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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HRC RUSSIA INFORMATIC
NOV 08 '93 05:11PM CRS/FAND
P.1
1111113
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
Congressional Research Service
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
CRS
The Library of Congress Room LM-815 101 Independence Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20540
DATE:
Total number of pages this transmission: 5
TO: Vice Pres, Gore
FROM:
Stuart Goldman
Attn: Dominic
FAX NUMBER: 8-2424
FAX NUMBER: (202) 707-8804
PHONE NUMBER: 4-2492
PHONE NUMBER: (202) 707-7685 7685
If there are problems in transmission, please call at
MESSAGE:
Here is the material on Rowsen election
campaign,
R-99%
2027077639
11-08-93 04:10PM P001 #45
R-99%
THE NEW Y
TIMES INTERNATIONAL MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4
Russians Scramble to Fill an Unformed Parliament
By SERGE SCHMEMANN
himself.
Special to The New York Times
Another group of Mr. Yellsin's sup-
MOSCOW, Oct. 31 - Campaign
porters have formally split with Mr.
workers sit clastered under the whim-
Gaidar to form the Rossian Party of
sical domes of St. Basil's with hand-
Unity and Accord under Sergei M.
lettered signs reading Russia's Choice,
Shakhrai, 37, a Deputy Prime Minister
Movement for Democratic Reform and
who has taken time off from the Gov.
New Russia. They try in shield their
ernment to run. His backers include
clipboards from the wet snow and pa-
several top members of the Yeltsin
CRES/AND 00:11:00 E6, 80 AON
ciently explain to a steady stream of
team, including Sergei B. Stankevich
people how to fill out petition forms.
and Aleksandr N. Shokhin.
"These are the people ] trust to build
The Shakhrai bloc has staked out a
democracy," explains Ivan Mukhanov,
position to the right of Mr. Gaidar,
a teacher.
rejecting "radicalism" and "shock
Communists and nationalists mi-
methods."
grate toward their usual meeting place
Several other well-known liberals
on the other end of Red Square, under
have formed a Movement for Demo
the partico of the Lenin Museum.
cratic Reform. They include Mayor
There, amid steady Invective against
Anatoly A. Subchak of St. Petersburg
President Boris N. Yeltsin and "demo-
and the former Mayor of Moscow, Gav.
crats". in general, representatives of
rill K. Popov, as well as Aleksandr
the Russian- Communist Party and
Yakoviev, once the top adviser to Mr.
their allles fill their lists.
Gorbachev, and Svyatoslav N. Fyo-
2027077639
II is a scene repeated in underpasses,
durov, a celebrated eye surgeon.
at bus stations and at other public
Also on the reformist wing is the
places all acruss Russia; as political
Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, led by
blocs and parties scramble to gather
Mr. Yavlinsky. His partners are Yorl
the 100,000 signatures needed to enter
Y. Boldyrev, who resigned in protest
the race for the Dec. 12 elections for a
this year as Mr. Yeltsin's corruption
tew Parliament.
fighter, and Vladimir Lokin, the Am-
bassador to Washington.
A Political Circus
UB the right wing, the Communists
Twenty-one bloes and parties have
will be represented most prominently
already registered, and virually every
by the Russian Communist Party,
known politician from ardent Commu-
which was briefly banned after the
nist to radical reformer, along with a
uprising this month. Led by Mr. Zyu-
huge supporting cast of academics,
ganov, 49, the party is by far the largest
businessmen and others, have thrown
in Russia; with a half-milton members.
their hats into the ring. The candidates
Other major conservative groupings
even Include a man currently on trial
include the Russian All-National Union
11-08-93 04:10PM P002 #45
for his role as a leader of the August
led by Sergei Baburin, a Communist
1991 putsch against Mikhafl S. Gorba-
politician in the former Congress, and
chev Vasily Starodubtsev, head of
the Agrarian Union led by Mr. Staro-
the conservative Agrarian Union of
dubtsev.
state and collective farm managers.
The most promiunt fringe party
The only prominent people missing,
contesting the elections is Vladimir
It seems, are Ruslan L Khasbulatov
Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic par-
and Aleksandr V. Rutskoi, who are in
ty, which is neither liberal nor demo-
P.2
jall as leaders of the opposition that
cratic, but a platform for Mr. Zhirin-
Mr. Yeltsin crushed a month ago
ovsky's nationalist views and dema-
and, so far, Mr. Gorbachev.
gogic style. The party managed to sur-
But for all the debates, polls and
vive the purge of fringe movements
prognoses; nobody, at this stage, is
this fall largely because Mr. Zhirin-
entirely clear what the election is all
ovsky took sides with Mr. Yeftsin
about.
Renteres
against the Congress.
What is known is that 450 deputies
1
09
y
political parties I blocs are scrambling to gather the
Old-style industrial managers have
will be chosen to a
the
100,000 signatures required to enter parliamentary elections
Dec. 12.
ranged behind Arkady I. Voisky's Civic
I Ininn a mnv
that
hailed as
to radical relormer, along with a
uprising this I
Led by
Zyu-
huge supporting
R-99%
of academics,
49, the party is by far the largest
inessmen others, th
in F
la, with a half-million members.
hats into the ring. The candidates
Other major conservative groupings
m Include a man currently on trial
include the Russian All-National Union
for bis role as a leader of the August
led by Sergel Baburin, a Communist
1991 putsch against Mikhail S. Gorba-
politician in the former Congress, and
chev Vasily Starodubtsev, head of
the Agrarian Union led by Mr. Staro-
the conservative Agrarian Union of
dubtsev.
state and collective farm managers.
The most promitent- fringe party
The only prominent people missing,
contesting the elections is Vladimir
it seems, are Ruslan 1. Khasbulatov
Zhirlnovsky's Liberal Democratic par-
and Aleksandr V. Rutskoi, who are in
ty, which is neither liberal nor demo-
jall as leaders of the opposition that
cratte, but a platform for Mr. Zhirin-
Mr. Yeitsin crushed a month age
ovsky's nationalist views and dema-
and, so far, Mr. Gorbachev.
gogic style. The party managed to sur-
But for all the debates, palls and
vive the purge of fringe movements
prognoses; nobody, at this stage, is
this fall largely because Mr. Zhirln-
entirely clear what the election Is all
ovsky took sides with Mr. Yeltsin
about.
Reuteps
against the Congress.
What Is known is that 450 deputies
Russia's many political parties and blocs are acrambling to gather the
CRE/FAND WHET:S0 E6, 80 AON
Old-style industrial managers have
will be chosen to a new lower house, the
100,000 signatures required to enter parliamentary elections on Dec. 12.
ranged behind Arkady L Volsky's Civic
State Duma - half directly elected in
In Red Square, a woman signed a petition for Russia's Choice, which
Union, a movement that was halled as
constituencies, half from party lists
a promising centrist force when it was
and another 176 deputies to an upper
supports the reform economist Yegor T. Gaidar.
formed a year ago, but quickly lost
house, the Federation Council. The two
momentum. Many new businessmen
mbers will form the Federal As-
The race is wide-
munism," he said. "The only other way
have lined up behind Konstantin Boro-
sembly, Russia's seventh attempt at a
voi, head of the "August" bloc of new
parliament.
to unite this country is by force, and
entrepreneurs.
One Candidate, One Bloc
then everything ends. Given Russia's
open for Russia's
A newcomer to Russian polities is
size, it can be ruled only democratical-
the Women of Russia bloc, formed of
In 225 election districts for the lower
Ry. it cannot exist without a Parlia-
Dec. 12 elections.
three women's organizations. Led by
house, people can vote for one local
ment. So how can I stand aside? What's
Alevtina Fedulova, head of the Union of
candidate and cast another vote for
the good of everything I've done ff I
Russian Women, the btoc rejects "ex-
their favorite bloc or party. Of the 450
step aside now?"
treme feminism" or "women's su
2027077639
seats, half will be filled by direct elec-
The challenge facing Mr. Yavlinsky
tion and half chosen from candidate
they can dominate.
premacy," and seeks to redress a radi-
and other candidates is formidable.
cal Imbalance - women formed less
lists of those parties and blocs that win
The upper chamber, the Federation
Chief among them is that Russia has
more than 5 percent of the vote. For the
Council, is especially vague at this
than 6 percent of the last Congress, and
yet to shape any significant political
there are no women in Mr. Yeltsin's
upper house, two candidates will be
stage. It was originally envistoned as a
parties. Only about 7 percent of the
Government.
directly elected from each of the 88
body of top leaders from Russia's 88
electerate belongs to a political group-
regions and provinces of the Russian
constituent regions, two from each. But
ing of any size.
Federation.
In the aftermath of last month's pqliti-
A result has been a flurry of rushed
Ex-K.G.B. Aide Is Questioned
One problem is that the new Assem-
cal clashes, Mr. Yeltsin has been far
coalitions and alliances, most of them
bly is being chosen on the same day
less induigent of the regions, pressor-
centered around personalities rather
In Poison Umbrella Killing
that voters will be asked-to endorse a
ing them to disband their own legisla-
than platforms, all of which are fikely
new Constitution - one-mobody has yet
tures and making both of their, Council
to be realigned several times before
seen, even though it will define the role
seats elective rather propora than appointive.
the election.
of the new Parliament:
Some regions might still balk at-the
LONDON, Oct. (Reuters) - The
Each blue is require to submit a
So nobedy can say for- sure exactly
arrangement, especially If the, new.
British police detained and questioned
petition with at least 100,600 names by
Constitution gives them less independ-
Oleg D. Kalugin, a former general in
what that rule will be, how the Partia-
Nov. 7. That In itself is a challenge for
the Soviet K.G.B,, about the killing of a
P003 1-80-11
ment's powers will be separate from
ence than they seek.
many a smaller bloc, especially since
Bulgarian dissident with a poison-
the President's and the Government's
Yet in all the confusion and com-
most have had no time to find money or
tipped umbrella in 1978, but the former
- or what will happen if the Constitu-
plaining, the excitement and suspense
to form national organizations.
official was released today without
tion is rejected.
are tangible. However flawed the pro-
charge.
With so little time to prepare, nobody
cess, politicians of all bues accept that
Bifts in Russia's Cholee
The police would not elaborate on
is entirely clear where the Partiament
it offers the only chance Rossia now
The most potent bloc at this stage is
why they had detained Mr. Kalugin,
will sit, what procedures it will follow
has of restoring governmental legiti-
Russia's Choice, which groups many
who has accused the K.G.B. of helping
or who will staff it. The old Parliament
macy after Mr. Yeltsin disbanded the
top Government ministers behind Ye-
to kill the dissident, Georgi 1. Markov,
center, known as the White House, is in
old Congress and discarded the old
got T: Geldar, the reform economist
by providing technical advice to the
P.3
for many months of reconstruction af-
Constitution, even if this Federal As-
and First Deputy Prime Minister.
Bulgarian secret service. Mr. Markov,
ter being shelled eartier this month
sembly falls short of a true parliament
Adorned with the halo of-victors after
who worked for the BBC and was a
when Mr. Yeltsin put down the violent
and proves to be only another stage on
the dispersal of the old Congress of
vocal critic of the Bulgarism Commu-
uprising against him.
the way to democracy.
People's Deputies and the quelling of
nist leadership, died in 1978, four days
"There is no other solution," said
the armed insurrection, the bloc also
after feeling a sharp jab in the leg as be
Making Up the Rules
Mr. Yavlinsky, who figures consis-
has Mr. Yeltsin's tacit endorsement
walted for a bus. A minute pellet, fired
Some candidates, ranging from the
tently in public-opinton polls as one of
and the luxury of constant news media
from the tip of a black umbrella and
of the Communist bloc, Gennadi
the
popular politicians side the
exposure.
containing the poéson ricin,
later
A. Zynganov, to the reform economist
Govern
L He described the ditem-
But the Government has I
in his thigh
with
les
3
in
Anril
with
The
NOV- 8-93 MON 17:41
P.01
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
CRS
The Library of Congress Room LM-315 101 Independence Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20540
DATE:
Total number of pages this transmission:
TO: Vice Pres. Gone
FROM:
Stuart Goldmen
Attn: Dominic
FAX NUMBER: 8-2424
FAX NUMBER: (202) 707-3304
PHONE NUMBER: 4-2492
PHONE NUMBER: (202) 707-7655
If there are problems in transmission, please call at
.
MESSAGE:
I think the bottom of this article
may have been cut off in MY
original transmillion
Stract
R=96%
11-08-93 04:45PM P001 #46
NOV- 8-93 MON 17:41
P.02
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
INTERNATIONAL
MONDAY,
NOVEMBER
1,
1993
Russians Scramble to Fill an Unformed Parliament
himself.
ERGE SCHMEMANN
Another group of Mr. Yellsin's sup-
Sprualle The And Yusk Tunts
porters have formally split with Mr.
MOSCOW. Oct. 31 - Campaign
Galdar to form the Russian Party of
workers sit clusted under the whim-
Unity and Accord under Sergel M.
dumes of SI. Basil's with hand-
Shakhrai 37. a Deputy Prime Minister
intered signs reading Russin's Choice
who has Laken time am from the Gov-
Moi
for Democratic Reform and
erament LD run. His backers include
New Mussia. They try (n shield thair
several LOP members of the Yelism
clipboards from the wct snow and pa-
team, Including Sergel B. Stankovich
Liently explain 10 a steady stream of
and Alaksandr N. Shokhin
people how 10 fill out polition forms
The Shakhrui blue has staked out #
i
are the people I trust to build
position to the right of Mr. Galdur,
:racy." explains Ivan Mukhanov,
rejecting "radicalism" and "shock
a concher.
methods."
Communists and nationalists mi-
Several other well-known liberals
grate loward their usual meeting place
have formed R Movement for Demo-
on the other end OΓ Red Square, under
cratic Reform. They Include Mayor
the
DO of the Lenin Museum.
Analogy A. Sobchok of St. Poteraburg
There, amid study invective against
and the former Mayor of Moscow, Cav.
President Boris N. Yelisin and "dama
rid K. Popuv, as well as Atolesandr
in general, representatives of
Yakoviev, ORCE the top adviser to Mr.
the Russion Communist Party and
Gorbachev, and Svystoslav N. Fyo-
alites fill their lists.
dorov, a celebrated eye surgar.
II as a scene repeated In underpusses,
Also an the reformin wing is the
at bus stations and at other public
Yaviinsky.Boldyrev-Lukn bloc, led by
places all across Russia, as political
Mr. Yavlingky His partners are Yuri
blocs and parties scramble LO gather
Y. Boldyrov, who resigned in protest
the 100.000 signatures needed to ainer
this year as Mr. Yettain's curruption
the
for the Dec. 12 elections. for a
fighter, and Viadimir Lukin, the Am-
Parliament.
basender to Washington
A Political Circus
on the right wing, the Communists
7
/-one blocs and parties have
will be represented most prommently
already registered, and virtually every
by the Russian Communist Party,
known politician from ardent Commu-
which was briefly banned after (hn
to radical reformer, ulong with a
uprining this munth Led by Mr. Zyu.
nuge supporting cast of academica,
ganov, 49, the party is by fur the largest
businassmen and where. have thrown
in Russia, with a half-million members.
buts into the ring. The candidates
Other mujor conservative groupings
include a man currently on trial
include the Russion All-National Union
for nis role as a leader of the August
lod by Sergol Buburin, a Communist
1091 putsch against Mikhail &. Gorba-
politician in the former Congruss, and
chev = Vasily Starodubisev, head of
the Agrarian Uniun led by Mr. Staro-
the
vative Agravian Union of
dolxsev.
st
llective farm managers.
The most prominent Irings party
prominent people masing.
contesting the elections is Vladimir
R
re Rusian 1. Khushwiatov
Zhirlaovsky's Liberal Democratic par-
and Aloksandr V. Ruiskoi, who are in
iy. which is neither liberal nor dermit
jall as tenders of the opposition that
cratic, but a platform for Mr. 2hirin
Mr. Yelism crushed a month ago -
uvaky's nationalist views and dema-
and so lur, Mr. Gerbachev.
gogic style. The party managed 10 sur
for all the debates, polls and
vive the purge of fringu movements
prognoses, nobody, at this stage, is
this tall targely because Mr. Zuirin-
emiroly clear what the election 15 all
ovsky took sidex with Mr. Yeltsin
Require
against the Congress.
wrint is know is that 450 deputies
Russia's many political parties and blocs are scrambling to gather the
Okl-myle Industrial managers have
wall bc chosen to a new lower house, the
100,000 signatures required to enter parliamentary elections on Dec. 12.
ranged behind Arkady L Volsky's Civic
State
1 - hulf directly elected in
Union. a movement that was halled as
nucnsies, hall from party lists -
In Red Square, a woman signed a petition for Ruasia's Choice, which
a promising centrict force when It was
and poother 170 deputies 10 an upper
supports the reform economist Yegor T. Gaidur.
formed a year ago. but quickly king
the Federation Council The two
momentum. Many new husinessmen
cnampers will form the Federal As-
have Incd up behind Kunstamin Boro-
munism." ho said. "The only other way
sembly. Russia's seventh attempt at a
The race is wide-
we head of the "August" blue of now
purliament.
to units this country is by force, and
ontrepreneurs.
then everything ends. Given Russia's
A nowcomer to Russian politics is
One Condidate, One Rine
open for Russia's
size, Il can be ruled only democratical-
the Women of Russia bloc, formed of
In 225 election districts for the lowar
ly. II cannot exist without a Parlis-
three women's organizations. Led by
house, people can vote for one lural
Dec. 12 elections.
ment 50 how can 1 stand aside? What's
Alevtina Fedulova, head of the Union al
candidate and CUSL another vote for
the good of overything I've dane If 1
Russian Women, the blor rejects "ex-
their lavorite bloc or party. or the 450
slep aside now?"
treme feminism" or "women's SU-
sents, half will be filled by direct cleo-
The challenge facing Mr. Yavlinsky
premacy." and weeks to redress a radi
and half chasen from candidate
thry can dominate.
and other candidates is formidable.
cal imhalance - women formed loss
uses of those parties and blocs that win
The upper chamber, the Foderation
Chief among them is that Russia has
Uwn 6 percent of the last Congress, and
than 5 percent of the vote. For the
Council, is especially vague at this
yet to shape any significant political
there are no women in Mr. Yellsm's
upper house. two candidates will be
stage. It was originally envisioned as a
parties. Only about 7 percent of the
Government.
directly clerted from each of the 88
body of top leaders from Russia's 88
electorate belongs to & political group-
regions and provinces of the Russian
constituent regions, two from each. But
ing of any size
Federation.
in the aftermath of last month's politi-
A result has Been in flurry of rushed
Ex-K.G.B. Aide Is Questioned
One problem is that the new Assum.
cal clashes, Mr. Yeltsin has buen far
confitions and alliances, most of them
bly is being chosen un the same day
loss Indulant of the regions, pressur-
ocntered around personalities rather
In Poison Umbrella Killing
that voters will be asked to underse a
50 thum to disband their OWD legisla.
than platforms all of which ate likely
new Constitution one unitedy has yet
tures and making both of their Council
to be realigned several times before
secu.
though Il will defune the role
sents elective rather than appointive.
the election.
LONDON. Oct. 31 (Routers) - The
of the new Parliament.
Some regions might still balk at the
Each bloc is required of submit a
British police detained and questioned
so nobody can say for sure exactly
arrangement, especially if the new
perition with at least 100,000 names by
Oleg D. Kalugin, a former general in
what that role will be, how the Partia.
Constitution gives them less inclepend-
Nov. 7. That in twelf is a challenge for
the Sovies K.G.B., about the killing of a
* powers will be separate from
once than they sock
many a smaller bine. especially since
Bulgarian dissident with a poison-
Inc President's and the Government's
Yet in all the confusion and com-
most have had no time to fluid money or
tippud umbrolla in 1978. but the former
- or
will happen if the Constitu-
plaining, the exclloment and surpense
to form national urganizations.
official was released today without
tion is rejected.
are tengible. However nawed the pro-
charge
With to little time to propare, nobody
cess. politicians of all hues accept that
allis le Russie's Choice
The police would not claborate on
is entirely clear where the Parliument
It offers the only chance Russia now
The most potent bloc at this slage is
why they had dotained Mr. Kalugin,
will sit what procedures it will follow
has of restoring governmental legiti-
Russia's Choice, which groups many
who has accused the K.G.B. of helping
or
staff it. The old Parliament
macy ulter Mr. Yolisin disbanded the
top Government ministers behind Ye-
to kill the dissident. Georgi 1. Markov,
DOS
as the While House. is in
old Congress and discarded the old
for T. Galdar, the reform economist
by providing technical advice to the
for
Anths of reconstruction at-
Constitution. even if this Federal As-
and First Deputy Prime Minister.
Bulgarian secral service. Mr. Markov,
tor
holled earlier mis month
acmbly falls short of a true parliament
Adorned with the hale of victors after
who worked for the BBC and was a
when MF. Yeltsin put down the violent
and proves to be only another stage un
the dispersal of the old Congress of
votal critic of the Bulgarian Commu-
uprising against blm.
the way to democracy.
People's Deputics and the quelling of
nist leadership, diod in 1978, four days
"Thero is no other polution." said
the armed insurrection the bloc Also
after feeling a sharp jah in the leg as he
Making Up the Rules
Mr. Yavilnaky. who figures consis-
has Mr. Yellsin's Lach endorsement
waited for a bus. A minure polict, fired
Sume candidates, ranging from the
tently in public-opinion pulls as one of
and the luxury of constant news media
from the up of a black umbrella and
head of the Communist blue, Gennadi
the must popular politicians outside the
exposure.
containing the poison ricin. was later
A. Zyuganov. 10 the reform excumemist
Government. lic described the dilem-
But the
has
heen
found in his thigh.
Grigory A. Yavinsky. have com-
ma after a late mussion with leaders of
known for Internal only.
ruts are
In an interview in April with The
nigined that Mr. Yelisin
his lieu-
his coulition, the "Ya
Blow.
a
18 in RUSELA'S Choice
Mall Sunday of London, Mr. Kalugin
R=96%
Viblar
e
Chernomvr-
caid he had bren ordered LA help ar-
11-08-93
P002
#46
NOV 08 '93 05:14PM ORS/FAND FAX 2024576992
P.1p.4
Daily
RFE/RL Daily Report
No. 214 B November 1995
Radio Free Europe/Badio Liberty, ma
RUSSIA
failing to qualify actuded the liberal "Angust" bloc, which
includes the Party of Beonomic Preedom. The national-
TELTSIN WANTS TO SERVE OUT THEM. President
ist Russian All-People's Union, meanwhile, made an
Boris Yeltsin told media representatives on 6 November
official complaint that petition sheets had been confis-
that he planned to groom a successor to the presidency
cated from its headquarters on 6 November, allegedly
for the presidential elections due in 1996, various Rus-
by members of the security forces. Wendy Slater
sian and Western media reported. Yeltsin sald that he
wanted to serveous his full term as president rather than
BLOCS ENTITLED TO PARTICIPATE INHECTIONS.
holding early elections in June 1994, as he had decreed
The blocs enritled to participate in the elections, as
on 23 September shortly after the suspension of parlia-
reported by Reuters on 7 November, are Pro-cominunist
ment He denied, however, that he would stand for a
Agrarian Party (500,000 signatures), liberal-centrist Party
second term of office. Presidential Chief of Staff Sergei
of Russian Unity and Concord (222,000), Russian Com-
Filatov said on Russian Radio on 6 November that the
munlst Party (187,000), pro-Yelisin bloc Russia's Cholde
decree on early presidential elections had been 2 com-
(200,000), Liberal Democratic Party of Viadimit Zhirt
promise forced upon Yeltsin which it was no longer
novsky (175,000), Yavinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc
necessary to implement. Yeltsin may be hoping that the
(170,000), Civic Union (150,000), Constructive Ecolo-
future parliament will disregard his decree. Wendy
gist Movement (150,000), Russian Movement of Demo-
Slater
cratic Reforms led by SL Petersburg mayor Anstolit
Sobchak (155,000), Dignity and Charity Movement
YELTSIN MEETS MEDIA CHIEFS. Yeltsin met on 6 No-
(150,000), Women of Russia (150,000), Association of
vember with the chief editors of 25 Russian news orga-
Independent Professional 114,000), Democratic Party
nizations to discuss media coverage of the election
of Russia led by Nikolai Travkin (109,000), The Future
campaign and other problems of the media, ITAR-TASS
of Russia-New Names (109,000), Russian All-People's
reported. On 29 October Yeltsin issued a decree urging
Union headed by hard-liner Sergel Baburin (108,000),
equal access to the state-run media for all electoral blocs.
conservative Constitutional Democratic Party (103,500),
Yes, many participants in the election campaign and the
National Republican Party (102,000), Consolidation Party
independent Russian press are complaining that the pro-
(100,000), New Russia (100,000), Russian Christian
Yeltsin election bloc, "Russia's Choice," enjoys far more
Democratic Party (100,000), Transformation Party (no
extensive publicity than the others. On 5 November,
numbers given). # Alexander Rahr
even deputy chairman of Ostankino Television Valentin
Lazutkin acknowledged charges of blased coverage, an
PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA'S RE-
RFE/RL correspondent reported. Talking to chief edi-
GIONS. "Russis's Choice" bloc is fielding candidates in
tors, Yeltsin again confirmed his support for complete
the overwhelming majority of Russia's regions. Regional
freedom in the election campaign for all groups regard-
pro-reform organizations are generally cooperating with
less of their political orientation. Vera Tolz
the bloc in the election campsign. However, according
to Radio Rossil of 1 November and Rossttskaya gazeta
TWENTY-ONE PARTIES REGISTERED 100,000 SIG-
of 5 November, the majority of the bloc's regional and
NATURES. By the deadline of midnight on 6 Novem-
local candidates are former deputies of the Russian
ber, 21 parties and blocs out of the 35 which had initially
parliament or regional and local soviets, In addition,
registered their intention to participate in the elections
most heads of regional administrations are running for
had presented lists of the required minimum of 100,000
seats in the new parliament Vers Tols
signatures in support of their participation. Many lists
arrived at the last minute; according to ITAR-TASS on
OBSERVER ON PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNORS IN
6 November only seven parties had qualified by 8 p.m.
ELECTIONS. Commenting on the participation of heads
Amongthe final 21, however, were pro-dersociatic
of regional administrations in the election campaign,
and opposition far-right and communist partica. Those
political scientist Andranik told Nezaulstmagya
RFE/RL Research Institute 0 EFE/EL Daily Report, No. 214
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2
Transomicasla and Central Asia: 8 November 1993
guzera on 4 November that by allowing governors (ap-
Moscow and staged a demonstration there. Further
pointed by the president) to stand for parlismentary
demonstrations, with modest turnouts, were reported
elections, Yeltsin made a political mistake. According to
from other parts of Russia, such as Krasnoyarsk,
Migranyan, a parliamentary mandate will give heads of
Blcaterinburg and Volgograd, as well as in former Sovier
administrations a power base and legitimacy Indepen-
republica. The biggest demonstration was reported from
dem of Yelusin, creating the situation that the president
the Belarus capital Minskwith 7,000 demonstrators. The
wanted to avoid by Issuing a decree that cancelled
gatherings were condu cted without violence.
popular elections of governors for the next two years
Alexander Rahr
and stipulated that governors would be appointed and
dismissed only by the president. This decree was inter-
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN SANES TO BE MAIN-
preted as an attempt by Yeltain to ensure the governors'
TAINED. The Ministry of Finance has issued a state-
support for orders from Moscowl by making them totally
ment to the effectthat M will maintain current restrictions
dependent on the president, . Vera Tois
on foreign banks for up to 5 years, Interfax and Western
agencies reported on 5 November. "Hasty access for
CHECHNYA AND THE ELECTIONS. Deputy premier
foreign banks, which havevest experience and resources,
Sergel Shakhrai, who is also chairman of the State Com-
could leave Russian banks in an unequal position," the
mittee for the Affairs of the Federation and Bihnic Re-
statement explained. In an Interview with Investiyas of
lations, told correspondents that a joint statement, drawn
6 November, First Deputy Prime Minister Egor Galder said
up by the Committee and the Central Electoral Commis-
that the government was looking at "supplementary
sion on 6 November, states that Chechnys is part of the
steps" to regulate foreign banking activity in Russia. In
Russian Federation and is therefore violating the Rus-
the debate over Limits on foreign banks, Russian Central
sian constitution by refusing to hold elections to the
Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko has, atypically,
Russian Federal Assembly on its territory, Ekho Moskvy
been on the side of the angels in that he has consistently
reported. Shakhrai said that Moscow was preparing to
advocated greater access to the banking industry for
hold further calks with Chechnya, and that he and the
foreign competitors, while the Ministry of Floance has
committee would support any efforts to hold the elec-
recommended limiting foreign banks to 1296 of all statu-
tions in Chechnys. . Ann Sheehy
tory capital in the commercial banking sector. . Keith
Bush
KoM, TATARSTAN LEADERS OBJECT TO NEW
CONSTITUTION. The chairman of the Komi partiament
Yurti Spiridonov said in Sykryvkar on 4 November that
he did not rule our appealing to the world community
TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
over the dropping of the sovercienty of the republics
GAMSAKHURDIA'S FORCES RETERAT. Georgian
and the federal treaty from the new Russian constitu-
government forces took the town of Chkhorotsku late
tion, Interfax reported. Spiridonov said that, if the treaty
on s November and advanced west to occupy Gamea-
wasnot included, he would personally campaign against
khurdis's stronghold, Zugdidi on 6 November Games
the new constitution. Taturatan President Mintimer Shal-
khurdia's forces retreated from Zugdidi without resistance
miev told journalists on 6 November that he would not
and are reportedly concentrated near Gall in southern
be taking part in the referendum on the constitution on
Abkhasis, Western agencies and ITAR-TASS reported.
12 November, Radio Rossli reported. Shaimlev said that
An Abkhak government spokesman has denied this,
attempts to reduce the republic's sovereignty to nought
according to Interfax. A curfew was Introduced in Zugdich
was a fruitless exercise. Ann Sheehy
and Georgian government troops withdrawn on 7 No-
vember to preclude friction between civilians and gov-
NO VIOLENCE AT OCTOBER ENVOLUTION ANNI-
ernment forces; order in Zugdidi will be maintained by
DEMONSTRATIONS. Police forces took steps
police and interior ministry forces, Liz Fuller
to prevent demonstrations to mark the anniversary of
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in central Moscow, ITAR-
AZERBAUAN ENLISTS AFGHAN MERCENARIES.
TASS reported on 7 November. The Moscow and
Following B secret visit to Kabul in August by 1 top level
Petersburg authorities had banned demonstrations
Axerbaljani official, Axerbatjan has enlisted a force of
for that day in their cities. Only few hundred hard-line
Afghan mudjahedin to bolster its shambolic amy in the
demonstrators disobeyed the ban. 1,500 communist
fighting in the south of the country, The Washington
followers met in the Medvedkovo forest in the north of
Post and The Boston Globe reported on 8 November.
MIFE/ML Research Institute . MFE/ML Daily Report, No. 214
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us- Russia General Bkgrd.
Order Code IB92089
CRS Issue Brief
Russia
Updated October 21, 1993
by
A
Stuart D. Goldman
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
CRS
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
New Russia and Its Significance
Largest Soviet Successor State
State and Government Structure
Russia's Significance for the United States
Political Developments
Russian Identity Crisis
Leadership Struggle
Economic Developments
Economic Crisis
Foreign Policy
Defense Policy
Fundamental Shakeup of the Military
Control of Nuclear Weapons
Division of Soviet Military Assets Among C.I.S. States
Questions For U.S. Policy
Whom Should the United States Support?
U.S. Assistance
IB92089
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Russia
SUMMARY
On Oct. 3-4, 1993, the political con-
Russia continues Gorbachev's foreign
frontation between Russian President
policies of cooperation with the West and
Yeltsin and the hardline parliamentary
retrenchment in the Third World. One
opposition erupted in armed conflict. On
Russian priority is to establish sound rela-
October 4, army units loyal to Yeltsin
tions with the other Soviet successor states,
subdued the opposition and stormed the
especially Ukraine. Another is to ensure
parliament building, leading to the surren-
the protection of the rights of Russian
der of the hardliners and the incarceration
minorities in those states. These goals
of their leaders. In the short-term, at least,
sometimes appear to conflict. Moscow is
this would appear to be a decisive victory
claiming a special "peacekeeping" role in
for Yeltsin. Since late 1992, the Yeltsin
troubled areas of the former Soviet Union,
government had been locked in an intense
such as Tajikistan, Georgia, Nagorno-Kara-
power struggle with the increasingly anti-
bakh, and Moldova. This raises concerns in
reform legislature led by Ruslan Khasbulat-
some of the other newly independent states
ov. A national referendum on April 25
about possible Russian designs for reestab-
strengthened Yeltsin's hand substantially,
lishing its dominance over them.
but he was unable to capitalize on that by
forcing the adoption of a new constitution
The military is in turmoil, facing severe
or early parliamentary elections, both of
force reductions and budget cuts. Russian
which were resisted by the anti-reform
armed forces are expected to be 1.2-1.5
majority in the legislature. On Sept. 21,
million by the year 2000, down from 4.5
1993, Yeltsin tried to break the political
million Soviet troops in 1985. Controversy
deadlock with a decree disbanding parlia-
over control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal
ment and calling for elections December 11-
remains. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Bela-
12. This led to the siege at the parliament
rus agreed in principle in 1992 to transfer
building and the violence of October 3-4.
all strategic nuclear weapons deployed on
their territory to Russia by 1999, there to
Meanwhile, the economy continues to
be dismantled. Ukraine, however, is seek-
contract despite the fact that economic
ing to link withdrawal of nuclear weapons
reforms, begun in January 1992, have
to financial compensation and security
achieved some important results. State
guarantees from the West. Growing ten-
control of prices and wages was greatly
sion between Kiev and Moscow is causing
reduced, a money economy was introduced,
Ukraine to reevaluate its commitment to
and a major program to privatize state-
give up nuclear weapons. These disputes
owned property is under way. But inflation
are delaying ratification of the START I
soared while production declined. These
and II Treaties. The newly independent
problems, together with the fear of bank-
states are struggling to divide the Soviet
ruptcies of large industrial enterprises and
armed forces among themselves, giving rise
resultant unemployment, led to the replace-
to conflicts such as between Russia and
ment of the reformist acting Prime Minis-
Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet. Other
ter, Gaidar, by the more conservative Cher-
sensitive military issues are Russia's role in
nomyrdin. The government, however, con-
the conflicts in Georgia, Tajikistan, and
tinued to pursue market reforms, and
Moldova, and the withdrawal of Russian
Yeltsin named Gaidar First Deputy Prime
troops from Estonia and Latvia.
Minister on September 18.
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
CRS
IB92089
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Oct. 3-4, 1993, the political confrontation between Russian President Boris
Yeltsin and the hardline parliamentary opposition erupted in armed conflict. On October
4, army units loyal to Yeltsin stormed the parliament building, leading to the surrender
of the hardliners and the incarceration of their leaders. This would appear to be a
decisive victory for Yeltsin. The obstructionist parliamentary opposition has been swept
away, but so has the entire parliament, until new elections now scheduled for December.
Yeltsin has also suspended the Constitutional Court, banned several opposition political
parties, and shut down many opposition newspapers, raising some concerns about a full
return to democracy. On October 4, President Clinton and congressional leaders
announced continued support for Yeltsin after receiving assurances from the Russian
President of democratic elections in December and respect for human rights.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The New Russia and Its Significance
Largest Soviet Successor State
Russia was by far the largest republic of the U.S.S.R. Its population of about 150
million accounted for slightly more than half the Soviet total. Its 6.6 million square
miles comprised 76.2% of the territory of the U.S.S.R. and it is nearly twice the size of
the United States, stretching from Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg in Northern Europe
to Vladivostok and Kamchatka on the Pacific, across 11 time zones. Russia also has the
lion's share of the natural resources, industrial base, and military assets of the former
Soviet Union.
Russia also claims to be the principal successor, and in some respects the legal
successor, of the U.S.S.R. Russia, for example, with nearly universal support, took the
Soviet seat the United Nations' Security Council. Russia also took over the Soviet
Foreign Ministry and operational control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Russia's claim
to be the Soviet successor state, however, and its claim to ownership of most former
Soviet assets, is disputed by many other C.I.S. states. Ukraine, for example, disputes
Russia's right to negotiate nuclear arms reductions unilaterally with the United States
and is believed by many to be trying to establish control over the strategic nuclear
weapons on its territory. Division of the economic assets of the U.S.S.R. is also a very
contentious issue among C.I.S. states, despite their extreme economic interdependence.
State and Government Structure
Russia is a multinational, multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a
complex federal structure inherited from the Soviet period. Within the Russian
Federation are 21 republics and 18 other ethnic enclaves called autonomous regions or
districts (krays, oblasts, and okrugs). The principal political subdivision of the
ethnically Russian part of the federation is the oblast (region), of which there are 49.
In some respects Russia's multinational federal structure resembles that of the former
Soviet Union, on which it was patterned. The demography, however, is different.
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Ethnic Russians, comprising 81.5% of the population, are a dominant majority. The
next largest nationality groups are Tatars (3.8%), Ukrainians (3%), and Chuvash (1.2%).
Furthermore, in most of the republics and autonomous regions of the Russian
Federation that are the national homelands of ethnic minorities, the titular nationality
constitutes a minority of the population. Russians are a majority in many of these
enclaves. Nevertheless, the prolonged political confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches has paralyzed the central government, allowing many of the
republics and regions to demand greater autonomy, and in some cases independence.
Some see this as a threat to the cohesion of the Russian state.
The structure of the Russian government has been transformed several times since
1990 and is about to change again as Yeltsin creates a new legislature and a new draft
constitution. The old Constitution provided for a separation of powers between
independently elected executive and legislative branches, with some features of both the
U.S. and French systems. Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia in June 1991,
the first time in history that Russia's top leader was democratically elected. The
President serves a five year term and, with the approval of the legislature, appointed
a Prime Minister. The President and Prime Minister appointed government ministers
and other officials. The President and Legislature had been struggling over the power
to appoint and confirm the government and other high officials and over the character
and pace of economic reform.
The complex two-tier legislature was a legacy of Gorbachev's perestroika
(restructuring). The top tier was the Congress of Peoples' Deputies (CPD), nominally
the paramount political organ of state. Its 1068 deputies were directly elected in March
1990, when the Communist Party was still dominant. The CPD had two regular two-
week sessions per year. It elected from its ranks a Supreme Soviet of 252 deputies,
which was the day-to-day functioning legislature. Factions and political parties were
emerging but were weak and poorly organized. The judiciary is the least developed of
the three branches. While theoretically independent, its personnel and procedures have
not yet been fully transformed from the discredited Soviet-era system. Reform of the
legal system has begun but much of the old structure and personnel is still in place.
Following his defeat of the parliamentary opposition in October 1993, Yeltsin decreed
the creation of a new bicameral legislature called the Federal Assembly, to be elected
on Dec. 11-12, 1993. The lower chamber, the State Duma, will have 450 members, 225
chosen from single-member constituencies and 225 from national party lists, with
proportional representation and a minimum 5% threshold for party representation in
the chamber. The upper chamber, called the Federation Council, will have 176
members, two from each of the 88 regions and republics of the Russian Federation.
Russia's Significance for the United States
Russia is not as central to U.S. interests and concerns as was the Soviet Union.
Throughout the postwar period, U.S. foreign and defense policy was based on
containing Soviet expansionism and the spread of communism. This shaped the U.S.
role in the world as well as domestic policies. With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and
the emergence of a new Russia apparently bent on democratization and market reform
and seeking full integration into the western community of nations, much of the Soviet
military threat, especially to western Europe, appears to have disappeared. Yet
developments in Russia are still important to the United States. Russia will play a
major role in determining the future national security environment in Europe, the
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Middle East, and Asia. Russia's role could be cooperative, passive, or disruptive,
depending on internal developments, and the triumph of democratic forces in Russia is
not assured. Russia is also a key factor in implementing the START I and II strategic
force reduction treaties, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and in
preventing nuclear proliferation. Such key issues as the U.S. budget deficit, the "peace
dividend," defense conversion, the future of NATO, and the U.S. role in the world will
all be affected by developments in Russia. Also, although Russia's economy is now
severely distressed, it is potentially an important market and trading partner. Russia
is the only country in the world that has more bountiful natural resources than the
United States, including vast oil and gas reserves. It has a large, well-educated labor
force and a huge scientific establishment. Furthermore, many of Russia's needs -- food
and food processing, oil and gas extraction, computers, communications, and
transportation -- are in areas in which the United States is highly competitive.
Political Developments
Russia has reached what could be a unique turning point in its history. Profound
change has occurred and is continuing, though the outcome is uncertain. Central to
this process is a veritable Russian "identity crisis."
Russian Identity Crisis
The turmoil in Russia -- military, political, economic, social, ethnic, ideological, and
spiritual -- is so pervasive, the verities of the old system so discredited, that Russians
are struggling in fundamental ways to redefine themselves and their country. In the
first instance the size and extent of the country is called into question. The Soviet
Union was in some respects a reconfiguration of Imperial Russia, which had conquered,
annexed, and absorbed many non-Russian lands in four and one-half centuries of
expansion. Now, as in 1917-1918, most of the non-Russian periphery has broken away.
Yet even confined to its present boundaries, Russia is the largest country in the world.
So far, Russia's largely peaceful reaction to the loss of the "external empire" (Eastern
Europe) and the "internal empire" (non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R.) has been
remarkable. Nonetheless, many Russians feel humiliated by these developments and
by the related perception that the terrible sacrifices they endured in World War II were
for nought. Will Russia be reconciled to the loss of the non-Russian periphery, the
reversal of an historic expansion that is twice as old as the United States and has
shaped the Russian sense of identity? This loss is aggravated by the fact that some 25
million Russians live in the periphery, outside Russia's new borders. Some of them
seek Russia's protection as their status is questioned in newly independent states whose
defining nationalism is not only anti-Soviet but often anti-Russian. How Russia relates
to its newly independent neighbors is part of the identity crisis.
Another aspect of the search for identity concerns the character of the Russian
state and its government. Russian history is long on authoritarianism and short on
democracy. Yet the Yeltsin regime and a good part of the urban intelligentsia
desperately want to make the leap from totalitarianism to membership in the "civilized
community" of advanced industrial democracies. The western democratic model now
seems very attractive to many Russians. Against this is not just the weight of history
and Russian political culture but the destabilizing effects of economic and social distress
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and the opposition of the Communist Party apparatus which, though banned, is still
entrenched in the government and in economic enterprises.
Part of the identity crisis focuses on the socioeconomic system, revealing confusion
and contradictions. Most Russians acknowledge that the Soviet economic system was
a failure, while at the same time professing admiration for socialism's declared
egalitarianism and antipathy to what they see as capitalism's inherent inequality and
exploitiveness. There is a struggle between advocates of socialism, capitalism, and a
"third way," combining elements of both. Although capitalism has very fragile roots in
Russia, one of its strengths is that its opponents seem intellectually (and literally)
bankrupt. They have presented no viable alternative to marketization.
Another face of the identity crisis involves Russia's international orientation and
its sense of "mission." Will Russia "join" the West? Will it be accepted? Some, including
prominent Yeltsin advisor Sergei Stankevich, advocate a more eastern orientation,
emphasizing relations with Eastern Europe, China, and other developing nations. What
about its international role? Russia remains a nuclear superpower but in most other
respects has lost its superpower status. Will Russia find a new equilibrium as a
responsible regional power, seek regional dominance, or resume its quest for global
power?
These different aspects of the great identity crisis remind some observers of the
age-old struggle for Russia's soul between westernizers and slavophiles. Pessimists
warn that historically the slavophiles have always eventually prevailed. Optimists note
that Russia has never before been so truly open to western influence -- to U.S.
influence.
Leadership Struggle
Since the winter of 1992-1993, Russia has been in the grip of an intense political
and constitutional crisis which has many aspects. Chief among them are: a struggle
over political ideology and the character of post-Soviet government; a contest over the
pace and character of economic reform and the ownership of vast amounts of property;
an institutional clash between the executive and legislative branches of government;
and the personal rivalry between President Boris Yeltsin and the man who has emerged
as his chief nemesis, Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin's
dissolution of the parliament on September 21 appears to be more than merely the
continuation of an ongoing power struggle. It is likely to be the decisive showdown.
After the Soviet coup attempt of August 1991, the Communist Party was banned.
More than 30 new parties have been registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice since
1990. It is very difficult to assess the parties' strength: the CPD was elected in March
1990, when the Communist Party was still dominant (86% of the elected deputies were
Communist Party members); and the presidential election in June 1991 was based more
on political personality than party affiliation. The political landscape is fluid, with new
parties and coalitions forming and others dissolving. Although it is an
oversimplification, it still seems useful to speak of three main political blocs in Russia.
Liberal democratic market reformers rallied around Yeltsin's banner in 1991
and supported the Yeltsin-Gaidar Government in 1992. Many, but not all, continue to
support Yeltsin. They seek democratization, rapid transition to a market economy, and
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political and economic integration with the advanced industrial democracies. From mid-
1992 to early 1993, however, Yeltsin's political support, especially in the legislature,
dwindled. Some early supporters "defected" to one of the two main opposition blocs.
(See below.) Others remained loyal to liberal democratic ideals but split with Yeltsin
over specific policies. Yeltsin remains, however, the most popular political leader in
Russia, as was demonstrated in his victory in the April 25 referendum. Khasbulatov
and the CPD had little popular support.
Centrist opposition to Yeltsin's policies emerged in response to three main
issues: the pace and scope of Gaidar's radical economic reform program; the
government's allegedly "weak" and too western-oriented foreign policy; and the danger
of the break up of the Russian Federation. The Civic Union, formed in 1992 and calling
itself the "constructive opposition," became the strongest element of this bloc. Its three
main components were: Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party Free Russia,
Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party, and Arkady Volsky's Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs, which claims to represent thousands of directors of state enterprises.
In the aftermath of Yeltsin's April referendum victory, however, Civic Union split up,
with Travkin and Volsky moving closer to Yeltsin and Rutskoi moving toward the
irreconcilable opposition (see below). Rutskoi's party repudiated him several months
before the armed conflict of October 3-4. Other centrists call themselves "statists,"
determined to protect Russia against what they see as anarchy and disintegration
brought on by Yeltsin's policies. Centrists say they are democrats. Most claim to favor
cautious, and perhaps more limited, market reform. Some, especially those in the
government, support broad, comprehensive reform but differ with the liberal reformers
on specifics.
Irreconcilable opposition, called the red-brown coalition by the democrats,
is an alliance of hardline communists and right-wing ultranationalists. They oppose
the Government's western-oriented market reforms, democratization, and foreign policy.
Nationalism is their strongest theme. Many advocate the restoration of the Soviet
Union or an expanded Russian Empire. Their propaganda is strongly anti-Semitic. The
Communist Party as a national organization has been banned since the 1991 coup
attempt, but several neo-communist parties have been formed. The neo-communists do
not have much popular support, but thousands of unreconstructed communists remain
entrenched in national, regional, and local government and in the leadership of
economic enterprises. Many CPD Deputies, elected with Communist Party support in
March 1990, joined the ranks of the irreconcilable opposition, whose relative strength
in the CPD was much greater than among the general public. On Oct. 5, 1993, Yeltsin
banned the Communist Party of Russia, the right-wing National Salvation Front, and
several other extremist parties and organizations that allegedly took up arms against
the government on October 3-4.
From mid-1990 to mid-1991, while Yeltsin was Chairman of the new Russian
Supreme Soviet, Khasbulatov, who appeared to be a democratic reformer, served under
him as Deputy Chairman. After Yeltsin was elected President in June 1991, he
supported Khasbulatov to succeed him as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
Khasbulatov gradually shifted his position during 1992, emerging as Yeltsin's nemesis,
backed by the hard-line communists and ultranationalists. Khasbulatov built an
effective anti-Yeltsin majority in the legislature which, by the winter of 1992-1993,
opposed and sought to undermine many of Yeltsin's key domestic and foreign policies.
This led to an extreme form of gridlock between the executive and legislative branches
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that paralyzed the central government, exacerbated economic distress, and heightened
the danger of the break-up of the Russian Federation.
Yeltsin scored an impressive victory over his parliamentary opposition in the Apr.
25, 1993 national referendum. (See CRS Report 93-456 F, Russian Referendum.) He
sought to capitalize on that by convening a Constitutional Assembly in June 1993 to
draw up a new constitution that would break the political deadlock by strengthening
the presidency and holding parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1993, 2 years
ahead of schedule. The present Constitution, however, defines the CPD as the
paramount political organ of state and gives it exclusive authority to change the
Constitution. The parliamentary majority, led by Khasbulatov, was determined to resist
Yeltsin's draft constitution and early parliamentary elections, both of which threatened
to terminate their political careers. Yeltsin tried, unsuccessfully, to enlist the leaders
of the republics and regions of the Russian Federation to force through either a new
constitution or early elections. (See CRS Report 93-577 F, Russia: Toward A New
Constitution.) Yeltsin's failure emboldened his opponents, who regained some of the
confidence and aggressiveness they had lost after the April referendum and renewed
their attacks against many of the government's programs. Despite his popular support,
Yeltsin could find no constitutional means of ending this political impasse. This
ultimately drove him to dissolve the legislature in September.
On September 21, Yeltsin announced in a televised speech that he was doing away
with the Supreme Soviet and CPD, and called for elections on December 11-12 for a
new bicameral legislature along the lines envisioned in the proposed draft constitution.
He acknowledged that this was unconstitutional, but said that it was necessary to break
the deadlock that was paralysing government, blocking economic recovery, and
threatening the break-up of the state. As further justification, he said that the Russian
people had endorsed his leadership and his policies in the April referendum, and voted
overwhelmingly for early parliamentary elections, and that the legislature was defying
the will of the people. He also said he would agree to early presidential election after
a new parliament was in place. On September 22, a presidential spokesman said that
the government would take no physical action against the present legislature, unless
it provoked violence, in which case the government would act forcefully. (See CRS
Report 93-851 F, Yeltsin Disbands the Russian Parliament.)
That same day Rutskoi declared himself Acting President and was immediately
endorsed by the Supreme Soviet. Rutskoi ordered government agencies to obey only
him or Khasbulatov. He and Khasbulatov invoked a Constitutional Amendment
adopted by the CPD in December 1992 stipulating that the President be immediately
impeached if he attempts to dissolve the legislature. The Constitutional Court, in
emergency session, voted 9-4, that Yeltsin's action violated the Constitution and might
justify impeachment. Rutskoi announced that he was dismissing Defense Minister
Grachev, Interior Minister Yerin, and the newly appointed Security Minister, Golushko.
Rutskoi named hardline Gen. Vladislav Achalov his Defense Minister. Rutskoi's
Security Minister was Viktor Barannikov, whom Yeltsin dismissed from that post in
August 1993. The "power ministries," however, refused to take orders from Rutskoi's
appointees. Khasbulatov called for an immediate nationwide strike to protest Yeltsin's
action, but none took place. Moscow and the rest of Russia remained relatively calm.
The hardline deputies approved resolutions viewed by many as increasingly harsh and
shrill. One resolution altered the criminal code to permit the death penalty for Yeltsin
and his aides who attempted to obstruct the legislature.
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The legislature could not get the quorum required to convene the CPD. On
September 23, the legislature voted to expel many pro-Yeltsin deputies, thus lowering
the quorum requirements enough to allow convocation of the CPD, which promptly
voted virtually unanimously to uphold the legislative decisions already taken. Many
influential deputies resigned. On September 29, a "military court" in the parliamentary
building decreed a death sentence for one of Yeltsin's advisors.
In the following week it became clear that Yeltsin held most of the high cards. He
was unequivocally backed by the "power ministries" (Defense, Interior, and Security)
and controlled radio and TV.
On Sunday, October 3, an angry and increasingly violent crowd of 5-10,000 anti-
Yeltsin activists broke through the security forces surrounding the parliament building,
which seemed quite unprepared for the size and aggressiveness of the crowd. Rutskoi
exhorted the crowd of excited supporters to seize the nearby Moscow mayor's office and
the Ostankino TV center several miles away. Afterward, Khasbulatov told them that
their next target should be the Kremlin, the seat of Yeltsin's government.
On Sunday afternoon and evening the crowd, including well-armed army veterans
and paramilitary forces, seized the Moscow mayor's office with impunity and attacked
the TV center, knocking the pro-Yeltsin state TV broadcasts off the air. Yeltsin's
government appeared to be in serious jeopardy. The insurgents, however, were unable
to persuade the military and security forces to desert Yeltsin's government. Forces
loyal to the government repelled the attack on the TV center after a bloody battle. On
Monday morning, October 4, the government marshalled elements of six elite divisions
and crushed the opposition that day, amidst heavy fighting. The storming of the
parliament building by elite troops supported by tank cannon fire quickly forced the
surrender of the outgunned anti-Yeltsin forces and the incarceration of their leaders.
Deaths over the two days are estimated to be well over one hundred, with many
hundreds wounded. (See CRS Report 93-884 F, Russia's Violent Showdown of October
3-4: Analysis and Implications; 93-879F, Russia's Violent Showdown: A Chronology of
Events, September 21-October 4, 1993; and Video Program LTR 93-1361, Russia's
Political Showdown.)
In the short term, at least, Yeltsin appears to have won a decisive victory,
although some speculate that he may now be more dependent on the military and
security forces. The parliamentary opposition led by Khasbulatov has been swept away
and new.parliamentary elections are set for December 11-12. On the same dates there
are also to be elections for new, smaller regional legislatures and a referendum on a
new constitution, based on the Constitutional Assembly's July 12, 1993 draft which
is being modified under Yeltsin's supervision and is to be published in early November.
Following his October 4 victory, Yeltsin banned numerous political parties charged with
participating in the armed uprising. His government shut down 15 allegedly extremist
newspapers and ordered Prauda and Sovietskaya Rossiya to change their names, chief
editors, and political orientation. The government also instituted a vigorous crackdown
on crime in Moscow, including the highly controversial expulsion of thousands of
(relatively dark-skinned) natives of the Caucasus, who are viewed by many Moscovites
as disproportionately active in organized crime .. and in retail trade. These measures
raise concerns in Russia and the West that Yeltsin may be moving toward authoritarian
rule. Preliminary opinion polls, however, indicate that despite, or perhaps because of,
these measures, Yeltsin's popularity has increased since October.
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Economic Developments
Economic Crisis
In 1991, the (Soviet) gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 17%. Consumer prices
rose by 140%. In 1992, Russia's GDP fell by another 20% and inflation soared to over
2,600%. In the first half of 1993, production continued to fall but the rate of inflation
slackened a bit. Russia is also plagued by environmental degradation and ecological
catastrophes of staggering proportions, and the near collapse of the health system.
Economic Reform Program. On Oct. 28, 1991, Yeltsin announced a sweeping
economic reform program, developed by a team led by Yegor Gaidar, a 35-year-old
academic economist with no prior government or management experience. Gaidar was
named First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs in November. The
Yeltsin-Gaidar program was considered by most western specialists to be the most
promising plan for transforming the Russian economy, and also as an engine for
marketization in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Its key elements included:
a) economic stabilization through tough monetary and credit policies, drastic
devaluation of the ruble, and greater budget discipline; b) price liberalization to allow
prices to rise to world market levels; c) wage policy of slowing the growth of wages in
the public sector to control inflation and deregulating wages in the private sector to
stimulate productivity; and d) a new tax policy featuring a 28% value added tax (VAT),
an enterprise wage tax, and a profits tax.
Yeltsin warned the Russian people that this program, though absolutely
indispensable, would cause a great deal of hardship. He predicted, however, that
improvements would begin to be felt by late 1992 -- an assessment that proved overly
optimistic. Mounting social and political pressure, however, forced the government to
modify some of its policies. Tight monetary and credit policies were relaxed in order
to provide more money for workers' salaries and benefits and more credit to keep giant
state enterprises afloat, causing the budget deficit to rise sharply and fueling an
inflation rate of over 25% per month. The VAT was reduced from 28% to 15% on
certain staple products. In the protracted political struggle between Yeltsin and the
Supreme Soviet, both sides often resorted to populist economic measures to placate or
"bribe" various constituencies.
In the second half of 1992, the Government launched a major program of
privatization of state property by public auction. Every citizen was issued a
privatization voucher with a face value of 10,000 rubles. To ensure broad support for
the program, other provisions include workers being given a share, thought not a
controlling share, in their enterprises, and reducing restrictions on foreign investors.
The plan calls for long-term efforts to privatize economic enterprises, land, and other
property and to shift from military to civilian-centered production. Many factories
were expected to close and others to cut their work force, bringing levels of
unemployment previously unknown in Russia, but there have been few such closures.
These prospects aroused strong opposition from Civic Union, representing large
state enterprises, and also from populist parties and groups. This swelled the
opposition to Gaidar at the December CPD and led to his replacement by
Chernomyrdin, the former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the oil and gas industry.
Chernomyrdin pledged to continue the transition to a market economy, but at a slower
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pace, with more government regulation to stabilize industrial production and prevent
widespread enterprise bankruptcies. The widespread expectation was that he would
seek to roll back important elements of the Gaidar program. This did not happen. In
January 1993, Chernomyrdin shocked the Supreme Soviet by saying that his top
priority was to check arrest hyperinflation. This sounded very much like the fiscal
discipline that was the key to Gaidar's program -- and was severely criticized by the
conservative opposition in the Supreme Soviet. In late July the Supreme Soviet
renewed its attack on the government's economic reform program, taking particular aim
at privatization, which had been moving ahead very rapidly. At the same time, a furor
arose over the Central Bank's abrupt decision to call in all pre-1993 rubles. This
aroused sharp public criticism, which may damage the government and President
Yeltsin. On September 18, Yeltsin brought Gaidar back into the Cabinet as First
Deputy Prime Minister, under Chernomyrdin.
Foreign Policy
The shift in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev from confrontation to
cooperation -- the so-called "new thinking" -- evolved further in Yeltsin's Russia
primarily in ways favorable to the West. The most dramatic source of change is the
abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology in foreign policy, allowing Russia to behave
"like a country instead of a cause." This new pragmatic, nonideological approach is
evident in Russia's relations with countries such as South Korea, Israel, and China.
The dissolution of Moscow's East European empire and then of the multinational
Soviet Union itself incline Russia toward a national rather than imperial foreign policy.
Finally, the end of the cold war and the political and economic transformation of Russia
create a new international security environment in which Russia can view western
states as partners and natural allies rather than inevitable foes. The hard-line neo-
communist and ultranationalist opposition to Yeltsin's Government, however, opposes
these changes and seeks to reestablish Moscow's previous power.
Senior officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Soviet asserted
in late 1991 that Russia's top foreign policy priority was to alleviate the economic crisis.
Operationally this meant maximum cooperation with the West -- beyond Gorbachevean
"new thinking." Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan; Yeltsin cut off
military supplies and the Kabul government fell. Gorbachev reduced aid to Cuba and
Vietnam; Yeltsin ordered Soviet combat troops out of Cuba. Gorbachev opened the door
for Jewish emigration and moved toward better relations with Israel; Yeltsin established
diplomatic relations with Israel. Gorbachev sought large-scale western economic
assistance and IMF membership; Yeltsin committed Russia to a reform program that
achieved both. Gorbachev negotiated three major arms reduction treaties predicated
on asymmetrical cuts to achieve parity of forces. Yeltsin agreed to a radical nuclear
force reduction agreement which calls for eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (the core of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces), and his defense program calls for Russian
reductions to levels well below the United States and NATO in many categories.
