation. Others point out that the latter data
are imperfect and currently exist only as estimates of visa overstays.²
When the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L.
104-208) reauthorized the VWPP, it created a new probationary status for VWPP
countries that had not maintained a low visa refusal rate. Countries on probation were
determined by a formula based on a disqualification rate of 2%-3.5%.³ Probationary
countries with a disqualification rate less than 2% over a period not to exceed 3 years may
remain VWPP countries. The law also diminished the role of the Department of State in
selection of countries, replacing language that said the Attorney General and the Secretary
of State make the determination jointly with language stating that the Attorney General
makes the decision in consultation with the Secretary of State.
Consideration of Trade and Tourism. Those in the travel and tourism industry state
that the VWPP has done a great deal to facilitate tourism to the United States. The
I Countries participating in the VWPP at the beginning of 1998 are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Licchtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
2
Problems that INS has in meeting VWPP data requirements are discussed in a recent report. Sce:
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General Report No. 1-97-08, Immigration and
Naturalization Service Monitoring of Nonimmigrant Overstays, September 1997.
3 "Disqualification rate" is defined as the percentage of nationals from a country who applied for
admission as a nonimmigrant who either violated the terms of the nonimmigrant visa, who were
excluded from admission or who withdrew their application for admission as a nonimmigrant.
CRS-3
example of Argentina is frequently used to illustrate this relationship; during the first year
Argentina was in the VWPP, tourism from that country to the United States grew by
11.5%. Some cite Korea as a country that should be participating in VWPP because of
the trade and tourism it offers and contend that this factor should be added to the criteria
used to select participating countries. Other proponents of the VWPP, however, contend
that the criteria should not be broadened to include tourism potential if the thresholds of
refusal rates and visa overstay violations are weakened, arguing that these provisions are
essential to safeguard and control our borders.
Temporary Status of the VWPP. Since its enactment in 1986, VWPP has been a
temporary program. P.L. 104-208 reauthorized it through September 30, 1997.
Supporters of the VWPP maintain that it improved relations with the participating
countries because it reciprocates what they have long done - permitting U.S. travelers
to visit their countries without visas. They also state there are financial benefits because
it reduces the work load of the consular offices and because it increases commerce by
facilitating international travel to the United States. The Department of State has long
supported the extension of the VWPP.
Others are more cautious about the VWPP, fearing that it may foster nonimmigrant
visa overstays and other immigration violations such as employment. They want to ensure
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has sufficient checks in place to
deter these immigration violations before making the program permanent. INS
acknowledges that it has found fraud in the program but supports its extension.
Legislation
4
The Senate passed legislation (S. 1178) to extend the program on September 26,
1997. The chair and ranking member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration, Senators Spencer Abraham and Ted Kennedy, introduced
S. 1178 which would have extended the program for 5 years, until September 30, 2002.
The Senate bill also would have increased the 2-year average visa refusal rate limit from
2% to 3% (and correspondingly the visa refusal rate threshold of 2.5% to 3.5% in any one
year) for participation in the program.⁵ S. 1178 furthermore would have required that the
Attorney General make precise numerical estimates for each participating country's visa
overstay rate and disqualification rate. Additionally, S. 1178 would have strengthened the
requirements for passport security by requiring that all VWPP countries have machine
readable passports (not merely working toward having them) and that they have "highly"
fraud-resistance passports. S. 1178, finally, would have re-established the lead role of the
Secretary of State in selecting VWPP countries in consultation with the Attorney General.
4
Hearings were held on June 17, 1997, by House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration and Claims and on July 17, 1997 by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration. Other bills on the visa waiver program include H.R. 203, S. 974,
H.R. 1880, H.R. 627, and S. 290.
5
According to the State Department's visa refusal rate statistics for FY1996 and FY1997,
countries such as Uruguay, Singapore, South Africa and Taiwan may become eligible for the
VWPP under current law. If the threshold is raised to 3.5%, countries such as Chile, Greece,
Portugal and Zimbabwe may also be considered.
CRS-4
The House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
initially reported legislation (H.R. 2412) that would have extended the VWPP for 2 years,
until September 30, 1999. H.R. 2412, however, had other provisions pertaining to the
extension of religious worker immigration that proved controversial and did not come to
the House floor before the September 30, 1997 sunset.⁶ Meanwhile, Congress included a
23-day extension of the VWPP in the Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 94, P.L. 105-46).
House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims subsequently
reported new legislation (H.R. 2578) that would have extended the VWPP for 2 years,
until September 30, 1999. It also would have required the Attorney General to implement
(no later than 180 days after enactment) a program to collect data on nonimmigrants who
overstay the terms of their visas and to provide an annual report to Congress on
nonimmigrant overstays. The House Committee on the Judiciary ordered H.R. 2578
reported on October 7, 1997.
The second Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 97, P.L. 105-64) also contained an
extension of the VWPP for the duration of the resolution. The conferees for H.R. 2267,
the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary (CJS) FY1998 appropriations act (P.L. 105-
119), added a provision extending VWPP until April 30, 1998.
On March 25, 1998, the House called up S. 1178 and replaced it with an amended
version of text of H.R. 2578. As ultimately agreed to by the House and Senate, S. 1178
(P.L. 105-173) extended the VWPP through April 30, 2000. It also modified the
qualifications for the pilot program. The new qualifications are: the average refusal rate
was no more than 2.0% over the past 2 fiscal years with neither year going above 2.5%
or the refusal rate during the previous fiscal year was less than 3.0%. 8 It also requires the
Attorney General to implement (no later than 180 days after enactment) a program to
collect data on nonimmigrants who overstay the terms of their visas and to provide an
annual report to Congress on nonimmigrant overstays.
6 CRS Report 97-891, Immigration: Religious Workers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
7
§125 of H.R. 2267; H.Rept. 105-405.
8 This modification results in Greece and Portugal being added to VWPP.
Congressman Lamar Smith - TX21 - Press Release
http://www.house.gov/lamarsmith/pr-050599.htm
NEWS from
21st
District
Texas
Congressman
Lamar Smith
2231 Raybum House Office Building
Washington, D.C.
202-225-4236
Opening Statement of Chairman Lamar Smith
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
Hearing on Nonimmigrant Visa Fraud in the
Petition-Based and Student Visa Categories
Wednesday, May 5, 1999
Today=s hearing focuses on nonimmigrant visa fraud, specifically fraud with
employment-based and student visas.
With aliens paying tens of thousands of dollars to be smuggled into the United States in
derelict vessels and across arid and inhospitable deserts, obtaining a visa fraudulently is a
very tempting solution for aliens seeking to enter the U.S. illegally.
Who wouldn=t choose a comfortable seat on an airplane over an the unventilated hold of a
ship or a long distance trek through the wilderness? Traveling with a visa offers safety and
comfort. Some even fly first class.
While our primary concern about visa fraud is over its use as a means to facilitate illegal
immigration into the United States, we should not forget that it also can be utilized by
terrorists and criminals. Front companies that file fraudulent petitions on behalf of aliens
who want to work illegally in the United States can just as easily be used as front companies
for organized crime.
The INS and Department of State have identified pervasive fraud with some petition-based
visa categories. First, let=s look at L visas. Those visas enable personnel of multi-national
organizations to transfer to offices in the U.S.
A 1997 report by the INS= California Service Center on L visa fraud by Chinese applicants,
entitled the AGreat Wall of Deception,@ described how paper companies play a Ashell
game@ with phony sales invoices, business contracts and other documents that give the
appearance of legitimate business activities.
Site checks of subsidiaries in the United States (the destination where the L visa holders are
supposed to work) turned up a Aflea bag motel, a residential home, an immigration
consultant=s office, and a legitimate business that allows subsidiary companies to use their
address.@
According to the report, 90 percent of the Chinese L visa petitioners investigated were found
to have submitted fraudulent documents to the INS. Department of State reporting from
China posts described similar levels of fraud with L visa petitions.
Although many fraudulent L visas are denied, the Department of State still issued 38,000
1 of 2
6/28/99 12:21 PM
Congressman Lamar Smith - TX21 - Press Release
http://www.house.gov/lamarsmith/pr-050599.hm
L-1 visas in fiscal year 1998 and over 150,000 have been issued in the past five years.
Thousands more acquired L status by changing their nonimmigrant status with the INS
while in the U.S. While many of these visas were issued to the employees of well-known,
legitimate companies, the true circumstances of many of the petitioning companies was
undetermined.
Next, the H-1B Program is not without fraud. A March 1999 report by the INS= Vermont
Service Center on Indian H-1B fraud described companies that established subsidiaries in
the U.S. and then solicited job candidates and guaranteed them employment in the U.S. for a
fee of $8,000 to $10,000.
If the applicant did not have the necessary educational background to qualify for an H-1B
visa, the recruiting agency would charge an additional fee and provide the applicant with
fraudulent educational certificates or employment experience letters.
One of the questions we need to ask today is whether there are ways to eliminate structural
vulnerabilities that exist in these visa categories while maintaining them as vehicles that are
responsive to the real needs of legitimate companies.
One option would be for the INS to establish a system to track the immigration status of the
holders of petition-based visas after they enter the country. These individuals can remain in
the United States legally for as long as seven years -- we need to know where they are and
what their status is.
Today, in a related matter, we will hear from the INS about the system it is developing, in
collaboration with the schools, to monitor foreign students in the U.S.
Section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
mandated that the INS set up a system to track foreign students in the U.S.
Congress= primary concern in setting up this system was with students who legitimately
enter the U.S. with a visa, but either do not show up at the school, or drop out after a short
time and seek illegal employment. Up until now, the INS and the academic initiations have
not had an effective tracking system in place.
The ranking member, Ms. Jackson Lee from Texas, is recognized for an opening statement.
The text of this statement and all written statements from witnesses at this hearing are
available today at the following web site: www.house.gov/judiciary/6.htm.
CONTACT: Allen Kay
202-225-4236 (O)
301-990-3749 (H)
Committee on the Judiciary, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims * Chairman, Committee
on Standards of Official Conduct
*
Committee on Science
Home / Biography / How to Contact Me / Legislative Resources / Immigration
/ Education / Constituent Services / News and Views / Columns / Texas and
the 21st District / District Photo Slide Show / My Favorite Links /
2 of 2
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.hm
Statement of
Michael R. Bromwich
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice
before the
House Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims
concerning
Nonimmigrant Visa Fraud
May 5, 1999
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and Members of the Subcommittee on
Immigration and Claims:
I. Introduction
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the work of the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) with respect to fraud involving nonimmigrant visas
and other immigration documents.
Combating nonimmigrant visa fraud is a responsibility shared primarily by the State
Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The State Department
has primary responsibility for administering immigration laws outside the United States.
Specifically, the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs administers
visa-processing operations at overseas posts. The primary goal of Consular Offices is to
provide expeditious visa processing for qualified applicants while denying entry to
individuals who pose a security threat or are likely to remain in the United States
illegally. The Inspector General from the State Department can address these issues in
greater detail.
Domestically, the primary responsibility for controlling entry of non-citizens into the
United States falls to INS. When nonimmigrants arrive at a port of entry and present a
1 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.htm
visa and passport, an INS inspector determines whether to grant the nonimmigrant entry
to this country. If the visa is machine-readable, the inspector scans it. If it is not, the
inspector types the nonimmigrant's name and date of birth into the Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS) - commonly known as the "Lookout System."
This morning I plan to do four things during my testimony: first, provide an overview of
the potential for fraud in the nonimmigrant visa program. Second, describe the OIG's role
in investigating visa and other immigration document fraud. Third, update the
Subcommittee on testimony I provided two years ago this month on the steps INS has
taken to address recommendations in our 1996 inspection of document fraud records
corrections. And finally, briefly address the potential for fraud inherent in the Visa
Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP), which comes up for reauthorization next year.
