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President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
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23901887
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President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
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Records of the First Lady's Office (Clinton Administration)
Lisa Caputo's Files
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FOIA Number: 2011-1037-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
First Lady's Office
Series/Staff Member:
First Lady's Press Office
Subseries:
Lisa Caputo
OA/ID Number:
6054
FolderID:
Folder Title:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia, and Warsaw, Poland July 1994 [Binder]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
S
59
1
3
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. memo
Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Latvia, July 6 (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
002 memo
Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Visit to Latvia (3 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
003a briefing
Meeting and Signing Ceremony (3 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
003b. report
report [Released in Part] (2 pages)
06/14/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
004a briefing
Working Lunch (4 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
004b. report
report [Released in Part] (2 pages)
06/17/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
004c. report
report (2 pages)
06/17/1994
P1/b(1)
004d. report
report [Released in Part] (2 pages)
06/17/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
005a. briefing
Radar Site (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
005b briefing
Troop Withdrawals (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
005e briefing
Russian Minority (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
005d. briefing
Naval Base (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
005e. briefing
Latvia Political Economic Overview (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
005f. briefing
Estonia Political Economic Overview (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
005g. briefing
Lithuania Political Economic Overview (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
006 memo
Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Poland, July 6-7, 1994 (1
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
page)
007. memo
Anthony Lake to POTUS re Your Trip to Poland (5 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
008. briefing
Arrival Ceremonies (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
009a. briefing
Meeting (4 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
009b. report
report (2 pages)
04/28/1994
P1/b(1)
010 briefing
Dinner (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
9 /21 / 2023
011. briefing
Wreath Laying (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
9/21/2023
012. briefing
Ceremony (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
9/21/2023
013a. briefing
Meeting (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
013b. report
report (2 pages)
06/16/1994
P1/b(1)
013c. report
report (1 page)
06/16/1994
P1/b(1)
01 4a. briefing
Meeting (3 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
014b. report
report (2 pages)
06/15/1994
P1/b(1)
015. briefing
Speech (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
016 briefing
Ceremony (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
017. briefing
Reception (3 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
018. briefing
Meeting (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
019. briefing
Departure (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
020a. briefing
US Investment (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
020b briefing
Partnership for Peace (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ
paper
020c. briefing
EU Polish Relations (1 page)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
020d. briefing
Bilateral Issues (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
020e. briefing
Initiatives Checklist (2 pages)
07/01/1994
P1/b(1) VZ 9/21/2023
paper
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SECRET
PRESIDENT THE OF SEAL OF UNUM 40 THE REVENUE UNITED
President Clinton's Trip to
Riga, Latvia
and
Warsaw, Poland
July 1994
Lisa Caputo
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Cover Unclassified sheet only
Initials: @ Date: 06/06/13
when separated From
SECRET
Attachment
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
LATVIA
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1994
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE A
SUBJECT:
Your Trip to Latvia, July 6
Your trip to Latvia is an historic visit. While only a short
stop, you will be the first American President to visit the
Baltic states. This visit will include a bilateral meeting and
signing ceremony with Prime Minister Birkavs and a working lunch
with the three Baltic Presidents. Your open air speech at
Freedom Monument is expected to be publicly viewed by perhaps as
many as ten thousand people. Your public remarks will be
provided separately. This briefing book contains:
SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
SCOPE MEMORANDUM
ARRIVAL CEREMONY
BILATERAL AND SIGNING CEREMONY WITH PRIME MINISTER BIRKAVS
WORKING LUNCH WITH BALTIC PRESIDENTS
PRESS AVAILABILITY
SPEECH AT FREEDOM PLAZA
MEETING WITH LATVIAN POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS
MEETING WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By vz NARA, Date 6/5/2023
2016-0314-m-1
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
Chief of Staff
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
Wednesday, July 6
ARRIVAL CEREMONY
BILATERAL AND SIGNING CEREMONY WITH PRIME MINISTER BIRKAVS
WORKING LUNCH WITH BALTIC PRESIDENTS
PRESS AVAILABILITY
MEETING WITH LATVIAN POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND BUSINESS LEADERS
FLOWER LAYING AND SPEECH AT FREEDOM PLAZA
MEET AND GREET WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF FROM LATVIA, ESTONIA AND
LITHUANIA
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
SCOPE MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DECLASSIFIED
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE KER
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0314 -m-1 (1.21)
SUBJECT:
Your Visit to Latvia
6/12/2023 vi
OVERVIEW
Your seven-hour stop in Riga July 6 represents a highly symbolic
and dramatic kickoff for your third trip to Europe this year.
The symbolism lies in the message you convey by the very fact of
your visit: America champions the sovereignty of the Baltic
states and supports their reintegration into the Western fold,
rejecting any pretension of a Russian sphere of influence in the
region. The drama of your visit is historical. America
sheltered the flame of Baltic independence during five decades of
Soviet occupation. Your arrival as the first American President
to set foot on Baltic soil constitutes a decisive affirmation of
the rebirth of these three small states as independent nations.
The theme of the continuing consolidation of a new post-Cold War
Europe will recur at every stop of your trip, from your
discussions with President Walesa, through your meeting with
Yeltsin in a new political "G-8" in Naples, to your walk through
the Brandenburg Gate in an undivided Berlin. But your visit to
Riga, climaxed by an open air speech to thousands of Baltic
citizens, will underscore in a simple yet powerful way the
epochal nature of the change that has come to Europe.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
o
Demonstrate our continued staunch support for the
sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States.
Highlight the importance of the Russian troop withdrawal
this summer and our role in promoting it. Seek to bridge
differences between Estonia and Russia on troop withdrawal
talks.
Emphasize the continued security and economic integration of
the Baltic states as a priority U.S. goal for the future.
BACKGROUND
Support for the Independence of the Baltic Countries. You meet
this objective largely by the very fact of your visit, which has
already generated great excitement among the governments and
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
2
peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This central message
of support resonates well among the Baltic people, who were by
far the most Westernized in the former USSR and are looking
firmly toward Europe and North America in search of full
reintegration. They have not forgotten that the U.S. never
recognized the Soviet Union's occupation. from 1940 to 1991; that
we maintained and financed their exiled legations to Washington
during those five decades; and that we promptly returned the gold
reserves that we safeguarded for their eventual independence.
History has taught the people of the Baltics to fear that their
periods of sovereignty will be short-lived; many are convinced
that a resurgent Russia will sooner or later threaten them once
again. Your meeting in Riga with the three Baltic heads of state
will send a clear message that we do not recognize a Russian
"sphere of influence" in the region and will demonstrate that we
are not willing to countenance Russia's presence in every part of
the former Soviet Union. For these reasons, the Riga stop will
also resonate at home with the nearly one million Baltic-
Americans who have been so vocal and active with us and the
Congress in support of Baltic independence.
Highlight the U.S. Role in Russian Troop Withdrawals. The
central issue of your discussions in Riga and a major topic of
your outdoor speech will be our involvement in promoting the
final withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics this summer.
Russian forces are out of Lithuania and will be close to gone
from Latvia by the time you arrive. Russia and Estonia are
nearing the end of their negotiations; we expect to be able to
take advantage of your visit and your meeting with Yeltsin four
days later, to promote final agreement there, as well.
Specifically, we are encouraging Estonian President Meri to give
you a letter in Riga with his near-bottom-line positions on the
withdrawal talks for transferral to Yeltsin four days later in
Naples. Coupled with the pullout from Germany in late August,
agreement on the Estonian withdrawal means that the Russian
military will, for the first time since 1945, be back inside the
pre-WWII borders of the former Soviet Union.
The United States has been the most influential country in
convincing the Russians to leave the Baltics. Although the
previous administration began the battle, you can rightly claim
the lion's share of the credit. Your personal diplomacy with
Yeltsin, our funding of 5,000 houses for departing Russian
officers and our financial assistance to dismantle the Skrunda
ABM site have all been crucial tactical contributions to the
success of the withdrawal talks.
While you can credibly defend the right of the Baltic states to
live without Russian troops, you should also leave an important
public message with the Baltic leaders and publics: they need to
live in peace with Russia. This relates to the large ethnic
Russian minority that will remain in the Baltics after the troops
are gone. The Balts need to treat this group with decency and
work to include them in the social and political fabric of their
societies. This is consistent with the approach we have
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
maintained since you took office. It is also good politics for
our relationship with Yeltsin and Russia.
The Future of U.S.-Baltic Relations. Much of the emphasis of
your visit will be placed on our actions in the past to promote
Baltic independence. The third major objective of your visit
should be to talk about the future. There is concern that once
the Russian troops are removed, America will forget about the
Baltics. You can counter that argument by spelling out the
remarkably broad program of cooperation that we envision in the
economic and security spheres. We have welcomed all three states
into PFP and will work to make theirs a meaningful membership
through a $10 million FY-95 program to help train the nascent
Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. On the economic side, you will
announce the $50 million capitalization of the Baltic-American
Enterprise Fund, sign a trade pact with the Latvians and look
forward to further expansion of trade and investment through a
Baltic business development mission this fall.
The economic success story of the Baltics will help reinforce the
point that Western assistance alone cannot assure prosperity;
privatization, growth and trade are the surest guarantees of
longterm political stability and normal, neighborly relations
with Russia. Our support for this continuing economic
integration with the West will in many ways be our most durable
and valuable legacy to the people and governments of the Baltic
states.
KEY EVENTS
Baltic Presidents Lunch. This is the centerpiece of the visit,
the original concept event for the trip. You will meet over
lunch for an hour and a half with Presidents Meri, Brazauskas and
Ulmanis in a structure as informal as we can make it in order to
allow for a more relaxed and natural discussion. We expect a
heavy focus on the Russian-Estonian withdrawal talks, there
should also be a good exchange on economic and security issues of
concern to the three Presidents.
Open Air Speech. Against the backdrop of Freedom Monument in
downtown Riga, you will address a crowd in the surrounding square
that could number well over ten thousand. The central theme of
your brief remarks will be America's celebration of the Baltic
rebirth of freedom and our determination to stand by the region
as it completes its reintegration into the Western fold.
Latvian Bilateral Events. You will have a brief meeting with
Latvian Prime Minister Birkavs, followed by a ceremony to sign
the bilateral trade agreement. Later, President Ulmanis will
host a reception where you will have the chance to meet Latvia's
political, cultural and business leadership. The reception will
be held in Riga's newly re-opened Stock Exchange.
CONFIDENTIAL
Clinton Presidential Records
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This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
ARRIVAL CEREMONY
ARRIVAL CEREMONY
CONTEXT OF THE EVENT
You are the first serving American President to set foot on
Baltic soil, making your arrival historic. Your visit to Riga to
meet with the three Baltic Presidents symbolizes our support and
respect for the sovereignty and independence of these nations.
Mindful of the quadrilateral nature of this event, the Latvians
have dispensed with the full retinue of bilateral honors and have
planned a colorful but short ceremony at which you will be
formally introduced to the three Baltic delegations.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Convey a sense of the historical significance of your visit.
Highlight your presence in the Baltics as a demonstration of
support for the nationhood of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.
CORE POINTS
This is truly an historic moment. The arrival of an
American President in the Baltics is a symbolic affirmation
of the long road you have travelled to achieve true
sovereignty and independence.
I look forward to our discussions today as a chance to
bolster your reintegration with Europe and North America.
BACKGROUND
Upon arrival, you and the First Lady will be greeted by the
Presidents of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania and then introduced
to their delegations. You will introduce the U.S. delegation to
the Latvian President.
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
Divider Title:
BILAT/SIGNING W/PM BIRKAVS
CONFIDENTIAL
BILATERAL MEETING AND SIGNING CEREMONY
WITH LATVIAN PRIME MINISTER BIRKAVS
CONTEXT OF THE MEETING
This half-hour meeting and signing ceremony is a mark of
appreciation for the Latvian government's agreement to act as
host for your multilateral visit. Your interlocutor is Prime
Minister Birkavs, whose role as head of government has been
eclipsed in recent months by the need to conduct business at the
Presidential level between you, Yeltsin and President Ulmanis,
whose role in Latvian politics is largely ceremonial. Birkavs is
also serving as Acting Foreign Minister following the resignation
of the former FM over allegations he cooperated with the KGB
before Latvia's independence.
The Latvian government is honored by your decision to visit Riga,
and deeply appreciates your personal efforts to help Latvia and
Russia sign the troop withdrawal agreement on April 30. The
Russians have indicated that their pullout is likely to be
completed before the August 31 deadline. In fulfillment of our
commitment to help the Latvians dismantle the Skrunda radar site,
a U.S. team recently visited Riga to begin coordinating the joint
effort. We have now doubled our contribution to the Skrunda
dismantlement fund, from $2 million to $4 million. The meeting
will also afford an opportunity to reiterate our concerns about
Latvia's draft citizenship law, which contains an unacceptably
small quota for non-Latvians.
At the conclusion of your meeting, you and Prime Minister Birkavs
will sign the Bilateral Trade Agreement, underscoring our support
for Latvia's future integration into the Western economic fold.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
o
Reassure Latvia about continuing U.S. interest in smooth
implementation of the troop withdrawal agreement, citing
Skrunda dismantlement and housing vouchers.
Stress our strong interest in strengthening bilateral
relations through increased emphasis on trade and investment
and broadening security ties.
Encourage passage of a generous and inclusive citizenship
law.
Introduction and thanks
I want to reiterate my thanks to you and President Ulmanis
for inviting me to Riga and acting as host for the meeting
with Presidents Meri and Brazauskas.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2016-0314-M-1 (1.22)
6/12/2023 vz
CONFIDENTIAL
2
The statesmanship Latvia has displayed in concluding the
troop withdrawal agreement with Moscow has earned the
respect of all of us. We look forward to working with you
and with Moscow to ensure full, timely implementation.
Skrunda dismantlement
When I met President Ulmanis in Washington in May, I told
him we would provide at least $2 million to fulfill our
promise to help you take down the large structure at
Skrunda.
An American team recently visited Skrunda and met your
experts. We are well on the way to coordinating our
efforts. But it appears dismantlement will cost more than
we first thought.
We have identified another $2 million in funding for the
project; brings our total commitment to $4 million. We will
continue to encourage other states to contribute, as well.
Housing vouchers
We have tried to provide a real incentive for Russian
compliance with the withdrawal deadline through our $160
million program to resettle demobilized officers.
You have helped us by working with the Russians to identify
specific officers who qualify for the program. We have
increased the number of vouchers available from 1,000 to
2,500, split equally between Latvia and Estonia.
Bilateral issues
The troop withdrawal sends a positive signal to traders and
investors. I am announcing today the board members of the
Baltic American Enterprise Fund to be chaired by Ambassador
Rozanne Ridgway, President of the Atlantic Council, which
will have $50 million in investment capital to support
private business development in the Baltics.
Looking forward to the Central Europe trade and investment
conference in Washington this fall. Afterwards, we will
send out a trade development mission to the Baltics,
including participation by major U.S. firms.
Your active participation in Partnership for Peace will help
strengthen your security ties to the West. We have also
asked our Congress to provide $10 million in FY95 funds to
support regional peacekeeping forces, including the Baltic
Peacekeeping battalion.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
O
(IF ASKED ABOUT JOINTLY DEVELOPING RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE SITE
AT VENTSPILS AS A SCIENCE/TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER) :
- -
Intriguing proposal. Would be happy to explore details
to see if we could make this work.
(IF ASKED ABOUT WILLINGNESS TO PURCHASE U.S. EMBASSY
BUILDING IN RIGA, ENABLING LATVIA TO BUY NEW BUILDING IN
D.C. ) :
- -
I am told that our present tight budget still will not
allow us to purchase the building here. If the funds
become available, we will raise this with you again.
Naturalization law
Pleased that President Ulmanis remanded this law to
parliament. We share view of CSCE and others that the
citizenship quota is far too restrictive.
Encourage you to find ways to include your large Russian
minority in political and social life of your country.
Know this is difficult issue here but we are convinced
you will be better off in the long-term if Russians are
treated fairly.
CONFIDENTIAL
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COLLECTION:
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First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
3.5c
Valdis BIRKAVS
LATVIA
(Phonetic: BEERkavs)
Prime Minister (since July 1993);
Declassified
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
in Part
(since 7 June 1994)
Per E.O. 13526
Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister
2016-0314-M-1
(1.23) 6/12/2023
VZ
Valdis Birkavs has had to rely on his
considerable legal expertise and political savvy to
keep his minority coalition government on a
proreform path,
EO 13526 1.4c
He assumed the Foreign Ministry portfolio when
his predecessor, Georgs Andrejevs, resigned-after
admitting to having worked for the KGB in the
early 1960s.
EO 13526 1.4c
Birkavs will hold the post until a new minister is
named, which they say may not be until the fall of
1994. He has been termed a crisp, clearheaded,
tough-talking politician by the Baltic press.