Gorbachev ended the enmity between the Soviet Union and the West; Yeltsin seeks
alliance, NATO membership for Russia, and agrees to NATO peacekeeping troops on
former Soviet territory. The national security policy of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev is described by some as "the new 'new thinking." It includes closer
relations with Western and Central Europe and a possible "special relationship" with
Germany. This remarkable transformation is not completely smooth. In May 1992, for
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example, the Bush Administration imposed trade sanctions on a Russian space
technology company that sold rocket motors to the Indian Space Research Organization
in contradiction of U.S. efforts to halt the spread of missile technology. More recently
Moscow has publicly opposed military action against Serbia and unilateral U.S. attacks
against Iraq.
Another vital task for Russia is to establish sound relations with the other states
of the former Soviet Union. This now appears to be a greater challenge for Russia than
was ending the cold war and more crucial than relations with the West. It may be the
acid test of "the new 'new thinking." The Russian Government would have preferred
that the C.I.S. maintain a "common strategic space" with armed forces under a unified
command and a "common economic space" with a single currency, coordinated economic
policies, and a free trade zone -- under Russian leadership, of course. Instead,
centrifugal forces of nationalism, especially in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan, are weakening the C.I.S. Russia finds itself closer to the Central Asians and
Belarus than to the others.
The struggle between Russia and Ukraine is the most publicized and the most
important. Ukrainian leaders now seem intent on absolute and complete independence
and see Russian advocacy of a cohesive C.I.S. as a thinly veiled attempt to reimpose
Russian dominance. This is what underlies Ukraine's insistence on its own armed
forces, currency, and independent foreign policy and has led to serious tension with
Moscow over such issues as the transfer to Russia of nuclear weapons deployed in
Ukraine, control of the Black Sea Fleet, and the status of the Crimean Peninsula. (The
military issues are discussed below.) The Crimea may be the most dangerous issue of
all. Viewed by Russians as historically part of Russia, it was arbitrarily "given" to
Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954. Crimea's population is 67% Russian and 26%
Ukrainian. Only a slim majority in Crimea voted for independence in Ukraine's
December 1991 referendum. The Crimean legislature adopted a declaration of
independence from Ukraine in April, although it soon backed away and reached at least
a temporary compromise agreement with Kiev. The Russian CPD in April 1992
approved a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of Crimea illegal. Russian
nationalists, including Vice President Rutskoi, insist that Crimea is Russian. On July
9, 1993, the Russian Supreme Soviet voted almost unanimously declaring Sevastopol,
the capital of the Crimea and home port of the Black Sea Fleet, a cit of the Russian
Federation. The Ukrainian and Russian governments both denounced this act as
irresponsible and illegal. Moscow and Kiev want to avoid conflict over Crimea, but
their hands could be forced by local events. If armed conflict arose between Russia and
Ukraine, over Crimea or some other issue, it could have extremely grave consequences.
(See CRS Issue Brief 92072, Ukraine.)
Russia's relations with other neighbors are strained by similar problems. A
Russian nationalist separatist movement in eastern Moldova is fighting for secession,
supported by the predominantly Russian 14th (former Soviet) Army, stationed there.
(See CRS Report 92-495 F, Moldova Conflict: An Update, June 1992.) All three Baltic
states insist that the Russian (former Soviet) armies stationed on their territories be
withdrawn promptly. Moscow says that it cannot be completed until 1995 because of
the economic conditions in Russia, including a severe housing shortage. Also, new and
proposed Latvian and Estonian citizenship laws deny most of their large Russian
minorities voting and land ownership rights. The Russians turn to Moscow for support,
which it provides -- so far mostly verbally. There is also a potentially serious territorial
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problem with Kazakhstan, whose northern tier, adjacent to Southern Russia, is
populated predominantly by Russians. Kazakh fears of a separatist movement in the
north or of territorial claims by Russia are a troubling factor in their relations.
Russia further aggravated relations with these neighbors. Defense Minister
Grachev threatened the use of armed force to protect Russians in other C.I.S. states.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in an interview in Le Monde (Paris), said that "I do not rule
out territorial changes in that part of the world," (eastern Moldova and Crimea) albeit
within a political rather than a military context. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the
Russian Supreme Soviet, threatened Russian military intervention in Georgia on behalf
of Georgia's North Ossetians, who seek unification with South Ossetia, part of Russia.
On Feb. 28, 1993, Yeltsin declared that Russia should be granted authority to guarantee
peace and security on the territory of the other former Soviet states and on March 3
Russia submitted this proposal to the U.N.. This may signal a significant shift in
Russian policy toward its European C.I.S. neighbors. Alternatively, it may be an
attempt by the Yeltsin Government to use nationalist rhetoric to attract some of the
supporters of its hardline nationalist opponents.
East Asia was not a high priority in Russian foreign policy in 1992, although some
in Moscow would make it SO. Relations with Japan have been strained for years by a
dispute over four islands in the Southern Kuriles captured by the Soviet Union in 1945.
Japan claims they are part of its home islands and insists on their return. Washington
supports Tokyo's claim. Large-scale Japanese aid to Russia is conditioned on return
of the islands. Yeltsin's government seemed to be moving toward satisfying Tokyo, but
fears that surrender of the islands might give the opposition hardline nationalists a
potent weapon and further inflame separatism in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far
East led Yeltsin to abruptly cancel a scheduled trip to Japan in September. Japan has
more capacity for aid and investment in Russia than any other nation, which increases
the stakes on settling the territorial dispute. Moscow is continuing the Gorbachev
policy of improving relations with China. Both states are seized by domestic problems.
Decades-old border disputes are being slowly resolved, cross-border trade is burgeoning,
and Russia is looking to China's economic development zones as a possibly useful
model.
Another striking feature of Russian foreign policy, accelerating a trend evident
under Gorbachev, is retrenchment in the Third World, especially in regions far from
Russia. Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia seem virtually to have disappeared
from the Russian radar screen. Even in the Middle East, much closer geographically
and in terms of national interest, Moscow's profile is much lower.
Russian arms sales, however, are a source of concern in the West. Moscow's sale
of diesel submarines to Iran and advanced jet fighters to China, although driven by
economic considerations, were viewed as destabilizing in the West.
Defense Policy
Fundamental Shakeup of the Military
The impact of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. on the armed forces has been
enormous. When the C.I.S. was formed, General Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the last Soviet
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Minister of Defense, was named head of C.I.S. armed forces. Russia tried hard to
maintain a unified military, but differences within the C.I.S., especially between Russia
and Ukraine, led to the creation of separate national armies. Ukraine set the pace,
beginning in October 1991. Many others followed. Russia grudgingly acknowledged the
new reality and established its own Ministry of Defense. In April 1992 Yeltsin
appointed General Pavel Grachev, former Commander of Airborne Forces, as Defense
Minister. Andrei Kokoshin, a liberal civilian policy analyst, is the First Deputy
Minister of Defense. (See CRS Issue Brief 92014, Soviet Armed Forces in Transition.)
A CIA-DIA report to the Joint Economic Committee, made public on June 8, 1992,
highlights recent sharp declines in Soviet defense spending, which fell by 15% in 1991.
Weapons procurement fell even faster. Since the high point in 1988, spending for
procurement of tanks and artillery has dropped by 60% and for aerospace by 50%. The
CIA-DIA report predicts a startling 60%-85% drop in weapons "sales" this year, as a
growing share of the shrinking defense budget is dedicated to improving the generally
miserable living conditions of the troops and junior to mid-level officers. The report
also predicted that if present trends continue, Russian defense spending would drop to
4%-6% of GNP, compared to the estimated 14%-17% during the Brezhnev years. There
has been very little progress in conversion of production in the thousands of defense
plants to civilian needs, so as weapons procurement falls, defense plants are idled. They
are generally not being shut down as yet, but it is doubtful if the government can afford
to finance them as in the past.
It is difficult to exaggerate the turmoil in the armed forces and the defense
industries. The privileged position they held for decades in the allocation of resources
has been broken, as has their almost sacrosanct status in official ideology and
propaganda. Hundreds of thousands of troops being brought home from Eastern
Europe and other parts of the former Soviet Union have no housing. Living in tents
in central Russia and Siberia is a frightful prospect for them. This is a factor in
Russia's timetable for withdrawing troops from Eastern Germany and the Baltic states,
although the Balts and others are concerned that Russia -- or the Russian military --
may have more sinister motives. Germany has addressed the problem by paying to
build 36,000 new apartments in Russia. Massive budget cuts and troop reductions will
force tens of thousands of officers out of the ranks into an economy moving toward
depression and massive unemployment. In May 1992, the Russian Defense Ministry
announced plans to cut Russian armed forces in half, to about 1.5 million men, by the
year 2000. Other government officials suggest a total of 1.2 million men. Such cuts
would represent a huge change in the Eurasian military balance.
The career officer corps, by and large, was imbued with a strong sense of Soviet
nationalism and internationalism. For most of them the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and
the creation of substantially reduced rival national armies is a personal and professional
catastrophe. Their anger is compounded by often squalid living conditions and what
they perceive as insults to their dignity and honor by politicians and the popular press.
No wonder then, that despite the humiliating failure of the August 1991 coup and the
strong tradition of the Soviet military not to intervene in politics, many observers in
Russia and the West fear the possibility of a military coup or military complicity in an
authoritarian takeover, especially if the economy does not improve.
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Control of Nuclear Weapons
Over 80% of the strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union
are in Russia. The remainder are based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. All
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, which had been more widely dispersed before 1991,
reportedly have been moved to Russia, awaiting dismantlement. When the C.I.S. was
formed in December 1991, the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus pledged
that they would transfer all nuclear weapons to Russia and promptly ratify the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. In May 1992, in Lisbon,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed that all strategic nuclear forces outside
Russia would be transferred to Russia by 1999 to be dismantled. This position is
strongly endorsed by the United States and is considered a prerequisite in Washington
and Moscow for ratifying START I and II. Substantial resistance arose in Ukraine,
however, especially in its parliament, to giving up the nuclear weapons deployed on its
territory -- 130 6-warhead SS-19 and 46 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs, and about 40
strategic bombers and their associated cruise missiles. On Sept. 3, 1993, Yeltsin and
Ukrainian President Kravchuk signed an agreement whereby Ukraine would transfer
all nuclear warheads on its soil to Russia and would receive nuclear fuel for its reactors
from Russia. Moscow soon "annulled" the agreement, however, saying that Ukraine had
unilaterally altered it. Russia insists that the original agreement referred to all nuclear
weapons on Ukrainian soil, while the Ukrainian version refers only to those weapons
covered by START. Kravchuk says the 46 SS-24s are not covered by START, an
interpretation rejected by Russia and the United States.
The command and control system for strategic nuclear weapons is believed to be
very tightly and centrally controlled, with the Russian President and defense minister
responsible for authorizing their use. Ukraine, however, now appears to be challenging
Russia's exclusive control. Kravchuk has openly acknowledged seeking some
mechanism to enable Ukraine to block the launch of nuclear weapons from its territory,
a proposal that Moscow has steadfastly resisted. Many U.S. experts now worry that
Ukraine might be able technologically to defeat or circumvent Russia's electronic
control mechanisms and assert Ukrainian operational control over those weapons. This
could provoke a crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations. (See CRS Issue Brief 91144,
Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Issues and Prospects.)
Division of Soviet Military Assets Among C.I.S. States
The C.I.S. states are struggling with many thorny questions concerning the
division of military assets. By the end of 1991, Soviet armed forces were by far the
largest in the world: approximately 4 million men under arms (down from 4.5 million
in 1985), compared to about 2.5 million in the United States. The huge conscript mass
is multinational; the officer corps is overwhelmingly Slavic and predominantly Russian.
If each C.I.S. state simply were to keep the forces deployed on its territory, Russia,
despite its size, would be at a disadvantage because the offensive-oriented Soviet
military doctrine strongly favored forward deployment. Therefore, the strongest and
best equipped ground forces deployed on Soviet territory were in the western regions,
i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. Those units are especially heavy in tanks
and artillery. Most of the army divisions deployed in Russia were undermanned or
skeleton units, at low levels of readiness, and often with obsolescent equipment. This
imbalance was partly offset by Russia's claim to the very powerful Soviet forces
stationed in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Also, three of the four Soviet fleets
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are based at Russian ports. In May, C.I.S. leaders agreed on a formula for dividing
ground force weaponry regulated by the 1990 CFE Treaty. Russia's share of the
weapons that were allotted to the Soviet Union in the treaty is as follows: tanks, 6,400
of 13,150; artillery, 6,415 of 13,175; other armored vehicles, 11,480 of 20,000; combat
aircraft, 3,450 of 5,150; combat helicopters, 890 of 1,500. Presently some 700,000 of the
former Soviet Union's best and best-equipped troops are deployed in Ukraine, including
the Black Sea Fleet. In May 1992, Kiev announced the goal of a 200,000 man force.
The biggest controversies in dividing military assets are between Russia and
Ukraine. The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet is the best known. That fleet is based
primarily at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula, part of Ukraine. Kravchuk initially
claimed all ships based at Ukrainian ports but subsequently reduced his demand to
about one third of the fleet. Moscow insists that it is fundamentally a strategic force
that has historically been part of the Russian Navy. (The Crimea was annexed by
Russia in 1783 and had no connection to Ukraine before 1954.) The two sides earlier
agreed in principle to divide the fleet between them with the lion's share going to
Russia. On Sept. 3, 1993, however, Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed that Russia would
"buy out" Ukraine's portion of the fleet, with Russia's "payment" being a reduction of
Ukraine's large debt to Russia and continued supply of Russian gas and oil. This
agreement is strongly opposed by Ukrainian nationalists in the parliament.
Most of the C.I.S. states are creating national armies. In Central Asia, however,
impoverished economies and the absence of major external threats incline some
governments to rely on Russian security guarantees. At a C.I.S. summit meeting in
May 1992, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan
signed a collective security treaty pledging joint defense in the event of a foreign attack
against any of them.
Questions for U.S. Policy
There is no doubt that from the U.S. perspective most of the political, economic
and military changes in Russia are very positive and should be encouraged. It is quite
possible, however, that future developments, such as the revival of authoritarianism or
the escalation of conflict among C.I.S. states, could undermine recent Russian
achievements. This gives rise to a number of questions for U.S. policy makers.
Whom Should the United States Support?
While most observers see Boris Yeltsin as the best hope for a successful democratic
and free market transformation in Russia, others caution against tying U.S. policy too
much to one man as we did with Gorbachev earlier. Measured by western
democratic standards, Yeltsin has many flaws. Although his broad policies and
principles seem genuinely democratic, he continues to exhibit authoritarian tendencies,
the result perhaps of both personal temperament and the communist political culture
of which he is a product. Yeltsin's often abrasive and uncompromising style
antagonized some of his natural allies and supporters in parliament, driving them into
opposition. Not all opponents of Yeltsin are necessarily opponents of democracy and
market reform. The draft constitution he proposed in April 1993 would have created
a strongly presidential republic in which the legislative branch would have only a
secondary role. He admitted that his September 21 decree disbanding parliament was
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unconstitutional; critics' charges that it amounted to a coup are not without merit.
Such acts contribute to lack of respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law. His
increasingly tight control of radio and TV in 1993, his imposition of broadcast news
censorship after September 21, and newspaper censorship on October 5, trouble some
of his Russian and Western supporters. Yeltsin's harsh measures in October against
the Constitutional Court, opposition parties and newspapers, and a number of local
legislatures and regional administrators that had sided with the parliamentary
opposition, are justified by Yeltsin supporters as necessary, temporary measures to
stabilize a volatile situation. They note that Yeltsin acted similarly right after the
Soviet coup-attempt of August 1991, and promptly restored and expanded political
freedoms. Yeltsin's opponents and some democratic critics, however, say they fear a
new authoritarianism.
Despite these and other flaws, however, Yeltsin's hardline opponents make him
look very good in western eyes. Nevertheless, many U.S. observers, including many
Members of Congress, express concern about whether U.S. policy is too heavily
committed to Yeltsin as an individual. If the events of October 3-4 do prove to be a
decisive defeat for the "red-brown" coalition, that could have the effect of depriving
Yeltsin of the opponents that make him look so good to the West. That might
strengthen the arguments of those who seek less unequivocal U.S. support for Yeltsin
personally and more support for democratic and market principles, even if that means
agreeing occasionally with some of Yeltsin's opponents.
The question of who to support has another dimension: what sort of Russia should
the United States support? By most objective measures Yeltsin's government is the
most democratic and the most firmly committed to market reform of the C.I.S. states.
Some see Russia not only as an example but also as an engine of reform. In this view,
the United States should support Russia's leadership as "first among equals" in the
C.I.S. Others, like former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, object to this
approach, warning that we should not encourage Russian domination of its neighbors.
This, they argue, is precisely the imperial tendency that we should try to discourage,
for the benefit of the other successor states and for Russia's own good.
U.S. Assistance
On October 6, Congress passed the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which President
Bush proposed on April 1 to provide economic assistance to Russia and other C.I.S.
states .2532, H.R. 4547). Its provisions include various humanitarian and technical
assistance activities; $12 billion as the U.S. share in an IMF quota increase; up to $3
billion in currency stabilization funds; elimination of various restrictive trade and aid
legislation; greater flexibility in agricultural assistance programs; and expanded use of
previously appropriated Department of Defense funds for demilitarization activities.
Associated with this package but not included in the Administration's proposed
legislation, is a new pledge of $1.1 billion in agricultural credit guarantees. At the
Vancouver summit (April 3-4) President Clinton announced additional aid for Russia.
On Sept. 23, 1993, the Senate passed H.R. 2295 appropriating $1.6 billion in
supplemental FY1993 funding and $904 million for FY1994 aid to the states of the
former Soviet Union. The final bill was approved by Congress and signed by President
Clinton on September 30. (See Issue Brief 91050, U.S. and International Assistance to
the Former Soviet Union.)
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CRS Issue Brief
Russia
Updated October 21, 1993
by
Stuart D. Goldman
.
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
CRS
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
New Russia and Its Significance
Largest Soviet Successor State
State and Government Structure
Russia's Significance for the United States
Political Developments
Russian Identity Crisis
Leadership Struggle
Economic Developments
Economic Crisis
Foreign Policy
Defense Policy
Fundamental Shakeup of the Military
Control of Nuclear Weapons
Division of Soviet Military Assets Among C.I.S. States
Questions For U.S. Policy
Whom Should the United States Support?
U.S. Assistance
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Russia
SUMMARY
On Oct. 3-4, 1993, the political con-
Russia continues Gorbachev's foreign
frontation between Russian President
policies of cooperation with the West and
Yeltsin and the hardline parliamentary
retrenchment in the Third World. One
opposition erupted in armed conflict. On
Russian priority is to establish sound rela-
October 4, army units loyal to Yeltsin
tions with the other Soviet successor states,
subdued the opposition and stormed the
especially Ukraine. Another is to ensure
parliament building, leading to the surren-
the protection of the rights of Russian
der of the hardliners and the incarceration
minorities in those states. These goals
of their leaders. In the short-term, at least,
sometimes appear to conflict. Moscow is
this would appear to be a decisive victory
claiming a special "peacekeeping" role in
for Yeltsin. Since late 1992, the Yeltsin
troubled areas of the former Soviet Union,
government had been locked in an intense
such as Tajikistan, Georgia, Nagorno-Kara-
power struggle with the increasingly anti-
bakh, and Moldova. This raises concerns in
reform legislature led by Ruslan Khasbulat-
some of the other newly independent states
ov. A national referendum on April 25
about possible Russian designs for reestab-
strengthened Yeltsin's hand substantially,
lishing its dominance over them.
but he was unable to capitalize on that by
forcing the adoption of a new constitution
The military is in turmoil, facing severe
or early parliamentary elections, both of
force reductions and budget cuts. Russian
which were resisted by the anti-reform
armed forces are expected to be 1.2-1.5
majority in the legislature. On Sept. 21,
million by the year 2000, down from 4.5
1993, Yeltsin tried to break the political
million Soviet troops in 1985. Controversy
deadlock with a decree disbanding parlia-
over control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal
ment and calling for elections December 11-
remains. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Bela-
12. This led to the siege at the parliament
rus agreed in principle in 1992 to transfer
building and the violence of October 3-4.
all strategic nuclear weapons deployed on
their territory to Russia by 1999, there to
Meanwhile, the economy continues to
be dismantled. Ukraine, however, is seek-
contract despite the fact that economic
ing to link withdrawal of nuclear weapons
reforms, begun in January 1992, have
to financial compensation and security
achieved some important results. State
guarantees from the West. Growing ten-
control of prices and wages was greatly
sion between Kiev and Moscow is causing
reduced, a money economy was introduced,
Ukraine to reevaluate its commitment to
and a major program to privatize state-
give up nuclear weapons. These disputes
owned property is under way. But inflation
are delaying ratification of the START I
soared while production declined. These
and II Treaties. The newly independent
problems, together with the fear of bank-
states are struggling to divide the Soviet
ruptcies of large industrial enterprises and
armed forces among themselves, giving rise
resultant unemployment, led to the replace-
to conflicts such as between Russia and
ment of the reformist acting Prime Minis-
Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet. Other
ter, Gaidar, by the more conservative Cher-
sensitive military issues are Russia's role in
nomyrdin. The government, however, con-
the conflicts in Georgia, Tajikistan, and
tinued to pursue market reforms, and
Moldova, and the withdrawal of Russian
Yeltsin named Gaidar First Deputy Prime
troops from Estonia and Latvia.
Minister on September 18.
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
CRS
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Oct. 3-4, 1993, the political confrontation between Russian President Boris
Yeltsin and the hardline parliamentary opposition erupted in armed conflict. On October
4, army units loyal to Yeltsin stormed the parliament building, leading to the surrender
of the hardliners and the incarceration of their leaders. This would appear to be a
decisive victory for Yeltsin. The obstructionist parliamentary opposition has been swept
away, but so has the entire parliament, until new elections now scheduled for December.
Yeltsin has also suspended the Constitutional Court, banned several opposition political
parties, and shut down many opposition newspapers, raising some concerns about a full
return to democracy. On October 4, President Clinton and congressional leaders
announced continued support for Yeltsin after receiving assurances from the Russian
President of democratic elections in December and respect for human rights.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The New Russia and Its Significance
Largest Soviet Successor State
Russia was by far the largest republic of the U.S.S.R. Its population of about 150
million accounted for slightly more than half the Soviet total. Its 6.6 million square
miles comprised 76.2% of the territory of the U.S.S.R. and it is nearly twice the size of
the United States, stretching from Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg in Northern Europe
to Vladivostok and Kamchatka on the Pacific, across 11 time zones. Russia also has the
lion's share of the natural resources, industrial base, and military assets of the former
Soviet Union.
Russia also claims to be the principal successor, and in some respects the legal
successor, of the U.S.S.R. Russia, for example, with nearly universal support, took the
Soviet seat the United Nations' Security Council. Russia also took over the Soviet
Foreign Ministry and operational control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Russia's claim
to be the Soviet successor state, however, and its claim to ownership of most former
Soviet assets, is disputed by many other C.I.S. states. Ukraine, for example, disputes
Russia's right to negotiate nuclear arms reductions unilaterally with the United States
and is believed by many to be trying to establish control over the strategic nuclear
weapons on its territory. Division of the economic assets of the U.S.S.R. is also a very
contentious issue among C.I.S. states, despite their extreme economic interdependence.
State and Government Structure
Russia is a multinational, multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a
complex federal structure inherited from the Soviet period. Within the Russian
Federation are 21 republics and 18 other ethnic enclaves called autonomous regions or
districts (krays, oblasts, and okrugs). The principal political subdivision of the
ethnically Russian part of the federation is the oblast (region), of which there are 49.
In some respects Russia's multinational federal structure resembles that of the former
Soviet Union, on which it was patterned. The demography, however, is different.
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Ethnic Russians, comprising 81.5% of the population, are a dominant majority. The
next largest nationality groups are Tatars (3.8%), Ukrainians (3%), and Chuvash (1.2%).
Furthermore, in most of the republics and autonomous regions of the Russian
Federation that are the national homelands of ethnic minorities, the titular nationality
constitutes a minority of the population. Russians are a majority in many of these
enclaves. Nevertheless, the prolonged political confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches has paralyzed the central government, allowing many of the
republics and regions to demand greater autonomy, and in some cases independence.
Some see this as a threat to the cohesion of the Russian state.
The structure of the Russian government has been transformed several times since
1990 and is about to change again as Yeltsin creates a new legislature and a new draft
constitution. The old Constitution provided for a separation of powers between
independently elected executive and legislative branches, with some features of both the
U.S. and French systems. Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia in June 1991,
the first time in history that Russia's top leader was democratically elected. The
President serves a five year term and, with the approval of the legislature, appointed
a Prime Minister. The President and Prime Minister appointed government ministers
and other officials. The President and Legislature had been struggling over the power
to appoint and confirm the government and other high officials and over the character
and pace of economic reform.
The complex two-tier legislature was a legacy of Gorbachev's perestroika
(restructuring). The top tier was the Congress of Peoples' Deputies (CPD), nominally
the paramount political organ of state. Its 1068 deputies were directly elected in March
1990, when the Communist Party was still dominant. The CPD had two regular two-
week sessions per year. It elected from its ranks a Supreme Soviet of 252 deputies,
which was the day-to-day functioning legislature. Factions and political parties were
emerging but were weak and poorly organized. The judiciary is the least developed of
the three branches. While theoretically independent, its personnel and procedures have
not yet been fully transformed from the discredited Soviet-era system. Reform of the
legal system has begun but much of the old structure and personnel is still in place.
Following his defeat of the parliamentary opposition in October 1993, Yeltsin decreed
the creation of a new bicameral legislature called the Federal Assembly, to be elected
on Dec. 11-12, 1993. The lower chamber, the State Duma, will have 450 members, 225
chosen from single-member constituencies and 225 from national party lists, with
proportional representation and a minimum 5% threshold for party representation in
the chamber. The upper chamber, called the Federation Council, will have 176
members, two from each of the 88 regions and republics of the Russian Federation.
Russia's Significance for the United States
Russia is not as central to U.S. interests and concerns as was the Soviet Union.
Throughout the postwar period, U.S. foreign and defense policy was based on
containing Soviet expansionism and the spread of communism. This shaped the U.S.
role in the world as well as domestic policies. With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and
the emergence of a new Russia apparently bent on democratization and market reform
and seeking full integration into the western community of nations, much of the Soviet
military threat, especially to western Europe, appears to have disappeared. Yet
developments in Russia are still important to the United States. Russia will play a
major role in determining the future national security environment in Europe, the
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Middle East, and Asia. Russia's role could be cooperative, passive, or disruptive,
depending on internal developments, and the triumph of democratic forces in Russia is
not assured. Russia is also a key factor in implementing the START I and II strategic
force reduction treaties, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and in
preventing nuclear proliferation. Such key issues as the U.S. budget deficit, the "peace
dividend," defense conversion, the future of NATO, and the U.S. role in the world will
all be affected by developments in Russia. Also, although Russia's economy is now
severely distressed, it is potentially an important market and trading partner. Russia
is the only country in the world that has more bountiful natural resources than the
United States, including vast oil and gas reserves. It has a large, well-educated labor
force and a huge scientific establishment. Furthermore, many of Russia's needs -- food
and food processing, oil and gas extraction, computers, communications, and
transportation -- are in areas in which the United States is highly competitive.
Political Developments
Russia has reached what could be a unique turning point in its history. Profound
change has occurred and is continuing, though the outcome is uncertain. Central to
this process is a veritable Russian "identity crisis."
Russian Identity Crisis
The turmoil in Russia -- military, political, economic, social, ethnic, ideological, and
spiritual -- is so pervasive, the verities of the old system so discredited, that Russians
are struggling in fundamental ways to redefine themselves and their country. In the
first instance the size and extent of the country is called into question. The Soviet
Union was in some respects a reconfiguration of Imperial Russia, which had conquered,
annexed, and absorbed many non-Russian lands in four and one-half centuries of
expansion. Now, as in 1917-1918, most of the non-Russian periphery has broken away.
Yet even confined to its present boundaries, Russia is the largest country in the world.
So far, Russia's largely peaceful reaction to the loss of the "external empire" (Eastern
Europe) and the "internal empire" (non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R.) has been
remarkable. Nonetheless, many Russians feel humiliated by these developments and
by the related perception that the terrible sacrifices they endured in World War II were
for nought. Will Russia be reconciled to the loss of the non-Russian periphery, the
reversal of an historic expansion that is twice as old as the United States and has
shaped the Russian sense of identity? This loss is aggravated by the fact that some 25
million Russians live in the periphery, outside Russia's new borders. Some of them
seek Russia's protection as their status is questioned in newly independent states whose
defining nationalism is not only anti-Soviet but often anti-Russian. How Russia relates
to its newly independent neighbors is part of the identity crisis.
Another aspect of the search for identity concerns the character of the Russian
state and its government. Russian history is long on authoritarianism and short on
democracy. Yet the Yeltsin regime and a good part of the urban intelligentsia
desperately want to make the leap from totalitarianism to membership in the "civilized
community" of advanced industrial democracies. The western democratic model now
seems very attractive to many Russians. Against this is not just the weight of history
and Russian political culture but the destabilizing effects of economic and social distress
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and the opposition of the Communist Party apparatus which, though banned, is still
entrenched in the government and in economic enterprises.
Part of the identity crisis focuses on the socioeconomic system, revealing confusion
and contradictions. Most Russians acknowledge that the Soviet economic system was
a failure, while at the same time professing admiration for socialism's declared
egalitarianism and antipathy to what they see as capitalism's inherent inequality and
exploitiveness. There is a struggle between advocates of socialism, capitalism, and a
"third way," combining elements of both. Although capitalism has very fragile roots in
Russia, one of its strengths is that its opponents seem intellectually (and literally)
bankrupt. They have presented no viable alternative to marketization.
Another face of the identity crisis involves Russia's international orientation and
its sense of "mission." Will Russia "join" the West? Will it be accepted? Some, including
prominent Yeltsin advisor Sergei Stankevich, advocate a more eastern orientation,
emphasizing relations with Eastern Europe, China, and other developing nations. What
about its international role? Russia remains a nuclear superpower but in most other
respects has lost its superpower status. Will Russia find a new equilibrium as a
responsible regional power, seek regional dominance, or resume its quest for global
power?
These different aspects of the great identity crisis remind some observers of the
age-old struggle for Russia's soul between westernizers and slavophiles. Pessimists
warn that historically the slavophiles have always eventually prevailed. Optimists note
that Russia has never before been so truly open to western influence -- to U.S.
influence.
Leadership Struggle
Since the winter of 1992-1993, Russia has been in the grip of an intense political
and constitutional crisis which has many aspects. Chief among them are: a struggle
over political ideology and the character of post-Soviet government; a contest over the
pace and character of economic reform and the ownership of vast amounts of property;
an institutional clash between the executive and legislative branches of government;
and the personal rivalry between President Boris Yeltsin and the man who has emerged
as his chief nemesis, Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. Yeltsin's
dissolution of the parliament on September 21 appears to be more than merely the
continuation of an ongoing power struggle. It is likely to be the decisive showdown.
After the Soviet coup attempt of August 1991, the Communist Party was banned.
More than 30 new parties have been registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice since
1990. It is very difficult to assess the parties' strength: the CPD was elected in March
1990, when the Communist Party was still dominant (86% of the elected deputies were
Communist Party members); and the presidential election in June 1991 was based more
on political personality than party affiliation. The political landscape is fluid, with new
parties and coalitions forming and others dissolving. Although it is an
oversimplification, it still seems useful to speak of three main political blocs in Russia.
Liberal democratic market reformers rallied around Yeltsin's banner in 1991
and supported the Yeltsin-Gaidar Government in 1992. Many, but not all, continue to
support Yeltsin. They seek democratization, rapid transition to a market economy, and
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political and economic integration with the advanced industrial democracies. From mid-
1992 to early 1993, however, Yeltsin's political support, especially in the legislature,
dwindled. Some early supporters "defected" to one of the two main opposition blocs.
(See below.) Others remained loyal to liberal democratic ideals but split with Yeltsin
over specific policies. Yeltsin remains, however, the most popular political leader in
Russia, as was demonstrated in his victory in the April 25 referendum. Khasbulatov
and the CPD had little popular support.
Centrist opposition to Yeltsin's policies emerged in response to three main
issues: the pace and scope of Gaidar's radical economic reform program; the
government's allegedly "weak" and too western-oriented foreign policy; and the danger
of the break up of the Russian Federation. The Civic Union, formed in 1992 and calling
itself the "constructive opposition," became the strongest element of this bloc. Its three
main components were: Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi's People's Party Free Russia,
Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party, and Arkady Volsky's Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs, which claims to represent thousands of directors of state enterprises.
In the aftermath of Yeltsin's April referendum victory, however, Civic Union split up,
with Travkin and Volsky moving closer to Yeltsin and Rutskoi moving toward the
irreconcilable opposition (see below). Rutskoi's party repudiated him several months
before the armed conflict of October 3-4. Other centrists call themselves "statists,"
determined to protect Russia against what they see as anarchy and disintegration
brought on by Yeltsin's policies. Centrists say they are democrats. Most claim to favor
cautious, and perhaps more limited, market reform. Some, especially those in the
government, support broad, comprehensive reform but differ with the liberal reformers
on specifics.
Irreconcilable opposition, called the red-brown coalition by the democrats,
is an alliance of hardline communists and right-wing ultranationalists. They oppose
the Government's western-oriented market reforms, democratization, and foreign policy.
Nationalism is their strongest theme. Many advocate the restoration of the Soviet
Union or an expanded Russian Empire. Their propaganda is strongly anti-Semitic. The
Communist Party as a national organization has been banned since the 1991 coup
attempt, but several neo-communist parties have been formed. The neo-communists do
not have much popular support, but thousands of unreconstructed communists remain
entrenched in national, regional, and local government and in the leadership of
economic enterprises. Many CPD Deputies, elected with Communist Party support in
March 1990, joined the ranks of the irreconcilable opposition, whose relative strength
in the CPD was much greater than among the general public. On Oct. 5, 1993, Yeltsin
banned the Communist Party of Russia, the right-wing National Salvation Front, and
several other extremist parties and organizations that allegedly took up arms against
the government on October 3-4.
From mid-1990 to mid-1991, while Yeltsin was Chairman of the new Russian
Supreme Soviet, Khasbulatov, who appeared to be a democratic reformer, served under
him as Deputy Chairman. After Yeltsin was elected President in June 1991, he
supported Khasbulatov to succeed him as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.
Khasbulatov gradually shifted his position during 1992, emerging as Yeltsin's nemesis,
backed by the hard-line communists and ultranationalists. Khasbulatov built an
effective anti-Yeltsin majority in the legislature which, by the winter of 1992-1993,
opposed and sought to undermine many of Yeltsin's key domestic and foreign policies.
This led to an extreme form of gridlock between the executive and legislative branches
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that paralyzed the central government, exacerbated economic distress, and heightened
the danger of the break-up of the Russian Federation.
Yeltsin scored an impressive victory over his parliamentary opposition in the Apr.
25, 1993 national referendum. (See CRS Report 93-456 F, Russian Referendum.) He
sought to capitalize on that by convening a Constitutional Assembly in June 1993 to
draw up a new constitution that would break the political deadlock by strengthening
the presidency and holding parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1993, 2 years
ahead of schedule. The present Constitution, however, defines the CPD as the
paramount political organ of state and gives it exclusive authority to change the
Constitution. The parliamentary majority, led by Khasbulatov, was determined to resist
Yeltsin's draft constitution and early parliamentary elections, both of which threatened
to terminate their political careers. Yeltsin tried, unsuccessfully, to enlist the leaders
of the republics and regions of the Russian Federation to force through either a new
constitution or early elections. (See CRS Report 93-577 F, Russia: Toward A New
Constitution.) Yeltsin's failure emboldened his opponents, who regained some of the
confidence and aggressiveness they had lost after the April referendum and renewed
their attacks against many of the government's programs. Despite his popular support,
Yeltsin could find no constitutional means of ending this political impasse. This
ultimately drove him to dissolve the legislature in September.
On September 21, Yeltsin announced in a televised speech that he was doing away
with the Supreme Soviet and CPD, and called for elections on December 11-12 for a
new bicameral legislature along the lines envisioned in the proposed draft constitution.
He acknowledged that this was unconstitutional, but said that it was necessary to break
the deadlock that was paralysing government, blocking economic recovery, and
threatening the break-up of the state. As further justification, he said that the Russian
people had endorsed his leadership and his policies in the April referendum, and voted
overwhelmingly for early parliamentary elections, and that the legislature was defying
the will of the people. He also said he would agree to early presidential election after
a new parliament was in place. On September 22, a presidential spokesman said that
the government would take no physical action against the present legislature, unless
it provoked violence, in which case the government would act forcefully. (See CRS
Report 93-851 F, Yeltsin Disbands the Russian Parliament.)
That same day Rutskoi declared himself Acting President and was immediately
endorsed by the Supreme Soviet. Rutskoi ordered government agencies to obey only
him or Khasbulatov. He and Khasbulatov invoked a Constitutional Amendment
adopted by the CPD in December 1992 stipulating that the President be immediately
impeached if he attempts to dissolve the legislature. The Constitutional Court, in
emergency session, voted 9-4, that Yeltsin's action violated the Constitution and might
justify impeachment. Rutskoi announced that he was dismissing Defense Minister
Grachev, Interior Minister Yerin, and the newly appointed Security Minister, Golushko.
Rutskoi named hardline Gen. Vladislav Achalov his Defense Minister. Rutskoi's
Security Minister was Viktor Barannikov, whom Yeltsin dismissed from that post in
August 1993. The "power ministries," however, refused to take orders from Rutskoi's
appointees. Khasbulatov called for an immediate nationwide strike to protest Yeltsin's
action, but none took place. Moscow and the rest of Russia remained relatively calm.
The hardline deputies approved resolutions viewed by many as increasingly harsh and
shrill. One resolution altered the criminal code to permit the death penalty for Yeltsin
and his aides who attempted to obstruct the legislature.
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The legislature could not get the quorum required to convene the CPD. On
September 23, the legislature voted to expel many pro-Yeltsin deputies, thus lowering
the quorum requirements enough to allow convocation of the CPD, which promptly
voted virtually unanimously to uphold the legislative decisions already taken. Many
influential deputies resigned. On September 29, a "military court" in the parliamentary
building decreed a death sentence for one of Yeltsin's advisors.
In the following week it became clear that Yeltsin held most of the high cards. He
was unequivocally backed by the "power ministries" (Defense, Interior, and Security)
and controlled radio and TV.
On Sunday, October 3, an angry and increasingly violent crowd of 5-10,000 anti-
Yeltsin activists broke through the security forces surrounding the parliament building,
which seemed quite unprepared for the size and aggressiveness of the crowd. Rutskoi
exhorted the crowd of excited supporters to seize the nearby Moscow mayor's office and
the Ostankino TV center several miles away. Afterward, Khasbulatov told them that
their next target should be the Kremlin, the seat of Yeltsin's government.
On Sunday afternoon and evening the crowd, including well-armed army veterans
and paramilitary forces, seized the Moscow mayor's office with impunity and attacked
the TV center, knocking the pro-Yeltsin state TV broadcasts off the air. Yeltsin's
government appeared to be in serious jeopardy. The insurgents, however, were unable
to persuade the military and security forces to desert Yeltsin's government. Forces
loyal to the government repelled the attack on the TV center after a bloody battle. On
Monday morning, October 4, the government marshalled elements of six elite divisions
and crushed the opposition that day, amidst heavy fighting. The storming of the
parliament building by elite troops supported by tank cannon fire quickly forced the
surrender of the outgunned anti-Yeltsin forces and the incarceration of their leaders.
Deaths over the two days are estimated to be well over one hundred, with many
hundreds wounded. (See CRS Report 93-884 F, Russia's Violent Showdown of October
3-4: Analysis and Implications; 93-879F, Russia's Violent Showdown: A Chronology of
Events, September 21-October 4, 1993; and Video Program LTR 93-1361, Russia's
Political Showdown.)
In the short term, at least, Yeltsin appears to have won a decisive victory,
although some speculate that he may now be more dependent on the military and
security forces. The parliamentary opposition led by Khasbulatov has been swept away
and new parliamentary elections are set for December 11-12. On the same dates there
are also to be elections for new, smaller regional legislatures and a referendum on a
new constitution, based on the Constitutional Assembly's July 12, 1993 draft -- which
is being modified under Yeltsin's supervision and is to be published in early November.
Following his October 4 victory, Yeltsin banned numerous political parties charged with
participating in the armed uprising. His government shut down 15 allegedly extremist
newspapers and ordered Pravda and Sovietskaya Rossiya to change their names, chief
editors, and political orientation. The government also instituted a vigorous crackdown
on crime in Moscow, including the highly controversial expulsion of thousands of
(relatively dark-skinned) natives of the Caucasus, who are viewed by many Moscovites
as disproportionately active in organized crime -- and in retail trade. These measures
raise concerns in Russia and the West that Yeltsin may be moving toward authoritarian
rule. Preliminary opinion polls, however, indicate that despite, or perhaps because of,
these measures, Yeltsin's popularity has increased since October.
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Economic Developments
Economic Crisis
In 1991, the (Soviet) gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 17%. Consumer prices
rose by 140%. In 1992, Russia's GDP fell by another 20% and inflation soared to over
2,600%. In the first half of 1993, production continued to fall but the rate of inflation
slackened a bit. Russia is also plagued by environmental degradation and ecological
catastrophes of staggering proportions, and the near collapse of the health system.
Economic Reform Program. On Oct. 28, 1991, Yeltsin announced a sweeping
economic reform program, developed by a team led by Yegor Gaidar, a 35-year-old
academic economist with no prior government or management experience. Gaidar was
named First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs in November. The
Yeltsin-Gaidar program was considered by most western specialists to be the most
promising plan for transforming the Russian economy, and also as an engine for
marketization in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Its key elements included:
a) economic stabilization through tough monetary and credit policies, drastic
devaluation of the ruble, and greater budget discipline; b) price liberalization to allow
prices to rise to world market levels; c) wage policy of slowing the growth of wages in
the public sector to control inflation and deregulating wages in the private sector to
stimulate productivity; and d) a new tax policy featuring a 28% value added tax (VAT),
an enterprise wage tax, and a profits tax.
Yeltsin warned the Russian people that this program, though absolutely
indispensable, would cause a great deal of hardship. He predicted, however, that
improvements would begin to be felt by late 1992 -- an assessment that proved overly
optimistic. Mounting social and political pressure, however, forced the government to
modify some of its policies. Tight monetary and credit policies were relaxed in order
to provide more money for workers' salaries and benefits and more credit to keep giant
state enterprises afloat, causing the budget deficit to rise sharply and fueling an
inflation rate of over 25% per month. The VAT was reduced from 28% to 15% on
certain staple products. In the protracted political struggle between Yeltsin and the
Supreme Soviet, both sides often resorted to populist economic measures to placate or
"bribe" various constituencies.
In the second half of 1992, the Government launched a major program of
privatization of state property by public auction. Every citizen was issued a
privatization voucher with a face value of 10,000 rubles. To ensure broad support for
the program, other provisions include workers being given a share, thought not a
controlling share, in their enterprises, and reducing restrictions on foreign investors.
The plan calls for long-term efforts to privatize economic enterprises, land, and other
property and to shift from military to civilian-centered production. Many factories
were expected to close and others to cut their work force, bringing levels of
unemployment previously unknown in Russia, but there have been few such closures.
These prospects aroused strong opposition from Civic Union, representing large
state enterprises, and also from populist parties and groups. This swelled the
opposition to Gaidar at the December CPD and led to his replacement by
Chernomyrdin, the former Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the oil and gas industry.
Chernomyrdin pledged to continue the transition to a market economy, but at a slower
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pace, with more government regulation to stabilize industrial production and prevent
widespread enterprise bankruptcies. The widespread expectation was that he would
seek to roll back important elements of the Gaidar program. This did not happen. In
January 1993, Chernomyrdin shocked the Supreme Soviet by saying that his top
priority was to check arrest hyperinflation. This sounded very much like the fiscal
discipline that was the key to Gaidar's program -- and was severely criticized by the
conservative opposition in the Supreme Soviet. In late July the Supreme Soviet
renewed its attack on the government's economic reform program, taking particular aim
at privatization, which had been moving ahead very rapidly. At the same time, a furor
arose over the Central Bank's abrupt decision to call in all pre-1993 rubles. This
aroused sharp public criticism, which may damage the government and President
Yeltsin. On September 18, Yeltsin brought Gaidar back into the Cabinet as First
Deputy Prime Minister, under Chernomyrdin.
Foreign Policy
The shift in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev from confrontation to
cooperation -- the so-called "new thinking" -- evolved further in Yeltsin's Russia
primarily in ways favorable to the West. The most dramatic source of change is the
abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology in foreign policy, allowing Russia to behave
"like a country instead of a cause." This new pragmatic, nonideological approach is
evident in Russia's relations with countries such as South Korea, Israel, and China.
The dissolution of Moscow's East European empire and then of the multinational
Soviet Union itself incline Russia toward a national rather than imperial foreign policy.
Finally, the end of the cold war and the political and economic transformation of Russia
create a new international security environment in which Russia can view western
states as partners and natural allies rather than inevitable foes. The hard-line neo-
communist and ultranationalist opposition to Yeltsin's Government, however, opposes
these changes and seeks to reestablish Moscow's previous power.
Senior officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Soviet asserted
in late 1991 that Russia's top foreign policy priority was to alleviate the economic crisis.
Operationally this meant maximum cooperation with the West -- beyond Gorbachevean
"new thinking." Gorbachev withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan; Yeltsin cut off
military supplies and the Kabul government fell. Gorbachev reduced aid to Cuba and
Vietnam; Yeltsin ordered Soviet combat troops out of Cuba. Gorbachev opened the door
for Jewish emigration and moved toward better relations with Israel; Yeltsin established
diplomatic relations with Israel. Gorbachev sought large-scale western economic
assistance and IMF membership; Yeltsin committed Russia to a reform program that
achieved both. Gorbachev negotiated three major arms reduction treaties predicated
on asymmetrical cuts to achieve parity of forces. Yeltsin agreed to a radical nuclear
force reduction agreement which calls for eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (the core of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces), and his defense program calls for Russian
reductions to levels well below the United States and NATO in many categories.
Gorbachev ended the enmity between the Soviet Union and the West; Yeltsin seeks
alliance, NATO membership for Russia, and agrees to NATO peacekeeping troops on
former Soviet territory. The national security policy of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev is described by some as "the new 'new thinking." It includes closer
relations with Western and Central Europe and a possible "special relationship" with
Germany. This remarkable transformation is not completely smooth. In May 1992, for
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example, the Bush Administration imposed trade sanctions on a Russian space
technology company that sold rocket motors to the Indian Space Research Organization
in contradiction of U.S. efforts to halt the spread of missile technology. More recently
Moscow has publicly opposed military action against Serbia and unilateral U.S. attacks
against Iraq.
Another vital task for Russia is to establish sound relations with the other states
of the former Soviet Union. This now appears to be a greater challenge for Russia than
was ending the cold war and more crucial than relations with the West. It may be the
acid test of "the new 'new thinking." The Russian Government would have preferred
that the C.I.S. maintain a "common strategic space" with armed forces under a unified
command and a "common economic space" with a single currency, coordinated economic
policies, and a free trade zone -- under Russian leadership, of course. Instead,
centrifugal forces of nationalism, especially in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan, are weakening the C.I.S. Russia finds itself closer to the Central Asians and
Belarus than to the others.
The struggle between Russia and Ukraine is the most publicized and the most
important. Ukrainian leaders now seem intent on absolute and complete independence
and see Russian advocacy of a cohesive C.I.S. as a thinly veiled attempt to reimpose
Russian dominance. This is what underlies Ukraine's insistence on its own armed
forces, currency, and independent foreign policy and has led to serious tension with
Moscow over such issues as the transfer to Russia of nuclear weapons deployed in
Ukraine, control of the Black Sea Fleet, and the status of the Crimean Peninsula. (The
military issues are discussed below.) The Crimea may be the most dangerous issue of
all. Viewed by Russians as historically part of Russia, it was arbitrarily "given" to
Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954. Crimea's population is 67% Russian and 26%
Ukrainian. Only a slim majority in Crimea voted for independence in Ukraine's
December 1991 referendum. The Crimean legislature adopted a declaration of
independence from Ukraine in April, although it soon backed away and reached at least
a temporary compromise agreement with Kiev. The Russian CPD in April 1992
approved a resolution declaring the 1954 transfer of Crimea illegal. Russian
nationalists, including Vice President Rutskoi, insist that Crimea is Russian. On July
9, 1993, the Russian Supreme Soviet voted almost unanimously declaring Sevastopol,
the capital of the Crimea and home port of the Black Sea Fleet, a cit of the Russian
Federation. The Ukrainian and Russian governments both denounced this act as
irresponsible and illegal. Moscow and Kiev want to avoid conflict over Crimea, but
their hands could be forced by local events. If armed conflict arose between Russia and
Ukraine, over Crimea or some other issue, it could have extremely grave consequences.
(See CRS Issue Brief 92072, Ukraine.)
Russia's relations with other neighbors are strained by similar problems. A
Russian nationalist separatist movement in eastern Moldova is fighting for secession,
supported by the predominantly Russian 14th (former Soviet) Army, stationed there.
(See CRS Report 92-495 F, Moldova Conflict: An Update, June 1992.) All three Baltic
states insist that the Russian (former Soviet) armies stationed on their territories be
withdrawn promptly. Moscow says that it cannot be completed until 1995 because of
the economic conditions in Russia, including a severe housing shortage. Also, new and
proposed Latvian and Estonian citizenship laws deny most of their large Russian
minorities voting and land ownership rights. The Russians turn to Moscow for support,
which it provides so far mostly verbally. There is also a potentially serious territorial
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problem with Kazakhstan, whose northern tier, adjacent to Southern Russia, is
populated predominantly by Russians. Kazakh fears of a separatist movement in the
north or of territorial claims by Russia are a troubling factor in their relations.
Russia further aggravated relations with these neighbors. Defense Minister
Grachev threatened the use of armed force to protect Russians in other C.I.S. states.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in an interview in Le Monde (Paris), said that "I do not rule
out territorial changes in that part of the world," (eastern Moldova and Crimea) albeit
within a political rather than a military context. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chairman of the
Russian Supreme Soviet, threatened Russian military intervention in Georgia on behalf
of Georgia's North Ossetians, who seek unification with South Ossetia, part of Russia.
On Feb. 28, 1993, Yeltsin declared that Russia should be granted authority to guarantee
peace and security on the territory of the other former Soviet states and on March 3
Russia submitted this proposal to the U.N.. This may signal a significant shift in
Russian policy toward its European C.I.S. neighbors. Alternatively, it may be an
attempt by the Yeltsin Government to use nationalist rhetoric to attract some of the
supporters of its hardline nationalist opponents.
East Asia was not a high priority in Russian foreign policy in 1992, although some
in Moscow would make it SO. Relations with Japan have been strained for years by a
dispute over four islands in the Southern Kuriles captured by the Soviet Union in 1945.
Japan claims they are part of its home islands and insists on their return. Washington
supports Tokyo's claim. Large-scale Japanese aid to Russia is conditioned on return
of the islands. Yeltsin's government seemed to be moving toward satisfying Tokyo, but
fears that surrender of the islands might give the opposition hardline nationalists a
potent weapon and further inflame separatism in Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far
East led Yeltsin to abruptly cancel a scheduled trip to Japan in September. Japan has
more capacity for aid and investment in Russia than any other nation, which increases
the stakes on settling the territorial dispute. Moscow is continuing the Gorbachev
policy of improving relations with China. Both states are seized by domestic problems.
Decades-old border disputes are being slowly resolved, cross-border trade is burgeoning,
and Russia is looking to China's economic development zones as a possibly useful
model.
Another striking feature of Russian foreign policy, accelerating a trend evident
under Gorbachev, is retrenchment in the Third World, especially in regions far from
Russia. Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia seem virtually to have disappeared
from the Russian radar screen. Even in the Middle East, much closer geographically
and in terms of national interest, Moscow's profile is much lower.
Russian arms sales, however, are a source of concern in the West. Moscow's sale
of diesel submarines to Iran and advanced jet fighters to China, although driven by
economic considerations, were viewed as destabilizing in the West.
Defense Policy
Fundamental Shakeup of the Military
The impact of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. on the armed forces has been
enormous. When the C.I.S. was formed, General Evgenii Shaposhnikov, the last Soviet
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Minister of Defense, was named head of C.I.S. armed forces. Russia tried hard to
maintain a unified military, but differences within the C.I.S., especially between Russia
and Ukraine, led to the creation of separate national armies. Ukraine set the pace,
beginning in October 1991. Many others followed. Russia grudgingly acknowledged the
new reality and established its own Ministry of Defense. In April 1992 Yeltsin
appointed General Pavel Grachev, former Commander of Airborne Forces, as Defense
Minister. Andrei Kokoshin, a liberal civilian policy analyst, is the First Deputy
Minister of Defense. (See CRS Issue Brief 92014, Soviet Armed Forces in Transition.)
A CIA-DIA report to the Joint Economic Committee, made public on June 8, 1992,
highlights recent sharp declines in Soviet defense spending, which fell by 15% in 1991.
Weapons procurement fell even faster. Since the high point in 1988, spending for
procurement of tanks and artillery has dropped by 60% and for aerospace by 50%. The
CIA-DIA report predicts a startling 60%-85% drop in weapons "sales" this year, as a
growing share of the shrinking defense budget is dedicated to improving the generally
miserable living conditions of the troops and junior to mid-level officers. The report
also predicted that if present trends continue, Russian defense spending would drop to
4%-6% of GNP, compared to the estimated 14%-17% during the Brezhnev years. There
has been very little progress in conversion of production in the thousands of defense
plants to civilian needs, so as weapons procurement falls, defense plants are idled. They
are generally not being shut down as yet, but it is doubtful if the government can afford
to finance them as in the past.
It is difficult to exaggerate the turmoil in the armed forces and the defense
industries. The privileged position they held for decades in the allocation of resources
has been broken, as has their almost sacrosanct status in official ideology and
propaganda. Hundreds of thousands of troops being brought home from Eastern
Europe and other parts of the former Soviet Union have no housing. Living in tents
in central Russia and Siberia is a frightful prospect for them. This is a factor in
Russia's timetable for withdrawing troops from Eastern Germany and the Baltic states,
although the Balts and others are concerned that Russia -- or the Russian military --
may have more sinister motives. Germany has addressed the problem by paying to
build 36,000 new apartments in Russia. Massive budget cuts and troop reductions will
force tens of thousands of officers out of the ranks into an economy moving toward
depression and massive unemployment. In May 1992, the Russian Defense Ministry
announced plans to cut Russian armed forces in half, to about 1.5 million men, by the
year 2000. Other government officials suggest a total of 1.2 million men. Such cuts
would represent a huge change in the Eurasian military balance.
The career officer corps, by and large, was imbued with a strong sense of Soviet
nationalism and internationalism. For most of them the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and
the creation of substantially reduced rival national armies is a personal and professional
catastrophe. Their anger is compounded by often squalid living conditions and what
they perceive as insults to their dignity and honor by politicians and the popular press.
No wonder then, that despite the humiliating failure of the August 1991 coup and the
strong tradition of the Soviet military not to intervene in politics, many observers in
Russia and the West fear the possibility of a military coup or military complicity in an
authoritarian takeover, especially if the economy does not improve.
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Control of Nuclear Weapons
Over 80% of the strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union
are in Russia. The remainder are based in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. All
Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, which had been more widely dispersed before 1991,
reportedly have been moved to Russia, awaiting dismantlement. When the C.I.S. was
formed in December 1991, the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus pledged
that they would transfer all nuclear weapons to Russia and promptly ratify the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. In May 1992, in Lisbon,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed that all strategic nuclear forces outside
Russia would be transferred to Russia by 1999 to be dismantled. This position is
strongly endorsed by the United States and is considered a prerequisite in Washington
and Moscow for ratifying START I and II. Substantial resistance arose in Ukraine,
however, especially in its parliament, to giving up the nuclear weapons deployed on its
territory -- 130 6-warhead SS-19 and 46 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs, and about 40
strategic bombers and their associated cruise missiles. On Sept. 3, 1993, Yeltsin and
Ukrainian President Kravchuk signed an agreement whereby Ukraine would transfer
all nuclear warheads on its soil to Russia and would receive nuclear fuel for its reactors
from Russia. Moscow soon "annulled" the agreement, however, saying that Ukraine had
unilaterally altered it. Russia insists that the original agreement referred to all nuclear
weapons on Ukrainian soil, while the Ukrainian version refers only to those weapons
covered by START. Kravchuk says the 46 SS-24s are not covered by START, an
interpretation rejected by Russia and the United States.
The command and control system for strategic nuclear weapons is believed to be
very tightly and centrally controlled, with the Russian President and defense minister
responsible for authorizing their use. Ukraine, however, now appears to be challenging
Russia's exclusive control. Kravchuk has openly acknowledged seeking some
mechanism to enable Ukraine to block the launch of nuclear weapons from its territory,
a proposal that Moscow has steadfastly resisted. Many U.S. experts now worry that
Ukraine might be able technologically to defeat or circumvent Russia's electronic
control mechanisms and assert Ukrainian operational control over those weapons. This
could provoke a crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations. (See CRS Issue Brief 91144,
Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Issues and Prospects.)
Division of Soviet Military Assets Among C.I.S. States
The C.I.S. states are struggling with many thorny questions concerning the
division of military assets. By the end of 1991, Soviet armed forces were by far the
largest in the world: approximately 4 million men under arms (down from 4.5 million
in 1985), compared to about 2.5 million in the United States. The huge conscript mass
is multinational; the officer corps is overwhelmingly Slavic and predominantly Russian.
If each C.I.S. state simply were to keep the forces deployed on its territory, Russia,
despite its size, would be at a disadvantage because the offensive-oriented Soviet
military doctrine strongly favored forward deployment. Therefore, the strongest and
best equipped ground forces deployed on Soviet territory were in the western regions,
i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states. Those units are especially heavy in tanks
and artillery. Most of the army divisions deployed in Russia were undermanned or
skeleton units, at low levels of readiness, and often with obsolescent equipment. This
imbalance was partly offset by Russia's claim to the very powerful Soviet forces
stationed in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Also, three of the four Soviet fleets
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are based at Russian ports. In May, C.I.S. leaders agreed on a formula for dividing
ground force weaponry regulated by the 1990 CFE Treaty. Russia's share of the
weapons that were allotted to the Soviet Union in the treaty is as follows: tanks, 6,400
of 13,150; artillery, 6,415 of 13,175; other armored vehicles, 11,480 of 20,000; combat
aircraft, 3,450 of 5,150; combat helicopters, 890 of 1,500. Presently some 700,000 of the
former Soviet Union's best and best-equipped troops are deployed in Ukraine, including
the Black Sea Fleet. In May 1992, Kiev announced the goal of a 200,000 man force.
The biggest controversies in dividing military assets are between Russia and
Ukraine. The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet is the best known. That fleet is based
primarily at Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula, part of Ukraine. Kravchuk initially
claimed all ships based at Ukrainian ports but subsequently reduced his demand to
about one third of the fleet. Moscow insists that it is fundamentally a strategic force
that has historically been part of the Russian Navy. (The Crimea was annexed by
Russia in 1783 and had no connection to Ukraine before 1954.) The two sides earlier
agreed in principle to divide the fleet between them with the lion's share going to
Russia. On Sept. 3, 1993, however, Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed that Russia would
"buy out" Ukraine's portion of the fleet, with Russia's "payment" being a reduction of
Ukraine's large debt to Russia and continued supply of Russian gas and oil. This
agreement is strongly opposed by Ukrainian nationalists in the parliament.