II. Potential for Nonimmigrant Visa Fraud
In October 1998, the OIG's Inspections Division developed an in-house reference
document entitled, "Potential for Fraud in the Visa Program" that focused specifically on
nonimmigrants. This document was designed to provide important background
information as a prelude to doing further work in this area. To compile the report, OIG
Inspectors interviewed staff from INS, the State Department, and the General Accounting
Office (GAO). They also reviewed documents from these three agencies as well as
relevant legislation. I have copies of this report for members of the Subcommittee and
their staff.
Based on our review, we identified four common types of nonimmigrant visa fraud or
fraud related to the use of visas:
A person uses fraudulent documents to obtain a legitimate visa. For example, an
individual improperly obtains letterhead from a United States business and creates a letter
supporting a false reason for traveling to this country. The State Department generally
will issue a B-1 visa (temporary visitor for business). In such cases, the INS inspector has
no reason to deny the individual entry into the United States.
A person obtains a fraudulent visa. An individual can attempt to use the passport and
visa of a person who has similar looks and biographical characteristics (e.g., hair and eye
color, age) or can purchase an altered document. Accomplished counterfeiters can alter
the biographical data and digitized photographs on even the most secure visas in use
today.
An individual may not meet the spirit or intent of the specific visa program. For
example, GAO found that 85 percent of individuals requesting religious worker visas are
already in the United States and are attempting to adjust status (e.g., from a student visa to
a religious worker visa). Many of these individuals are requesting visas through
unaffiliated, "storefront churches."
After arriving legitimately, an individual may overstay his/her visa and plan to reside in
the United States "permanently."
We did not find comprehensive data related to nonimmigrant visa fraud. In fact, there is
2 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.hm
very little hard data available to gauge the magnitude of visa fraud, a point noted by GAO
in its reports on this subject. For example, the State Department does not track visa
refusal rates by visa type. Similarly, INS told us that individuals made 42,299 attempts to
enter the United States between October 1992 through May 1993 with fraudulent or
altered documents. While INS produced these statistics for an audit report, they are
unable to update these figures because they do not maintain centralized statistics on
fraudulent or altered documents. This lack of comprehensive statistics hinders the ability
of the State Department and INS to appropriately respond to visa fraud.
Based on the information we collected, however, potentially the greatest risk to national
security and illegal immigration appears to come from nonimmigrants visiting under the
VWPP, a subject I will return to later in my remarks. With the extensive use of VWPP
and without comprehensive systems to track or without aggressive efforts to identify
nonimmigrant visa fraud, it is difficult to provide accurate risk assessments for the
various visa classes.
That said, we offer an opinion in our in-house report of the relative risk for each visa type
based on the information we reviewed. We also provide for each visa type a description
of the visa, the maximum initial period of admission, the number of visas the State
Department issued in FY 1996, the number of arrivals INS recorded in FY 1996, and
additional information.
III. OIG Role in Investigating Immigration Fraud
The OIG spends almost one-fourth of its Investigations Division resources investigating
immigration document-related corruption in INS. During the past five years, 22 percent of
all OIG investigations involved document fraud; this percentage is significantly higher for
our field offices along the southwest border. A statistical breakdown follows:
INS Fraud Cases Opened
Total
Employee
Contractor
Civilian
Year
Arrests
Arrests
Arrests
Arrests
1994
105
68
19
0
49
1995
102
63
9
20
34
1996
109
55
7
0
48
1997
193
38
15
1
22
1998
150
26
7
0
19
Total
659
250
57
21
172
To assist the Subcommittee in its examination of this issue, I highlight several examples
of investigations of visa fraud or other types of document fraud conducted by the OIG:
Between 1987 and 1995, four Korean nationals bribed a supervisory Immigration
Adjudications Officer in the INS San Jose, CA, office to unlawfully adjust the status of
aliens to permanent residence. At least 275 aliens, almost exclusively from Korea,
initially entered the United States on nonimmigrant visas. The corrupt INS employee
3 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.htm
created false records in INS databases indicating that the aliens changed their status from
"nonimmigrant" to "immigrant" (i.e., permanent resident). The INS officer admitted
receiving a total of $450,000 in bribe payments from four Korean nationals who made at
least a million dollars from this scheme. The former Immigration officer and the four
Korean nationals have been indicted.
A former INS Officer-in-Charge in Hong Kong was arrested for trafficking in blank
Honduran passports (i.e., containing no name, photograph, or biographic data) containing
fraudulent U.S. nonimmigrant visas. The passports and nonimmigrant visas were
apparently being sold in Hong Kong to Chinese nationals who would use them to enter
the United States. The OIG investigated this case jointly with the Hong Kong Independent
Commission Against Corruption.
In the Eastern District of New York, an INS immigration inspector assigned to JFK
International Airport was arrested on charges of providing altered U.S. passports and
other identity documents to illegal aliens. The inspector was videotaped accepting a total
of $10,000 in bribes in exchange for identity packages that contained U.S. passports, INS
Alien Registration Receipt Cards (Green Cards), and drivers' licenses.
These investigations are essential to protect the integrity of the lawful immigration
process and to help deter INS employees who might be susceptible to corruption. The
experience and expertise of OIG investigators make this office uniquely suited to conduct
these complex investigations.
IV. Update: Inspector General's May 1997 Testimony
I would like to update the Subcommittee on actions taken by INS in response to the
recommendation made in our report, Immigration and Naturalization Service Document
Fraud Records Corrections, that formed the basis for my testimony before this panel in
May 1997.
As you may recall, our inspection found that in successful document fraud investigations
the government generally prosecutes the vendors of the documents, the middlemen who
paid bribes, and any corrupt INS employees who accepted bribes. If the vendors and
middlemen are illegal aliens, INS usually initiates deportation proceedings. What was less
clear was what INS did with the aliens who obtained immigration documents by
fraudulent means.
Our inspection found that INS took no action against these aliens. Not only did INS fail to
prosecute or deport these aliens, it had no method of even flagging the names or alien
numbers ("A-numbers") in INS's record systems to alert INS officers who subsequently
came into contact with these aliens. Consequently, these aliens were free to continue to
reap benefits from an illegal scheme and even use one illegally obtained benefit to obtain
additional benefits.
We pointed out the deterrent value of pursuing and deporting aliens identified through
document fraud investigations while recognizing constraints on INS's ability to do so.
Short of deportation, we recommended that INS correct fraudulent database entries and
4 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.htm
develop a flagging system to alert INS personnel to alien participation in fraud schemes.
In its response to our report, INS agreed to develop a "fraud flagging system" and to
begin working on the necessary enhancements to its automated systems. INS has since
provided us with a copy of its "Flagging of Fraudulent Records in INS Automated
Systems Operational Policy and Procedures" document and reported that the automated
system has been implemented. Based on this information, we closed the
recommendations in our Inspection report. This is the type of issue in which OIG
follow-up work would be warranted; however, we have not yet done such work because
of resource constraints.
V. Visa Waiver Pilot Program
The OIG issued a report in March 1999 that examined the potential for fraud in the
VWPP, a program that waives visa requirements for visitors from 26 countries who travel
to the United States for business or pleasure. In FY 1997, 14.5 million visitors entered this
country under the VWPP, representing 51 percent of all nonimmigrants admitted.
The VWPP allows aliens who might otherwise be inadmissible or who present law
enforcement or security concerns to avoid the pre-screening that consular officers
normally perform on visa applicants. All that is required is a passport from one of the 26
participating countries. Our review found that terrorists, criminals, smugglers, and others
have attempted to enter the United States using stolen blank passports from a Visa Waiver
country or by altering or counterfeiting these passports.
While the recommendations in our report will assist INS in reducing the risks of the
VWPP, we recognize that many important issues related to the VWPP are beyond INS's
control. These include the State Department's ability to nominate countries for the VWPP
that INS considers problematic, when or whether participating countries will be required
to implement "machine readable" passports that will facilitate the inspection process and
are fraud resistant, and coordinating participating countries' reporting of stolen passports.
These are problems that may potentially compromise INS's inspection process.
I understand that the Subcommittee may address this issue in detail next year when the
VWPP program comes up for reauthorization. We stand ready to assist the Subcommittee
in its deliberations.
VI. Nonimmigrant Visa Overstays
Finally, I wanted to mention a Special Investigation by my office released in March 1998
- "Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the
New York Subway Entered and Remained in the United States" - that highlighted the
threat that some non-immigrant overstays may be involved in terrorist activities. In this
particular investigation, one of the two Palestinians arrested for allegedly planning to
bomb the Brooklyn subway illegally remained in the United States after his visitor's visa
expired.
We found that because the Palestinian's alleged purpose for traveling to the United States
was solely to catch a connecting flight to Ecuador, he should not have received a visa that
5 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Bromwich Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/brom0505.htm
permitted him to remain in this country longer than the time needed to board a connecting
flight. We recommended that the INS and the State Department more carefully consider
when "transit without visa travel" is appropriate; in this particular case, the Consular
Office did not even consider this status as an option.
As I testified at the Subcommittee's March hearing on nonimmigrant overstays, our
investigation discovered significant differences of understanding between INS and the
State Department about various officials' roles in the visa process. Neither the
immigration inspector at the port of entry nor the Consular Officer who issued the visa
thought it was his or her role to verify that the Palestinian actually had a ticket to Ecuador
or adequate funds for the trip. Neither thought that it was his or her responsibility to
consider restricting the period of his stay to something less than the 29 days permitted
under a "person in transit" or C-1 visa. We believe that this confusion over the
appropriate role of INS and State Department officials needs to be addressed and clarified
in the interests of controlling illegal immigration.
VII. Conclusion
Nonimmigrant visa fraud poses a threat to the orderly operation of our immigration
system and both the State Department and Justice Department have vital roles to play in
this process. As resources permit, the OIG will continue to conduct investigations,
inspections, and audits that address some of the key vulnerabilities that exist in the
system.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
6 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.htm
STATEMENT OF
JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND THE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, INCLUDING
INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING
FOR THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 5, 1999
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee on nonimmigrant visa fraud. I am
pleased to provide an overview of our work relating to consular antifraud efforts in the Department of
State, as well as some of our activities as they relate to OIG visa fraud investigations.
Summary
Each year, millions of individuals apply for passports and visas at the more than 230 U.S. embassies and
consulates throughout the world. During FY 1998, our overseas missions processed over 311,000
passport applications, 700,000 immigrant visa applications, and over 7 million nonimmigrant visa
applications. Antifraud units at overseas posts conducted over 142,000 consular fraud investigations.
Attempts to falsify, alter, or counterfeit U.S. visas or passports, or obtain genuine documents by
fraudulent means are a constant problem both within the United States and overseas. Fraud associated
with these official documents focuses on either the document itself through counterfeiting or altering it,
or on the issuance process through trickery or bribery. Defeating these efforts requires secure documents
that are difficult to counterfeit and easy to detect when altered. Additionally, countering fraud requires
competent and honest officials who are well trained and informed about common methods of fraud.
People are willing to pay a tremendously high cost to obtain entry into the United States. Depending on
the locale, quality, and type of a counterfeit visa, the cost can range anywhere from $1,500 to $5,000.
The Department has faced significant challenges in its visa processing operations over the years. Since
1987, immigrant and nonimmigrant visa processing has been listed as a material weakness in the
Department's annual Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act report. The Department has cited unfilled
computer needs, insufficient consular staffing, and inadequate interagency exchanges of intelligence on
inadmissible aliens as problems that create a greater likelihood of fraud by weakening management
1 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.htm
controls over consular operations.
Since 1988, my office has also identified a number of weaknesses in the Department's consular
operations, particularly in the areas of staffing, training, and program management. Currently, my office
is reviewing the Department's consular antifraud programs. While we have not yet issued a final report,
my statement includes observations based on our ongoing review.