1.4(c)
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c
1.4(c)
3.5c
The Prime Minister has steered the government
toward areas that he considers key to transforming
Latvia into a market economy and to drawing the
country into Western organizations-economic
reform continues to move forward, an agreement
witnesses for the court system. In 1988 he
has been reached on Russian troop withdrawal, and
established the Latvian Lawyers' Association, the
Latvia has joined the Partnership for Peace
first independent bar organization in what was then
program. However, Birkavs still faces the ethnically
the Soviet Union, and he was elected its first
touchy issue of establishing a citizenship law, the
president. He became involved in the independence
resolution of which is needed for the country's
movement in 1990 when he was elected to the
incorporation into organizations such as the Council
Saeima (parliament) as a proindependence Popular
of Europe.
Front candidate. He served as one of the
3.5c
parliament's experts on legislation matters and,
Birkavs was born on 27 July 1942 in Riga. After
according to press reports, he frequently was sought
attending the Riga Polytechnic Institute, he
out by other members of parliament for advice on
performed his mandatory service in the Soviet
procedure and phraseology; he became a deputy
army. Birkavs subsequently earned a law degree
speaker in 1992.
3.5c
(with honors) from Latvian State University's law
school in 1969. He also holds a Ph.D. in
The press describes Birkavs-who speaks
criminology. Birkavs began his career at the
English, Russian, and Latvian-as a refined
Latvian Justice Ministry's Forensic and
intellectual. He admitted in an interview that
Criminology Laboratory, which provides expert
because of his knowledge and experience, he never
3.5c
(continued)
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
has suffered from an inferiority complex. Birkavs
basketball match, Birkavs led members of his
enjoys vacationing at his summer house by the
Cabinet to victory over a team drawn from the
Baltic Sea; he says that proximity to the sea
Lithuanian Cabinet; he quickly fouled out of the
provides him creative and physical freedom to think
game. Birkavs and his wife, Aina, have a son.
and write. He also enjoys sports-skiing, tennis,
3.5c
and sailing (in which he once competed at the
international professional level). In a January 1994
14 June 1994
2
3.5c
Clinton Presidential Records
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Divider Title: WORKING LUNCH W/BALTIC PRESIDENTS
CONFIDENTIAL
WORKING LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENTS
OF ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA
CONTEXT OF MEETING
This meeting is the centerpiece of your visit to the Baltics: an
opportunity to convey to the Baltic heads of state, as a group,
the assurances of America's commitment to the future of their
independent nations and to the prosperity and development the
Baltic region as a whole. All three Baltic Presidents deeply
appreciate your personal involvement in promoting the withdrawal
of Russian troops from the Baltics, and you will be able to
provide them evidence of our commitment to ensure smooth
implementation of the withdrawal agreements. The Estonian-
Russian talks are at a sensitive endgame phase, and your
discussions with President Meri may yield enough progress on the
outstanding issues to allow the outlines of a final deal to take
shape when you meet President Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday.
Beyond the troop withdrawal issue, though, this luncheon should
focus on the future. History and geopolitical realities inspire
deep pessimism among the Baltic people and their leaders. There
is great fear of resurgent Russian nationalism and a lingering
suspicion that America will put the Baltics on the back burner
once the Russian troops are gone. There is also uncertainty,
especially in Latvia and Lithuania, that a successful transition
to a market economy is in sight. The single overriding message
for you to leave with your Baltic counterparts is our
determination to help them reintegrate into the Western security
and economic fold and our rejection of the idea of a Russian
"sphere of influence" in the Baltics. The surest guarantee of
long-term Baltic sovereignty and prosperity lies in close
integration with Europe and North America and, simultaneously,
normal relations with a reforming, stable Russia. In this
respect, the Baltic leaders will value your assurances that our
relations with Russia remain healthy, resilient and realistic.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Hail progress in achieving full Russian troop withdrawal and
our commitment to the implementation phase of the process.
Express readiness to help conclude the Russia-Estonia talks,
specifically by carrying a message from President Meri to
your meeting with Yeltsin in Naples.
Stress need for an enlightened policy of including the
Russian ethnic minority in political and social life.
Make clear our steadfast support for Baltic security and
economic integration with the West.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
2016-0314-m-1 (1.24)
6/12/7023 vr
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Stress the strength of our ties with Moscow, but reject any
suggestion of a Russian sphere of influence in the Baltics.
CORE POINTS
Russian Troop Withdrawals
Congratulations to all three on progress in withdrawal of
Russian forces. These agreements will help you establish
normal relations with your big neighbor and create a better
climate for reforms and trade and investment.
August 31 is a firm deadline as far as we are concerned.
We've told Russia that withdrawals cannot drag on past then.
I believe Yeltsin is committed to deadline - - doesn't want
this as a long-term problem in our relations.
We are committed to make these agreements work. Have made
ready 2,500 housing vouchers so that departing officers can
buy apartments in Russia. The Russians are responding. The
first vouchers are already being handed over to qualified
officers.
Our contribution to Skrunda dismantlement now totals $4
million. We are providing over $1 million to the
international fund to help clean up Paldiski. We will also
work closely within CSCE to monitor implementation.
Estonian-Russian talks seem close to final agreement.
President Meri, we want to be helpful. I will see Yeltsin
in Naples on Sunday; what will it take to close the deal?
Can I be helpful?
I believe you need to close the deal with President
Yeltsin personally and not allow this to go back to
mid-level negotiators.
Separate points for Meri pull-aside:
Believe the Russians will accept that their officers have
the same rights to privatize their flats as Estonians; no
more no less. Will support you fully on this.
Regarding cutoff date for residence permit applications,
urge you to be flexible. Our housing vouchers can "buy off"
some of the disputed group.
On Paldiski reactors, key is the status of the facility.
Russians will likely agree to civilian status for the
interim period -- personnel would not wear uniforms. We
will support you in pushing for shortest period - - 6-12
months.
Key is a signed agreement with date of August 31.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Russia and Russian Ethnic Minority
We've survived some rough spots in our relations with
Russia. Yeltsin and I are committed to keeping things on
track. We have learned to manage disagreements through
frequent diplomatic consultation. Yeltsin and I call or
write frequently to give direction and keep things moving.
We've been impressed by Chernomyrdin and his pragmatism on
economic decisions. Vice President Gore has close personal
relationship with him. Overall, reform process is still
moving forward.
I mention this because a large part of your security depends
on a stable, reforming Russia. Helping Russia make that
hard transition is still my top foreign policy priority.
We reject any suggestion that the Baltics lie in any sort of
Russian "sphere of influence." We are watching Russian
actions closely in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but the
Baltic states are in a completely different category. You
are pointed westward and we want you to remain that way.
The Russian minority in your countries is a fact of life you
must deal with. I know it's difficult. I urge you to find
ways to include them in the social and political life of
your countries, consistent with CSCE and other multilateral
suggestions. Make it a priority to keep this problem
manageable. Let us know how we can help.
Bilateral and Multilateral Security Relations
Expanding our security relations with your countries is a
priority for us. It emphasizes our support for your
sovereignty. The first sessions of the bilateral working
groups on defense matters were a good start to build upon.
We strongly support your integration into the Euroatlantic
community multilaterally. You are already playing a
constructive role in the CSCE and NACC.
Now, we welcome you into the Partnership for Peace. Your
membership will play a pivotal role in your integration.
I strongly support the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
initiative and have asked Congress to give us $10 million in
our FY95 budget to support this and other regional
peacekeeping groups. The battalion is an excellent example
of regional cooperation and a model for other Central and
East European states.
Economic Cooperation and Support
Your progress toward building market democracies is
remarkable. I realize that the battle is far from won and
urge you to stay the course.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
Our economic assistance for the Baltic region will fall a
bit in the coming year, in line with cuts to all other
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
We have placed a renewed emphasis on trade and investment.
I have just approved the board of the Baltic American
Enterprise fund. It will be headed by Rozanne Ridgway, our
former Ambassador to Finland and East Germany and Assistant
Secretary of State for Europe. She is now President of the
Atlantic Council.
I know you have been waiting a while for the Fund to start
up. I have put it on a fast track to start making the first
grants from its $50 million before September.
The White House is also sponsoring a Conference on Trade and
Investment in Central and Eastern Europe this fall.
Afterwards, we will send to your countries a major Baltic
Business Development Mission, bringing many top U.S. firms
with it.
CONFIDENTIAL
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COLLECTION:
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First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
RESTRICTION CODES
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
3.5c
Lennart MERI
ESTONIA
(Phonetic: MAYree)
Declassified
President (since 1992)
in Part
Per E.O. 13526
Addressed as: Mr. President
2016-0314-M-1
(1.25) 6/12/2023
Estonia's first president since 1940, Lennart Meri
is publicly
VZ
EO 13526 1.4c
committed to integrating his country with the West
and eradicating the vestiges of 50 years of Soviet
occupation. He is adamant in urging the withdrawal
of Russian military forces from Estonian territory by
31 August 1994 and does not pass up an opportunity
to assail their continued presence in talks with
Western officials and in the press.
EO 13526 1.4c
©
EO 13526 1.4c
Meri did avoid major conflict with Russia in July
1993 when he rejected at the eleventh hour an anti-
Russian Aliens Law that would have put tight
restrictions on granting citizenship to non-Estonians.
EO 13526 1.4c
he remains
EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c
sensitive to Moscow's charges of discrimination
against ethnic Russians living in Estonia.
3.5c
Soviets. After returning to his homeland after World
War II, Meri graduated from Tartu University in
1953 with a degree in history. He was a well-known
reformist intellectual before entering politics in the
EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c
late 1980s, having spent much of the preceding three
decades as a radio editor, documentary filmmaker,
and author of books on Finnic-Ugric ethnic groups
in the Soviet Union. By 1989, Meri had emerged as
a prominent member of the independence-minded
Popular Front. After serving as Foreign Minister, he
was Ambassador to Finland for several months.
3.5c
Background and Personal Notes
Meri is an ethnic Estonian. He was born on
EO 13526 1.4c
29 March 1929 in Tallinn, the son of a post-World
War I Estonian diplomat who had served in Paris
and Berlin. In 1941, his family was deported to
Siberia after the republic was occupied by the
3.5c
(continued)
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
. He is capable of carrying
on several conversations in multiple languages
simultaneously-in addition to his native Estonian,
he speaks English, French, German, Finnish,
Italian, Danish, and Swedish. Meri is an electronics
junkie and has many phones. His wife, Helle, is
about 30 years his junior and is an actress and an
opera singer. The couple has a young daughter,
Tulle, who was born around 1985. Meri also has
two sons from a previous marriage.
3.5c
17 June 1994
2
3.5c
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OA/Box Number: 6054
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
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financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
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2011-1037-F
kc1151
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
3.5c
Algirdas Mikolas BRAZAUSKAS
LITHUANIA
(Phonetic: brahZOWskas)
Declassified
in Part
President (since February 1993)
Per E.O. 13526
Addressed as: Mr. President
2016-0314-M-1
(1.27) 6/12/2023
Algirdas Brazauskas is
EO 13526 1.4c
VZ
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c
1.4(c)
his country's most popular
politician in a poll published in March 1994.
3.5c
Brazauskas supports cultivating good relations
with Western countries, especially the United
States.
EO 13526 1.4c
EO 13526 1.4c
Party Politics
EO 13526 1.4c
He
Brazauskas was born on 22 September 1932.
has energetically expanded economic and security
He holds a candidate's degree in both construction
ties with the West, and he was the first Baltic leader
engineering and economics (roughly equivalent to
to apply for NATO membership. He wants to
a Ph.D. in this country). After a Soviet apparatchik
attract Western investment, but he has warned that
career in successive positions of increasing
Lithuania also needs to improve relations with its
responsibility in the construction and supply sector
eastern neighbors, according to press reports.
and in the Communist Party apparatus of Lithuania,
Brazauskas, who has publicly noted Lithuania's
Brazauskas was named first secretary of Lithuania's
dependence on Russia as its main energy supplier,
Communist Party in 1988. In late 1989 he drew the
has made liberalizing trade with Russia a top
priority. 3.5c
3.5c
(continued)
3.5c
3.5c
3.5c
proindependence Lithuanian Communist Party out
United States
EO 13526 1.4c
from under the umbrella of the Soviet Communist
Party. The Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
EO 13526 1.4c
was formed from the remnants of that party in 1990,
and he headed it until April 1993. After Lithuania
gained independence in 1991, Brazauskas
1.4(c)
Married to a retired doctor, he has twin
unsuccessfully ran for chairman of the parliament.
daughters and several grandchildren.
3.5c
3.5c
Personal Notes
17 June 1994
Brazauskas does not speak English but reads
it well. He speaks Russian and Polish, as well as
Lithuanian. He has traveled widely, including to the
2
3.5c
Clinton Presidential Records
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Divider Title:
PRESS AVAILABILITY
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
BALTIC ECONOMIC SITUATION
Q:
How do you rate the economic situation in the Baltic
States?
A.
-
Baltic region a model for how states can make the
transition to a market economy. All three
countries have strong currencies and relatively
low inflation.
-
Estonia is predicted to have the highest growth
rate in all of Europe this year -- 6%.
-
Latvia and Lithuania are not far behind; both are
privatizing well and have followed IMF
recommendations.
-
Overall, trade and investment prospects here are
excellent. We are committed to help it improve
even more.
-
I don't want to minimize the hardships that this
economic transition imposes. I know that many
families are suffering. But we are confident that
these hardships will lessen as each country
continues its turnaround.
POST-COMMUNIST RETURN
Q:
How do you view the return of former communists to
power in a number of Central and Eastern European
countries, such as Lithuania and Poland?
A.
-
I'm more interested in a government's policies and
results than in the political labels that apply to
it.
-
We are committed to work with any democratically
elected government that supports political and
economic reform, human rights, respect for
neighbors and good relations with the United
States.
-
Our relations with Lithuania and Poland are
excellent.
2
SKRUNDA
Q:
Did the United States make a deal with Russia over the
disposition of the Skrunda radar facility?
A.
-
No, we understood the Russian need to maintain
their early warning capacity at Skrunda
temporarily, until it could be replaced. It will
close after a specified period of time. My talks
with Presidents Ulmanis and Yeltsin helped find a
time frame that both sides could accept for
keeping the radar open and under civilian control.
-
There are no secret agreements. Everything is
public.
-
At Latvia's request, we have committed $4 million
dollars to help with the dismantlement of the
large, unfinished structure at Skrunda.
U.S. BALTIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
Q:
What type of defense or security relationship
does the United States have with the Baltic States?
A
-
We have active bilateral and multilateral security
relationships with all three countries.
-
We recently had consultations on regional
security, defense cooperation and bilateral
assistance with each of the Baltic states.
-
We also have a program of high-level visits, ship
visits and exchanges of defense officials.
-
We have also proposed to Congress a $10 million
program in FY95 to support regional peacekeeping
units in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of this
money would support the Baltic Peacekeeping
Battalion being established jointly by these three
states.
-
We also hope to expand our security cooperation
through NATO's Partnership for Peace, in which all
of the Baltic States participate.
-
Baltic countries are important to the West.
Delighted they will take part in PFP.
3
NATO ISSUES
Q:
Why has the U.S allowed Russia to veto the Baltic
states and other countries in CEE from joining NATO?
A.
-
Russia has not vetoed membership in NATO for any
nation. No state outside NATO has a veto on
membership. At the January Summit of NATO we said
we expect that NATO will eventually expand
eastward.
-
As we consider expansion, we will be looking at
the overall European security situation and the
ability of prospective members to meet the
responsibilities that NATO membership entails.
Active participation in PFP is an important
factor. The enthusiasm the Baltic states have
shown over their membership PFP is a very good
trend.
ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN TALKS
Q:
What is the status of the Estonian-Russian troop
withdrawal negotiations? Will the U.S. mediate these
talks as you did between the Russians and Latvians?
A.
-
President Meri and I had a good discussion of the
state of play. I have no doubt that the Estonians
are committed to reach agreement to permit troops
to leave by August 31. I believe the Russian side
shares that commitment. There are just a few
outstanding issues.
-
The U.S. did not mediate the Russian-Latvian
talks, and we have no intention of playing that
role here.
-
I do expect to discuss the negotiations when I see
President Yeltsin in Naples on Sunday.
-
I expect that Russia will meet the August 31
deadline it has set for withdrawal of its forces
from Latvia and Estonia.
4
ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA
Q:
What is the United States position on the status of
ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia? What about the
Latvian citizenship law?
A.
-
From the very start, we have encouraged the
governments of all the Baltic countries to adopt
an inclusive approach to dealing with their
minority populations.
-
There have been numerous international groups
monitoring the minority situation in the Baltics.