Most of the C.I.S. states are creating national armies. In Central Asia, however,
impoverished economies and the absence of major external threats incline some
governments to rely on Russian security guarantees. At a C.I.S. summit meeting in
May 1992, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan
signed a collective security treaty pledging joint defense in the event of a foreign attack
against any of them.
Questions for U.S. Policy
There is no doubt that from the U.S. perspective most of the political, economic
and military changes in Russia are very positive and should be encouraged. It is quite
possible, however, that future developments, such as the revival of authoritarianism or
the escalation of conflict among C.I.S. states, could undermine recent Russian
achievements. This gives rise to a number of questions for U.S. policy makers.
Whom Should the United States Support?
While most observers see Boris Yeltsin as the best hope for a successful democratic
and free market transformation in Russia, others caution against tying U.S. policy too
much to one man as we did with Gorbachev earlier. Measured by western
democratic standards, Yeltsin has many flaws. Although his broad policies and
principles seem genuinely democratic, he continues to exhibit authoritarian tendencies,
the result perhaps of both personal temperament and the communist political culture
of which he is a product. Yeltsin's often abrasive and uncompromising style
antagonized some of his natural allies and supporters in parliament, driving them into
opposition. Not all opponents of Yeltsin are necessarily opponents of democracy and
market reform. The draft constitution he proposed in April 1993 would have created
a strongly presidential republic in which the legislative branch would have only a
secondary role. He admitted that his September 21 decree disbanding parliament was
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unconstitutional; critics' charges that it amounted to a coup are not without merit.
Such acts contribute to lack of respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law. His
increasingly tight control of radio and TV in 1993, his imposition of broadcast news
censorship after September 21, and newspaper censorship on October 5, trouble some
of his Russian and Western supporters. Yeltsin's harsh measures in October against
the Constitutional Court, opposition parties and newspapers, and a number of local
legislatures and regional administrators that had sided with the parliamentary
opposition, are justified by Yeltsin supporters as necessary, temporary measures to
stabilize a volatile situation. They note that Yeltsin acted similarly right after the
Soviet coup-attempt of August 1991, and promptly restored and expanded political
freedoms. Yeltsin's opponents and some democratic critics, however, say they fear a
new authoritarianism.
Despite these and other flaws, however, Yeltsin's hardline opponents make him
look very good in western eyes. Nevertheless, many U.S. observers, including many
Members of Congress, express concern about whether U.S. policy is too heavily
committed to Yeltsin as an individual. If the events of October 3-4 do prove to be a
decisive defeat for the "red-brown" coalition, that could have the effect of depriving
Yeltsin of the opponents that make him look so good to the West. That might
strengthen the arguments of those who seek less unequivocal U.S. support for Yeltsin
personally and more support for democratic and market principles, even if that means
agreeing occasionally with some of Yeltsin's opponents.
The question of who to support has another dimension: what sort of Russia should
the United States support? By most objective measures Yeltsin's government is the
most democratic and the most firmly committed to market reform of the C.I.S. states.
Some see Russia not only as an example but also as an engine of reform. In this view,
the United States should support Russia's leadership as "first among equals" in the
C.I.S. Others, like former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, object to this
approach, warning that we should not encourage Russian domination of its neighbors.
This, they argue, is precisely the imperial tendency that we should try to discourage,
for the benefit of the other successor states and for Russia's own good.
U.S. Assistance
On October 6, Congress passed the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which President
Bush proposed on April 1 to provide economic assistance to Russia and other C.I.S.
states .2532, H.R. 4547). Its provisions include various humanitarian and technical
assistance activities; $12 billion as the U.S. share in an IMF quota increase; up to $3
billion in currency stabilization funds; elimination of various restrictive trade and aid
legislation; greater flexibility in agricultural assistance programs; and expanded use of
previously appropriated Department of Defense funds for demilitarization activities.
Associated with this package but not included in the Administration's proposed
legislation, is a new pledge of $1.1 billion in agricultural credit guarantees. At the
Vancouver summit (April 3-4) President Clinton announced additional aid for Russia.
On Sept. 23, 1993, the Senate passed H.R. 2295 appropriating $1.6 billion in
supplemental FY1993 funding and $904 million for FY1994 aid to the states of the
former Soviet Union. The final bill was approved by Congress and signed by President
Clinton on September 30. (See Issue Brief 91050, U.S. and International Assistance to
the Former Soviet Union.)
CRS-15
US-Russian Summit
93-432 F
April 14, 1993
CRS Report for Congress
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
U.S.-Russian Summit, April 3-4, 1993:
Outcome and Implications
Jim Nichol
Senior Technical Information Specialist
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
SUMMARY
The Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Meeting in Vancouver, Canada, covered a wide
range of bilateral issues ranging from security to regional cooperation. The
major focus was on the unveiling of a $1.623 billion U.S. assistance package
aimed at supporting Yeltsin and democratic and economic reforms in Russia.
President Clinton, continuing the recent precedent of regular summit meetings
and indicating his support for Yeltsin and his reforms, accepted an open-ended
invitation to a follow-on summit in Russia. (For the run-up to the Vancouver
Summit, see CRS Report 93358, The U.S.-Russian Summit).
BACKGROUND
Although the incoming Clinton Administration viewed domestic economic
policy, rather than foreign policy, as its highest priority, President-elect Clinton
reportedly in early January 1993 agreed to President Yeltsin's written invitation
to an "early summit." U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met on February 25 and again on March 23-24
to lay the groundwork for the Summit. Just two weeks before the Summit, a
Russian legislative-executive power struggle intensified when Yeltsin declared
that he would rule by decree until a popular vote could be held on April 25 on
his leadership and other matters. After strong opposition from many Russian
legislators and the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin backed down, partly defusing
the crisis. A referendum was agreed to, though the legislature insisted on its
own questions and voting procedures. Clinton offered several strong statements
of U.S. support for Yeltsin and democratic and market reform in Russia during
the crisis, conditioning his support on Yeltsin's continued commitment to
uphold civil and human rights. Clinton also endeavored to win wider U.S.
popular support for enhanced aid to Russia. The political instability in Russia
altered the Summit agenda by placing more emphasis on discussions of political
events in Russia and making the issue of U.S. and Western support for Russian
reforms more urgent. (For background, see CRS Issue Brief 93052, Russia's
Constitutional Crisis).
Besides being a "get acquainted" meeting between the two Presidents, the
Summit furthered U.S.-Russian cooperation on many bilateral issues and
CRS
CRS Reports are nrenared for Members and committees of Conaress
CRS-3
to spell out his plans to stabilize the economy and continue reform efforts. The
joint communique noted Yeltsin's pledge to continue reform efforts, such as
privatization. Yeltsin admitted, however, that economic problems such inflation
and a weak banking system were more intractable and would take some time to
resolve. He added in the press conference that some reforms had slowed down
because the Russian economy was "out of breath," and stated that Russia would
need outside economic assistance for "some two years probably" during this
"transition period."
The two leaders agreed to work to encourage Russian trade and remove
various impediments to trade and investment. The Administration announced
support for Russia's full membership in the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT, the 108-member multilateral agreement on international
trade norms and settlement). It also proposed making Russia eligible for
receiving the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), allowing it duty-free
access to the U.S. market for many of its exports. Both sides agreed to enhance
energy and space cooperation by setting up a U.S.-Russian Commission, headed
by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Albert
Gore. They also agreed to set up a Business Development Committee on other
trade issues, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokhin and Secretary
of Commerce Ronald Brown.
In the press conference, President Clinton stated that he had discussed
Yeltsin's request to eliminate U.S. "Cold War" legislation limiting trade and
investment with Russia. These include restrictions on high technology sales and
the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which links U.S. trade and financial relations
to the emigration policies of "nonmarket economy" countries. Yeltsin argued
that these were "discriminatory" and "offensive" to Russia. President Clinton
stated that a list of restrictions still reflected in legislation would be compiled
and that he would consult with Congress on their possible repeal. He also
cautioned Russian reporters that changes in Jackson-Vanik would be possible
only "if Congress is convinced there are in fact no more refuseniks, no more
people who wish to emigrate who are not being allowed to."
The major Summit initiative was the unveiling of the U.S. aid package. As
outlined by the Administration, the $1.623 billion package in FY1993 spending
is already funded out of existing appropriations. It consists of $690 million in
grant aid and $932 million in credits. President Clinton indicated that three-
quarters of the aid would go to the Russian private sector rather than to the
Russian government and most would go to areas outside of Moscow and St.
Petersburg. Besides this aid, designed to provide "immediate and tangible
results to the Russian people," President Clinton indicated in his press
conference that he would discuss other possible aid initiatives with Congress in
housing and technical assistance, nuclear safety, environmental cooperation, and
exchange programs. He has already requested $703.8 million in Agency for
International Development (AID) humanitarian and technical assistance for the
former Soviet republics as part of the FY1994 budget.
CRS-5
elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles, submarines,
and heavy bombers), construction of a fissile materials storage facility, and
establishment of systems for enhancing material control, accountability, and
physical protection of civil nuclear materials. (See also CRS Issue Brief 91144,
Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union).
Regional and International Concerns. In contrast to previous summits,
the two sides did not release joint statements on regional or international issues,
and the communique provided few details on discussion of these issues. In the
press conference, President Clinton mentioned that the two leaders pledged to
promote the Middle East peace talks and peace in Bosnia, while Yeltsin added
that they had discussed a common approach to efforts to get the parties to the
conflict in Bosnia to agree to the Vance-Owen peace plan. Before the Summit,
the Administration had noted some difference in emphasis between the two sides
on the Bosnian conflict. Clinton also mentioned that he had raised U.S.
concerns about the Russian construction of a nuclear power station in Cuba.
Administration officials also noted that military housing aid (mentioned above)
was aimed at facilitating Russian military withdrawal from the Baltic states.
The communique endorsed discussions on enhancing the effectiveness of
peacemaking by the United Nations, Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), "and other appropriate regional organizations," perhaps
alluding to Russian calls for international recognition of its peacekeeping role
in the former Soviet republics. The leaders also voiced support for continued
cooperation in the U.N. Security Council to solve international conflicts,
promote democratic values, protect human rights, and solve global problems
such as pollution, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The communique also
urged upholding human rights, "including those of ethnic Russian and all other
minorities" in the former Soviet republics. In the press conference, Yeltsin
linked respect for ethnic Russians' rights to progress in Russian troop pullouts
from Estonia and Latvia. This remark led to objections by Estonian President
Lennart Meri on April 6 that President Clinton did not protest this remark.
IMPLICATIONS FOR YELTSIN AND RUSSIA
Yeltsin and his supporters presented the Summit results as demonstrating
Yeltsin's foreign policy expertise and as providing needed economic aid to
Russia. At the Summit press conference and in later statements, he praised the
U.S. "economic package" (avoiding using the term "aid") as providing real, strictly
scheduled aid to Russia. At a stopover on April 5 in the town of Bratsk in
Siberia during his return from the U.S.-Russian Summit, he urged voters to
support him in the upcoming referendum, pointing to the U.S. economic aid
offered at the Summit as an accomplishment of his presidency.
Many legislative and other political opponents of Yeltsin were critical of the
Summit, arguing that the U.S. aid was inadequate or that Yeltsin had
capitulated to U.S. interests. A Russian legislative spokesman on April 6
Yeltsin Lifts State of Emergency; Police Retain Tough Anti-Crime Measures
WP 10/19/93
ed during the fight with rebels holed up inside, were
bulk of them from the Caucasus, and thousands more
Mayor Yuri Lyzhkov promised to continue the political
By Margaret Shapiro
reopened to regular traffic today. Repair work on the
were reported to have left, in fear, on their own.
ly popular police sweeps, less than two months before
Washington Post Foreign Service
mammoth, fire-charred building continued behind huge
Pavel Sviridov, a spokesman for Moscow's comman-
elections for a new legislature are to be held.
MOSCOW, Oct. 18-The state of emergency Pres-
cement barriers.
dant charged with overseeing the state of emergency,
"The lifting of the state of emergency and the curfew
ident Boris Yeltsin imposed during a hard-line rebellion
Police officials said that during the two-week state of
told Russian television today that 1,447 people had
does not mean that the tougher regime of law and order
two weeks ago ended today, but police officials said
emergency and midnight-to-5 a.m. curfew, crime had fal-
been detained during the past two weeks for "criminal"
enforcement will be dropped Alexander Kotenkov,
they intended to continue tough measures to combat
len dramatically in the city. They said beefed-up police
offenses and nearly 67,000 people for "administrative"
head of Russia's legal department, told the Russian
crime and expel from Moscow anyone without a proper
patrols succeeded in rounding up not only armed groups
offenses. More than 30,000 people had been detained
Tass news agency.
residency permit.
that had escaped arrest when the hard-line rebellion col-
at some point during the emergency for violating the
The Interfax news service said that heightened police
Russian television tonight showed soldiers packing
lapsed Oct. 4, but also criminal gangs that have operated
curfew, he said. Two people were killed and 12 injured
patrols will continue to operate, especially at night, and
their gear in armored personnel carriers in preparation
with increasing brazenness in recent months.
for what Sviridov said was resisting police actions.
hotels, markets, railway stations and airports will be
for their withdrawal from the city. Yeltsin imposed the
The police tactics have been heavily directed against
Moscow commandant Alexander Kulikov said last
under "special control" to prevent expelled persons
state of emergency and a curfew on Oct. 3, when armed
natives of the Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan, Ar-
week that there had been a dramatic drop in crime be-
from returning to Moscow now that the state of emer-
rebels stormed key sites in the capital. Yeltsin was forced
menia and Georgia, who many Muscovites believe have
cause of the increased police and military presence and
gency has ended. Interfax also reported that cars and
to call in the military to restore order.
brought murder, organized crime and high prices to
the expulsions. A poll released here last week said that
trucks entering the city will continue to be searched
In another sign of a return to normalcy, roads around
Russia. Nearly 10,000 people have been expelled from
a large majority of Muscovites who were questioned
and all visitors to the city will have to register their
the Russian parliament building, which tanks had blast-
Moscow for not having Moscow residency permits, the
approved of the tough new measures, and Moscow
arrival immediately with police.
93-879 F
October 5, 1993
CRS Report for Congress
Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress
Russia's Violent Showdown:
Chronology of Events, September 21-October 4, 1993
Jim Nichol
Senior Technical Information Specialist
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
SUMMARY
This chronology lists the events of the two week crisis that began with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin's September 21, 1993, decree disbanding the
legislature and calling for new parliamentary elections and ended with the
storming of the parliamentary building and arrest of the leaders of the anti-
Yeltsin insurrection of October 3-4. Events are listed in reverse chronological
order.
CHRONOLOGY
10/04/93
---
(Monday) Government troops early in the morning complete
recapturing the Ostankino television center in Moscow from
anti-Yeltsin protesters who had partially seized it.
Television also shows government troops being shot at from
inside the legislative building, called the White House.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin vows to defeat quickly the
armed "fascist-communist mutiny." After fierce fighting,
government troops occupy the "White House," and take the
leaders into custody, including legislative speaker Ruslan
Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexandre Rutskoi.
Reportedly dozens are killed and hundreds wounded in
violence which began Sunday. Other rampaging anti-Yeltsin
demonstrators are subdued by nightfall. Yeltsin declares an
overnight curfew in the city.
10/03/93
---
(Sunday) Legislative-executive talks mediated by the Russian
Orthodox Church are inconclusive, with Khasbulatov telling
reporters that the legislature will not compromise with
"criminal" Yeltsin. Up to 15,000 anti-Yeltsin demonstrators
march from the outskirts of central Moscow toward the
White House, scattering government police. After being
urged on by Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, demonstrators take
over the mayor's office and storm the Ostankino television
center and other buildings, resulting in many casualties.
CRS
CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress
CRS-2
Responding to these attacks, government forces launch a
counteroffensive aimed at securing the White House and
other sites. Yeltsin declares a state of emergency in Moscow,
banning rallies and demonstrations, to last until October 10.
10/02/93
---
(Saturday) The legislature demands television access as a
precondition to further negotiations with the government.
Anti-Yeltsin demonstrators block traffic on the ring road
around central Moscow as part of efforts to disrupt normal
functioning of the city. Rutskoi urges his supporters to take
up arms against Yeltsin, resulting in mounting violence in
Moscow.
10/01/93
---
(Friday) Russian Orthodox Church mediate talks result in
agreement to partly lift the government blockade of the
legislature, restoring electricity and phone links, cut off
earlier, in return for the legislature's partial disarmament.
After the government restores some electrical power, the
legislature votes to reject the agreement.
09/30/93
---
(Thursday) Additional armored personnel carriers take up
positions around the White House. The Russian Orthodox
Church proposes mediation between the president and
legislature, and meetings begin. Yeltsin reportedly proposes
ending the blockade if the legislature surrenders most
weapons. A large meeting of regional legislative leaders calls
on Yeltsin to lift his blockade of the White House. Russia
and the United States sign a $1.1 billion debt rescheduling
agreement.
09/29/93
---
(Wednesday) Interior Ministry troops push anti-Yeltsin
demonstrators away from around the White House.
Deputies and defenders in the White House refuse to
surrender their arms, with the government setting a new
deadline of October 4 to surrender arms and leave the White
House. A group of Siberian regional legislative leaders
threaten separatism if Yeltsin does not withdraw his decree
dissolving the parliament. Yeltsin calls for a meeting of the
Federation Council (FC), a previously established body which
Yeltsin envisages as the temporary upper house of the new
legislature. A meeting of the FC is later set for October 9.
The U.S. Congress concludes work on U.S. FY1994 foreign
aid appropriations legislation that includes $2.5 billion in
added spending on Russia and other newly independent
states.
CRS-3
09/28/93
---
(Tuesday) The Interior Ministry seals off the White House
with armored personnel carriers and barbed wire, arguing
that the armed deputies and guards pose a danger to the
neighborhood, and orders them to surrender their arms
within 24 hours.
09/27/93
---
(Monday) Yeltsin rejects several appeals for simultaneous
presidential and legislative elections, saying that this would
create a "vacuum of power" threatening further political
chaos.
09/26/93 ---
(Sunday) About 15,000 Yeltsin supporters rally in central
Moscow, while a counter-rally is held by several thousand
anti-Yeltsin protesters near the White House. Rutskoi
announces he will "fight to the death" if government forces
storm the White House. A meeting of leaders of about 40
regional legislatures and administrations urge Yeltsin to call
simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections.
09/24/93 ---
(Friday) The Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) votes to
hold simultaneous legislative and presidential elections by
March 1994, which is rejected by the Yeltsin government. A
legislative proposal to replace Khasbulatov is thwarted after
Rutskoi defends him. Yeltsin hosts a Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) summit of heads of state in
Moscow, where most support Yeltsin's actions against the
legislature.
09/23/93
---
(Thursday) Yeltsin agrees to appeals by regional officials and
many of his supporters to schedule early presidential
elections, setting them for June 12, 1994. He states that his
willingness to stand for early elections shows that he is not
trying to accumulate dictatorial powers. The Yeltsin
government also moves aggressively against the legislature,
closing its major newspaper, formally taking over its
property, voiding deputies' diplomatic passports, and trying
to entice compliance by announcing a "pension plan" for ex-
lawmakers. The legislature attempts unsuccessfully to reach
a quorum necessary to convene the CPD and formally
impeach Yeltsin, finally lowering the quorum requirements
by expelling pro-Yeltsin deputies and convening in the
evening with less than two-thirds its 1,033 membership.
Reacting to this and other legislative actions, some
influential legislative leaders resign.
09/22/93
---
(Wednesday) Yeltsin receives added verbal support from his
ministries of defense, interior, and security. The Central
CRS-4
Bank also says it will obey Yeltsin's orders. Reaction from
the Russian regions is ambiguous, with some administrators
supporting Yeltsin and some supporting Khasbulatov. Many
world governments, including the United States, Great
Britain, and Japan, voice support for Yeltsin. Russian
popular reaction to Yeltsin's actions is generally muted, with
few responding to the legislature's call for protest strikes.
The Constitutional Court in the early hours of September 22
overturns Yeltsin's decree, and finds that it may provide
grounds for impeachment by the CPD. Faced with
government and popular unresponsiveness to its calls and
demands, the legislature passes resolutions viewed by many
as increasingly harsh and shrill, including changing the
criminal code to permit the death penalty for Yeltsin and
others who obstruct the legislature.
09/21/93
---
(Tuesday) Appearing on nationwide television, Yeltsin
announces he is dissolving the Russian legislature because
it no longer represents the will of the people. He decrees
December 11-12, 1993, as the date for new legislative
elections, with presidential elections to be held some time
thereafter. Defying the announcement and decree, the lower
tier of the legislature, the Supreme Soviet, convenes, voting
in favor of impeaching Yeltsin and naming Vice President
Rutskoi as acting president. It calls for convening the upper
tier CPD to formalize its decisions. In his first actions,
Rutskoi "nullifies" Yeltsin's decree and names new ministers
of defense, interior, and security to replace pro-Yeltsin
ministers. Khasbulatov calls for nationwide strikes to
protest Yeltsin's actions. Some nationalist and pro-
communist hardliners flock to White House to build
barricades.
Russia-Internal Sit.
Political, Economic,4 Assist!
NIA & NATO Expansion
CIS Relations ` Peacekeeping
Arts : Literature
P.
DK350A
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 45, No. I, 1993, 115-139
The Death of Soviet Literature:
Can Russian Literature Survive?
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
Copyright Claimant
Reproduced with Permission
ROSALIND MARSH
AFTER THE MOMENTOUS EVENTS of August 1991, when the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union has been swept away after 74 years and the USSR has disintegrated, it
would seem a good time to take stock of the achievements and problems of what used
to be called 'Soviet literature' in what used to be called the 'Gorbachev era'.
In 1987-88 commentators were speaking of an exhilarating new period in Soviet
culture. The Soviet press and 'thick journals' had witnessed an unprecedented
explosion of information, and a flood of fiction by writers both living and dead which
had never before been published in the USSR had burst upon the Soviet public. What
we were observing amounted to far more than the 'thaw' which had taken place under
Khrushchev; it was nothing less than a cultural and spiritual revolution. In recognition
of this, Alec Nove characterised the period as one of 'cultural renaissance in Russia',²
and Vitalii Shentalinsky, a member of the commission formed to investigate the cases
of writers falsely condemned in Stalin's purges, spoke of 'the formation of a new
country and a new people'.³
Yet by 1989 the Russian political and cultural scene was being characterised as one
of 'chaos and uncertainty'; and by 1991 it had become fashionable to speak of the
'death' of Soviet literature. Writers and critics began to imply that glasnost' had not
helped Soviet literature but, paradoxically, had helped to destroy it. The acute critic
Alla Latynina said in January 1991: 'The [past] year was not a literary one. True,
Solzhenitsyn was published. A great event. But after leaping this final hurdle,
glasnost' seems to have spilled over into freedom of speech-to have inadvertently
distanced society from literature'. She argues that about three years earlier many
writers and critics had imagined that all that was needed would be to remove the
bridle of censorship, and 'the field of our country's culture would burst into flower',
but concludes: 'It isn't blossoming. Rather the contrary'.⁵
The death of Soviet culture has been announced by writers on both sides of the
political divide: by the 'democrat'6 Viktor Erofeev in his famous article 'Soviet
Literature: In Memoriam', and by the 'patriot' Yurii Bondarev, Chairman-elect of the
RSFSR Writers' Union, who declared in December 1990: 'Contemporary literature is
not yet dead, but it has reached or is approaching a tragic state, that is, a diabolical
confusion of ideas, styles, heroes and moral doctrines, a brutal mixture of snobbish
taste and guignol-type filth or, in other words, a state of evil-mindedness'.8 Another
critic, Mark Kharitonov, commented more philosophically in June 1991: 'All sorts of
funerals, wakes and defamations of literature are becoming a kind of ritual'.⁹
116
ROSALIND MARSH
If, as I have argued elsewhere, the publication in the USSR of previously censored
literary works has radically altered Russians' perception of their own history and
played an important part in transforming their country since Gorbachev's accession, 10
it is ironic that it is now necessary to ask: 'does literature matter any more?' Yet it
is undeniable that by 1991 the pace of political events in the USSR had become so
rapid that writers and critics were more concerned with political debate than with
writing fiction, while most Soviet people were more interested in watching the
Congress debates on television or reading the press and publitsistika than in reading
serious literature. Whether because they were tired of the current political and
economic crisis, or because they had no time to read on account of the endless
queues, many people preferred escapist literature, such as detective stories by Agatha
Christie and Raymond Chandler, Western bestsellers by Arthur Hailey or James
Hadley Chase, science fiction, erotica or books on sensational subjects like oriental
and martial arts, UFOs, folk medicine and psychic phenomena. The ambitious were
reading books on business or marketing, while intellectuals were seeking solace in
Russian and Western classics, such as Dostoevsky, Joyce and Dante, or had returned
to the works of Russian religious philosophers of the early 20th century.
The aim of this essay is to investigate why the condition of Russian literature has
changed so radically since the euphoric days of 1987-88. It will explore a number of
reasons-moral, spiritual, political and economic-why by 1991 fiction could no
longer sustain the great popularity which it had enjoyed in the early years of
glasnost'. An attempt will be made to explore why literature is now in crisis, to ask
whether there are any hopeful signs on the horizon and, finally, to discuss whether we
are indeed witnessing the death of Soviet literature, or even of Russian literature as
a whole.
The need for repentance
One of the major reasons for the crisis now facing Russian literature is the widespread
reassessment of the role of the writer in Russian society. In particular, glasnost'
brought to the forefront of cultural debate the question of the moral responsibility of
writers for the contemporary state of Russian literature and society. Already in 1987,
after the release of Tengiz Abuladze's film satirising Stalinism, Repentance, the
respected scholar Academician Dmitrii Likhachev had argued: 'The main theme of
literature now is repentance'. 12 By 1991, when every aspect of Soviet history had been
re-examined, the Russian literary establishment was perceived as having lost all
claims to moral authority. 13 Russian writers were perceived as having set themselves
up as teachers and prophets advocating social utopias while collaborating, actively or
passively, with the Soviet regime for over seventy years, and therefore were deemed
to bear a responsibility for the Revolution, the Gulag and other crimes of 20th century
Russia. One Literaturnaya gazeta article in 1991 was entitled: 'The blood of the
twentieth century: is literature guilty?' 11
In this debate the traditional Russian question 'Who is to blame?' has come to take
precedence over the more constructive 'What is to be done?''5 The theme of
repentance has increasingly been interpreted in a highly personal way, with accusa-
tions being couched in vituperative terms. Individuals who held prominent positions
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
117
in the Union of Writers have been accused of persecuting their fellow writers in the
past. Particular episodes singled out for condemnation have been the signing of the
notorious letter attacking Pasternak in 1958, collaboration with the authorities during
the Sinyavsky/Daniel trial of 1966, and the hounding of Tvardovsky from the
editorship of Novyi mir in 1970. Conservative literary officials tried to defend
themselves; indeed, Bondarev flatly refused to repent, but was ably countered by
Likhachev, who maintained: 'Not one person can say that he is not guilty; we are all
guilty of what has happened in past decades. I emphasise: all without exception'. 17 In
1991 the critic Aleksandr Rubashkin emphasised the significance of writers' accep-
tance of responsibility for past abuses, for the future of Russian literature and
criticism: 'Repentance is not an aim in itself; it is essential in order to work further,
to have the right to speak to our readers'. 18
Although the desire to single out scapegoats for the crimes and persecutions of the
past is very understandable in a country which has never experienced the equivalent
of the Nuremburg trials, in some respects the new freedom to criticise fellow writers
has had unsavoury consequences. The Soviet public has witnessed the unedifying
spectacle of writers and critics setting themselves up in judgement on their fellows.
Intolerance and recrimination, always characteristic of Russian literary life, have
become more vocal and universal. Liberals of the 1960s (the so-called shestidesyat-
niki) have been forced to defend themselves against more radical younger critics;¹⁹
while Jewish writers have been showered with anti-Semitic abuse. 20 Even such
scourges of writers' past collaboration with the regime as the critics Vladimir
Bondarenko and Viktor Toporov have themselves come under attack: 'They judge
others as if they themselves had only just come into the literary workshop. Both
critics consider their value judgements and moral positions to be beyond reproach.
But in past years I did not notice their boldness, which now makes itself so militantly
felt.
,21
The writer and editor Mikhail Berg, whom I met in spring 1991, was probably
expressing the view of many democratic Russian intellectuals when he argued that
Soviet history is so terrible that if Russians are to overcome the legacy of the Gulag
there is a need for a massive collective repentance or a cataclysm that might involve
great bloodshed. Neither of his predictions has yet been realised in European Russia,
but with the failure of the August 1991 coup there has been a new wave of revenge
and recrimination, starting with the coup leaders and spreading to engulf their
supporters in the literary world. In 1992 voices have been raised suggesting that
vague appeals for 'mass repentance' are a poor substitute for actual trials of
individuals associated with the old regime, since 'guilt is personal'; and some
members of the Russian political leadership hope to turn the Constitutional Court
hearings into a 'Nuremberg trial' of the Communist Party. 23
Changing reputations
The reappraisal of Soviet history and the publication of 'returned literature' in the last
six years have given new authors and works a central place in the Russian literary
canon and swept away the reputations of former 'Soviet classics'.
118
ROSALIND MARSH
Party hacks
The vast majority of conformist Soviet writers who followed the dictates of 'socialist
realism' have now been dismissed as pisatelokratiya ('the dictatorship of failed
scribblers').' 24 In particular, all the writers who won the Stalin Prize between 1941 and
1952 have, in Toporov's words, 'fallen out [of the canon) like milk-teeth in growing
children'. 25 Erofeev has spoken of the "tragedy of Shakespearian proportions' which
has affected former literary luminaries, now in their seventies, who realise that their
lives have been lived in vain.²⁶ Possibly this realisation of the futility of their lives
has been the reason for the vituperative tone of many speeches and articles in the
conservative press. Bondarev, for example, has compared the new forces in literature
to the fascist hordes who invaded the USSR in 1941, and has also characterised liberal
writers and other supporters of perestroika as 'an invasion of rats' which 'is bringing
danger and menace and indicates sheer hopelessness
A time of prosperity for the
rodents is approaching, a triumph of the exultant rule of deception and the dictator-
ship of banality'. 27
Liberal writers
Along with the party hacks, radical writers and critics have also sounded the death
knell for 'liberal literature', the product of the Khrushchev 'thaw'. Erofeev admits that
it was an 'honest trend' based on 'the desire to tell as much truth as possible in
opposition to the censorship', which created a special 'Aesopian language' and a
readership accustomed to reading between the lines. When perestroika began, liberal
writers leapt on the bandwagon and began to play the role of prosecutor, criticising
Soviet society on the grounds of morality and common sense. But, as Erofeev says,
'their joy was not far-sighted: perestroika this time, in contrast to Khrushchev's
"thaw", proved to be too bottomless for liberal literature, and in this well many works
which had yesterday seemed amazingly bold began to drown'. The increasing
freedom of glasnost', according to Erofeev, quickly made formerly daring works out
of date. 28
To some extent Erofeev's words ring true for all highly politicised 'liberal'
literature in the USSR. Anatolii Rybakov's Children of the Arbat, which seemed so
bold in 1987 for its analysis of Stalin's 'philosophy of power' and the psychology
involved in the purge trials, appeared old-fashioned by 1990-91 because of its overly
respectful attitude towards Lenin and Kirov. 29 Similarly, Mikhail Shatrov's series of
plays demythologising Lenin, including Onward
onward
onward!, so contro-
versial at the time of its publication in 1987, felt in 1991, when televised to mark the
anniversary of Lenin's birthday, like a desperate attempt on the part of Leonid
Kravchenko, the conservative head of Soviet television, to rekindle people's fading
enthusiasm for Lenin. However, Erofeev's claim that all liberal works are 'old-fash-
ioned' is not entirely fair: Rybakov's portrait of Stalin is still interesting, and
Shatrov's plays explore many moral and historical issues which transcend their
Leninist line. A blanket condemnation of 'liberal' literature threatens to 'throw out the
baby with the bathwater': good writers like Trifonov and Abramov, once regarded as
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
119
very outspoken, are now posthumously attacked for not demonstrating enough
resistance to the Soviet authorities.30
Although partially misguided, such a cynical attitude towards 'liberal' writers,
whom the poet Andrei Voznesensky dubbed 'proraby perestroiki' ('the clerks of
perestroika'), was widespread among Soviet intellectuals by 1991. Toporov argued
that there was no longer any room for 'intermediate writers'-that is, the majority of
honest writers who had tried to steer a middle course between the party hacks and the
dissidents. Similarly, German Baluev, the editor of the Leningrad newspaper
Literator, stated baldly: 'ninety per cent of Russian writers are no longer necessary
for the people'.33
Dissident literature
The reputations of some formerly 'dissident' writers too are not as high as they once
were. Erofeev claims, with some plausibility, that much dissident literature was
written by 'liberal' writers who underestimated the harshness of the censorship in the
post-Stalin period, and hence became 'dissident' purely by chance. Dissident litera-
ture too has achieved its purpose and is now outdated, because its practitioners still
mistakenly try to attach a socio-political significance to literature. After emigration to
the West some of the former dissidents 'choked from excess of oxygen' and could not
adapt to the new conditions of freedom. In Erofeev's opinion, most sensible liberals
should have 'blessed their comfortable lack of freedom' and stayed in Russia, as most
intelligent ones did.34
By the time much formerly dissident literature had returned to Russia, it had lost
the lure of 'forbidden fruit', and public opinion had already outstripped it. Even some
of the most famous dissident works, such as Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago, published
in 1988, appeared too late to have much impact in the USSR. Even Solzhenitsyn,
who has the greatest claim to being the teacher and prophet of his nation, has had
surprisingly little influence in Russia, although 1990 was heralded as 'the year of
Solzhenitsyn'.36 His novels The First Circle and Cancer Ward have provoked little
discussion in his homeland, and even The Gulag Archipelago, which, it once seemed,
could change lives and topple the Soviet regime, has not been read by enough people
to lead to adequate critical analysis. The main reasons for this are that many Soviet
intellectuals had read these works years earlier when they first circulated in samizdat
or were published in tamizdat; that few people were able to acquire copies of Novyi
mir or the book version of Gulag, which had not been published in a large enough
print run; and that the press had already published many other revelations about
Stalinism and the prison camps by 1989. By 1991 young people were apparently
moaning: 'Oh no, not more about the camps!'." As for Solzhenitsyn's monumental
epic The Red Wheel, which began to be published in the USSR in 1990, 38 the editor
of Literator said to me in 1991: 'I have never met anyone who has read it'.39 So if
Solzhenitsyn hoped that his work would encourage Russians to draw parallels
between the current political situation and the chaotic democracy after the Revolution
of February 1917, he seems to have been unsuccessful (similar warnings in his
pamphlet How Should We Reorganise Russia? (1990) also fell on deaf ears.⁴⁰
Another reason why literature by highly respected former dissidents now faces the
120
ROSALIND MARSH
dichotomy of freedom and impotence is that over the past seven years words have
been the easiest thing to license in Russia, but they have not cured the political or
economic crisis. At one time it seemed unthinkable that the works of Pasternak,
Grossman and Solzhenitsyn would be published in the USSR, but they were
published, and nothing happened. The Soviet people expected a 'miracle' when
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago was published in 1989,4 but this failed to materi-
alise, and Russians were saying in spring 1991: 'the government has not fallen'.
However, now that the Communist government has fallen, a strong case could be
made for the view that public opinion in Gorbachev's Russia was itself a product of
the new moral and spiritual climate formed by samizdat and tamizdat which had been
palpable, but submerged, in the Brezhnev era and only had a chance of surfacing
under glasnost'. The widespread awareness of the crimes of Stalin and Lenin by the
time of Gorbachev's accession undoubtedly owes a great deal to such works as
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago and Lenin in Zurich. Dissident literature could be
seen as a time-bomb ticking away until it finally exploded in 1991.
In the electric atmosphere of the last few years, radical writers and critics have been
more concerned with the iconoclastic toppling of literary authorities than with a
serious analysis of literary texts. A longer period of assimilation may be necessary
before Russians can make considered judgements about the aesthetic and historical
importance of their literary legacy.
Emigre writers
By 1991 Russians' attitudes to emigre writers were also beginning to change: the
former excitement at the return of previously unpublished writers and works was
already turning into disillusionment. This disenchantment was due to the feeling
among young or neglected writers that emigres were crowding them out of literary
journals; disappointment with the low level of much emigre literature, from which
Soviet people had expected so much; and disillusionment with the political views of
Russian emigres, which often seemed to be out of touch with the reality of the
situation in Russia. Attitudes to emigre writers may also have been coloured by the
general feelings of envy and resentment against emigres who were perceived as
enjoying an easy life in the West while their homeland was in crisis (even though
certain prominent writers had frankly admitted the difficulties of emigre life in
interviews published in the Soviet press).
One example of this changed approach was the publication of an interview with the
writer A. Kustarev, who works for the BBC World Service in London, entitled
'Emigre Literature: In Memoriam (by analogy with Erofeev's article on Soviet
literature). Kustarev says that when he left the USSR in the early 1980s he felt 'an
irritated disillusionment' with third-wave emigre literature, feeling that the literary
quality of even famous emigre works by Voinovich and Zinoviev was no better than
that of some 'official' Soviet literature. Kustarev also took issue with the colossal
pretensions of emigre writers, their narcissistic and mistaken belief in their own
originality. He claimed that foreigners who knew little about the context of Russian
literature had chosen to praise certain emigre writers as the true heroes of Russian
literature: in particular, there was a 'cult' of Solzhenitsyn and Brodsky. In the USSR,
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
121
he argued, people thought: 'Once he has been recognised in the West, he must be a
wonderful writer'. Kustarev argued that 'a formula had been prepared; all talented
writers had to write something anti-Soviet, and everything anti-Soviet was a product
of repressed talent'. With some justification, he concluded that Russia lacked 'a
professional depoliticised literature'.
This article could simply be dismissed as the ravings of one jaundiced emigre,44 if
a similar disillusionment had not also been expressed later in the year by other writers
and critics. In July 1991 the moderate critic Alla Latynina attacked the emigre writer
Eduard Limonov for the provocative political views he had expressed in a series of
interviews in the Soviet press: the opinion that Stalin had been attacked too strongly
in the Gorbachev era; that the USSR should not have withdrawn from Afghanistan;
that democracy is merely a 'luxury for rich countries'; and that Russia should return
to 'good old violence' in order to avoid a regression to capitalism. 45 Latynina wonders
what the 'democratic press' would have said if such views had been expressed by
someone living in the USSR; milder versions of Limonov's ideas expounded by such
conservatives as Polozkov, the Chairman of the Russian Communist Party, the 'black
colonels' Alksnis and Petrushenko and generals Rodionov and Makashev had been
held up to shame and ridicule, whereas Limonov had been taken seriously, simply
because he was an emigre. Latynina feels that there is now 'a fashion
of regarding
the emigration tolerantly, indiscriminately considering everyone who has left a
sufferer in the battle against totalitarianism'. In her view, Russian support for emigres
is unthinking: she cannot understand why Russians in the metropolis should show so
much tolerance for emigres like Limonov when tolerance is hardly a marked feature
of contemporary political debate.
A more serious question raised by Latynina is how Russians should treat their
erstwhile heroes if they now say things with which they profoundly disagree. By
mid-1991 the euphoria with which every emigre writer had originally been greeted
was palpably turning into a more sober assessment of each individual emigre's
literary merits and political views. An editorial in Literaturnaya gazeta stated,
perhaps rather disingenuously: 'This is not a change of fashion, not a campaign (first
we praised them, now we'll attack them), but the movement of time'. 46
Thus by 1991 the attitude to emigre literature on the part of the democratic Russian
intelligentsia was rather paradoxical. On the one hand, even Latynina was prepared
to admit that works by Russian writers now living abroad had exerted a great deal of
influence on Soviet intellectuals at the time of their original publication in the West.
Another positive development was that the publication of emigre writers in the USSR
under glasnost' had allowed the two strands of Russian literature to merge into one:
it seemed that there would no longer be any distinction between 'Soviet' and 'emigre'
literature, and that the battles about 'two literatures or one?' which used to rage
among emigre and Western critics had now been superseded.4 On the other hand, by
1991 there appeared to be a growing sense in the USSR of a great divide between
Russians in the capital and the emigration, and a feeling of pride on the part of those
who had remained to share the destiny of their country. As Latynina argued: 'You can
take your language, culture and memory away into emigration. But the history of
Russia takes place in Russia'. 48
Latynina's article was greeted by indignant responses from such well-known
122
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emigre writers as Voinovich and Limonov. The most considered reply came from
Sinyavsky's wife Marya Rozanova, who argued that Limonov was an exception
among emigre circles and not to be taken seriously, and that Latynina was simply
unaware of the wide range of views among the Russian emigration-all the current
debates within Russia had their counterpart among Russian emigres. She found it
unfortunate, as many Russians living in the former USSR must also, that the 'we' and
'they' dichotomy in Latynina's article accentuated an artificial division which, she
hoped, had already been healed.50
This debate was raised to a higher plane by the literary scholar Efim Etkind, who
chronicled the severe, perhaps irredeemable destruction of the Russian intelligentsia
throughout the 20th century, and warned of the negative consequences of the
continuing 'brain drain' from the former Soviet Union. 51 The division between
Russian intellectuals in the metropolis and the emigration has continued into 1992,
perhaps contributing to the Russian public's disillusionment with contemporary
literary life. The writer Daniil Granin has complained that the negative comments of
Russian emigres on the contemporary political and economic crisis are helping to sow
fear and despair among the Russian population.52 Russian nationalists have implied
that emigre writers are unpatriotic if they do not choose to return to their homeland;
and Voinovich, who lives in Munich, but also possesses a sparsely furnished flat in
Moscow, has implied that exhortations to emigre writers to return home have almost
reached the level of a new 'social command'. 54
Writers' spiritual crisis
Another less obvious result of the present troubled political climate has been the crisis
of creativity which so many writers and cultural figures are undergoing. Even such a
talented writer as Tat'yana Tolstaya was quoted as saying in 1991: 'I know I can
write, but I can't seem to find anything to write about'.55 The film director Aleksei
German, Chairman of the Film Makers' Union and director of the highly acclaimed
film 'My friend Ivan Lapshin' (completed in 1983; released in 1985) admitted in 1991
that he had not made a film for five years because he knew that it was necessary to
work in a new way, but was unable to adapt to the new conditions of freedom.
Similarly, 'alternative' writers of the younger generation who did not publish before
Gorbachev's accession have not always found it easy to emerge from the Russian
'underground' into the glare of glasnost', and readers have not always been ready for
what they have to say.
One reason which has been advanced for literature's present loss of influence is that
writers have been unable to respond to the troubled political situation in Russia since
1989. 'The muses have been silent', as they often are in wartime; people have been
turning to literature vainly for help, but literature is in crisis, like life itself.58 In 1991,
commenting on the fact that the poet Igor Irtenev had not written anything for almost
a year, the critic Andrei Nuikin asked:
Why? He's experiencing some sort of break, some crisis (and so are many of his
acquaintances). Because one can't always chase after events. A poet is not a
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123
seismograph
In order to analyse past events, draw conclusions, it is necessary
to have at least a minimal peace of mind-which does not exist.59
The critic V. Kardin, who admits that the only literature that can be produced in such
chaotic circumstances is 'one-day propaganda literature', and that it may be unfair to
expect writers to respond in this crisis, nevertheless insists that it is expected of them.
Russian writers have always been expected to advance political ideas, and Soviet
literature has by its very nature been militant.60 However, if literature is 'emotion
recollected in tranquillity', a time of political cataclysm may not be the ideal time for
the creation of good literature.
The absence of new writers
A more purely literary problem caused by glasnost' is that the great attention paid to
the rehabilitation of previously unpublished works has meant that there has not been
enough space in journals for works by new, younger writers.⁶ Until 1990-91 there
was no room either for writers of the 'forgotten generation' of 50 years-old and under
who had been unable to publish in the 'era of stagnation' under Brezhnev, but had
neither suffered persecution in the past nor had any desire to treat political issues or
sensational themes in their present work. In a 1990 article which the Soviet press
refused to print, the poet Larisa Miller complained: 'The problem is that today in the
era of glasnost' a whole generation has been buried. A whole generation is doomed
to silence, having no outlet to its readers' 62 Similarly, Tolstaya (born in 1951), the
most famous of the younger writers who have risen to prominence since the inception
of glasnost`, has said of the fate of young writers: "They have nowhere to go', and
of editors: 'They no longer say: "It's awful! Take it away!" Now they say, "It'll be
published later." But when later?'63
Although it is obviously difficult for new writers to compete for space in literary
journals with classics like Pasternak, Nabokov and Solzhenitsyn and sensational
works by emigres, it is not true to say that there are no new writers of the era of
glasnost' (although, as Julian Graffy has noted, not all of them are young). 64 In the
1990s, now that the store of 'returned literature' is beginning to run out, this problem
is being at least partially resolved. A number of new literary almanacs publishing
young and neglected writers have sprung up; and in 1991 one of the established
journals, Znamya, published at least eight new writers in their 20s or 30s. However,
the main problem remains the one pointed out by the science fiction writer Boris
Strugatsky: 'Freedom has come and there's still no flood of masterpieces' 65 Of
course, masterpieces are rare in any culture at any time, but by 1991 critics were
complaining that some writers who had once shown talent had written little new
(Tolstaya) or were repeating themselves (Sergei Kaledin). 66 It was also recognised by
aspiring writers that, although no official censorship now existed, most Russian
editors, concerned about their circulation figures, now unofficially discriminated
against writers who did not treat sensational themes. The critic Aron Lur'e
complained in 1991 that the only themes in contemporary Russian literature were 'the
camps, the Jews, the KGB and sex'.68
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ROSALIND MARSH
The politicisation of literature
Another problem caused by glasnost' has been that the expression of long-suppressed
complaints has increased not only the honesty of writers and editors, but also their
factionalism and cliquishness. Although Soviet writers have been divided into two
camps of 'liberals' and 'conservatives' ever since the death of Stalin, glasnost' has
intensified this division, sanctioning not only liberal reformist views, but also the
explicitly racist views of the conservatives, with their nationalism and anti-Semitism.
This has become worse since 1989, when Gorbachev's grip on the unpredictable
forces unleashed by his own reforms began to slacken. From 1989 an unholy alliance
has existed between neo-Stalinists and conservative nationalists, supported by some
elements in the KGB and the army, who have answered the question 'Who is to
blame?' with the view that the 'Jewish-Masonic conspiracy' has been responsible for
all the ills of modern Russian history, including the abdication of the Tsar, the
Bolshevik Revolution and collectivisation.
By 1991 the two camps of intelligentsia had become increasingly politicised and
polarised, and writers were complaining about the way in which politics had come to
dominate literature. The poet Aleksandr Kushner claimed that literary politics in the
era of perestroika possessed all the same faults that had existed in the bad old days
of party control: 'Still the same suspiciousness, tendentiousness, factionalism, only
turned upside-down'. He concluded wryly: 'We're still a long way away from a
civilised literary life'.70 Apart from the political division of writers into 'patriots' and
'democrats', there has also been another division on moral and literary grounds
between the 'traditionalists' and 'avant-gardists', or the 'official writers' and the
'underground'. Those who had fallen victim to the literary 'freeze' of the 1960s and
had taken humble jobs as caretakers or night watchmen accused 'liberals' of being
insufficiently radical and uncompromising during the Brezhnev era, and of participat-
ing in 'official literature' in order to have a chance of publishing their work.'
The writer Iyuliyu Edlis has argued that the state of contemporary literature,
divided into warring camps, has meant that Russian writers still have no true freedom
to create literature, despite the vaunted 'liberalism and free thought' of the glasnost'
era. He asserts: 'The total politicisation of literature threatens to turn it into some sort
of mutant: from a chronicle of the human heart it is becoming nothing but a register
of facts', which, in his opinion, are interpreted arbitrarily in accordance with each
individual writer's political views. Edlis cites a joke by one of his fellow writers: 'The
time has now come to write for the drawer'-an ironic conclusion to six years in
which Soviet literature has enjoyed an unprecedented freedom from censorship. Edlis
expresses the hope that when literary battles cease and there is time for literature
again, 'there will be something to take out of the desk drawer'. 72
Another aspect of the politicisation of literature is the fact that many writers have
been deputies in either the Soviet or national parliaments too, and that although in
theory they have the freedom to write anything they want, in practice they are too
busy. In 1991 Yurii Shcherbak, then a Ukrainian deputy (now Minister of the
Environment in the Ukrainian government) admitted that he had not written anything
for the past two years since his election, and had left unfinished a documentary novel
on the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33. He confessed: 'I live for politics', which, in his
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125
opinion, provided 'the last chance of becoming a free people. a free country' and of
climbing out of the 'medieval concentration camp, the black hole of history, the
conditions of "chronocollapse" in which the Soviet people had lived for too long."
Yet such is the pluralism in contemporary Russian literary life that writers have also
been criticised from the opposite point of view-for failing to respond directly
enough to current political events, for example for their reluctance to support the
miners' strike in Belorussia in the spring of 1991. 74 Fortunately, not all Russian
writers wish to be involved in politics: Andrei Sinyavsky relates how in prison camp
he met a madman who thought he was the Russian Tsar and invited him to be
minister of culture, but his response was: 'I don't want to sacrifice myself any more,
I don't want to be a minister, I don't want to be a deputy. I want to remain a writer'. 75
The administration of literature
Constant uncertainty about the administration of literature has not helped writers to
concentrate on their work, and the veritable civil war which has been raging between
rival journals and writers' organisations may well have alienated the Russian public
even further from contemporary literary life. 76
In the early years of glasnost' the institutions in charge of Soviet literature were
slow to change." The critic Natalya Il'ina emphasised in 1988 that there was great
opposition to change on the part of privileged people who had an interest in
maintaining the status quo. At that time the USSR Union of Writers (SP SSSR) had
10 000 members with an average age of 60; 820 of them had been honoured with the
publication of their collective works during the current twelfth five-year plan. There
were many corrupt practices still entrenched in Soviet publishing houses. Frequent
publication still bore no relation to literary ability: the exploitation of ghost writers
and exchanges of favours helped the careers of people without talent.
The conservatism of the literary establishment led 'liberal' writers to band together
in unofficial groups, such as the Moscow writers group 'Aprel', founded in March
1990 and headed by Anatolii Pristavkin, who simultaneously resigned from the
Communist Party.⁷⁸ Professional organisations administered on radically different
lines from the old Union were also created, notably the PEN Centre, established in
Moscow in 1990 under the presidency of Anatolii Rybakov. In 1991, before the
August coup, scathing attacks were launched on the Union of Soviet Writers;79 a
number of writers issued a manifesto for a new 'Union of Independent Writers'
(Soyuz Nezavisimykh Pisatelei);8 and critics discussed whether the Ninth Congress
of Soviet Writers, originally postponed from May to October 1991 and thereafter
postponed indefinitely, would be its last.81
The August coup further complicated an already complicated situation and polar-
ised Russian writers even more. The only liberal writer who played a politically
prominent role in the events of August 1991 within Russia was Evgenii Evtushenko,
whose poem '19 August 1991' on the defence of the Russian parliament was read out
in the White House on 20 August;8 subsequently, telegrams of support for El'tsin and
the Russian Congress of Deputies were sent by the editorial boards of Znamya and
Literaturnaya gazeta.⁸³ Support also came from prominent emigre writers: Georgii
Vladimov sent from Germany a penetrating assessment of 'The Conspirators' Three
126
ROSALIND MARSH
Mistakes', which was published in the underground Obshchaya gazeta.⁸⁴ At the same
time conservative writers were also active: on 20 August a small group of members
of the Secretariat of the USSR Union of Writers held a secret meeting with Sergei
Bobkov, a representative of the Emergency Committee and, according to some
reports, 'welcomed the coup' (although this was later denied by another participant,
Sergei Mikhalkov). 85 However, by 21 August. when the failure of the coup had
become obvious, Yanaev's aide Bobkov published a self-serving letter claiming that
he had not possessed the powers ascribed to him and expressing the hope that there
would be no 'witchhunts' among the literary community or society as a whole.
On 23 August, flushed with victory, Evtushenko and a group of well known
reformist writers, some of them secretaries of the USSR Writers' Union who had not
been invited to meetings for a long time, stormed a meeting of the secretariat in the
Central House of Litterateurs, causing Sergei Kolov, the Acting First Secretary, to
flee. The liberals appointed a new temporary secretariat under Evtushenko's chair-
manship which dismissed Kolov and Nikolai Gorbachev, the administrator of the
Litfond, the organisation responsible for writers' financial needs. 87 Evtushenko de-
manded the closure of the conservative newspaper Den' and the journals Nash
sovremennik and Molodaya gvardiya, and called for the resignation of the writers
Bondarev, Rasputin and Prokhanov, who were accused of being 'ideological instiga-
tors of the putsch', because they had signed the notorious letter of 23 July, 'A Word
to the People', which had proposed an authoritarian solution to the country's
problems, along with Tizyakov and Starodubtsev, members of the disbanded Emer-
gency Committee.88 The conservatives protested loudly that the 'democrats' were
treating them in an undemocratic, even fascist manner. At a meeting on 26 August the
RSFSR Writers' Union (SP RSFSR) adapted to the new circumstances, passing a
resolution condemning the coup and supporting the new Russian leadership, while at
the same time comparing the behaviour of the 'democrats' to the unconstitutional
tactics of the coup leaders themselves. The hostilities between the two camps
reached a climax on 31 August, when a meeting of the Board of the conservative
RSFSR Writers' Union was interrupted by representatives of the prefect of Moscow's
Central District who arrived to close the building and suspend the Union's activities
on charges that it had taken part in laying the ideological framework for the coup.90
Since August 1991 the disintegration of the Communist Party and the USSR itself
has led, not surprisingly, to the disintegration of the organisations which formerly
controlled Soviet culture. The stronghold of the conservatives, the RSFSR Writers'
Union, whose membership numbered about 1500. withdrew from the USSR Writers'
Union, and so did the unions of the three Baltic states and Georgia. Discussions took
place about the formation of a new democratic Union of Russian Writers (Soyuz
Rossiiskikh Pisatelei) under the chairmanship of Sergei Antonov;9 while at the same
time splits between 'democrats' and 'patriots' occurred within the Moscow and
Leningrad writers' organisations. The conservatives of the RSFSR Writers' Union
attempted to take advantage of the disintegration of the USSR and the new dominance
of the Russian Federation, declaring the USSR Writers' Union to be illegal, and
calling for the transfer to their organisation of all funds belonging to the Litfond. The
liberal writers in their turn declared this move to be illegal.
In early 1992 the liberals disbanded the old USSR Writers' Union, which was an
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
127
organ of the totalitarian state, in favour of a new Commonwealth of Unions of Writers
(Sodruzhestvo Soyuzov Pisatelei), open to all interested writers' unions in. the
Commonwealth of Independent States. The democratic writers' organisations in the
newly independent nations are envisaged as independent, non-political associations of
professional people;95 but some non-aligned writers still feel the need to retain their
separate identity in a Club of Independent Writers, which hopes to devote itself
exclusively to literature and not to become involved in political debate.⁹⁶
The wrangling between different factions of writers is still continuing, at times
reaching almost unbelievably farcical extremes. On 15 January 1992 200 conservative
writers led by Bondarev and Prokhanov burst into the headquarters of the Common-
wealth of Unions of Writers, showering its leaders with racist anti-Semitic abuse;
subsequently they marched to the Leo Tolstoy memorial in the yard facing the Central
House of Writers, where they burned an effigy of Evtushenko.⁹ In March a
counter-coup took place against Timur Pulatov, the new leader of the SSP, for alleged
collaboration with the conservatives, and both Pulatov and Evtushenko were dis-
missed for misappropriating Union funds, particularly to finance their frequent trips
abroad.⁹ The long-postponed Ninth Congress of the Writers' Union, which was
supposed to decide on the future administration of Russian literature, was postponed
again until June, and it was recognised that the Union had insufficient money to pay
many delegates' fares.99 Pulatov refused to resign as Chairman of the Union, so two
executive committees were set up; and the possibility was envisaged that two separate
congresses might meet.¹⁰⁰ Finally, on 2 June 1992, a depleted Ninth Writers' Congress
organised by Pulatov's faction met in Moscow, without the participation of the legal
SSP, the democratic writers' organisations of Moscow, St Petersburg, Armenia and
others. This abortive congress is likely to intensify the bitterness among the writers'
community, as those who attended perceive themselves as natural heirs of the old
USSR Writers' Union, which is now to be renamed the "Community of Writers'
Unions' (Soobshchestvo Pisatel skikh Soyuzov), whereas the democrats who boy-
cotted it wish to establish a totally new type of writers' organisation. 101
It is evident that these battles have taken up a great deal of writers' time and
energy-time which might have been more productively spent writing. The wrangling
between rival factions is likely to continue,¹⁰² and some writers choose to belong to
a bewildering array of different organisations. Whatever structures eventually emerge
as dominant among the literary community, it seems that Russian writers still wish to
band together in collective organisations possessing greater cultural and political
influence than the looser professional associations common in the West. Indeed, even
among those who were eager to destroy the old Union, there seems to be a sense of
'United we stand; divided we fall'.103
Publishing houses
The changing political circumstances since 1985 have had a profound impact on
publishing houses, literary journals and newspapers. One problem, particularly in the
first few years of glasnost', was the difficulty of guaranteeing genuine freedom and
pluralism in Russian literature when the state still had a monopoly over the means of
artistic production. However, writers and intellectuals initially avoided this problem
128
ROSALIND MARSH
by launching independent periodicals, such as Glasnost', under the editorship of
ex-political prisoner Sergei Grigoryants. In the wake of the press law of August 1990,
which allowed all independent publications to become legal as long as they were
officially registered, the newspaper Literaturnaya gazeta announced that it was now
independent of the Writers' Union and called itself 'a free tribune of writers'. 104
Acrimonious disputes have arisen between certain journals and the Union over who
is the legal owner-the Union or the editorial collective. In 1991 both the journal
Znamya and Literaturnaya gazeta won their lawsuits against the Union. 105
Expectations were raised by the new cooperative publishing houses which began to
operate from about 1987, but some went out of business very rapidly. By 1990 both
journals and cooperative publishing houses were faced with a new problem: a serious
paper shortage. Larisa Miller, in her unpublished 1990 article, describes events as
follows:
Recently, in August, came the long-awaited Law on the Press; independent
publishing houses have been allowed. And they began to appear, but THE
DEAD SEASON CONTINUES; PAPER HAS CATASTROPHICALLY DIS-
APPEARED. And again, as before, a wall has been artificially erected between the
reader and the writer. The paradox of the present day consists of the fact that while
events change very quickly, in practice everything remains the same or becomes
worse; every plus is without fail neutralised by a minus.¹⁰⁶
Because of the paper shortage there was a huge delay in producing some issues of
literary journals in 1990; and Novyi mirtook the unprecedented step of announcing
that issues 9-12, 1990 would be published as numbers 5-8, 1991. 107
1991 witnessed the welcome appearance of independent anthologies of 'alternative
literature', such as Vestnik novoi literatury and Glas: New Russian Writing (Moscow),
which publishes English translations of new fiction.¹⁰⁸ However, the majority of
cooperative publishing houses will probably continue to publish commercially viable
works, such as translations of foreign detective stories, books on folk medicine,
marketing and various types of entrepreneurial activity, and what one critic has called
'the fantastic escapades of prostitutes in outer space'. 109 In late 1991 the gravity of the
situation in publishing was recognised by Mikhail Nenashev, former USSR Minister
of Education and the Press, who argued that the state 'in the person of the Presidents
of the USSR and Russia' should 'renounce its long-standing and destructive policy of
extracting extremely high profits from the state book publishing industry and should
exempt the children's and textbook publishing houses from taxes'. 110
Although some cooperative publishing houses may eventually prove to be success-
ful, they may not have any particularly beneficial effects on the publication of serious
literature. In 1992 one writer complained that the only publishing houses which now
existed were 'nouveaux riches' only interested in commercial success and well-mean-
ing 'amateurs' who produce small anthologies of prose and poetry, but risk going
bust."