In recent years, the Department has made significant progress in enhancing visa and passport processing
operations. It has introduced a photodigitalized passport, enhanced data sharing via the Interagency
Border Inspection System, installed modernized consular systems worldwide, improved effectiveness of
the namecheck system, increased efforts to counter document fraud, and is introducing a more secure
border crossing card in Mexico. The Department reports that its TIPOFF program, using all-source, U.S.
intelligence information, has been used to deny U.S. visas to over 400 terrorists since 1997. In addition,
the Office of Consular Fraud Prevention Programs has shifted focus from looking at individual fraud
cases to identifying systemic fraud-related issues across a large number of cases. The Department has
also developed a model for ranking high-fraud posts and now issues a monthly magazine devoted to
global and regional fraud trends.
In my statement today I will discuss ongoing challenges the Department faces in preventing consular
fraud. These include staffing shortages in key areas, inexperienced staff, and insufficient training for
consular line officers. I will also address problems in the management of antifraud programs including a
lack of support for overseas post operations, insufficient analysis of data to provide fraud trends, and
inadequate supervision in antifraud units overseas. Finally, I will discuss our investigative work as it
pertains to passport and visa fraud cases. My discussion of the Department's antifraud efforts is not
limited to nonimmigrant (NIV) fraud, but rather applies more broadly to all types of consular fraud.
Consular Fraud
The Department's antifraud programs are designed to deter applicants, including terrorists, organized
criminals, drug traffickers, foreign smuggling rings, and others wanting to illegally immigrate to the
United States, from illegally obtaining visas or passports. In the Department, the Office of Consular
Fraud Prevention Programs is responsible for developing policies and programs to ensure the integrity of
U.S. passports and visas and to prevent consular fraud; coordinating passport, visa, and consular cases
involving document fraud; acting as a liaison with other government agencies on fraudulent matters; and
providing antifraud training for passport agents and consular officers.
At overseas posts, consular officers are the first line of defense against consular fraud. When consular
officers become suspicious of an applicant or the documentation used to support an application, they
may refer the case to the antifraud officer for investigation. The antifraud unit will attempt to verify the
applicant's identity and the application documents by phone, mail, site visits, or a combination of these
techniques.
Consular Staffing
In 1997, the Assistant Secretary of Consular Affairs testified before your subcommittee, and cited the
importance of adequate staffing levels to effective fraud prevention. My office's 1995 report on the
nonimmigrant visa process, and 1997 report on the machine readable visa program also stressed the
importance of staffing and identified problems related to inadequate staffing levels for consular
operations.
Overseas consular offices and antifraud units continue to face staffing shortages. High-fraud posts are
not able to attract enough experienced consular officers, or enough full-time, experienced antifraud
officers because these posts are generally in undesirable locations and have heavy workloads. In
addition, no correlation exists between the fraud level of a post and whether that post has a full-time
antifraud officer. In the course of our work we have found that many high-fraud posts lack full-time
antifraud officers, while many moderate- to low-fraud posts employ such officers on a full-time basis. Of
the 12 full-time antifraud officers in the Department, only 4 are assigned to high fraud posts.
2 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.html
Antifraud units also have difficulty retaining Foreign Service national (FSN) investigators because
investigator positions are classified at a lower grade than investigator positions for other agencies. High
turnover of such staff, who leave for better paying positions, has a negative impact on the effectiveness
of antifraud units.
The Department also needs to better match the expertise of its staff with antifraud program priorities and
workload. The overwhelming numbers of antifraud investigations relate to visa applications at overseas
posts, however the majority of staff has experience working primarily in domestic passport operations.
In addition, a 1995 reorganization of the Office of Consular Fraud Prevention Programs changed staff
responsibilities from reviewing individual cases to identifying trends and providing operational support.
Many employees did not have the skills necessary for the new responsibilities.
At overseas posts, inexperienced consular officers often rely too heavily on antifraud unit staff for
routine cases, limiting the time antifraud staff can devote to more serious antifraud efforts. At posts we
visited, we found a number of routine visa fraud cases referred to the antifraud units that line officers
should have been able to recognize and handle themselves. These types of fraud cases were forwarded to
the antifraud unit partly because posts lacked clear guidelines for case referrals. Also, insufficient
training and experience caused consular officers to question their own judgement.
Training
Inadequate training for consular officers has been a problem identified in several past OIG reports. Our
ongoing review of the Department's consular fraud prevention programs has focused on the antifraud
training provided to junior officers and passport specialists, antifraud officers and passport fraud
managers, and antifraud unit FSN investigators. While the Department has made improvements in its
antifraud training efforts, deficiencies still exist.
Antifraud training for the junior officers is inadequate. The Department's basic consular course, which
all consular officers are required to attend prior to departing for post, contains a 4-hour antifraud training
segment. Because fraud varies from country to country, this training segment is general in nature. The
Department relies on posts to provide country-specific antifraud training. We found that officers were
receiving limited, or in some cases, no country-specific antifraud training prior to serving on the visa
lines. Instead, officers were expected to learn on the job. As a result, we found that officers did not have
confidence in their ability to decide whether to approve visas and were routinely sending applications to
the antifraud unit, overwhelming the antifraud officers with routine cases that should have been dealt
with on the line.
In response to OIG's ongoing review, the Department has already made some improvements to its
antifraud officer training. The Department has initiated a 1-week course for antifraud officers, which it
plans to offer annually. Prior to this there was no specific training related to this function. While this
training is a good initiative, the Department needs to ensure that those antifraud officers assigned to high
fraud posts attend this training. The Department has also initiated a series of regional training
conferences for FSN antifraud unit investigators. This is the first formal training for many of the
investigators.
The Department needs to expand the concept of regional training to the antifraud officers. Although the
Department frequently offers regional training conferences to deliver and reinforce training for many
jobs overseas, with the exception of one post-initiated effort, no regional training has been devoted
specifically for consular antifraud officers. Regional training would help improve and coordinate posts'
antifraud efforts by disseminating regional fraud trends and patterns that may otherwise go unnoticed,
allowing officers to share best practices and unique antifraud tools or techniques, and improving
communication among the officers.
Fraud Program Management
Support to Overseas Posts
3 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.htm
The Bureau for Consular Affairs is responsible for providing antifraud guidance and support to passport
agencies and overseas posts. Site visits by Washington staff to posts and passport agencies are one
method of support by identifying and correcting antifraud operational deficiencies, providing training,
obtaining hands-on knowledge of fraud trends, and establishing working relationships between the
Department and the post or passport agency visited. However, site visits are infrequent and rarely
include visits to those posts with the highest fraud.
Instead of prioritizing site visits based on the fraud level, posts were being selected based on requests
from a post and on invitations to consular or other conferences. For example, of the 37 overseas site
visits made by Washington staff during FY 1997, only 2 were to posts ranked in the top 10 high-fraud
category, and only 4 were ranked from 11 to 20 for high fraud. When site visits have been conducted,
the quality of the visits has been inconsistent, since there are no standardized written procedures for
reviewing the operations or reporting the results of the visits. As a result of the lack of visits to these
locations, deficiencies in antifraud operations continue, unnoticed by the Department. By neglecting to
make site visits, the Department missed opportunities to improve its understanding of field operations
and to train entire consular sections and passport agencies. More recently, the Department has conducted
site visits to more high fraud posts such as Manila, Kingston, and Santa Domingo.
Antifraud officers at posts are also not provided with the basic guidance needed to run an antifraud
operation. Officers assigned as antifraud officers are often inexperienced and untrained for the position
and do not have the knowledge or background to do an adequate job. Few posts overseas maintain
fully-staffed antifraud units, therefore officers must generally start from scratch in developing
procedures. For example, at the sixth highest ranked fraud post, the antifraud unit consisted of a
part-time junior officer in a rotational position and a newly hired, inexperienced FSN investigator.
Antifraud officers at posts we have visited want to perform their jobs effectively but were frustrated by
the lack of guidance. Lack of guidance resulted in serious management deficiencies, such as inadequate
supervision of FSN investigators, insufficient or nonexistent case management tracking systems, poorly
documented investigative files, and failure to set workload priorities and control workflow.
Data Analysis and Verification
We also found that posts were not adequately monitoring their nonimmigrant visa operations for fraud.
There are several methods by which this can be done such as: analyzing Immigration and Naturalization
Service data on applicants turned away at the border; sampling prior issuances to determine whether the
applicants returned to the host country as required; or routinely verifying the return of applicants who
obtained visas under the posts' referral programs.
When applicants are turned away from U.S. borders, documentation detailing the actions is routinely
sent to the applicable post. While posts generally review this documentation on an individual case basis,
few posts we visited ever performed an overall analysis of this information. One post began doing this at
our suggestion and subsequently reported back that its analysis had helped develop information on a
smuggler who was able to enter the United States five times on a photosubstituted Machine Readable
Visa. The analysis also led to the arrest of two visa vendors, provided leads for future investigations of
certain travel agencies, and resulted in post's restricting the use of the drop box for certain other suspect
travel agencies. The review also identified operational weaknesses on the visa line and helped the
antifraud officer to focus the training of the line officers. In fact, this particular post ended up
recommending such analysis to the Department as a best practice.
Conducting samples of prior issuances to identify which applicants remained illegally in the United
States is also a method to monitor fraud. These reviews, called validation studies, are recommended by
Washington as a best practice, but in actuality are rarely conducted by posts. Those posts that have
conducted studies have been able to use the information to identify which categories of applicants that
are higher risk and therefore require interviews, and which categories of applicants can have interviews
waived. In many cases, this not only helps to identify fraud patterns and trends, but also helps to
streamline nonimmigrant visa operations by reducing the number of applicants who are required to
appear in person. The Department has reported that it has completed a statistical sampling model for
4 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.htm
validation studies, and has piloted it successfully at six posts. However, unless the Department has an
enforcement plan, effective implementation of this practice by posts is doubtful.
Consular sections often use referrals from travel agencies, businesses, universities, and U.S. personnel at
post to facilitate visa processing. This allows low-risk applicants to bypass the interview process,
thereby relieving consular officers of heavy workloads, facilitating the visa process for host country
officials, and allowing officers to help important contacts. These programs, however useful, are
extremely vulnerable to fraud and need to be closely monitored for noncompliance and abuse. We have
found that posts rarely conduct spot-check verifications to determine whether the applicants remained in
the U.S. illegally.
Antifraud Unit Supervision
Supervision over FSN investigators is lax at many posts, often resulting in internal malfeasance.
Investigators are especially vulnerable because of the independent nature of their day-to-day work and
their frequent direct contact with those people who are committing fraud. American officers rarely, if
ever, accompany the investigators on their field investigations. Other supervisory controls are often
lacking. Officers often do not control the investigative process by establishing priorities, assigning cases,
and reviewing investigative reports, but instead delegate this function to the supervisory investigator.
These weaknesses can often be attributed to the overall lack of full-time antifraud officers at posts.
Antifraud responsibilities are often ancillary and therefore officers have little time to focus on antifraud
work. As a result, there have been several instances of malfeasance, which have been identified through
outside sources, not through management controls. At one such post where my office identified serious
supervisory deficiencies, two of the investigators were subsequently fired due to evidence of visa fixing.
OIG Investigations of Passport and Visa Fraud
OIG is mandated to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and mismanagement. Specific allegations or other
information indicating possible violations of law or regulation are investigated by OIG special agents
supported by experts from other OIG offices as appropriate. For the most part, OIG's investigative
caseload is reactive.
The Office of Investigations, for its part, historically has conducted passport and visa fraud
investigations, primarily targeted against employees of the Department who are part of these schemes.
Often the investigations involve cooperative efforts with the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security and with other law enforcement agencies.
Visa and passport fraud currently comprises over 25 percent of the cases being investigated by OIG. Our
cases include a broad range of malfeasance related to consular fraud. For example, in 1998, OIG
investigated a case involving "marriages of convenience" for illegal aliens currently in the United States.