We agree with their findings that there are no
abuses of human rights among the minority
population.
-
At the same time, I have urged all three
Presidents to find ways to include ethnic
minorities in the social and political life of the
country.
-
On the Latvian citizenship law, we agree with
CSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. The
current draft has some improvements over earlier
versions, but it still sets an unfairly low quota
for non-Latvians to become citizens.
-
I think President Ulmanis was right to send it
back to Parliament, and I hope they will make the
necessary corrections to it.
KALININGRAD
Q:
What is the U.S. position on the status of Kaliningrad?
A.
-
Kaliningrad is part of Russia.
-
We are aware of the high concentration of Russian
forces in the region and understand the desire of
others in the region to see that concentration
reduced, or to demilitarize Kaliningrad
completely.
-
We hope that as Russia begins to resolve its
housing shortage for military personnel,
Kaliningrad's force concentration can be reduced.
5
AID PHASEOUT IN ESTONIA
Q:
Why did the United States decide to cut off economic
assistance to Estonia?
A.
-
We have agreed with the Estonians to move from aid
to trade.
-
Estonia is reaching that stage in its economic
development where trade and investment has a
greater effect than economic assistance. When
that happens, we begin to phase out some of the
assistance.
-
The Estonian government fully understands and
supports this policy. It is the best vote of
confidence we can give them.
STABILITY PACT
Q:
What does the U.S. think of the Baltic Table of the
European Stability Pact?
A.
-
We are consulting closely with the European Union
on its proposal to establish a Baltic Table. We
intend to work with the EU to ensure that this
initiative contributes to the success of efforts
already underway in the CSCE and elsewhere.
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SPEECH AT FREEDOM PLAZA
CEREMONY AND SPEECH AT FREEDOM MONUMENT
CONTEXT OF THE EVENT
Your open air speech in central Riga will underscore in dramatic
fashion the central themes of your visit: strong public support
for Baltic sovereignty; America's role in promoting the
withdrawal of Russian troops; our commitment to the security and
economic integration of the Baltics with the West. A large crowd
-- perhaps as many as ten thousand people -- is expected to
gather in the square before the monument. Latvian workers have
been given the afternoon off to attend the event, and you
encouraged Estonians and Lithuanians to join you in Riga in your
videotaped message to the Baltic peoples.
Upon arrival at Freedom Monument, you will be greeted by
President Ulmanis and will lay flowers at the base of the
monument. You will then proceed to the adjacent stage, where
President Ulmanis will make introductory remarks. The three
Baltic Presidents will be seated on the stage during your speech,
which will be interpreted consecutively into Latvian. We will
provide the text of your speech separately.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Impress upon your audience the steadfastness of America's
support for the Baltics.
Underscore our commitment to the full implementation of the
troop withdrawal agreements.
Describe your vision of a prosperous, stable Baltic region
at peace with its neighbors and integrated with the West.
BACKGROUND
Freedom Square is Riga's most historically significant location.
In Czarist times, a statue of Peter the Great stood on the spot,
and the site was called "Peter's Square." The statue was removed
after World War I, and the current Freedom Monument was erected
in 1935 as a symbol of Latvia's new-found statehood and liberty.
When the "Latvian Awakening" began in 1987, the Freedom Monument
became a rallying point for opponents of the Communist regime.
Since independence, the square and monument have often been the
site of public gatherings in support of reform. All visiting
foreign dignitaries lay flowers at the Monument.
The 146-foot high stone obelisk is topped by a bronze statue of
Liberty holding three stars, symbolizing the unity of Latvia's
three regions. The four stone sculptures at the base depict
national and cultural themes. The inscription on the Monument
reads "For Fatherland and Freedom."
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MTG WITH LATVIAN LEADERS
MEETING AT THE STOCK EXCHANGE
CONTEXT OF THE EVENT
This is your opportunity to meet a broad spectrum of Latvian
opinion- and decision-makers. You will be meeting with Latvian
and American business, political and cultural figures at the Riga
Stock Exchange immediately prior to delivering your speech at
Freedom Square. Among the Latvians you will meet are the
Minister of Government Reform and the President of the Bank of
Latvia. The guest list also includes the Board of Directors of
the American Chamber of Commerce and the General Manager of
Kellogg's cereal, the largest U.S. investor in Latvia. The
meeting will be closed to the Press.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
O
Highlight the role of American trade and business in
Latvia's recovery.
O
Underscore our support for Latvia's future development with
a broad group of leaders.
CORE POINTS
(text of remarks to be provided)
BACKGROUND
Latvia has been very successful in stabilizing its economy. It
has the lowest inflation rate of any NIS or Baltic country. Its
private sector has grown rapidly: there is now one private
company registered for every fifty Latvians. The town of Riga
has emerged as a regional banking, business and transportation
hub.
The U.S. has made a significant contribution to Latvia's
recovery. The U.S. is one of the largest foreign investors in
Latvia ($75-100 million in planned investment). Bilateral trade
was $113 million in 1993 and is expanding rapidly. Riga is home
to a growing and dynamic business community which is represented
by an active chamber of commerce.
The venue of the meeting, the old Riga Stock Exchange Building,
is scheduled to become the home of a functioning stock exchange
and stock registry in the first quarter of 1996.
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MTG WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF
MEETING WITH STAFFS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN THE BALTICS
CONTEXT OF THE EVENT
This is your opportunity to thank the official American
communities in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for their hard work
toward supporting our policy goals in the region and for their
efforts to make your visit a success. The staffs of our
embassies in Tallinn and Vilnius have travelled by bus to join
their colleagues in Riga for this event. You will meet the group
following your Freedom Square speech, immediately before
departing for the airport.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Recognize the hard work and dedication of the Americans (and
their families) who represent the U.S. in the Baltics and
the Foreign Service National employees who support them.
Impress upon the group your personal commitment to
strengthen U.S. relations with the Baltic nations and their
important role in making that commitment a reality.
CORE POINTS (text of remarks to be provided)
BACKGROUND
The United States re-established full diplomatic ties with
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in September, 1991, following the
aborted effort to oust Soviet President Gorbachev. We have had
Ambassadors in the three countries since mid-1992. The Embassy
staffs are small, but growing as our relationships broaden.
Counting all agencies represented, each post currently has about
15 full-time resident professional members and 30-45 locally-
hired support personnel, either Foreign Service national
employees or officer's spouses.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
BACKGROUND PAPERS
Skrunda Radar Site: Dismantlement Assistance
Russian Troop Withdrawals
The Russian Minority in the Baltic States
Paldiski Naval Base
Baltic-American Enterprise Fund
Latvia: Political-Economic Overview
Estonia: Political-Economic Overview
Lithuania: Political-Economic Overview
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SKRUNDA RADAR SITE: DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE
The radar facility at Skrunda, Latvia comprises three large
ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radars. Two older radars
were constructed during the 1960's to track northern Europe and
especially the Northeast Atlantic. They were fully operational
by 1971, predating the 1972 ABM Treaty. Each radar consists of
two antenna buildings with a control building between them.
These are the radars that the Russians will run for four more
years under the troop withdrawal agreement with Latvia. It
provides Russia time to replace this coverage with facilities
either in Moscow or Belarus.
Construction of the third site, a large phased-array radar
(LPAR), began in 1986 in order to replace the older Hen House
radars. These buildings were near external completion
when construction was halted in early 1992. Although inoperable,
the 18-storied skyscraper stands as a symbolically ominous
reminder to Latvians of Soviet/Russian presence. For this reason
the Latvians want the LPAR destroyed quickly. Our $4 million
dismantlement assistance package is designed to help them do so.
On April 30, 1994, the Latvians and Russians signed a troop
withdrawal agreement that included Russia's consent to turn over
the LPAR immediately to Latvian control. Under the terms of
agreement, the CSCE is to establish a mission to help monitor
implementation of the Skrunda provisions (4 years of continued
operation by the Russians plus another 18 months for
dismantlement). We are encouraging the Latvians and the Russians
in Vienna to give the CSCE an idea of the composition and mandate
for the CSCE mission.
The Latvians have now taken over the LPAR, although Russians
guard the site. In addition to our $4 million toward
dismantlement, the Swedes have also committed $1 million and the
British have agreed to help resolve Latvia's environmental
concerns over radio waves from the site. We have asked other
Western donors to contribute to this project.
An interagency technical assessment team visited Latvia in
mid-June to assess dismantlement parameters and to determine
project costs. The team will assist in preparation of bid
specifications for contractors to complete demolition as soon as
possible.
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RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS
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The issue of Russian troop withdrawals is a genuine U.S. foreign
policy success story. Our strategy to get those troops out has
been threefold.
The first approach has been to use our good offices with the
Baltic states in reassuring them of continued U.S. support for
their sovereignty and independence long after the troops are
gone. We have done this through high-level visits and telephone
calls, establishing a normal defense and security relationship
bilaterally and through Partnership for Peace and cooperating
with the Baltic states and Russians on dismantling and cleaning
up Russian military facilities that symbolically pose a threat to
Baltic security (the Paldiski nuclear training reactor and
Skrunda radar).
The parallel approach has been to work with the Baltic states to
ensure that they treat their ethnic Russian populaces equitably.
We have done this through establishment of resident CSCE missions
in Estonia and Latvia and multilateral programs to support the
teaching of Estonian and Latvian to the Slavic communities, for
example.
Along with our Russian officer housing program to relocate
retired military officers to Russia, we have repeatedly reminded
the Russian Government at the highest levels of its international
commitment to withdraw its troops speedily and unconditionally no
later than August 31, 1994.
Lithuania
The Defense Ministers of Lithuania and Russia signed an agreement
on September 8, 1992 calling for complete Russian troop
withdrawals by August 31, 1993. Despite a last-minute suspension
of the withdrawals by the Russian government, active intervention
by the U.S. and other Western governments ensured that the
deadline was met. Lithuania continues to express solidarity with
its Baltic neighbors in calling for Russia to withdraw its forces
from Estonia and Latvia by August 31, 1994.
Like most Baltic Sea states, Lithuania remains deeply concerned
about the excessive concentration of Russian troops in neigh-
boring Kaliningrad (any resupply of these troops must go either
by sea or, more practically, by rail through Lithuania) and would
like to see a substantial number of these troops withdrawn.
Latvia
In order to promote a Latvian-Russian troop withdrawal agreement,
at the Moscow Summit in January you suggested a compromise of
four years and 18 months for the continuing operation and
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subsequent dismantlement of the Skrunda radar facility. Yeltsin
accepted the compromise, and the Latvian Government also agreed
to it.
That compromise formed the basis for the resolution of remaining
issues, and Presidents Ulmanis and Yeltsin signed a troop
withdrawal agreement on April 30. Less than 7,000 Russian
soldiers now remain in Latvia, and Russia has stated that it will
withdraw most of the rest by as early as July 31. The Russian
navy already departed on June 1.
Estonia
Negotiators admit that more than 90% of the issues connected with
a troop withdrawal agreement were resolved long ago. No progress
was made until recently when, at your initiative, Russia agreed
to raise its level of representation in the talks. FM Kozyrev
and Estonian President Meri held a productive private meeting in
Tallinn on May 25, and Russian DFM Churkin traveled to Tallinn
the next week to negotiate directly with FM Luik. Despite some
progress, the negotiations have again stalled over three main
issues:
Application for residence permits by retired officers. The
Estonians insist that applicants must have retired before
August 21, 1991 (their "independence day") to be considered. The
Russians want a broader formulation: anyone can apply, and the
Estonians can deny whomever they want based on their laws. We
are recommending that the Estonians throw in the towel here and
accept the Russian formula; we have told them that we will front-
load our housing vouchers in favor of the post-August 21 group
they are concerned about.
Housing for retired officers. Moscow has revived an earlier
position that retired officers should have an automatic right to
privatize and thus take cost-free ownership of the apartments
they live in. Even Estonians do not have this right; they must
buy the right to privatize. Here, the Russians need to give.
Paldiski. This is the naval nuclear reactor training facility
that the Russians are abandoning. They want the right to remove
the fissile core and unspecified "secret" parts, which means they
would need to remain at the facility for some time after the
August 31 withdrawal date. The Estonians want all troops out by
that date. The obvious, Skrunda-like solution is for the two
sides to agree on an interim period (6-12 months is reasonable)
for "civilianized" (i.e., non-uniformed) Russian personnel to
carry out the defueling and related work.
Now that the United States, Sweden and other nations will be
active in a multilateral effort on environmental cleanup of the
two land-based nuclear submarine training reactors at Paldiski,
this issue also should be easily resolved. The Energy Department
has committed its support for this effort with a package of
evaluation and training measures worth approximately $2 million.
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THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN THE BALTIC STATES
Aside from our usual human rights concerns, a major part of our
strategy to promote the withdrawal of Russian troops from the
Baltic States has been to press for fair and equitable treatment
of the Russian minority. Russia routinely accuses Estonia and
Latvia of massive violations of the human rights of their large
Russian-speaking population, and often some Russian officials
have tried to link these issues with the troop withdrawal issue.
We have supported the visits to Estonia and Latvia of numerous
international human rights experts from non-government and
inter-governmental organizations. We have agreed with their
conclusions that there is no pattern of human rights violations
there. Estonia accepted a CSCE mission in December 1992, and
Latvia accepted a CSCE mission in November 1993. We are very
pleased with the results of these missions in resolving a number
of problems, such as the Aliens Law controversy in Estonia and
the provocative behavior of the former Latvian Citizenship and
Naturalization Department Director. The CSCE mission in Latvia
is headed by an American Foreign Service Officer.
Lithuania
Ethnic Russians comprise only seven percent of Lithuania's
population, and most of them automatically became citizens under
Lithuania's liberal citizenship law of December, 1991. Unlike
its Baltic neighbors, Lithuania did not experience a dramatic
proportional rise in the number of postwar non-ethnic
Lithuanians. This happened because border adjustments
reintroduced a large number of ethnic Lithuanians. In addition,
Stalin's Russification policy was not implemented as harshly in
agricultural Lithuania as elsewhere.
Estonia
Estonia generally has taken a very pragmatic course in addressing
the issue of its large ethnic Russian noncitizen community.
Roughly 38 percent of its inhabitants are noncitizens; about
33 percent are ethnic Russian, most of whom live in the urban,
industrialized Northeast. Estonia allowed its noncitizens to
vote in municipal elections and granted citizenship to
practically all noncitizens who wanted to run to office. For the
elderly and handicapped, Estonia has dropped its language
requirement for citizenship, and its citizenship law requires
only a three-year residency, two years of which are retroactive.
Estonia agreed to most of the revisions proposed by the CSCE to
its Law on Aliens from last summer, which substantially eased a
potential crisis in Russian-Estonian relations.
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Latvia
Latvia has taken a much more hesitant and legalistic approach to
dealing with its large noncitizen community. Part of this may be
related to the dynamics of the troop withdrawal process and part
from doubts about the loyalty of these ethnics, even though they
have not shown an inclination toward organizing politically. As
in Estonia, a majority of ethnic Russians supported independence.
However, a large number did not and are overwhelmingly
anti-Yeltsin in sentiment. Few speak Latvian. While ethnic
Russians comprise about the same percentage of the population as
in Estonia, ethnic Slavs are 48 percent of Latvia's inhabitants
and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy. The law on
naturalization, with its strict quota system is contentious and
unacceptable to us and most other European countries. We
encouraged Latvia to review this aspect of the draft law, and it
has been remanded to the Parliament for more work.
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PALDISKI NAVAL BASE
The Soviet Navy used Paldiski as a warm-water port since the late
1940s. Construction of the land-based nuclear submarine training
facility that houses two reactors began in the 1960s. By 1989,
however, the navy declared the reactors unsafe and obsolete and
ordered them shut down. The military base reverted to Estonian
control in August 1993, but the nuclear training facility remains
under Russian control.
Russia made a commitment to decommission and dismantle the
reactors at Paldiski and is expected to begin removing the
reactors this summer in accordance with a plan that was discussed
with an international group of nuclear experts.
During a recent visit, the Estonian Prime Minister mentioned the
importance of U.S. support for a multilateral effort to help
clean up the Paldiski site. The Energy Department has committed
its support for this effort with a package of evaluation and
training measures worth approximately $2 million. The Swedish
government has already committed $1.25 million to this cleanup
project, and it appears likely that other interested governments
in the region will also join the effort once the United States
officially participates.
By helping the Estonians and Russians eliminate radioactive
risks, U.S. involvement in a Paldiski cleanup program will also
ensure smooth implementation of Russia's pledge to clean the area
of other hazardous materials. A multilateral program with
substantial U.S. participation will help prevent future
Estonian-Russian disputes over this matter and thereby enhance
regional security and stability.