Literature and the market
Since 1990 writers and critics have been discussing the impact which the market
system will have on literature, citing the commercialisation of culture in the West as
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
129
a terrible warning of what Russian writers may have in store." In 1991 Toporov
claimed that a 'regulated market economy of a mixed type' already existed in
publishing; both state and cooperative publishing houses asked their authors to
produce works which responded to consumer demand, 'that is, "black prose" and
porn' (chernukha i pornukha). 113 Latynina posed the harsh question: 'Is everyone
ready to assume a place in the "normal" literature of a free society-a literature that
develops without censorship and without coddling, without the patronage of the state,
but also without that of society?' and answered bluntly: 'I think not everyone is.
Toporov warned Russian writers that in the West writers do not earn their living
through good prose, poetry and literary criticism, but by doing other jobs, working for
television and the cinema or writing bestsellers. He claimed that fewer books than
before were being published in Russia, and hardly any poetry. 115 He argued that a
normal market system is one thing, but the current wave of speculation in Russia is
quite another, and expressed dismay at a system which is only interested in making
quick profits, and hence prizes detective stories and cookery books above poetry.
Similarly, Latynina has defined the situation in Russia as 'this savage period of
primitive accumulation'. While admitting that nothing can be worse than the diktat of
ideology, she nevertheless admits:
Nothing joyful awaits culture on the road to a market system either. And people can
argue as much as they please that a situation in which a theatre struggles for
survival and fails because it can't support itself financially, or in which a film
director has to make the film that promises commercial success rather than the one
he wants to make, or in which a writer has to learn competitiveness and acquire a
knack for business in order to be successful, is normal. I will never agree that such
a situation is normal.
Latynina's apprehension is shared by other writers and intellectuals: she cites the
writer Naum Korzhavin as saying: 'It turns out that innovation in art is now serving
mediocrities. They very quickly figure out what is "good" and what is "bad", what is
"new" and what is "old".' The market system promotes kitsch and leaves no room for
'an artist who is incapable of attaching himself to any group or movement that acts
as a market mafia'. Latynina admits that such an artist's fate will be 'as sad as
before-before he was crowded out by those who trimmed their sails to an ideology,
while now he will be crowded out by those who trim their sails to the market'. 116
The market has already had an adverse effect on certain individuals: for example,
the poet Leonid Ageev, who died in 1991, has been called 'the first victim of market
relations in our literature' 117 It has been alleged that one of the reasons for Ageev's
premature death may have been that he ran into difficulties with his last major project,
an anthology of prose by poets and poetry by prose writers. The Sovetskii pisatel'
publishing house at first welcomed the project, then demanded he spice it up with
chernukha and pornukha in order to attain commercial success. The poet subsequently
took his manuscript away and tried unsuccessfully 10 interest other publishers in it-a
futile quest which helped to send him to an early grave.
Russian intellectuals are not merely trying to safeguard the security and privileges
afforded by the old system of party-controlled culture; they have genuine concerns
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ROSALIND MARSH
about the implications of the new market system. Few writers of the older generation
can accept as inevitable the transition to a system similar to that of the West, sincè
they are fully aware of its disadvantages. The most philosophical adopt a position
similar to that of Latynina, who has no regret for 'the dead
semi-official literature'
which she herself helped to bury, since 'there is nothing worse than a totalitarian
system, a planned economy and ideological pincers at human throats
That system
is hostile to culture'. While conscious of the many drawbacks of a market system, she
nevertheless comes to the conclusion that 'the diktat of the market is several orders
of magnitude better than the diktat of ideology. In fact, it is incomparably better',
even though she realises that the market has no obligation to be concerned with
culture at all.¹¹⁸
The 'thick journals' and the literary press
Another important aspect of the market system's impact on Russian culture is the
possible death of the 'thick journal', which is such an institution in Russia, virtually
a symbol of the Russian intelligentsia. The decline which became apparent in 1991
was highly unexpected after the boom of 1987-90 which had witnessed a huge
increase in the circulations of literary journals. 119 There are many possible reasons for
this, the simplest of which are the external ones: continual price increases, delays in
distribution and journals' lack of competitiveness in relation to certain publishing
houses like Ventura Publishers, which can rush out books more rapidly than
traditional publishing houses. Journal editors face the same problems as those outlined
by the editor of the newspaper Literator in 1991: although there was no longer any
ideological censorship, the increased cost of paper and printing amounted to 'eco-
nomic censorship' 120
Another reason for the decline of the journals is that until recently they have still
been dominated by old hierarchical structures based on a conflict between administra-
tors and professionals, which has led some of the youngest and most talented people
working on the best journals of the last few years, such as Ogonek, Literaturnoe
obozrenie and Inostrannaya literatura, to leave in order to find more independent
work, with the result that the quality of these journals has deteriorated. 121 A third,
more controversial explanation advanced by the critic Aleksander Arkhangelsky is
that the journals destroyed themselves through their own greed-their overwhelming
desire to take part in the country's political life. They tried to provide answers to
every contemporary problem-political, economic, moral and psychological-and
were eager to publish every interesting literary work immediately in order to raise
their subscriptions and defeat their competitors. 122 The critic's objections, although
valid, are not entirely fair: editors' haste in the years 1987-89 was partly due to their
desire to publish as much as possible very quickly because of their fear that glasnost'
would end. Moreover, at the beginning of the Gorbachev period literary journals felt
quite genuinely that it was their duty to fulfil many functions which in other countries
are fulfilled by such institutions as the Church, parliament, the media, the educational
or legal systems.
Arkhangelsky also claims that journals compromised on questions of literary taste:
works like Rybakov's Children of the Arbat were not given their proper critical
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
131
assessment at the time of publication, because they were politically useful. The result
of this was that by 1990 editors were losing their traditional intellectual readership,
relying instead on acquiring millions of new readers who did not want any material
which was too academic; works from the 'literary heritage' were published too
quickly without any commentary; and poetry became "rhymed publitsistika with a
very progressive content'. The implication is that the traditional intellectual readership
of the 'thick journals' had already read many works of 'returned literature' in
samizdat, and would have preferred to read more new fiction, more profound
commentaries on works of the past and higher quality literary criticism; while the new
multi-million readership which the journals acquired in the first years of glasnost'
might now be lost because of price rises and people's reluctance to renew their
subscriptions, since new journals merely add to the overwhelming pile of books
which they already feel obliged to read.
By late 1991 few good works by emigre writers remained to be published, and
writers within Russia were not producing much of any interest. To some extent the
'thick journals' had become victims of their own success: their increased subscrip-
tions in the years 1987-88 made it look as if they could survive independently, so
state subsidies were removed. Another of the journals' mistakes was that they only
belatedly started to adopt a 'parallel course'-the publication of new writers along
with older suppressed or emigre works-and only began to do this because the
'golden reserve' of formerly censored works was running out. The only honourable
exception to this is the journal Znamya, which has been pursuing this policy since
1990.
In 1991 journals adopted different approaches to the current crisis. Novyi mir
proposed to raise its price considerably-a development deplored by Arkhangelsky,
who felt that people would not be able to maintain their subscriptions and feed their
children at the same time. Whether Novyi mir was good or bad, he argued, it was still
'the symbol and centre of our national journalistic tradition', and he feared that if it
collapsed, so would all the others, leaving the field to sensational newspapers such as
Seks Daidzhest and Demokraticheskaya Rossiya. Arkhangelsky paints a bleak picture
of the crisis of 1991:
the 'thick' journals have turned out to be in a situation of total collapse: the 'books
of a difficult fate' have been printed; a carefree attitude to economic problems has
been lost; there is no new generation of authors capable of diverting the fire onto
themselves; the structure of the journals' readership has been destroyed. What are
the chances of survival? Almost nil.
However, he hopes that they will not die, because they were a 'unique ethno-cultural
phenomenon' which used to unite Russian-speaking people of many different nation-
alities and professional groups. (It could, however. be argued that the collapse of the
Soviet Union has almost inevitably deprived the journals of their former all-USSR
context and multi-national Russian-speaking readership). 123
In Arkhangelsky's opinion, the death of the 'thick journals' would mean the
collapse of the old Soviet intelligentsia and its ultimate disintegration, as in the West,
into a multitude of disparate groups reading specialised professional journals with
such titles as The Magazine of Computer Viruses. The critic's greatest fear is that 'we
132
ROSALIND MARSH
will lose everything of our own and fail to acquire anything Western'. 124 A similar
view has been expressed by Latynina, who is also saddened by 'carefree "civilisers"
declaring: 'So what if magazines are dying? They're an atavism anyway. Europe
doesn't have magazines like ours, and there's nothing terrible about that-it has a
book market. Things will be the same way here'. She argues that this may well
happen, but remarks: 'If civilisation begins by destroying an institution that is as
attractive as it is archaic, one can't help watching, sadly and with baited breath, to see
where
it
will
put
its
feet
down
next
A less apocalyptic view might be to expect
some journals to fail, but others to survive through the advertising they have
reluctantly been forced to acquire. The most successful appear to be those which have
carved out a special market niche for themselves, offering such features as Russian
nationalist ideas or experimental literature.
In 1992 price liberalisation and hyperinflation continued to pose a serious threat to
both the 'thick journals' and the press in general. 126 Moreover, there were signs that
the market system itself was being manipulated by the new political authorities. In
February 1992 Literaturnaya gazeta, which had just announced its own decision to
raise its price from 1.00 to 1.50 rubles, disappeared from the streets of Russia along
with other central newspapers critical of El'tsin's government, because the agency
Soyuzpechat' demanded that the newspaper raise its price to 6.82 rubles if it still
wished to be sold in its network of kiosks. The newspaper suspected that market
pressures were not the only reason for this development, as newspapers which 127
supported the Russian government were still being sold at a mere 40 or 60 kopeks.
In February 1992, perhaps partly to calm such fears, El'tsin issued a decree on 'the
legal and economic defence of the periodical press and state book publishing
industry'. However, the Russian intelligentisia are not yet convinced that this will
help, as they want to know whether only journals and newspapers supporting El'tsin's
government will be guaranteed paper supplies, and who exactly will fix the price of
paper. They fear this may be yet another attempt by a Russian government to control
the press and publishing in Russia. A recent editorial in Literaturnaya gazeta has
declared: 'The loss of a free press is a loss of freedom for every person and the whole
country
Russian literature is in danger'. 128 A passionate statement in February
1992 by the PEN Centre in Moscow, signed by 84 of the most famous writers, critics
and academics in the country, proclaimed: 'Instead of political censorship there is
economic censorship, which in practice will entail a limitation of freedom of speech'.
In an allusion to Evgenii Zamyatin's famous 1921 article which warned that the only
future of Russian literature would be its past, they conclude: 'If the government and
society today remain indifferent to the fate of literary journals and book publishing,
culture will inevitably run wild, and this will affect the fate of several generations
and, as at the time of the 1917 Revolution, will leave Russia one future-its past'. 129
Conclusion
Is Erofeev correct in pointing to the 'death' of Soviet literature? There is certainly
some truth in this view if it is interpreted, as Erofeev does, to mean the decline of
both the official Soviet literature of socialist realism (although this still enjoys 'cult'
status among former communists) and the genre of 'village prose' which was so
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
133
popular in the Brezhnev era¹³⁰ (even though the nationalistic and patriarchal values it
propagated are by no means dead). Erofeev is also right in claiming that the 'liberal'
literature published in 1987-88 now seems outdated, although it is still being,
produced. Rybakov, for example, is continuing to produce the trilogy on Stalinism
which began with Children of the Arbat; the most recently published part, Fear,
which concerns the purges in the army, will no doubt still arouse some interest. 131
However, some recent works by 'liberals' popular in the 1960s, such as Granin,
Nagibin and Baklanov, have received a critical reception. 132 Moreover, if 'Soviet
literature' is regarded as a political and ideological system of controlling Russian
writers, the August 1991 coup seems to have sounded the death knell for the Union
of Soviet Writers in its old form. There is no need to mourn the passing of
party-sponsored 'Soviet literature': as Sinyavsky has observed, 'there are historical
situations in which art, literature, culture in general are placed on the brink of
extinction. If they are not given freedom, they will perish
In these conditions,
liberation became a matter of life and death'. 133
What of Russian literature as a whole? It is worth recalling that Russians have an
apocalyptic propensity for announcing that Russian literature is dead: in 1834, for
example, the critic Belinsky said 'We have no literature' shortly after the publication
of Pushkin's Evgenii Onegin and The Queen of Spades. 134 It could also be argued that
ever since Stalin's death, long before the Communist Party had been officially
disbanded, much literature produced in the USSR had already been transformed from
'Soviet' to 'Russian' literature, since it had ceased to be the handmaid of the party. 135
Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Russian literature will never be the same as it
was before Gorbachev's accession. The map of 20th century Russian literature has
been completely changed; new literary values and literary authorities have replaced
the old false ones. Rumours of the death of Russian literature would seem to be
greatly exaggerated, even if critics who take an optimistic view of the contemporary
literary scene tend to focus on good contemporary emigre writers (russkaya liter-
atura) rather than literature produced within Russia itself (rossiiskaya literatura). 136
It is true that Russian literature is experiencing a crisis at present: Russian writers
and readers appear to be disillusioned with each other, and many writers are finding
it hard to adapt to the new circumstances. It is. however, difficult to assess whether
this is only a temporary phenomenon or a permanent transformation. The major
question confronting modern Russian literature is whether in the Russia of the future
the role of literature will become less important than ever before. Will literature lose
the privileged status it formerly enjoyed in the Soviet Union both as the purveyor of
the official ideology and the conscience of the nation? Will literature be reduced to
the level of a mere entertainment, as in the West? Since 1991 discussions on this
subject have been raging in the literary press,¹³⁷ but the critic Nuikin has already
given an unequivocal answer:
The exclusiveness of position, the extraordinary social function attached to litera-
ture, as they have been in our country until recent times, will disappear. They have
already disappeared. A fact with which neither our former luminaries nor the young
talents of our literature wish to be reconciled. But I'm afraid they will have to.¹³⁸
There is some hope that there may be a new beginning, a new kind of Russian
134
ROSALIND MARSH
literature exemplified by the journals Glas and Vestnik novoi literatury. 11 is,
however, difficult to predict whether an apolitical 'alternative literature' which aspires
to "create spiritual values' and 'a new literary language' will become popular in
Russia. 140 One cannot deny that revelatory, politically daring or sensational literature
seems to correspond more closely to what most Russian people want to read. If the
critic Andrei Vasilevsky is correct in arguing that the assumption that in Russia 'some
kind of literature in itself is possible, separate from religion, politics and morality' is
nothing but a comic illusion, 141 and the idealistic proponents of 'alternative literature'
continue to please only a small minority, perhaps the future may belong to a variant
of traditional 'socialist realism' new kind of politically committed democratic or
nationalist literature. The former liberals of the 1960s may find a new role for
themselves in welcoming El'tsin and the new dawn of democracy in Russia.
Evtushenko, one of the foremost 'proraby perestroiki', has already made a claim to
being considered the poet laureate of the post-communist era with his August 1991
poem eulogising 'El'tsin on a tank'. 142 The cultural battle lines of the new era have
already been drawn: Evtushenko's 'terrible poem' has been condemned by Limonov,
who sees it as an example of a new kind of opportunistic literature by 'democrats'
intent on promoting a 'cult of El'tsin' 143 (In fairness to Evtushenko, however, it
should also be pointed out that the conservative writers in their newspaper Den' are
equally prepared to praise El'tsin as a great Russian nationalist).
The greatest threat to Russian literature in the post-communist era appears to be
economic censorship, although since August 1991 fears of renewed political censor-
ship have also been aroused by the authoritarian tendencies of the Russian
government. 144 Yet notwithstanding all the problems currently facing Russian writers,
it is to be hoped that the last decade of the 20th century will witness a renaissance
of literature in Russia, since the impact of Russian history on people's lives since
1985 is an exciting subject which merits serious literary treatment.
University of Bath
I J. Graffy, 'The Literary Press', in J. Graffy and G. Hosking, eds., Culture and the Media in
the USSR Today (Basingstoke and London, 1989), pp. 107-157; J. Graffy. 'The Arts', in M.
McCauley, ed., Gorbachev and Perestroika (London, 1990). pp. 189-207; R. Marsh, Images of
Dictatorship: Stalin in Literature (London and New York, 1989), pp. 70-102; D. Brown, 'Literature
and Perestroika', Michigan Quarterly Review, 28, 4, Fall 1989.
2
A. Nove, Glasnost in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia (Boston, MA, 1989). For a
comparison between Gorbachev's glasnost' and Khrushchev's 'thaw', see K. Clark, 'Rethinking the
Past and the Current Thaw', in M. Pavlyshyn, ed., Glasnost in Context (New York, Oxford, Munich,
1990). pp. 1-16; J. Curtis, 'Literature under Gorbachev-A Second Thaw?'. in C. Merridale & C.
Ward. eds., Perestroika: The Historical Perspective (London, 1991). pp. 168-180.
3
V. Shentalinsky, meeting at St Antony's College, Oxford. October 1990. For a similar view,
see T. Ivanova, 'Kto chem riskuet?', Ogonek, 11-18 June 1988, 24. p. 12.
4
H. Goscilo, 'Introduction: A Nation in Search of Its Authors'. in H. Goscilo & B. Lindsey.
eds., Glasnost: an Anthology of Russian Literature under Gorbachev (Ann Arbor, MI, 1990). p. XV.
5
A. Latynina, 'Chto vperedi?', Literaturnava gazeta (henceforth LG). 23 January 1991, 3, p. 10.
6
The terms 'democrats' and 'patriots' are used by V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora",
Literator (Leningrad), May 1991, 21, p. 7.
7
V. Erofeev, 'Pominki po sovetskoi literature', Aprel. 1, 1991, pp. 274-282.
K
Yu. Bondarev, Literaturnaya Rossiya, 14 December 1990, 50. pp. 2-4.
9 M. Kharitonov, 'Apologiya literatury', LG, 19 June 1991, 24. p. 11.
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
135
10 R. Marsh, 'Reassessing the Past: Images of Stalin and Stalinism in Contemporary Russian
Literature', in S. Duffin Graham, ed., New Directions in Soviet Literature (Basingstoke and London,
1992), pp. 89-105.
11
See, for example, K. Stepanyan, 'Nuzhna li nam literatura?', Znamya, 1990, 12, pp. 222-30;
Kharitonov.
12 LG, 6 May 1987, pp. 7. 10.
13 See, for example, E. Shklovsky, 'U razbitogo koryta', LG, 19 February 1992, 8, p. 4.
14 'Krov' XX veka: vinovna li slovesnost'?'. LG, 19 June 1991, 24, p. 11.
15 The references are to A. Herzen, Kto vinovat? (1845), N. Chemyshevsky, Chto delat'?
(1863) and V. I. Lenin, Chio delat' ? (1903). For a similar view, see 'From the Editors', in Goscilo
& Lindsey, eds., p. XXV.
16 On the 'Pasternak affair', see V. Kaverin, 'Literator', Znamya, 1987, 8, pp. 80-121; on
Sinyavsky and Daniel, see V. Simonov, Moskovskie novosti, 1987. 8, p. 23; on Tvardovsky, see,
among many other articles, Yu. Karyakin, 'Stoit li nastupat' na grabli? Otkrytoe pis'mo odnomu
incognito', Znamya, 1987, 9, pp. 200-224; A. Bocharov, 'Pokushenie na mirazhi', Voprosy literatury,
1988, 1, pp. 72-73; Yu. Burtin, "Vam, iz drugogo pokoleniya k publikatsii poemy A.
Tvardovskogo "Po pravu pamyati", Oktyabr' 1987. 8, pp. 191-202; N.II'ina, 'Zdravstvui, plemya
mladoe, neznakomoe', Ogonek, 1988, 2, pp. 23-26; A. Ivanov, 'Vysoka tsena istiny', Literaturnaya
Rossiya, 1988, 18, p. 9; V. Lakshin, 'Ne vpast' V bespamyatstvo (iz khroniki 'Novogo mira' vremeni
Tvardovskogo', Znamya, 1988, 8, pp. 210-217.
17 Cited in A. Rubashkin, 'Sprosit' S sebya', LG, 3 July 1991, 26, p. 10.
IN Ibid. A recent positive example of 'repentance' is that expressed to Natalya Solzhenitsyna by
the present staff of Literaturnaya gazeta, who condemned the attacks on her husband in LG in the
1970s: see LG, July 1992, 27, p. 3.
19 Erofeev; V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora", Literator, May 1991, 17, p. I; A. Kushner,
'Pozhiznennost' zadachi', LG, 26 June 1991, 25, p. 10.
20 For an anti-Semitic attack on Rybakov and Shatrov, see V. Kozhinov, 'Pravda i istina', Nash
sovremennik, 1988, 4, pp. 160-175. Lev Kopelev and Aleksander Yanov have expressed concern
about this negative aspect of glasnost': see 'Vopros bez otveta', Ogonek, 1989, 46, pp. 13-14.
21 Rubashkin.
22 M. Berg, personal interview, April 1991; V. Kamyanov, 'Zabyt' tak skoro? Ob "okhote na
ved'm" i printsipe kollektivnoi viny', LG 12 February 1992, p. 3.
23 V. Tolz & J. Wishnevsky, 'The Russian Government Declassifies CPSU Documents',
RFE/RL Research Report, I, 26, 26 June 1992, pp. 8-11.
24 A. Nuikin, "Kamo gryadeshi?', LG, 19 June 1991, 24, p. 11.
25 V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora", Literator, May 1991, 21, p. 11.
26
Erofeev, p. 277; see also Rubashkin.
"
V. Bondarev, Literaturnaya Rossiya, 14 December 1990. pp. 2-4.
28
Erofeev, pp. 280-281.
19
For criticism of Rybakov, see A. Latynina, LG, 14 December 1988, p. 4; M. Chudakova,
Literaturnoe obozrenie, 1990, I; M. Zlotonosov, Oktyabr', 1991, 4; L. Bakhnov, Druzhba narodov,
1990, 12.
MI On Abramov, see L. Krutikova, 'Fedor Abramov i tsenzura', Moskva, 1990, 10, pp. 176-196;
on Trifonov, see O. Trifonova, 'Pisat' do predela vozmozhnogo', Yunost', 1990, 10, pp. 4-6.
31 For the origin of the term, see B. Orlov, 'Bespredel, ili chto zhe vy, muzhiki?', LG, 12
February 1992, 7, p. 11.
32 V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora" No. 8', Literator, May 1991, 17, p. 1.
33 G. Baluev, interview, March 1991.
14
Erofeev, p. 281. No doubt he has in mind such writers as Aitmatov, Bitov, Iskander, Granin,
Bykov and Okudzhava.
35
E. Rich, 'Russian Writers, Critics and Publishers on Perestroika and its influence on Soviet
Literature', Soviet Literature, 1990, 1. p. 151 cites a Russian critic as saying: by today's
standards they were late in publishing Doctor Zhivago
people read it and think: what is
anti-Soviet here?'.
36
S. Zalygin, 'God Solzhenitsyna', Novyi mir, 1990, 1, pp. 233-240; for a contrary view, see
K. Stepanyan, Znamya, 1990, 12, p. 225. The phrase 'the year of Solzhenitsyn' was also used as the
title of a series in which critics and writers answered a questionnaire about Solzhenitsyn: see LG,
1991. 8, 11, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24.
17 A. Lur'e, lecture, March 1991.
18
The first three parts of Solzhenitsyn's Krasnoe koleso-Avgust chetyrnadisatogo, Oktyabr'
136
ROSALIND MARSH
shestnadisatogo and Mart sem'nadtsatogo-were published in 1990 by Neva, Zvezda and Nash
sovremennik. Aprel' sem'nadisatogo was published in Novyi mir in 1991-92.
34 G. Baluev, interview. V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora". Literator, February 1991, 8 pp.
I-2 speaks of 'the lack of success, failure even' of Krasnoe koleso.
40 A. Solzhenitsyn, Kak nam obustroit' Rossiyu? (Leningrad, 1990), pp. 26-27.
41 A. Latynina, "Solzhenitsyn i my', Novyi mir, 1990, 11. pp. 241-251. A similar view was
expressed by A. Lur'e in a lecture in Leningrad, March 1991. See also P. Vail & A. Genis, 'Poiski
zhanra. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn', Oktyabr', 1990, 6, pp. 197-202.
42 See the interview with A. Sinyavsky and M. Rozanova, Moskovskie novosti, 1989, 2.
43
S. Taroshchina, 'Pominki po emigrantskoi literature', LC, 3 July 1991, 26, p. 11.
44
This is the response of A. Miloslavsky. 'Ivan Aleksandrovich ne vinovat', LG, 7 August 1991,
p. 10. For a similar view, see V. Maksimov, 'Kto tam-za kordonom?', LG. 16 October 1991, 41,
p. 11.
45 Cited in A. Latynina. 'Kogda podnyalsya zheleznyi zanaves', LG, 24 July 1991, 29 pp. 9, 11.
46 LG, 24 July 1991, p. 9.
47 See, for example, the section 'Two literatures or one?' in O. Matich with M. Heim, eds, The
Third Wave: Russian Literature in Emigration, (Ann Arbor, MI, 1984), pp. 23-50; N. Ivanova, 'Proiti
cherez otchayanie', Yunost', 1990, 1, p. 87. However, there now seems to be a new distinction
between russkaya literatura, Russian-language literature written anywhere, and rossiiskaya literatura,
literature produced within the Russian Federation.
48 Latynina. 'Kogda
49 E. Limonov, 'Da, ya vrag vashei perestroiki', LG, 7 August 1991, 33, p. 11; V. Voinovich,
'So vsemi dolgami davno rasplatemshis", LG, 7 August 1991, 33.
50 M. Rozanova, 'Zvezda nad skhvatkoi', LG, 3 August 1991, 33.
51
E. Etkind, 'Brein-drein', LG. 6 November 1991, 44, p. 9. Another interesting article is V.
Aksenov, 'Krylatoe vymyrayushchee', LG, 27 November 1991, p. 1, which compares the problems
besetting writers in Russia and the West.
52 D. Granin, 'Unynie-velikii grekh', LG, I January 1992, p. 3.
53 Den'. 1992, 1; cited in A. Latynina, 'Ya tebe vieplyu odin beze
LG, 8 January 1992, 2,
p. 4, who is indignant at being cited as an ally by the conservatives.
54 1. Zolotussky, 'Grustnye razgovory V prostoi kvartire', LG, 22 April 1992, 17, p. 5. It remains
to be seen whether Solzhenitsyn's ideas will be taken more seriously when he returns to Russia.
55
Cited in I. Maryniak, "Writing as the Clock Runs Wild', Independent, 24 August 1991, p. 26.
56
A. German, 'Pochemu ya ne snimayu kino posle 1985 goda', LG, I May 1991, 24, p. 14.
57
M. Berg. interview. For the use of the term 'underground', see LG, 26 June 1991, p. 10.
58
V. Kardin, 'Skvoz' ternii
LG, 7 August 1991, 31, p. 9.
59
A. Nuikin, 'Kamo gryadeshi?', LG, 19 June 1991, 24, p. 11.
(d)
Kardin.
61 Yu. Edlis, LG, 10 July 1991, p. 10.
62
L. Miller, unpublished article, 1990. In 1990-1 some of the writers of the 'forgotten
generation' have at last found their way into print: see, for example, L. Miller, 'Oknami na volyu',
Novvi mir, 1990, 8, pp. 19-20; L. Miller, LG, 1991, 28, p. 12.
63 T. Tolstaya, Knizhnoe obozrenie, 1988, 1, p. 4; see also the discussion between E. Popov and
S. Chuprinin, LG, 3 August 1988, 31, p. 3. For evidence that young writers still faced problems in
1992, see the comments of the professor and critic E. Sidorov, now Russian Minister of Culture, in
I. Rishina, 'Aktery ushli so stseny. V roli ministra-Evgenii Sidorov', LG. 12 February 1992, 7. p.
3.
64
Graffy, "The Literary Journals', p. 115. On the narrow range of new writers whom journals
wish to publish, see A. Ageev, 'Posle shoka'. LG, 3 June 1991, 23, P. 4.
65 Cited in lecture by A. Lur'e, March 1991.
66
A. Arkhangelsky, 'Toshchii sokhnet, tolstyi sdokhnet`, LG, 26 June 1991. 25, p. 10.
67 This view was expressed to me in 1991 by Larisa Miller and the young Petersburg poet Elena
Chizhova.
68 A. Lur'e. lecture. A similar picture emerges in M. Zlotonosov, 'Otdykhayushchii fontan.
Malen kaya monografiya o postsotsialisticheskom realizme', Oktyabr', 1991, 4, pp. 166-179.
69 For a distorted view of the role of the Jews in Russian history, see V. Belov, Vse vperedi
(Moscow, 1987); 'God velikogo pereloma,' Novyi mir, 1989. 3; 1991, 3, 4; for the 'Jewish-Masonic
conspiracy', see V. Shafarevich, 'Russofobiya', Nash sovremennik, 1989, 6-11.
70 A. Kushner, LG, 26 June 1991, p. 10.
71 M. Berg, interview. By 1992, according to the literary editor Natalya Perova, there was also
a younger "underground" of writers hostile to the older 'underground'.
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
137
72
Yu. Edlis, 'Pokazatel'stvo ot protivnogo', LG, 10 July 1991, 27, p. 10.
71
Yu. Shcherbak, 'Rekviem po parlamentu', LG, 15 May 1991, 19, p. 9; see also the completely
political interview given by G. Baklanov, the editor of Znamya, 'Skazka o rybake i rybke', LG, 10
July 1991, 27, p. 9. In a later article, 'Pochemu ya perestal byt' sochinitelem?'. LG, 5 February 1992,
6. p. 4, Shcherbak admits that a deeper reason for giving up literature was that he became
disillusioned with the power of literature to change people's lives.
74
Kushner.
75
A. Sinyavsky, 'V tupikakh svobody', LG, I April 1992, 14, p. 3.
76
For evidence of Russian readers' disillusionment with literary disputes, see S. Chuprinin,
'Zadanie na dom. Chto proiskhodit S sovremennoi russkoi literaturoi', Ogonek, January 1992, 4, p.
16.
77
N.Il'ina, 'Zdravstvui, plemya mladoe, neznakomoe', Ogonek, 1988, 2, pp. 23-26. See also the
comments by Andrei Bitov, cited in I. Maryniak, 'Battle of the books in an age of freedom',
Independent, 28 July 1990.
78
Ogonek, October 1990, 40. p. 5. On 'Aprel', see Soviet Analyst. 19, 18.
74
See, for example, G. Baklanov, LG, 10 July 1991, 27, p. 9.
NO
'Manifest o sozdanii Soyuza nezavisimykh pisatelei', LG, 10 July 1991, 27, p. 9; 'O Soyuze
nezavisimykh pisatelei. Posle manifesta', LG, 10 July 1991. 27, p. 9.
81 V. Toporov, 'Dnevnik "Literatora" No. 8', Literator, May 1991, 17, pp. 1, 5.
82
E. Evtushenko, '19 avgusta', LG, 31 August 1991, 33, p. 9; 'Obrashchenie kollektiva redaktsii
"Literaturnoi gazety", LG, 31 August 1991, 33, p. 1.
83 'Prezidentu Rossii El'tsinu', LG, 28 August 1991, 34, p. 9; 'Obrashchenie kollektiva redaktsii
"Literaturnoi gazety", LG, 31 August 1991, 33, p. 1.
84
G. Vladimov, 'Tri oshibki zagovorshchikov', reprinted in Moskovskie novosti, 24 August
1991, 34, P. 1.
85
LG. 28 August 1991, 34, p. 9. See also the short report from V. Kazakov and V. Savelev in
the letters section of Komsomol'skaya pravda, 28 August 1991. For a more detailed treatment of the
events of August 1991, see R. Pittman, 'Writers and the coup: the chronology of events in summer
1991', Rusistika, December 1991, 4, pp. 16-19.
B6 Cited in LG, 28 August 1991, 34, p. 9.
87
1. Rishina & M. Kudimova, 'Oboidemsya bez raskola? Reportazh S zasedaniya sekretariata
pravleniya SP SSSR, 23 avgusta 1991 g.', LG, 28 August 1991, 34, p. 9. In the elections which took
place a week later, Timur Pulatov was elected to the post of First Secretary of the Union, while
Evtushenko became one of 15 co-chairmen. See 'UI. Vorovskogo, 52'. LG, 28 August 1991, 34, p. 9.
88
'Slovo k narodu'. Sovetskava Rossiya. 23 July 1991, 142, p. 1.
89 'K pisatelyam Rossii', Literaturnaya Rossiya, 30 August 1991, 35, p. 2. See also Yurii
Bondarev's statement, 'Moya pozitsiya', Literaturnaya Rossiya, 30 August 1991. 35. p. 3.
90
'Eto
est'
nash
poslednii
Batal'nye stseny iz zhizni pisatelei', LG. 4 September 1991, 35,
p. 3.
91 'S"ezd pisatelei Rossii-21 oktyabrya'. LG, 9 October 1991, 40, p. 9.
92
See LG, 9 October 1991, 40, p. 9; M. Kudimova, 'Moscow must not be surrendered!', Current
Digest of the Soviet Press. 43, 38.
93 For the conservatives' resolution, see Literaturnaya Rossiya, 20 September 1991; for the
liberals' response, see Orgkomitet SRP, 'Kakim byt' nashemu soyuzu. Tochka zreniya sekretariata
pravleniya SP SSSR'. LG. 16 October 1991, 41, p. 9.
94 Ibid; 'Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh pisatelei', LG, 1 January 1992, 1, p. 3.
95 R. Soltsev, Ne "al'ternativnyi", a drugoi', LG, 6 November 1991, 44, p. 9; M. Kudimova,
'Kakim my vidim Soyuz Rossiiskikh Pisatelei', LG, 30 October 1991, 43, p. 9.
96 'Klub otkryt dlya vsekh'. LG, 9 October 1991, 40, p. 9.
97 I. Rishina, ""Nebol'shoe autodafe", ili Chto sluchilos' V Soyuze pisatelei'. LG, 22 January
1992. 4, p. 3.
98 'Byt' ili ne byť s''ezdu?'. LG, 25 March 1992. 13, p. 3.
99 'Kogda byt' s''ezdu pisatelei?'. LG, 26 February 1992, 9, p. 1; Vo chto oboidetsya "ezd;
o byudzhete Sodruzhestva soyuzov pisatelei', LG, 19 February 1992, 8, p. 6.
100 T. Pulatov, 'Perestupim cherez raspri', LG, 26 February 1992, 9, p. 3; *Dva orgkomiteta-
dva "ezda', LG. 8 April 1992. 15, p. 3.
101
'IX S"ezd pisatelei', LG, 3 June 1992, 23, p. 1; 'A byl li S''ezd?', LG, 10 June 1992, 24,
p. 3. The UW of Azerbaidzhan did not attend, the Ukrainian observers, SRP and Belarus delegations
walked out. Pulatov was elected First Secretary of the SPS. For the SSP objections to the congress
and the writer Viktor Astaf'ev's comment that he would never join another writers' association, see
LG. 10 June 1992, 24, p. 3.
138
ROSALIND MARSH
102 For the very different views of the SRP, SP RSFSR and Club of Independent Writers, see
'Kakim byt' Soyuzu pisatelei. Tri tochki zreniya', LG, 13 November 1991. 45, p. 7. In 1992 the
conservative SP RSFSR was renamed the SP Rossii: see LG, 10 June 1992, 24, p. 3.
103 I. Fonyakov, 'Otchayanie publitsista', LG, 8 April 1992, 15, p. 4.
104 LG, 18 September 1990, 38, p. 1.
105 On Znamya, see the report by V. Rudnev, Izvestiya, 12 December 1990, p. 3; on LG's
victory, see Soviet Analyst, 19, 18.
106 L. Miller, 'Mertvyi sezon prodolzhaetsya', 1990. On the paper shortage, see also V.
Yakovlev, Izvestiya, 19 July 1990, p. 1. For its impact on the publishing house 'Sovetskii pisatel', see
V. Treskov, 'Books Amid Market Forces', Current Digest of the Sovier Press, 43, 31.
107 See the editorial note, Novyi mir, 1991, 5, p. 2. Subscribers were sent four volumes of Yurii
Dombrovsky's works to replace the four missing issues. For speculation about more sinister reasons
for the 'paper shortage' at Novyi mir, see Yu. Geiko, 'Don't Ask for Whom the Bell Tolls. Neither
Stalin, nor Khrushchev, nor Brezhnev could get the Better of this Magazine, but Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, 43, 23.
108 Vestnik novoi literatury, 1991, 1, 2, 3. For further discussion of 'alternative literature', see
R. Marsh, "Alternative literature" in Russia: an interview with Mikhail Berg', Rusistika, December
1991, 4, pp. 16-18.
109 V. Koresteleva, 'By the Wayside. Do we need a Writers' Union? And if so, what for?',
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 42, 41, p. 30. The reference is to the pamphlet Space Prostitute,
on sale in the Arbat for 10 rubles: see V. Treskov, op. cit.
110 'It's all about Sex and Detectives. But what else? Three questions for Mikhail Nenashev',
interview conducted by Viktor Kozhemyako, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 43, 46.
111 F. Svetoch, 'Chest' russkogo literatora', LG, I April 1992, 14, p. 4; on the problems of
publishing houses in 1992, see V. Bykov, 'Illyuziya privlekatel'r pravdy', LG, 29 January 1992,
5, p. 3; 'Smert' kul'turnoi knigi', LG, 26 February 1992, 9. p. 7.
112 See A. Latynina, 'Chto vperedi?', LG, 23 January 1991, p. 10; V. Toporov, Literator, May
1991, 17, pp. 1, 5; May 1991, 18, p. 5; 19, p. 5; N. lovlev & E. Slavkin, 'My-za privilegii
svobodnykh lyudei', LG, 30 October 1991, 43, p. 9; E. Etkind, 'Brein-drein', LG, 6 November 1991,
44, p. 9.
113 V. Toporov, Literator, 1991, 17, p. 1. 'Black prose' is naturalistic prose dealing with
contemporary social problems and the seamy side of Russian life.
114 A. Latynina, LG, 23 January 1991, p. 10.
115 V. Toporov, Literator, May 1991, 18, p. 5. He relates that the publishing house 'Sovetskii
pisatel" has refused to continue the long tradition of publishing the anthology Den' poezii
Leningrada. The famous book series 'Biblioteka poeta' is also in trouble.
116 Latynina. LG, 23 January 1991.
117
Arkhangel' sky, 'Toshchii sokhnet
118 Latynina, LG, 23 January 1991. Some younger writers seem to be more enthusiastic about
the market system, claiming that their elders are complaining because they have lost their privileges
and cannot adapt to the new society: see, for example, O. Pavlov, 'Mezhdu volkom i sobakoi' LG.
27 May 1992, 22. p. 4.
119 Arkhangel'sky, 'Toshchii sokhnet
120 G. Baluev, interview, March 1991. A similar phrase used in the PEN Club appeal, LG, 26
February 1992, 9, p. 2.
121
A. Nemzer & A. Arkhangel'sky, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 March 1991; L. Bakhnov,
Druzhba narodov, 1990, 12.
122 Arkhangel'sky, 'Toshchii sokhnet
p. 6.
123
See, for example, L. Anninsky, 'Novogodnye mechtaniya', LG, 1 January 1992, 1, p. 4.
124
Arkhangel'sky, 'Toshchii sokhnet
125
Latynina, 'Chto vperedi?'; V. Toporov, Literator, 1991, 18, suggests that new journals might
be created for prose, poetry and drama.
126
A. Udal'tsov, 'Vasha gazeta vchera, segodnya i zavtra', LG, I January 1992, 1, p. 1.
127
'O tsene na "Literaturnuyu gazetu", LG, 1992, 5 February 1992, 6, p. I; A. Udal'tsov, 'Esli
svobodnaya pressa pogibnet-znachit, novaya vlast' ne sostoyalas', LG, 12 February 1992, 7. p. 1.
The price of LG in July 1992 was 'free to the retail trade; 3 rubles in Moscow'.
128 'Russkaya slovesnost' V opasnosti', LG, 26 February 1992, 9, p. 1.
129 'Dorozhaet vse, desheveet lish' tvorcheskii trud', LG, 26 February 1992, p. 2.
130 Erofeev, pp. 276-280.
111
A. Rybakov, 'Strakh'. Druzhba narodov, 1990, 9, 10.
112
V. Toporov, "Dnevnik "Literatora" No. 2', Literator, March 1991, 9. pp. 1, 5.
RUSSIAN LITERATURE
139
133 A. Sinyavsky, LG, I April 1992, p. 3.
134 S. Chuprinin, 'Bol'shaya peremena', Ogonek, December 1991, 52, pp. 14-16.
135 G. Hosking, Beyond Socialist Realism: Soviet Fiction since Ivan Denisovich (London, 1980);
R. Marsh, Soviet Fiction since Stalin: Science, Literature and Politics (London and New York, 1986).
136 See, for example, K. Kedrov, 'Rastsvet, o kotorom nikto ne znaet', Izvestiya, 21 April 1992,
95, p.7.
137 See, for example, M. Chudakova, 'Ne zaslonyat'sya ot real'nosti', LG, I January 1991. I, p.
1; LG, 29 May 1991, 21, p. 11; A. Ageev, 'Konspekt o krizise', Literaturnoe obozrenie, 1991, 3; A.
Vasilevsky, 'No my zhivem V Rossii' LC, 29 May 1991, 21. p. 11; V. Kardin, 'Skvoz' ternii
LG, 7 August 1991, 31, p. 9; S. Chuprinin, 'Zadanie na dom. Chto proiskhodit sovremennoi russkoi
literaturoi', Ogonek, January 1992, 4, pp. 16-18; E. Popov, 'Uspokoites', gospoda!', LG. 4 March
1992, 10, p. 4.
138 A. Nuikin, 'Kamo gryadeshi?', LG, 19 June 1991, 24, p. 10.
139 Erofeev, pp. 281-282; Marsh, 'Alternative Literature'; J. Curtis, 'Literature under Gor-
bachev'. p. 180 expresses the pessimistic view that we may have to wait until the twenty-first century
for the shoots of 'new literature' to take root.
140 Interview with Mikhail Berg. Recent evidence suggests that 'alternative literature' still has
no more readers than it had before, in samizdat.
141 Vasilevsky, LG, 29 May 1991, p. 11.
142 Evtushenko, '19 avgusta'.
(43 E. Limonov, 'Fal'shivaya demokraticheskaya, fal'shivaya revolyutsiya', LG. 16 October
1991. 41, p. 5. For a more positive response to Evtushenko's poem, see A. D. P. Briggs, 'Russia's
Muse on the Barricades: Yevtushenko's August 19', Rusistika, December 1991, No. 4, pp. 26-29.
144 See, for example, V. Tolz, 'The Soviet Media'. RFE/RL Research Report, 1, 1, 3 January
1992, pp. 30-31; J. Wishnevsky, 'Russia: Liberal Media Criticise Democrats in Power', RFE/RL
Research Report, 1. 2, 10 January 1992, pp. 10-11; D. Hearst, 'Planned Russian censorship "will be
worse than under communists", Guardian, 16 July 1992, p. 6.
Soviet Unio
Country Study
Mass Medio
LE Arts
Andropov's rule, coverage was given to the downing of the South
aimed at the younger generation. In 1988 Western estimates put
Korean airliner that strayed over Soviet territory in 1983, includ-
the number of computers at 30,000 mainframes and 70,000 smaller
ing a live broadcast featuring several high-level political and mili-
computers. In 1985 a law requiring ninth and tenth graders to learn
tary leaders who answered questions from reporters without prior
computer fundamentals was introduced. In the Twelfth Five-Year
submission. With Gorbachev's accession, many live programs were
Plan, the leadership declared its goal to furnish high schools with
broadcast via satellite television bridges (satellite electronic links)
at least 500,000 computers by 1990, representing 45 percent of
between the Soviet Union and the United States; footage and com-
national computer production. By the year 2000, the leadership
mentary were shown on the war in Afghanistan; the Chernobyl'
projected that 5 million computers would be distributed through-
nuclear reactor accident was explored in-depth; the Armenian earth-
out the schools. The Soviet Union developed a copy of the Apple
quake was covered; and live interviews, speeches, and debates in-
II computer (called the Agat) and International Business Machines
volving Gorbachev and other Politburo members were broadcast.
personal computer clones. In addition, the Soviet Union developed
Almost every television program tried to include an ideological
the Janus with Hungary and the MMS-16 with the German Demo-
theme. Televised propaganda bombarded viewers in many forms;
cratic Republic (East Germany). All of these computer models,
themes on the benefits of the economy were especially prevalent.
however, encountered production problems.
Economic series, such as "Construction Sites of the Twelfth Five-
Achievements in computer technology may have benefited the
Year Plan," "Winner in Socialist Emulation," and "How to Put
national economy, especially industry and the military, but they
Your Heart into Your Work," exhorted viewers to help to improve
also may have imperiled the leadership's ability to control access
the economy. Patriotic films portrayed Soviet victories during World
to information. The leadership's control of information was likely
War II, and spy movies depicted the efforts of the country's se-
to be further reduced by a continuing rise in the number of VCRs,
curity services to protect it from the "imperialist threat." Other
access to direct-broadcast satellite transmissions, and access to
programs featured lectures ranging from secondary school class
Western data networks that managers and scientists desired. Despite
instruction to party virtues, nonviolent cartoons for children, some
measures to suppress the dissemination of mass information, the
game shows highlighting proper social values, and sports compe-
regime faced a dilemma. It could not expect to compete with the
titions. In an effort to create a larger viewer constituency, Gor-
West unless it modernized its technology and improved its com-
bachev took advantage of television's popular appeal by being the
puter facilities, yet it wanted to maintain strict controls over data
first leader to use it to reach the population with his speeches and
networks and personal computer use.
public relations campaigns.
The Arts
With television, in contrast to radio, where the authorities had
a difficult time controlling foreign broadcasts, censors could exer-
Throughout Soviet history, the arts have played an integral role
cise greater control. Yet, with the dramatic increase in VCRs, un-
in influencing the population. In particular, literature has served
authorized tapes circulated around the major ports and cities. This
as the main political instrument through which the leadership has
circulation complicated the regime's attempts to control the infor-
regulated cultural currents. As, by Stalin's definition, the "en-
mation revolution. In fact, Western specialists estimated that Soviet
gineers of human souls," writers were required to bolster policies
households contained approximately 300,000 VCRs. The problem
sanctioned by the leadership. All writers, whether or not members
of control became more acute in the mid-1980s as the policy of glas-
of the party-controlled Union of Writers, submitted their works
nost' led the younger generation to yearn for more information.
for party approval. After Stalin's death, writers experienced a brief
literary thaw when some party constraints lessened. Not until the
Computers
late 1980s, however, did the regime loosen its previously confin-
After Gorbachev's accession to power, the leadership promul-
ing strictures on literary form and content.
gated a new series of telecommunications and computerization
The regime exercised strict controls over other forms of art as
goals. Some of those efforts had already been incorporated into the
well. The leadership's political line dictated the content and form
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90). They included a universal im-
of cinema, theater, music, the plastic arts such as painting and sculp-
plementation of computers and data bases throughout the economy
ture, and the graphic arts. The party used the cinema screen to
and an all-union computer modernization and training program
portray its societal ideals. Directors had to produce films praising
Soviet Un
Country Study
Mass Med
ie Arts
the regime and exhorting moral conduct. On the stage, playwrights
Chernenko's death. During Chernenko's rule, the second half of
and actors operated within the party's controlled framework under
the novel had been withheld from publication without explanation.
which themes had to be approved in advance of a performance.
Under Gorbachev, literary treatment of such topics as alcohol
Musicians wrote and played only music sanctioned by the regime
and drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, religious subjects (in-
for public performances. Art galleries displayed works approved
cluding references to God), historical reassessments of previous lead-
by party officials. In the 1980s, however, artists began to express
ers, and even harsh criticisms of past leaders have been approved,
harsh and painful themes in their works, sometimes cutting a fine
provided they contained the prescribed amount of support for the
line between permitted and forbidden subjects. In the post-Brezhnev
regime. Yet in the late 1980s, editors continued to uphold the party
period, the government vacillated between imposing more restric-
creed to prevent works containing unsanctioned views from reaching
tive artistic controls and allowing greater freedom of expression.
the public. In 1988 books almost never contained material on or
After 1985 the Soviet artistic world experienced a number of con-
made reference to "anti-Soviet émigrés" or defectors, anticom-
tentious debates about the liberties allowed to artists.
munist foreign literature, pornographic topics, or "underground"
works-referred to as samizdat (see Glossary) if self-published in
Literature
the country or tamizdat if published abroad.
Since the 1930s, the regime has regulated literary expression
Gorbachev's policy of openness also contributed to more lively
through socialist realism. In spite of the brief literary thaw during
discussions among members of the Union of Writers. Controversy
the late 1950s, throughout the Brezhnev period writers endured
erupted at the Eighth Congress of the Union of Writers during the
a reemphasis of Stalinist constraints over their works. Traditional
summer of 1986, where the majority of speeches centered on hotly
ways of thinking and of viewing history no longer applied to many
disputed topics. Speeches by Voznesenskii and Evtushenko criti-
parts of literature, however, once Gorbachev assumed power.
cized the neglect shown by the regime toward some of the Soviet
The ferment inspired a creativity not witnessed since Khru-
Union's most talented writers, and they advocated support for pub-
shchev's literary thaw. Books began to treat conflicts faced by real
lication of their works. Thus, by 1988 the journal Novyi mir had
human beings and to portray critical and poignant topics thereto-
published Pasternak's novel Doctor Zhivago in four installments. In
fore banned. Poets such as Evgenii Evtushenko and Andrei Voz-
addition, at Voznesenskii's behest, the Union of Writers approved
nesenskii, who had receded into the background from the mid-1960s
the selection of such nondelegates as the famous poet Bella Akh-
to the mid-1980s, were again able to express their desire for a more
madulina, the writer and balladeer Bulat Okudzhava, and the fire-
humane society, uncovering the truth about the past and seeking
brand writer Iurii Chernichenko to membership on the union's
greater freedom for the arts. Previously banned themes began to
administrative board. Finally, the writers' congress witnessed the
appear for the first time since the 1920s. Conservative elements
changing of the guard as Vladimir Karpov, a survivor of Stalinist
persisted in some literary circles, however, and in the late 1980s
labor camps, replaced the conservative Georgii Markov as first
some bans on literary themes remained in effect.
secretary of the Union of Writers.
A limited degree of freer expression on topics dealing with so-
At the congress, ethnic confrontations also arose between Rus-
cietal changes was permitted between Brezhnev's death and Gor-
sian and non-Russian authors; opposition was voiced against bu-
bachev's rise to power. For example, in 1983 Andropov allowed
reaucratic publishing roadblocks; and vehement demands were
the publication in book form of Chingiz Aitmatov's, The Day Lasts
made favoring a reevaluation of Soviet history. Conservative views,
More Than a Hundred Years. In this novel, Aitmatov, a native of the
however, also appeared. Sergei Mikhalkov, the first secretary of
Kirgiz Republic, confronts such historical themes as the brutal
the Russian Republic's writers' union and a declared opponent
Stalinist period, social and moral turpitude, and nationality ten-
of Gorbachev's openness policy, cautioned against "parasites" who
sions in the Soviet Union. In the novel, he treats tensions between
lack a direct relation to literature and others who espouse overly
Russians and non-Russians from a Central Asian perspective. This
liberal views. In addition, Nikolai Gribachev, a conservative writer,
book, however, stands alone.
advocated a return to "classic Soviet writers," especially Maksim
Chernenko reintroduced strict bans on critical and innovative
Gor'kiy, associated with "proletarian populism," and Aleksei N.
works. One example concerns Sergei Zalygin's (editor in chief
Tolstoi, a supporter of "Russian nationalism." The conservatives
of Novyi mir) novel After the Storm, which appeared shortly after
highlighted the importance of nationalism and the legacy of socialist
Soviet Un
Country Study
realism's emphasis on the "positive hero." Nationalistic defenses
prompted another conservative writer, Aleksandr Prokhanov, to
criticize the emergence of the "new social type" of individual in
literature, an ideologically apathetic citizen overly sympathetic to
the West.
Nevertheless, at the Eighth Congress of the Union of Writers,
the liberals gained ground and secured a number of dramatic
changes. After much lobbying by prominent writers and poets, in-
cluding Evtushenko and Voznesenskii, the liberal and conserva-
Home of poet and
tive elements of the writers' union reached agreement in mid-1988
novelist Boris Pasternak,
to turn Peredelkino, Pasternak's former home, into an official
southwest of
museum. The Eighth Congress also served as a harbinger for loosen-
Moscow in the
ing the censorship restrictions on the publication of several politi-
writers' colony at
cally charged novels. Among these works were Anatolii Rybakov's
Peredelkino
penetrating Children of the Arbat, which offered insights into the ori-
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard
gins of Stalinism, and Vasilii Grossman's Life and Fate, which drew
historical comparison between Stalinism and Nazism. The late 1980s
ushered in the way for poet Tatiana Tolstaia, the granddaughter
of the Soviet writer Aleksei Tolstoi (1882-1945), to publish. Known
for her dramatic realism about death in ordinary people's lives, Tol-
staia saw her publications appear in Oktiabr' and Nouyi mir and won
demands for greater cinematic freedom. Previously, film makers
great acclaim, even though the Union of Writers continued to ex-
who wanted to produce films were required to please Goskino and
clude her.
the censors. Box office success was unimportant. In the late 1980s,
Cinema
film makers won the right to have their films judged on their merits.
A long tradition of classic and monumental films created by film
As a result, success for film makers meant producing money-making
makers such as Sergei Eisenstein served the regime's intent of por-
ventures. They no longer required the full professional and finan-
traying a strong socialist society (see Society and Culture in the
cial support of Goskino.
1920s, ch. 2). The party dictated the themes and issues that Soviet
The CPSU Central Committee also reduced the power and
film makers would depict.
influence of the Ministry of Culture's Glavrepertkom (see Glos-
In the late 1980s, the film industry underwent dramatic changes
sary), the official film-release control apparatus. By the end of 1986,
as the CPSU allowed film makers to analyze social dilemmas and
many previously banned or withheld films were showing in movie
propose remedies. From 1986 to 1988, three important develop-
theaters. Yet as of 1988, Glavrepertkom continued to wield sub-
ments occurred within the film-making leadership. First, film mak-
stantial censorship influence, with its reach extending to theaters,
ers banded together to remove conservative bureaucrats from the
circuses, concerts, phonograph records, and general musical produc-
Union of Cinematographers and to replace them with younger,
tions.
bolder, and more innovative directors. Second, these changes led
One of the most adventuresome film makers was a seasoned film
to the formation of the Disputes Committee within the union headed
professional, Iulii Raizman. Born in 1903, Raizman survived many
by an important, more open-minded Pravda critic in order to
tribulations during the oppressive eras of Soviet film making. He
examine approximately sixty films that had been "withheld"
poignantly explored such themes as family trauma, societal im-
without any proper justification. Among these prohibited films were
morality, materialism and corruption, and economic deprivation.
three directed by the new head of the Union of Cinematographers,
His Private Life (1982) explores the ordeals of a factory manager
Elem Klimov. Third, the official state organ controlling cinema,
who, when forced into retirement, realizes that he has sacrificed
Goskino, was forced to yield to an ever-increasing number of union
time with his family. A Time of Wishes (1984) examines how women
Soviet Uni
Country Study
endure their inferior lot in society. Raizman has gained such re-
nown, particularly as head of Mosfilm studios in Moscow, that he
has been able to initiate the production of progressive films and
has supported efforts of younger, aspiring, and creative film mak-
ers to voice their concerns through their works.
The relaxation of controls over film making has also permitted
the release of numerous films that had been restricted for many
years. Four such prominent films released were Klimov's Agoniia
and Come and See, Aleksei German's My Friend Ivan Lapshin, and
Tengiz Abuladze's Repentance. Known in the West as Rasputin,
Klimov's Agoniia presents a more balanced view of Tsar Nicholas
II than that historically taught in the school systems, and it also
contains religious overtones. The film maintains an unusual silence
regarding the Bolshevik Revolution. Klimov completed Agoniia in
1975, but it was not released until 1985. In Come and See, Klimov
captures the horrors of war from a typical Soviet perspective, that
of destruction symbolized not only by the Nazi genocide but also
by the premonition of nuclear holocaust.