OIG, working with INS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, identified the marriage broker who had
arranged at least 30 sham marriages between aliens and U.S. citizens over a 5-year period.
In 1996, a joint investigation conducted by OIG and INS uncovered an operation run by an individual
who was illegally obtaining nonimmigrant tourist visas, selling fraudulent documents and U.S.
passports, and smuggling aliens into the United States. Also in 1996, OIG conducted a joint operation
with INS, on a case involving visa swindling, forgery, and passing fraudulent identity documents to
defraud the INS. Using an undercover operative, INS and OIG purchased numerous documents and a
fraudulent political asylum package. It is believed that the subjects filed over 1,200 false political
asylum applications, with unreported income from the scheme in excess of $1 million. In a passport
fraud case, OIG conducted an undercover operation in which an individual sold a fraudulent passport to
a confidential informant. The individual had sold at least 20 such passports for $3,000 each.
Some of OIG's investigations also include fraud allegations in the H-1 nonimmigrant visa program.
These investigations are typically brought to our attention by informants and through contacts with other
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies. The H-1B program permits eligible foreigners to
5 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Williams-Bridgers Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/will0505.htm
enter the U.S. temporarily to perform services in a specialty occupation that requires the theoretical and
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge to fully perform the occupation. It may
require a baccalaureate degree or equivalent experience in a specific occupational specialty.
Fraud involving the H-1 visa program often involves large scale and complex operations. Joint
investigations and the creation of task forces are particularly useful and often necessary when dealing
with H-1 visa fraud. Moreover, the magnitude of the smuggling operations usually associated with these
fraud cases requires significant investigative resources.
In our latest semiannual report, I reported on a case involving selling fraudulent H-1B nonimmigrant
visas to illegal aliens. A joint investigation was initiated with the U.S. Customs Service, INS, the U.S.
Social Security Administration's Office of Inspector General and my office. The investigation developed
evidence that an individual, posing as a financial and legal consultant in a storefront office, was
manufacturing fraudulent H-1B visas, as well as INS entry stamps and INS employment authorization
stamps, and was inserting them into passports supplied by the subject's customers. The passports
containing the fraudulent documents would then be used as documentation in support of applications for
social security cards and driver licenses. Judicial proceedings are pending in U.S. District Court on this
matter.
***
This concludes my statement Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
6 of 6
6/28/99 12:21 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Yates Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/yate0505.htm
STATEMENT OF
WILLIAM R. YATES
ACTING DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
OF THE
IMMIGRATION SERVICES DIVISION
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2237 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
MAY 5, 1999, 10:00 A.M.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss this important issue. I last spoke before you on immigration benefit fraud on May 20,
1997. Today, I will discuss the Immigration and Naturalization Services' (INS') investments and
initiatives in fraud detection since that time and their current status.
INS' Commitment to Fraud Prevention and Detection
The INS encounters two types of immigration fraud: fraud relating to applications or petitions for
immigration benefits and document fraud. Fraud relating to petitions for immigration benefits (or
immigration benefit fraud) is any misrepresentation of fact with the fraudulent intent to gain an INS
benefit. Document fraud consists of the creation and or utilization of fraudulent documents to enter
and/or remain in the United States. The former is particularly problematic, if undetected, in that it may
result in the issuance of valid documents.
Immigration benefit fraud has increased both in scope and complexity in recent years. As INS has
increased enforcement pressure at borders and at ports of entry aliens have increasingly resorted to
immigration benefit fraud as an alternative means to enter and remain in the United States. Although
immigration fraud is certainly not new, the volume and complexity of the fraud schemes and the
exploitation of the benefit petition process by criminals and criminal organizations generate serious
concern.
During the first half of FY 1999, INS received approximately 158,000 I-129s (Petitions for
Nonimmigrant Worker) and completed approximately 146,000. INS denied a total of approximately 7%
of the 146,000 petitions completed (for all reasons combined). This denial rate is consistent with prior
year reports. For all fraud cases, including benefit fraud, Servicewide reports during the first 5 months of
Fiscal Year 1999 indicate that presentations for prosecution far exceeded anticipated midyear goals. The
actual number of fraud conspiracy investigations presented for prosecution Servicewide was 164 cases.
1 of 5
6/28/99 12:22 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Yates Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/yate505.htm.
These cases accounted for the presentation of 247 principals for prosecution. For those fraud
prosecutions involving immigration benefit fraud, the number of immigration benefit petitions related
may be one or 10,000. INS has also increased Special Agent attention to fraud activities. Based on the
hours reported during first 6 months of FY 1999, INS will devote the time of nearly 200 Special Agents
to fraud.
The INS is committed to detecting fraud. The INS has increased programs to combat and prevent
fraudulent visa petitions and student petitions that would result in the issuance of valid immigration
documents if approved. INS has concentrated its efforts at detection of fraudulent visa petitions the
Service Centers where the majority of nonimmigrant worker petitions are filed. The INS is also piloting
a new database system for student petitions that may prove to be a powerful safeguard against student
visa fraud. The INS also has several initiatives underway to combat and prevent the creation of
fraudulent documents, including the Forensic Document Laboratory and the Integrated Card Production
System.
Fraudulent Benefit Petition Detection and Prevention
Immigration Benefits Fraud in Nonimmigrant Petitions
While improvements in forensic document capability and improvements in the technology used to create
permanent resident cards, and other INS documents, has combatted document fraud, these efforts have
created potential for fraud in petitions for H1 (temporary skilled workers) and L1 (intracompany
transferee, specifically designed for large, multinational companies) nonimmigrant visa programs. Prior
to these anti-fraud document efforts, immigration documents used to be much more widely available in
the counterfeit market.
INS' Service Centers receive approximately 98% of all nonimmigrant worker petitions filed with the
Service. As a result, they have created anti-fraud operational units to detect and investigate fraudulent
applications. The Service Centers have initiated several anti-fraud measures, including: a check by the
Service Center of the requesting company and address in INFOTEK (a commercially available database
of public source information that provides corporate record information, zoning for a provided address,
etc.), site visits by either the Service Center or INS office closest to the petitioning company, and
computer assisted link analysis. These measures are employed when the Service Center receives
petitions from small or new companies with little or no prior petitioning record, and/or companies
having problematic past records with the Service. During site visits INS verifies the legitimacy of the
company and that the beneficiary is actually employed there and performing the duties specified in the
petition. The Service Center's Special Agents conduct site visits in the local area for H1 and L1 petitions.
For companies outside the Service Center commuting area, the Service Center transfers the case to a
Special Agent assigned to the local office with jurisdiction. The Service Centers have substantially
increased their ability to use automated systems to conduct immigration benefit fraud link analysis.
Because the four Service Centers each cover large geographical areas, opportunities exist to uncover
large scale regional fraud conspiracies. Intelligence research specialists assigned to the Service Centers
use commercial database tools as well as data from INS systems to link individual fraud cases, then
continue to provide support for field investigations and prosecutions.
H1-B Petitions
The H1-B category requires a baccalaureate or higher degree in a specialized field. Currently 115,000
persons are allowed to enter the United States (U.S.) annually under the H1-B classification. The
individual must work in the specific job and for the requesting company. INS has received and
processed these petitions for many years. Recently, however, annecdotal reports by INS Service Centers
indicate that INS has seen an increase in fraudulent attempts to obtain benefits in this category. These
fraud schemes appear to be the result of those wishing to take advantage of the economic opportunities
available in the U.S. The INS encounters 2 primary types of H1-B fraud: either the fraud on the part of
the requesting employer and/or the beneficiary.
Examples of fraud associated with the requesting company include instances where: the company is
2 of 5
6/28/99 12:22 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Yates Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/yate0505.htm
non-existent and/or operating from a post office box, residence, apartment, or many companies are
sharing one of the above. Often the requesting company acts as an employment agency, petitions for the
foreign workers, but then attempts to find them other jobs, with associated additional fees, paid for by
the intending company. In some cases, an existing company petitions for employees, but terminates
them on arrival, enabling an otherwise ineligible person to enter into the U.S. These actions are
accomplished both with and without the beneficiary's advance knowledge.
Beneficiary fraud involves the falsification of either the education or prior job experience of the
petitioner. This information is difficult for INS to verify as it originates from foreign sources and the
format or form for submission by foreign businesses and schools is not standardized. These documents
are easily falsified and, currently, the INS must rely on the American Consulate personnel as the means
of verification. The employer may not know that the information is false.
As an example, more H1-B visas are issued in India than anywhere else in the world. The American
Consulate in Chennai, India (AmCon Chennai) processed 20,000 H1-Bs last fiscal year, more than any
other post in India. As early as 1996, AmCon Chennai estimated that a significant percentage of their
H1-B petitioners, almost all of whom were computer programmers, were misrepresenting their academic
or professional credentials. The INS Service Centers worked with the AmCon Chennai in a joint effort
aimed at verifying claimed education and work experience from the petition submitted to the INS. These
joint efforts were initiated one year ago. Between the inception of the joint effort and March 31, 1999, of
the 3,247 cases referred to AmCon Chennai's anti-fraud unit, they were unable to verify the authenticity
of close to 45% of the claims made on the petitions. Twenty-one percent of the work experience claims
made to the INS were confirmed to be fraudulent in this investigation. In the cases where we are unable
to verify the authenticity of the claims, INS issued an "intent to deny" to the petitioner, providing the
petitioner with the opportunity to refute or overcome the presumption through countervailing evidence.
The investigation and joint effort continues.
L1 Petitions
The L1 category was designed to allow a foreign company to send executive or managerial personnel to
a U.S. subsidiary. Some examples of fraud schemes found in this category include instances where the
petitioning company is started in the U.S. with no parent company overseas, or where the petitioning
company does not exist. In the first instance the parent company is either nonexistent, or has no
relationship to the U.S. subsidiary. Often, multiple companies will use the same address, will lease store
fronts, or will operate from post office box addresses, residences, or apartments.
INS often relies upon consular offices and embassies overseas to verify the foreign parent company
information. Nationals most commonly encountered by the INS utilizing the above L1 schemes are from
China, Russia, and Brazil. Of the site checks done by the Texas Service Center on 108 Chinese
companies in the Houston, TX area that had submitted petitions for L1 employees, 37 were determined
to be involved in fraudulent schemes similar to those listed above, and the case was referred to the
adjudications section with a recommendation to issue an "intent to deny".
Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS)
The INS and the Department of State have encountered visa fraud in the current, paper-based process for
establishing visa eligibility for F, M, and J student or exchange visitor and their dependents. Because
there is no system against which the consular officer can check, and because verifying the authenticity of
each individual form I-20 (Verification of Nonimmigrant Student Status Eligibility) or IAP-66
(Certificate of Exchange Status Eligibility) is impractical, some aliens may use forged forms and
counterfeit supporting documents to obtain F, M, and J visas. In cases where the forged forms and/or
counterfeit supporting documents are suspect or are submitted to posts with historically high fraud rates,
then individual beneficiaries are interviewed. Consular officers will check the beneficiary's eligibility
documents with the alleged school or exchange sponsor to verify the legitimacy of the I-20/IAP-66.
Once issued a visa, the alien travels to the United States and applies for admission through a Port of
Entry (POE). The alien is admitted on the basis of a valid visa and the I-20/IAP-66 forms and supporting
3 of 5
6/28/99 12:22 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Yates Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/yate0505.htm
evidence. The POE transmits the master copy of the form I-20/IAP-66 for data entry into either the INS'
Student Schools (STSC) data system or the United States Information Administration's Exchange Visitor
Information System (EVIS). Once the master copy of the I-20/IAP-66 has been data-entered, the school
or exchange program reconciles the list against their records. Some aliens, posing as F, M, or J students
or exchange visitors are, therefore, able to enter the U.S. because these systems are not connected to
consulate posts or POE's. INS is usually alerted to this fraud long after the malafide alien has been
admitted to the U.S.
The Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS) system is an
electronic interactive process that has the potential to reduce all F, M, or J visa fraud as described above.
In CIPRIS, the school or sponsor creates the eligibility record and transmits it via the Internet to the INS'
CIPRIS data system. The CIPRIS system verifies the legitimacy of the school/sponsor, and the
Designated School Official/Exchange Program's Responsible Officer, as well as the program
information listed on the alien's petition against this record, and sends a notice to the alien overseas. The
alien brings the notice to the Consulate, along with evidence in support of their visa petition.
At the Consulate, the consular officer verifies the legitimacy of the alien's record in CIPRIS. If the
school/sponsor record is not in CIPRIS at the time of visa petition, the alien's visa petition is denied. If a
record exists in CIPRIS, the consular officer then interviews the petitioner and verifies the authenticity
of supporting evidence and enters the decision in CIPRIS. If approved, the visa information, passport
information, and photo/fingerprint of the alien are downloaded into CIPRIS, and the system notifies the
school/sponsor of the alien's visa issuance. At the time the alien appears at the POE for admission, the
inspector is able to verify the visa, passport, and appearance of the alien against the data in CIPRIS. The
inspector updates the system to reflect whether the alien was admitted, deferred or denied admission.
This action results in the notification of the school/sponsor from CIPRIS via the Internet. When the alien
enrolls or registers at the school/exchange program, the school/exchange program, via the Internet,
updates the alien's record in CIPRIS. If the alien fails to enroll, the school/exchange sponsor updates the
alien's record in CIPRIS, and CIPRIS flags the record as a "no show" initiating look out procedures by
the Service.
CIPRIS is a joint partnership effort of the INS, the Department of State, the United States Information
Agency, and the Department of Education, working in close relationship to schools, universities and
exchange programs. CIPRIS is currently being pilot tested at the INS Atlanta Port of Entry and district
office, the Texas Service Center, Department of State and United States Information Agency
headquarters, and 21 pilot institutions located in the states of Georgia, Alabama, North and South
Carolina.
Fraudulent Document Detection and Prevention
Forensic Document Laboratory
The INS Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL) provides a wide variety of forensic document analysis
and support services to all INS programs in the enforcement of the immigration laws. Support is also
provided to other Federal, State, and local agencies in joint operational initiatives involving immigration
fraud. FDL services include: the scientific examination of questioned document evidence; the provision
of testimony as expert witnesses in judicial proceedings and hearings; technical advice and assistance in
major criminal cases involving fraudulent documents; training programs in the detection of fraudulent
documents; the identification of document evidence; the production and dissemination of "Document
Intelligence Alert" bulletins; collection of document exemplars; real-time assistance via the Photophone
network in resolving questions concerning suspect travel documents and identity documents; and
guidance to INS Headquarters program managers and foreign immigration authorities on policies and
procedures involving document fraud.
Visa fraud is one such area in which FDL staff support INS field personnel. The INS Field Offices
request forensic examinations of suspect immigration and identity documents used in status claims.
Field personnel also utilize the Photophone network to obtain immediate assistance from FDL
Intelligence staff in determining the disposition of suspect documents. In addition, the FDL provides
4 of 5
6/28/99 12:22 PM
05/05/99 Committee on the Judiciary - Yates Statement
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/yate0505.htm
advice and assistance to the Department of State Office of Fraud Prevention Programs and the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security in common efforts to enforce the immigration laws.
The INS Service Centers also have small forensic document labs on site because of the large number of
petitions and documents received. These labs are able to focus on the less complex and more common
detections and rely on the support and expertise of the FDL for the more complex cases.
Creation of New INS Documents with Heightened Security
Over the last several years, the INS has initiated processes to create new and more secure immigrant
documents to both prevent the creation of counterfeit documents and to increase detectability of
counterfeit documents. These initiatives include the creation of new permanent resident cards,
employment authorization cards, and LaserVisas (in conjunction with the Department of State).
These documents take advantage of improvements in technology; making them more difficult and
significantly more expensive to counterfeit.
Recent INS Fraud Prosecution Efforts
The following case scenarios illustrate the variety and extent of immigration fraud that the INS must
combat.
In Los Angeles this past November, INS undercover agents executed a search warrant for two storage
facilities and seized more than 2,000,000 counterfeit identification documents. These documents
included resident alien cards, Social Security cards, and driver's licenses from 9 states. The INS Forensic
Document Laboratory has linked counterfeit documents seized in more than 80 other INS cases from
across the country as being manufactured by the same organized crime group that was responsible for
producing the stockpile seized in the Los Angeles raid. Commissioner Meissner has said of the
operation, "We put out of business what we believe to be the largest organized crime group responsible
for manufacturing and distributing phone identification documents in the United States."
Also in Los Angeles, a college student from Taiwan was found to be arranging marriages for other F1
students in exchange for the student obtaining a reduction in tuition costs.
An undercover investigation conducted jointly by INS and the Office of the Inspector General led to a 19
count indictment against an Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Agent, an attorney, and two immigration
brokers in March 1998. Those indicted had attempted to bribe an INS officer with $82,100 to obtain
resident alien cards for 35 Korean families. The aliens paid $350,000 to obtain the cards to the indicted.
INS is committed to improving our fraud detection and prosecution and is actively pursuing joint
ventures with other agencies to better utilize resources and technology. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before you today. I will be happy to take any questions you may have at this time.
5 of 5
6/28/99 12:22 PM
:
Robert
. frittery
Janet &Pathy-
conf call - 4/22
Open to his idear.
Pus Executive Authrity -
No DED to mne than 1 county
what's the Presidenti - -
Alan
Dues
R
No upend of
€203 applicants no
pinal decisione -may be connected leave
very much open. upgeade Some fee for smething else
full application (new) w noaddian for
Wold need ugulation to implement
Do feel still
need this language
EawRled
Some cost would be amproved incurred -
if paits fee wigher
J
"Pauty" in the name of the bill = the Relief $
[email protected].
07/01/99 06:45:00 PM
Record Type:
Record
To:
Irene Bueno/OPD/EOP
CC:
Subject: Re: Visa Waiver Program
Irene -- does this cover it?
Forward Header
Subject: Re: Visa Waiver Program
Author: Maria T Cardona at HQ-COM-006
Date: 7/1/99 9:12 AM
Cathy, these are the responses from Mike Cronin's shop. Could you forward
to
Irene??
Subject: Re: Visa Waiver Program
From: Michael J Hrinyak at HQ-INP-001
Date: 6/30/99 1:30 PM
The system changes to include the passport number require coordination with
USCS
(IBIS). It could take up to 24 months to accomplish this since their
priorities
are not always our priorities.
The EONS working group will be meeting to review the current legislation and
to
discuss how it can be strengthened to better address law enforcement and
process
concerns within the next two weeks. It would take at least until the end of
the
year to prepare and clear a full legislative proposal.
Reply Separator
Subject: Visa Waiver Program
Author: Michael D Cronin at HQ-INP-001
Date: 6/30/99 8:44 AM
Mike, pls. handle
Forward Header
Subject: Visa Waiver Program
Author: Maria T Cardona at HQ-COM-006
Date: 29/06/99 20:11
Eyleen, Mike, could you please follow-up on the following two questions from
the
White House regarding the Visa Waiver issue?? Let me know when you get
answers
so we can forward to the DPC.
Thanks. Maria
Subject: Visa Waiver Program
From: Cathy St Denis at HQ-COM-004
Date: 6/29/99 4:02 PM
Maria -- I'll try and find out, but I need the Q&A to do so...please
have someone email or send up ASAP...thanks!
Forward Header
Subject: Visa Waiver Program
Author: [email protected]_at_inetgw2 at wtgate
Date: 6/29/99 11:50 AM
I received the talking points on this issue.
Follow up questions -
- (bullet #5) - when is the INS expected to complete it's review and make
recomendations?
- (bullet #6 ) when is the DOJ/EONS working group expected to provide
suggestions for strengthening the program?
Let me know. Thanks.
OMB/LRD/ESGG
ID:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98
17:25 No. .013 P.01
CHEM MASSACHUSETTS OHEL a
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE DIVISION
ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT BRANCH
TO:
Julie Fernandes
FROM: INGRID SCHROEDER
DATE: 2/4/98
phone: (202) 395-3883
FAX: (202) 395-3109
NUMBER OF PAGES (including this cover sheet):
6
COMMENTS:
Please provide unts or your sign-off.
Thanks
Please call (202) 395-3454 to report any difficulties with transmission of this fax.
OMB/LRD/ESGG
ID:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98
17:26 No. 013 P.02
FROM IKONICA
703-653-8027
1998.01-23
18:16
HEOE P.02/07
Draft
January 23, 1998
Dear Senator Torricelli:
I have been asked to respond to your letter to Secretary Albright regarding
possible reform of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) and the inclusion of Korea and
Portugal as VWPP participants. Senators Inouye, Murkowski and Akaka CO signed your
letter, and I am sending each of them this same reply.
The existing VWPP legislation, which mandates objective critcria that are not
country specific, has worked extremely well. These criteria have ensured that nations
have received equitable treatment in line with the historical principles of the United States.
Strict adherence to the criteria has enabled representarives of the Department of State
overseas to respond honestly and straightforwardly to requests for inclusion from
numerous friendly countries that do not moot the criteria.
While the Department of State takes national security concerns into consideration
when nominating countries for inclusion in the VWPP, the primary criterion is the refusal
rate. The low two percent refusal rate was set by the Congress to ensure that only
countries that pose a minimal risk of illegal immigration participate in the program. The
Attorney General's authority to designare, from that first group, only those countries that
would not compromise U.S. law enforcement interests ensures that only countries that do
not post a security threat are admitted to the program.
To date, the refusal rate is the only reasonably reliable indicator of potential
immigrant intent. Statistics on the continuing qualification rate as mandated by statute
(i.e., the combined denial of admission, withdrawal of application and violation of
admission statistics, commonly referred to as the "overstay rate") are not available. While
potential VWPP participants cannot be nominated for inclusion in the program unless/until
they satisfy the statutory requirement to have or be in the process of developing a machine
readable passport program, this is a technical requirement separate from the low refusal
rate and law enforcement criteria. (I note that while machine readable passports can
enhance anti-fraud efforts, they are used primarily to handle travelers more efficiently
during the entry process.)
The Honorable
Robert G. Torricelli,
United States Senate.
022
/
LEGISLATIVE AFF.
4482 647 202
11:25
01/26/98
OMB/LRD/ESGG
ID:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98
17:26 No 013 P.03
FROM :KONICA
703-553-9027
1998.01-23
10:15
#505 P.03/07
Korea and Portugal unfortunately do not qualify for nomination to the VWPP
under the current statute, based on their nonimmigrant visa refusal rates. However, if the
ce
Gongress were to change the qualifying criteria the Department of State would of course
reconsider their qualifications under the new criteria
If you need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact 119 again.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin
COOD
LEGISLATIVE AFF.
20202 4462 647
11:28
01/20/98
OMB/LRD/ESGG
ID:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98
17:27 No. 013 P.04
FROM TRONING
1994.01-23
18:18
HERE P. DR/07
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
26431
DEC & -5 1997
November 14, 1997
The Honorable Madeleine R. Albright
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Madam Secretary:
We are writing to bring to your attention the need
to reform the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP).
The Congress recently reauthorized the VWPP for
6 months. In this regard, significant attention has
been focused on proposals that would allow more
visitors to the United States without the often
cumbersome and time-consuming process of applying
for visas. We feel that citizens of certain
countries, specifically Portugal and the Republic of
Korea, should be allowed to enter the United States
without visas, based upon their meeting other
significant important criteria as required by law,
such as machine-readable passports to reduce the
possibility of unauthorized entry and to enable
relevant federal agencies to monitor and report
unauthorized overstays.