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BALTIC-AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND
During your visit to Riga, you will announce the establishment of
the Baltic-American Enterprise Fund (BAEF). The Fund will be
capitalized with $50 million in foreign assistance appropriations
over a 3-4 year period. The purpose of the Fund is to promote
private-sector development in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The
Fund's Board will be chaired by Rozanne Ridgway, former Assistant
Secretary of State for Europe and Ambassador to East Germany and
Finland.
The Fund will have the authority to make equity investments and
loans and, as appropriate, offer technical assistance to promote
new private initiatives, entrepreneurs and privatization, with
special emphasis on the promotion of small and medium-sized
enterprises. In particular, the Fund may support joint ventures
involving U.S. and other foreign investors with Baltic country
partners.
The Fund will be similar to the existing enterprise funds in
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and
Bulgaria. Our experience in these countries has shown that
enterprise funds can play an important role in providing
financing for the private sector, as well as leading the way for
other investors. As with all the enterprise funds, the Baltic
Fund will be managed by a private sector board of directors
selected with the concurrence of the White House.
The Fund will be expected to maintain a meaningful presence both
in terms of representation and its investment portfolio in all
three Baltic States. The Fund will be encouraged to use its U.S.
capitalization to attract other resources for private sector
development in the Baltic States.
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The Latvian Ambassador calls Latvia "a nation of lawyers" in
mentality. Culturally, Latvians most reflect their Lutheran
German heritage and emulate Swedes. The Latvian language is
neither Slavic nor Germanic, but a Baltic tongue related to
Lithuanian. Under Hanseatic and German influence since the 13th
centry, Latvia always has used its geographic location as an
important commercial trading center.
After 200 years of continuous Russian rule, a bloody civil war
erupted in 1918 when part of the independence movement sided with
the Bolsheviks. By 1920, the Germans and Bolsheviks were
defeated. Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis, uncle of the current
President, headed the independence struggle and the first
independent government. Before the Depression Latvia's
minorities enjoyed cultural autonomy, the economy reformed and
recovered. As in the other Baltic States, the mid-1930's brought
authoritarian rule to Latvia.
Soviet and Nazi invasions during World War II reduced Latvia's
population by one-third by 1945. During that decade, about
60,000 were deported to Siberia, and thousands fled to the West.
The Soviets radically colonized and urbanized Latvia by bringing
in thousands of Slavic industrial workers.
In March 1990, democratic elections gave the Popular Front
independence movement a majority in the Supreme Council. In
January 1991, shortly after a parallel attempt in Lithuania,
Soviet political and military forces tried to overthrow the
Latvian government. Eight people were killed. Latvia regained
its independence in the wake of the aborted Soviet coup in August
1991.
Latvia's economic situation is steadily improving. The country
enjoys a positive trade balance, relatively restrained inflation,
and a very stable currency. Latvia still imports 90 percent of
its energy from the NIS. De facto agricultural privatization
also has occurred. Ethnic Slavs comprise 48 percent of the
populace and control an estimated 80 percent of the economy.
Latvia signed a troop withdrawal agreement with Russia on
April 30, paving the way for the departure of Russia's remaining
7,000 or so troops by August 31, 1994. The Russian navy already
has departed, and the troops may be gone by as early as July 31.
About 800 Russian technicians will remain to operate the Skrunda
radar facility for another four years under CSCE supervision.
With the withdrawal agreement, Latvia now needs to focus on
privatization as well as citizenship and naturalization
legislation. The Latvian citizenship law emerged from Parliament
with unacceptably low quotas for citizenship by non-Latvians
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(i.e., Russians), in direct contradiction to suggestions from
CSCE and the Council of Europe for greater inclusivity.
President Ulmanis has remanded the law back to Parliament for a
rewrite. The United States has defended Latvia's human rights
record against Russian accusations. We remain engaged in the
issue and have supported the presence of a resident CSCE mission
to promote harmonious relations between ethnic Russians and
Latvians.
Relations with the United States and the West
A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, Latvia seeks GATT
membership and associate membership status in the EU. Latvia
actively pursues Western security relationships and
enthusiastically supports Partnership for Peace (PFP).
The U.S. established diplomatic relations with Latvia on July 28,
1922, and reestablished ties on September 2, 1991. Latvian
representation in the U.S. continued uninterrupted for over 70
years. The U.S. never recognized the forcible incorporation of
Latvia into the USSR. About 85,000 Americans of Latvian descent
play an active role in bilateral relations.
Latvia enjoys MFN status and GSP privileges. We will sign a
Bilateral Trade and Intellectual Property Protection Agreement
during your visit. In 1993, Latvia exported to the U.S. $22.6
million and imported $89.5 million, the latter being chiefly
agricultural commodities under concessional programs. American
firms registered $35 million out of a total $110 million in
foreign investment. The U.S. is the largest Western investor in
Latvia and, by far, Kellogg's is the biggest single U.S.
investor.
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ESTONIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
A Nordic people closely akin to the Swedes culturally and the
Finns linguistically, Estonians did not enjoy national
independence until the interwar period. That Republic enjoyed
relative economic prosperity but suffered political instability.
Then, as now, personalities rather than real issues determined
politics.
The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact brought an end to Estonian
independence by 1940. The next decade brought 10,000 Soviet
deportations and 5,500 deaths in Nazi camps. Ten percent of the
population fled to the West. Soviet rule brought large numbers
of urban Slavic immigrants to industrialize Estonia's northeast.
Nevertheless, Estonia remained a window on the West and enjoyed a
relatively extensive range of contacts with Finland through
August 20, 1991, when it regained independence in the wake of the
attempted coup in the Soviet Union. The transition to
independence was entirely bloodless.
Estonia has generally done a good job in managing the ethnic
Russian issue, both in domestic terms as well as in its bilateral
relations with Russia. The United States has defended Estonia's
human rights record against exaggerated accusations. We will
continue to remain engaged in the issue and have supported the
presence of a resident CSCE mission to promote harmonious
relations between ethnic Russians and Estonians.
Estonia is a regional role model for reform. It has a balanced
budget, free trade, annual inflation under 30% and a stable
currency. Privatization is occurring at a relatively fast clip,
except in the heavily Russian-ethnic Northeast. Barely 25% of
its trade is with the NIS. Over 90% of small and medium-sized
firms are in private hands, while two-thirds of large firms have
been privatized. Only agricultural privatization lags.
Relations with the United States and the West
A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an association
partner of the WEU, Estonia seeks GATT membership. Estonia
actively pursues Western security relationships and eagerly
signed on to Partnership for Peace (PFP).
Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over $33 million to
Estonia's economic transformation and to address humanitarian
needs; annual assistance under the SEED program is now over $6
million.
Estonia's phased graduation from AID's assistance programs, to be
completed by 1996, recognizes Estonia's position at the vanguard
of Eastern European reform. In 1993, Estonian trade with the
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United States amounted to $20 million in exports and $54 million
in imports, the latter being mainly agricultural commodities
under concessional programs. U.S. investment, consisting of
about 145 firms, makes up $20 million of $185 million in foreign
investment in Estonia.
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LITHUANIA: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Lithuania is a staunchly Catholic nation. with a strong sense of
national identity dating back to its glory days as a medieval
empire, when it stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Subsequently tied in a union with Poland for centuries, Lithuania
was an independent nation again from 1918 to 1940, when it was
annexed by the USSR.
Under the leadership of intellectuals, the Lithuanian reform
movement Sajudis was formed in mid-1988, declaring a program of
democratic and national rights. After 50 years of occupation, in
1990 the Lithuanian Supreme Council declared Lithuania
independent from the Soviet Union. The USSR responded with the
imposition of a harsh economic blockade, and in January 1991
unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the elected government, killing
13 civilians and injuring hundreds. Lithuania finally regained
its full independence in August 1991.
Politico-economic gridlock and economic mismanagement returned
the former Communists to power in elections in the autumn of
1992, but they have not fared much better than their
predecessors. Politics traditionally has been marred by a
disorganized but effectively disruptive opposition.
The new currency is very stable, and inflation has been brought
under control (about a 30 percent annual rate). However,
economic reform has stalled. Because it won on the premise of
improving social conditions, the Government has shied away from
making tough fiscal/privatization decisions. Although it finally
passed comprehensive privatization legislation this spring, the
opposition has now succeeded in forcing a public referendum on
the Government's plan.
Relations with the United States and the West
A member of the UN, CSCE, NACC and COE, and an associate partner
of the WEU, Lithuania also seeks GATT membership. Lithuania
actively pursues Western security relationships, has formally
applied to join NATO, and already has submitted its presentation
document for Partnership for Peace (PFP).
Through 1993, the U.S. has committed over $66 million to
Lithuania's economic and political transformation and to address
humanitarian needs; annual assistance under the SEED program
totals over $9 million. In 1993 Lithuania exported $16.1 million
in goods to the U.S. and imported $56.8 million, primarily
agricultural commodities under concessional programs. U.S.-
Lithuanian firms registered 235 of 3,674 foreign joint ventures,
and of $115 million in total foreign investment, the U.S. holds a
$35 million share. Philip Morris is a major investor.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1994
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Your Trip to Poland, July 6-7, 1994
Your visit to Poland includes meetings with President Walesa and
Prime Minister Pawlak, a state dinner hosted by Walesa, a major
speech at the Polish parliament, an informal meeting/reception
with assembled CEE Foreign Ministers and ceremonial events
connected with the Polish and Jewish communities. Your public
remarks will be provided separately. This briefing book
contains:
SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
SCOPE MEMORANDUM
ARRIVAL CEREMONIES
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT WALESA
PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH PRESIDENT WALESA
STATE DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT WALESA
WREATH LAYING AT TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
CEREMONY AT WARSAW GHETTO MEMORIAL
COURTESY MEETING WITH SPEAKERS OF BOTH HOUSES
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAWLAK
SPEECH AT THE POLISH PARLIAMENT
CEREMONY AT WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL
RECEPTION WITH CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS
AMERICAN COMMUNITY EVENT
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POLAND
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SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS
ARRIVAL CEREMONIES
BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT WALESA
PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH PRESIDENT WALESA
STATE DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT WALESA
WREATH LAYING CEREMONY AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
WREATH LAYING CEREMONY AT THE WARSAW GHETTO MEMORIAL
MEETING WITH POLISH PARLIAMENT SPEAKERS
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND
SPEECH TO THE POLISH PARLIAMENT
MEMORIAL CEREMONY AT THE WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL
RECEPTION WITH CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS
GREET U.S. EMBASSY STAFF AND FAMILIES
DEPARTURE CEREMONIES
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1994
INFORMATION
DECLASSIFIED
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SUBJECT:
Your Trip to Poland
OVERVIEW
You visit Poland July 6-7, just after Riga and before the G-7
Summit and German/EU stops. The Warsaw stop is bilateral;
Secretary Christopher will hold a concurrent Ministerial with his
Central and East European counterparts. Your events include
meetings with President Walesa and Prime Minister Pawlak, a
speech at Parliament, a meeting with the CEE foreign ministers
and ceremonial events. With you will be U.S. business
executives, American Jewish and Polish-American Community leaders
and Lane Kirkland.
Poland pioneered the communist world's democratic transformation
in 1989 and has made major, even inspiring, strides. But success
is not assured and remaining problems are daunting. The economy
is growing rapidly but unevenly. Large-scale unemployment and
other social stresses from wrenching change weakened support for
reform. The outcome was the victory, in September 1993
elections, of parties with roots in the old regime. Reforms have
been maintained but are at risk. The widespread and corrosive
sense of economic insecurity is compounded by Poles' sense of
exposure to the unstable NIS and, in their view, a deteriorating
Russia. Many Poles fear the West will never accept CEE, but keep
it at arms length as a vulnerable buffer zone.
Poland represents a key test of our objective of enlarging the
world's community of market democracies. If Poland "makes it" - -
carries its democratic and market transformation to
irreversibility - - then our goals for the post-communist world
will be vindicated in a major post-communist country. The
outcome in Poland is up to the Poles, not us. Poland is close to
success. What we say and do can make a difference while Poland
and the post-communist world stand at a critical balance.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
O
Confirm to the Poles and all CEE's that we welcome their
membership in the family of democratic nations.
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Support continued market economic reforms by emphasizing
Poland's tremendous strides since 1989 and offering new
initiatives.
Support Polish efforts to ameliorate human problems created
by the collapse of the Soviet-style economic system.
Reassure an apprehensive Polish society that America remains
committed to it and its future in Europe; that Russia does
not have a veto over Poland's integration with the West;
that you are prepared to advance NATO's stated objective of
expansion to Eastern democracies.
POLAND'S PROGRESS; POLAND'S PROBLEMS
The Economic Dimension. Poland invented "shock therapy" market
reforms and proved these bring results. What Poles call "Poland
A" - - fast-track, modernizing, entrepreneurial - - has made major
gains. After an initial sharp decline (18% of GDP), the economy
grew at 4% in 1993 and may do even better this year, one of
Europe's best rates. GDP is over 50% private. While core heavy
industries are still state owned, manufacturing is about 40%
private and that share is rising; construction and services are
overwhelmingly private. Warsaw and other big cities are
transformed, with growing middle classes and pockets of
affluence.
But millions are left behind. "Poland B" - - insecure, depressed,
disoriented represents the majority of the country.
Unemployment has levelled off at 16% but is uneven: single digit
in Warsaw and 25% or higher in some areas. Workers in some heavy
industries and the public sector -- used to socialist-era
entitlements - - have seen living standards drop and insecurity
rise. New opportunities are abundant in some big cities but
sparse in the provinces. Housing shortages limit workers'
ability to move to jobs in dynamic areas. Crime is growing and
it feeds a sense of insecurity. Around 20% of the country may be
considered middle class or better; about 20% impoverished; the
remainder is just getting by.
Poland's economic hardships result from the collapse of the
Soviet trading system, recession in Western Europe, inherent
deficiencies of communist economies and Poland's transformation
to a market system. But many Poles blame the reforms for all
their difficulties. Poland's lesson is that a flourishing
private sector is necessary for successful reform, but not
sufficient. Democratic government has a role in providing
necessary services, regulation and helping people whom the new
economy has not yet reached. Without this, reform's political
base may erode faster than the new economy can strengthen it.
The Political Dimension. The Solidarity forces which took power
in 1989 knew their political base might erode before they turned
the economy around. The economic upturn they counted on arrived,
but too late and too unevenly. September 1993 elections brought
to power a coalition of the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance
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(SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which used to be a
communist front in the farm areas. PSL's leader Waldemar Pawlak
took over as Prime Minister; SLD reformers took the difficult
economic portfolios. Walesa, exercising his constitutional
power, named the foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers.
Strains among these power centers are growing.
Leaving behind their anti-reform campaign rhetoric, SLD leaders
have continued the economic reforms of previous Solidarity-based
governments. Most top SLD leaders appear to be genuine converts
to democracy and market reforms. But PSL tends toward social
conservatism and statism. Their electorates SLD's industrial
and some white collar workers and pensioners and PSL's peasants
are ambivalent about reform, tempted by protectionism and
inflationary subsidies. The prospect of integration into the
West, emotional attachment to the U.S. and a deep desire to be
part of a "normal" country has persuaded Pawlak and his PSL to
acquiesce in reform. But unless more is done to address social
strains feeding disillusionment, reform could be badly damaged.
The Security Dimension. The Poles, Walesa especially, push
security as the core of the relationship. Like most CEE's, Poles
feel exposed to what they see as a chaotic NIS and a neo-
imperialist Russia. They do not feel immediately threatened but
fear the West will, perhaps tacitly, allow Russia to reassume
hegemony in CEE. The Polish government -- including Walesa in a
recent letter to you -- has focussed on a request for $25 million
in bilateral military support and on NATO's expansion as symbolic
of our intentions. Their concerns are often put in stark terms;
they are quick to suspect the worst about a U.S. or NATO "special
relationship" with Russia. Politically, lack of confidence in
the West works against reformers committed to the Western option.
Warsaw's concerns are exaggerated but reflect Polish history.
The Poles know the importance of a positive outcome in Russia.
But they seek assurances that we will not, for the sake of our
Russian equities, sacrifice them; that the road is open to
Poland's (and CEE's) integration into the West; that NATO's
expansion to new democracies is, as you said in Prague, a matter
of when and how. The Poles seek an expanded NATO to include CEE,
a strengthened NATO-Russian relationship, and more robust
European institutional ties (e.g., via CSCE). After initial
grousing, the Poles accepted PFP and are playing an active role;
the first PFP exercise on former Warsaw Pact territory, scheduled
for September, will take place in Poland, including U.S. forces.
The Poles want a robust exercise.