Taganka Theater, Moscow. The Taganka was founded in 1964 by the
The other two films deal with some of the horrors of the Stalin
director Iurii Liubimov; Vladimir Vysotskii performed here
period. German's My Friend Ivan Lapshin, which required three years
until his death in 1980.
for approval after it had been completed, contains an investiga-
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard
tion said to depict innocent people being persecuted during Sta-
lin's reign of terror. Abuladze's Repentance created a stir throughout
the Soviet Union as well as the outside world. Written in 1982,
produced in 1984, and approved for public viewing in 1987, Repen-
Theater
lance concentrates on the crimes of the Stalin era and the evil in-
Soviet citizens have a rich cultural heritage in theater. Two of
volved in the arrests of innocent people, some of whom were later
the most internationally famous theaters, Moscow's Bolshoi Theater
executed. The dictator portrayed supposedly is based on a num-
and Leningrad's Kirov Theater, attracted both domestic and for-
ber of evil men in recent history, the most important of whom are
eign audiences with striking performances in huge, ornate, and
Stalin and his secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria. Echoes of Adolf
festive halls. The performers who played to sold-out performances
Hitler and Benito Mussolini are also evident in the dictator's ap-
in these theaters and who adhered to the regime's acting and direct-
pearance. Not only was the film viewed as an overt attack on
ing guidelines received special benefits such as worldwide travel,
Stalinism but it also was intended to shock Soviet citizens and raise
luxurious apartments, and the highest state honors for their artis-
their political consciousness to prevent a recurrence of these hor-
tic contributions. Those artists, however, who chose to portray views
rors. Evtushenko has likened the film to "the cultural event of Gor-
opposed to the regime's artistic standards experienced shame and
bachev's cultural thaw, just as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's One Day
denunciation, even though audiences often admired them.
in the Life of Ivan Denisovich represented the spiritual acme of the
Such an artist was Vladimir Vysotskii. In his short lifetime,
Khrushchev era." As Gorbachev stressed in a speech on the seven-
tieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in a 1987 Central
Vysotskii attracted widespread popularity but railed against a sys-
tem he opposed. Although he died in 1980 of a heart attack, ap-
Committee plenum, such films are more openly watched in a so-
ciety encouraged to reassess itself and ensure that "no forgotten
parently the result of alcoholism, Vysotskii's mass appeal became
of the years of industrialization and
in many ways more pervasive after his death. His memory evolved
names and no blank pages
collectivization" be left untouched.
into a veritable cult, with thousands of people mourning the anni-
versaries of his death by filing past his burial place. This balladeer
Soviet U
Country Study
and actor, who for years played such famous roles as Hamlet un-
der the tutelage of Taganka Theater director Iurii Liubimov, raised
the avant-garde theater to a cultural pinnacle in Moscow by at-
tracting thousands of followers, even for unannounced or unpub-
licized programs that featured his protests, often against the
leadership's failings. His poetry and music, once banned in the
Soviet Union, have been disseminated throughout the country and
depict bureaucratic corruption, elitism, poverty, war, and prison
camp horror. In the late 1980s, Vysotskii's mentor, Liubimov, con-
tinued to leave an indelible mark on the theater, even after his forced
exile by the authorities and the bans on his productions. He lived
abroad and continued to produce masterpieces adapted from Gor'-
kiy's novel Mother, Bertold Brecht's play The Good Woman of Szechuan,
Mikhail Bulgakov's novel The Master and Margarita, and Fedor
Grave of Vladimir Vysotskii
Dostoevskii's novel Crime and Punishment, making him the greatest
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard
Soviet theatrical director. The Taganka Theater performed without
him, but the stage did not retain the same popularity. Under Gor-
bachev, Liubimov was allowed back to his homeland to direct his
version of the opera Boris Godunov, banned in 1983 when he was
forced to leave the Soviet Union. However, Liubimov remained
only long enough to oversee the project's completion and left of
composers and musicians. The authorities, however, have sought
his own accord, preferring to live abroad.
to control their music as well as their performances. As a result,
After 1985 a degree of liberalization similar to that permitted
composers struggled to produce their works under strict limitations.
for literature and cinema prevailed for the stage. In 1985 and 1986,
Some artists emigrated, but their works endured and continued
approximately 10 percent of the directors were replaced in favor
to attract large audiences when performed.
of younger and more innovative directors, who, in turn, opened
Restrictions on what musicians played and where they performed
the door to more creative playwrights. In addition, theater groups
often caused artists to leave the country either of their own accord
(collectives) gained "full independence in the selection of plays,"
or through forced exile. Great composers and musicians such as
releasing them in some measure from the onus of the regime's
Dmitrii Shostakovich, Mstislav Rostropovich, and Vladimir Fel'ts-
authoritarian and arbitrary decisions. As a result of these changes,
man were persecuted, and some ultimately emigrated. In 1986,
playwrights such as Mikhail Shatrov blossomed within the freer
however, Moscow and Leningrad audiences were privileged to hear
theater environment. In 1986 his "neo-Leninist" work Dictator-
several memorable performances by the brilliant pianist Vladimir
ship of Conscience, which portrayed Stalin and Brezhnev as shady
Horowitz, who left the Soviet Union in 1925 and who previously
and sometimes unfaithful communists, played to receptive audiences.
had not been allowed to reenter the country. A composer who decid-
Shatrov's other prominent play from the 1987-88 period,
Fur-
ed to remain in the Soviet Union was Alfred Schnittke, acclaimed
ther
Further, and Further!, offered a scathing indictment of the
as the best Soviet composer since Shostakovich and a formidable
Stalin period, this time concentrating on Lenin's legacy and the way
technician of surrealist expression. Although at times he was re-
Stalin manipulated the other Bolshevik leaders during the 1920s in
his successful effort to defeat them. Shatrov captured the characters
stricted by the authorities to presenting unoriginal and party-line
works, Schnittke attracted both avant-garde and mainstream au-
of many early revolutionary leaders, using strong dialogue to depict
vivid conflicts.
diences because of his original, deeply spiritual, and often mysti-
cal compositions. When not confined by the regime to recording
Music
certain compositions, Schnittke created such masterpieces as (K)ein
The Soviet Union has produced some of the world's foremost
Sommernachtstraum, Concerto No. 4 for Violin and Orchestra,
Soviet Union
untry Study
Mass Media
Arts
Concerto Grosso No. 1, and Concerto Grosso No. 2, which ap-
Until the mid-1980s, avant-garde expression appeared not in state
pealed to audiences around the world.
museums but within the confines of the basement galleries on
In addition to classical music, jazz endured and survived the offi-
Moscow's Malaia Gruzinskaia street. Displays of overtly religious,
cial denunciations the government had cast upon it over the years.
surrealist, or semiabstract works began in 1978. The artists who
The regime distrusted this form of music because it had originat-
created such works became an integral part of the cultural life of
ed in the United States and because its essence was improvisation.
Moscow, as their art directly contrasted with socialist realism. These
As a symbol of artistic freedom and individual expression, jazz was
"survivalists" withstood pressure from the official unions and
difficult to control. In the late 1960s and 1970s, jazz was one of
prospered through domestic and foreign patronage from established
the most popular forms of music in the Soviet Union. Such famous
cultural figures, influential higher officials, scientists, and diplomats.
jazz artists as Vadim Mustafa-Zadek and Aleksei Kozlov became
Nonconformist artists created attention both at home and abroad
music idols to a generation of jazz lovers. In the late 1980s, however,
in the late 1980s. Former underground artists, such as Il'ia Kabakov
the popularity of jazz declined because of the emergence of rock
and Vladimir Iankilevskii, were permitted to display their works
and roll.
in the late 1980s, and they captured viewers' imagination with harsh
The rhythms and sounds of rock and roll appealed mainly to
criticism of the Soviet system. Paintings by such artists as Vadim
the young. In the 1980s, the popularity of the once leading rock
Sacharov and Nikolai Belianiv, linoleum graphic works by Dshamil
bands Winds of Change and The Time Machine faded in favor
Mufid-Zade and Maya Tabaka, wood engravings by Dmitrii Bisti,
of younger groups. Leningrad rock groups such as Boris Greben-
and sculpture by Dmitrii Shilinski depicted society as gray, drab,
shchikov's band Aquarium and the group Avia, which incor-
harsh, and colorless. Their works indicted industrialization, the
porated slogans, speeches, loud sounds, unorthodox mixtures of
Great Terror (see Glossary), the annexation of Estonia, Latvia,
instruments, and screams, provided an important outlet for youth.
and Lithuania, and the polluted environment.
Some of their music supported themes along the lines of Gor-
Gorbachev based much of his policies' success on the new con-
bachev's policies, expressing a desire for change in society. Rock-
tent of artistic expression appearing throughout the Soviet Union.
and-roll lyrics sometimes exceeded the boundaries of the politically
By opening up cultural life and enabling mass media representa-
permissible. Yet, the leadership realized that this music could not
tives and artists to speak more honestly, the leadership attempted
to win the support of the intelligentsia for its policies. In the late
be eliminated or even censored for long because it not only ap-
1980s, the leadership loosened the strictures of socialist realism to
pealed to many citizens but also could help disseminate the leader-
enrich the cultural vitality of society, although censorship laws still
ship's policies.
prevented much information from reaching the public. Although
For many youth, rock and roll served as a means to live out
strictures were relaxed, the principle of party control remained in
dreams and desires that might not be possible in daily life. Aspir-
force.
ing rock or popular musicians expressed themselves publicly in the
more open political environment during the late 1980s. In that peri-
od, Moscow and Leningrad permitted performances of music by
punki (punk fans) and metallisti (heavy metal fans), whose loud, rau-
Many works offer insights into Soviet mass media and culture.
cous music appealed to alienated and rebellious youth. Most rock
For a good overview of the mass media and descriptions of the cen-
music, however, portrayed the artist as explorer and expressed the
sorship institutions, the following sources are particularly helpful:
desire for new styles and forms.
Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington's Politics in
Painting, Sculpture, and the Graphic Arts
the USSR; Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin's Press Control
Around the World; Vadim Medish's The Soviet Union; Lilita Dzir-
Moscow and Leningrad housed the two most popular art muse-
kals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson's "The Media and
ums in the Soviet Union, the Tret'iakov Gallery and the Hermitage
Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR"; and Ellen Mickiewicz's
Museum, respectively. The Tret'iakov contained medieval and
Media and the Russian Public. More specialized works concentrating
modern Russian masterpieces; the Hermitage's collection of Im-
on media and culture include Maurice Friedberg's Russian Culture
pressionist painters was one of the best in the world.
in the 1980s; Martin Ebon's The Soviet Propaganda Machine; Ellen
FEB 21 1993
K350A
MAIN FILE COPY
MANO
ER GUARDIAN WEEKLY
Rep
ed with the permission of
Manchester Guardian Weekly c 1993
V. 148
p.
The various schools of Russian avant-garde art, from
because they are shown in their
original state, with their cheap
1905 to 1925, are the subject of a fascinating exhibition
frames and their handwritten la-
now on at the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Nantes. Most
bels stuck to the canvas? Whatever
the explanation, these abstractions
of the works on show have never been exhibited
radiate a powerful charm.
anywhere before, even in Russia, where they have
Against a white background that
15 neither uniform nor flat,
been slumbering for years in the reserves of provincial
Malevich's yellow, green, and pink
squares and rectangles are ar.
museums, safe from the inquisitive eyes of censors.
ranged into constellations, forming
an admirably ethereal geometric
Russia's forgotten
cosmogony. His painting is much
less two-dimensional than has been
claimed. The planes float, dance,
avant-garde get
and slide under each other like
wings or fish.
In 1915 Shaposhnikov painted his
their chance at last
grey. white and green "Cubist
Composition: The Last Judgment',"
an unexplainable, allusive, and
THE show of Russian avant-garde
Suprematism and Proletkult (pro-
sweetly melancholy composition
art at the Musée des Beaux-Arts in
letarian culture) were hardly of
which is one of the finest paintings
Nantes is remarkable in both form
enormous interest to the general
of the period.
and content: the layout of the ex-
public?
In 1918 Alexander Rodchenko
hibits in the museum's great white
It was long claimed that this
produced his "Composition without
patio, with its broad Italianate ar-
policy of dispersal had been plot-
Object No 61." It is "non-objective"
cades, is elegant and intelligent;
ted by the champions of Stalinist
only insofar as it does not admit to
and the pictures themselves. most
revolutionary realism 80 as to put
having an object. A round orange
of which have never been seen be-
paid to the various avant-garde
planet illuminates a blue-black sky.
fore, are splendid, startling, and
movements, which by 1925 had be-
A fiery-red circle moves forward
disturbing works.
come a thorough nuisance.
into space, which seemingly ex-
In a sense, the high quality of the
What actually happened was the
pands and deepens.
exhibition should not come as a
reverse: between 1918 and the be-
An aesthetic, of which there were
surprise, since the museum's cura-
ginning of the artistic Dark Ages
no examples in France or
tor, Henry-Claude Cousseau, has
in the Soviet Union, the Fine Arts
Mondrian's Netherlands, and a po-
already proved bimself to be a skil-
department (IZO), which had been
etic art - which could at a pinch
ful and adventurous exhibition
founded in 1918, amassed large
be described as abstract, but was
organiser on many occasions
collections consisting entirely of
really much more "sur-réaliste" in
This time he has tracked down
works by artists belonging to mod-
the sense that Apollinaire gave his
and brought together over 80 pic-
ern movements. Between
neologism, in other words realistic
tures painted in Russia during the
September 1918 and December
in a new way, through transposi-
two decades following the 1905, or
1920, 1,926 works of all kinds were
tion and metaphor - were being
so-called "Potemkin," revolution.
bought from 416 artists.
born untrumpeted, amidst war and
During that period, an artistic re-
Of those, 1,211 were immediately
revolution. And war and revolu-
bellion of quite extraordinary
sent out to 30 provincial museums.
tion destroyed them. killing some
fervour and violence erupted in
The aim was to publicise the new
Shaposhnikou's "Cubist Composition: The Last Judgment' - 1915
painters and enslaving or banish-
Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
movements, to enlighten the citi-
described itself as neo-Primitivist.
Larionov and Goncharova founded
ing those who survived. All that
It had its warring factions, its
zens of faraway places, and to
While it has long been known that
the Donkey's Tail group, whose ac.
remains are these miraculously
rather confused opposing doctrines,
provide examples that could be
Kandinsky was to some extent in-
tion was designed to challenge that
rescued pictures, emblems of a
and its labels - Rayonism. neo-
used by teachers. In other words,
debted to Matisse and Derain and
of the Jack of Diamonds movement,
dawn no sooner born than it was
Primitivism, Suprematism. It had
the October Revolution deliberately
that many Russian painters spent
which was receptive to Fauvist,
snuffed out.
its heroes (Mikhail Larionov, David
copied the French policy of state
some time in Paris before World
Cubist, and Futurist influences.
"L'Avant-Garde Russe, 1905-
Burliuk, Alexander Rodchenko) and
loans to provincial collections.
War I, it is now possible to evalu-
The Donkey's Tail painters turned
1925: Chefs-d'Oeuvre des Musées
do
Russin
Musto
was
of quite extraordinary
out to 30 provincial museums.
tion d
and violence erupted it
im was to publicise the new
Shaposhnikov's "Cubist Composition: "The Last Judgment' - 1915
1 them, killing some
pair
alaving or banish-
and Saint Petersburg.
ients, to enlighten the citi-
described itself as neo-Primitivist.
Larionov and Goncharova founded
ing
vived. All that
its warring fi
of faraway places, and to
While it has long been known that
the Donkey's Tail group, whose ac-
rema
miraculously
confused opposing doctring
le examples that could be
Kandinsky was to some extent in-
tion was designed to challenge that
rescue.
emblems of a
labels - Rayonism, ne
by teachers. In other words,
debted to Matiase and Derain and
of the Jack of Diamonds movement,
dawn no
born than it was
Suprematism. It had
October Revolution deliberately
that many Russian painters spent
which was receptive to Fauvist,
snuffed out.
Mikhail Larionov, David
copied the French policy of state
some time in Paris before World
Cubist, and Futurist influences.
"L'Avant-Garde Russe, 1905-
Alexander Rodchenko) and
loans to provincial collections.
War 1, it is now possible to evalu-
The Donkey's Tail painters turned
1925: Chefs-d'Oeuvre des Musées
(Natalya Goncharova,
By the time the National Acad-
ate the simultaneous and distinct
away from the spirit of the West-
de Russie," Musée des Beaux-Arts,
Popova, Alexandra Exter).
emy of Fine Arts was set up in
influences of Cubism and Futurism
ern avant-garde and looked to
firebrands like Kazimir
44000 Nantes. Closed Tuesday.
1923 and the modern artists' golden
on the formation of the Russian
Russian specificity, its traditions
Until April 18.
reclusive philosophers
age came to an end, the damage
avant-garde.
and its past. They found their
(January 28)
avel Filanov, and teachers like
it turned out to be a blessing -
From Cubism, the Russians bor-
Douanier Rousseau in the naive
Kandinsky.
had already been done on a wide
rowed the geometric fragmentation
painter Niko Pirosmanashvili, and
were cut down in their
scale. The works that had been sent
of volumes, subdued colouring,
discovered a new and refractory
hail Le Dentu at 28
from Moscow and Petrograd were
words in capital letters used in the
doctrine in neo-Primitivism, whose
World War 1), Olga
removed from per-
painting, papiers
theorist, in 1913, had been Alex-
at 32 (from diphtheria)
manent exhibition
Popora at 35. It was not long
and put into re-
By Philippe Dagen
collés and paint
ander Shevchenko.
thickened with sand
The vigorousness of that move-
Kandinsky, Larionov,
serves, where they
and plaster. And
ment, to which Malevich and
and Goncharova emi-
were often treated with only rudi-
from Futurism they took their dy-
Vladimir Tatlin belonged, is well
Malevich and B.V.
mentary care.
namism, clashing acid colours
demonstrated in the Nantes exhi-
poshnikov went into internal
Rolled up in cellars, these works
and diagonal constructions.
bition by some disconcerting
and others reneged on their
thus managed to survive both the
Some were adept at pastiche, like
pictures which combine adroitness
by doing their best to coexist
Stalin years and Hitler's invasion,
Popova, whose "Futurist Portrait"
and studied simplicity, some of
Socialist Realism and its in-
which destroyed several cities in
is at once a manifesto, a tribute
them like icons painted with a
the Volga Valley (the paintings had
and an energetic synthesis of in-
broad brush.
phenomenon also produced
already been moved elsewhere).
fluences. The mysterious Le Dentu
Larionov's "Kalsap Venus" is a
share of artists who went
During the Brezhnev period, cura-
tried to combine Umberto Boccioni
Russian version of Manet's "Olym-
scognised or were forgotten af-
tors continued to preserve them out
and Georges Braque with the
pia," set in an isba and with an
- some of those already
of laziness or bureaucratic indif-
Rayonism of Larionov. Mikhail
almost caricatural cat looking on.
ationed, as well as David
ference. though some of them they
Menkov and Vera Pestel showed
The colours scream, and the
aresberg, Wladialaw Strzem-
may have possibly done BO in a
themselves to be equally good pu-
brushstrokes crisscross. Petr
and Nadezhda Udaltsova.
spirit of resistance.
pila, diligently adapting inventions
Konchalovaky and Rozanova try to
their works have been
So when Cousseau started pros-
that were fashionable in Paris and
outdo each other in audacity. There
suscitated today, it is because
pecting for his exhibition, he
Milan to the objects and landscapes
are no doubt allusions to Byzan-
was lucky enough to vanish
unearthed works whose abundance
of Saint Petersburg.
tine art here, and reminiscences of
70 years, and because of a his-
and quality had never been sus-
On this last point, the exhibition
old Russia. But these explosions of
event which has also got
pected by any art historian or critic
confirms something I had lorg sus-
purple and bright green also have
in the mists of time: the arts
- Malevich's "Woman Harvester"
pected. Just as the "Figures du
roots in Japonisme, Fauvism,
decision systematically
and "Reaper" in Astrakhan and
Moderne" exhibition now on at the
Gauguin, and Van Gogh
paintings from studios
Nizhni Novgorod respectively; a
Musee d'Art Moderne de la Ville de
The aheer intensity of these works
1918 on. That massive pur-
first-class Expressionist landscape
Paris, which is devoted to German
forces a closer examination of their
programme was followed
by Kandinsky in Astrakhan; sev-
Expressionism up to 1914, illus-
bright harmonies. But their real
squally systematic distribu-
eral works by Larionov, who was
trates the close ties that existed
interest lies elsewhere, and this is
the
$ to provincial
well represented at the Regional
between Germany and France at
cleverly brought out by the hang-
Art Museum of Ulianovsk; and, at
that time, the Nantes show dem-
ing of the exhibition: they paved
such of what has been
Samara. an assembly-painting by
onstrates that there was an equally
the way for the second colour revo-
about this phenomenon is
the fascinating Strzeminski that
fruitful relationship between Rus-
lution, that of Malevich, Rod-
it is important to be
was 40 years ahead of its time and
sia and France, which did not have
chenko, Ivan Kliun and the ex-
the pictures on show in
prefigured pop art.
to rely on Expressionist Germany
traordinary Shaposhnikov, that of
some from collections in
These rediscoveries might have
to play the role of an intermediary.
Suprematism and Constructivism.
tersburg and from ten
had only curiosity value. But they
Communications were direct and
Is it the rarity of these composi-
Russian cities, includ-
in fact make it possible for one to
surprisingly fast: it took Moscow
tions, which were thought to be
Samara, Astrakhan,
correct some historical over-
only a few months to respond to
lost or destroyed? Is it the fact they
vgorod and Nizhni Tagil.
simplifications, to reassess Western
what was being invented at the
are shown in the midst of contem-
the first question that
influences on Russian art, and to
Bateau-Lavoir.
porary pictures which explain and,
is: how did they find
perceive at last the true
Response was very soon followed
50 to speak, corroborate them? Or
there, to cities where
importance of the movement that
by contradiction. In March 1912,
is it, on a more emotions level,
Soviet Union
rd
a country study
by
ler
he
Federal Research Division
er
Library of Congress
Edited by
Raymond E. Zickel
y,
al
Research Completed
n-
May 1989
ral
ial
of
tic
ke
m-
are
eir
nd
lot
n-
to
is,
el-
on
0
5 1993
DK380
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY
Reproduced with the permission of
Manchester Guardian Weekly C 1993
V.
149
p. 16
16 Ie Monde
GUARDIAN WEEKLY
August 15 1993
M oving pictures
from Russia's history
Naum Kleiman is head of Moscow's film museum and
custodian of the Eisenstein Cabinet, where the great
director's archives are kept. Jean-Michel Frodon
reports on a great survivor
M
EETING Naum Kleiman
genuine hope, that Communism
in Moscow is a bit like
was possible but had been betrayed
stumbling on an oasis in
by Stalin, that it could and should
the desert of the contemporary
revert to its original state, to "Social-
Russian cinema - a desert of igno-
ism with a human face'. It was that
rance, greed, laziness and self-inter-
slogan that made us so enthusiastic
ested narcissism that is just one
about the period of the 1920s - we
symptom of the state of disintegra-
thought we could just carry on
into which Russian society as a
where it had left off, as though its
whole is gently slithering. For nigh
momentum had simply been halted
on 40 years, Kleiman has used his
in mid-course."
ow reapons (scholarship, film
At the VGIK, off his own bat and
debates) to fight for
against the advice of his teachers,
y and common sense. He
Kleiman took a keen interest in the
Eisenstein, cutting his film Battleship Potemkin
PHOTOGRAPH NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE LONDON
vor par excellence.
work of Dziga Vertov, prophet of
e perpetually smiling Kleiman
the revolutionary cinema and inven-
which was never made - Stalin had
"After that, however, from 1958 to
possible the notion of responsibility.
somehow contrives to look both ex-
tor of the notion of "Kino-Eye".
banned Part II, which he found too
1962 there was a brief thaw which
"So some hope remains. It can be
hausted and as tough as nails at the
whose radical formal experimenta-
critical of his distant predecessor.
was symbolised for us by
sensed, for example, in the short
: time. A big man, he seems
tion was the closest cinematic equiv-
No images of Part III had ever been
Tarkovsky's first feature, Ivan's
films my students make. But it will
cramped by his little office on the
alent of the work of Malevich and
seen before.
Childhood Then came the move-
die if the foundations of the industry
fifth floor of the dismal building that
Mayakovsky.
Despite the Kafkaesque difficul-
ment partly started by Marlen Khut-
go on being sapped as they are now.
houses his film museum, the Mu-
It was only later that Kleiman re-
ties in which his Museikino is em-
siev, which opened the way for
What we urgently need is some sort
seikino.
alised just how important was the
broiled - its tutelary body has gone
film-makers like Gleb Panfilov,
of legal framework and a political
That day he clearly had umpteen
trail that Eisenstein had blazed in
bankrupt and its neighbour in the
Elem Klimov, Larissa Shepitko and
will if we are to claw back from the
things on his agenda. yet all he
another artistic direction. "At that
building, the Kinocentr, which has
Vassily Shukshin.
mafia the production system and
seemed interested in doing was
time, the only 'approved' film by
espoused the free-market cause
"Then, after Khrushchev was
above all the distribution circuits it
talking and listening. As more and
Eisenstein was Battleship
with a vengeance, is doing every-
ousted, the lights went out again.
has laid its hands on.
more visitors walked into his office,
Potemkin. October was denounced
thing it can to take over the
What happened was terrible, and
"The only way to bring in a new
the situation became increasingly
as formalistic. while Alexander
premises in which the Museikino
we're still paying the price for it
type of cinema is to educate film-
reminiscent of the hilarious scene in
Nevsky was regarded as a work by
continues its altruistic work -
today, in the cinema and in other
makers, scriptwriters and so on dif-
the Marx Brothers' A Night At The
Prokofiev. And we had only seen
Kleiman persists in believing in the
areas. The people who are now mak-
ferently. Under the Brezhnev
Opera where a succession of people
Part I of Ivan The Terrible. Virtually
future and in the contribution the
ing films belong to the Brezhnev
regime, people like Panfilov,
are crammed into a tiny cabin (an
none of Eisenstein's writings had
cinema can make to it. That evening
generation. They're utter cynics -
Klimov, German, Shepitko and es-
autographed photo of Harpo Marx
been published - nothing on edit-
at the "Eisenstein apartment". all
they kiss but hate each other - and
pecially Khutsiev, and even
sits in one corner of the office).
ing, nothing on colour. Only one
there was to eat were some boiled
their films are frantically hysterical
Tarkovsky in his own way, had a
But Kleiman's favourite place, the
book was in print, and it was a col-
potatoes and raw onions. Yet it was
and self-centred.
sense of their own responsibility. In
Eisenstein Cabinet (which he calls
lection of newspaper articles mainly
the most reinvigorating meal I had
the context of the society of silence
the "Eisenstein apartment" despite
anecdotal or connected with current
in Moscow.
the fact that Eisenstein never lived
"No doubt I'm an incorrigible op-
"T
HE most interesting
that was then the rule, they put
affairs."
members of that genera-
across a certain number of truths.
there) is even tinier and cosier. It
The evening of my visit, Kleiman
timist," Kleiman went on, "but I've
tion, because they are
"Nowadays, no one knows what
consists of two poky rooms, plus a
was in particularly ebullient mood.
already been through some hard
great directors. are Kira Muratova
our future will be, or indeed what
kitchenette in which the electricity
An elderly gentleman who had been
times, and I'm not easily discour-
and Alexander Sokurov, but their
we want it to be. So no one knows
does not work, and is littered with
the assistant of Edward Tisse (the
aged. After the hopes raised in 1956,
films, although remarkable. are ter-
how to make the films we need.
books, manuscripts, photographs,
director of photography on all
then the crushing of Budapest, the
ribly unhealthy.
Even the most talented of our direc-
drawings and models.
Eisenstein's films) had just brought
year 1957 was terrible: we thought
"To my mind the healthiest reac-
tors have lost the ability to speak to
Located near the Arbat, the apart-
him 12 stills from a test sequence
they'd tell us the truth, and what we
tion by a national film industry to a
people - always supposing they
ment was allocated to Eisenstein's
for Part III of Ivan The Terrible,
got instead was a total blackout.
crisis situation was that of the Amer-
wanted to. All our terms of refer-
widow, Pera Atasheva, at the begin-
icans in the 1930s. That's what we
ence and scales of values are in tat-
ning of the 1960s (her husband had
need here. We need three types of
ters. That's why it's so urgent to
died in 1948). She filled it with the
film simultaneously: films which ob-
start thinking about the cinema
enormous archives left by the poly-
serve and criticise society, like
again. and about the way it works.
of Frent Food
IVI
in Moscow is a bit like
was possible but had been betrayed
stumbling on an oasis in
by Stalin, that it could and should
the desert of the contemporary
revert to its original state. to Social-
Russian cinema - a desert of igno-
ism with a human face'. It was that
rance, greed, laziness and self-inter-
slogan that made us so enthusiastic
ested narcissism that is just one
about the period of the 1920s - we
symptom of the state of disintegra-
thought we could just carry on
tion into which Russian society as a
where it had left off. as though its
whole is gently slithering. For nigh
momentum had simply been halted
on 40 years, Kleiman has used his
in mid-course."
own weapons (scholarship, film
At the VGIK. off his own bat and
showings, debates) to fight for
against the advice of his teachers.
democracy and common sense. He
Kleiman took a keen interest in the
Eisenstein, cutting his film Battleship Potemkin
PHOTOGRAPH NATIONAL FILM ARCHIVE. LONDO
is a survivor par excellence.
work of Dziga Vertov, prophet of
The perpetually smiling Kleiman
the revolutionary cinema and inven-
which was never made - Stalin had
"After that, however, from 1958 to
possible the notion of responsibility
somehow contrives to look both ex-
for of the notion of "Kino-Eye".
banned Part П. which he found too
1962 there was a brief thaw which
"So some hope remains. It can b
hausted and as tough as nails at the
whose radical formal experimenta-
critical of his distant predecessor.
was symbolised for us by
sensed, for example, in the show
same time. A big man, he seems
tion was the closest cinematic equiv-
No images of Part III had ever been
Tarkovsky's first feature. Ivan's
films my students make. But it wi
cramped by his little office on the
alent of the work of Malevich and
seen before.
Childhood. Then came the move-
die if the foundations of the industr
fifth floor of the dismal building that
Mayakovsky.
Despite the Kafkaesque difficul-
ment partly started by Marlen Khut-
go on being sapped as they are nov
houses his film museum. the Mu-
It was only later that Kleiman re-
ties in which his Museikino is em-
siev, which opened the way for
What we urgently need is some so:
seikino.
alised just how important was the
broiled - its tutelary body has gone
film-makers like Gleb Panfilov,
of legal framework and a politic:
That day he clearly had umpteen
trail that Eisenstein had blazed in
bankrupt and its neighbour in the
Elem Klimov, Larissa Shepitko and
will if we are to claw back from th
things on his agenda, yet all he
another artistic direction. "At that
building, the Kinocentr, which has
Vassily Shukshin.
mafia the production system an
seemed interested in doing was
time, the only 'approved' film by
espoused the free-market cause
"Then, after Khrushchev was
above all the distribution circuits
talking and listening. As more and
Eisenstein was Battleship
with a vengeance, is doing every-
ousted, the lights went out again.
has laid its hands on.
more visitors walked into his office.
Potemkin. October was denounced
thing it can to take over the
What happened was terrible, and
"The only way to bring in a ne
the situation became increasingly
as formalistic, while Alexander
premises in which the Museikino
we're still paying the price for it
type of cinema is to educate filn
reminiscent of the hilarious scene in
Nevsky was regarded as a work by
continues its altruistic work -
today. in the cinema and in other
makers, scriptwriters and so on di
the Marx Brothers' A Night At The
Prokofiev. And we had only seen
Kleiman persists in believing in the
areas. The people who are now mak-
ferently. Under the Brezhne
Opera where a succession of people
Part I of Ivan The Terrible. Virtually
future and in the contribution the
ing films belong to the Brezhnev
regime, people like Panfilo
are crammed into a tiny cabin (an
none of Eisenstein's writings had
cinema can make to it. That evening
generation. They're utter cynics -
Klimov, German. Shepitko and e
autographed photo of Harpo Marx
been published - nothing on edit-
at the "Eisenstein apartment". all
they kiss but hate each other - and
pecially Khutsiev. and eve
is in one corner of the office).
ing. nothing on colour. Only one
there was to eat were some boiled
their films are frantically hysterical
Tarkovsky in his own way, had
But Kleiman's favourite place. the
book was in print. and it was a col-
potatoes and raw onions. Yet it was
and self-centred.
sense of their own responsibility. 1
Lisenstein Cabinet (which he calls
lection of newspaper articles mainly
the most reinvigorating meal I had
the context of the society of silenc
the "Eisenstein apartment" despite
anecdotal or connected with current
in Moscow.
the fact that Eisenstein never lived
affairs."
"T
HE most interesting
that was then the rule. they pi
"No doubt I'm an incorrigible op-
members of that genera-
across a certain number of truths.
there) is even tinier and cosier. It
The evening of my visit, Kleiman
timist," Kleiman went on, "but I've
tion, because they are
"Nowadays, no one knows wh:
consists of two poky rooms, plus a
was in particularly ebullient mood.
already been through some hard
great directors. are Kira Muratova
our future will be, or indeed wh:
kitchenette in which the electricity
An elderly gentleman who had been
times, and I'm not easily discour-
and Alexander Sokurov, but their
we want it to be. So no one know
does not work. and is littered with
the assistant of Edward Tisse (the
aged. After the hopes raised in 1956.
films, although remarkable. are ter-
how to make the films we nee
books, manuscripts, photographs,
director of photography on all
then the crushing of Budapest, the
ribly unhealthy.
Even the most talented of our dire-
drawings and models.
Eisenstein's films) had just brought
year 1957 was terrible: we thought
"To my mind the healthiest reac-
tors have lost the ability to speak 1
Located near the Arbat, the apart-
him 12 stills from a test sequence
they'd tell us the truth, and what we
tion by a national film industry to a
people - always supposing the
ment was allocated to Eisenstein's
for Part III of Ivan The Terrible,
got instead was a total blackout.
crisis situation was that of the Amer-
wanted to. All our terms of refe
widow, Pera Atasheva, at the begin-
icans in the 1930s. That's what we
ence and scales of values are in ta
ning of the 1960s (her husband had
need here. We need three types of
ters. That's why it's so urgent 1
died in 1948). She filled it with the
film simultaneously: films which ob-
start thinking about the cinem
enormous archives left by the poly-
serve and criticise society, like
again, and about the way it works.
glot and highly eclectic Eisenstein
those of Frank Capra, John Ford
"I'm trying to create a cinemat-
- or at least those that had not
and Mervyn LeRoy; the equivalent
graphic school of democracy. b.
been dispersed among various state
of the comedies and musicals which
cause I don't think we will get 1
libraries.
reminded people that life could also
grips with reality and start movin
Before she died she asked
be funny and enjoyable, that they
forward again unless we can look
Kleiman to act as a guardian of the
could pull through: and finally his-
things differently - which is tt
apartment. He uses it as a base for
torical films. both documentary and
function of the cinema anyway."
his considerable research and pub-
fictional. which actually try to de
So Kleiman particularly likes 1
lishing activities, which he now con-
scribe what we have just emerged
show films which were first co
ducts with the help of his daughter
from instead of consistently settling
signed to oblivion by the old regin
Vera.
scores with the past."
of political censorship. then forge
The job was tailor-made for
Kleiman is an indefatigable
ten again in the present climate
Kleiman. In the early 1950s. when
teacher as well as an optimist. and
indifference. He publishes article
he was a young student at Moscow's
he says he has confidence in the
and organises debates, which ofte
film school, the VGIK (State Film
younger generation, as represented
centre on Eisenstein and the fill
Institute), he was one of the first
by his students at the Higher Cin-
theory he expounded in Film Sen:
people to rediscover the great theo-
ema Institute at Moscow University.
(1942) and Film Form (1949).
rists and practitioners of the Soviet
They seem to him less interested
Ten years ago, an emine:
cinema of the 1920s. who took part
than their elders in pathos or in the
French film critic, the late Ser
in the remarkable creative clan
emotional settling of scores. and
Daney, wrote after visiting Kleima
which accompanied the early years
more down to earth.
"Kleiman is banking on time, an
of the revolution, only to be snuffed
"The problem here is that no one
time is playing in Eisenstein
out later by the very people who
has ever been held responsible -
favour. That may be true, but tin
claimed to be its standard-bearers.
those who used to be perceived as
is darned well taking its time.
Kleiman sees parallels between
responsible were the Isar and the
(July 29)
current situation and the prevail-
church, then the state and the party.
climate of his youth: "After
The new generation that grew up
alin's death the country went
during perestroika is really different
Le Monde
through an ideological crisis compa-
in that respect. It doesn't accuse the
rable to the one that is taking place
state and expects nothing from it.
today. though it was probably less
Six years of perestroika, with all the
Directeur Jacques Lesourne
profound."
mistakes Gorbachev made, all the
World copyright by
He explained: "We cherished the
mistakes the whole of our society
©le Monde, Paris
illusion that Lenin had embodied a
Kleiman in the Eisenstein 'apartment'
made. have perhaps at last made
All rights strictly reserved
DK350H
ART
Paintings for the dictatorship
of the proletariat
arly in this century Sergei Diaghilev or-
owners but were also nationalized and could not be
E
ganized an exhibition of 18th-century Rus-
disposed of at discretion.
sian portraits totalling some 2,000 items. Sub-
A third category comprised collections owned by
sequently, these portraits were returned to their
museum curators or writers and artists, who were
owners. However, when Soviet art historians re-
afforded special certificates protecting them against
called this exhibition in the mid-1920s, they disco-
searches and official looting. Over the 1920s these
vered that more than half the items shown had dis-
Private collections,
collections were put up for sale in a market sus-
appeared.
domestic
tained likewise by systematic auctioning of palace
properties.
Cautious collectors
museums, icons
Prices were fixed by the stupendous Sukharevka
and folk art. The
bazaar in Moscow and the legion of antiques shops
Many objects of virtu perished during the civil war.
history of Russia's
and stalls opened. The main purchasers were the
More perished in the 1920s, mostly when privately
nouveaux riches.
owned apartments were converted into communal
art market
Towards the close of the 1920s, this category,
flats, with the rooms allotted including furniture,
stripped of money, suffrage and ration cards, were
paintings and other items. As a rule, the new ten-
obliged to sell their newly acquired treasures.
ants had no idea of their value. Some pieces were
In 1922 the state instituted a procedure for the
either handed to domestics by former masters in the
centralized purchase of paintings according to fixed
hope that with time they would be able to get them
prices. The objects thus acquired were allotted by
back, other objects were simply stolen.
the People's Commissariat of Education to the vari-
After the revolution the larger private collections
ous provincial museums regardless of character,
were nationalized and converted into proletarian
type of collection, or even display area, for which
museums, of which there were seven in Moscow
reason everything was usually stowed away without
alone. In the 1930s these museums were abolished,
an inventory taken, as these museums, as a rule,
some items were sold, others again were stolen.
had no catalogues of their own.
Some collections remained in the hands of their
The early 1930s witnessed the first cautious col-
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
© Copyright Claimant: Reproduced
for use of Members of Congress
In their legislative duties.
V.Svebakh. The postal sleigh. In a private collection
NEW TIMES
4° 5944
no.2 Jan. 1993
lectors in the Soviet clite.
of an works without cus-
However, towards the close
toms inspection. As a re-
of this decade they were
sult, this proprietor of a
shoved into the Gulag and
pencil factory became a mil-
their relatives, friends and
lionaire by reselling Russian
even neighbours sold every-
antiques in the 1930s.
thing of value they had once
One of the few men
possessed.
aware of this tragedy was
The year of 1935 saw the
the Antiquariat agency
emergence of numerous
head A. Vlasov. At his own
collections, especially in
risk he catalogued the col-
Leningrad, when aristocra-
lections of his VIP clients
tic families, including Uni-
and notified them of Rus-
versity graduates, who prior
sian paintings that his
to the revolution had been
agency had, so that for-
granted nobility status
eigners get only the "leav-
along with their graduation
ings," which were extensive
diplomas, were expelled al-
at that.
most overnight and let their
Though art works con-
possessions go for a song.
tinued to flow out of the
country during those tragic
Dangerous to be
years it was not that notice-
able, except for gold and
regarded as a
silver items, which the law
rich man
compelled to be broken up
for scrap before the owners'
In the mid-1930s some of
eyes.
Leningrad's new intelligent-
As for ecclesiastic an-
sia, people feeling they
tiques, all sale or purchase
were part of old-time
was prohibited. I personally
Petersburg,
identified
know only of one solitary
themselves with the cultural
case of the sale in that period
scene and most sensitively
of Victor Vasnetsov's collec-
reacted to its demise. In the
D.Velasquez. Portrait of Maria of Hungary. From Yu.V.'s private collection. Repro-
tion of icons to Tatiana Mav-
flats they shared with other
duction published for the first time
rina and Pavel Korin.
tenants, they sought to establish illusory is-
the early twentieth century Jack of
lets of the past, mainly by collecting art ob-
Diamonds group.
Chagalls not wanted
jects of the 18th and early 19th centuries.
Foreigners had their own market. In 1972
They were prepared to deny themselves
I was invited by Mr Verlaine, the Red Cross
In 1948 the anti-"cosmopolitism" cam-
the few boons available and even risk life it-
commissioner in Russia during the NEP
paign, which involved hundreds of
self to detect and "save" art works. Collec-
years, to his home, and in his dining-room I
thousands of people, began. As a result an
tions could not be donated. One most valu-
saw Shubin's bust of the Russian tsar Paul I,
appreciation of Western culture was consi-
able collection of icons, paintings and old
as well as 37 Elizabethan 1757-61 plates plus
dered a crime.
silver in Moscow belonged to the physician
one of the finest Venetsianov's paintings I
When in that year Marc Chagall wanted
Velichko, who bequeathed all his treasures
had ever laid eyes on. He had acquired all
to donate 27 of his works to the Tretyakov
to Russian museums. However, his
these treasures through the Soviet agency
Gallery in Moscow, his offer was rejected,
executor nephew had to spend some 30
known as Antiquariat.
as generally possession of impressionist,
years to carry out his uncle's wishes as the
post-impressionist and cubist paintings,
state refused to accept donations.
Pencils for antiques
after the abolition of the Museum of New
As it was dangerous to be considered a
Western Art and the ban on showings of
rich man, the collections assembled posses-
More than enough has been written about
modern painting, was dangerous. Even
sed value that could not be estimated. Take,
the sale of masterpieces from the Hermit-
reputable members of the Academy of Art,
for instance, the amazing collection of por-
age, the world's richest muscum prior to the
who would have seemed beyond suspicion,
traits of Pushkin's contemporaries that the
revolution. Though it is believed that in
shunned monographs devoted to artists ac-
Muscovite Yakov Zak had gathered.
1936 Stalin denounced the sale of museum
tive after 1880.
Though a separate sheet might cost but a
exhibits, in 1937 the wife of the US Ambas-
Within this context there occurred some-
pittance, the value of the entire collection
sador took out a whole museum of Russian
thing truly surprising. Prior to the early 1950s
was difficult to assess. Or take Pavel
cultural treasures. which formed the basis
the so-called "trophies" could not be sold,
Gubar's stupendous "Views of St.Peters-
of the museum she subsequently started
even though generals, high Communist Party
burg" collection, or the incomparable col-
near Washington. It possessed, besides
officials and chekists had brought to Moscow
lection of Russian folk toys that Nikolai
gems of the 18th and 19th centuries, many
and Leningrad whole collections of treasures
Pereteli gathered. The architect Vinog-
precious pieces from the Russian Imperial
by air, rail and road. However, when State
radov while openly collecting Russian
Court. Back in Lenin's time Armand Ham-
Security Minister Merkulov was found
gingerbreads secretly bought up works of
mer secured the right to take out trainloads
to have a collection of trophy paint-
N
S
ings when arrested, the "Father and
the quiet Arbat sidestreets before, but had
In the second half of the 1970s the news
Teacher" was furious. Second-hand shops
never suspected that all these old things
media systematically assailed collectors.
were deluged with "goldframed evidence"
were sold as metal scrap. Peeping through
Thus, in its sensational article headed
and prices, low as they were, dropped still
the open door by which rusty iron was
"Time to Donate" Literaturnaya Gazeta
further.
piled out I discerned in the poorly lit, smelly
explained that prior to 1976 it had been the
interior all those 'unwanted' things that had
time to assemble collections, but that now
Domestic museum
been depicted as pouring into the cor-
the day had arrived to donate these collec-
nucopia."
tions to the state. This drive resulted in the
The 1950s saw large collections appear of a
enactment of the senseless but virtually
totally new type, what we might term
Icons
never enforced law of 1978, which sought to
domestic museums. The collection of Prof.
obstruct private collectors, but which, on
Silberstein affords some idea. Though he
Interest in icons grew keener when en-
the other hand, facilitated the robbing of
had but three small rooms, whose ceilings
thusiasts traipsed out to neglected or distant
collectors by criminals who, as a rule, had
kept caving in, the exhibition of Western art
villages, that after the war began to die out
been contracted thereto.
alone from his collection, which consisted
as the younger folk had flocked to the cities.
In the early 1970s the police reacted
mostly of Russian artists, occupied the en-
With no roads, it was almost impossible to
most passively to the robbing of private
tire central hall of the Pushkin Fine Arts
buy food and a bypassing truck was rare.
collectors. Subsequently they de-
Museum, when shown in 1973. As a matter
The aforementioned Nikolai Vorobyov as-
monstrated activity but of a totally diffe-
of fact, this exhibition for the first time fur-
sembled a fascinating collection of icons. In
rent fashion. Thus upon learning that one
nished a notion of the scale of private col-
1982 he wrote:
or another individual in Northern Russia
lecting in the USSR:
"Bygone now is the time when a collector
had an icon in his posession, they would
That part of the Kostakis collection,
could freely visit one or another village in
rub out the painting and return nothing
which he managed to take out, was assessed
search of old objects unafraid of being de-
but a cleared board.
at $30 million. Or take the Museum of
tained by the police and having his finds
In the 1980s attempts were made to jail
Tropinin and His Circle, today one of Mos-
confiscated. Some younger, bolder chaps
collectors on charges of blackmarketeering.
cow's gems, which was donated by Felix
still risk it, but often they run into trouble.
However, in 1985 the framing of a group of
Vishnevsky, although its treasures com-
On the other hand, the well-organized
Moscow collectors collapsed and the confis-
prised but a small portion of his collection.
thieves drive into villages in their cars and
cated art objects, which incidentally had not
Curiously enough Vishnevsky, whom I
displaying fake museum documents, gather
been sanctioned by the prosecutors, were
well remember, was always garbed in an old
icons and loot functioning churches and pri-
returned. This was intensively written up at
trench coat which the museum staff had
vate collectors, particularly pious old
the time, and at once the image of the col-
given him. When I once offered Silberstein
crones. In effect, by now private collectors
lector changed he becoming a respected ad-
to take him home in a cab, he declined, af-
are deprived of their basic right to collect."
vocate of things cultural. Meanwhile, in
raid that he would have to go half and half.
In the mid-1970s the newspaperman Vic-
Russia's art market prices rose to near
Though Kostakis was relatively well off, I
tor Louis thought to adorn his country-
world levels.
once overheard him discussing with his
house with icons. He was at once offered
At the time the more farsighted Com-
brother from whom they could borrow a
samples of 15th and early 16th century icon
munist Party VIPs, sensing that the day
couple of hundred rubles.
painting, but aware that attempts were
would come when the Party nomenclatura
made to hoodwink hiin, he said he was in-
could collapse, also began to collect items of
The junk of the 1960s
terested only in 19th century icons, for
virtu.
which he would pay no more than 50 rubles
Lately, the art market has been changing.
The antiques and art market of the 1960s
per item. He was offered such icons but
Works of art, antiques and rare books are
and early 1970s flourished when the housing
among them a third were of the 18th, if not
coming under the hammer, for which
situation changed. Moving from shared
the 17th century. However, towards the
reason prices are more natural. Moscow
flats to separate apartments people sought
close of the 1970s such trade was already out
now has a permanently functioning Alpha-
to refurnish them, and many good things
of question.
Art auction house. Many private galleries
were sold for a song, if not simply chucked
have opened, including some that specialize
out.
Time to donate?
in genre, historical period and regional
The artist Nikolai Vorobyov relates:
schools. An international art stock exhange
"Strolling down Stolovy Lane one even-
During this same period gangs of criminals
is operating in the capital. Private collectors
ing, I spotted a large splashy signboard
looted provincial museums using false chits
need now no longer worry about their trea-
daubed with a horn of plenty into which
to obtain the still uncatalogued acquisitions
sures by donating or bequeathing them to
such 'unwanted' things as chandeliers,
from the People's Commissariat of Educa-
the Museum of Private Collections for
candlesticks, samovars, basins and
tion Museum Department of the 1920s and
which a new wing of the Pushkin Fine Arts
kerosene lamps poured in, and from which
the 1930s. These were primarily avant-
Museum is being currently built. Tardily,
wireless sets, tape recorders, electric irons
garde painters, among them Chagall, Kan-
though now and again with agony, trade in
and vacuum cleaners streamed out. In-
dinsky and Lyubov Popova, who unwanted
art works and antiques is acquiring civilized
scribed in big black lettering above it was
for decades, now commanded stupendous
shape.
the legend 'Citizens, sell junk and scrap
sums of money. All this was shipped ab-
here!' Of course, I'd seen such signboards in
road.
Boris Brodsky
NEW TIMES
2.93
27.
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
DK350 A
WASHINGTON POST
Washington Post Company Inc. c 1993
Reproduced with permission of the
MAR 09 1993
P.AI,ALS
Those Russian-Anthem Blues
Quest for New Lyrics Roils Debate on National Identity
resented
Be bright
live the Russian land, located on the northern part
flv-
By Fred Hiatt
of the planet!" is one offering.
Washington Post Foreign Service
"I'm afraid we don't yet have a national idea," said
MOSCOW, March 8-Fifty years ago, Sergei
parliament member Anatoly Shabad. "So it is too
Mikhalkov co-wrote the Soviet Union's national an-
soon to have a national anthem."
them, a hymn to the glories of Joseph Stalin and the
Russians cannot yet agree on whether their coun-
certain triumph of Leninism.
try will become a democracy or a dictatorship. They
Three decades. later, Mikhalkov cheerfully re-
have come to no consensus on whether to enshrine
wrote his anthem to eliminate all references to the
the West's belief in individual freedom or the East's
discredited Stalin.
respect for community. They have yet to decide
Today, lean and courtly as he approaches his 80th
whether the Soviet Union's collapse represents a
birthday, Mikhalkov has been tapped once again,
new order or a temporary aberration in Russia's
this time to help create an anthem for the new,
centuries-long quest for empire.
democratic Russia. That appointment, along with
And they have not determined, as a nation,
Mikhalkov's unrepentant readiness to serve, has
whether the 75-year history of the Soviet Union is
triggered a controversy revealing deep uncertain-
something altogether shameful or a glorious testa-
ties within Russian society about its past and future
ment to the power of the people, or something in
and about the very nature of the new Russian state.
between.
Indeed, Russia's two-year, and thus far fruitless,
So it is perhaps not surprising that Lenin still lies
quest for an anthem sheds light on the political and
enshrined near President Boris Yeltsin's Kremlin
economic disarray now paralyzing the country.
office, or that Russia's leaders cannot agree on a
More than 4,000 citizens have written proposals,
new constitution, or even on who should write it. It
glorifying everything from the Orthodox religion to
also is not surprising that Russia cannot agree on a
entrepreneurship to fascism to geography. "Long
See RUSSIA A16,Col,1
ISSIA
A1
Among the signatories were
After Stalin died and Nikita
Lev Razgon, a writer who sur-
Khrushchev gingerly denounced
new state seal; officials tried sim-
vived decades in Siberian labor
the personality cult that had sur-
ply removing the crown from the
camps, and Vladimir Kornilov,
rounded him, the Soviet anthem
old imperial eagle, but the bird
who was expelled from the Writ-
was, from 1956 to 1977, a "song
looked so bald and forlorn that it
ers Union in 1976 for refusing to
without words." Finally, the na-
was dubbed "the Chernobyl broil-
toe the official line.
tion's leaders had the courage to
er," after the site of the 1986
During an interview in his
commission Mikhalkov to pro-
nuclear reactor accident.
high-ceilinged, book-filled apart-
duce a new version, cleansed of
And while Germans would not
ment here, Mikhalkov made clear
Stalin glorification.
likely appoint a glorifier of Adolf
that he feels no need to apolo-
"Times changed, and correc-
Hitler to extol their reunified
gize. Casually elegant in house
tions had to be made," Mikhalkov
republic, Prime Minister Viktor
slippers, a necktie and a cardigan
said with a shrug.
Chernomyrdin found nothing
sweater, the poet sat beneath
And every day at 6 a.m., from
strange in naming Mikhalkov to
pictures of his two sons, both
Kaliningrad to Khabarovsk, So-
chair a commission on a new an-
well-known filmmakers, and di-
viet citizens awoke to
them.
plomas and awards from around
Mikhalkov's hymn on the radio.
Long one of the most powerful
members of the Soviet intelli-
the world, testament to the priv-
Today, Mikhalkov, Hero of
ileges of travel he enjoyed in the
Socialist Labor and three-time
gentsia, Mikhalkov was re-
nowned for his ability to make or
Soviet days.
winner of the Stalin Prize, has
"Of course I don't regret," he
lost no faith in his own abilities.
destroy authors of children's
books, his sometimes slavish de-
said of his authorship of the So-
Although he said he mourns the
votion to the Communist Party
viet anthem, first played on the
death of the Soviet Union, he is
and KGB secret police and his
radio on Jan. 1, 1944. "I was
ready to write a Russian anthem,
writing for a country that was
"if there is a need."
taste for the perquisites of pow-
er. He helped orchestrate the
fighting fascism.
The state
Mikhalkov is one of three co-
repression of dissident authors
anthem was a big event for the
chairmen of a commission to
Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuri Daniel
whole world."
judge the 4,000 proposals for
and used his position to accumu-
In his recently published mem-
lyrics garnered during two years
late a fortune. As an official of
oirs, "I Was a Soviet Writer,"
of competition; the government
the Writers Union in the 1960s,
Mikhalkov wrote with self-dep-
has decided the words will be set
he was accused of helping set up
recation about sitting next to
to a patriotic hymn by the 19th-
a private bordello in Moscow.
Stalin at a dinner in 1943 when
century Russian composer
After his appointment to over-
the dictator pronounced himself
Mikhail Glinka. But judging the
see creation of a new anthem, 14
satisfied with the new anthem,
competition, Mikhalkov said with
writers condemned Mikhalkov as
which replaced the Communist
another dismissive shrug, will
"a sly courtier of Stalin, a cynic
take "two minutes."
"Internationale."
and a money grabber." In a letter
As Stalin looked over the doc-
"They're only suitable for re-
to the newspaper Moskovsky
cycling," he said of the proposals
uments proclaiming the new an-
Komsomolets, the writers quoted
received so far. " 'From one sea
them, he turned to Mikhalkov
the original Soviet anthem-
to another, stars over the Krem-
and said: "Don't peek! Here we
"Great Lenin lit our path, Stalin
lin, friendship of peoples'-
don't need you."
inspired us to faith in the people,
there's nothing there but childish
"I'm sorry, Comrade Stalin!"
to labor and great feats"-and
babble."
Mikhalkov replied.
then asked, "Is it human to re-
As to what Russia should stand
"And don't stutter!" Stalin said.
mind the author of this
for, Mikhalkov said he does not
"I told [Foreign Minister
shameful and servile and poet-
know, but he does not worry
ically vapid text?"
Vyacheslav] Molotov to stop
about it much. What is needed in
Others rushed to Mikhalkov's
stuttering, and he stopped.
an anthem, he said, is profession-
defense, calling him a beloved
And don't be shy!"
alism.
children's poet, which he remains
"I won't be shy, Comrade
"The words may be very gen-
today, and a symbol of much that
Stalin!" Mikhalkov replied.
eral-Russia should be strong
was great in Soviet history. Per-
"We don't like the arrogant
and prosperous, that sort of
haps more reassuring, they found
ones," said the leader who had
thing-but they must be beau-
in him a symbol of those who—
sent millions to their deaths, "but
tiful," he said.
like the vast majority of Sovi-
the shy ones we don't like ei-
Tatyana Bek, a poet who ob-
ets-compromised and made ad-
ther."
jected to Mikhalkov's appoint-
justments rather than risk stand-
But for the most part,
ment, said she is not sure what
ing up to tyranny.
Mikhalkov boasts in his book that
the anthem should say, although
"Who today would consider
he alone at the dinner spoke
she hopes it will embrace "dem-
himself unsinful enough to throw
without fear to Stalin, that he
ocratic, freedom-loving" ideals.
a stone at an 80-year-old poet?"
made Stalin roar with laughter,
"Russia today is in such a state
asked the editor of Moskovsky
that Stalin bowed to him as he
of ferment, maybe we should not
Komsomolets in reply to the
left. And that Stalin bestowed the
be in a hurry to make a new an-
writers' appeal. "I would not so
ultimate
compliment
on
them," Bek said. "Maybe we
consider the signatories of this
Mikhalkov's lyrics: "This is the
should wait to see who and what
letter."
anthem of a powerful country."
we shall become."
Christmas
JK 1761 Christmas
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
FT. WORTH
TEX.
STAR-TELEGRAM
SEC.
JAN 07 1991
1*P.]
Sounds of Christmas
ring of Soviet reforms
BY BRIAN FRIEDMAN
Christmas Eve service as leader of the
The Associated Press
Russian Orthodox Church.
MOSCOW The rarely heard bells of
"May the joy of the holiday bring us all
t. Basil's Cathedral chimed, and a
together in the faith in our God and Sav-
Christmas tree was lighted for the first
ior," Alexi said in a Christmas Eve ad-
ime on Red Square yesterday evening as
dress broadcast earlier on state-run radio.
lussian Orthodox believers began cele-
He thanked Christians in other coun-
rating the birth of Christ.
tries for their humanitarian aid that has
The Russian Orthodox Church marks
flowed into the Soviet Union to help ease
Christmas on Jan. 7, and today is an
shortages, and he said, "The Lord will
fficial holiday this year for the first time
return a hundredfold their love and atten-
Associated Press
n the Soviet republics of Russia,
tion."
A tree decorated with cards from the United States and a ceremony led by an
yelorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia and
At the Christmas tree lighting in Red
American minister attracted about 1,000 Soviets.
Georgia.
Square, the mood was less solemn. The
Religion has flourished under Presi-
Soviet Navy Band played Jingle Bells, Oh
Canty, led the interdenominational cere-
short videotaped message of Christmas
ent Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms.
Come All Ye Faithful and Stars and
mony, which was part of a three-week
greetings from former President Ronald
Many Soviet people, including the young,
Stripes Forever.
celebration called Merry Christmas,
Reagan.
re no longer afraid to worship openly.
The tree, decorated with greeting cards
Moscow; Happy New Year, World.
The crowd of fewer than 1,000 seemed
More than 3,000 believers jammed
from the United States, sat in front of an
"Tonight is no ordinary night in the
drawn to the event more out of curiosity
1oscow's Yelokhovskiy Cathedral yes-
entrance to the huge GUM department
city of Moscow. This is a very hard-
than faith. The ceremony took on a com-
erday evening as Patriarch Alexi II,
store - directly across the square from
earned, legal holy day, and we have much
mercial air at times, especially when sev-
earing ornate gold vestments and a
Lenin's Mausoleum.
to celebrate this evening," Canty said.
eral U.S. corporate sponsors were
:weled golden crown, celebrated his first
An American minister, the Rev. J.W.
A television next to the tree played a
thanked for their support.
JK 1761 Christmas
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
Reproduced for use of Members of Congress
in their legislative duties.
GLOBE AND MAIL
(TORONTO)
JAN 08 1991
P
DAY TO REJOICE / Holiday officially sanctioned for first time
since revolution of 1917 and millions of Orthodox Christians celebrate
Real Christmas comes to Moscow
BY JEFF SALLOT
erated religion in the early years of
spite Stalin's repressions and the ur-
USSR Bureau
Communist rule. The situation
ban sprawl.
worsened for believers in the 1930s
The church was ablaze with yel-
MOSCOW - A withered old
under Joseph Stalin.
low candlelight at dawn yesterday.
woman faced the biting wind blow-
Mrs. Savalskay remembers the
As a choir chanted prayers from the
ing past a brooding statue of Lenin
day the church was closed in her
loft, hundreds crammed into the tiny
and hobbled three long blocks from
farming village, Voyzdvizenskoye,
nave to light tapers before the gold-
the subway to the gleaming gilded
about 60 kilometres northeast of
framed icons of St. Nikolai the Mir-
domes of the Church of St. Ivan the
Moscow. It was 1930. Stalin's police
acle Worker, the Holy Virgin and St.
Warrior for Christmas services yes-
came, confiscated the religious
Ivan.
terday morning.
icons, arrested the village priest and
With his long hair, flowing beard,
Elizaveta Savalskay, 79, who re-
padlocked the church, and that was
hand-sewn canvas anorak and k
calls joyful childhood Christmases
the end of that.
breeches, Vladimir Teplushev
before the Communists took power,
Two years later, her family was
looked like a figure from a Leo
never thought that she would live
forced from the land during Stalin's
collectivization of farms and moved
Tolstoy novel. He led his two sons,
long enough to see the Russian
Orthodox Christmas celebrated as a
Vasili, 10, and Gregori, 8, to the
to Moscow.
state holiday in the Soviet Union.
Like many other Russian women
crèche. The boys made the sign of
"I can't tell you how happy I am
of her generation, Mrs. Savalskay
the cross, leaned forward and k 1
this morning,' she said.
had her children baptized secretly.
the figures of the Christ Child and
Millions of Orthodox Christians
For many years, she was afraid to
the Virgin.
celebrated Christmas across the So-
take her children to church. Only
"I'm really an old hippie, Mr. Te-
viet Union yesterday. Despite the
when they had grown and she was
plushev, 42, said after the service. "I
country's deepening political and
safely retired on her meagre pension
tried the Western avant-garde in the
economic crisis, churches from Le-
did she begin to return on Sundays.
1960s. And then it was Zen and the
ningrad to Vladivostok were packed
She attended the Christmas ser-
Eastern mystical religions.
with worshippers in an outpouring
vice alone. "For my children, it is
About 10 years ago, he redisco-
of religious fervour unknown since
just a day off work to have a party.'
vered his Russian Orthodox heri-
the days of the czars.