800
LEGISLATIVE AFF.
202 647 4462
11:28
01/20/10
UMB/LRD/ESGG
D:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98 17:27 No 013 P.05
FROM :KONICA
703-553-6027
1998,01-23
18:16
#525 P.06/07
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
November 14, 1997
Page 2
It is our understanding that both the State
Department and the Justice Department have expressed
concern about security issues associated with the
expansion of the VWPP. We believe that national
security must be an overriding concern when there
are legitimate national security issues.
However, we find these concerns, in the cases of
Portugal and the Republic of Korea, are not
warranted. In fact, 1f you review the reason why
visas are denied in Portugal and the Republic of
Korea, you find that consular officers,
historically, have rarely refused visas for
Portuguese and South Korean travelers for terrorism
and drug trafficking because these countries pose
minimal terrorism and drug trafficking threats.
Individuals in any nation committed to violating
U.S. terrorism, immigration or drug trafficking laws
are unlikely to be deterred by visa requirements and
the existing processing system. The primary
consequence of the current system is long delays,
resulting in alternative travel and tourism
destinations, and a lower level of business activity
with one of our largest trade partners. Although we
feel that there is adequate authority under current
law to address enforcement problems, we would
certainly support additional authority if it is
deemed necessary to address concerns of expanding
the program. However, machine-readable passports
should provide an additional and valuable
enforcement tool.
On September 15, 1997, the United States Senate
passed S. 1178 which extends and revises the VWPP.
We firmly believe that the Administration, in
particular the State and Justice Departments, should
900
LEGISLATIVE AFF.
aboa GAT store
2:18
01/28/98
OMB/LRD/ESGG
ID:202-395-3109
FEB 04'98
17:28 No. 013 P.06
FROM !KONICA
703-553-8027
1998.01-23
18:15
#525 P.07/07
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
November 14, 1997
Page 3
review its past position on this issue and support at
broader admissions policy and criteria that would
allow the visas-free entry of citizens of Portugal
and the Republic of Korea.
An overstay rate should be the primary criteria for
participation in the VWPP, and should eventually
replace the antiquated visa application refusal rate
criteria. The House and Senate measures require
that accurate overstay statistics be compiled so
that such rates could be monitored for enforcement.
We feel an overwhelming case has been made for
Portugal and the Republic of Korea to participate in
the program immediately, subject to compliance with
overstay criteria currently being reviewed by the
Congress.
We urge you to review and revise your Department's
position on participation of Portugal and the
Republic of Korea in the VWPP. We look forward to
hearing from you on this matter at your earliest
convenience.
Sincerely,
samp DANIEL K. INOUYE
V. Manch
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI
DANIEL K. AKAKA
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI
077
LEGISLATIVE AFF.
4482 20202 647
11:27 01/26/88
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 1/17
Immigration
Visu waiver
Total Pages:
LRM ID: IMS95
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001
Friday, June 13, 1997
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
TO:
Legislative Lisison Officer . See Distribution below
FROM:
James J. Jukes (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
OMB CONTACT:
Ingrid M. Schroeder
PHONE: (202)395-3883 FAX: (202)395-3109
SUBJECT:
JUSTICE Testimony on Visa Waiver Pilot Program
DEADLINE:
2pm Monday, June 16, 1997
In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above
subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. Please advise us if this
item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title
XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
COMMENTS: State Department is also testifying at this hearing.
DISTRIBUTION LIST
AGENCIES:
114-STATE - Julia C. Norton - (202) 647-4463
25-COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt . (202) 482-3151
83-National Security Council - Glyn T. Davies - (202) 45/6-9221
118-TREASURY - Richard S. Carro . (202) 622-0650
EOP:
Steven M. Mertens
Evan T. Farley
Bruce K. Sasser
Louisa Koch
Kimberly A. Maluski
Jose Cerda III
:
Leanne A. Shimabukuro
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P.2/17
LRM ID: IMS95SUBJECT: JUSTICE Testimony on Visa Waiver Pilot Program
RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM
If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment). we prefer that you respond by
e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response Is short and you prefer to call, please call the
branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.
You may also respond by:
(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail If the analyst does not
answer); or
(2) sending us a memo or letter
Please Include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.
TO:
Ingrid M. Schroeder Phone: 395-3883 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454
FROM:
(Date)
(Name)
(Agency)
(Telephone)
The following is the reponse of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:
Concur
No Objection
No Comment
See proposed edits on pages
Other:
FAX RETURN of
pages, attached to this reponse sheet
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P.3/17
02/016
2025145231
HOCIR
06/23/97 14:52
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
39
DRAFT (6-13-97)
TESTIMONY OF
MICHAEL D. CRONIN
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR INSPECTIONS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
before the
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND CLAIMS
Regarding
THE VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM
June 17, 1997
LTC
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 4/17
08/13/97
2025145231
NOCIK
14:53
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome the
opportunity to testify on the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP). During the last
nine years, this Program has become a regular part of the inspection and admission
process for visitors from 25 countries. It is appropriate for Congress to review the
Program, even as the Administration has begun an interagency evaluation of its
operation and its effect on U.S. tourism and law enforcement activities.
Development and Expansion of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
The Visa Waiver Pilot Program was established by the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986. Under its provisions, visitors for pleasure or business
from countries designated jointly by the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State, who meet express statutory criteria may enter the United States without a
visa for a period of ninety days. They are required to waive in writing any right to
the review of an immigration officer's determination that they are inadmissible or
removable from the United States. They may only contest removal based on an
application for asylum. They are also required, if arriving by air or sea, to travel
on a transportation line which is signatory to an agreement with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service permitting the line to transport passengers under the
2
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P.5/17
004/016
06/13/97
14:53
2025148831
HQCIR
Program, and they are required to be in possession of a round-trip or onward
ticket.
The four criteria for inclusion of countries in the program are:
1) that they offer reciprocal privileges to United States citizens;
2) that they have had a nonimmigrant visitor visa refusal rate of under 2
percent for the previous two years and under 2.5 percent for any one of
these two years;
3) that they certify that they issue or are in the process of developing a
machine-readable passport; and
4) that the Attorney General make a determination that inclusion of the
country in the Program does not pose a law enforcement risk to the United
States.
The Act further provides that the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, may refrain from including countries in the Program or remove
them for any reason, including national security.
Applicants for admission under the program must complete a Form I-94W,
answering questions regarding their admissibility to the United States and
3
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 6/17
06/13/97
2025145231
HQCIR
14:33
executing the waiver noted above. They are examined by immigration officers
who are aware that these individuals have not been screened through a visa
process. The officers check the names of these applicants against a lookout
database. These officers may open and pursue any appropriate line of inquiry to
make a determination concerning the individual's admissibility.
From its inception in 1988 through fiscal year 1995, the Program grew from
one to 25 participating countries. In Fiscal Year 1995, seventy-six percent of
nonimmigrants from participating countries entered under this program. This was
over 10 million travelers, or just under one-half of all documented nonimmigrants.
Prior to the statutory modifications made by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the agencies involved in
making the necessary determinations for addition of countries to the program had
developed a process for the inclusion of countries. The Bureau of Consular
Affairs of the Department of State makes the necessary threshold determinations
of eligibility, i.e., that the visa refusal rates are within the statutory criteria; that
the country is Issuing or intends to issue a machine readable passport; and that the
country extends or will extend reciprocal privileges to U.S. travelers. Before
4
ULA/DOJ
666C FIS 202 YVJ 18:05 RRI L6/CT/90
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P.7/17
000/016
06/13/97
14:54
T2028145231
HQCIR
making a recommendation that a country be included in the Program, the Bureau
of Consular Affairs considers any other relevant foreign relations or national
security Issues. Upon receipt of a recommendation from the Department of State
that 8 country be included in the Program, the Department of Justice requests
information from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation concerning immigration, criminal, and national security
considerations and data. As necessary, a team may be dispatched to the country to
consult with its law enforcement and criminal justice organizations and to review
such activities as horder control and passport issuance procedures. Upon analysis
of this information, a recommendation is made to the Attorney General as to
inclusion or rejection of the country. Under IIRIRA, the authority to designate a
country to participate in the Program was vested solely in the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of State.
The number of persons applying for admission under the Visa Waiver Pilot
Program who are refused entry grew, through Fiscal Year 1994, in a manner
consistent with the growth of the Program, from 22 persons in 1988 to 1,876
persons in 1994. This number increased significantly in Fiscal Years 1995 and
1996, by approximately 2,000 persons a year, to 7,011 refusals in 1996. This
5
RRRP FTC 707 YVJ on:0T TXI
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER. L.
P.8/17
08/13/97
C2023145231
BUCIK
14:54
recent increase appears attributable in part to the fraudulent use of travel
documents from countries in the Program, which will be discussed below.
However, statistics relating to the apprehension and removal of nationals of Visa
Waiver countries, as shown on the attached chart, indicate that these countries
remain low-risk for immigration law violations.
The Success of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
The Visa Waiver Pilot Program has grown tremendously and has proven
extremely popular with nationals of visa waiver countries and with travel and
tourism interests. It has significantly reduced consular workload but has not
markedly degraded facilitation at United States ports-of-entry. Port-of-entry
enforcement capabilities have been enhanced by the addition of select data from
the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) to the Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS) database. The Program has remained a high priority of
travel and tourism advocacy groups and professional associations, including the
White House Conference on Tourism.
Concerns about the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
VWPP fraud is advantageous to the prospective illegal entrant in the same way
6
TWI
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P.9/17
008/016
08/13/97
14:34
2025145231
HQCIR
it is for the legitimate traveler 44 entry to the United States can be achieved with
nothing but a passport. A significant enforcement concern relating to the Program
is the targeting of the passports of Visa Waiver countries by document vendors and
alien smugglers. As the Department of State has increased the fraud resistance of the
United States nonimmigrant visa, the attractiveness of using VWPP passports for
non-VWPP nationals seeking to enter the United States illegally has also increased.
With the introduction of the machine-readable nonimmigrant visa, which includes
biographical information and the bearer's digitized photograph, the Department of
State has enhanced the security of any passport containing the visa regardless of the
country of issuance. The attraction of smugglers to VWPP passports is encouraged
by several factors, including limited security features present in some VWPP
passports (which simplify the alteration and forgery of them) and the existence of
multiple passport-issuing authorities and procedures in some VWPP countries.
The use of lost or stolen blank VWPP passports is one of the gravest fraud
problems facing the INS today. There is also я large supply of stolen blank VWPP
passports on the market today. INS Intelligence has received reports dealing with the
increasing involvement of international organized crime groups in the theft of these
documents and their vending to smuggling rings of individual aliens.
7
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 10/17
08/13/97
14:55
2025145231
MUCIK
INS has worked with the airline industry to develop criteria for the use of
electronic ticketing on international flights to the United States. Under recent
direction from INS Headquarters, visa waiver applicants may use electronic tickets
provided that they can, upon demand, present some proof of onward travel
arrangements and provided that, also upon demand, participating transportation lines
cooperate with INS requests for verification of travel arrangements.
Administration Review of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program.
As noted above, the Program appears to have worked extremely well for
travelers from low-risk countries. However, some issues and concerns persist. The
Department of Justice recently, in response to recommendations for the inclusion of
two new countries in the Program, conducted an intra departmental review of the
Visa Waiver Pilot Program to assess the risks associated with further expansion of the
Program, including incremental effects of program expansion on the effectiveness of
ports-of-entry. That review will now be expanded to an interagency working group
which will evaluate the Program as a whole, its extension, the continued designation
of current countries, and criteria to be applied to determinations about the addition
of further countries to the Program.
8
TM4
18/21/90
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 11/17
010/016
08/13/97
14:55
2025143231
HQCIR
Nonimmigrant Information System and Visa Overstay Rates.