OUR AGENDA
The Entrepreneurial Side. We should emphasize to Pawlak in
particular that Poland's achievements in quelling inflation and
achieving stability can still be undone; that an erosion of
support for restructuring and privatization can leave the economy
at an untenable half-way point on the verge of success. You can
note past, ongoing and future U.S. efforts. Aside from bilateral
assistance, we have taken the lead in coordination between the
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U.S., EU, IFI's and key Western governments in providing economic
support and assistance. You will be able to announce:
A $65 million Poland Partners Fund -- result of your
Prague initiative to increase OPIC (Overseas Private
Investment Corporation) engagement in CEE. Half the
Fund comes from U.S. labor unions.
An initiative to provide at least $75 million equity
for newly-privatized firms, working with the Enterprise
Fund and EBRD.
The Social and Human Side. Your Administration recognizes the
importance of attention to the human impact of economic
dislocation. You announced this shift of approach in Prague and
we have since sought to put it in programmatic terms. We should
not suggest the U.S. or any outsider can resolve these problems,
or that we should no longer stress continued macroeconomic
stabilization and privatization. But we have worked with the
Poles, and IFI's and the EU, to develop programs for the benefit
of those who have suffered greatly as a result of economic
decline. As examples of our efforts, you can announce:
-
A micro-lending program to help set up businesses,
targeted at high unemployment areas.
-
A sustained effort to increase Polish housing
construction -- perhaps the most depressed sector in
the economy -- both by accelerating existing programs
and setting up pilot demonstration projects.
-
Joint efforts with the Poles to modernize their
pension, welfare and health policy systems.
A regional law enforcement initiative to fight white
collar and organized crime.
Security and Poland's Integration. While deflecting exaggerated
Polish concerns, you should confirm our interest in Polish
security, our rejection of a Russian veto over CEE's integration
into the West or a "special relationship" with NATO at CEE's
expense and our intention to proceed on the course you charted in
January. We then said NATO would expand and PFP was the best
road to that expansion. We also said we would reorient bilateral
military programs with CEE to support PFP. You can take next
steps by announcing:
Our intention that NATO expand on country-by-country
basis, not just in the event of failure of democratic
reform in Russia.
The political bases for eventual NATO membership,
including democracy, market economies and responsible
security policies.
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Offer to seek $100 million including $25 million for
Poland, starting in FY '96, for military cooperation
with new Partners to support PFP initiatives.
U.S. willingness to support a meaningful PFP exercise
in Poland this September, the first to be held on
former Warsaw Pact territory.
Bilateral Issues
We may be able during the visit to exchange Instruments
of Ratification for our Bilateral Economic Treaty
(BET). You would simply note the event.
As Pawlak mentioned in Prague, the Poles want to
conclude our bilateral agreement on Poland's GATT
reaccession. Final issues include poultry quotas and
aircraft and semi-conductor tariffs.
We are concerned about an on-again, off-again Polish
tank sale to Iran.
We have asked the Poles to set aside the sentence of
former Polish Colonel Kuklinski, who, motivated by
ideology, worked nine years for the CIA before being
exfiltrated in 1981. This is sensitive in Poland.
The Poles have pressed hard for Vice President Gore to
attend their 50th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising.
EVENTS
Meetings with Walesa and PM Pawlak. The Walesa meeting will
take place the first evening, followed by a press availability
and State Dinner. You should discuss security, urge continued
reforms and convey our awareness of social dislocation. With
Pawlak the next day, you can stress market reforms and discuss
our initiatives in greater detail.
Wreath Layings. You have three: the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier; a monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, accompanied by
American Jewish Community leaders and; a monument to the Warsaw
Uprising, whose 50th Anniversary falls August 1, accompanied by a
Polish-American group. The Uprising is deeply-felt by all Poles.
Speech. You will address the Polish Parliament and guests the
second day, also meeting briefly beforehand with the Marshals
(speakers) of Parliament's two Houses.
CEE Foreign Ministers. After the speech you and Walesa will meet
with the CEE Foreign Ministers, who will have held a Ministerial
with Secretary Christopher.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ARRIVAL CEREMONIES
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ARRIVAL CEREMONIES AT
WARSAW OKECIE AIRPORT, PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
CONTEXT OF EVENT
The Poles organize a set-piece arrival ceremony for every
Official Visit. Your ceremony will be different because airport
ceremony will be very brief and the major protocolary event will
take place at the newly-renovated Presidential Palace (the
Radziwill Palace). There will be no arrival statements.
BACKGROUND
Airport. You will be met by Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski
(o-la-HOFF-ski) and other Polish government officials. Among
them will be Jan Piekarski, (pye-KAR-ski), the new Deputy Chief
of Protocol but until recently head of the U.S. Interests Section
in Baghdad. Piekarski earned high praise (and a Superior Honor
Award) from the State Department and deep thanks from Senator
Boren for his work, including efforts on behalf of an arrested
American citizen. Also among them will be newly-named Ambassador
to the U.S. Jerzy Kozminski (kozh-MEEN-ski), whose credentials
you accepted in June.
For the U.S., Ambassador Nicholas Rey and Mrs. Rey will be
present, and others from the Embassy. Rey is a direct descendent
of Mikolaj Rej, the greatest literary figure of the Polish
Renaissance.
You will walk through an honor guard cordon to your limousine and
depart for the Marriott Hotel.
Presidential Palace. This is a set piece, rather elaborate
ceremony taking place both outside and inside the Palace.
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MEETING WITH PRESIDENT WALESA
CONF IDENTIAL
MEETING WITH
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Walesa (va-WHEN-sa) considers himself the guarantor of Polish
reforms; President since 1990, he has used his limited
constitutional powers to push and prod Poland's market
transformation and integration into the West. As you recall,
Walesa's style combines deliberate (and frustrating)
unpredictability, metaphors either colorful or opaque and natural
forcefulness. Sometimes insightful and inspired, Walesa can be
abrupt or rambling. Despite occasional populist rhetoric, Walesa
has supported reform at virtually every difficult moment - - and
there have been many - - even at considerable political cost to
himself.
Walesa has held center stage in Poland since 1980, but in recent
years his popularity has dropped sharply (only 25% support him,
according to a recent poll). This stems partly from Walesa's
difficulty in finding a Presidential as opposed to Tribune's
voice, partly from his solo leadership style and partly from
disillusionment with the reform program. Walesa will run for
reelection in late 1995; he has not decided whether to run as an
"anti-communist" outsider against the current government or as a
Presidential figure above politics. He may look to his standing
in the West to help him at home.
Despite an appreciation of the West's support before and after
1989, Walesa is uncertain of the West's commitment to CEE. He
has more faith in the U.S. than in Western Europe, but worries we
are tempted by isolationism or a "naive" pro-Russian tilt.
Walesa has stated that the West's response to the democratic
breakthrough in 1989 was inadequate and stressed to visitors that
the overwhelming majority of Poles has suffered deprivation in
the wake of the Communist collapse. He believes that the West
should be of greater help to Poland.
Security will be central to Walesa's agenda - - he regards as
inevitable Russia's return to neo-imperialism. He will press for
movement on NATO expansion and assurance that Poland will not be
left in an insecure "grey zone" outside the West. He has again
staked out a position on NATO expansion and requested bilateral
security assistance ($25 million to support PFP activities),
though less aggressively than before the Prague Summit. The
Poles will host PFP's first exercise on former Warsaw Pact
territory this September; we will take part. The Poles want a
"muscular" exercise; we want to be supportive without turning it
into a provocative event.
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YOUR OBJECTIVES
Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-
market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping Poland
on that road.
Set out U.S. views on European security, including our
policy of NATO's gradual expansion to Eastern democracies
such as Poland.
Affirm U.S. support for Poland's market transformation.
Convey your awareness of human problems created by the
collapse of the old regime's economic system and our
willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.
CORE POINTS
European Security, NATO, Poland
Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy.
Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a
secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to
Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it
happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
The way ahead is open.
NATO's expansion will take place country by country.
-
New members must be democracies, market economies,
responsible in their security and foreign policies.
PFP is the practical road to NATO membership.
Militaries need time to work together. PFP provides
means. Pleased Poland is active Partner.
Good that Poland will host first PFP exercise in former
Warsaw Pact in September. Want exercise to be as
robust as possible.
Russia cannot veto this process. A catastrophe in
Russia would accelerate expansion, but expansion does
not depend on democracy's failure in Russia.
Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's
expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.
This will take time but direction is clear. Hope while
President to welcome new democracies as new allies.
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Bilateral Military Program
Have considered Poland's request for $25 million to support
your participation in PFP. You make good case that applies
to other new partners, too.
Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 -- is nearly
set: I'm asking Congress for about $25 million for military
cooperation with CEE countries.
Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for
$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to
support PFP initiatives. Request will include $25 million
for Poland.
Support for Free Market Reforms
Admire Poland's achievements since 1989; you're on the right
track, proving free market transformation is possible.
Your role in supporting reforms is essential; I respect it.
Keep fighting inflation; implement Mass Privatization.
Proud of U.S. support since 1989: $200 million of the $1
billion Stabilization Fund, unprecedented official debt
reduction worth $2.4 billion, the Polish-American Enterprise
Fund capitalized at $240 million. I intervened to support
London Club (commercial debt) reduction deal expected to be
worth over $5 billion to Poland.
Will keep helping:
Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S.
executives here.
Will announce $65 million Poland Partners Fund, a
capital investment fund set up by OPIC. Half the Fund
financed by American labor unions, so Lane Kirkland is
part of this too.
Will announce initiative with Enterprise Fund and EBRD
to bring $75 million of capital resources to newly-
privatized firms under Mass Privatization program.
Supporting Poland's accession to OECD.
Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters
of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready
to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres
to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
Should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession talks. Very
few issues remain; can compromise on poultry quotas; hope we
can move semi-conductors and aircraft.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
[If asked] Want to ensure greatest possible market access
for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade
agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.
Coping with Social Dislocation
Know people have been hurt by collapse of the old system.
Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political
problems, even as Polish economy now grows fast.
Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led
by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
Our governments have been consulting closely in recent
weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
-
Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing
program moving, start demonstration projects.
-
To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending
program to help small businesses, especially in high
unemployment areas.
U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your
pension, welfare and health policy systems.
We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside
Poland. Will announce new CEE law enforcement initiative to
help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.
Warsaw Uprising
(If asked). Admire Poland's decision to make this important
commemoration a ceremony of reconciliation with Germans,
Russians invited. U.S. will be represented at high level.
CONFIDENTIAL
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04/28/1994
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
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an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
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Divider Title: PRESS AVAILABILITY W/PRESIDENT WALESA
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Bilateral Relations
Q:
How would you characterize U.S. - Polish relations?
A.
-
Excellent and growing.
-
Polish, American people linked by history: Polish
support for American Independence; U.S. support
for Polish independence; WWII Allies -- Polish
Army at Normandy; solidarity with Polish people
through Cold War.
-
Linked today by shared objective of integrated
Europe with Poland in it. Poland:
o
A Democracy.
o
Building vibrant, growing market economy.
o
"Stability exporter"; good relations with
neighbors.
-
Polish security important to the U.S; reject "grey
zone" of insecurity for Poland, CEE.
-
U.S. - Polish dialogue very strong. Saw President
Walesa, Prime Minister Pawlak in January in
Prague; since then, Polish Foreign, Defense
Ministers; Deputy Prime Minister travelled to
Washington.
-
U.S. - Polish security partnership growing - -
bilaterally and through PFP. Poland will host
first PFP exercise in former Warsaw Pact in
September.
-
Economic partnership important. Poland a success
story; good place for investment. Among highest
growth rates in Europe. U.S. hosting CEE Trade
and Investment Conference this fall.
-
U.S. - Poland working together to help with social
problems caused by collapse of old system.
2
Poland, Russia, NATO
Q:
Can Poland join NATO?
A.
-
In January, NATO made historic decision to expand
to new democracies. Not whether but when and how.
-
NATO's expansion not directed against any country;
when it comes, will enhance Europe's security.
-
NATO requires serious commitments. Our pledge to
defend Poland; Poland's pledge to defend all NATO
members.
-
Not to be expanded lightly, in haste, or in ways
that increase tensions.
-
Need to get ready -- via PFP as best road to NATO
membership - for NATO's obligations.
Q:
Does U.S. have a "Russia First" policy; give Russia veto
over Poland's joining NATO?
A.
-
No. Want democracy, free markets, responsible
security policies to succeed everywhere; new
Europe to extend as far East as possible.
-
Prepared to deal with a lesser outcome, if
necessary; consolidate democracy where it takes
root.
-
No non-NATO country -- neither Russia nor anyone
else -- has a veto over NATO's expansion.
PFP
Q:
How does the Partnership for Peace address Polish security
needs?
A.
-
PFP the best way to NATO membership.
-
PFP means practical military cooperation, not
talk.
-
Poland an exemplary Partner; moving out fast to
prepare PFP work program.
-
Polish officers already at NATO Headquarters, in
permanent offices.
-
Poland will host first PFP exercise in former
Warsaw Pact this September. U.S., Polish, other
Partner forces working together. Strong
beginning.
3
Q:
Will Russia have a privileged position in PFP?
A.
-
No. Russia will be important member of PFP, but
equal with all others. No "special relationship"
at others' expense.
-
NATO's strong, productive relations with Russia in
everyone's interest. Natural that NATO and Russia
will work on nuclear arms issues, other matters of
common concern.
Complexion of Polish Government
Q:
How does U.S. assess the post-Communist Polish Government?
A.
-
Democracy, market reform, responsible security
policies are key. Important what government does.
-
Pleased that Polish government -- freely elected
last September committed to market reforms,
integration with democratic family of nations.
-
Respect Prime Minister Pawlak's contribution;
value President Walesa's role in supporting
reforms consistently since his election in 1990.
Polish Economic Reforms
Q:
How does U.S. assess Poland's economic reforms?
A.
-
Poland has made great strides. Impressive 4
percent growth last year; highest in Europe.
First new democracy country to turn corner.
-
Poland proves transformation can work, and
democratically.
-
Poland's progress a tribute to Polish people:
courage, patriotism, patience, talent.
-
Poland a good place to do business, investment.
-
Battle not yet over: need to keep fighting
inflation, maintain budget discipline, continue
restructuring, privatization.
-
Don't minimize hardship, unemployment caused by
old system's collapse. Reform the cure, not the
cause.
4
U.S. Economic Support
Q:
How can U.S. help Poland's reforms?
A.
-
Proud of U.S. support for Polish reforms.
-
U.S. biggest investor in Poland by far.
O
$1.2 billion by 1993. Coca Cola, Procter and
Gamble, Ameritech, Levi Strauss, Gerber,
Dupont Conoco, Int'l Paper, others investing;
providing jobs for Americans, Poles.
-
Poland largest recipient of U.S. financial support
in region.
U.S. organized $1 billion Stabilization Fund,
$2.4 billion in debt relief, Polish-American
Enterprise Fund with capital base of over
$340 million; support commercial bank debt
reduction (London Club) this year.
-
Want to work with Poland to increase trade and
investment: represents the future.
Look forward to CEE Trade and Investment
Conference this fall.
U.S. OPIC (Overseas Private Investment
Corporation) has established a $65 million
Poland Partners Fund to support investment.
Working to resolve final issues, allow Poland
to reaccede to GATT as market economy.
Most Polish goods enter U.S. market duty
free. Designated Poland as market economy
for purposes of anti-dumping laws; under
Uruguay Round, U.S. committed to
liberalization and then elimination of all
cheese and textile quotas in ten years.
Poland should keep improving conditions for
foreign investors: streamline regulations,
tax laws; develop infrastructure.
-
U.S., Poland working together to manage social
problems from the past. Want:
To stimulate housing construction, reduce
unemployment through job creation, fight
organized and white collar crime.
Working in partnership to help Poland reform
social security systems, make compatible with
market economy.
5
Market Access
Q:
What is U.S. doing to increase market access to Poland, CEE?
A:
-
Future prosperity depends on trade and investment
to allow reformed economies to grow fast. Working
with EU to ensure we all do our part.
-
U.S. has extended MFN and GSP (duty-free entry for
a wide range of products) to all CEE, except
Serbia/Montenegro.
-
Have reduced few barriers that remain: e.g., by
negotiating generous textile agreements with most
CEEs. Will eliminate additional barriers to CEE
exports through Uruguay Round.
-
No quotas for Poland except textiles and cheese,
and these will be eliminated under Uruguay.
Warsaw Uprising
Q:
Who will represent U.S. at Warsaw Uprising Commemoration?
A.
-
Warsaw Uprising heroic event -- tribute to Allied
Poland; entire Polish people.
-
Commend President Walesa's determination to making
Commemoration an act of reconciliation.
-
U.S. will be represented at a high level.
"Rifle Affair"/Szwonder Case
Q:
Why did U.S. Customs Service Entrap Six Innocent Poles?
(NOTE: In 1992, U.S. Customs arrested six Poles in Germany
after a sting operation on weapons trafficking charges.