But she remembers those
tage. He said his religious faith is
For the first time since Lenin's
Christmases of her childhood when
entwined with his feelings of R
n
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
it was something more.
patriotism and nationalism.
Christmas was an officially sanc-
The Church of St. Ivan the War-
"I choose to live apart from the
tioned holiday in the predominantly
rior is a small jewel of 18th-century
state so it makes no difference to me
Orthodox Christian republics of
Russian architecture. Hidden be-
if Christmas is a state holiday or not.
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova.
hind high walls near the banks of the
It is a holy day whether the poli-
The atheist Bolsheviks barely tol-
Moscow River, it has survived de-
ticians say so or not."
Culture, Ideas, + Values
F
DK350A
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
© Copyright Claimant: Reproduced
for use of Members of Congress
in their legislative duties.
D.S. LIKHACHEV
Russian Culture in the Modern World
No other country in the world is cloaked in such contradictory myths
about its history as is Russia, and no other nation in the world inter-
prets its history as variously as do the Russian people.
N. Berdiaev was constantly pointing out the polarization of the Rus-
sian character, which in a strange way accommodates quite opposite
traits: goodness and cruelty, emotional subtlety and boorishness, ex-
treme love of freedom and despotism, altruism and egoism, self-abase-
ment and national pride, even chauvinism. And much more as well.
Another reason is the diverse "theories," ideology, and tendentious
illumination of the present and the past that have played such an im-
portant role in Russian history. I shall cite one example that suggests
itself: Petrine reform, the implementation of which required highly
distorted conceptions of preceding Russian history. Since drawing
much closer to Europe was essential, they had to assert that Russia was
completely cut off from Europe. Since they had to move forward more
quickly, a myth had to be created about a stagnant, slow-moving Rus-
sia, and so on. Since they needed a new culture, the old one was
useless. As has often happened in Russian life, it took a fundamental
blow to everything old in order to move ahead. This they managed to
do with such vigor that all Russia's seven-century history was rejected
and slandered. The creator of the myth about Russia's history was Peter
the Great. It is he who can be considered the creator of the myth about
himself, whereas Peter was a typical pupil of the seventeenth century, a
man of the Baroque, the embodiment of the behests of Simeon Polotskii,
court poet to Peter's father, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich.
Russian text © 1991 by "Novyi mir." "Russkaia kul'tura V sovremennom mire,"
Novyi mir, 1991, no. 1, pp. 3-9.
Russian text based on a paper presented by the author to the Sixth Congress of
the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature
(MAPRIaL), 1990.
p.70-81 Russian social science review V.34
Jan./Feb.1993
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 71
Never in the world has there been as persistent a myth about a
people and its history as the one Peter created. We know something
about the persistence of state myths from our own time as well. One
such "essential" myth to our state is the myth of Russia's cultural
backwardness before the revolution. "Russia had been an illiterate
country and it became a leading
and so on. So many boastful
speeches over the past seventy years have begun in this way. Whereas
in fact the research of Academician Sobolevskii into the signatures on
various official documents from before the revolution has demonstrated a
high percentage of literacy in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries;
this is confirmed by the abundance of birch-bark documents found in
Novgorod, where soil conditions contribute to their preservation. In the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries all Old Believers were registered as
illiterate because they refused to read "new" books. It is another matter
that before the seventeenth century there was no higher education in
Russia, although the explanation for this should be sought in the special
type of culture to which ancient Rus belonged.
There is a firm conviction in the West and the East that Russia has
had no experience of parliamentarism. Indeed, parliaments did not
exist here before the State Duma in the early twentieth century, and the
State Duma's experience was very limited. Deliberative traditions be-
fore Peter were profound, however. I am not talking about the veche.
In pre-Mongol Rus, the prince, beginning his day, sat down to "think a
thought [duma]" with his armed force and his boyars. Deliberations
with the "people of the town," "father superiors and priests," and "all
the people" were a constant and laid firm foundations for the Assem-
blies of the Land, with their specific procedure for convening and
representing the various estates. The Assemblies of the Land of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had written reports and resolutions.
Naturally, Ivan the Terrible "toyed with the people" cruelly, but even
he did not dare officially rescind the old custom of deliberating "with
all the land," at least pretending to govern the country "as in days of
old." Only Peter, in carrying out his own reforms, put an end to
Russia's old broad-based deliberations and representative assemblies
of "all the people." Public-state life was not resumed until the second
half of the nineteenth century, but this public, "parliamentary" life was
resumed; it had not been forgotten!
I am not going to talk about other prejudices that exist about Russia
and in Russia itself. It is no accident that I have dwelt on those concep-
72 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
tions that cast Russian history in an unfavorable light.
When we want to construct the history of any national art or the
history of a literature, even when we compile a guidebook or a descrip-
tion of a town, or a simple museum catalog, we look for focal points in
the best works; we concentrate on brilliant authors and artists and their
best creations, not their worst. This is an extremely important and
absolutely indisputable principle. We cannot construct the history of
Russian culture without Dostoevsky, Pushkin, and Tolstoy, but we can
get along quite well without Markevich, Leikin, Artsybashev, and
Potapenko. Therefore do not take national pride for chauvinism if I talk
about the most valuable that Russian culture has to offer and omit what is
worthless or negative. After all, whatever place a culture occupies among
the cultures of the world, it does so only thanks to the highest it possesses,
and although it is hard to sort out the myths and legends about Russian
history, we can at least settle on a single circle of questions. The issue can
be stated as follows: Is Russia the East or the West?
Right now in the West it is very much accepted to refer to Russia
and its culture as the East. But what are the East and the West? We
have some idea about the West and Westem culture, but what consti-
tutes the East and the Eastern type of culture is entirely unclear. Is
there a boundary between East and West on the geographical map? Is
there a difference between Russians living in Petersburg and those
living in Vladivostok, although the fact that Vladivostok belongs to the
East is reflected in the city's very name? It is equally unclear whether
the cultures of Armenia and Georgia belong to the Eastern or the
Western type. I do not think any answer is required to these questions
if we turn to one extremely important characteristic of Rus, of Russia.
Russia is spread out over a huge area that brings together diverse
peoples who are obviously of both types. From the very beginning in
the history of the three peoples possessing a common origin-Rus-
sians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians-their neighbors have played an
enormous role. It is for this reason that the first great historical compo-
sition, the Tale of Bygone Years [Povest vremennykh let], also known
as the Primary Chronicle, of the eleventh century begins its story
about Rus with a description of who neighbors upon Rus and which
rivers flow where and join Rus with which peoples. In the north it was
the Scandinavian peoples, the Varangians (an entire conglomerate of
peoples that included the future Danes, Swedes, Norse, and "English").
In the south of Rus the chief neighbors were the Greeks, who lived not
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 73
only in Greece proper but also directly bordering on Rus, along the
northern shores of the Black Sea. Then there was a separate conglom-
erate of peoples, the Khazars, among whom were also Christians,
Jews, and Muslims.
The Bulgars and their written language played a significant role in
the acquisition of written Christian culture.
Rus had the closest of relations on their enormous territories with
the Finno-Ugric peoples and the Lithuanian tribes (Lithuanians, Prus-
sians, Yatvags, and others). Many became part of Rus, shared a com-
mon political and cultural life, summoned princes, and according to the
chronicles went together against Tsargrad. There were peaceful rela-
tions with the Peipsi, the Mari, the Mordva, the Cheremis, the Komi,
and so on. The state of Rus was multiethnic from the very start, and it
was surrounded by multiple nationalities as well.
What was characteristic was the Russians' desire to found their
capitals as close to the borders of their state as possible. Kiev and
Novgorod arose on a very important ninth-to-eleventh-century trade
route linking the north and south of Europe, on the route "from Var-
angia to the Greeks." Polotsk, Chemigov, Smolensk, and Vladimir
were founded on trade rivers.
Then, after the Tatar-Mongol yoke, as soon as opportunities opened
up for trade with England, Ivan the Terrible made an attempt to move
the capital closer to the "sea-ocean," to the new trade routes-to
Vologda. Only chance kept him from carrying out this plan. Peter the
Great built his new capital-Saint Petersburg-on the extremely dan-
gerous frontiers of the country, on the coast of the Baltic Sea, under
conditions of unfinished war with the Swedes. In doing this (the most
radical action Peter ever took) he was following a lengthy tradition.
In our consideration of the entire thousand-year experience of Rus-
sian history, we can talk about Russia's historical mission. There is
nothing mystical about this concept of a historical mission. Russia's
mission has been determined by its position among other peoples, by
the fact that it brings together as many as three hundred peoples-
some big and great, some few in number and defenseless. Russia's
culture was formed under the conditions of this multiple ethnicity.
Russia has served as a giant bridge between peoples-a cultural bridge
above all. We have to realize this, for this bridge, by facilitating com-
munication, also facilitates hostility and the abuse of state power.
Although the Russian people are not to blame in spirit or culture for
74 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
the national abuses of state power in the past (the division of Poland,
the conquest of Central Asia, and so on), nonetheless the state commit-
ted the abuse in their name. The abuses in ethnic policy in our century
were not committed or even covered over by the Russian people, who
endured equal if not greater sufferings. Here once again we are pro-
ceeding from a generally recognized rule-consider culture the combi-
nation of the best a people has to offer. Even as conservative a
philosopher as Konstantin Leontev was proud of Russia's multiple
ethnicity and had great respect and admiration for the national charac-
teristics of the peoples that inhabited Russia.
It is no accident that the flourishing of Russian culture in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries came about on multiethnic soil in Mos-
cow, but chiefly in Petersburg. Petersburg's population was
multiethnic from the very beginning. Its main street, Nevskii Prospekt,
became a unique prospect for religious tolerance, where side by side
with Orthodox churches one could find Dutch, German, Catholic, and
Armenian churches, and not far from there, Finnish, Swedish, and
French churches. Not everyone knows that the largest and richest Bud-
dhist temple in Europe was built in Petersburg in the twentieth century.
A sumptuous mosque was also built in Petrograd.
The fact that the country, which created one of the most humane
universal cultures and which had all the prerequisites for unifying the
many peoples of Europe and Asia, was at the same time one of the
cruelest ethnic oppressors, especially of its own "central" people, the
Russians, constitutes one of history's most tragic paradoxes. To a sig-
nificant extent this paradox was the result of the ancient conflict be-
tween the people and the state, the polarization of the Russian
character and its concurrent aspiration for freedom and power.
This polarization of the Russian character does not imply, however,
a polarization of Russian culture. Good and evil in the Russian charac-
ter are by no means given equal weight. Good is always many times
more valuable and weighty than evil. Culture is built on good, not evil,
and expresses the principle of good in a people. It is wrong to confuse
a culture and a state, a culture and a civilization.
Universalism is Russian culture's most characteristic trait through-
out its thousand-year history, beginning with Rus in the tenth to thir-
teenth centuries, the common mother to the three Eastern Slavic
peoples-Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian. This universalism
often gets distorted, engendering, on one hand, criticism of everything
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 75
of its own and, on the other, extreme nationalism. Paradoxical though
it may seem, radiant universalism gives rise to dark shadows.
So the issue of whether Russian culture belongs to the East or the West
becomes totally irrelevant. Russia's culture belongs to dozens of peoples
of the West and the East. It is on this basis, on this multiethnic ground,
that it grew up in all its diversity. It is no accident, for example, that the
Russian Academy of Sciences is responsible for remarkable Oriental and
Caucasian scholarship. I shall mention the names of just a few Orientalists
who have brought renown to Russian scholarship: Iranist K. G. Zaleman,
Mongolist N. N. Poppe, Sinologists N. Ia. Bichurin and V. M. Alekseev,
Indologists and Tibetologists V.P. Vasilev and F. I. Shcherbatskoi, Indol-
ogist S. F. Oldenburg, Turkologists V. V. Radlov and A. N. Kononov,
Arabists V.P. Rozen and I. Iu. Krachkovskii, Egyptologists B. A. Turaev
and V. V. Struve, Japanist N. I. Konrad, Finno-Ugrists F.I. Videman and D.
V. Bubrikh, Hebraists G. P. Pavskii, V. V. Veliaminov-Zernov, and P. K.
Kokovtsov, Caucasist N. Ia. Marr, and many others. It would be impossible
to list everyone in Russia's great Oriental studies, but it is they who have
done so much for the peoples who have become part of Russia. I knew
many of them personally and met them in Petersburg, and less often in
Moscow. They are gone and did not leave behind equally worthy replace-
ments, but Russian scholarship is these people of Western culture who did
so much for the study of the East.
This attention to the East and the South expresses above all the
European nature of Russian culture. For European culture is distin-
guished precisely by its openness to the perception of other cultures, to
bringing them together, to studying and preserving them, and in part,
to mastering them. It is far from accidental that so many of the Russian
Orientalists I have named are Russified Germans. The Germans who
came to live in Petersburg since the time of Catherine the Great later in
Petersburg became representatives of Russian culture and its universal-
ism. It is no accident that a Russified German in Moscow, Dr. F. P.
Gaaz, came to express another Russian trait-compassion for prison-
ers, whom the people used to call unfortunates and whom Gaaz helped
on the very broadest scale, often going out onto the roads where con-
voys were traveling en route to hard labor.
So Russia is the East and the West, but what has it given either one
of them? Wherein lies its specificity and value to them both? In our
search for the national uniqueness of a culture we must first seek an
answer in its literature and written language.
76 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
I shall permit myself a single analogy.
In the world of living creatures-and there are millions of them—
only man possesses speech, the word, and can express his thoughts.
Therefore a man, if he truly is a Man, must be the defender of every-
thing living on earth and speak for everything living in the universe. In
precisely the same way, in any culture that represents an extensive
conglomerate of various "mute" forms of creativity, it is literature, the
written language, that expresses the culture's national ideals most
clearly. It expresses the ideals, only the best in the culture and only
what is most expressive of its national characteristics. Literature
"speaks" for an entire national culture, just as man speaks for every-
thing living in the universe.
Russian literature opened on a high note. Its first work was a compi-
lation dedicated to world history and a meditation on the place of Rus
in that history. This was the Philosopher's Speech [Rech filosofa],
which subsequently went into the first Russian chronicle. This theme is
not accidental. A few decades later another historical work appeared,
the Sermon on Law and Grace [Slovo o zakone i blagodati) of Ilarion,
the first metropolitan of the Russians. This was already a wholly ma-
ture and skillful work in a genre that knew no analogies in Byzantine
literature-a philosophical meditation on the future of the people of
Rus, an ecclesiastical work on a secular theme that in and of itself was
worthy of the literature, the history, conceived in the east of Europe. In
this meditation on the future lies a unique and extremely important
theme of Russian literature.
In "The Steppe" [Step], Anton Chekhov made the following autho-
rial comment: "The Russian loves to reminisce but not to live." That is,
he does not live in the present but indeed only in the past or the future!
I feel that this is the most important Russian national trait, and it goes
well beyond the limits of literature alone. In fact, this special interest in
the past is attested to by the extraordinary development in ancient Rus
of historical genres, and above all the chronicles famous in thousands
of lists, chronologies, historical tales, annals, and so on.
Fictitious subjects in ancient Russian literature are extremely few;
before the seventeenth century, only what had happened or people
believed had happened was worthy of narration. Russians were filled
with respect for the past. Thousands of Old Believers died for their
past, burned themselves in innumerable "burnings" (self-immolations)
when Nikon, Aleksei Mikhailovich, and Peter tried to "destroy anti-
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 77
quity." This trait has persisted in unique forms into modern.times.
Along with its cult of the past, from the very beginning there was a
striving toward the future in Russian literature. This again is a feature
that goes far beyond the limits of literature. In unique and diverse-at
times even distorted-forms, it is characteristic of all Russian intellec-
tual life. This striving toward the future has been expressed in Russian
literature throughout the course of its development. It is a dream about
a better future, a condemnation of the present, and a search for an ideal
construction for society. Pay attention: Russian literature is character-
ized to the highest degree, on one hand, by direct instruction, the
propagation of moral renewal, and, on the other, by intense doubts and
quests, dissatisfaction with the present, unmasking, and satire. An-
swers and questions! Sometimes the answers can even appear before
the questions. Let us assume that instruction and answers predominate
in Tolstoy, and questions and doubts verging on despair predominate
in Chaadaev and Saltykov-Shchedrin.
These interrelated tendencies-to doubt and to instruct-are charac-
teristic of Russian literature from the very first stages of its existence
and have consistently placed literature in opposition to the state.
Nikon, the first chronicler, who established the form of Russian chron-
icle writing (in the guise of annual records), was forced to flee princely
wrath to Tmutarakan on the Black Sea and there continue his work. In
future all Russian chroniclers in one form or another not only laid out
the past but also exposed and instructed and called Rus to unity. That
is what the author of The Tale of Igor's Campaign [Slovo o polku
Igoreve] did as well.
These quests for a better state and social structure for Rus achieved
a special intensity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Russian
literature became extremely publicistic while creating grandiose an-
nalistic compilations encompassing both world history and Russian as
a part of world history.
The present has always been perceived in Russia as existing in a
state of crisis. This is typical for Russian history. Think: has Russia
known any eras that its contemporaries might have perceived as
wholly stable and prosperous? The period of princely feuds or the
tyranny of Muscovite sovereigns? The Petrine era and the period of
post-Petrine rule? The period of Catherine the Great? The reign of
Nicholas I? It is no accident that Russian history has been marked by
unrest provoked by dissatisfaction with the present, veche upheavals
78 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
and princely feuds, rebellions, troubled Assemblies of the Land, upris-
ings, and religious upheavals. Dostoevsky wrote about "Russia in the
process of permanent creation." And Alexander Herzen noted: "In
Russia nothing is finished or fossilized; everything in it is still in a
state of dissolution, of preparation.
Yes, you smell lime every-
where and hear the saw and ax."
In its searches for truth and justice, Russian literature was the first in
the world literary process to appreciate the value of the human individ-
ual in and of himself, regardless of his position in society or the actual
qualities of that individual. In the late seventeenth century, for the first
time in the world, an utterly unremarkable person, an obscure young
man without a permanent roof over his head who was frittering his life
away gambling and drinking up all he had-down to bodily naked-
ness-became the hero of a literary work, The Tale on Sorrow and
Misfortune [Povest 0 gore i zlochastii], a unique manifestation of Rus-
sian rebellion.
The theme of the worth of the "little man" later became the basis for
the moral steadfastness of Russian literature. The obscure little man,
whose rights must be defended, became one of the central figures in
Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and many twentieth-century au-
thors.
Moral quests took literature over to such an extent that content
distinctly predominated in Russian literature. Any fixed form, stylis-
tics, or literary work of any kind has seemed to inhibit Russian authors,
who are constantly throwing off the garb of form, preferring the naked-
ness of the truth. Literature's progress has been accompanied by a
constant return to life, to the simplicity of reality, by resorting either to
common or colloquial speech, to folk art, or to "practical" and every-
day genres-correspondence business documents, diaries, notes
(Karamzin's Letters of a Russian Traveler [Pisma russkogo
puteshestvennika]), even shorthand reports (individual portions of
Dostoevsky's The Devils).
The exceptional wealth and diversity of the Russian language has
had substantial importance for these constant rejections of a permanent
style, of common tendencies in art, and of genre purity, as well as in
the combinations of genres and what I consider the rejection of profes-
sional writing, which has always played a major role in Russian litera-
ture. This fact is confirmed to a significant degree by the fact that the
territory over which the Russian language was spread was so great that
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 79
the difference in everyday and geographical conditions and the diver-
sity of national contiguities created an enormous supply of words for
the different everyday, abstract, poetic, and other concepts. It is also
confirmed by the fact that Russian literary language took shape again
out of "interethnic contact"-between Russian common speech and the
high, ceremonial, old Bulgarian (Church Slavonic) language.
The diversity of Russian life in the presence of language diversity
and the constant incursions by literature into life and life into literature
softened the line drawn between the two. Literature under Russian
conditions was always invading life and life literature, and this has
defined the nature of Russian realism. Just as ancient Russian narration
attempted to recount what really happened, so in modern times
Dostoevsky forced his heroes to act in the real Petersburg or the pro-
vincial town where he himself lived. Turgenev wrote in his Hunter's
Sketches [Zapiski okhotnika] about real incidents. Gogol combined his
romanticism with the pettiest naturalism. Leskov convincingly pre-
sented everything he related as having happened, creating an illusion
of documentality. These characteristics transferred, too, into twentieth-
century literature of the Soviet period. This "concreteness" has only
intensified the moral aspect of literature, its instructive and unmasking
nature. In it one does not feel any stability of daily life, of the structure
or the system. It (reality) is constantly provoking moral dissatisfaction
and a desire for something better in the future.
Russian literature squeezes the present between the past and future.
Dissatisfaction with the present is one of the basic features of Russian
literature that brings it closer to popular thought. Typical for the Rus-
sian people are religious quests, searches for a happy kingdom where
there is no oppression from officials or landowners, and beyond the
bounds of literature-the tendency to wander, and also various search-
ings and endeavors.
Writers themselves have not settled down in one place. Gogol was
constantly on the road, and Pushkin traveled a great deal. Even Lev
Tolstoy, who seemed to have acquired a permanent place to live in
Iasnaia Poliana, left home and died like a tramp. Then there was
Gorky
The literature created by the Russian people is not only its wealth
but also its moral strength, which will help the Russian people through
all the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. We can
always turn to this moral principle for spiritual assistance.
P.
80 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
In talking about the important values the Russian people possess, I
do not want to say that other peoples do not have similar values, but
the values of Russian literature are unique in the sense that their artistic
power lies in their close link to moral values. Russian literature is the
conscience of the Russian people. It has an open nature compared with
other literatures. It is linked in the closest way possible to life, to
reality, to the awareness of the value of the individual.
Russian literature (prose, poetry, drama) is Russian philosophy and
the Russian peculiarity of creative self-expression; it is Russian univer-
sal humanity.
Russian classical literature is our hope, the inexhaustible source of
our peoples' moral powers. As long as Russian classical literature is
available, as long as it is printed and libraries are operating and open to
everyone, the Russian people will always have the strength for moral
self-purification.
On the basis of its moral powers, Russian culture, the expression of
which is Russian literature, unites the cultures of diverse peoples. It is
in this unification that its mission lies. We must heed the voice of
Russian literature.
Thus, the place of Russian culture is determined by its highly di-
verse links with the cultures of many other peoples of the West and the
East. One could talk and write endlessly about these links. Whatever
tragic ruptures or abuses may exist, these links are the most valuable
aspect of the position that Russian culture (culture, not the lack of it)
has occupied in the world around it.
The importance of Russian culture has been determined by its moral
position in the ethnic issue, in its philosophical quests, in its dissatis-
faction with the present, in its burning torments of conscience and
searches for a happy future, perhaps at times false, hypocritical, justi-
fying any means, but still not putting up with complacency.
The last question for us to consider is whether Russia's thousand-
year culture can be considered backward. There would seem to be no
doubt: thousands of obstacles have stood in the way of Russian
culture's development. But the point is that Russian culture is of a
different type than the culture of the West. This concerns above all
ancient Rus, especially the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. The arts
were always well developed in Russia. Igor Grabar felt that the art of
ancient Rus was not inferior to that of the West. In his day (the first
half of the twentieth century) painting in Rus was equal to that any-
RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 81
where, even if it was iconography or frescos. This was true as well of
music, folklore, chronicles, and the ancient literature that was close to
folklore. But what Rus before the nineteenth century distinctly lagged
behind the Westem countries in was science and philosophy in the
Westem sense of the word. Why is this? I think it was the absence in
Rus of universities and higher education in general. From this absence
stem many negative phenomena in Russian life, and of church life in
particular. The university-educated stratum of society created in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries proved too thin. Moreover, this stra-
tum was unable to evoke the proper respect for itself. The populism
that permeated Russian society, the admiration for the people, facili-
tated the demise of its authority. The common people, who belonged to
a different type of culture, glimpsed something false, something alien
and even hostile, in the university intelligentsia.
What is to be done now, during this period of backwardness and
catastrophic cultural decline? The answer, I think, is clear. In addition
to preserving the material remnants of old culture (libraries, museums,
archives, architectural monuments) and the level of mastery in all
spheres of culture, we must develop university education. Here we
need communication with the West.
I shall conclude my comments with a proposal that might seem
fantastic. Europe and Russia ought to be under a single higher educa-
tional roof. It would be perfectly possible to create an all-European
university in which each college represented one European-type coun-
try (European in the cultural sense, that is, including the United States,
Japan, and the Middle East as well). At a later date such a university,
created in some neutral country, could become worldwide. Each col-
lege would offer its own science and its own culture, which would be
mutually permeable, accessible to other cultures, and open to ex-
change.
Finally, it is the concern of the entire world to elevate humanitarian
culture throughout the world.
Selected by Deming Brown
Translated by Marian Schwartz
P.
www.jreb.1143
1993
THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL FRIDAY, AUGUST 20,
The Smiles of a Summer Day at the Volga Dachas
By STEVEN ERLANGER
Special to The New York
VASILYEVO, Russia - Kolya's
wife, Lyudmila, a tight-lipped type,
had the misfortune to arrive at their
dacha here at 4 o'clock Saturday
morning. She wanted to rouse him for
mushroom picking, which Russians
fervently believe must begin before
dawn.
Kolya had the misfortune of being
both half-naked and fully drunk, lying
near a dining table covered with the
remains of shashlik, fruit compote
and a nearly dead half-gallon of
something called "Banker's Vodka,
An all-night drinking and banya, or
steam bath, party had ended in a
cascade of bad jokes and male senti-
mentality about an hour before Lyud-
mila arrived, when two friends and a
foreigner stumbled back to their own
dachas through the long, grasping
summer grasses of this little island
between the Volga and Svyaga Riv-
ers, 22 miles west of Kazan and about
430 miles east of Moscow.
Russian life in the cherished, fleet-
ing summer, before the long gray
chill settles in, revolves around the
dacha. A dacha (it rhymes with got-
cha) may be a shack without lights or
running water, or a lavish brick
three-story mansion of the kind Rus-
sia's nouveaux riches are building
themselves. But "the dacha" is a
synonym for "the countryside,"
where life is more free and property
more private, and the dacha appeals
to the residual peasant apparently
lurking in each Russian soul.
Everyone Has a Garden
Misha Tikhonov, a manager at a huge helicopter factory in Kazan, Russia, enjoying the other side of his life
Every dacha, no matter how hum-
at his Volga dacha with his wife, Lyudmila, right, their grandson, Vanya, and their dog, Gris.
ble, has some sort of vegetable gar-
den. Even Mikhail A. Tikhonov,
known as Misha, a manager at a huge
Kazan helicopter factory, has given
in to the garden.
"I knew I would never garden; the
whole idea paralyzes me with bore-
dom," he said, gesturing toward the
tomatoes, parsley and flowering dill
beyond his squeaky screen door. "So
of course, now I garden. My wife
The sauna, of
course, soup and
a marital spat.
knows I'm helpless with anything
around the house; I just get in the
way."
She gestured to him to stop chat-
ting and clean some sterlyad, a Volga
River fish that looks as prehistoric as
the sturgeon, only smaller. He shud-
dered; she shrugged, laughed, then
plunged in the knife; she would make
a pungent fish soup, laden with dill
from Misha's garden. The big ques-
tion was whether Kolya was going to
be allowed to come to lunch, or if
Lyudmila, known as "the Commis-
sar, would keep him locked in the
house. " was a dicey business.
Micha
and
be allowed to come to lunch, or if
Lyudmila, known as "the Commis-
sar,' would keep him locked in the
house. It was a dicey business.
On a previous occasion this sum-
Life at the dacha revolves around gardening - but drinking is not unknown. Misha Tikhonov, center, and
mer, Misha had gone to Lyudmila and
asked for Kolya's help with some
Feliks A. Faizullin enjoyed some homemade wine as Tatyana Faizullin brought in fresh tomatoes.
household task. Then she caught
them having a nip of vodka before
lunch, with no household task visible,
and she had shouted at Misha: "You!
You're not safe to let my husband out
with! 1 won't come to your 50th birth-
day party!" But she came anyway.
This dacha community, running
alongside the railroad tracks leading
out of Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan,
has a distinctly suburban feel, with
houses or shacks cheek by jowl on
whatever land could be garnered
from the party, the enterprise or local
officials. Unlike huge urban apart-
ment blocks, dachas Inspire individ-
ual pride and even competition
among neighbors.
Misha bought the plot on which his
dacha stands; Kolya's plot, given by
a factory, is only about 3,230 square
feet. That's half the average, but his
dacha is comfortable, with electrici-
ty, running water and an assortment
of frumpy furniture, including a huge
wooden radio from the 1960's, Sonata
brand, with tubes and an oscillating
green light, like a cat's eye, to indi-
cate reception. Kolya's garden is lav-
sh, and his banya, or bathhouse, is
superb.
The Sauna Is All-Important
One cannot understand Kolya -
Nikolai V. Machtakov, when he's fully
dressed - and his career without
understanding the central impor-
tance in Russian life of the banya: a
One Pohl for The New York Times
wooden sauna with a wood-burning
Lunch at the Tikhonov dacha is often accompanied by a toast of homemade wine disguised in a Wild
stove to heat stones for steam, and a
Turkey bottle. Misha Tikhonov, left, was joined by Kolya and Lyudmila Machtakov.
bench on which to sit or lie, while a
bath attendant massages or whips
you, gently enough, with a hot, damp
broom of birch branches, with leaves
him, presumably including a banya.
On the path, coming back from the
still attached.
"Should 1 write him?" Kolya asked.
0
Miles 400
Moscow
Kazan
bread store, were Kolya and Lyud-
A whole voodoo surrounds the
After much discussion, it was agreed
broom - when in June the branches
RUSSIA
mila. Kolya looked relieved; Lyud-
that he should, invite the Vice Presi-
Vasilyevo
mila, embarrassed. "So it's all right
must be gathered and how they must
dent to "the new Russia, whatever
then?" Misha asked. She nodded.
be dried, to survive until next sum-
Volga
that IS
Then come to lunch."
mer. There are snobs who insist that
UKRAINE
oak is far preferable. Some insist that
The Colonel's House
First Kolya offered another session
KAZAKHSTAN
of the banya, but with no visible vod-
the water, for the steam, must con-
But no one here - or perhaps any-
Casplan
ka. The house was spotless; all the
tain certain herbs; others demand
where - compares with Feliks A.
Sea
mess cleaned from the shining dining
the vital addition of beer.
Faizullin. A retired colonel in the
GEORGIA
Black
table. But while Lyudmila worked in
A fine host, Kolya prepared the
army's firefighting brigades, Feliks
Seal
the garden, Kolya, irrepressible, of-
banya for his guests, whacked them
is 55, with a monthly pension of 60,000
UZBEKISTAN
fered some homemade vodka, or sa-
with hot birch leaves, told them when
rubles, or $60, and a straggly graying
mogon, with herbs. After a quick
to get in or out, and offered them his
beard. He is the first to come to
The New York Times
drink, he swallowed down some of his
cherry compote or herbal tea, de-
Vasilyevo to open his dacha and the
pending on the proper stage. In the
last to leave. "From March 25 until
Dachas have sprung up cheek by
compote, to hide the smell.
Misha offered more vodka over
meantime, he tended the fire for the
the end of October," he says, and if
jowl in the village of Vasilyevo.
lunch, with the fresh sterlyad soup.
shashlik, checked the vodka supply
there were a medal for "Hero of
Lyudmila, complaining only a little.
and delved into an extensive store of
Private Labor," as there once was for
joined in the toasts, wishing a foreign-
jokes and proverbs, like the Russian
socialist labor, Feliks, lean in cutoff
tomatoes, cucumbers, raspberries,
er long life, a safe journey and a good
Army folk wisdom: "It doesn't mat-
jeans, would have a chestful.
gooseberries, blueberries, melons,
impression of the Russian people. Ko-
ter whether it's a machine gun or
He has built himself a brick house,
dill, parsley, mint and flowers of
lya gave the foreigner another dried
vodka, so long as we fall down.'
paneled in driftwood taken from the
many types; dries his own fish and, to
fish to take home, and a big. vaudevil-
While these skills may be unappre
Volga, dried, cut, sanded and planed.
the consternation of his neighbors,
lian wink.
clated by Lyudmila, they made Ko-
Every corner matches; every nail is
shoots his own ducks.
lya's career, since the bosses of the
neatly driven. He built his furniture
There is a spot of grassy wetland
Communist Party loved nothing
the same way, and 15 currently weld-
next to his dacha. "It's mine," he
more, after work, than a long night of
ing a boiler from scrap metal to pro-
says, "and everybody knows it." One
vodka and banya. Kolya, who no
vide hot water and heat. His banya,
day, after he shot some ducks, some-
doubt has other administrative skills,
needless to say. is larger than Ko-
one went to the police. "The militia
GET UP AND GO
is a superb bath master. Sent to a
lya's and the elegance and efficiency
told him, 'It's Feliks, SO mind your
poor, autonomous republic called
of his forlet, not normally a hig priori-
own business!" Then he gave a
arakalpakiya, in western Uzbeki-
ty at the dacha, is the wonder of the
island
manic laugh and forced more home-
an, the emollient Kolya rose to par-
made herbal and sour-cherry wine on
The Travel Section
y second secretary. then to first sec-
Feliks has also built a mini farm -
his guests. "My son likes it 100 much,
Every Sunday
retary.
with an II rigation system he designed
SO let's finish it!' he said. His guests
While there, he met Al Gore, then a
himself. greenhouses, chicken coop.
left with cucumbers. flowers and two
The New Hork Times
Senator. and spent a few days with
compost pile. gull and well. He grows
dried fish.
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
© Copyright Claimant
Reproduced with Permission
DK350
NOTEBOOK
From Russia, With Soul
Only the depth of human contact here can carry them through now.
by Barbara Jo Brothers, M.S.W.
shared a train compartment
I wish I could find a way to talk about
to talk about soul here in the United States
I
with Mongolian Black
the Russian soul: I almost think it is better
makes me feel like it might just get people
Marketeers, shared a room
not to even try. It is very difficult for an
looking at me like I am a displaced sixties
on Lake Baikal with a young
American who has not experienced
hippie or solipsistic, latter-day New Ager.
Russian woman living in
Russians in Russia to understand. You al-
This much is for sure. There is a con-
Siberia whose family had
most have to be there; maybe you do have
sensus among all the Americans we have
been "successful" commu-
to be there.
brought to Russia for these three years of
nists in the "businessman" sense, and
conferences: Being there is a deeply nur-
shared a day or so of the four-day train ride
The Nature of the Russian Soul
turing experience; we feel that which
to Moscow with an older Russian woman
It is something that just does not exist
"Russians have to offer Americans." It is a
living in Paris whose father had been exiled
in this country on the scale it exists there. I
depth of human contact in the ordinary
to Siberia in 1937 by Stalin because he was
am not as articulate nor as clear on this
course of life's events that they maintain.
a "real communist." All this is before I even
subject as I would like. I am not sure the
The Russians have a sense of connect-
arrived in Moscow, where I was to meet
world has much of a language for it any-
edness to themselves and to other human
with Russian psychotherapists, but it cer-
way-or, at least, the English-speaking
beings that is just not a part of American
tainly added depth to my picture of what
world. I find that the clarity of my own
reality. It isn't that competitiveness does
people from that part of the world are like.
sense of that soul fades when I get back
not exist; it is just that there always seems
One point jumped out at me immedi-
home, where I am
to be more consideration and respect for
ately: Russia is in no position not to be
drowned in our
others in any given situation. And it may
pragmatic. The collapse of the Russian
familiar market
be that feeling of connectedness that will
economy in the wake of the overnight
mentality, con-
bring them through these terrible eco-
switch to a market economy colors every-
sumer crush,
nomic trials they have now entered.
thing and deeply impacts everybody.
the measuring
Elena, the Russian economist who is
All psychology in Russia should be-
of everything
part of our meeting group, thinks it will.
must be-viewed with three factors in
in dollars and
The Russians seem not to make the divorce
mind: The nature of the Russian soul, the
cents-"is it cost
between "hard" science and heart and soul
current state of the Russian economy, and
effective"-and
that we do in the United States. Elena is
the incredible number of losses in Russian
our starkly contrast-
probably a classic example. In her position
families due to Stalin's purges. There is un-
ing individualism.
as a part of the Academy of National
resolved bereavement on a massive scale.
To try
Economy, a division of the Academy
RUSSIANS "BUILD" A BRIDGE; ELENA ON
PHOTOS: BARBARA JO BROTHERS
ECONOMICS; A BIT OF FALLEN BARRICADE!
p. 26-28,89
Jan./Feb.1993
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
V.2
of Science, she works in facts and statistics
American dollars. By the end of the
whose job is to help government officials
all day long; when you ask her how (how
month, the same dollar was worth 200
understand free-market economy with all
in the world!) she thinks they will make it,
rubles. They were experiencing a 500 per-
its implications for rebuilding the country.
she gives you a metaphysical answer. The
cent annual inflation rate during the
For all practical purposes, Russia has been
scientist part of her gave a presentation
month of August. You can imagine how
asleep for the past 70 years.
that showed us how it was absolutely im-
anxious that might make any one of us
Elena also writes articles for Moscow
possible for the economy to begin to work.
were it reversed.
newspapers to help educate the Russian
Yet, she says, "I am not pessimistic."
The shock of the overnight switch to a
public about their shifting, trembling
None of the known resources of the
market economy has affected our friends
economy. Her most recent is "I, Banker,
modern world are in place. Pushed to the
considerably. The schoolteachers were im-
and You, User of Bank."
wall of reality, the economic structure of
poverished overnight. Among the univer-
The institute Misha chairs is a Russian
their country collapsing around them—
sity professors, our own friends still have
sister organization to the Institute for
nothing in anybody's theory of economics
jobs, but others have been terminated from
International Connections (IIC) in Denver,
to provide any basis for hope, let alone
their positions.
created in 1989 to facilitate exchange be-
comfort-still they hope. For what, I had
To cope, our psychologist friends have
tween Russia's new profession of clinical
asked.
developed a wide range of consultation
psychology and psychotherapists from the
What she hopes in is the Russian peo-
United States. The IIC, working alongside
ple's resilience and will to save themselves.
the IPD, sponsored this conference as well
Her own 67-year-old mother laughs at her
There is nothing in
as conferences in 1990 and 1991. We are
when she talks of her anxiety about the
working together to find the ingredients
coming winter. These new hardships are
anybody's theory of
conducive to the welfare of individual hu-
nothing compared to the hardships en-
man beings in a context of community.
dured in the Russia of her memory-after
economics to provide
Since the first joint meeting in 1990,
all, there are no wholesale murders going
there has been a great deal of work be-
on, armies are not marching on Moscow,
any basis for hope, but
tween Russian and American schoolteach-
people are not starving in the streets. It is
ers and business consultants, as well as
such endurance that gives Elena hope. That
still they hope.
between Russian and American psy-
endurance coupled with faith in the very
generative force of Life itself to sweep her
In what, I asked.
chotherapists. Although, as anyone might
imagine, there is considerable mistrust of
people up into cooperative ventures with
and resistance to "government involve-
one another at the grass-roots level. Even
ment" among the Russians, the school and
though she, as an expert in economics, sees
business committees hope to take their
no objective hope, in her heart she bears
possibilities. With the current rate of infla-
model programs to the national councils
the faith of her forefathers and foremothers
tion, they have to work a lot to make
so that what works may be applied on a
who had literally given their lives to see
enough money for the high-priced com-
national level. Ongoing work with Tahir
freedom for the people of Russia.
modities. However, there is no point in
Basarev, deputy chief for the Department
The Russians used a word, sovest, which
making more than it literally takes to sup-
of Human Resources (it includes all per-
seemed not easily translated, but may cor-
port the family, because the ruble is shrink-
sonnel working for the Russian govern-
respond roughly to the Jungian concept of
ing as one holds it in one's hand.
ment) is an example of the successful work
a higher self. It is on the sovest in each of
The Russians have reached a level of ac-
of the business committee toward that end.
the people of Russia that Elena pins her
ceptance of the state of instability. Knowing
Basically, psychology as a discipline that
hope for the future of her country.
they have no control over what happens in
cares about the individual and not simply
In these people, who have been so blud-
the economy, they seem to have adopted
the work group seems to have been born in
geoned by czars and dictators and KGB for
the philosophy of taking each day at a time.
Russia 15 years ago when Viktor Frankl
a 1,000 years, that faith is more than inspi-
It is unrealistic to do otherwise. It is impos-
came to the USSR. Until 1985, psychology
rational; it is awe-inspiring. No family was
sible to plan under such uncertainty. It is
was strictly an academic subject taught in
left untouched by the bloody hand of
not useful to dissolve oneself in anxiety
universities. Only since perestroika has
Stalin. Forced into an existential position
about "what is going to happen." The
clinical psychotherapy-work with
of feeling like it is useless to make plans,
Russian simply "carries on." What amazes
clients-been possible. In 1988, under the
they rely on the now-the new possibility
me is that they do it with such graciousness.
auspices of the Association of Humanistic
in each new moment and in the awareness
Psychology, Virginia Satir-pioneer in
that they can address themselves to being
Healing Exchange
family therapy and in the application of
responsible and "making the right choic-
Misha Ivanov is a psychologist and his
the healing principles to larger systems-
es" as the moment reveals a time for choice.
wife Elena Starostenkova-lvanov is an
came to the Soviet Union. The seeds of our
It seems to be like trusting in the Tao, al-
economist. Elena is one of the members of
two groups were planted with her arrival.
though they did not use those words.
the Academy of National Economy origi-
As chairperson of the Institute for
nally appointed by Gorbachev, now advi-
Professional Development, Misha orga-
The Cataclysmic Shift
sor to the new government. Misha is
nized this third annual meeting in Moscow
When I crossed the border from
chairman of the Institute for Professional
to bring together Russians and Americans
Mongolia into Siberia at the beginning of
Development (IPD) in Moscow.
for joint training and cultural exchange.
the month, I got 150 rubles for one of my
Elena is a part of a team of economists
The unique feature of the IPD and the IIC
is the emphasis on joint training. We of the
government could not stand. Something
trying to learn about
American organization feel the Russians
had to give and soon.
have as much to offer us as we have to of-
Three days later. Elena's husband,
stress and anxiety.
disorder and theories about dealing with
fer them, that very difficult-to-describe
Misha, and his professional friends were out
depth of soul being a major gift.
in the streets at those barricades, "taking
New Problems
Our broadest aim is continued com-
that position" to which Elena had referred.
The overnight shift to market economy
mitment to each other toward the healing
Mandating "egalitarianism," that everybody
has had a huge impact on the people. It has
of both our cultures. The Russians are vir-
be "equal," had to produce violence.
created brand new problems in families.
tually a whole nation in bereavement or
The palpable difference since last year
Galina, the schoolteacher, was suddenly
post-traumatic stress; their Afghanistan
is the deregulation of prices according to
impoverished, along with most of the rest
veterans had experiences similar to our
guidelines of the International Monetary
of the nation, overnight. The monthly
Vietnam veterans. Americans are suffering
Fund. Everybody realizes now, too late to
salary of most Russians is about the equiv-
a narcissistic orientation to life that engen-
do anything about it, what a mistake this
alent of $15 American money. The rent
ders the addiction epidemic rampant in the
sudden shift was.
formula has been changed so that housing
United States. We are committed to a long-
as well as food is more expensive. Plus 500
term association.
percent annual inflation.
Elena is a research fellow of the Institute
In my opinion, panic can
Now that everybody is free to sell what-
for Studies of U.S. and Canadian
ever there is a market for, adolescents are
Economies as well as a member of the
hardly be viewed as
selling black-market beer in the streets and
Academy of National Economy and the
earning several times over what their fa-
Graduate School of International Business.
"disorder" when the
thers have ever earned. This is, of course,
This school trains ministers and deputy
reminiscent of the American problem of
ministers-managers who would be in
entire economy is
adolescents making thousands of dollars
charge of state production enterprises. In
selling drugs. How do you stop something
Russia, business has, of course, been gov-
collapsing around
that is so rewarding? And what is the im-
ernment-run until the very recent shifts. It
pact on the family of that adolescent with
is Elena's job, as research fellow in her insti-
your ears.
his big wad of money while his father is on
tute and as part of the team of her academy
his same less-than-$15-in-American-cur-
to provide training to improve the Russian
rency salary-and/or facing unemploy-
conomy, to teach the people at the top
ment in the event his job is considered
what works and what doesn't.
Now it is not so clear "what position
obsolete under the new market system?
While Elena is focused on helping her
must be taken."
One Russian therapist held a role-play
country understand and deal with the
Elena draws four boxes representing the
family session presenting this problem.
"earthquake" rumbling through the econ-
Russian economy: Raw Material
Misha had consulted on the case.
omy, Misha is trying to hone his skills in
cal
the treatment of post-traumatic stress syn-
Capital
Land
Loss
drome and panic disorder. In my opinion,
The Russian population has experienced
panic can hardly be viewed as "disorder"
generation after generation of situations
when the entire economy of your country
People,
that produce post-traumatic stress syn-
is collapsing around your ears.
Equipment
personnel and
organization
drome. They are experiencing bereavement
on a scale hard to imagine in our country.
11's
ands
Elena: Notes from her Presentation
The "people, personnel, and organiza-
Stalin murdered the grandfathers, great un-
on
When Elena and I met again this sum-
tion" are not trained or organized for the
cles as well as the grandmothers and great
then
mer, it was on the first anniversary of last
modern technological world. Training them
aunts of most of our Russian psychologist
year's failed coup. "Last year," said Elena,
would take money, which they do not have.
friends. No family in Russia was untouched
"it all seemed very simple: We must take a
The "equipment" is all in need of repair; fix-
by this slaughter. The latest government es-
position. And we did. We went to the
ing or replacing it would take money, which
timate is 40 million people. That is one
White House and took our position." The
they do not have. There is no "capital."
fourth the population of the United States.
Russians deliberately refer to their new par-
Ninety percent of the plants that were func-
Then add the number of people the
liament building as the "White House" af-
tional before deregulation would have been
czars before him murdered and the KGB af-
ter our White House because they wanted
forced out of business by the resulting in-
ter him murdered and you see a nation of
it to stand as a symbol of democracy; white
flation had their government not inter-
people who for centuries have been deal-
house, not "red" house. "I think maybe
vened. Otherwise, production would have
ing with emotional loss and post-traumat-
aveling
arity.....
that was last occasion Russian hope for
stopped. This is a statistic, not hyperbole. It
ic stress. When one wonders aloud how
being
miracle. But there is no miracle. Now, we
took about six months to become clear that
they cope with their many frustrations, the
tht, you
must take position, but now it is not sim-
the deregulation was not going to work.
Russians have a way of saying, "We are used
experi-
ple. I know we must take a position, but
Elena's prognosis is, there is none. From
to it." However, therapists know that one
ist it be?"
the point of view of economics there is no
does not "get used to" post-traumatic
ago, Elena had presented a then-
apparent solution. They lack the basic in-
stress-that, in fact, it haunts until the
economic picture of Russia. She
gredients required to turn it around.
lever this
redit card
ended the lecture with the warning that the
So Elena's psychologist husband is busy
continued on page 89
use ask for
28
otebook
Special Offer
continued from page 28
COLLECTORS NEWSSTAND EDITION
point of resolution. Likewise, loss unac-
knowledged influences behavior out of
awareness of the bereaved.
After getting back to the United States,
I called Elena to check out that figure of
psychology today
40 million to be sure what it included. It
was 8:30 Sunday night in Moscow. No,
Misha answered the phone; Elena was
working at her office.
THE BEST OF
Of course, Misha would know: Did the
40 million include the Russians who died
in WWII defending Russia against Hitler's
army. No. That is another 20 million!
Limited
Misha says there is now an ongoing at-
tempt to get accurate figures about Stalin's
Supplies
YEARS
purges and the figure is growing every time
they look. It seems the first thing Stalin did
was to murder the entire Census Bureau,
so that makes it even harder. But the
Russians are intent on getting the whole
truth now that they at last have access to all
the KGB files. The 40 million doesn't even
count the 1917 Revolution.
Since 1967, the
Misha cautions, "Now this includes
also those who died in prisons in Siberia,
articles in PT
or froze or starved along the way." 1 sup-
pose he didn't want me to get carried away
1
LE BEST
were the stories
and think Stalin had personally shot them
all. We are talking, I know for sure, about
of our times.
Elena's grandfather and about the grand-
Service
Medical
father of another of our group, who had
-
And they're
been a minister in city government.
There is still a great deal of feeling
still relevant,
around those issues. Many Russians spoke
about it in the 1990 meeting. They told us
still
they didn't talk about these things among
themselves-the presence of outsiders was
important.
almost required for the tears to be released.
In Russia today, one notices that the
TOMBUE
women can't let go of their grown chil-
dren, and often they live in the same flat
with them. In Moscow, one of the Russian
women in our group says she wants two
more children because in five to seven
This issue will have limited newsstand distribution. NOW YOU
years hers will be gone; she would like
CAN ORDER THIS COLLECTOR'S EDITION BY MAIL FOR
children somewhere in her house. She had
ONLY $5.00
this price includes shipping and handling.
spoken previously of being afraid to be
alone in her flat while her husband was
($6.00 outside the U.S.A.)
gone with the children for several days.
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She had spoken also of the energy that
WHILE SUPPLIES LAST!!!
comes with a new baby.
My theory is that middle-aged women
To order simply send a check or money order to:
may be holding on to the children in the
next generation as a way of dealing with
Psychology Today
the massive losses in the past one. It is a
P.O. Box 78368, Dept. 2000
sort of antidote to the loss, mourning, and
St. Louis, MO 63178-8368
sadness of the last lost generation.
Please include complete shipping information with your order.
Current Politics
93-884 F
October 6, 1993
CRS Report for Congress
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Russia's Violent Showdown of October 3-4:
Analysis and Implications
Stuart D. Goldman
Specialist in Russian Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
SUMMARY
On October 3-4, 1993, the political confrontation between Russian President
Yeltsin and the hardline parliamentary opposition erupted in armed conflict. For
a time the Yeltsin regime seemed endangered by an aggressive crowd of 5-10,000
determined foes. On October 4, however, army units loyal to Yeltsin subdued
the opposition and stormed the parliament building, leading to the surrender of
the hardliners and the incarceration of their leaders. In the short-term, at least,
this would appear to be a decisive victory for Yeltsin. Longer term prospects for
democratization and market reform are less clear. The obstructionist
parliamentary opposition has been swept away, but so has the entire parliament,
until new elections are held. The political influence of the military in the future
is uncertain, as is the effect of these events on Yeltsin's popularity and on the
cohesion of the Russian Federation. Since Yeltsin's hardline opponents were
strongly anti-American, the initial outcome of the conflict seems clearly favorable
to U.S. interests.
BACKGROUND
The nearly continuous series of political crises that have plagued Russia since
the end of 1992 came to a head with President Boris Yeltsin's September 21, 1993
decree disbanding the legislature and calling for election in December of a
restructured parliament. The hardline parliamentary opposition expelled pro-
Yeltsin deputies, impeached Yeltsin, and declared Vice President Aleksandr
Rutskoi Acting President. Yeltsin besieged the parliament building and used a
combination of pressure, inducements, and threats stopping short of armed
violence, to get the diehard legislators to give up and go away. A standoff ensued,
with the isolated Rutskoi and Parliamentary Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov calling
on the military and security forces for support and gaining the political backing
of a number of regional governments of the Russian Federation. (For background,
see CRS Report 93-879F, Russia's Violent Showdown: A Chronology of Events,
September 21-October 4, 1993; 93-851F, Yeltsin Disbands the Russian Parliament;
CRS Issue Brief 92089, Russia; and Video Program LTR 93-1361, Russia's Political
Showdown.)
CRS
CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress
CRS-2
Analysis of the Violent Events
On Sunday, October 3, an angry and increasingly violent crowd of 5-10,000
anti-Yeltsin activists broke through the security forces surrounding the parliament
building. Unaccountably, the government forces appeared quite unprepared for
the size and aggressiveness of the crowd. The mostly young, conscript Interior
Ministry troops, outnumbered and apparently ordered not to use firearms, fell
back repeatedly before the surging crowd and were routed from around the
parliament building. Rutskoi exhorted the crowd of excited supporters to seize
the nearby Moscow mayor's office and the Ostankino TV center several miles
away. Afterward, Khasbulatov told them that their next target should be the
Kremlin, the seat of Yeltsin's government.
On Sunday afternoon and evening the crowd, including hundreds of well-
armed army veterans and paramilitary forces, seized the Moscow mayor's office
with impunity and attacked the TV center, knocking the pro-Yeltsin state TV
broadcasts off the air. Yeltsin's government appeared to be in serious jeopardy.
The insurgents, however, were unable to persuade the military and security forces
to desert Yeltsin's government. Forces loyal to the government repelled the attack
on the TV center after a bloody battle. On Monday morning, October 4, the
government marshalled elements of six elite divisions¹ that crushed the opposition
that day, amidst heavy fighting. Defense Minister Grachev reportedly played a
key role in rallying the military behind Yeltsin. The new Security Minister,
Golushkov, and Deputy Defense Minister Kobets are also believed to have played
important roles. The storming of the parliament building by elite troops supported
by tank cannon fire quickly forced the surrender of the outgunned anti-Yeltsin
forces and the incarceration of their leaders. Deaths over the two days are
estimated to be well over one hundred, with many hundreds wounded.
The timing and details of the September 21-October 4 crisis took most people
by surprise. But that Russia should experience large-scale violence during its
post-Soviet transition is not surprising. The precipitous collapse of the Soviet
Union and Russia's transformation from totalitarianism to market democracy
are earth-shaking events. It is historically unprecedented for such radical
developments in a major power to proceed in a smooth, linear, non-violent
progression. Even if Russia's transition to democracy is ultimately successful,
-- which is not assured -- it may take one or two generations to accomplish, and
it may encounter detours, setbacks, and possibly more violence.
A DECISIVE VICTORY FOR YELTSIN?
Many observers see the October 4 outcome as a decisive victory for Yeltsin.
They note that his arch enemies, Khasbulatov, Rutskoi, and others who led
insurrection, are in prison. The "red-brown" coalition of hardline communists
I Elements of three airborne divisions, two tank divisions, and a crack ex-KGB
security division reportedly formed the main strike force.
CRS-3
and ultranationalists has been defeated and several of its most extreme parties
banned. The obstructionist, anti-reform legislature has been swept away,
temporarily removing any parliamentary opposition. And finally, in this view,
Yeltsin's effective use of force is likely to dissuade others from overt opposition.
Not all analysts share this view. According to a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
assessment, it is impossible to say either that Boris Yeltsin can now count
on the support of the army as a whole, or that the militant "red-brown" coalition
that opposes him will not, in the future and perhaps under different leadership,
enjoy greater success in its efforts to win over elements of Russia's increasingly
fractured armed forces."2
Some supporters as well as critics of Yeltsin note that this may not prove
to be a decisive victory for the President unless he acts decisively now to capitalize
on his success. They note that Yeltsin seems to be at his best in moments of crisis,
but that he is a poor administrator and often seems to drift into lethargy and
relinquish authority to feuding subordinates when danger has passed. Some in
Yeltsin's camp urge him to seize this moment to eradicate "vestiges of the Soviet
political system," such as communist-dominated regional and local legislatures
and political parties and pro-communist state enterprise managers. 3 Others want
him to press ahead boldly with radical economic reforms, arguing that unless the
economy begins to improve, "red-brown" extremists will find ample support among
confused and frightened Russians.
Implications for Russia
Yeltsin's victory in the October 3-4 conflict encourages some of his supporters
to see the increased likelihood of an "optimal outcome" in the larger struggle over
Russia's political and socioeconomic future. In this scenario, Yeltsin capitalizes
upon his dramatic victory and the absence of parliamentary opposition by fully
implementing comprehensive economic reforms with broad popular support, or
at least acquiescence.⁴ These reforms begin to stabilize the economy. A new,
democratic constitution is adopted. Parliamentary elections in December usher
in a period of "normal" politics and increased political and economic stability.
Such an "optimal outcome" has become a real possibility; but it is by no means
the only possibility. Many would argue that it is also not the most likely outcome.
2 Foye, Stephen. Army Backs Yeltsin For Now, RFE/RL Research Institute,
October 4, 1993.
3 Hiatt, Fred. "Yeltsin Tightens Grip, Fires Opposing Officials," Washington
Post, October 6, 1993. p. A1, 24.
4 Economic reformers were heartened by Yeltsin's reappointment of Yegor
Gaidar as First Deputy Prime Minister on September 18, 1993. Gaidar was the
architect of Russia's radical economic reform plan of 1991-92. The parliamentary
opposition forced Yeltsin to remove him as Acting Prime Minister in December
1992 and replace him with the more conservative Viktor Chernomyrdin.
CRS-4
Some believe that the events of October 3-4 make Yeltsin heavily dependent
on the military, increase the military's political influence, and bring the military
actively into politics.⁶ In this view, Yeltsin might be forced to placate the military
by following a less radical economic reform program, particularly in the areas
of defense spending and defense conversion. Military influence might also push
Russia toward a more nationalistic foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis the other
Soviet successor states on its periphery, from the Baltic, Ukraine, and Moldova,
to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Attempts to reestablish "imperial" Russian
dominance in those areas would be incompatible with democratic and economic
reform domestically and would also likely strain Russia's relations with the West,
including the United States.
Another departure from the "optimal outcome" focuses on the proposed new
parliamentary elections. In his September 21 decree, Yeltsin set December 11-12
as the dates for electing the State Duma, the lower house of a new bicameral
legislature. Many question whether those dates are realistic. Candidates have
not yet been nominated. The necessary election law is not in place. Nor is there
agreement even among Yeltsin's advisors as to the size of the proposed State
Duma (400-450 deputies) and the means of election (what percentage of deputies
to be elected from single-member constituencies and what percentage from party
lists). Under these circumstances, if the election date were to slip from mid-
December to sometime later in the winter, that would not necessarily call into
question Yeltsin's commitment to parliamentary elections. But a longer or
indefinite postponement might. If the economy continues to deteriorate, fueling
popular discontent, a longer postponement might be a tempting option for Yeltsin.
Not only the election date but, more significantly, the election outcome is
in doubt. The defeat of the hardline opposition does not assure the success of
democratic reform candidates in parliamentary elections. Observers agree that
voters will not elect large numbers of Communist Party officials and state
enterprise directors, as they did in 1990. But many experts believe that populists
and nationalists are likely to make very effective electoral appeals, especially in
the countryside and small-to-medium-sized cities. The state of the economy and
people's perceptions of their economic prospects could be decisive. Most economic
indicators now are negative, and public opinion polling indicates that most people
are pessimistic about the foreseeable future. It is possible that the October events
may hurt the chances of democratic reform candidates by depriving them of the
opportunity of running against the widely despised Khasbulatov, communists,
and the CPD. If pro-Yeltsin reformers are relegated to a minority, a parliament
dominated by populists and nationalists with a strong popular mandate could
seriously impede the realization of Yeltsin's "optimal outcome" and push Russia
toward a more nationalistic foreign policy, with the negative results noted above.
5 That is the premise of Stephen Foye's article, cited in footnote 2, above.
See also, "Support From Russian Armed Forces Was Crucial for Yeltsin,"
Washington Post, October 4, 1993. p. A31.
CRS-5
Some observers have speculated that Yeltsin's disbanding of the parliament
and violent suppression of the hardline opposition may increase the tendency
among Russia's regions and republics toward greater autonomy and, in some cases,
separatism. This argument is driven by two beliefs. First, that the regions and
republics naturally seek more autonomy and view negatively Yeltsin's
authoritarian actions vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet. And second, that most of the
regional and republic legislatures not only felt an institutional kinship to the
disbanded and assaulted parliament, but were literally and figuratively their
political comrades. It is true that leaders of many regional legislatures criticized
Yeltsin's moves against the parliament since September 21. Many of those
legislatures, however, do not enjoy as much popular support locally as Yeltsin
does. Moreover, the regional leaders are realists who understand power. Yeltsin's
effective use of force may be more likely to inhibit than inflame regional autonomy
or separatism. If the regional legislatures remained centers of anti-Yeltsin
resistance, Yeltsin might call for regional as well as national legislative elections
-- a prospect that would probably threaten to unseat a large majority of regional
legislators elected in 1990, during the period of Communist Party dominance.