Sec. 217(c)(3)(i) and (ii) of the INA indicate that a qualification for continued
participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) is that the number of
nationals of a member country who were denied admission at the time of arrival or
withdrew their application for admission, and the number of nationals of that country
who violated the terms of such admission during the previous fiscal year remain
below 2 percent of the total number of nationals of that country who applied for
admission as nonimmigrant visitors during such previous fiscal year.
Data are collected in the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) on the
number of withdrawals for VWPP counties, and can be provided for each year since
the beginning of the program (1988). Similarly, comprehensive data on VWPP
refusals can be provided.
Data are available in NIIS from 1988-92 for VWPP countries whose nationals
violated their terms of admission (as measured by nonimmigrant visa overstay
rutes). These data are estimates of overstay rates which are based on "apparent
overstay" numbers from NIIS. INS developed a methodology that reduces the
number of apparent overstays by the "system error" known to exist in NIIS. The
9
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM: SCHROEDER, L.
P. 12/17
011/016
08/13/57 14:55
2025145231
HQCIR
system error (historically about 8-10 percent for all countries) is caused by collection,
keypunching, and processing problems (including difficulties in matching arrival and
departure records). This methodology was refined as a result of review by the General
Accounting Office in 1995.
Nonimmigrant overstay rates have not been estimated since July 1994 (when
calculation of fiscal year 1993 rates were attempted) due to inconsistent numbers of
apparent overstays in NIIS. Because of the magnitude and variation of apparent
overstays since 1992, the INS' established methodology cannot currently be used to
produce overstay rates with the required level of reliability to make relative
comparisons among countries. The numbers of apparent overstays have been
reviewed every G months through February 1997 in attempts to estimate defensible
nonimmigrant overstay rates; however, data from NIIS continue to be inadequate for
this purpose.
From the 1994 realization that corrective action was required, plans were made
to rewrite the NIIS software to improve data integrity, identify new requirements and
convert the old database. This development effort began in 1995 and continued until
the new system was introduced in July, 1996. The regular production operation of
10
000/YTO
666C FTS 202 EATH 80:01 RRI LB/CT:90
16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
P. 13/17
06/13/97
14:38
2025143231
BUCIK
the new system was encumbered by the process of converting the old database of
admissions, withdrawals, and departures from 1983 through June, 1996. Backlogs
caused by the necessity of maintaining dual processing were not completed until
May, 1997.
We hope to have completed and introduced corrective actions to the NIIS by
the end of the calendar year.
INS is presently performing numerous tasks related to the provisions of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 which deal
with automation, card technology, biometrics, and departure management. This work
will result in significant improvement in INS's ability to track arrivals and departures,
identify overstays, and generate accurate overstay statistics.
x
Recommendations:
As Congress considers extension of the VWPP, INS has several
recommendations. As WE have stated in the past, INS recommends that legislation
be enacted to require Visa Waiver Pilot Program countries to introduce highly fraud-
resistant, machinc-readable passports by 8 date certain. Current language does not
refer to fraud resistance and some countries have failed to introduce machine-
readable documents to date. It should be noted that the initial 8 VWPP countries
11
RRRP FTC 202 YVJ 80:01 INI 18/CT/90
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:SCHPOEDER, L.
P. 14/17
05/13/97
14:36
HQCIR
013/016
2025145231
entered the program before this requirement was introduced by the Immigration Act
of 1990
The provisions requiring transportation lines to be signatory to agreements with
INS and requiring air and sea passengers to be in possession of onward tickets have
posed some difficulties in relation to private and military conveyances. Individuals
familiar with other countries' less regulated visa waiver schemes seldom focus on the
noted U.S. requirements. It may be appropriate to review the Program provisions
with the aim of accommodating private and military conveyances.
Given the interagency review to be completed under Department of Justice
direction, and given the need to integrate into this Program many changes mandated
by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the
INS recommends that the Program not be made permanent but that it be retained as
a pilot program. INS would, however, support a multi-year extension of the Program.
This completes my testimony. I would be glad to respond to any questions you
may have.
12
Chart 1.
Nonimmigrants Admitted by Selected Class of Admission for Countries in the VWPP:
Fiscal Years 1988-95
$4,000,000
13,338,637
12,007,912
12,543,263
12,370,567
12,000,000
19,893,166
08/13/97 14:58 2028145231
CERDA 09:9T
76%
10,000,000
y7%
9,200,385
73%
Number Allens Adm for VWPP Countries
1449,391
BTM
Total
Admitted
8,000,000
VWPP
HQCIR
1
Admitted
5,000,000
52%
(WB+WT)
65%
4,658,679
50%
Visitors
of
82%
$
Admitted
41%
(B1+B2)
4,000,000
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
27%
22%
8%
27%
19%
2,000,000
1%
1988 (2)
1969 (6)
1990 (B)
1991 (21)
1992 (21)
1993 (22)
1994 (22)
1995 (23)
Years (Number of Countries in the VWPP)
910/210
P.15/17
Chart 2.
Enforcement Statistics for Countries in the VWPP:
Fiscal Years 1985-96
7000
06/13/97 14:56
VWPP Refusals
6800
Apprehensions
Removals
28
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
Criminal Removals
$000
4000
Number 01 Aliens
KIDDH
3000
2000
06/13/97 FK1 10:10 FAA " 014 0000
FROM:SCHROEDER, FROM: L.
1000
n
X
M
o
1985
1968
1987
1088 (2)
1989 (8)
1990 (8)
1391 (21)
1992 (21)
1993 (22)
1994 (2)
1995 (Z3)
1996 (23)
Years (Number of Countries In the YAPP)
NOTE: Apprehension data are not available by country pilor to 1987.
VWPP began in 1968. Only VWPP Refusal data available for FVD6 (4th Quarter projected).
P. 16/17
Chart 3.
Enforcement Statistics (Per Million Admitted) for Countries in the VWPP:
Fiscal Years 1988-95
400
Apprehensions
350
Removals
06/13/97 14:57 52025148231
JUN-13-1997 16:50 TO:JOSE CERDA
$
Criminal
Removals
Number of Allens Per Million Admitted
250
A
200
HQCIR
05A
......
150
ATC
FROM:SCHROEDER, L.
709
as
0
1988 (2)
1999 (8)
1990 (8)
1991 (21)
1992 (21)
1993 (22)
1994 (22)
1995 (23)
Years (Number of Countries in the VWPP)
17/17
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM: GAYMON, D.
P. 1/7
Total Pages:
LRM ID: IMS181
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001
Monday, October 27, 1997
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
TO:
Legislative Lialson Officer See Distribution below
FROM:
James J. Jukes (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
OMB CONTACT:
Ingrid M. Schroeder
PHONE: (202)395-3883 FAX: (202)395-3109
Jin
SUBJECT:
JUSTICE Report on S1178 Visa Waiver Pilot Program Reauthorization Act of
1997
DEADLINE:
4pm Tuesday, October 28, 1997
In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above
subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. Please advise us if this
Item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title
XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
COMMENTS: Please note that Justice opposes S. 1178 (see page 1 - first paragraph). The VWPP
is set to expire on November 7th.
DISTRIBUTION LIST
AGENCIES:
114-STATE - Paul Rademacher - (202) 647-4463
25-COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202) 482-3151
118-TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202) 622-0650
83-National Security Council - Glyn T. Davies - (202) 456-9221
EOP:
Steven M. Mertens
David J. Haun
Kenneth L. Schwartz
Michael Deich
Theodore Wartell
Joseph G. Pipan
Evan T. Farley
Bruce K. Sasser
Philip A. DuSault
Gordon Adams
Debra J. Bond
Kimberly A. Maluski
Alice E. Shuffield
Charles Konigsberg
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:GAYMON, D.
P. 2/7
Lisa M. Kountoupes
Peter G. Jacoby
Leanne A. Shimabukuro
Jose Cerda III
WARNATH_S
Scott Busby
William P. Marshall
James C. Murr
Tracey Thoraton
Chuck kiefle
Josh Gotbane
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM: GAYMON, D.
P. 3/7
LRM ID: IMS181
SUBJECT: JUSTICE Report on S1178 Visa Waiver Pilot Program
Reauthorization Act of 1997
RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM
If your response to this request for views Is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by
e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the
branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.
You may also respond by:
(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail If the analyst does not
answer); or
(2) sending us a memo or letter
Please Include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.
TO:
Ingrid M. Schroeder Phone: 395-3883 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454
FROM:
(Date)
(Name)
(Agency)
(Telephone)
The following is the reponse of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:
Concur
No Objection
No Comment
See proposed edits on pages
Other:
FAX RETURN of
pages, attached to this reponse sheet
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:GAYMON, D.
P.4/7
VAT
WIVV6
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, DC 20530
Draft
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This presents the views of the Department or Justice on
S. 1178, the "Visa Waiver Pilot Program Reauthorization Act of
1997" (Visa Waiver Reauthorization Act), as passed by the Senate.
Although we support the goals of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program
(VWPP), we oppose the enactment of the Visa Waiver
*
Reauthorization Act for the reasons discussed below.
We have reviewed S. 1178 in this Department's capacity as
the designated chair of an interagency working group (IWG)
convened at the direction of the Attorney General in consultation
with the Secretary of State. Since July 1997, the IWG has met to
develop a protocol to formalize the procedures for nomination and
approval of visa waiver pilot countries and to examine the
criteria that should be established as conditions for a country's
admission to the program. The consensus within the IWG is that
changing the statutory criteria at this point is premature and
that we should not propose changes in those criteria until WE
have the banefit of further study. The consensus is also that
any extension of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) should be
for no longer than two years, so that the program can remain a
pilot program and not become more permanent without additional
action by the Congress. Unfortunately, we do not believe the
Reauthorization Act is consistent with this approach.
We are particularly concerned with Section 2 of the
Reauthorization Act, which would amend section 217 (c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to raise threshold visa
refusal rates on which acceptance into the program is based. At
this point, we do not believe that WB have had sufficient
experience with the Visa Waiver Pilot Program to warrant changing
the threshold standards. In addition, the VWPP extension would
be for three, not two years.
The Reauthorization Act would aloo change the basic approval
formula for the second time in as many years. When Congress
first enacted the VWPP, the Attorney Genoral and the Secretary of
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM: GAYMON, D.
P.5/7
UMB
JUNES
enous
State shared the responsibility of designating countries as visa
waiver pilot countries. The Illegal immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) later amended
Section 217 (c) to provide that "the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of state," had the authority to
designate participating countries. S. 1178 would once again
grant to "the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General" the authority to designate participating
countries, but would grant the Attorney General the authority to
redesignate a country's participation in the program.
After numerous meetings over the last several months, the
IWG has reached consensus on formal procedures to address the
designation process under the IIRIRA formulation. Enactment of
S. 1178 would require that the IWG formulate a new set of
procedures to accommodate the dual revised authorities of the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General -- the authority of
the former to designate countries in the first instance, and that
of the latter to redesignate participating countries.
In addition to the general policy concerns discussed above,
we also have more specific technical concerns with the Visa
Waiver Reauthorization Act. Attached to this letter is a
compilation of minor amendments to the Reauthorization Act that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has concluded
would be required if the Reauthorization Act is to maintain
consistency with the present Visa Waiver Pilot Program. These
changes are also necessary in order to provide data on the rates
of violation of terms of admission that are intended to be the
basis for redesignation for or disqualification from the program.