Poles regarded this as set-up; many accused U.S. of behaving
like USSR. New York trial resulted in acquitals.
A.
-
Six Poles were arrested in Germany on charges of
seeking to export weapons to Iraq, through the
U.S. U.S. trial returned not guilty verdicts.
-
Judicial, not legal matter. Should put behind us.
6
Radio Free Europe
Q:
Why are you shutting down RFE's Polish service, moving rump
to Warsaw as commercial station?
A.
-
All are proud of RFE's role as voice of truth and
freedom during long decades of imposed communist
rule in Poland.
-
World has changed; RFE reorganizing, changing.
-
We're looking for best formulas.
Colonel Kuklinski
Q:
Is U.S. asking Poland to set aside sentence against former
CIA spy Colonel Kuklinski? (NOTE: Kuklinski worked in
place for CIA prior to martial law; now in U.S. We recently
asked Poland to set aside sentence. Very sensitive case in
Poland. )
A.
-
Matter is complex; not here to discuss this
matter.
-
(If pressed). Kuklinski's actions took place in
different era, different world.
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Divider Title: DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT WALESA
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
DINNER HOSTED BY
PER E.O. 13526
POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA
7016-0314-11 (1.35)
6/42/2023 n
CONTEXT OF EVENT
This will be a large, formal dinner - - the first at the newly-
refurbished Presidential (Radziwill) Palace. The occasion gives
you the chance to continue with topics not fully covered in the
earlier bilateral. It is Walesa's usual style to be aggressive
at the start of meetings, so by the dinner you may have heard a
lot about Polish NATO membership and the alleged inadequacies of
the West's response to post-1989 Europe. At the dinner itself,
however, Walesa may be comparatively relaxed. It is a good
chance to discuss regional developments, Russia and Poland's
transformation and Walesa's role in it. You and Walesa will
exchange toasts.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Underscore U.S. commitment to Poland's reforms and to
Poland's becoming a full member of an integrated Euro-
Atlantic world.
Reiterate Walesa's important role in keeping Poland's
reforms on track.
Emphasize your recognition of Poland's progress to date,
while stressing the need to continue market reforms and deal
with social dislocations.
Urge that U.S. and Poland work together to handle Euro-
Atlantic expansion carefully, rejecting any suggestion that
the U.S. will give Russia a tacit or explicit veto over the
process.
CORE POINTS (Text of toast to be provided separately)
U.S. Commitment
Poland key to our objective of a secure Europe of market
democracies.
Committed to Poland's full integration: reject "grey zone"
for CEE; no Russian veto; Polish security important.
U.S. is rejecting neo-isolationism. Will stay engaged.
Walesa's role
Respect your historic role as Solidarity's leader, first
President of new Poland. Kept reforms on track.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Value your pledge to be guarantor of reforms.
Pleased you signed Polish budget; boosts international
confidence.
Poland's Progress, Problems
Poland a success; shows radical reforms work.
Impressive growth; new preliminary IMF Stand-by Agreement,
increasing interest by investors show promising future.
"Poland A" -- growing, entrepreneurial, active Poland - is
the future. But "Poland B" -- mired in depression,
unemployment, less private activity -- can drag you down.
U.S. wants to keep supporting entrepreneurial Poland fulfill
potential; at same time, help you cope with social, human
dislocation. U.S. working with IFI's and EU to organize
joint efforts.
European Integration
NATO's decision to expand, PFP, put us on road to expansion
of Western democratic community.
Appreciate Poland's constructive policy toward Eastern
neighbors. Your friendship with Ukraine helps; Kravchuk
cites your arguments in his decision to agree to
denuclearize Ukraine.
We know your history with Russia. Always danger of history
repeating itself. But for first time Russian people have
voice. If democracy takes root, Russia will turn toward
improving lives of its people.
Aware of past; are prepared for adversarial relations if we
must; but must work for better outcome if we can.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Divider Title:
TOMB OF UNKNOWN SOLDIER
CONFIDENTIAL
WREATH LAYING
TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
CONTEXT OF THE EVENT
This is a standard ceremonial event for State visits. The Tomb
of the Unknown Soldier is a four column single-story structure - -
all that remains of the Saxon Palace blown up by the retreating
Germans. The ceremony is a set piece without formal remarks.
You will be asked to sign the Book of Remembrance adding
appropriate comments. Invited guests will include Polish-
Americans accompanying you.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Demonstrate U.S. respect for Polish independence and those
who defended it.
Note Poland's role as WWII Ally, as noted in the Tomb's
inscriptions of battles in Polish history.
CORE POINTS
Poland and the world owe much to the valor of Polish
soldiers.
Poland is taking rightful place as member of Western,
democratic family: once an ally, now a friend, perhaps an
ally again.
BACKGROUND
Inscribed on the tomb are the names of significant battles in
Polish history, including defeat of the Teutonic Knights in 1410.
The taking of Moscow in 1610, the failed Kosciuszko Uprising in
1794, the defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1920, the Warsaw Jewish
Ghetto Uprising in 1943, the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, and WWII
battles in which the Poles fought as Allies. Democratic
governments after 1989 added the names of many battles consigned
to "non-history" under the old regime.
CEREMONY
A military band and honor guard will be to your right; guests to
your left. You will follow soldiers bearing the wreath and
marching at a slow step. The soldiers place the wreath while you
place your hand over your heart as the military bank sounds a
trumpet call. Afterwards, a Polish officer will brief you on the
history of the Tomb and Polish military history. You sign the
book at the end. You will not make any remarks.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
CONFIDENTIAL
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Divider Title: CEREMONY AT WARSAW GHETTO MEMORIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CEREMONY AT
WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING MEMORIAL
CONTEXT OF EVENT
The event marks our respect for the heroes of the Jewish Ghetto
who took up arms in courageous, hopeless defiance. In April
1993, Vice President Gore attended the 50th Anniversary
Commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, organized by Lech
Walesa. You will make brief public remarks in this candle-
lighting ceremony. A small group of leaders from the American
and Polish Jewish communities will be present. The monument is
located in what was a pre-War Jewish neighborhood and then part
of the Ghetto. The Germans razed the entire area; the apartments
now standing are post-war.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
o
Demonstrate our undiminished memory of the Holocaust.
o
While acknowledging the uniquely horrible character of the
Holocaust, note that the dark purveyors of ethnic and racial
hatred are still among us.
BACKGROUND
Pre-WWII Poland was a multi-ethnic society with a significant
Jewish minority (9 percent of the population, 30 percent of pre-
War Warsaw). Jews had been present in Poland since the 14th
century; a large percentage of American Jews trace their ancestry
to lands now or once Polish. The German occupiers built the
Warsaw Ghetto in 1940; Jews found outside without permission were
put to death at once. After the systematic mass killings began
in 1941, hundreds of thousands of Jews were taken from the Ghetto
and transported to death camps from an embarkation point three
blocks north of the Monument.
With only about 60,000 Jews left alive and German intentions
clear, several hundred mostly young Jews took up arms in an
effort to die fighting. The Uprising began on April 19, 1943,
during Passover. They beat back initial German assaults and held
out for 22 days. The Germans burnt the Ghetto down and flushed
out the fighters building by building. Some escaped through the
sewers. A few survive to this day, including one of the leaders,
Marek Edelman, who remained in Poland and became a Solidarity
activist and celebrated Polish hero.
Poland's tiny (under 10,000) Jewish community -- while mostly old
and impoverished - - has been strengthened since 1989 by some
young families who have rediscovered their ethnic heritage.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
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Divider Title: MEETING W/SPEAKERS OF BOTH HOUSES
CONFIDENTIAL
MEETING WITH POLISH PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKERS
SEJM MARSHAL OLEKSY AND SENATE MARSHAL STRUZIK
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Shortly before your speech in the Sejm ("same"), you will proceed
for a brief meeting in the Parliament Building with the Marshals
(speakers) of the Sejm and Senate. Poland's provisional
constitution (a permanent constitution is being drafted) provides
for a parliamentary system of government. The Sejm is by far the
more powerful body and its Marshal an influential figure. The
Senate, in existence only since 1989, is little more than
advisory.
Sejm Marshal Jozef Oleksy (o-LEK-see) is a leader of the largest
Parliamentary party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), one of
the two ruling parties. Both SLD and its governing partner,
Prime Minister Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), have old
regime antecedents but so far have maintained a generally
reformist direction. Widely regarded as reformist, Oleksy
describes himself as a Western social democrat as opposed to
"left populists" in his party. Nevertheless, Oleksy has been
publicly skeptical about reliance on the U.S. to support Polish
integration into the West. In this, he reflects a view, held by
a variety of political figures, that the U.S. is not genuinely
interested in CEE and that Poland has to explore alternatives to
an (allegedly) futile search for Western acceptance.
Struzik (STRU-zhik) is a less dynamic figure, with mixed PSL and
Solidarity background. He is a doctor and has managed a
provincial hospital in the city of Plock. Personally close to
Pawlak, Struzik is the closest thing to a modern, reformed PSL
leader. He speaks of PSL building on its conservative base
rather than old regime past and becoming a Polish version of the
German CDU/CSU.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Stress U.S. commitment to support democratic Poland's full
integration into the West.
Confirm U.S. willingness to work with Poland's
democratically-elected government on the basis of its
programs, not its ideological antecedents.
Urge continuation of Poland's bold, successful market
reforms.
Note U.S. interest in helping Poland deal with human and
social dislocation caused by the failed former system.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
2016-0314-m-1 (1.36)
Declassify on: OADR
6/12/2023 or
CONFIDENTIAL
2
CORE POINTS
U.S. Goals
U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from
Euro-Atlantic base. Poland included.
Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc.
No Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone."
Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions
(NATO) in way that increases everyone's security.
Pleased by Polish participation in PFP. Is road to
increased Polish security, NATO membership. Hope Parliament
will support this program.
Polish Reforms
Basis of U.S. - Polish relations remains democratic, market
reforms in Poland and U.S. support.
Poland's progress since 1989 impressive. Past the worst.
Important to continue market transformation, mass
privatization, continued macroeconomic stability; keep
inflation from returning and destroying gains.
Aware of human and social dislocation caused by
collapse of old system. Want to help; U.S. ready with
specifics.
Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried
Africa, Latin America, South Asia -- always failed.
Sejm, Senate passed sound budget; now IMF has concluded
another preliminary agreement with GOP worth $773 million.
Will parliament maintain reformist direction?
CONFIDENTIAL
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First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
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FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
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FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
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Divider Title: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAWLAK
CONFIDENTIAL
MEETING WITH
POLISH PRIME MINISTER WALDEMAR PAWLAK
CONTEXT OF MEETING
Pawlak (PAHV-lak) is young, a farmer as well as politician and a
product of post-1989 Poland rather than an apparatchik. He owes
much of his rise to Lech Walesa, who once saw him as a protegee.
Pawlak's lack of outward sophistication has led friends and
enemies to underestimate him. Soft-spoken, adept at maneuver and
skilled at hiding his considerable ambition, Pawlak is ambivalent
about to Poland's market reforms. As Premier, he supported a
sound 1994 budget that earned IMF support.
Pawlak's Polish Peasant Party (PSL), however, is an anti-reform
bastion. It seeks to represent the interest of the more than 30%
of the population living on farms. The party is a direct
descendent of a communist satellite party and its internal
structures are less remade than those of its coalition partner,
the reborn former communists. PSL's committed electorate - -
small-holding peasants -- are conservative on social issues,
isolationist on foreign policy and statist and protectionist on
economic issues. PSL's social conservatism has garnered
considerable Catholic Church support. The Party's popularity is
rising, as it avoids association with tough economic reforms.
Pawlak has little responsibility for foreign affairs. He
focusses on economic issues, and there is considerable tension
between PSL and the reformers -- young intellectuals from the ex-
communist party -- who run key economic ministries. Pawlak plays
a balancing game, maintaining macroeconomic stability, keeping
privatization on track though at a lesser pace and pushing PSL
patronage interests hard behind the scenes. While the Polish
economy is growing strongly, a lack of GOP leadership could
weaken reform at a midpoint and allow inflation to return.
You met Pawlak in Prague last January. One notion he suggested,
without elaboration then or since, was an economic "Partnership
for Prosperity." This meeting is a place to focus on economic
and social issues and he may bring up his "PFP"; you should not.
Pawlak wants an invitation to the U.S. in 1995 but we should be
careful: Presidential elections will be held that fall and
Pawlak may run against Walesa. In May, Pawlak sent you an e-mail
greetings on Internet and will appreciate your referring to it.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
o
Strengthen Pawlak's commitment to Poland's market
transformation, stressing the need to fight inflation and
continue structural transformation.
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Convey your awareness of human problems created by the
collapse of the old regime's economic system and our
willingness to help Poland ameliorate them.
Raise bilateral trade issues.
Affirm that Poland's future lies with the democratic, free-
market West and that the U.S. is committed to helping a
democratic Poland on that road.
CORE POINTS
Support for Free Market Reforms
Poland's achievements since 1989 impressed the world; on the
right track but more to do. Inflation could return and wipe
out gains. Important to carry out Mass Privatization.
Continued reforms require leadership to continue. Hope
we can count on you.
Proud of U.S. support: Stabilization Fund, unprecedented
official debt reduction, Enterprise Fund. I supported
successful London Club (commercial debt) reduction.
We'll keep helping:
-
Seek more U.S. investment in Poland. Have brought U.S.
executives here.
-
Will announce $65 million Poland Partners Fund, a
capital investment fund set up by OPIC.
Will announce initiatiave with Enterprise Fund and EBRD
to bring $75 million of capital resources to newly
privatized firms.
-
-
Support Poland's accession to OECD.
Will improve coordination with EU, other Western supporters
of Poland, CEE. Energize EU; make most of resources.
Want to finish up Business and Economic Treaty. We're ready
to exchange Instruments of Ratification when Poland adheres
to Berne Convention on intellectual property.
Agree we should conclude our bilateral GATT reaccession
talks. Very few issues remain; can compromise on poultry
quotas; hope we can move semi-conductors and aircraft.
(If asked) Want to ensure greatest possible market access
for Polish, other CEE products in U.S., EU. Free trade
agreement might complicate Polish membership in EU.
CONFIDENTIAL
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3
Coping with Social Dislocation
People have been hurt by collapse of the old system.
Unemployment and insecurity can generate social, political
problems, even as Polish economy grows fast.
Outsiders cannot solve problem; answer lies in growth, led
by private sector. But cannot ignore human side.
Our governments have been consulting closely in recent
weeks, discussing some ideas; listening to yours.
Want to accelerate housing construction: get existing
program moving, start demonstration projects.
To fight unemployment, want to establish micro-lending
program to help small businesses, especially in high
unemployment areas.
U.S. prepared to send teams to help you modernize your
pension, welfare and health policy systems.
We're both concerned about new mafias, some from outside
Poland. Will announce a new CEE law enforcement initiative
to help Poles, others, fight white collar, organized crime.
European Security, NATO, Poland
Expansion of democracy central goal of U.S. foreign policy.
Want Poland, other CEEs, to take full-fledged place in a
secure Europe. Reject insecure "grey zone" for CEE.
Led by U.S., NATO took firm decision in January to expand to
Europe's new democracies. Should work together to make it
happen in way that increases security, not confrontation.
Should work together to get Russia used to idea of NATO's
expansion; to see it as stabilizing, not threat.
Bilateral Military Program
Have considered Poland's request for $25 million to support
your participation in PFP. Your case applies to other new
partners, too.
Our next budget -- for year beginning October 1 is nearly
set: I'm asking Congress for about $25 million for military
cooperation with CEE countries.
Will try to do more the year after. Will ask Congress for
$100 million for military cooperation with new Partners to
support PFP initiatives. Request will include $25 million
for Poland.
CONFIDENTIAL
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DOCUMENT NO.
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014b. report
report (2 pages)
06/15/1994
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
First Lady's Press Office (Lisa Caputo)
OA/Box Number: 6054
FOLDER TITLE:
President Clinton's Trip to Riga, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland, July 1994 [Binder]
2011-1037-F
kc1151
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Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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of gift.
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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SPEECH AT POLISH PARLIAMENT
CONFIDENTIAL
SPEECH TO THE
POLISH PARLIAMENT
CONTEXT OF EVENT
This is the major speech of the July trip and intended to reach
CEE, all-European and U.S., as well as Polish, audiences. Both
Houses of the Polish Parliament (the Sejm and Senate) will be in
attendance; guests will include Americans accompanying you from
the U.S. A peripheral body under the old regime, since 1989 the
Polish parliament has been a center of the country's political
life. President Bush addressed the Parliament in July 1989; Vice
President Gore did so in April 1993.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Underscore the U.S. objective of building a bigger trans-
Atlantic community, including as many of the new CEE and NIS
democracies as possible.