Implications for the United States
From the U.S. perspective, the most important result of the conflict in Russia
is the defeat of the "red-brown" coalition, which is largely anti-democratic, anti-
western, anti-market, and anti-semitic. One of the staples of its propaganda is
that Yeltsin and his followers are betraying and/or selling Russia to America and
the Jews. Even if Rutskoi and Khasbulatov and some others in parliament did
not fully share such extreme views, they were increasingly allied with and
dependent on hardline communist and ultranationalist extremists. It was these
extremists who tried to overthrow the Yeltsin government on October 3. A victory
by the hardline opposition at that time would almost certainly have been a great
misfortune for Russia, a tragedy for Russia's democratic reformers, and inimical
to U.S. national interests. The United States would probably have been confronted
by an embittered, vengeful, and far-from-friendly Russian government.
This assessment strongly influenced the U.S. decision to continue to back
Yeltsin in his final showdown with the parliament, even after his unconstitutional
dissolution of parliament on September 21 and the storming (and burning) of
the parliament building two weeks later. Yeltsin's opponents came to be viewed
so negatively in the United States that even U.S. officials who harbored
reservations about Yeltsin's policies or his personal reliability were forced to
conclude that he was vastly more preferable than his enemies. That does not
mean, however, that there are not reasonable grounds for reservations about
Yeltsin's leadership.
U.S. news media have generally portrayed Russia's political crisis as a struggle
between a democratic, reform-minded Yeltsin and an undemocratic, anti-reform,
Communist-dominated legislature. There was increasingly some truth to this
image. Nonetheless, the good-versus-evil characterization of the multifaceted
CRS-6
crises is an oversimplification that obscures several important facts. The Yeltsin-
Gaidar stewadrship of the economy in 1992, although generally supported by the
IMF and western governments, was blamed by many Russians for their economic
misery and aroused strong opposition -- even among many Russian democrats
who unquestionably want a market economy. Also, Yeltsin's often abrasive and
uncompromising style antagonized some of his natural allies and supporters in
parliament, driving them into opposition. Not all opponents of Yeltsin are
necessarily opponents of democracy and market reform.
Measured by western democratic standards, Yeltsin has many flaws. Although
his broad policies and principles seem genuinely democratic, he continues to
exhibit authoritarian tendencies, the result perhaps of both personal temperament
and the communist political culture in which he arose. The draft constitution
he proposed in April 1993 would have created a strongly presidential republic
in which the legislative branch would have only a secondary role.⁶ He admitted
that his September 21 decree disbanding parliament was unconstitutional; critics'
charges that it amounted to a coup are not without merit. Such acts contribute
to lack of respect for constitutionalism and the rule of law. His increasingly tight
control of radio and TV in 1993, his imposition of broadcast news censorship after
September 21, and newspaper censorship on October 5,⁷ trouble some of his
Russian and Western supporters. On October 4-6, Yeltsin shut down at least
10 opposition newspapers (including mass circulation dailies, Pravda, Sovietskaya
Rossiya, and Dyen), dismissed a number of Moscow area local legislatures and
regional administrators that had sided with the parliamentary opposition, and
banned several hardline political parties and organizations. Yeltsin supporters
say these are necessary, temporary measures to stabilize a volatile situation, noting
that Yeltsin acted similarly right after the Soviet coup-attempt of August 1991,
and promptly restored and expanded political freedoms. Yeltsin's opponents and
some democratic critics, however, say they fear a new authoritarianism.
Despite these and other flaws, however, Yeltsin's opponents make him look
very good in western eyes. Nevertheless, many U.S. observers, including many
Members of Congress, express concern about whether U.S. policy is too heavily
committed to Yeltsin as an individual. If the events of October 3-4 do prove to
be a decisive defeat for the "red-brown" coalition, that could have the effect of
depriving Yeltsin of the opponents that make him look so good to the West. That
might strengthen the arguments of those who seek less unequivocal U.S. support
for Yeltsin personally and more support for democratic and market principles,
even if that means agreeing occasionally with some of Yeltsin's opponents.
6 See U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Russia:
Toward a New Constitution. CRS Report No. 93-577F.
7 On October 6, Yeltsin said he was ending "pre-censorship" of the mass media.
11. 03. 93 06:12 PM *HELSINKI COMMISSION P02
WILSON CENTER
ID:2022873772
NOV 02'93 12:16 No.003 P.02
Michael Dobbs
PREPARED REMARKS FOR CSCE COMMISSION
Mr Chairman, Mr Co-Chairman, Congressmen.
Thankyou for giving me this opportunity of testifying before the
Commission. In my prepared remarks today, I should like to focus on
two questions: events leading up to the dissolution of the Russian
legislature and the prospects for democracy in Russia.
We have just witnessed the fall of the first post-Communist
republic in Russia. The bloodshed in Moscow last month also marked
the failure of the first brave, albeit flawed, attempt to create
democratic institutions in a country with a long tradition of
autocracy and totalitarianism. This doesn't mean that there is no
chance of democracy ever taking root in Russia. But it does mean that
we should brace ourselves for a protracted and rocky post-Communist
transition in the former Soviet Union. We must be prepared for many
setbacks and even upheavals as these countries attempt to find their
way in a new and unfamiliar world. And we must ask ourselves why an
elected legislature and an elected president resorted to the bullet
rather than the ballot as the means of resolving their differences.
Public debate in this country has tended to depict the clash
between Yeltsin and the Congress as a conflict between a
democratically-slected, reform-minded president and a reactionary
legislature dominated by former Communists and nationalists. There
may be some truth in this, but it is a gross oversimplification. Few
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people questioned the legitimacy of the Russian Congress of People's
eputies when it was elected in March 1990. Two months later, in May
1990, this supposedly retrograde body elected Boris Yeltsin as its
first speaker, by a majority of 535 votes to 467. It is true that many
deputies were former apparatchiks, but that description also applies
to Yeltsin. It is not true that only extremists were inside the
Russian White House on October 4, 1993, when it was shelled by
Yeltsin's tanks. I cite the case of Oleg Rumyantsev, a young
legislator who was once described by my newspaper, The Washington
Post, as the James Madison of Russia because of the effort he put into
drafting a new, democratic constitution.
While my personal sympathies were largely with Yeltsin,
particularly in the final stages of the crisis, I am against
demonizing the other side. Both president and parliament committed
erious mistakes and both must bear responsibility for what happened.
I don't think it is very helpful to view this conflict in terms of
good guys versus bad guys. In drawing lessons for the future, I prefer
to focus on the failure to develop functioning democratic institutions
and the inadequacy of the constitutional arrangements that Russia
inherited from the Soviet era.
The first post-Communist republic of Russia lasted for just 25
months-from August 1991 to October 1993. It was a political hybrid,
operating in a twilight zone between totalitarianism and democracy.
Superficially, its institutions appeared to be based on democratic
principles. But the political mentality and the political culture were
moulded by the totalitarian past. Russian democracy during this period
sometimes reminded me of a Potemkin village. The facade seemed
pleasing enough, but there was nothing behind it. For a democracy to
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work, you also need the proper foundations and structural supports:
blitical parties, independent news media, the rule of law, tolerance
for diverse points of view. Bome people argue there are also economic
pre-requisites for democracy: a minimum standard of living and a
strong property-owning class. Few of these conditions were satisfied
in Russia.
Most serious, in my view, was the lack of clearly-understood and
widely-accepted rules of the democratic game. In the United States,
the Constitution provides a mechanism for settling disputes between
the different branches of government. In Russia, the constitution
itself became a weapon in the brutal struggle for political power.
There was no clear division of authority between executive and
legislature. At Yeltain's urging, the legislators agreed to the
introduction of an American-style presidency in 1991. But they did not
really surrender any of their own powers. In the Communist period,
here was a slogan, All power to the Soviets. In theory at least, the
Soviets--the elected councils--were sovereign. In practice, of course,
this was just a facade for a one-party dictatorship. But the idea that
the Soviets were all-powerful survived the collapse of Communism. The
parliament felt it had the right to change the constitution whenever
it wanted--and did SO at least 300 times between 1991 and 1993. Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the conflict between
president and legislature was eventually resolved by extra-
constitutional means.
So what kind of foundation is necessary, if Russia's second post-
Communist republic is to avoid the unhappy fate of its predecessor?
The first requirement, in my view, is a constitution capable of
facilitating the unprecedented socio-economic revolution now underway
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n
Russia. We must remember that the birthpangs of democracy in Russia
lave been accompanied by growing economic and social tension, caused
by the collapse of the old command economy. When post-Franco spain and
post-Pinochet Chile made their transition to democracy, free markets
were already in place. Russia, by contrast, has been devastated by
seven decades of central planning. Tens of thousands of state-owned
companies are virtually bankrupt. Economic production has been
declining by 20 or 30 per cent a year--and is likely to decline still
further. To build a market economy on the ruins of central planning
will require great discipline and great sacrifice from an already
exhausted people.
A Congressional committee room may be the wrong place to voice such
an opinion, but I believe that in such a situation the future balance
of power in Russia must be tilted toward the executive. Russia needs
leaders who have the political courage and the political authority to
take some extremely unpopular measures. All Russian revolutions have
been revolutions from above--and it is naive to expect that a
transformation of such scope can be carried out by 500 or 600
legislators representing a vast range of political parties. At the
same time, I think it 18 necessary to introduce constitutional
guarantees against a return to dictatorship, even elected
diotatorship. These include an effective if diminished legislature,
some kind of constitutional court, and a free press.
Above all, Russia needs a constitution that all political factions
will respect. There is a serious danger that the opposition will
challenge the legitimacy of Yeltsin's constitution, just as Yeltsin
challenged the legitimacy of the previous constitution. The legal
basis for the December 12 elections is murky, to say the least.
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Voters are being asked to approve the new constitution on the same day
that they elect the Duma--or legislature--provided for in a
constitution that they have every right to reject. To make matters
even more complicated, nobody outside Yeltsin's inner circle has yet
seen this draft constitution.
If the new constitution is to be taken seriously, Yeltsin must
somehow show that it is a genuinely impartial document rather than a
political device designed to shore up his own power. In my view, the
best way to convince the Russian people that this is the case would be
to set a date for new presidential elections and announce that he does
not intend to run. I suspect that Yeltsin, like Mikhail Gorbachev
before him, will turn out to be a transitory political figure. To
steer Russia into a new era is gruelling, exhausting work--and it is
unreasonable to expect even the most energetic politician to see the
whole process through from start to finish. By defeating his old
Communist party comrades--not once, but twice--Yeltsin has fulfilled
his historical mission. But the spectacle of a charred and blackened
White House has tarred the heroic image he acquired in August 1991 as
a result of his vigorous defense of the same building in the name of
Russia's fledgling democracy. His most valuable contribution now would
be to give the second Russian republic a workable constitution--and
then surrender power, gracefully, to a new generation of post-
Communist politicians.
- 5 -
DK350B
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
WORLD REPORT
Copyright Claimant
Reproduced with Permission.
A FRAIL, FINICKY
RUSSIAN
DEMOCRACY
Advantage
Mr. Yeltsin
DO YOU APPROVE OF TELTSING
PERFORMANCE
STPRESIDENT?
Pro-reform candidates have a big head start as
the Russian parliamentary race heats up
S
ergei Baburin was pinning his po-
vantage, the election is unlikely to re-
litical future on a one-page, streak-
solve Russia's two most pressing prob-
marked flier cranked out by an ag-
lems: the need for serious economic
ing photocopying machine in a borrowed
reform - part to halt growing impov-
office after working hours. But under the
erishment and the sense of alienation
rules for Russia's December 12 legislative
among average Russians and the tug of
election, Baburin, an outspoken nation-
war for power between Moscow and the
ISITPOSSIBLE TO HOLD
alist who was one of the last deputies to
country's restless regions.
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
leave the burning White House last
Only about a third of Russian voters
month, could not even begin gathering
believe it is possible to hold genuine
Y85
the 100,000 signatures
democratic elections in
required to put him on
Russia now, according
the ballot until he had
to a U.S. News nation-
DONTKNOW
registered a list of par-
wide public-opinion
liamentary candidates
survey conducted in
from his Russian All-
Russia during mid-Oc-
People's Union. And his
tober. There is new
movement's executive
speculation in Moscow
committee still had not
that because of confu-
settled on a platform,
sion in the campaign
slogan or strategy.
process and still-high
A week earlier, Rus-
political emotions, Yel-
sia's Choice, the main
tsin may postpone the
bloc supporting Presi-
balloting. But amid the
dent Boris Yeltsin, laid
uncertainty and doubt,
out its program in a
80 percent of those sur-
slick, 49-page bulletin
veyed said they plan to
neatly tucked inside a
cast ballots.
two-color cardboard
Leader. Yeltsin on the hustings
In the U.S. News sur-
folder bearing the im-
vey, 43 percent said they
age of Peter the Great. The booklet
would vote for candidates who support
tian-Democratic Movement, and Mi-
was distributed at a lavish, televised
Yeltsin; 19 percent said they would vote
khail Astafyev, chairman of the Kadets
campaign kickoff at Moscow's House
for anti-Yeltsin candidates. Despite such
(Constitutional Democrats) party and
of Cinema while a state of emergency
odds, the right is mounting a determined
the former cochairman of the now
was still in force in the capital-and
challenge - with tacit support from con-
banned National Salvation Front.
political gatherings were supposedly
servative regional leaders and from some
Aksyuchits, a bushy-haired former dis-
forbidden.
military officers, who resent reform even
sident, says he is running "to try to give a
Pressing problems. Yeltsin's backers
though the Army put down the parlia-
last chance to prevent a civil war. He
have a big head start in the race to elect a
mentary rebellion last month.
calls for a return to Christian values in
new Russian parliament. They are richer
The only major opposition figures not
politics and the rebirth of the entrepre-
and better organized and have easier ac-
running are the handful in jail on charges
neurial class wiped out by the Bolsheviks.
cess to government-controlled media
linked to violent demonstrations. The
Baburin is militantly opposed to Ukraini-
and fewer problems with the authorities
lineup of candidates includes Baburin;
an independence and favors scrapping
than their conservative foes, who are still
Gennadi Zyuganov, chairman of the
the current privatization plan. Zyuganov,
reeling from Yeltsin's crackdown in early
Communist Party of Russia; Victor Ak-
whose party rose from the ashes of the
October. But despite the democrats' ad-
syuchits, chairman of the Russian Chris-
old Communist Party, wants a "voluntary
52
V.115
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT. NOVEMBER 8. 1993
Russians support Boris Yeltsin's policies but prefer that he not run for president again, according
to a new U.S. News poll. But when asked to choose among likely or declared presidential
candidates, Russians still prefer Yeltsin. Two indications of their unsettled mood and lingering
anger over the upheaval of recent years: Just over half want Yeltsin to reconstruct the Soviet
Union, and dictator Joseph Stalin is more popular than former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
WILL YOU EXPRESS OUR OPIN:
PUBLICIMAGE
THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM
IONS BY ARTICIPATING 1:133
ACING RUSSIATODAY
POLITICALEVENTS?
BORISVELISING
THE
MODERNIZINGUHE ECONOMY
MEETINGS
HIGH PRICES
DEMONSTRATIONS
REFORM AND ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY
ALEXANDER RUTSKOI
STRUCT THE SOVIETUMION?
CONFIDENT
386
VICTOR CHERNOMYRDIN
686
FAVOR REUNIFICATION
GPs
NOT-CONFIDENT
3%
ALLOW.REPUBLICSTO REMAIN
SEPARATE
RICHARD GAGE-USN&WR
return to socialism" and a "voluntary re-
Sergei Kovalyov, a leader of the pro-Yel-
tive popularity and virtually unchecked
vival of a union state."
tsin Russia's Choice bloc, which includes
power. He is demanding that Russia's
Divided. The opposition's biggest boost
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and
regions and republics immediately pay
could come from the fragmentation and
privatization chief Anatoli Chubais.
taxes they owe Moscow or face a cutoff of
feuding in the "democratic" corner. In
Sergei Shakhrai, a longtime Yeltsin
credits and supplies. He also wants to
the latest round, Yeltsin - through a
loyalist, has joined forces with Alexander
write broad new presidential powers into
spokesman accused Prime Minister
Shokhin and Yeltsin adviser Sergei Stan-
the draft Russian constitution, including
Victor Chemomyrdin of trying to create
kievich to form a pro-reform party that
the right to appoint a prime ministe
a "ministry of propaganda" by monopo-
opposes Russia's Choice. But Yeltsin
without parliamentary approval and fo
lizing the media. A Chernomyrdin
himself has no real rivals: In the U.S.
the president to be subject to impeach
spokesman countered that the presi-
News survey, 29 percent of the respon-
ment only for criminal acts, not for viola
dent's "henchmen" were trying to divide
dents backed Yeltsin in a presidential
ing the Constitution - the issue on whic
the president and the government. "I am
poll; his nearest opponent is economist
the old parliament tried to remove hin
afraid that the ability to be a team player
Grigori Yavlinsky, who heads another
Moreover, although the Yeltsin tea
is not being shown by democrats, and
pro-reform party, with 8 percent support.
promises a free and open election, cr
personal ambitions are enormous," says
Yeltsin is taking advantage of his rela-
ics charge that the Kremlin has stack
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT. NOVEMBER 8, 1993
MAJED REUTER
WORLD REPORT
the deck with its control of the media
and the bureaucracy. "We realize that
the election will be fake and that people
will be deceived again," says neo-Com-
munist Zyuganov. One Yeltsin adviser
admits privately, and uneasily, that the
government's control over the process
amounts to "guided democracy."
The government has promised to give
the opposition air time, but the powerful
state-run television evening news pro-
gram remains decidedly pro-Yeltsin.
When the Communists presented their
platform and candidates last week, Swiss,
Italian and British TV crews showed up,
but not Russia's main channel. "The
president is seeking to get a pocket par-
liament at all costs and in so doing does
not particularly care for democratic de-
corum," says Stepan Kiselev, deputy edi-
tor-in-chief of the liberal Moscow News.
Christian Democrat Aksyuchits, who
was harassed by the KGB after quitting
the Communist Party in 1979, is especial-
ly galled at being lumped together with
hard-line Communists by the pro-Yeltsin
press. "All of Yeltsin's team quit the
Communist Party only when it became
profitable for them - they changed their
ideological skins," he says. "It is very
difficult for them to debate with the dem-
ocratic opposition, which I represent."
Aksyuchits says he will use his few mo-
ments of television time to deliver a lone
To the polls. Fundamentalist candidates file nomination papers for Jordan's election.
message: "The last Communists in this
country are within the Kremlin walls."
Stifled. Without television coverage,
candidates must rely on old-style hand-
New threats to a
bills and word of mouth to get their
names and messages out. This could ben-
efit established political figures, such as
former parliament members in the prov-
peaceable kingdom
inces, but it stifles the smaller parties.
Candidates without the Kremlin's far-
flung resources have had to scramble to
Elections could compound Jordan's problems
register their lists of candidates and to
secure the necessary 100,000 signatures,
n the desert town of Yarout, a
and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
no more than 15 percent of which may
crowd of voters in traditional Bed-
tion is already producing new economic
come from any one region. This process
ouin robes gathered under a tent of
contacts with Israel, the prospect of im-
has to be completed by November 6.
black-and-brown camel wool to feast on
proved relations with the United States
Given the feuding among reformers,
giant trays of boiled meat and rice and
and the easing of a Western trade embar-
the controversy over the fairness of the
sing a smiling politician's praises.
go that was leveled to punish Jordan for
vote and the determination of the op-
There are similar scenes all across
trading with Iraq during the gulf war. But
position, a new parliament may not pro-
Jordan. From the cement-block hovels
Islamic fundamentalists, leftists and
vide the strong, legitimate government
of Palestinian refugee camps to the mar-
Arab nationalists in Jordan all oppose
Russia needs to tackle its economic
ble-floored salons of Amman's upscale
the Israeli-PLO accords, and the deal has
problems, fend off reactionary forces in
west side, the 1.5 million voters of the
fueled new tensions between Jordanians
the regions and military, and placate an
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan are pre-
and many Palestinians living in Jordan.
increasingly alienated public. So even if
paring for next week's parliamentary
Fearful the election might degenerate
it takes place as planned, December's
election, the country's first multiparty
into an explosive referendum on the
election may not mark the birth of a
national vote in more than 30 years.
king's support for the accords, some of
truly democratic Russia but only a new
The elections have only complicated
his advisers suggested postponing the
chapter of turmoil.
Jordan's delicate political balancing act.
vote. Hussein rejected that idea but put
King Hussein's tacit support for the land-
the royal brakes on electoral fervor in-
BY DOUGLAS STANGLIN IN MOSCOW
mark peace agreement between Israel
stead. Campaigning is taboo in mosques
54
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, NOVEMBER 8, 1993
Education, Health, &Welfare
Chapter 6. Education, Health, and Welfare
E
#
III,
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES to Soviet
citizens free, universal, and multilingual education; free, qualified
medical care provided by state health institutions; provision for
old age, sickness, and disability; and maternity allowances and sub-
sidies to families with many children. In quantitative terms, Soviet
regimes have made impressive strides in these areas since 1917.
The quality of the education and care, however, often fell below
standards achieved in the West.
Before the Bolshevik Revolution (see Glossary), education was
available to only an elite minority, consisting largely of the aristo-
cratic upper class; tsarist Russia's literacy rate was barely 25 per-
cent. By the mid-1980s, more than 110 million students-about
40 percent of the population-were enrolled in the Soviet Union's
government-controlled coeducational schools, universities, and in-
stitutes. The nation's literacy rate reached nearly 100 percent-
proclaimed by Soviet officials as the highest in the world. Western
authorities stressed, however, that the quality of Soviet education
often lagged behind that of the West, in large measure because of
the high degree of centralization and standardization of Soviet
schools, the emphasis on political indoctrination, and the reliance
on learning by rote and memorization.
On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, medical care was avail-
able to only a minority of the population, made up largely of
aristocrats and upper-level civil servants. The annual death toll from
epidemics and famine was in the millions. By the mid-1980s, the
Soviet Union had the world's highest ratio of physicians and hospital
beds per inhabitant, and basic medical care was available to the
large majority of the Soviet population, although the quality of
health care, in general, was considered low by Western standards.
Apart from limited assistance provided by private and church-
run charitable organizations, no nationwide welfare programs
provided for the needs of the old, disabled, and poor before the
Soviet era began. In the 1980s, social security and welfare pro-
grams were providing modest support to over 56 million veterans
and old-age pensioners, millions of invalids and disabled children
and adults, expectant mothers, and multichildren families.
During the regimes of Joseph V. Stalin and Nikita S. Khrush-
chev, Soviet authorities established the underlying principles and
basic organization of education, health care, and welfare programs.
The common denominator linking these programs was the country's
Newborn baby and nurse, young children, and pensioner
943
it Unio
Country Study
Education, Healt
Welfare
.oncern with establishing a technically skilled, well-indoctrinated,
(CPSU) in all aspects of education; the centralized and hierarchi-
and healthy labor force. A hallmark of Soviet education was its
cally structured administrative organs; and an essentially conser-
primary political function, originally enunciated by Vladimir I.
vative approach to pedagogy. The contemporary system also
Lenin, as a tool for remaking society. Political indoctrination-
reflected some holdovers from tsarist schools, including the five-
the inculcation of Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) ideals-thus re-
point grading scale, a formal and regimented classroom environ-
mained a constant throughout the uneven, decades-long process
ment, and school uniforms-dark dresses with white collars (and
of educational expansion and reform, and it set the Soviet system
white pinafores in the lower grades) for girls and dark pants and
of schooling apart from contemporary Western models.
white shirts for boys-in the secondary schools.
With the coming to power of General Secretary Mikhail S.
Educational reforms in the 1980s called for increased funding
Gorbachev in 1985 and the introduction of his policy of glasnost'
and changes in curriculum, textbooks, and teaching methods to
(see Glossary), the achievements made in education, health, and
correct serious shortcomings in the schools and improve the qual-
welfare since 1917 were being increasingly overshadowed by open
ity of education nationwide. An important aim of the reforms was
criticism and even growing alarm over serious failures in these
the creation of a "new school" that could meet fully the economic
spheres. By the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership and public alike
and social demands of the greatly modernized and technologically
finally acknowledged what Western observers had been noting for
advanced nation the Soviet leadership wished to create as it led
some time, namely, that the decades-long emphasis on quantita-
the country into the twenty-first century.
tive expansion had come at the expense of quality. Schools were
failing to develop the technically skilled work force needed to achieve
Philosophy and Aims
the goals of perestroika (see Glossary) and to create a modern and
The philosophical underpinnings and ultimate goals of Soviet
technologically developed economic system on a par with the ad-
education were closely interwoven and could be expressed through
vanced economies of the Western world.
two Russian words: vospitanie (upbringing or rearing) and obrazovanie
The situation in Soviet health care was even more serious. In
(formal education). Marxist-Leninist ideology, the philosophical
the 1970s and 1980s, significant increases in infant mortality and
foundation of Soviet education, stressed the proper upbringing of
considerable declines in life expectancy accompanied an alarming
youth to create the "new Soviet man" (see Glossary). To this end,
deterioration in the quality of health care. Pension and welfare pro-
the school system bore the lion's share of forming character by in-
grams were also failing to provide adequate protection, as evidenced
stilling and reinforcing Marxist-Leninist morals and ethics, begin-
by the large segment of the population living at the poverty
ning with preschool and kindergarten and continuing throughout
threshold. In the mid-1980s, Soviet leaders openly acknowledged
the entire schooling process. Lenin stressed the moral goal of edu-
these problems and introduced a number of reforms in an effort
cation, declaring after the Bolshevik Revolution: "The entire pur-
to rectify them.
pose of training, educating, and teaching the youth
should be
Education
to imbue them with communist ethics." The schools taught chil-
dren key socialist (see Glossary) virtues, such as love of labor, the
From its inception, Soviet education had Marxist-Leninist
atheist (scientific-materialist) view of life, Soviet patriotism and de-
philosophical underpinnings, including the dual aim of educating
votion to the homeland, and the primacy of the collective, namely,
youth and shaping their character. These aims were brought
the need to place the interests of society before those of the in-
together, as well, in the notion of "polytechnical education," de-
dividual.
fined loosely as integrating education with life-ideally connect-
The extent to which Soviet education bore the responsibility for
ing formal schooling with practical training in all kinds of schools
the rearing, or socialization, of youth set it apart from contemporary
and at all levels of education-with the aim of providing a dedi-
Western education systems and led many Western observers to see
cated and skilled work force.
a similarity between modern Soviet schools and American parochial
The government operated all schools, except for a handful of
schools of the past. Another uniquely Soviet feature was the close
officially approved church-run seminaries, which had an enroll-
integration of the schools with other major areas of society-cultural,
ment of only several hundred people. Other characteristics were
political, economic, and mass media-all of which served to rein-
the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
force the political indoctrination process.
Union:
untry Study
Education, Health,
lfare
The role of the family in child-rearing was not ignored, however,
and beginning in the 1980s Soviet leaders renewed emphasis on
central, publicly stated, aim of higher education, namely, the cre-
the family's central role in character formation. Parents were en-
ation of a classless society.
couraged to create a nurturing and loving environment at home
Control and Administration
and to cooperate actively with the schools, which generally led the
way, in fostering in their children the personal qualities considered
As was the case in every other major area of Soviet life in the
essential to a socialist morality: "Soviet patriotism, devotion to
late 1980s, the CPSU exercised ultimate control over the develop-
socially useful labor, and a feeling of being part of a social group."
ment and functioning of the nation's education system. Designated
The task of molding the "builders of communism" was advanced
by the Constitution as "the leading core of all organizations of the
as well through extracurricular activities centered on youth organi-
working people, both public and state," the Central Committee
zations that had close ties to the CPSU. Almost all schoolchildren
of the CPSU made major policies and decisions regarding all aspects
belonged to these groups: the Young Octobrists, for ages six to nine,
of education (see Central Committee, ch. 7). The party leader-
and the Pioneers, ages ten to fifteen. Most of the students in the
ship accepted fully Lenin's dictum about the inseparability of pol-
upper classes of secondary school belonged to the Komsomol (see
itics and schooling/schools, and it appreciated the far-reaching
Glossary) for ages fourteen to twenty-eight, which was specifically
power of education as a tool for refashioning the country's social
tasked with providing active assistance to the CPSU in building
fabric, "an instrument for the formation of a Communist society."
a communist society. To this end, Komsomol members supervised
Specifically, the Central Committee's Science and Education Insti-
and guided the two younger groups in a wide range of activities,
tutions Department initiated education policies to ensure ideolog-
including labor projects, sports and cultural events, field trips, sum-
ical conformity in all instruction. Together with the committee's
mer camp programs, and parades and ceremonies commemorat-
Ideological Department, it issued laws and regulations governing
ing national holidays (for example, May Day and Lenin's birthday),
all major spheres of education. The Council of Ministers and the
to develop in them proper socialist behavior and values and to at-
Supreme Soviet, in turn, gave pro forma ratification to party direc-
tract them, even at these early stages, to "socially beneficial" work.
tives and executed them (see Central Government, ch. 8). Adminis-
In addition to molding socialist morality, Soviet schools provided
tration of the school system was carried out by the government's
formal academic education, transmitting the knowledge and skills
education ministries under the direct authority of the Council of
to provide the nation's economy with a qualified and highly skilled
Ministers. In the late 1980s, the two chief administrative organs
labor force needed to sustain the country in a modern technologi-
were the Ministry of Education, which administered primary and
cal age. The dual concept of rearing and educating was brought
general secondary schools, and the Ministry of Higher and Special-
together as well in the notion of "polytechnical education," which
ized Secondary Education, which oversaw institutions of higher
stressed the inclusion of practical training at all levels of school-
learning and specialized secondary schools. These central, union-
ing. The polytechnical approach to education, which had waxed
republic ministries (see Glossary) operated through similarly named
and waned since the eΓa of Khrushchev, was receiving renewed
republic ministries, which were further broken down into province,
emphasis in the late 1980s under Gorbachev. Polytechnical school-
district, and local school committees. The republic ministries and
ing had three key components: cognitive-gaining knowledge about
their administrative organs at the province, district, and local levels
production sectors and industrial processes and organization,
were responsible for implementing the laws, regulations, and direc-
production tools and machinery, and energy and power sources;
tives concerning school curricula, methods of instruction, and text-
moral-developing respect for, and dedication to, both intellec-
books, and they also supervised the allocation of funds at their
tual and physical endeavor and eradicating the distinction between
respective levels.
mental and manual labor; and practical-acquiring sound work
Other main administrative organs (with counterpart agencies at
habits through direct involvement in the production or creation
lower governmental levels) were the Ministry of Culture, which
of goods and services. A polytechnical approach was important not
operated special schools of art, ballet, and music, and the All-Union
only to provide the dedicated, highly technically trained, and
Central Council of Trade Unions, which oversaw vocational and
productive workers needed to realize Gorbachev's program of eco-
technical schools. Management of higher education institutions
nomic restructuring and modernization but also to adhere to a
involved administrative agencies from the various party organs
and government ministries, such as those involved with health,
Union: A Country Study
Education, Health, and
agriculture, communications, and civil aviation. Not surprisingly,
highly qualified and committed workers for the nation econ-
these numerous entities spawned a huge bureaucracy, one that
omy.
represented a formidable obstacle to implementation of major school
The first component-developing a Marxist-Leninist worldview
reforms introduced in the mid-1980s.
and communist ethics-was geared to general character training
In the 1980s, overbureaucratization was openly criticized by the
as well, impressing upon youth basic ideas of good and bad, honesty,
official press and by leading educators as a major cause of the seri-
modesty, kindness, friendship, self-discipline, love of studies and
ous lack of quality in education. For example, management of tech-
conscientiousness, and "correct social behavior." Although the po-
nical training, the most critical area for the success of economic
litical content of school subjects had to be ideologically correct, the
reform, was excessive: seventy-four ministries and administrative
materials were not necessarily overwhelmingly politicized, as in-
departments oversaw institutions of higher learning, with thirty
dicated by a Western study of reading topics in secondary schools
of these ministries directing only one or two institutes each. Another
that found less than one-third of them dealt with clear-cut socio-
200 administrative departments were in charge of specialized sec-
political themes.
ondary schools.
The second chief concern of Soviet pedagogy was upgrading voca-
Traditionally, the party apparatus had exercised control over not
tional education and labor training in the general secondary school.
only the direction of educational development but also the im-
A related central goal was inculcating in youngsters a respect for
plementation of policies and directives. The essentially parallel struc-
blue-collar work. This remained a difficult if not insurmountable
ture between party and government provided the main mechanism
challenge because of Soviet society's traditional view of manual
for this oversight. Furthermore, most administrators in central,
labor as intrinsically inferior to work that involved purely mental
republic, and local education posts were party members, as were
or intellectual effort.
the majority of school directors and many teachers, particularly
The most important Soviet pedagogue historically was Anton
at the higher levels (one-sixth of secondary school teachers belonged
S. Makarenko (1888-1939), whose theories on child-rearing and
to the CPSU). The large body of Komsomol members in the upper
education, which rejected corporal punishment and stressed per-
grades of secondary schools and in institutions of higher learning
suasion and example, served as the foundation of contemporary
also aided party oversight.
education and parenting. His methodology also emphasized de-
velopment of good work habits, love of work, self-discipline, and
Pedagogy and Planning
collective cooperation. Makarenko's approach to discipline re-
Under the administrative oversight of the Academy of Sciences
mained the norm in Soviet schools in the 1980s. Physical punish-
(see Glossary) and the Ministry of Education, the Academy of Peda-
ment was forbidden; disciplinary measures included oral reprimands
gogical Sciences was responsible for conducting research and de-
by teachers, collective pressure (peer disapproval), bad marks in
velopment in education. The Academy of Pedagogical Sciences had
record books (demerits), consultations with parents, and, only as
thirteen institutes, several experimental schools, and other facili-
a last resort, expulsion from school.
ties. Each institute focused on a specific area of research, such as
Change in pedagogy's predominantly conservative approach
curriculum and teaching methods, general and pedagogical psy-
came very slowly. Old-fashioned teaching methods, a regimented
chology, visual teaching aids and school equipment, labor train-
and formal classroom environment, and the rote method of
ing, and professional orientation. The academy's research efforts
learning-holdovers from tsarist Russia that became firmly en-
also included special education (for the physically and mentally im-
trenched in the Stalin era-were still the norm in the Soviet schools
paired), teacher training, testing methodology, and textbook prepa-
of the 1980s. But during the second half of the 1980s, theories and
ration.
practices of a number of progressive educators were being advanced
The academy brought together the country's leading research-
in conjunction with efforts to reform schooling. One of the impor-
ers in the pedagogical sciences, prominent teachers, and a small
tant figures in this area was Leonid V. Zankov, an education the-
number of foreign (mostly East European) education specialists.
orist who had been influenced by the writings and philosophy of
The efforts of these pedagogues and educators were guided by the
American educator John Dewey and who had advocated in the
recdemv's dual mission: first, developing a socialist mentality by
1960s the elimination of the rote-learning approach. The leading
providing
figures in the 1980s among those striving to develop the philosophy
Union: A Country Study
Education, Health, ano
re
and methodology for a "new school" were sociologist Vladimir N.
nationwide. Except for a low enrollment fee for preschool, all tui-
Shubkin, mathematician Mikhail M. Postnikov, and innovative
tion was free, and the majority of students in specialized second-
teacher M. Shchetinin.
ary schools and institutions of higher learning received monthly
The State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyi planovyi
stipends. Although the degree of standardization and centraliza-
komitet-Gosplan; see Glossary), part of the Council of Ministers,
tion was very great, the school system was not totally monolithic,
played a major role in Soviet education by influencing the train-
and it reflected the multiethnic diversity of the country's fifteen
ing and distribution of specialists in institutions of higher learn-
republics as well as considerable differences, particularly in qual-
ing. Its task was to ensure graduation of sufficient numbers of people
ity, between urban and rural schools.
trained in certain specialties to meet the work force requirements
About 600 schools specialized in teacher training. Many univer-
of the nation's economy. By directing the higher schools to admit
sity graduates also joined the ranks of secondary school teachers.
only a limited number of students in each specialty, Gosplan in
In general, although salaries were not always commensurate with
effect established a quota for student admissions.
But despite extensive planning efforts, Gosplan consistently did
profession. status, Soviet society had a great deal of respect for the teaching
more to cause than to alleviate the country's manpower problems,
primarily because planning was based on immediate rather than
Preschool
long-term needs. The situation was particularly serious in the 1980s,
In 1986 the Soviet Union operated approximately 142,700
when the push to modernize the economy with high technology
preschool institutions on a year-round basis, with an enrollment
and automation was seriously hampered by the lack of skilled en-
of over 16.5 million; this represented 57 percent of all preschool-
gineering and technical workers. Although the schools graduated
age children and was 1.6 million below demand. To eliminate this
a large number of engineers, their training was often too theoreti-
shortage, as well as to encourage women with infants or toddlers
cal, narrow in scope, and limited in practical experience. Broader
to return to the work force, the government planned to make avail-
training and multiple-skill capability were needed. The short-
able new preschool facilities for another 4.4 million youngsters dur-
sightedness of the planning apparatus was exacerbated by a con-
ing the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90).
tinuing contradiction between student preferences and economic
Preschool institutions included nurseries (iash) and kindergar-
and social demands, as well as by an inability to attract enough
tens (detskie sady), often housed in the same buildings and located
young people into lower level technical fields.
in urban and suburban neighborhoods, as well as at factory sites
Institutions of Learning
and on collective farms. Nurseries accepted children between the
ages of six months and three years, but the percentage of young-
To provide free, universal, and multilingual education to all
sters under two years of age was typically low. Many mothers
citizens, the government operated a vast network of learning in-
preferred to stay home with their infant children through the first
stitutions, including preschools, general secondary schools, special-
year (working women were granted a full year of maternity leave),
ized secondary schools, vocational-technical schools, trade schools,
and frequently a grandmother or another family member or friend
and special education schools, as well as universities and other in-
provided child care to toddlers. (In 1979, for example, 8 to 9 mil-
stitutions of higher learning (see fig. 11). Completion of the sec-
lion preschool children were cared for by grandmothers.) The more
ondary school program, roughly equivalent to American high
common practice was to enroll children of about three years of age
school, became compulsory in 1970. By 1987 more than 120 mil-
in preschool. The government subsidized 80 percent of preschool
lion people, out of a population of nearly 282 million, had com-
tuition, requiring parents to pay fairly low fees of 12 rubles (for
pleted secondary and higher education; another 43.7 million had
value of the ruble-see Glossary) a month for nursery care and
finished at least eight years of schooling.
about 9 rubles a month for kindergarten; in certain cases-for
The common threads linking all institutions of learning were the
example, for children from large families-enrollment was free.
central aims of rearing and educating youth; thus, political indoc-
By freeing women for the work force, the preschool system was
trination and the education and training of specialists and skilled
economically beneficial both to the state and to the family, which
workers remained of pivotal concern at all levels of schooling.
generally needed two incomes. Kindergarten combined extended
were standardized
day care (as a rule, from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.) with some
it Union: A Country Study
Education, Health,
"Velfare
values and molding socialist character. The children's daily activi-
ties, which included story-telling, drawing, music, games, and out-
GRADUATE STUDY
door play, were highly structured and consistently conducted in
UNIVERSITIES. INSTITUTES,
AGE
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MILITARY ACADEMIES:
groups, fostering a sense of belonging to the collective, the primacy
THREE YEARS FOR A GRADUATE DEGREE
of the needs of the group over those of the individual, and the prefer-
YEAR
OF
HIGHER EDUCATION
ence for competition among groups rather than individuals. Polit-
STUDY
22
UNIVERSITIES, INSTITUTES. MILITARY ACADEMIES:
ical indoctrination at this level consisted of songs and slogans,
16
FULL-TIME, PART-TIME. OR CORRESPONDENCE:
FOUR OR FIVE YEARS FULL-TIME FOR A DEGREE
21
celebration of national holidays, and stories about Lenin and other
15
heroes of the Bolshevik Revolution. Preschoolers were also taught
20
ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
14
(FULL-TIME, PART-TIME, OR CORRESPONDENCE)
respect for authority, patriotism, obedience, discipline, and order.
19
13
Children were provided hot meals and snacks, child-size beds for
18
nap time, and basic health care.
12
17
SECONDARY
SECONDARY
VOCATIONAL
MILITARY
Western visitors to Soviet preschools in the 1970s and early 1980s
11
SPECIALIZED
VOCATIONAL
TECHNICAL
SCHOOL
reported seeing children who were happy, healthy, and well cared
18
10
SPECIAL
SPECIAL
SCHOOL
TECHNICAL
SCHOOL
for. But this positive image was sharply contradicted in 1988 with
15
SCHOOLS
SCHOOLS
SCHOOL
9
the publication in a Soviet newspaper of an article titled "Atten-
FOR
FOR THE
14
MENTALLY
GIFTED:
tion: Children in Trouble!" The article was endorsed by a group
8
13
AND
BALLET,
of specialists (including R. Bure, doctor of pedagogical sciences
DIRECT
7
PHYSICALLY
MUSIC,
ROUTE
and head of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Preschool Scien-
12
HANDICAPPED
MATH
6
tific Research Laboratory) who participated in a seminar called
11
5
"Kindergarten in the Year 2000." According to the newspaper
GENERAL
10
SECONDARY SCHOOL
piece, a crisis in preschool education was emerging: the ratio of
4
9
twenty-five children per teacher was far too high; teachers and other
3
staff were poorly trained; and children's health was suffering be-
8
2
cause of inadequate medical care. Children were entering first grade
7
1
unprepared intellectually and physically. More than 50 percent were
6
"neurotic," two-thirds suffered from allergies, 60 percent had poor
5
posture, and 80 percent suffered from upper-respiratory infections.
KINDERGARTEN
The large majority had not mastered the most basic norms of con-
4
duct and social interaction.
3
2
Secondary Education
NURSERY OR HOME
1
In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had in place a vast and com-
plex network of secondary schools comprising general secondary
schools (grades one through eleven), secondary vocational-technical
Source: Based on information from David Lane, Soviet Economy and Society, New York, 1985,
schools, specialized secondary schools, special education schools,
272; and Vadim Medish, The Soviet Union, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1987, 197.
and extramural schools (part-time, evening, and correspondence
programs). In 1970 compulsory secondary education was extend-
Figure 11. Structure of the Education System, 1987
ed to ten years from eight. The 1984 reform of general secondary
schools and secondary vocational-technical schools lowered the start-
academic preparation for entry into the first grade (the starting age
ing age for first grade from age seven to age six and increased com-
was gradually lowered to six years of age in the mid-1980s).
pulsory schooling to eleven years.
In addition to providing children with a head start for regular
In 1987 the Soviet Union operated 138,000 general secondary
of instilling societal
schools, with a total enrollment of 43.9 million students. There were
Union: A Country Study
ughly three phases to the general secondary program of study,
reflecting differences in curriculum and total time in class: the
primary grades, one through three; intermediate, four through
eight; and upper secondary, nine and ten. The 1984 reform added
a year at the beginning level, modifying these grade groupings as
follows: one through four, five through nine, and ten and eleven.
As a rule, secondary schools in urban areas combined all grades,
but rural schools were small, with only four or eight grades in the
same building.
The school year ran approximately from September 1 (the offi-
cial Holiday of Learning) to June 1. Classes were held Monday
through Saturday, and total class time ranged from about twenty-
four hours a week in the primary grades to thirty-six at the upper
levels (following the reform, the range of class time was reduced
to twenty to thirty-four hours). At all levels, class periods lasted
forty-five minutes, with ten-minute breaks and a half-hour for
lunch.
The 1986-87 school year marked the wide-scale entry of six-year-
olds into secondary schools; by September 1987, an estimated 42
Typical classroom, Moscow
percent of all six-year-olds were enrolled in first grade. In some
Courtesy Irene Steckler
republics, e.g., the Georgian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian, the
transition was nearly completed; but because of lack of space and
school equipment (a chronic problem), many schools had to oper-
requiring high-level skills. The new curriculum for grades ten and
ate on double and even triple shifts to accommodate the additional
eleven included courses called "Ethics and Psychology of Family
new entrants.
Life" and "Elementary Military Training." From one to four hours
The primary curriculum emphasized reading, writing, and arith-
per week of "socially beneficial" labor was made compulsory for
metic. Children spent from ten to twelve periods a week learning
grades two through eleven.
to read and write in Russian or the native language and six peri-
General secondary schools emphasized mathematics and science;
ods a week on mathematics. The curriculum was rounded out with
science courses were designed not only to teach the fundamentals
art and music classes, physical education, and vocational training.
but also to develop the official scientific-materialist worldview.
Children attending non-Russian schools-representing a total of
Teaching of history and literature was particularly politicized and
forty-four different Soviet nationalities in 1987-began learning
biased, through selection and interpretation, toward inculcation
Russian, the lingua franca in the Soviet Union, in the second grade,
of communist values and ideology. As an outgrowth of the de-
resulting in an even heavier academic load for them (see Nation-
Stalinization effort under Gorbachev, the official Soviet press de-
alities of the Soviet Union, ch. 4).
nounced elementary and secondary school history books as "lics,"
Foreign language study, with English the most popular, began
and, to the students' glee, school authorities canceled final history
in the fifth grade. The curriculum in the intermediate and upper
examinations in the spring of 1987.
classes included courses in literature, history, social studies, geog-
On the whole, final examinations were rigorous and compre-
raphy, mathematics, biology, physics, chemistry, and technical
hensive, and they included both written and oral parts. Performance
drawing. Consistent with the 1984 school reform's call for achiev-
was graded on a number scale of one (failure) to five (outstand-
ing computer literacy, the schools introduced computer training
ing). The general secondary school diploma was roughly equiva-
in the upper grades in the mid-1980s (see Computers, ch. 9). Voca-
lent to a high school diploma in the United States. Completion of
tional counseling was also introduced in the upper grades in an
this program offered the most direct route to entrance into an in-
to pursue training in technical areas
stitution of higher learning.
Inion:
untry Study
Education, Health,
lfare
.fter the eighth or ninth grade, students who chose not to fin-
Special Education
ish the final two years of the general secondary school had several
Special schools included those for physically and mentally handi-
options. The most popular in the 1980s was enrollment in second-
capped children as well as those for intellectually and artistically
ary vocational-technical schools or specialized secondary schools.
gifted youth. They also included military schools for secondary-
In 1987 nearly 25 percent of students chose the former and almost
level cadet training.
13 percent the latter route (more than 60 percent continued in the
In 1987 about 500,000 youngsters with mental and/or physical
general secondary school).
impairments were enrolled in 2,700 schools designed to meet their
The secondary vocational-technical school (srednee professional'no-
special needs. Schools for the mentally retarded strived to help chil-
tekhnicheskoe uchilishche-SPTU) combined a full secondary education
dren acquire as much of a general or vocational education as their
with training for skilled and semiskilled jobs in industry, agricul-
abilities permitted and also encouraged them to become as self-
ture, and office work. In 1986 more than 7,000 such schools were
reliant as possible. The blind and those with partial sight could
in operation; the period of instruction was two or three years.
complete the regular secondary program and/or vocational train-
Graduates received diplomas and could apply to institutions of
ing in schools with a modified curriculum and special physical
higher education. An incomplete secondary education trade school
accommodations. There were also schools for deaf children, deaf-
variant, vocational-technical schools (professional'no-tekhnicheskie
mutes, and the hearing impaired.
uchilishcha-PTU), numbering about 1,000 in the mid-1980s, pro-
Universities operated a small number of advanced academic pro-
vided training in skilled and semiskilled jobs.
grams for exceptionally bright children who demonstrated outstand-
At the beginning of the 1986-87 school year, 4,506 specialized
ing abilities in the sciences and mathematics. Schools also specialized
secondary schools (srednie spetsial'nye zavedeniia), commonly called
in a specific foreign language, for example, English or German.
technicums (tekhnikumy), had an enrollment of nearly 4.5 million
About 50 percent of all subjects were taught in the given language.
students (2.8 million in regular daytime programs and 1.7 million
These highly prestigious schools provided complete secondary
in evening or correspondence schools). The course of study lasted
schooling, and their graduates were guaranteed entrance into in-
from three to four years and combined completion of the final two
stitutions of higher learning.
grades of general secondary schooling with training at a paraprofes-
The Ministry of Culture operated a small network of schools for
sional level. Technicums offered over 450 majors, most of them
artistically gifted youngsters, which combined regular secondary
in engineering and technical areas, as well as paraprofessional-level
education with intensive training in music, ballet, or the arts. These
training in health care, law, teaching, and the arts. Graduates
special schools were located primarily in Moscow, Leningrad, and
received diplomas and could obtain jobs as preschool and primary
other large Soviet cities.
school teachers, paramedics, and technicians; they could also apply
First established during World War II, military boarding schools
to higher education institutions. A technicum education cor-
continued to provide free care and education to war orphans of
responded roughly to an associate degree or two years of study in
military personnel and to train future officers of the armed forces.
an American junior college or community college.
With enrollments of between 150 to 500 students, the eight Suvorov
In 1986 another school reform stressed the specialized secondary
military schools and the Nakhimov Naval School offered a regu-
school system and higher education. The qualitative improvement
lar, general school curriculum supplemented by a heavy load of
of the technicums, which traditionally had served as an important
mathematics, political and military training, and physical educa-
source of technically trained workers, was a key component in
tion. Most graduates of these schools entered higher military in-
providing skilled, technically qualified manpower required for the
stitutions (see Officers, ch. 18).
success of economic restructuring and modernization. To this end,
the reform called for revamping both technicums and secondary
Higher Education
vocational-technical schools to train specialists with diverse tech-
In 1987 the Soviet Union had 896 institutions of higher learn-
nical skills and hands-on experience with computer technology and
ing (vysshie uchebnye zavedeniia-VUZy), of which only 69 were
automated production processes, as well as a more independent,
universities. The remainder included more than 400 pedagogical,
creative, and responsible approach to their jobs.
medical, and social science institutes and art academies and
Union: A Country Study
servatories of music; over 360 institutes of specialized engineer-
u.g and natural sciences; and about 60 polytechnical institutes.
VUZy were located in major cities, including the union republic
and autonomous republic capitals, with the highest concentrations
in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. Enrollment was over 5 million
students, with nearly 50 percent (2.4 million) attending part time.
Women made up 56 percent of the student body. Forty-one per-
cent of the students came from the working (blue-collar) class, 9
percent from the collective farm (see Glossary) sector, and 50 per-
cent from families working in the services (white-collar) sector.
With nearly 587,000 students enrolled, universities offered a
broad range of disciplines in the arts and sciences, while concen-
trating on the theoretical aspects of the given field. Institutes and
polytechnics were more specialized and stressed specific applied
disciplines, for example, engineering, education, and medicine.
The approach to higher education traditionally focused on acquir-
ing knowledge and comprehension rather than on developing skills
of analysis and evaluation.
As the country's major scientific and cultural centers, universi-
ties produced the leading researchers and teachers in the natural
Turkmen University, Ashkhabad, Turkmen Republic
and mathematical sciences, social and political sciences, and hu-
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard
manities, e.g., literature and languages. They also developed text-
books and study guides for disciplines in all institutions of higher
learning and for university courses in the natural sciences and hu-
a wide range of related subjects. A major research center, the state
manities.
university had a library of over 6.5 million volumes. A teaching
On the whole, Soviet society considered universities the most
staff of about 7,000 full-time and part-time professors and instructors
prestigious of all institutions of higher learning. Applicants con-
taught over 30,000 students (more than half attended on a part-
siderably exceeded openings, and competition for entrance was stiff.
time basis).
Officially, acceptance was based on academic merit. In addition
Full-time higher education took 4 to 5.5 years of study, depending
to successful completion of secondary schooling, prospective en-
on the area of specialization, for example, 5.5 years for medicine;
trants had to pass extremely competitive oral and written exami-
5 years for engineering; 4.5 years for agriculture; and 4 years for
nations, given only once a year, in their area of specialization, as
law, history, journalism, or art. The programs combined lectures,
well as in Russian and a foreign language. Students commonly
seminars, practicums, and research. At the final stage, students
employed private tutors to prepare for university entrance ex-
had to complete an approved thesis and defend their work before
aminations. Beyond this generally accepted practice, other less
the State Examination Committee; they also had to pass extensive
honest methods were used widely and included drawing on per-
examinations in their field of specialization. Graduates were
sonal connections of parents and even resorting to bribes. Party
awarded diplomas; depending on the course of study and institu-
or Komsomol endorsement strengthened an applicant's chances
tion, the diploma fell roughly between a bachelor's degree and
for admission.
master's degree in the United States.
Moscow University, established in 1755, was the Soviet Union's
Tuition at all institutions of higher learning was free; in the
largest, most prestigious, and second oldest institution of higher
1986-87 school year, 78 percent of full-time students received
learning (the Ukrainian Republic's L'vov University was founded
monthly stipends ranging from 40 to 70 rubles. Students paid only
in 1661). It comprised seventeen colleges or schools (in Russian,
minimum room and board because dormitories (albeit crowded and
into 274 departments, each offering
lacking most modern amenities) and cafeterias were subsidized by
the government. The universities also provided basic medical care
.ion:
untry Study
Education, Health, a
lfare
cost, as well as free passes to rest and recreation homes and
teachers' salaries were not commensurate in this regard. With start-
summer and winter resorts.
ing pay as low as 140 to 150 rubles per month (compared with the
Graduates were expected to repay the government's generosity
average worker's salary of 200 rubles), teachers' salaries, especially
by devoting two or three years to a job assigned by the govern-
at the primary and secondary school levels, were on the lower rungs
ment. This practice was becoming an increasingly serious problem
of the pay scale. The most common Western explanation for this
with respect to labor distribution in the 1980s. Among the major
disparity was the preponderance of women in the field. In 1987
contributing factors were Gosplan's failure to forecast correctly the
nearly three-fourths of the more than 2.6 million secondary school
country's needs for specialized labor cadres (graduates frequently
teachers and school directors were women. Among secondary school
were assigned to jobs totally unrelated to their areas of specializa-
teachers, 77.7 percent had completed higher education, 16.3 per-
tion) and the often outright refusal by graduates to accept jobs in
cent had completed secondary school teacher training, 3.5 percent
undesirable (remote or rural) parts of the country.
had completed a portion of their higher education, and 2.5 per-
Graduate training could be pursued at all universities and selected
cent had completed specialized or general secondary education.
institutes and polytechnics. Relative to the number of undergradu-
In the 1986-87 school year, more than 2 million students were
ates, the number of Soviet graduate students was small, about
enrolled in teacher training programs in about 400 specialized
100,000 in the mid-1980s. Many pursued their studies on a part-
time basis while continuing to work in their field.
secondary-school teachers' schools and more than 200 pedagogi-
Two advanced degrees, the candidate of science and the doctor
cal institutes. Teacher training focused on the chosen specialty; a
of science (kandidat nauk and doktor nauk), were available. To be ad-
significant amount of time was devoted to the study of Marxism-
mitted to a course of study for the candidate degree, applicants had
Leninism, as well as courses in education and applied psychology.
to pass competitive examinations in a foreign language, philosophy
Because the university curriculum included courses in teaching
(primarily Marxism-Leninism), and the field of specialization. Com-
methodology, university graduates also often taught upper-level
pletion of this degree required three years of course work, training
secondary grades.
and research, and a dissertation dealing with an original topic and
The salaries and prestige of teachers at universities, institutions
representing a significant contribution to the given field. The thesis
of higher learning, and specialized secondary schools were consider-
had to be defended publicly before an academic panel and was pub-
ably higher than those of general secondary-school teachers. About
lished. In the 1980s, about 500,000 specialists, primarily university
750,000 professors and instructors, of whom only about one-third
and institute faculty staff and members of the scientific and research
were women, belonged to this elite group of professionals.
community, held candidate degrees. These degrees might be equated
Quality, Reform, and Funding
to the master's and doctor of philosophy degrees in the United States,
depending on the specialization and the institution attended.
A "report card" for Soviet education in the 1980s based on com-
A much smaller group (fewer than 45,000) of scholars and sci-
ments from government leaders, educators, and rank-and-file
entists held a doctor of science degree, also commonly called a
teachers, as well as from the public at large, indicated the schools
doktorat. It was conferred on a selective basis to well-established ex-
were failing in serious ways. The picture that emerged from arti-
perts whose considerable research and publications represented
cles published in the Soviet press revealed inadequate facilities,
original major contributions to their specialized areas. Doctoral
crowded classrooms, and schools operating on two- and even three-
work was generally part of the individual's professional or teach-
shift schedules. Shortages of school materials and equipment were
ing activity. A one-year paid leave of absence was granted for the
serious. The quality of teaching was often low. These deficiencies
writing and defense of a doctoral thesis. The doctorate was also
were particularly acute in rural areas and in the Soviet Central
sometimes conferred for outstanding past achievements. Accord-
Asian republics. Abuses, such as cheating by students and grade
ing to Vadim Medish, holders of this advanced degree represented
inflation by many teachers, were widespread as well. The schools
"the elite of the Soviet scientific establishment and academe."
were failing to meet the nation's labor needs: shortages of adequately
skilled workers existed in almost every sector of the economy, and,
Teacher Training
although institutions of higher learning were graduating large
Soviet society generally held the teaching profession in high es-
numbers of engineers and specialists, their training was theoreti-
teem. continuing the long prerevolutionary tradition, although
cal and narrow and lacked practical applicability. These limitations,
on: A Country Study
Education, Health, and lfare
:r with excessive bureaucracy, led to poor performance (see
nation's economy. Indeed, the individual citizen's health was
Administration of Science and Technology, ch. 16). Indus-
viewed not only as a personal matter "but as part of the national
tria. accidents, most notably the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant
wealth."
accident, were openly attributed to inappropriate training and tech-
In the mid-1980s, the government operated a huge network` of
nical incompetence.
neighborhood and work site clinics to provide readily accessible
The schools were failing as well in the task of inculcating youth
primary care and large hospitals and polyclinic complexes for
with Marxist-Leninist ideals and socialist morality. Young people
diagnosis and treatment of more complicated illnesses and for sur-
were becoming increasingly cynical about official ideology; they
gery. Health care facilities included numerous women's consulta-
were motivated more and more by the pursuits of material things,
tion centers and pediatric clinics, emergency ambulance services,
personal comforts, societal status, and privilege. Moreover, the
and sanatoriums and rest homes for extended and short-term ther-
school system's emphasis on uniformity and conformity, rote learn-
apy and relaxation. Psychiatric care remained the most outdated
ing, and memorization quashed students' creativity and the de-
and abuse-ridden area of the country's medical system.
velopment of critical thinking and individual responsibility.
The mid-1980s were marked by growing concern on the part of of-
The 1984 reform of the general and vocational schools together
ficials and the public over the serious decline in the country's health
with the 1986 reform of higher and specialized secondary educa-
and the low quality of medical services available to the general popu-
tion aimed at fundamental perestroika (restructuring) and demo-
kratizatsiia (democratization) of the education system. The Soviet
lace. In addition to Gorbachev's war against alcoholism, which was
leadership saw the role of teachers as central to this endeavor; in
seen as a principal contributing factor in increased male mortality
addition to increased wages, they promised that teachers would have
rates, reforms in the 1980s called for eliminating overbureaucrati-
greater autonomy and flexibility and that the "command mental-
zation of medical services, improving medical training and sala-
ity, formalism, and overbureaucratization produced by the multi-
ries, expanding fee-for-service care, and significantly increasing
layered administrative bureaucracies would be eradicated. Articles
funding to improve the quality of health care nationwide.
in the official Soviet press called for the "teacher-creator" to take
Provision of Medical Care
the "path of freedom," with a "freely searching mind
tied
to no one and to no thing."