Because many aliens are admitted for periods of time that go
beyond the fiscal year in which they are admitted, calculation of
violation (or overstay) rates needs to be made for persons who
were required to depart within a given fiscal year. Ninety days
following the end of a fiscal year would be the minimum amount of
time required to receive data on departures from the airlines and
ports of entry, enter it into the data base, process and match
records of arrival and departure, and, finally, to evaluate data,
estimate violation rates, and prepare a report to the Committees
on the Judiclary. Subparagraph 217 (o) (3) (A) (II) (11), BR amended
by the Reauthorization Act, would specify that "as of September
30, 1999, estimales of violation ratoo shall be based on the
automated entry-exit control system mandated by Section 110 of
Public Law 104-708." Even if the implomentation date for this
entry-exit control system is not delayed as previously requested
by the Department, the system would contain only information on
required departures for that portion of the nonimmigrants who had
been admitted to the United states prior to April 1, 1999, for
2
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:GAYMON, D.
P.6/7
VALD JURES
44 UU4
persons on B-1 and B-2 visas, and prior to July 1, 1999, for
persons who were admitted under the VWPP. The INS has apprised
the drafters of S. 1178 of these concerns and thoy have agreed to
work toward perfecting language that would accomplish the desired
reporting.
Finally, Section 3 of the Reauthorization Act compresses the
time frame for the Report on the Automated Entry-Exit Control
System from that which the Department requested in the Tochnical
Amendments to the TIRIRA proposed bill which we previously
transmitted to the Committee. while the INS has preparations and
funding in place for a pilot test of an automated arrival-
departure management system for pedestrians on the southern
border, INS needs additional time and funding for similar pilot
tests for vehicles on both the southern and northern land
borders. The Department recommends that the Attorney General be
required to commence pilot tests on both the northern and
southern borders within six months after the date of enactment
and to report on the tests within twelve months after the date of
enactment.
For the above reasons, the Department of Justice opposes
S. 1178 as passed by the Senate. As we noted above, however, we
have apprised the drafters of that bill of our concerns, and they
have expressed a willingness to work with us toward resolving
them. We would also be pleased to work with your Committee
toward enactment of an appropriate and acceptable extension of
the VWPP authority.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this
matter. If we may be of additional assistance, do not hesitate
to contact 118. The office of Management and Budget has advised
that there is no objection from the standpoint of the
Administration's program to the presentation of this report. S
Sincerely,
Andrew Fois
Assistant Attorney General
cc: The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
s1178.ltr
10/27/97
3
OCT-28-1997 08:43 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM: GAYMON, D.
P.7/7
DUJ ULA
OMB JUKES
005
10/27/97 13:13 202 307 0097
EONS
10/02/97 20:41 2025145231
HQCIR
001/003
Technical Corrections to S. 1178:
In Section 2(a) revising Section 217(c) of the ACT,
subparagraph 217(c)(2)(E) should be titled "VIOLATION OF STATUS
AND DISQUALIFICATION";
in subperagraph 217(c)(2)(B)(I), strike "excluded from" and insert
"rafused";
in subperagraph 217(c)(2)(E)(II), insert after "sonimmigrant visitors" the
phrase, "who were required to depart";
in subparagraph 217(c)(3)(A)(I), strike "excluded from" and insert
"refused";
in subparagraph 217(c)(3)(A)(II), insert after "nonimmigrant visitors" the
phrase, "who were required to depart".
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. 1/8
Immigration
usawaiver
Total Pages: 8
LRM ID: IMS91
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001
Friday, June 13, 1997
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
TO:
Legislative Liaison Officer - See Distribution below
FROM:
James J. Jukes (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
OMB CONTACT:
Ingrid M. Schroeder
PHONE: (202)395-3883 FAX: (202)395-3109
J.-
SUBJECT:
STATE Oversight Testimony on Visa Waiver Pilot Program
DEADLINE:
5pm Friday, June 13, 1997
In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above
subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. Please advise us if this
Item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title
XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.
COMMENTS: Justice will also be testifying at this hearing,
DISTRIBUTION LIST
AGENCIES:
61-JUSTICE - Andrew Fois . (202) 514-2141
25-COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202) 482-3151
83-National Security Council - Glyn T. Davies . (202) 45/6-9221
118-TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202) 622-0650
EOP:
Steven M. Mertens
Evan T. Farley
Louisa Koch
Kimberly A. Maluski
Jose Cerda III
Leanne A. Shimabukuro
:
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. 2/8
LRM ID: IMS91SUBJECT: STATE Oversight Testimony on Visa Walver Pilot Program
RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM
If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by
e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response Is short and you prefer to call, please call the
branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistent.
You may also respond by:
(1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not
answer): or
(2) sending us a memo or letter
Please Include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.
TO:
Ingrid M. Schroeder Phone: 395-3883 Fax: 395-3109
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant): 395-3454
FROM:
(Date)
(Name)
(Agency)
(Telephone)
The following is the reponse of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:
Concur
No Objection
No Comment
See proposed edits on pages
Other:
FAX RETURN of
pages, attached to this reponse sheet
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. 3/8
Draft
STATEMENT OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY A. RYAN
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 17, 1997
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am delighted to have been invited today to testify on behalf of the Department of
State about the nonimmigrant visa waiver program. 1 can say without reservation that
this program is a resounding success. It has bolstared the U.S. economy through the
expedited admission of millions of legitimate short term visitors for business, thus
allowing for the negotiation of contracts for the provision of American goods and
services to the world. It has provided a welcome boost to the U.S. tourism industry,
which employs thousands of American citizens, through the visa-free admission of
millions of foreign tourists. In addition, it has enabled the U.S. government to use its
limited resources more efficiently and productively during a period of budgetary
constraint. We strongly urge that this highly effective program be made permanent.
During the 1980's, economic prosperity in Europe and Japan and the growing
interdependence of the world's economy contributed to an explosion in international
travel. The State Department found itself in the position of devoting increasing resources
to visa issuance which was virtually perfunctory. Let there be no mistake about it--a
British national applying for a visa to visit the U.S. in 1987 was not required to go to the
Embassy. let alone have a visa interview. Yet, even this perfunctory processing
consumed major personnel resources owing to the sheer volume of visa issuance.
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. 4/8
2
The visa waiver pilot program was & logical response to that situation. It was
instituted pursuali to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Its objective was
to determine if a selective waiver of the nonimmigrant visa requirement would improve
the use of U.S. government resources and encourage travel to the United States, without
diminishing U.S. border security. The program waives the visa requirement only for
touristic or business trips of ninety days or less in duration. Others, such as students and
temporary workers, from qualifying countries all still need visas to travel to the U.S. It
went into effect on July 1, 1988, in eight countries jointly designated by the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General. Under joint administration of the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General the program has now expanded to encompass 25 countries which
have met the statutory criteria.
The program simultaneously helped U.S. business, generated growdi in the U.S.
tourist industry and allowed the State Department to redirect its consular resources to
higher risk situations like the newly independent states in the former Soviet Union. The
visa waiver program was not just a win/win situation, it was a win for business, a win for
tourism and a win for effective management of the Department of State.
Strict criteria for participation were established to ensure that the test program
would not entail unacceptable risks to our ability to control our borders. To qualify for
the program, nations must:
Have a minimal nonimmigrant visa refusal rate;
Issue or agree to Issue a machine readable travel document;
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. 5/8
3
Reciprocate the vien waiver by permitting visa-free entry to Americans for business or
tourism.
Furthermore, before any country is designated as a participant, the Attorney
General must determine that U.S. law enforcement interests would not be compromised
by the designation Formal and informal consultations take place within the border
security community before a country is nominated. A number of countries have the
requisite refusal rates and machine readable documents but have not been accepted for the
program because of law enforcement or security concerns.
The criteria laid out in the legislation have worked astoundingly well. The
established requirements have ensured that only low fraud, low risk countries, such as
Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Norway, have been designated as
participants. Strict adherence to the criteria has enabled representatives of the
Department of State overseas to respond honestly and straightforwardly to requests from
numerous friendly nations to be part of the program by noting their current inability to
meet the criteria. Most significantly, the criteria have ensured that nations have received
equitable treatment in line with the historical principles of the United States. We strongly
support continued adherence to these criteria which have maintained the integrity of the
program over the years. Any proposal to dilute the qualifying criteria must be carefully
evaluated to see if it is consistent with the program's stated aims and U.S. border security
interests.
Safeguards have been included in the program to deter the admission of ineligible
aliens. The mere fact that a country participates in the visa waiver program does not
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P.6/8
4
mean that all of its citizens will be admitted to the United States upon application or that,
if admitted under the waiver program, they will be granted all the privileges they would
enjoy If they were admitted with visas. They first must not be excludable under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. In addition, they have severely limited appeal rights to
decisions by the Immigration and Nationality Service to deny their entry, and they must
have 8 round-trip ticket 80 that they can depart immediately if found excludable. All
individuals applying for admission, Including those in the visa wiaver program, are
subject to the same look-out checks at the port of entry that they would be subjected
to at the time of visa issuance overseas.
The Department of State and the INS share data to ensure that all information on
ineligible aliens is available to both agencies. I am convinced that application of the
criteria for admission outlined in the legislation plus our enhanced data share programs
offer U.S. agencies appropriate control over those seeking admission without visas.
Based on the information we have available, issuing visas to all of the travelers who
entered under the visa waiver would have been a considerable drain on resources without
any discemible benefit to our national security.
Some would argue that this program weakens U.S. border security, I would
advance the counter argument. The visa waiver program was not and is not a "loser" for
U.S. border security. Indeed. rather than weakening border security, the visa waiver
program has strengthened it, bccause It has allowed the Department of State to focus its
resources upon those countries and regions where fraud potential is greatest. The resource
savings were applied to the opening of posts and staffing of consular sections in the
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P. .7/8
5
former Soviet Union and to administering legislatively-mandated immigrant visa lottery
programs. Iu addition, the Department has been able to move personnel previously
engaged in relatively pro forma nonimmigrant visa adjudication into straight anti-fraud
work or to adjudicatory positions in immigration-push countries.
So what would be the resource implications for the Department of State if the visa
waiver program were ended? It is almost impossible to calculate and daunting to
contemplate. We have eliminated positions in visa waiver countries and even closed
many consulates, especially in Western Europe, which used to provide perfunctory visa
services. The cost of reestablishing these posts and positions would be significant. Since
1988 when the visa waiver program began, the demand for nonimmigrant visas in non
visa waiver countries has grown considerably. The resources which were reprogrammed
to these countries are essential to providing adequate service and maintaining anti-fraud
initiatives.
Estimating what it would cost to the U.S. to restore consular services to all the
nations that currently participate in the visa waiver program is admittedly an inexact
science. However, one rough measure would be based on the number of foreigners who
entered the U.S. in 1996 using the visa waiver program. Last year some 12.4 million
aliens entered the U.S. on the visa waiver program. The current Machine Readable Visa
application fee is $20, based on a 1991 cost of service study. Even if only half the aliens
who entered the U.S. last year required a visa (since some of those visitors probably
entered more than once in 1996 and some would be dissuaded from traveling here by a
visa requirement), that would mean that the additional cost to the U.S. would be over
JUN-13-1997 12:16 TO:JOSE CERDA
FROM:JULIA YUILLE
P.8/8
6
$120 million-and that does not even cover the cost of expanding facilities or hiring and
training all of the additional staff the Department would require. Our business and
tourism would suffer, the cost to the U.S. government would be high, and U.S. border
security would not be improved. As I noted earlier, I really don't even like to think about
it.
While the government has benefited enormously from the visa waiver program, it
has been the U.S. economy that really won the gold ring on this ride. The World Tourism
Organization statistics for 1996 show that the United States was the second most popular
international tourist destination with 44.8 million arrivals but number one as far as
tourism receipts go. International tourists spent $64.4 billion here in 1996. Lots of them
entered the U.S. on the visa waiver program.
In closing, I would like to stress once again the value of the visa waiver program
to U.S. government operations, to the U.S. travel and tourism industry and to our
relations with participating countries. Even a short disruption of this vital program would
have disastrous economic, political and resource implications for the U.S. government.
We urgently need to have this program made permanent. It has proven itself.
Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to take your questions.