Affirm your commitment to Polish democracy, security and
market reform.
Make clear our intention that NATO expand to new
democracies, including a democratic Poland.
Strengthen Polish commitment to reform at a difficult mid-
way point, stressing U.S. respect for Polish accomplishments
to date and awareness of social and human dislocation.
Showcase U.S. initiatives to help Poland further its
transformation begun in 1989.
Link the liberation of Europe begun in Normandy with our own
efforts today.
CORE POINTS (Speech text to be provided)
BACKGROUND
You will be speaking to a special session of the Sejm ("SAME").
The main chamber seats 546 people on the main floor with another
200 in the gallery. The building dates from the 1920's; it was
rebuilt after WWII.
September 1993 elections produced, from 36 percent of the popular
vote, a nearly 65 percent majority for two parties with
antecedents in the old regime -- the Alliance of the Democratic
Left and the Polish Peasant Party -- who constitute the
government coalition. Post-Solidarity parties constitute most of
the opposition. You are speaking at the formal invitation of
Sejm Marshal (speaker) Jozef Oleksy, one of the most pro-reform
ex-communist leaders.
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Divider Title: CEREMONY AT WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CEREMONY AT
WARSAW UPRISING MEMORIAL
CONTEXT OF EVENT
The Warsaw Uprising beginning August 1, 1944 was the high point
of Polish resistance to Germany during WWII and an event of
stirring heroism as well as terrible suffering. The Uprising has
enormous significance to Poles everywhere, and your participation
in a commemorative ceremony at one of Warsaw's monuments to the
Uprising will be appreciated. You will be accompanied by a group
of Polish-Americans who came with you to Warsaw. One of several
monuments to the Uprising, the "Little Soldier" Monument
commemorates children who fought in the Uprising. It stands by
the Medieval old city wall.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Pay tribute to the heroes of the Uprising and, more broadly,
to Poland's contribution to the Allied effort in WWII.
Link Polish resistance in WWII to our themes from Normandy
and our objectives of expanding democracy in Europe today.
CORE POINTS (Remarks to be provided separately)
BACKGROUND
In the summer of 1944 the Soviet Army was pushing back the
Germans along a broad front in Poland and appeared ready to take
Warsaw. But the pro-Western London Government-in-exile and its
Home Army in Poland were worried about Soviet political
intentions. The Poles believed they could forestall a communist
takeover only if they themselves liberated their capital before
the Soviets arrived.
As the Soviets approached Warsaw, the Home Army launched its
Uprising on August 1, 1944 and quickly seized control of most of
the city. But they failed to capture the Vistula River bridges
and major roads. At that point, the Soviet advance came to a
halt just outside Warsaw, probably on Stalin's orders. With the
Soviets standing still across the river, the Germans had time to
crush the Uprising. Bitter fighting took place for two months as
the German ring tightened. Stalin complicated U.S. and British
efforts to supply the Home Army by air (though our efforts are
still remembered fondly by Home Army veterans). In October, the
Home Army surrendered. The Germans dynamited what was left of
Warsaw. The Soviets resumed their advance in January, 1945 and
installed a communist regime that lasted until 1989.
The Poles seek high-level U.S. attendance at the 50th Anniversary
Commemorative event to be held this August 1. Mitterrand, Major,
Herzog and possibly Chernomyrdin are planning to attend and the
Poles have pressed for the Vice President to represent us.
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Divider Title: RECEPTION WITH CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS
CONFIDENTIAL
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CEE FOREIGN MINISTERS
CONTEXT OF EVENT
While your visit is bilateral, the Warsaw stop also reinforces
our commitment to democracy, security and market economic reform
in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. This point is
especially important for southern tier states - - Romania and
Bulgaria, Albania - - who believe themselves to have made major
sacrifices in adherence to the Serbian sanctions regime and worry
they have decidedly second-tier status in our thinking.
The Poles easily accepted our request and invited the CEE Foreign
Ministers: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, FYROM,
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to meet with Secretary
Christopher; we later added Croatia and Bosnia. Your meeting
with them takes the form of a reception at the Presidential
(Radziwill) Palace following your speech to the Polish Parliament
and two ceremonial events.
While each foreign minister has separate concerns, all support
continued U.S. engagement in Europe and CEE, seek greater U.S.
investment in their countries and urge that the U.S. not consign
their region to a Russian sphere of influence or security "grey
zone." Secretary Christopher will have met with the CEE Foreign
Ministers for two hours that afternoon; he will brief you on the
results of the meeting. You will meet with each Foreign Minister
briefly and informally in the course of the reception.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Underscore U.S. support for democracy, security and economic
reform throughout CEE.
Emphasize to southern-tier CEE's -- especially Bulgaria and
Romania -- that we do not consign them to inferior status
but that our relations will be a function of their progress
toward democracy and economic reform, and conduct of
responsible foreign policies.
Emphasize to front-line states that we appreciate their
support for Serbian sanctions and hope for a settlement
soon.
Convey particular points to individual Foreign Ministers.
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CORE POINTS
U.S. Objectives in CEE
U.S. seeks expansion of democratic family of nations from
Euro-Atlantic base. All CEE can be part.
Our vision inclusive: no anti-Russian encirclement or bloc;
no Russian veto either; reject CEE in "grey zone.
Must manage expansion of trans-Atlantic, other institutions,
e.g., NATO, in way that increases everyone's security.
Pleased by CEE participation in PFP. Is road to NATO
membership. Hope your governments will continue to support.
CEE Reforms
Basis of U.S. relations with CEE's remains democratic,
market reforms, U.S. support for transformation.
Progress impressive. Some CEE's past the worst, show way
for others.
Important to continue market transformation, mass
privatization, macroeconomic stability.
Aware of human and social dislocation caused by
collapse of old system. Want to help.
Reject "third way" of statist protectionism. Has been tried
Africa, Latin America, south Asia - - always failed.
Reforms not the cause of problems but the cure. Slowing
reforms not answer.
U.S. engaged: greater coordination with EU, major Western
countries, IFI's to help across board; Trade and Investment
Conference in fall, expanded OPIC programs; new efforts to
help with social dislocation. Try in Poland; perhaps
expand.
Specific Country Points
Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Hungary: Urge continued
adherence to Serbian sanctions; understand how difficult,
joint efforts on transport corridors, infrastructure can
ease some burden.
Romania: (FM Teodor Melescanu (meh-lesh-KAH-noo)) : Pleased
by Romania's progress with IMF, World Bank; support for PFP.
Important now to continue reforms.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Bulgaria: (FM Stanislav Daskalov (DAWS-kloff)) : Important
to restart reform momentum. Want to see Bulgaria succeed;
important to avoid false sense of isolation or neglect.
Hungary: (State Secretary Janos Martonyi (MAHR-tohn-yee)
will head delegation; FM designate Kovacs (KO-vach) will be
in delegation) : Look forward to working with new
government. Appreciated President Goncz's assurance that
Hungary's reforms and pro-Western policies would continue.
Albania: (FM Alfred Serregi (seh-RECH-ee) ) : Encourage
progress in treatment of its ethnic Greek minority.
Understand concern about Kosovo; very much on U.S. agenda.
Slovakia: (FM Edward Kukan (KU-kahn)) : Support new
government's reformist direction; intensifying efforts to
help. Hope September elections support continued reforms.
Welcome President Kovac's commitment to reform from June 21
meeting.
Czech Republic: (FM Josef Zieleniec (ZHE-len-ets)
Republic doing well. Each country's integration to West
will be individual; we look to new democracies to cooperate
regionally, too. (If asked: Hope to resolve complex
budgetary issue of possible RFE/RL move to Prague.)
Slovenia: (FM Alojz Peterle (PAY-ter-lay) ) Slovenia
becoming success story. We support your integration into
West and have made that point with GOI. Difficult to lift
arms embargo, but want to find ways to recognize Slovenia's
status as apart from conflict in former Yugoslavia.
Croatia: (FM Mato Granic (GRA-nich) : All parties should
accept Contact Group territorial compromise. Negotiations
only road to peace. Peace your first step to West. Should
renew UNPROFOR.
Bosnia: (FM Irfan Ljubijankic (lyoo-BYAN-kich) : Pleased
Congact Group produced realistic, serious territorial
compromise; is best chance for peace. International will to
enforce strong; serious incentives and disincentives.
Poland: (FM Andrzej Olechowski (o-la-HOFF-ski) ) :
Appreciate Polish hosting meeting. Understand Polish
interest in moving rapidly toward Western integration; are
making progress.
CONFIDENTIAL
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AMERICAN COMMUNITY EVENT
CONFIDENTIAL
MEETING WITH AMERICAN COMMUNITY
CONTEXT OF EVENT
This is your opportunity to make contact directly with the large
and diverse official American community in Warsaw. Ambassador
Nicholas Rey has been at post since the fall.
YOUR OBJECTIVES
Acknowledge the work of Americans and their families
representing the U.S. in Poland and the Polish employees who
support them.
Note the broad scope of work the community is engaged in;
new missions for a new Europe.
CORE POINTS (Text of remarks to be provided)
BACKGROUND
The Warsaw Embassy, a small Iron Curtain reporting post in 1989,
is now hub of a strong American effort to help Poland complete
its transformation The official community numbers 270,
including Peace Corps, long-term advisors and Embassy staff.
There are 154 American family members not employed by the Embassy
and 440 Polish nationals working for the Embassy. The Peace
Corps presence is among the largest in the world. We also have
Consulates General in Krakow and Poznan.
The meeting will take place following the formal Departure
Ceremony at the Presidential Palace at the Ambassador's
Residence. Built in the early-1960's, the Residence is located
in an attractive neighborhood.
The Residence took on special significance during the mid- and
late-1980's, when it served as unofficial haven and meeting place
for Solidarity intellectuals. Jaruzelski once remarked
derisively that "Solidarity was just a bunch of intellectuals who
went to dinner at (then Ambassador) John Davis' house. One year
later, Jaruzelski sat down to lunch with the newly-empowered
Solidarity leadership and President Bush. After 1989, the
Residence (then home to former Ambassador Tom Simons) served as a
place where Poles of all political persuasion could meet and
conduct business.
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DEPARTURE CEREMONIES
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTURE CEREMONIES AT
THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND OKECIE AIRPORT
CONTEXT OF EVENT
The by-the-numbers departure ceremonies, standard for every
Official Visit, are the exact reverse of the Arrival Ceremonies.
No remarks are required.
BACKGROUND
The elaborate departure ceremony will take place at the
Presidential Palace. You will proceed to the airport immediately
after greeting the official American community at the
Ambassador's Residence.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Index
U.S. Investment in Poland
U.S. Economic Assistance to Poland
Poland, NATO and the Partnership for Peace
European Union-Polish Relations
U.S. Economic Assistance to Poland
U.S. - Polish Trade Issues
U.S. - Polish Bilateral Issues
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Prague Initiatives Checklist
CONFIDENTIAL
U.S. INVESTMENT IN POLAND
U.S. investment in Poland has grown rapidly as the Polish economy
recovered from the initial shocks imposed by adjustment and the
breakdown of the CEMA trading area. At the close of 1993, U.S.
investments in Poland totalled approximately $1.2 billion, with
another $1.0 billion committed to future projects. U.S.
investment, in fact, dwarfs that of other nations, accounting for
approximately 44 percent of total foreign investment in Poland.
Italy (11 percent), France (7 percent) and Germany (6 percent)
follow. Major U.S. corporate investors include Coca Cola,
Proctor and Gamble, Ameritech, Levi Strauss, Gerber and Dupont
Conoco. U.S. interest in portfolio investment in Poland has also
grown rapidly.
This U.S. investment interest stems first from Poland's
consistent reform effort and strong macroeconomic performance.
Poland was the first country in Eastern Europe to return to
growth during the 1990s, with a 1.5 percent increase in real GDP
in 1992 and a further 4.0 percent increase in 1993. In 1994,
that growth is expected to further accelerate to between 4.5 and
5.0 percent. Investors cite Poland's large internal market (35
million people), skilled workforce, relatively low manpower
costs, improving intellectual property rights protection and
growing access to markets in the European Union (with whom Poland
has negotiated an association agreement, which will provide for
essentially free trade within a decade). U.S. investors have
benefitted from strong support from the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency and the
U.S. Export-Import Bank.
Investors remain concerned about the poor state of Polish
infrastructure, an inefficient and risk-adverse banking system, a
still poorly developed capital market and the unexpectedly slow
pace of large-scale privatization, which has left many major
industrial plants in the hands of the government. Residual
concerns exist about regional stability, popular support for
reform within Poland, and the longer-term economic policies of
the center-left coalition elected in September, 1993.
To stimulate further trade and investment, the U.S. will sponsor
a Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern
Europe during the fall of 1994. This conference will bring
together investors from the United States with policy-makers from
CEE countries. Its purpose is to focus attention on the
potential for U.S. trade and investment in the region, obstacles
and steps CEE governments can take to promote it.
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U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND
With cumulative U.S. commitments exceeding $4 billion, Poland is
by far the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Central and
Eastern Europe. The total includes $2.4 billion in debt
reduction, a debt-for-environment swap, Eximbank and OPIC
programs and food assistance.
SEED Act Support: We have provided, through the first half of FY
1994, nearly $660 million of Support for East European Democracy
(SEED) funds for Poland -- almost half of the entire SEED total
for the region. SEED priorities for Poland focus on private
sector and enterprise development; financial sector development
and economic restructuring; and strengthening public and private
institutions essential to a market economy and democracy. This
Administration has sharpened our focus. We will cut extraneous
programs and concentrate on a) entrepreneurial development and b)
programs to help cope with social dislocation.
The Polish-American Enterprise Fund (PAEF): The Enterprise Fund
is the largest single activity in the U.S. assistance portfolio
and regarded as one of the most successful. With $240 million of
USG funds and total capital of over $340 million, the Fund offers
loans, equity capital and technical assistance directly to
private firms to promote private sector development. The PAEF's
small loan program has provided over 2,500 loans, worth over $60
million, to private entrepreneurs, resulting in the creation of
nearly 10,000 , new jobs.
Stabilization Fund: In 1989, the U.S. initiated establishment of
a multi-donor reserve of $1 billion to support the convertability
of the Polish zloty. (The U.S. contribution was $200 million.)
By 1993, the stabilization fund had served its purpose. In its
place the Polish Government (GOP) and bilateral donors
established the Polish Bank Privatization Fund. It is intended
to support the GOP's efforts to recapitalize, restructure and
privatize its state-owned commercial banks and state-owned
commercial enterprises in accordance with a program designed with
the World Bank.
Technical Assistance: Through long-term advisers and training,
the U.S. Treasury Department, USAID, and the SEC are providing
technical assistance to modernize Poland's banking and financial
services sector. The U.S. continues its commitment to support
Poland's privatization efforts by working with the Ministry of
Privatization and in strategic sectors.
Housing: USAID is implementing a $25-million Housing Investment
Guarantee Program for Poland which, in cooperation with World
Bank and EBRD activities, promotes market-based mortgage and
construction financing in the housing sector. A new initiative
will help accelerate the program. (See separate paper.)
CONFIDENTIAL
POLAND, NATO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
Integration into Western economic and security structures --
above all, the EU and NATO -- is a key Polish foreign policy
goal. It has enormous political and emotional significant. The
Poles had hoped that Yeltsin's August 1993 declaration in Warsaw
(to the effect that Russia would not object to Poland's joining
NATO, quickly walked back) would open the way for rapid progress
toward this goal. Prior to the NATO summit, Walesa and other
officials were vocal and sometimes strident in calling for NATO
membership to ensure Poland was not left in a "security vacuum"
or the victim of a "new Yalta.'
The Poles have since come around to the view that, since PFP is
what NATO has on offer, they should take an active role in it.
Poland was the third state to join PFP, the first to submit its
Presentation Document and the first to draft with NATO an
Individual Partnership Program (currently being reviewed in
Warsaw prior to NAC approval). Poland has offered to host the
first PFP field exercise in a Partner country later this year,
but is not satisfied with the scope of the exercise being offered
by NATO military officials. There is also U.S. interest in
whether Poland might (as it suggested in the past) permanently
dedicate a former Soviet exercise area as a peacekeeping
training/exercise facility.
The Poles miss no opportunity, however, to reiterate their
interest in early NATO membership and their desire for either a
direct commitment or an indirect "signal" (e.g., announcement of
NATO membership criteria) that their accession will not be long
delayed. Walesa's letter to President Clinton of June 10 said
that "we expect, Mr. President, that during your visit to Poland
you will state that Poland will soon find itself among the
members of the Alliance."