Having emphasized quantitative expansion of medical services,
Implementation of these reforms would require major increases
the Soviet Union, by the 1980s, took first place worldwide with
in funding, which in the mid-1980s was about 12 billion rubles for
respect to the number of hospital beds and physicians per 10,000
general secondary schools. The state spent about 1,200 rubles per
people and had in place a huge network of hospitals, polyclinics,
student for higher education and 780 rubles for secondary special-
consultation centers, and emergency first-aid stations throughout
ized study. Calling allocation of less than 8 percent of a nation's
the country. As in the education system, administration and con-
income to education a sign of societal degradation, Soviet educa-
trol of these numerous medical facilities was carried out by a
tion specialists expressed alarm that the country was currently al-
centralized, hierarchically structured government apparatus. In
locating only about 4 percent of its national income to its schools.
cooperation and consultation with CPSU organs, the Ministry of
But the greater, and perhaps insurmountable, obstacle to genuine
Health set basic policies and plans for the entire nationwide health
reform of education in the 1980s remained the overriding impor-
care system. These in turn were transmitted through the adminis-
tance assigned to ideological purity in all aspects of schooling.
trative chain of command, starting with the republic-level health
ministries down through the territorial, regional, district, municipal,
Health Care
and local levels.
The Soviet system of socialized medicine, introduced during the
In coordination with Gosplan, the Ministry of Health developed
Stalin era, emphasized "quantitative" expansion. The system was
nationwide annual programs for all aspects of health care services.
driven by three basic underlying principles: provision by govern-
The ministry's planning effort reflected an overwhelming concern
ment health institutions of readily available and free, qualified med-
"with numbers and complex formulas," such as setting norms,
ical care to all citizens; an emphasis on the prevention of illness;
standards, and quotas with virtually no flexibility, spelling out the
a healthy labor force for the
number of new 1,000-bed hospitals to be built, the number of
iron
Country Study
at visits and medical exams to be performed, and even the
aber of sutures per given type and size of laceration.
The numerous administrative entities and planning offices
spawned a huge bureaucracy, with all the attendant problems of
overbureaucratization red tape, and paper deluge. Most affected
and afflicted were physicians, who devoted 50 percent of their time
to filling out medical forms and documentation.
A large portion of the Soviet annual health care budget (about
18 billion rubles) was allotted to construction of a vast and com-
plex network of medical facilities, including polyclinics, consulta-
tion and dispensary centers, emergency first-aid stations and
ambulance services, hospitals, and sanatoriums. In 1986 more than
40,000 polyclinics provided primary medical care on an outpatient
basis. They ranged in size from huge urban complexes staffed by
hundreds of physicians and responsible for the health care needs
of up to 50,000 people, to small rural clinics consisting of several
examination rooms and three or four doctors, whose training was
often at the physician's assistant or paramedic (fel'dsher) level.
Generally, the first place turned to for medical assistance was
Schoolchildren in Vyborg, Russian Republic
the polyclinic. Individuals and families were assigned to a specific
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard
polyclinic, based on their place of residence, and could not choose
their physician within the polyclinic system. Outpatient services
stressed prevention and provided only the most basic medical treat-
day; about 700,000 of them, mostly women, stayed home to care
for sick children.
ment, including preliminary diagnosis and evaluation by a gen-
eral practitioner or internist (teurapet). If the patient's condition was
Nationwide, in 1986 there were 23,500 hospitals with more than
determined to be a more serious or complicated one (hypertension,
3.6 million beds. In an effort to eliminate duplication of medical
heart disease, or cancer, for example), the individual usually was
services by combining general and specialized hospital care, be-
referred to another specialist and/or was hospitalized for more ex-
ginning in the mid-1970s the Ministry of Health began building
large urban hospital complexes that provided specialized care in
tensive diagnosis and treatment. The polyclinic system was deliver-
the hospital and on an outpatient basis. A 1,600-bed hospital was
ing 90 percent of the country's medical care in the 1980s.
built in Novosibirsk; Rostov-na-Donu had a 1,700-bed hospital
An important facet of medical care was the provision of services
tower; huge multidepartment hospitals appeared in other cities as
at the place of work, reflecting the country's focus on maintaining
well.
a healthy labor force. Large production enterprises (see Glossary),
Although the thrust of hospital care was to provide diagnosis and
factories, and plants, as well as many other institutions, such as
treatment of more complicated health problems and to provide fa-
research facilities and universities, had their own clinics or medi-
cilities for surgery, people suffering from such minor illnesses as
cal units. The railroad workers' union operated its own autono-
influenza or gastroenteritis were often hospitalized. This exacer-
mous health care system, including rest homes and sanatoriums.
bated the already serious crowding problem in hospitals despite
Consonant with the nation's concern with worker productivity
the large number of hospital beds per capita. The situation stemmed
and loss of valuable production time, workplace clinics allowed
in part from official specification of exact periods of hospitaliza-
workers to get medical attention without leaving the work site. They
tion for each and every type of medical problem, for example, ten
also monitored and controlled worker absenteeism through issu-
days for childbirth, appendectomy, or gallbladder surgery; two
ance of sick leave certificates. In 1986 approximately 4 million work-
weeks for a hysterectomy; and eight weeks for a heart attack. These
crs/about 3 percent of the total work force) were on sick leave each
prescribed "recovery" periods were strictly adhered to, even when
Soviet U
Country Study
Education, Health
'elfare
the patient clearly no longer needed further hospital care. In the
with emergency rooms. In the early 1980s, the average ambulance
early 1980s, one-quarter of the population was hospitalized each
arrival time was eight minutes in Moscow and eleven in Leningrad.
year. The average hospital stay was 15 days, with a nationwide
Rounding out the nation's health care system, and giving it a
average of 2.8 hospital days per person per year (the average hospital
uniquely Soviet coloration, was the country's large network of
stay in the United States was 5 days, with 1.2 hospital days per
sanatoriums, rest homes, and health resorts, which was both an
person per year).
integral part of Soviet health care and extremely popular among
The propensity for medically unwarranted, extended hospitali-
the people. Labor unions controlled about 80 percent of the sanato-
zations reflected old-fashioned practice, the inefficiency of hospi-
riums; generally, a person's place of work granted the highly desir-
tals (for example, delays in diagnostic tests caused by excessive
able putevka (ticket) to such facilities. Some sanatoriums were
paperwork and shortages in medical equipment), and the difficulty
specialized, providing therapy for children, diabetics, or hyperten-
for patients to recover at home because of crowded living condi-
sives; many health resorts offered mud baths, mineral springs, and
tions. In addition, patients tended to prefer hospitalization to cura-
herbal therapies; all of them offered a much-welcomed period of
tive treatment in the clinics because hospitals were generally better
rest and recreation in pleasant natural surroundings along seacoasts
equipped and better staffed.
and in forests with fresh air. Demand for such facilities, dubbed
A pivotal concern of the public health system was the care and
"functional equivalents of tranquilizers" by one Western observer,
treatment of women and children. More than 28,000 women's con-
far exceeded availability. In 1986 over 15,800 sanatoriums and rest
sultation centers, children's polyclinics, and pediatric hospital fa-
homes served more than 50.3 million people, less than 20 percent
cilities focused on prevention and cure of women's and children's
of the population.
health problems. A number of institutes of pediatrics, obstetrics,
The most outdated and abuse-ridden area of health protection
and gynecology conducted research to improve diagnosis and treat-
was the system of psychiatric services. In the mid-1980s, psychiatric
ment of disease and contribute to overall health and well-being,
care continued to operate primarily on the outdated principles on
especially of pregnant women, infants, and young children. All
which it was originally based in the 1950s: Pavlovian (conditioned-
maternity services were free, and women were encouraged to ob-
response) psychology, a black-and-white approach to diagnosis of
tain regular prenatal care; expectant mothers visited maternity clin-
mental illness, heavy reliance on psychotropic drug therapies, very
ics and consultation centers on an average of fourteen to sixteen
little practice of individual or group counseling, and an emphasis
times. About 5 percent of physicians specialized in obstetrics and
on work as the best form of treatment and therapy. The average
gynecology. Women had ready access to free routine examinations,
citizen avoided seeking psychiatric help, convinced it was "better
Pap smears, and prenatal care. Abortions were also available on
to suffer" than have one's life ruined-an almost certain outcome
demand but sometimes required. a small fee.
of Soviet psychiatric clinics and services.
The Ministry of Health operated an extensive network of emer-
Among the corrupt practices (including bribery and blatant dis-
gency first-aid facilities. This "rapid medical assistance" (skoraia
regard of individual rights), the gravest and most infamous abuses
meditsinskaia pomoshch') system consisted of more than 5,000 emer-
in Soviet psychiatric medicine were political, namely, using men-
gency first-aid stations and included 7,700 specialized ambulance
tal hospitals as prisons for political dissenters. Along with schizo-
teams. Dialing "03" on any telephone (pay telephones did not re-
phrenics and violent prisoners, dissenters were institutionalized in
quire the usual 2 kopek coin) called out an ambulance (skoraia, as
special psychiatric hospital-prisons operated by the Ministry of
it was popularly called). Most often ambulances were equipped with
Internal Affairs (see The Ministry of Internal Affairs, ch. 19). Any-
only the barest first-aid basics: stretcher, splints and fracture boards,
one who actively disagreed with the official Soviet ideology could
oxygen equipment. But specialized antitrauma ambulances with
be easily and swiftly declared "insane" by a committee of psy-
portable equipment, such as an electrocardiograph, electric heart
chiatrists, locked up in a mental institution, and subjected to com-
defibrillator, and anesthesia equipment were available for major
pulsory treatment with powerful, at times permanently damaging,
emergencies. After administration of first aid, patients with major
psychotropic drugs. In the mid-1980s, estimates of the total num-
medical problems or severe trauma were taken to special emer-
ber of political prisoners in Soviet psychiatric facilities numbered
gency hospitals because most regular hospitals were not equipped
from 1,000 to several thousand.
Soviet
: A Country Study
Education, H
id Welfare
A harbinger of possible reform of the psychiatric system came
by top-ranking physicians, and had the latest equipment, includ-
in January 1988 with the issuance of a decree by the Presidium
ing Western-made modern diagnostic and treatment units. The
of the Supreme Soviet transferring the special psychiatric hospi-
medical care available in cities, which tended to have the better
tals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health,
equipped hospitals and clinics, differed considerably from that avail-
which operated a system of regular psychiatric hospitals and poly-
able in rural areas, which often lacked specially constructed medi-
clinics. A number of government-sponsored private psychiatric
cal facilities.
clinics offered slightly better levels of therapy and counseling, for
Similarly, although in principle health care was free, citizens often
a fee.
paid money or gave bribes to receive better treatment. Moreover,
In 1985 Soviet officials began publishing limited statistics on the
hospital patients routinely paid for basic services, such as changes
incidence of mental illness among the population, reporting 335
of bed linen and meals.
cases of schizophrenia per 100,000 people and over 1.3 million chil-
dren suffering from mental retardation. A total of 335,200 hospi-
Declining Health Care in the 1970s and 1980s
tal beds were devoted to psychiatric care in 1986, compared with
After Evgenii Chazov became the minister of health in Febru-
863,000 for general medicine, 526,900 for surgery, and 411,500
ary 1987 and Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' was extended to the
for pediatrics.
realm of health care, Soviet authorities finally acknowledged what
Between 1960 and 1986, the number of physicians and dentists
Western observers had suspected for some time, namely, that major
increased from 400,000 to 1.2 million, and mid-level personnel
health indicators depicted a disturbing picture of the nation's health.
increased from 1.4 to 3.2 million. Medical training for physicians
Statistics for the 1970s and 1980s showed rising infant mortality
(vrachi) required six or seven years. The emphasis was on practical
rates, falling life expectancy (particularly among the male popula-
training with little exposure to basic research or pure science (of
tion), increases in infectious diseases, rises in sexually transmitted
ninety-two medical institutes, only nine were attached to univer-
illnesses, and a high rate of new cases of tuberculosis among chil-
sities). Beginning in the 1970s, specialization began early, in the
dren and adolescents.
third year, and became increasingly more narrow, resulting in a
Statistics on the major causes of death were not published for
serious decline in the number and quality of general or family prac-
the total population but were published for the working-age group
titioners. The majority of doctors were women. As was the case
(sixteen to fifty-nine for men and sixteen to fifty-four for women).
in teaching and other social services areas, their salaries were low
In 1986 the greatest number of deaths among those of working age
(in the mid-1980s, physicians earned about 180 to 200 rubles per
(the total number of deaths was 401 per 100,000) was caused by
month compared with 200 rubles per month for industrial workers).
cardiovascular disease (120 per 100,000); accidents, poisoning, and
Mid-level medical personnel included physician's assistants, or
traumas (109 per 100,000); cancer (94 per 100,000); and lung dis-
paramedics, midwives, and nurses. These categories required only
ease (20 per 100,000). On a population-wide basis, official Soviet
two years of practical training and little or no scientific background.
sources ranked the major causes of death somewhat differently:
These mid-level health practitioners frequently served as physician
cardiovascular diseases, malignant tumors, and accidents and in-
surrogates in rural areas, where the shortage of trained physicians
juries. Statistics on sex-specific death rates and cause of death by
was serious.
age-group have not been published since the early 1970s.
Although the underlying principle of Soviet socialized medicine
A key contributing factor in the major causes of death, particu-
was equality of care and access, the reality was a multitiered, highly
larly among the male population, was the high level of alcoholism-
stratified system of care and facilities. The disparity between the
a long-standing problem, especially among the Slavic peoples (Rus-
services provided to the general populace and to special groups was
sian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian). Alcoholism was often referred
great. The so-called "fourth department" of the Ministry of Health
to as the "third disease," after cardiovascular illness and cancer.
operated a separate network of clinics, hospitals, and sanatoriums
Soviet health organizations and police records put the total num-
exclusively for top party and government officials as well as for
ber of alcoholics at over 4.5 million, but Western experts contended
other elite groups, such as writers, musicians, artists, and actors.
that this number applied only to those at the most advanced stage
These special facilities were far superior to those found in ordi-
of alcoholism and that in 1987 the real number of alcoholics was
nary health care networks. They provided the best care, were staffed
at least 20 million.
Soviet Unio
Country Study
Education, Health,
-lfare
Soon after coming to power, Gorbachev launched the most mas-
general populace was a major culprit and stemmed in large mea-
sive antialcohol campaign in Soviet history and voiced his concern
sure from the widespread lack of modern medical equipment, tech-
not only about the health problems stemming from alcohol abuse
nology, and pharmaceuticals. For example, the low life expectancy,
but also about the losses in labor productivity (up to 15 percent)
particularly for males, was linked in part to the lack of medical
and the increased divorce rate. The drive appeared to have an
equipment needed to perform bypass surgery and angioplasty proce-
almost immediate effect on the incidence of diseases directly re-
dures in the treatment of heart disease. Indeed, deaths from cardio-
lated to alcohol: for example, cirrhosis of the liver and alcohol
vascular diseases increased from 88 per 100,000 to 120 per 100,000
poisoning decreased from 47.3 per 1,000 in 1984 to 23.3 per 1,000
between 1970 and 1986.
in 1986. The biggest declines were in the Russian and Ukrainian
With glasnost' came publication in Soviet newspapers of numer-
republics, where the problem was the most widespread. Some at-
ous articles and letters-written by physicians as well as by ordi-
tributed the modest rise in male life expectancy between 1985 and
nary citizens-highlighting the crisis in the country's health care
1986 to success in the battle against the "green snake," a popular
system. Frequently attacked was the severe shortage of modern med-
Russian term for vodka. But to counter the major cut in govern-
ical equipment in medical facilities; for example, women's con-
ment production of alcohol, people distilled their own alcoholic
sultation centers had no fetal heart monitors, ultrasound units, or
beverages at home. One-third of illicit alcohol reportedly was
equipment for monitoring labor and delivery, resulting in thou-
produced using government agricultural facilities.
sands of additional infant deaths. Poor training of physicians was
To succeed in the battle against alcoholism, Soviet health care
singled out as the cause of 600 to 700 deaths of women each year
had to expand significantly its alcohol-abuse treatment and edu-
in childbirth and following abortions in the Russian Republic alone.
cation programs. Of particular concern was increased alcohol con-
The poor treatment and care of terminally ill cancer patients was
sumption and another major health problem-smoking-among
openly decried; mentioned were the serious shortage of beds in
women and teenagers. The rise in infant mortality, as well as other
cancer wards, lack of painkillers, blatant neglect, and absence
early childhood disease and abnormalities (8 to 10 percent of chil-
of compassion from medical staff. The widespread and long-
dren reportedly suffered from congenital or infantile abnormali-
standing practice of exchanging bribes and gifts for slightly better
ties), was linked to increased drinking and smoking among females
medical care and attention was specifically attacked, as were over-
in their childbearing years.
bureaucratization and its major product, "paper fever," and the
A Soviet statistical study (based on a 1987 survey of 62,000 fami-
common practice of falsifying medical statistics to fulfill planned
lies) indicated that about 70 million people smoked-nearly 70 per-
quantitative quotas. People also wrote to newspapers document-
cent of men and nearly 5 percent of women more than eighteen
ing personal tragedies involving the deaths of small children-deaths
years of age. Although an antismoking campaign was also under
that need not have happened and that were caused by gross negli-
way in the 1980s, it was on a much smaller scale than the cam-
gence on the part of hospital staff and physicians.
paign against alcohol, and the government did far less to decrease
Glasnost' brought into the open other previously taboo subjects,
production of tobacco products. In fact, output reached 441 bil-
as the press began to publish articles on drug abuse, venereal dis-
lion cigarettes in 1987, which was an increase of 23 percent over
ease, and even acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).
1970 production.
Drug abuse and venereal disease were reported to be on the rise
In addition to increased infant mortality rates in the 1970s and
in some regions of the country, most notably in the Georgian
1980s, the Caucasian and Central Asian republics experienced a
Republic. The number of drug addicts nationwide varied depending
rise in infectious diseases, such as typhoid fever and other gastro-
upon the official source: the Ministry of Health claimed 50,000;
intestinal illnesses, and viral hepatitis. Poor sanitation and con-
police records documented 130,000 addicts.
taminated water supplies were largely responsible for outbreaks of
In early 1987, the Soviet press began publishing a number of
typhoid fever and other gastrointestinal infections; the lack of dis-
articles about AIDS, referring to the deadly virus by the Russian
posable syringes was blamed for the upsurge in hepatitis infections.
acronym SPID (sindrom priobretennogo immunodefitsita). Although little
Deteriorating environmental factors, crowded living conditions,
concrete advice was being made available to the public regarding
and poor nutrition were seen as principal contributors to negative
prevention and high-risk groups, by the summer of 1987 a num-
health trends. But the low quality of health care available to the
ber of AIDS testing centers had been opened, and a Moscow center
Soviet Un
Country Study
Education, Health
Velfare
reportedly was testing about 100 people each day. Claiming the
practice, as well as expansion and improvement in certification of
infection was "imported," Soviet medical authorities required man-
medical school graduates and periodic recertification of practicing
datory testing of all foreign students in the country; they also re-
physicians. The central role of mid-level medical personnel-such
quired compulsory testing of suspected Soviet carriers, namely,
as physician's assistants, nurses, and pharmacists-was reaffirmed,
prostitutes and members of other high-risk groups. In August 1987,
and improvements in the quality of their training were promised.
the Supreme Soviet passed the strictest anti-AIDS law in the world,
The quality of medical teaching was to be raised by directly in-
making the knowing transmittal of an AIDS infection a criminal
volving medical teachers in research and development in the coun-
offense punishable by up to eight years in prison.
try's leading medical research institutes. The reforms also stressed
By the time the law was passed, 130 AIDS cases were officially
expansion of biotechnical and other advanced medical research and
registered; only 19 of these were said to be Soviet citizens. But
called for increasing domestic production of the most modern med-
numerous Soviet sources indicated the actual number of cases was
ical equipment, high-quality pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology
in the thousands; this figure still represented a minuscule percen-
products.
tage of the population compared with AIDS incidence in the United
Special efforts were planned to rectify the low level of health care
States and other Western countries. Nevertheless, Soviet virology
found in rural areas, where 80 percent of the 18,000 polyclinics
specialists foresaw serious spread of the infection, noting that domes-
and outpatient facilities did not have specially constructed medi-
tic production of AIDS testing equipment had to be significantly
cal buildings. A majority-65 percent-of regional hospitals in rural
increased. They claimed that the 1987 output of 2 million units
areas had no hot water supply; 27 percent were not equipped with
was 8 million short of the required number and anticipated that
sanitation systems; and 17 percent had no water supply at all. To
20 million test sets would be needed within two or three years. Public
correct these serious deficiencies, plans called for construction of
education about AIDS transmission and infection was hampered
more than 14,000 outpatient clinics equipped with pharmacies, as
by general Soviet prudishness about sex, but of greater importance
well as living quarters for medical and pharmaceutical personnel.
was the fact that the government ranked homosexual activity and
Along with continued emphasis on providing outpatient polyclinic
prostitution as criminal offenses punishable by imprisonment, which
care, a significant expansion-a fivefold increase-of fee-for-services
meant that these high-risk groups were unlikely to cooperate in the
medical care was planned by the year 2000.
battle against AIDS. The chronic shortage of condoms (which Soviet
The country's need for maternity wards and pediatric facilities
medical officials euphemistically called "Article Number 2'') fur-
was to be met by 1995; the population's outpatient and hospital
ther increased the threat of the spread of AIDS among the Soviet
needs were to be met by the year 2000. To this end, the reforms
population. But the widespread shortage of disposable hypodermic
called for a significant increase-between 100 and 150 percent-
syringes in hospitals and clinics, which often led to the repeated
in capital expenditures for renovation, equipment, and construc-
use of unsterilized needles, posed the greatest danger to checking
tion of polyclinics and hospital complexes. A final goal was the
the spread of AIDS in the Soviet Union. This fact was shockingly
establishment by the year 2000 of a "unified system of health care"
demonstrated by the tragic case involving the infection with the
for the entire population.
AIDS virus of up to forty-one children and eight mothers in late
To achieve these ambitious goals and to ensure the full health
1988 at a children's hospital in the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic.
of its population, the Soviet Union would have to increase sub-
Major reforms of the health care system were announced in
stantially the level of funding allocated to its health care system.
November 1987, underscoring the growing alarm over the nation's
Since the 1960s, the percentage of the gross national product
deteriorating health. The reforms reaffirmed the antialcohol and
(GNP-see Glossary) spent on health had continuously eroded,
antismoking campaigns and called for improving personal hygiene
dropping from a high of 6.6 percent of GNP in 1960 to about 4
and physical fitness training of the population in general and of
percent in the mid-1980s. (In 1986 the United States spent 11.1
schoolchildren in particular. The reforms stressed improving the
percent; the Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany], 8.1
quality of care, as opposed to the past practice of quantitative ex-
percent; and Britain, 6.2 percent of GNP for medical services.)
pansion alone, and advocated increasing the salaries and prestige
According to Minister of Health Chazov, more than 8 percent
of medical personnel. They called for shifting physician training
would be needed to meet fully the medical needs of the entire Soviet
from the narrow specialization of the past to family or general
population.
Soviet Union
rd
a country study
by
ler
he
Federal Research Division
er
Library of Congress
Edited by
Raymond E. Zickel
y,
al
Research Completed
n-
May 1989
ral
ial
of
tic
ke
m-
are
eir
nd
lot
n-
to
is,
el-
on
0006
0
11
Gr
100
B/
SOVIET STUDIES vol. 42, no. I, January 1990 133-145
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
90
© Copyright Claimant
02154
Reproduced with Permission
90-2154
PLAYING TO NEW RULES: SOVIET SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
By JIM RIORDAN
DURING the 1980s radical changes began to appear in communist sport, thereby
breaking the mould of its functionalised and bureaucratic (plan-fulfilment)
structure. Until then not only had the Soviet-pioneered, state-controlled, utilitar-
ian system hampered a true appraisal of realities that lay beneath the 'universal'
statistics and 'idealised' veneer, it had prevented concessions to particular groups
in the population-the 'we know what's good for you' syndrome by which men tell
women what sports they should play; the fil tell the disabled that sport is not for
them; the old tell the young they can only play on their (old) terms, in their clubs,
using their facilities; the political leadership, mindful of the nation's and ideo-
logy's international reputation, decides that competitive Olympic (i.e. European)
sports are the only civilised forms of culture.
It has to be said that not only has this system helped to make several communist
states (the USSR, GDR, Cuba, Hungary) forces to be reckoned with in world
sport, but its orientation to social change through sport (for purposes of improving
defence, health and hygiene, integration, productivity and international prestige)
has also found ready imitators in many developing states.
In the early 1980s, however, China began increasingly to orient its sports policy
to the West, particularly the USA, opening up the country to commercial sport for
leisure and recreation-from golf to baseball,' from boxing (which had been
banned for several years) to women's soccer, snooker, body building and weight-
lifting. At the same time, it started to pay more attention to hitherto neglected
groups and sports-e.g. the disabled and the folk games of national minorities.³
Such processes in China prompted a reappraisal of sport in the Soviet Union
after March 1985, and this, in turn, had repercussions throughout Eastern Europe.
This article will survey what seem to be the major trends in Soviet sport in the
latter part of the 1980s.
Sport for all
The Soviet leadership has always maintained in public that massovost' takes
precedence over mastersivo, and down the years it has produced regiments of
statistics to prove the case: that millions are regular, active participants in sport;
that the vast majority of school and college students gain a GTO (Gotov k trudu i
oborone-Prepared for Labour and Defence', initially based on Baden-Powell's
Boy Scout athletics badges) in the national fitness programme;4 that rising millions
(a third of the population) take part in the quadrennial spartakiads;5 and that the
bulk of workers do their daily dozen-'production gymnastics'-at the workplace.
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SOVIET STUDIES
We now learn in this 'honesty is the best policy' era that these figures were
fraudulent and a show to impress people above and below and to meet pre-set
targets (each school, region, factory and farm received a sports quota and incurred
penalties and criticism if they fell short). It is now admitted that only 8% of men
and 2% of women engage in sport regularly.⁶ It is also admitted that when put to
the test a mere 41 out of 700 Moscow schoolchildren taking part in the city sports
tournament could meet all the GTO requirements, and only 0.5% of the capital's
11-year olds met GTO standards.¹ Even among men doing their national service as
many as a third could not meet the norms.8
Although swimming is an obligatory element in the GTO programme, we now
learn that only 11% of schoolchildren can swim and fewer than 5% pass the GTO
swimming norm.' In Moscow, 70% of schoolchildren cannot swim.10 Even in a
Republic with a Californian climate, Armenia, most youngsters cannot swim. 11 All
college and university students must attend two sessions a week of sport and
physical exercise during their first academic year, yet a survey at Moscow State
University discovered that only 17% of students were physically fit. The conclu-
sion drawn from the survey was that compulsion results in resistance and anti-
sport sentiments.¹²
For most people, sport remains out of reach: some two-thirds of workers do not
belong to sports organisations and their physical fitness evidently 'makes only a
tiny contribution to higher productivity, a lower sickness rate and resolution of
social and economic problems'.¹ 13
Significantly, the 1986 Spartakiad passed off in a low-key fashion with no
participation figures released for the first time since the Games were held in 1956.
There are also signs that the GTO programme is being quietly abandoned, partly
out of a desire to break with the past 'fiddling of the books' and partly from its
increasing unpopularity with teachers and young people.
A serious move to involve more young people in casual sport and recreation
activities was made back in 1981 when the government decreed that sports schools
(i.e. clubs) should not be confined only to gifted athletes: 14 henceforth roughly half
the 7,500 sports schools (those run by local councils and education authorities)
would be open to all.¹⁵ Yet subsequent reports frequently complained of sports
centre managers and coaches trying to keep ordinary enthusiasts out.
The next step was to depart from the hallowed principle of completely free sport
by introducing charges for use of pool, gym, court and stadium; that, at least, it
was thought, might induce amenity owners to open their doors. Further, with
official permission given in 1987 for co-operative ventures to start up, a number of
co-operative health, fitness and sports clubs began to appear. A health club opened
in Moscow in mid-1988, for example, charging three rubles as entrance fee and a
scale of charges for various treatments and activities. 16 In Leningrad, the Juventus
Health and Sports Club had come into existence a few months earlier with
activities ranging from Aikido wrestling, skateboarding and break-dancing to
tennis, swimming and weight-watching exercises. A month's membership cost
about ten rubles; the club had a regular membership of 600 within months of
opening, and had another 800 on its waiting list.¹⁷ A co-operative group in the
town of Podolsk, some 50 km south of Moscow, had the bright idea of hiring out
SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
135
municipal sports facilities during 'fallow' time-evenings and weekends; it
charged 1.30 rubles an hour for swimming, just under a ruble for an hour's use of
sports grounds and 2.20 rubles for a two-hour sauna session. 18 At the same time, in
Georgia, the former tennis player Alex Metreveli opened a string of tennis clubs
along the Black Sea coast and in Tbilisi.¹⁹
A major change has also come over the trade-union sports societies: in mid-1987
the eight leading societies amalgamated to form a single sports organisation in an
attempt to improve facilities and service to the public as well as to "democratise
the work of the sports clubs'. They also declared their intention of reducing top-
level leagues and competitions so as to divert more funds to sport for all and to
cater for a diversity of interest groups and health clubs.20
At school the physical education curriculum has been adjusted to make some
form of recreation a daily feature for all children and to provide a choice of
activity. And in higher education, students can now choose the times at which
they engage in their compulsory sports activity, and they have a wider choice of
recreation activity.
Independent clubs
Young people have not sat around awaiting government resolutions. In fact, a
major cause of official action is that young people have been turning their backs on
official organisations, like the Young Pioneers and the Young Communist League
(Komsomol)-which has lost over 6 million members in the past five years 2
-and officially recommended and sponsored activities, and have been forming
their own groups and clubs. Although initially illegal, since only officially
sanctioned groups have been permitted in the USSR, the authorities seemed
unable or unwilling to suppress them. Finally, in May 1986, they set the official
seal on their existence by changing the law.23
In the field of sport, the clubs range from soccer fan clubs to groups for sports in
which the authorities have been slow to provide facilities-aerobics, yoga, body
building, jogging, karate and other combat sports. One of the first independent
groups was made up of soccer fans in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially of
Moscow Spartak, with their own distinctive red and white home-knitted scarves
and hats. They were followed, understandably, by combat sports clubs for both
defence and offence in the spreading street and soccer gang clashes. One of the
more sinister groups, the Lyubery, tend to be obsessed with martial arts and body
building, constructing their own gyms in the (central heating) basements of blocks
of flats.24
The forced acceptance of such independent clubs is a radical departure for the
authorities; after all, no youth groups free of party tutelage had been tolerated
since the 1920s.
Women and sport
Up and down the USSR women have long ignored the pontification of male
leaders about their participation in 'harmful' sports-soccer, body building, ice
136
SOVIET STUDIES
hockey, judo, weightlifting, water polo and long distance running. As recently as
1973 the USSR Sports Committee issued a resolution discouraging women from
participating in sports which were allegedly harmful to the female organism and
encouraged male voyeurism. Women's soccer, for example, was said to be
'injurious to a woman's organism
Physical stress typical of playing soccer can
cause harm to sexual functions, varicose veins, thrombophlebitis and so on'.2
What the resolution did not explain was why playing soccer was harmless for men,
or why those ailments did not result from approved (Olympic) sports like
basketball and field hockey.
Within the space of a few years, however, Soviet women have held four national
judo championships and a world judo championship, and as many as 15,000
women are registered in judo clubs. 26 The first women's national soccer champion-
ship was held in August 1987, sponsored by the campaigning youth weekly
Sobesednik (eight teams took part in the first year, 20 in 1988, and 50 from
virtually every part of the country in 1989), and the first international (v.
Czechoslovakia) took place in 1988.27 Moscow State University formed its first
women's water polo team back in 1982; the women's sport has now spread to
several other cities and the Soviet women's team played its first international
fixture (v. Hungary) in 1987. 28 Weightlifting and body building are developing
apace: the first women's body building championship was held in Tyumen in
1988, and women have been members of body building clubs in the Baltic
Republics at least since 1986.29 Women's ice hockey has reappeared for the first
time since the 1920s, and women are doing the marathon, pole vault, triple jump
and hammer throwing. These changes have all come about thanks to a few
women who were prepared to defy official sanction, ridicule and even persecution
in order to establish their right to pursue the sport of their choice.
Sport and the disabled
Another disadvantaged group to benefit from the wind of change is the physically
and mentally handicapped, long neglected by the Soviet sports establishment. It is
now admitted that 'for a long time we pretended the problem did not exist. We
thought: the state looks after the handicapped, social security provides living and
working conditions for them. What else do they want?'. 31
Before 1988 the USSR had never held domestic championships at any level for
any category of handicapped person. Two years after China had staged its first
nationwide games for the handicapped and in the year of the Seoul Paralympics,
the newly formed Disabled Sports Federation held its inaugural championship in
the Estonian capital of Tallinn. This was the culmination of long years of
campaigning by pressure groups, recently joined by the many thousands of
maimed young ex-Afghanistan veterans. While, again, it is the Baltic Republics
that are in the forefront of providing facilities for the handicapped, elsewhere
conditions are plainly woeful. Even 'Moscow has no equipment, coach, doctor or
sports facilities for the disabled' (1987).32
After a number of well publicised complaints that 'sport for the disabled has
been developing around the world with virtually no participation from the Soviet
SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
137
Union'," a team of invalid atheletes was sent to the Olympics for the very first
time, at Seoul in 1988. Unlike its able-bodied compatriots in the Olympic Games,
who won a quarter of all Olympic medals, the Soviet disabled team won no medals
at all. But at least a start has been made. Furthermore, as well as movement
towards caring more for minorities, the Soviet government is also showing signs of
encouraging folk game festivals, especially among non-Russian groups in the
population.³
Changing the image of Soviel sport
The sudden spate of honesty and the broaching of previously unmentionable
(censored) subjects have revealed the dark side of Soviet sport and stirred up
considerable debatc. Journalists now talk frankly about match fixing in major
spectator sports, bribery of referees, drug taking and other nefarious activities
hitherto only mentioned in the context of capitalist sport. They have also raised
questions about the very fundamentals of communist sport: its ethics and ethos.
In an article entitled 'It is people who lose' and supported by a full-page
caricature of two muscle-bound colossuses carrying a winner's podium over the
heads of a host of casual athletes, a journalist from Ogonek derided the 'win at all
costs' mentality and the privileges for the elite. He recalled the pentathlete Boris
Onishchenko, caught cheating at the Montreal Olympics in 1976: 'Did his coach
really know nothing? Did the sports leadership subject him to public ostracism?'. 35
He went on to mention two Soviet weightlifters caught selling anabolic steroids in
Canada (taken out of the USSR). The problem of drugs has also been raised in the
press and on an unscripted TV programme by two respected ex-athletes and
prominent sports officials: the weightlifter Yurii Vlasov and the long jumper Igor
Ter-Ovanesyan.
During a live TV debate on Soviet sport in late 1986, Vlasov, the Chairman of
the USSR Weightlifting Federation, broke the silence on drug taking; he declared
that immense damage had been done to Soviet sport, and weightlifting in
particular, by the 'coach pharmacologist' who worked alongside the sports coach.
Not only did Vlasov accuse Soviet athletes of using anabolics 'for several decades',
but he named names-specifically that of ex-Olympic weightlifter, coach and top
sports official Arkadii Vorobev, 'who was one of the first to distribute anabolic
steroids to members of our national team'. 36 Vlasov then revealed in a newspaper
interview that, following his accusations, Soviet officials had stopped him
travelling abroad."
A year after Vlasov's TV revelations, the daily sports paper Sovetskii sport
claimed that Oleg Solovev, coach to Novosibirsk's top swimmers, had encouraged
the use of anabolic steroids in training sessions.³⁸ Subsequently, following the
Seoul Olympics and the Ben Johnson drug scandal, Ter-Ovanesyan, now the
senior Soviet track and field coach, launched a well publicised campaign against
drug taking in Soviet sport. Admitting that 'many of our athletes' take drugs, he
mentioned that even several school athletes had been detected taking steroids: 'I
think that society needs proper legislation to combat this evil, seriously punishing
both doctors and athletes, coaches and drug suppliers'.¹⁹
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SOVIET STUDIES
The most sensational revelation on drugs came in mid-1989, with Leninskoe
znamya admitting that some 290 athletes and coaches had been punished for
using forbidden drugs in the three years prior to the Seoul 1988 Olympics.40
Certainly no other country in the world has had anything like that number of
positive drug tests registered; it is also probably the world's highest per capita
figure.
Another stone overturned by investigative journalists is that of 'amateur' status.
As the top Soviet swimmer, Vladimir Salnikov, revealed in Argumenty i fakty
early in 1989, 'We have rid ourselves of hypocritical declarations about so-called
amateurism and sporting achievements. Professionalism has been recognised and
athletes no longer have to compromise themselves'. It has to be said in
parenthesis that the Soviet leadership (Stalin) only introduced 'state amateur
status' into Soviet sport in the early 1950s, under pressure from the International
Olympic Committee, as a ploy to join the Olympic movement (the USSR was
admitted in May 1951). From then on the appearance had to be given that
performers received no remuneration from their sports performance, nor did they
devote themselves full-time to sport. The public, of course, knew differently, but it
was part of the double-think of the 1950-85 period never to mention it in public.
Glasnost' is drawing aside the veil. As a letter to the youth monthly Yunosi' has put
it, 'We got used to living a double life because many of our idols did the same. We
condemned professional sport in the West and were proud that our champions
were amateurs. We took it for granted that they trained for six or seven hours each
day after work or study. But everyone knew that most athletes never went to work
or college, and that they only met their workmates or fellow students on pay
day'.42
It is now officially admitted that top soccer players, for example, receive
between 200 and 300 rubles a month for playing soccer and spend as many as 250
days annually in training. Journalists have also broached other once censored
topics, like the security service sponsorship of Dinamo and army officer sinecures
for athletes sponsored by the armed forces.⁴⁴
Under pressure, the sports establishment has talked of taking steps to make
sports, especially soccer, clubs self-financing and officially to give all players of
Master of Sport ranking and over what they have always had unofficially:
professional status. This naturally follows the amendment to Olympic regulations
that permits professional performers in the Games. By mid-1989, however, no
firm decision on the latter issue had been taken, although several soccer clubs have
become self-financing and openly professional. The first, Dnepr, not only became
Soviet league champions in 1988, but made a handsome profit into the bargain. In
the 1989 soccer season, three top clubs, Dinamo Kiev, Dinamo Tbilisi and
Shakhter Donetsk, followed suit.45 In cycling, a 14-strong team signed a contract
in late 1988 with the San Marino aluminium firm Alfa Lum to form the first-ever
professional Soviet cycling team under contract to a foreign company (with the
USSR Sports Committee taking a third of their earnings).46 Perhaps the greatest
volte face in sporting principles is the entry of Soviet boxers and wrestlers into the
professional ranks. The USSR Boxing Federation has signed a contract with North
American promoters that will take 24 Soviet boxers to North America. Similarly,
SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
139
eight heavyweight wrestlers are currently performing in Japanese professional
rings.48
Fears are being voiced, nonetheless, that the encouragement of open profession-
alism might spoil the 'stars' even more than at present. It is nostalgically recalled
that once upon a time Soviet athletes would go through fire to gain medals and
glory for their country: 'That was before good mother Adidas fed them from her
bountiful bosom, spoiled them with life on the foreign circuit or even overseas
training. Today's athletes, however, are "scientifically programmed", rigged out in
the latest fashions and packed full of home-produced "vitamins"; as a result, we
have produced capricious idols and we don't know what to do with them'.49
The dilemma is not Soviet alone.
Morality of professional sport
A logical extension of the debate on the future of Soviet sport is seriously to
question the morality of top-class sport today. A number of articles in the press
have 'only recently started to mention out loud the major problem (in sport)-
deception, the rust that begins to corrode a child's innocent mind from that
moment when the first mischievous thought clouds the pure joy of playing-that
besides enjoying himself be can make something out of it'. 50
This brings us to a basic question that was raised frequently in the 1920s, yet has
rarely been aired since: what price is society prepared to pay for talent? Such
fundamental (to a socialist society) questions are certainly being asked now. How
wide should the gap in privileges be between the stars and the masses? Should a
communist society encourage the formation of an elite based on the luck of
nature's draw and thereby perpetuate original inequalities rather than properly
compensating for the lottery of birth? Or as Yurii Vlasov has put it, 'Who needs
big-time sport? What is it that makes hundreds and thousands of healthy young
people cast aside their studies and work? Why do state institutions spend such vast
sums of money on top sport? Who needs those medals and records?'."
The following extract from Ogonek also faces squarely up to the problem: 'From
a youngster's first steps in sport he is accustomed to being a parasite, clandestinely
assigned to miners, oilers or builders who generously repay his artless "feints"
with worldy goods of which miners, oilers or builders can only dream. City
apartments, cars, overseas trips, a free and easy life by the seaside-how all that
caresses youthful vanity, lifts him above the grey mass of those who have been
waiting years for housing, phones and cars, and who have to pay for the seaside
and the foreign trips out of their own pocket'.52
Besides criticising perverted morality that such privileges engender, a number
of Soviet writers have called into question the exploitation of children for the sake
of sporting glory. A sports monthly has written of the 'strict regimentation and
deprivation of many of childhood's joys, the numerous trips, lengthy training
camps, hotel stays, separations from family and school all this leads to moral
impairment'.3
Yet when Vlasov complained of the 'inhuman forms of professionalism'
involving 12- and 13-year old youngsters, especially in gymnastics and swimming,
140
SOVIET STUDIES
he was accused by Soviet coaches of 'undermining Soviet sport'. Disillusioned, he
resigned his post as Chairman of the Weightlifting Federation and returned to
writing fiction (and subsequently has become an outspoken MP).5⁴
All the same, more and more critics are taking up the cudgels against early
specialisation and intensive training of children at the age of five, six or seven,
particularly after the publication of a study of children's sports schools in Kazan,
showing that 'there was practically no difference between beginners and top
athletes when it came to the number of intensive training sessions'.55
The mood of glasnost' appears more to favour sport for all than special
privileges for the gifted.
Convergence in sport
Yet another consequence of the 'new thinking' seems to be the bringing closer of
some facets of Soviet sport to those in the West; it is nonetheless a contradictory
process that may have popular acclaim, yet at the same time lead Soviet sport
further away from the new morality it seeks.
For a start, commercial sports (in a professional, commodity sense) like golf,
baseball, Grand Prix motor racing, even American football, have arrived in the
USSR. Moscow had its first golf course (nine holes) in 1988, partly designed for
the foreign diplomatic corps and partly intended to prepare Soviet challengers for
international golf tournaments (60 teenagers are registered at the club's golf
school).56 The American billionaire Armand Hammer is planning a second golf
course at Nakhabino, some 30 km from the centre of Moscow. 57 With an eye to the
inclusion of baseball in the Olympic Games, the sports establishment has 'created'
Soviet baseball clubs (just as it "created' field hockey teams, by fiat, in the early
1970s expressly for Olympic participation-again without any grassroots tradi-
tion); the first baseball league came into being in 1988, a year after the first
national championship. By late 1988 there were 30 baseball clubs in the country
and a special children's baseball school in Tashkent.
Following the holding of the first Grand Prix Formula 1 race in a communist
country, Hungary, in 1988, the Soviet Union is now designing a world-class track
around Moscow's Sadovoe kol'tso (on similar 'round-the-houses' lines as the
Monaco circuit). No expense is being spared to stage this prestigious (and
profitable) event: 'We shall have to close all subways, seal down several hundred
sewer manholes, remove all trees along the route
and push back a few blocks of
flats'. Further, Pravda has called for the promotion of Soviet motor racing up to
world standards.⁶⁰
The USSR Sports Commiteee and an American corporation agreed to stage a
Dallas Cowboys V. Washington Redskins football game on 2 September 1989 'for
the Glasnost' Cup' (!), in order to promote the game in the USSR. The US
sponsors were intending to fly in as many as 6,000 fans for the match.
To cap it all, the first dog (borzoi) races were held at Moscow's Ippodrom
Racecourse in the autumn of 1987. Largely as a concession to the public, horse
racing in all forms (trotting, hurdling, steeplechase and racing on the flat-with
gambling on the state totalisator) has existed for most of the Soviet period,
SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
141
although up till now 'no mention of it had been made in the press, simply because
it was not accepted practice'; nor has it ever featured on TV, despite the country's
3,000 racehorses and 17 annual race meetings.⁶²
Other 'imports' and the resurfacing of old sports include snooker, darts,
billiards (it is said that there are as many as 5,000 players⁶³), the Chinese sport of
wushu (martial arts) (52 cities are said to have wushu clubs with over 30,000
members64) and body building-the first international body building contest,
watched by 16,000 spectators, was held in Moscow in late 1988, jointly sponsored
by West Germany's Armstrong Company and the USSR Sports Service;65 Soviet
body builders made their international debut at the world championship in spring
1989.66
Sponsorship, both foreign and domestic, has become a common feature in a
range of sports, with soccer teams sporting the Dorna or the Ocrim Spa logo since
the 1987-88 season. So intense is the interest in gaining foreign sponsorship that
'the National Olympic Committee has set up a federation of sponsors to
coordinate commercial activity in the interests of Soviet sport and of strengthen-
ing ties abroad'.'
Another innovation in Soviet sport, bringing it into line with Western (capital-
ist) practices, is to sell leading Soviet players to Western teams. Initially, in 1987,
these were players of 30 or over, but the lure of dollars and the will of individual
'stars' seem to have reduced the age limit considerably, particularly in the major
spectator sports like soccer, ice hockey and basketball. By mid-1989 as many as 27
leading ice hockey players were signed up for the North American NHL. 69 As an
example of such a deal (in soccer), the national goalkeeper Renat Dasaev signed a
$2 million contract for two years with the Spanish club Scvilla: the USSR Sports
Committee took 55% of the proceeds, Dasaev's club Spartak took 40%, and the
Italian agents Dorna, which set up the deal, took 5%.70 The striker Zavarov,
however, was sold to Juventus of Italy for $5 million and his former club Dinamo
Kiev 'was able to become self-financing [i.e. openly professional] on the $2 million
it gained from the transaction'.¹
The thorny question of remuneration, especially when foreign currency is
involved, has caused acrimonious debate. On one side, state officials claim that
Soviet-trained 'stars' have a civic duty to devote the bulk of their foreign earnings
to the benefit of Soviet sport generally." On the other, as the top male tennis
player, Andrei Chesnokov, has put it, he earns lucrative foreign currency on the
world tennis circuit, yet is permitted only $25 per diem-not enough even to feed
myself." In early 1989 Chesnokov's female partner Natalia Zvereva took the
unprecedented step of retaining her prize money, refusing to compensate the
USSR Sports Committee.
Some critics, including Zvereva and Chesnokov, accuse officials of wasting huge
sums of money 'on trips abroad for Sports Committee bosses and their retinue, on
officials who needlessly accompany teams and on translators who in most cases
are not needed" (but who in the past were often used to 'keep an eye' on athletes
abroad and to report back to the KGB on returning home).
The Sports Committee is also accused of going 'on a hard currency spending
spree when it badly wants the USSR to win'; at the Calgary Winter Olympics in
142
SOVIET STUDIES
1988, for example, each Soviet gold medal winner 'received $5,000 no matter how
strong the rivals were'. 75 For a gold medal at the Seoul Olympics in the same year,
the Soviet Sports Minister admitted that Soviet recipients would gain 12,000
rubles (6,000 for silver and 4,000 for bronze medals); since the Soviet team won
55 gold medals and 132 medals overall, it cost the Sports Committee about a
million rubles (part paid in dollars) in bonuses alone.⁷⁶
Not everyone is happy at what they see as a race for irrational glory, as the
cultivation of irrational loyalties, as unreasonable prominence given to the
winning of sports victories, the setting of records and the collection of trophics-a
fetishisation in sport. In fact, a feature of popular antipathy to the pre-Gorbachev
'stagnation' period is precisely reaction against the tub-thumping, flag-waving
obsession with international sports success. As a writer in Sobesednik put it before
the Seoul Olympics, 'International prestige may be important, but what is far
more important is sport for all at home, the number of people the Olympic
victories attract into sport and how we accommodate them. So don't let us spend
too much time celebrating, we must look down from the Olympic heights upon the
realities of the world around us'.77
A political commentator in Moscow News suggested the Soviet press publish two
tables: alongside that of Olympic medals should be a table showing the per capita
provision of sports amenities for each nation. If that were done, 'we would bc in a
very different position'. He cited the example of artificial skating rinks: Canada
had 10,000, the USA 1,500, Sweden 343 and the USSR just 102.78 The swimmer
Salnikov has contrasted the US total of a million swimming pools with the Soviet
figure of 2,500.79 As the Moscow News commentator concluded, 'Not long ago
statistics were so "cleverly" compiled that it seemed the entire population went in
for sport Can't we see for ourselves that much more emphasis is being put on
professional sport, on training record-breakers, champions, medal-winners than
on sport for all?'.80 It is a contentious issue and one not unknown in other
countries.
Conclusions
Today the inheritors of the sports system evolved during the Stalin, Khrushchev
and Brezhnev years find themselves in a quandary: to what extent should they
break with the past? How sharply and through what new forms should change be
brought about? In the field of culture, and specifically of physical culture, how
should they dismantle the various by now well entrenched fetishised institutions
and values?
The task is circumscribed partly by the fact that Soviet leaders still evidently
regard sport as a valuable weapon in the rivalry between East and West,
communism and capitalism. The international situation is just one of a number of
objective constraints (that also include domestic, economic, cultural and political
factors, not to mention relations within the communist world) on leaders
attempting to realise their desires-which are likely to be by no means uniform or
clearly perceived. Whatever course of action is pursued, the subjective will of the
leaders is bound to be constrained by the objective possibilities of the situation.
SPORT AND PERESTROIKA
143
But, as the Russian saying goes, the ice has begun to move. How far the thaw
will go and whether the ice will return with winter may depend on more than the
Soviet leadership. Most of all, it will depend increasingly on the Soviet people
themselves-joggers, stars and fans-as they fight for the right to their own
physical culture and personality.
Surrey University
I See Ma Yihua, 'Friendship Through Golf, China Sports, 1988 no. 10, pp. 17-21; Z.
Wubin, 'A Rising Sport in China', China Sports, 1985, no. 9, pp. 5-7.
2 See Xu Qi, 'Women's Sports in China', China Sports, 1989, no. 3, pp. 2-15.
3 See Zhao Chonggi, 'Minority People's Sports Meet', China Sports, 1986, no. 3, pp. 33-35:
China staged its first Minority People's Folk Games in Bcijing from 8 September to 20 October
1985; it attracted some 3,000 participants from 30 ethnic groups.
4 For details of the 1985 GTO programme see J. Riordan, "School Physical Education in the
Soviet Union', Physical Education Review, 9, no. 2 (1986), pp. 100-117; for details of the
influence of Scout athletics norms on the first BGTO (Bud' golov k trudu i oborone-' Bc Prepared
for Labour and Defence'-note the 'Be Prepared'), see J. Riordan, 'The Russian Boy Scouts'.
History Today, 38 (October 1988), pp. 48-52.
$ For a history of the Spartakiads SCC J. Riordan, Sport in Soviel Society (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977). pp. 248-253.
6
O. Dmitrieva, 'Bokal protiv detstvu', Komsomol'skaya pravda, 8 June 1985, p. 2.
7 M. Kondratieva, 'Na uroke iv zhizni', Molodoi kommunist, 1986, no. 12, pp. 73-78. at p.
74.
I K. S. Demirchyan, 'O zadachakh respublikanskoi partiinoi organizatsii', Kommunist, 25
September 1984, pp. I-7, at p. 2.
9 S. Belits-Gelman, 'Lipa ne tonet', Ogonek, 1987 no. 4, p. 27.
10 See Pravda, 1 February 1988, p. 8.
" Demirchyan, p. 2.
12 B. Novikov, 'Ne zabudul li oni kak khodit'?' Sport SSSR, 1988, no. 3, pp. 38-40, at p. 39.
13 Vladimir Balashov, 'Proizvodstvennaya gimnastika i proizvoditel'nost', Sport V SSSR,
1988, no. 7, pp. 12-15, at p. 15.
14 'Postanovlenie TsK KPSS i Sovcta Ministrov SSSR "O dalncishem podeme massovosti
lizicheskoi kul'tury i sporta", Sovetskii sport, 24 September 1981, p. 1.
15 The remainder of sports schools, roughly 3,400, are run by the Dinamo and armed forces
sports clubs.
16 'Novyi kooperativnyi klub zdorovya', Moskovskie novosti, 1988, no. 7. p. 14.
17 'New Sports Coop for Leningrad', Soviel Weekly, 7 May 1988, p. 14.
18 'Public Gets Coop Sports Dividend', Soviel Weekly, 18 Junc 1988, p. 18.
19 'Metreveli and Co Open New Tennis Centres', Soriet Weekly, 22 October 1988, p. 16.
20 Balashov, p. 14.
21 Riordan, 'School Physical Education
22 Alexander Anufriev, 'Pochemu ya ushel iz Komsomola', Sobesednik, 1989, no. 17, p. 3.
23 For more details, see J. Riordan, 'Sovict Youth: Pioneers of Change', Soviel Studies, XL,
no. 4 (October 1988), pp. 556-572, at p. 560.
24 lbid., pp. 564-566.
25 R. Davletshina, 'Futbol i zhenshchiny', Teoriya i praktika fizicheskoi kul'ury, 1973, no.
10, pp. 59-63, at p. 62.
26 V. Merkulov, 'Pressing on Regardless', Soviel Weckly, 17 October 1987, p. 16.
27 'Vosem', dvadisat', pyat'desyat', Sobesednik, 1989, no. 7, p. 2.
28 V. Tsirlin, 'Vodnoc polo dlya zhenshchin', Sport V SSSR, 1986, no. 8, pp. 42-54, at p. 45.
19 'Krasavitsa vilnyanka-88', Sobesednik, 1988, no. 18, p. 6.
10 Merkulov.
31 V. Ponomareva, 'Eshche odna pobeda', Sobesednik, 1987, no. 37 (September), p. 12.
32 Ibid.
33 S. Shenkman, 'Disabled Sport: An End to Blecding Hearts', Soviet Weekly, 11 June 1988,
p. 16. Scc also Sport V SSSR, 1988, no. 5, pp. 50-52.
34 For example, a Russian troika championship was held in Krasnodar in 1986, and new
144
SOVIET STUDIES
emphasis has been given to the folk games of Siberian peoples in the annual Sports Festival of
Peoples of the Far North (see Soriet Weekly, 6 September 1986, p. 11 and 1 November 1986, p.
14).
35 S. Tokarev, 'Ne proigral by chelovek', Ogonek, 1987, no. 9, pp. 20-21, at p. 20.
36 A. Klaz, 'Rekordy po retseptu?' Smena, 4 May 1988, p. 3. See also Yurii Vlasov, 'Drugs
and cruelty', Moscow News, 1988, no. 37, p. 15.
37 Vlasov.
38 Klaz.
39 Igor Ter-Ovanesyan, 'I Declare War on Anabolics!', Moscow News, 1988, no. 50, p. 15.
40 Vasilii Gromyko, 'Nash styd', Leninskoe znamya, 28 March 1989, p. 2.
41 Vladimir Salnikov, "Vremya nadezhd', Argumenty i fakty, 1989, no. 1, p. 3.
42 A. Novikov, 'Pis'mo redaktsii', Yunost', 1988, no. 6, p. 9.
43 'Skol'ko poluchact futbolist?' Moskovskie novasti, 1988, no. 10, p. 15.
44 O. Petrichenko, 'Ne sotvori sebc kumira', Ogonek, March 1987, no. 12, pp. 14-15, at p.
15. In all countries with Dinamo clubs (from Albania to Yugoslavia, the GDR to the USSR) the
governing body providing finance and ultimate control is the Ministry for Internal Affairs (several
other countries-notably Poland, Hungary and Romania-give such clubs a 'domestic' name):
SCC Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, pp. 292-295.
45 Igor Oransky, "Ne bogi gorshki obzhigayut Moskovskil komsomolets. 28 February
1989, p. 3.
44 M. Shlaev, 'Pervaya sovetskaya professional'naya komanda', Moskovskie novosti, 1988,
no. 50, p. 15; W. Fotheringham, 'Russian Pros Ready for Taste of the Big Time,' Cycling Weekly,
2 February 1989, pp. 8-9.
47 Mark Vodovozov, 'Bor'ba na ringe', Moskovskie novosti, 15 January 1989, no. 3. p. 15.
48 Oransky.
49 Petrichenko.
30 Petrichenko.
51 See Timur Absalyamov, 'Komu on nuzhen, elot sport?' Sobesednik, 1989, no. 7 (Febru-
ary), p. 11.
52 Petrichenko.
33 L. Kedrov, 'Sport y vozraste 6 let: 7.2 i protiv', Sport P SSSR, 1987, no. 6, pp. 26-28, at p.
27.
$4 Vlasov.
55 Kedrov.
$6 'Golf i Tumba', Nedelya, 1987, no. 41 (18 September), p. 13; 'Moscow's First Golf Club
Gets Into the Swing of Things', Soviel Weekly, 27 November 1988, p. 16.
57 Ibid.
38 A. Bezruchenko, 'Soviet Baseball Moves on from First Base', Soviel Weekly, 30 April
1988, p. 14.
59 Alexander Alexandrov, 'Formula l', Soretskii sport, 15 March 1989, p. 16.
60 'Motogonki', Pravda, 19 September 1987, p. 4; see also Maskorskie novosti, 1988, no. 43,
p. 15.
61 Elena Zubova, 'Amerikanskii "desant" na stadion "Dinamo", Moskovskii komsomolets,
28 February 1989, p. 4.
62 O. Dun, 'They're off!', Soviet Weekly, 30 April 1988, p. 14.
63 Mikhail Shakhov, 'Shar-v luzhu!', Moskovskie novosti, 15 January 1989, no. 3, p. 15.
64 Vladimir Kirilluk, 'Ushu', Sobesednik, 1988, no. 46 (November), p. 16.
65 Oransky.
66 'Sovetskii kulturizm', Molodoi kommunist, 1989, no. 4, pp. 62-66, at p. 63.
57 'Sweet Smell of Sports Sponsorship', Soviet Weekly, 26 November 1988, p. 16.
68 Ibid.
69 'Khokkeisty zhdut razresheniya Sovetskii sport, 29 April 1989, p. 4.
70 'Dasayev goes to Sevilla', Soviet Weekly, 5 November 1988, p. 16.
11 Vladimir Kirilluk, 'Enter the New Sports Supporters', Soviet Weekly, 6 May 1989, p. 16.
72 B. Geskin, 'Emotsii i banknoty', Sovetskii sport, 28 August 1988, pp. 1-4, at p. 1.
73 V. Dvortsov, 'Skol'ko nashi "zvezdy" dolzhny poluchat"?', Moskovskie novosti, May 1988
no. 19, p. 15.
74 Geskin, p. 1.
75 S. Petrov, 'Skol'ko stoit olimpiiskaya komanda', Moskovskie novosti, 1988, no. 39, p. 15.
76 D. Rennick, 'Soviet Olympians Compete for Pre-set Quota of Medals', The Korea Herald,