The Poles are particularly sensitive to any suggestion of a
Russian droit de regard over their relationship with NATO and
threatened to withdraw from PFP if Moscow were granted a "special
status" within the Partnership. The June 9 NAC Ministerial in
Istanbul made clear that NATO will not enter into a formal
"special relationship" with Russia and that Russia will enter PFP
on the same basis as other partners.
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EUROPEAN UNION-POLISH RELATIONS
European Union membership is near the top of Polish foreign
policy objectives. EU-Polish relations have remained good,
despite changes in Polish governments.
Poland's EU Association Agreement (AA) addresses a broad range of
trade and political relations and envisions but does not
guarantee eventual EU membership. In April, Poland formally
applied for EU membership; the GOP understands that the EU will
not begin serious consideration of its application before 1997.
The biggest obstacles to Polish membership are the relative
weakness of its economic development and its large agricultural
sector. If Poland were admitted, it would be entitled to huge
subsidies under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy and economic
development funds. Nevertheless, the Germans have been strong
advocates of Polish membership.
EU-Polish contacts at high levels are frequent. The EU has been
Poland's greatest source of economic assistance; from 1990
through June 1993, the EU and member states had committed over
$8.5 billion to Poland, including debt forgiveness (U.S. figure
for the period was $3.9 billion).
Trade and Market Access: Poland has complained about access to
EU markets, usually following the imposition of an EU trade
restriction on Polish exports, notably on steel and agricultural
products. These should become more rare as the AA is fully
implemented, though the Poles will be watching EU application of
its safeguard provisions. Under the AA, most Polish industrial
goods will enter the EU duty- and quota-free beginning on
January 1, 1995; restrictions on steel and textiles will be
lifted later. The EU and Poland will have free trade in all
non-agricultural sectors by January 1, 1997. Thanks in part to
the AA, Polish exports to the EU rose over 40% from 1990 to 1993,
despite the European recession; however, imports from the EU more
than doubled, thanks to increased consumer demand in Poland and
the appreciation of the zloty in real terms. As a result,
Poland's billion dollar-plus trade surplus with the EU in 1990
became a $2.5 billion deficit in 1993.
European Stability Pact ("Balladur Pact"): The GOP remains
unhappy with the European Stability Pact; it does not consider
itself to be an "object" of the Pact as it argues, with some
justice, that Poland has no border or minority problems. The
Poles did not participate in bilateral meetings with the EU on
the Pact and maintain that at a minimum the Pact's focus needs to
be diverted to "good neighborly" relations including, in
particular, economic cooperation, in order to make it possible
for them to participate. It would also like its agreement with
Germany to be included in the Pact. Germany is not enthused.
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U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND
With cumulative U.S. commitments exceeding $4 billion, Poland is
by far the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Central and
Eastern Europe. The total includes $2.4 billion in debt
reduction, a debt-for-environment swap, Eximbank and OPIC
programs and food assistance.
SEED Act Support: We have provided, through the first half of FY
1994, nearly $660 million of Support for East European Democracy
(SEED) funds for Poland -- almost half of the entire SEED total
for the region. SEED priorities for Poland focus on private
sector and enterprise development; financial sector development
and economic restructuring; and strengthening public and private
institutions essential to a market economy and democracy. This
Administration has sharpened our focus. We will cut extraneous
programs and concentrate on a) entrepreneurial development and b)
programs to help cope with social dislocation.
The Polish-American Enterprise Fund (PAEF): The Enterprise Fund
is the largest single activity in the U.S. assistance portfolio
and regarded as one of the most successful. With $240 million of
USG funds and total capital of over $340 million, the Fund offers
loans, equity capital and technical assistance directly to
private firms to promote private sector development. The PAEF's
small loan program has provided over 2,500 loans, worth over $60
million, to private entrepreneurs, resulting in the creation of
nearly 10,000 new jobs.
Stabilization Fund: In 1989, the U.S. initiated establishment of
a multi-donor reserve of $1 billion to support the convertability
of the Polish zloty. (The U.S. contribution was $200 million.)
By 1993, the stabilization fund had served its purpose. In its
place the Polish Government (GOP) and bilateral donors
established the Polish Bank Privatization Fund. It is intended
to support the GOP's efforts to recapitalize, restructure and
privatize its state-owned commercial banks and state-owned
commercial enterprises in accordance with a program designed with
the World Bank.
Technical Assistance: Through long-term advisers and training,
the U.S. Treasury Department, USAID, and the SEC are providing
technical assistance to modernize Poland's banking and financial
services sector. The U.S. continues its commitment to support
Poland's privatization efforts by working with the Ministry of
Privatization and in strategic sectors.
Housing: USAID is implementing a $25-million Housing Investment
Guarantee Program for Poland which, in cooperation with World
Bank and EBRD activities, promotes market-based mortgage and
construction financing in the housing sector. A new initiative
will help accelerate the program. (See separate paper.)
U.S. POLISH TRADE ISSUES
The United States accounts for a small but growing share of
Poland's trade. Poland liberalized its pre-1989 trade regime
extensively as part of its market-oriented reforms. Poland has
MFN status and was extended GSP privileges in 1989.
Levels: Bilateral trade with the U.S. amounted to 4 percent of
Poland's total trade. U.S. exports to Poland were $916 million
during 1993, double their 1991 levels. Polish exports to the
United States increased from $351 million in 1991 to $454 million
in 1993. Poland's 1993 trade deficit with the United States of
$462 million accounted for 20 percent of its global trade
deficit. Leading U.S. exports and imports are agricultural
products.
Barriers to U.S. Exports: Poland's 1992 Association Agreement
with the European Union (EU), which establishes an eventual free
market in manufactured goods, includes tariff preferences for the
EU which have placed some U.S. exporters at a significant
long-term disadvantage. The U.S. requested and received
temporary tariff reductions for semiconductors, computers and
certain agricultural products in 1993. We want Poland to sustain
these concessions and lower additional tariffs as part of its
reaccession to the GATT. Poland's new copyright law addresses
our key intellectual property concerns and resulted in Poland's
removal from the Special 301 Watch List. Industry groups remain
concerned about protection of U.S. sound recordings.
GATT Re-Accession: In 1990, Poland requested renegotiation of
its GATT Protocol to reflect that it now has a market economy.
This includes renegotiating its tariff schedule. Negotiations
began in 1991 and are nearing completion. To conclude, we must
resolve the issues of high tariffs on aircraft parts, quotas on
U.S. poultry exports and continued tariff reductions on computers
and semiconductors. Poland wants to conclude these negotiations
in time to join the new World Trade Organization as a founding
member (by January 1995).
Business and Economic Treaty: The U.S. and Poland signed the
treaty in 1990. The U.S. ratified it in 1990; Poland did so in
1994. It provides investors guarantees of national treatment,
protection from expropriation and assurances regarding the
repatriation of funds. Poland, however, must still satisfy two
conditions -- appointment of an "ombudsman" for U.S. investors
and adherence to the Paris Act for the Bern Convention on the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works -- before the treaty
can enter into force.
Airworthiness Certification of Polish Aircraft: In April, Poland
requested expedited FAA airworthiness certification for a Polish
produced commuter aircraft, which would be fitted with U.S.
engines, for sale to Venezuela and perhaps other countries. The
FAA certification is the standard many countries look for when
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buying aircraft. The FAA, however, has a limited staff of
technicians and the certification process is lengthy. In
addition, there is a long queue of countries awaiting FAA
inspection and certification for their aviation products.
Nevertheless, FAA has told NSC staff that it would put the Polish
case to the head of the waiting list. We have not yet informed
the Poles.
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U.S. POLISH BILATERAL ISSUES
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General: Bilateral relations are very good. Nevertheless, both
sides, after decades of mutual admiration and little actual
interaction, are learning to deal with the inevitable negatives
in relations, including trade issues, Polish security concerns
and arms sales.
Security Issues: Integration into Western economic and security
structures - - above all, the EU and NATO - - is a key Polish
foreign policy goal, and Warsaw presses for NATO membership at
every opportunity. Developments in Moscow have increased the
Poles' sense of urgency for NATO membership.
Initially, the Poles were disappointed with the Partnership for
Peace (PFP), hoping instead for a commitment to early Polish
membership in NATO. The Poles have since taken a vigorous, even
model, approach to PFP. Poland was the first country to submit
the completed Presentation Document identifying the resources it
plans to contribute to PFP activities, and has also agreed to
host a PFP field exercise (involving U.S. forces) in Fall 1994.
Iraq Protecting Power: Poland serves as the protecting power for
the U.S. in Iraq and has done a superlative job in defending U.S.
interests and citizens there. Particularly notable were Polish
Ambassador Piekarski's efforts to get detained American
businessman Kenneth Beaty released and to ensure his well-being
during his prolonged detention by Iraqi authorities. Beaty was
freed in November. In February, President Clinton wrote to
President Walesa in praise of Piekarski's work. Piekarski
received a U.S. Superior Honor Award from the State Department
for his efforts.
Tank Sale to Iran: In 1991, the Polish government agreed to sell
115 T-72 tanks to Iran. The Poles told us repeatedly it was a
one-time-only transaction, not the beginning of an arms
relationship. Earlier this year the deal appeared to fall
through for financial reasons and the Poles told us informally it
was off. We repeatedly made senior-level warnings to the GOP
(including one from Vice President Gore) that the transaction
"would not be cost free" to U.S. Polish relations. Internally,
we decided to grandfather the Polish tank sale in exchange for a
commitment that Poland will avoid all objectionable trade in the
future and will fully abide by the terms of the COCOM successor
regime. With the apparent collapse of the tank deal, no action
was taken. On instruction, Embassy Warsaw has asked the GOP
whether the transaction is definitively off. We know from
special intelligence that some tanks have been shipped.
Kuklinski Case: In 1971 Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a member of the
Polish general staff, volunteered to provide intelligence to the
U.S. He did so -- motivated by ideology until 1981 and was
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exfiltrated shortly before martial law. His contributions were
extremely valuable. Poland's communist authorities tried him in
absentia and convicted him of treason for his activities. None
of Poland's post-1989 governments has been eager to reverse the
treason verdict, a move that much of the Polish officer corps
(not just ostensible pro-communists) would regard as an insult.
However, given the circumstances of Kuklinski's action during a
period of Poland's subjugation to Soviet hegemony, we have urged
the Poles to set aside the sentence.
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RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
Consolidation: Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL)
are being consolidated and reduced in size. Many technical
activities of RFE/RL will be taken over by USIA's Voice of
America (VOA), and over one thousand of RFE/RL's employees in
Munich will be laid off. The 1994 appropriations bill mandated
that RFE/RL's present annual budget of $220 million be reduced to
$75 million. The current Board of International Broadcasting
(BIB) is to be replaced by an independent Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG), which will operate under the USIA umbrella.
In order to reach the $75 million budget level the present BIB
terminated RFE's Hungarian service and has decided to privatize
the Polish and Czech services at the end of 1995. Some Poles
have been unhappy with the decision to terminate the Polish
service and move a trannsformed service to Warsaw. A well-
attended "wake" for RFE's Polish service was held in June in
Poznan. We hope the privatization process will help strengthen
independent broadcasting in Poland but the issue is sensitive in
Poland.
Praque Move: The Czech Government has offered the Federal
Parliament Building as a rent-free site for the radios if they
were to move to Prague from Munich (although maintenance costs
would be approximately $2 million annually). The USG is
considering the Czech offer, but budgetary and Congressional
issues have complicated our reaching a decision on the move. It
is not popular in Poland and you should not raise it.
Research Institute: On May 31, the Board of International
Broadcasting (BIB) and financier George Soros' Open Society
Institute announced that the Research Institute and the
accompanying archives would be transferred from Radio Free Europe
(RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) control to a new institute funded by
Soros. The new facility will probably be located in Prague.
The GOP and some Polish-Americans expressed concern the Polish
portion of the archives would not be available to the Poles
unless it was located in Warsaw. BIB and Soros have since
announced that they will microfilm the entire archive and will
provide a complete copy to the Polish Government as well as to
other governments in the region. Polish scholars will also
eventually have direct computer access to the archives.
The Poles have also asked RFE/RL turn over to the GOP the
complete broadcast transcripts of RFE's Polish broadcasts over
the past forty years. BIB hopes to eventually be able to turn
the tapes over to the Poles, but must first make copies for the
archives of the Library of Congress. The Poles are sensitive
about this material, which represents a source for their "lost
history" during the Cold War.
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PRAGUE INITIATIVES CHECKLIST
Sustained High Level of Engagement: Since your Prague trip there
has been sustained high level engagement with Central and Eastern
European (CEE) countries. Cabinet members and senior level
travellers include: UN Amb. Albright and Gen. Shalikashvili
(throughout the region), Commerce Sec. Brown (Warsaw), Atty. Gen.
Reno (planned - Budapest), Deputy Sec. Talbott (Warsaw and
Bratislava), Under Sec. Tarnoff (Warsaw, Budapest and Prague),
Under Sec. Davis (Budapest, Bratislava, Sofia and Skopje) and NSC
Senior Director Schifter (Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Bratislava
and Budapest).
Democracy Network: USAID expects to start awarding grants for
the "Democracy Network" this summer. We will provide about $30
million in grants to U.S. NGOs over the next 3-5 years. In turn,
the selected U.S. NGOs will cooperate with and support CEE
counterparts involved in public policy.
Improved Market Access: We have agreed with the EU to avoid
megaphone diplomacy on this sensitive matter. We can do little
more to expand CEE access to our markets; the EU cites "domestic
political realities" as preventing its further concessions. The
U.S. is interested in working with CEE states to address their
own sizeable barriers to exports and could work with the EU.
U.S. Trade Remedy Laws: NEC Deputies agreed to explore
Congressional receptivity to a proposal to establish an
inquiry-based trade remedy for CEE/NIS "economies in transition."
The new remedy would apply in lieu of current market surge and
anti-dumping provisions applied to non-market economies.
U.S. -sponsored Conference on CEE Investment and Trade: This
proposal has sparked great interest in the CEE. It will probably
take place in Cleveland in September or October. We are
arranging for U.S. private sector cooperation in hosting the
conference. The conference will focus not only on both trade and
investment opportunities in the region, but also on what measures
these countries should take to make their business climate more
attractive. Key CEE ministers - - but not heads of government --
will be invited to attend and learn.
Early OECD Membership for Visegrad Countries: With strong U.S.
leadership the OECD Ministerial Communique stated our intention
to begin negotiation with the V-4 on membership as soon as
possible. Eventual OECD membership will depend largely on how
quickly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia can
bring their laws, regulations and practices into conformity with
OECD guidelines on trade, investment and the environment.
Regional Infrastructure Improvements: At a February 1994 meeting
in Vienna, the USG and CSCE partners developed a regional road
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infrastructure plan for short-term projects in the southern CEE
countries. The EU has been slow to provide its share of the
funding necessary to implement these projects. TDA is working on
a series of special infrastructure programs; it has been funded
to the level of $3 million for regional programs. State and
Customs continue to lead an effort to develop a transport
corridor around Serbia for perishable agricultural commodities
from the southern Balkans. We are trying to identify possible
sources of funding for the "Highways for Peace" proposal.
Regional Civil/Military Airspace Management: DoD has provided
$500,000 toward the cost of a preliminary study of a regional
integrated civil air traffic control system/military air
sovereignty regime. The Visegrad states other than the Czech
Republic have endorsed this initiative. The target date for
completion of the preliminary study is the end of FY94.
Social Sector Restructuring Assistance: Using primarily existing
assistance resources, and coordinating with other international
donors, we have launched an initiative to help Poland in this
area. Our focus is the financing and provision of retirement and
disability pensions, poverty relief, health care, housing and job
generation. We will draw on our experience in Poland to assist
other CEE countries.
Post-privatization Assistance: Treasury has developed a proposal
involving at least $50 million from the EBRD, $15 million from
the Polish-American Enterprise Fund and up to $10 million of USG
technical assistance) to support companies newly privatized under
the Polish Mass Privatization Program.
Bilateral Working Groups on Security: So far this year alone, we
have held BWGs consultations on regional security, defense
relations and bilateral assistance -- with ten CEE non-combatants
(all except Hungary, with whom we will meet in the fall and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
Peacekeeping Units: With our support, the Baltic states have
launched a joint peacekeeping battalion initiative. We have
requested $10 million for FY95 to support CEE peacekeeping,
including the Baltic Battalion.
Removing Cold War-era Restrictions: We have finished removing
all CEE states (except those subject to the Yugoslav arms
embargo) from the International Traffic in Arms proscribed
destination list. In addition, we and our allies removed
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland -- but not
Romania or Bulgaria -- from the COCOM proscribed destination
list before the termination of COCOM on March 31. Finally, this
year you signed Presidential Determinations (PDs) for all CEE
states not already covered by PDs and not subject to the Yugoslav
arms embargo. These PDs make these states eligible to
participate in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
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