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Christine Macy's Files
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001a. report
re: U.S. Government (2 pages)
n.d.
P1/b(1)
001b. report
re: U.S. Government (2 pages)
n.d.
P1/b(1)
001c. report
re: U.S. Government (2 pages)
n.d.
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
First Lady's Office
Christine Macy
OA/Box Number: 17203
FOLDER TITLE:
Yemen/Background
2013-0936-S
rc1358
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors. or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
U.S. Department of State
China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999.
CHINA
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) is the paramount source of power. At the national and regional levels, party
members hold almost all top government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority rests
with members of the Politburo. Leaders stress the need to maintain stability and social order and
are committed to perpetuating the rule of the CCP and its hierarchy. Citizens lack both the
freedom peacefully to express opposition to the party-led political system and the right to change
their national leaders or form of government. Socialism continues to provide the theoretical
underpinning of Chinese politics, but Marxist ideology has given way to economic pragmatism
in recent years, and economic decentralization has increased the authority of regional officials.
The party's authority rests primarily on the Government's ability to maintain social stability,
appeals to nationalism and patriotism, party control of personnel and the security apparatus, and
the continued improvement in the living standards of most of China's 1.2 billion citizens. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judicial system is
subject to the "policy guidance" of the CCP and government influence, particularly in politically
sensitive cases.
The security apparatus is made up of the Ministries of State Security and Public Security, the
People's Armed Police, the People's Liberation Army, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and
penal systems. Security policy and personnel were responsible for numerous human rights
abuses.
China has a mixed economy that continues to expand, albeit at a slower rate than in recent years.
The growth rate target was 8.0 percent for 1998. According to official government statistics gross
domestic product reached a growth rate of 7.8 percent, but the actual figure was widely
considered to be between 3 and 5 percent. The economy faces growing problems, including state
enterprise reform, unemployment, underemployment, and regional economic disparities. Rural
unemployment and underemployment is estimated to be over 30 percent. Tens of millions of
peasants have left their homes in search of better jobs and living conditions. Demographers
estimate that between 80 and 130 million persons make up this "floating population," with many
major cities counting 1 million or more such persons. Urban areas also are coping with millions
of state workers idled on partial wages or unemployed as a result of industrial reforms. Workers
throughout the country increasingly organized public protests to press their demands.
Nonetheless, economic reforms have raised living standards for many, providing greater
independence for entrepreneurs, diminishing state control over the economy and citizen's daily
lives, and creating new economic opportunities. Despite serious economic difficulties in the state
sector, individual economic opportunities expanded in nonstate sectors, resulting in increased
freedom of employment and mobility. The total number of citizens living in absolute poverty
continues to decline; estimates range from official figures of 42 million to World Bank estimates
of 150 million. However, the income gap between coastal and internal regions is growing
markedly. The ratio is now approximately 12 to 1.
The Government's human rights record deteriorated sharply beginning in the final months of the
year with a crackdown against organized political dissent. The loosening of restrictions on
political debate and activism by authorities for much of 1997 and 1998, including toward public
calls for political reform and expressions of opposition to government policies, abruptly ended in
the fall. The Government continued to commit widespread and well-documented human rights
abuses, in violation of internationally accepted norms. These abuses stemmed from the
authorities' very limited tolerance of public dissent aimed at the Government, fear of unrest, and
the limited scope or inadequate implementation of laws protecting basic freedoms. The
Constitution and laws provide for fundamental human rights, but these protections often are
ignored in practice. Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment
of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado
detention, and denial of due process. Prison conditions at most facilities remained harsh. In many
cases, particularly sensitive political cases, the judicial system denies criminal defendants basic
legal safeguards and due process because authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public
order and suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms.
The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government continued restrictions on
freedom of speech and of the press, and tightened these toward the end of the year. The
Government severely restricted freedom of assembly, and continued to restrict freedom of
association, religion, and movement. Discrimination against women, minorities, and the
disabled; violence against women, including coercive family planning practices--which
sometimes include forced abortion and forced sterilization; prostitution, trafficking in women
and children, and the abuse of children all are problems. The Government continued to restrict
tightly worker rights, and forced labor remains a problem. Serious human rights abuses persisted
in minority areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other
fundamental freedoms intensified.
Beginning in the fall, Communist Party leaders moved to "nip in the bud" organized challenges
they believed threatened national stability or Communist Party authority. Dozens of political
activists were arrested for attempts to register a political party and engage in other political
activities. In November over 30 members and supporters of the China Democracy Party were
detained, and, in December, three of its leaders were sentenced to lengthy jail terms, apparently
as a warning to other activists.
Veteran dissidents Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, and Qin Yongmin were tried under the law on state
security for their attempts to organize and register the CDP as an opposition party and for
allegedly colluding with foreign forces to "subvert state power." They were given harsh
sentences of 13, 11, and 12 years, respectively, in closed trials that flagrantly violated due
process. Also in November and December, the authorities imposed new regulations on the
Internet, the publishing industry, and social organizations; closed several newspapers and fired
several outspoken editors; and banned a popular, but politically- sensitive, book and other
publications. The China Development Union, an independent group in Beijing, which had
organized discussions on a wide range of topical issues, including political reform, had its
activities curtailed in November and was eventually shut down.
Unapproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups, continued to experience
varying degrees of official interference and repression. The Government continued to enforce
1994 State Council regulations requiring all places of religious activity to register with the
Government and come under the supervision of official, "patriotic" religious organizations. There
were significant differences from region to region, and even locality to locality, in the attitudes of
government officials toward religion. In some areas, authorities guided by national policy made
strong efforts to control the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant churches; religious
services were broken up and church leaders or adherents were detained and, at times, reportedly
beaten. At year's end, some remained in prison because of their religious activities. In other
regions, registered and unregistered churches were treated similarly by the authorities. Citizens
worshiping in officially sanctioned churches, mosques, and temples reported little or no
day-to-day interference by the Government.
The number of religious adherents in many churches, both registered and unregistered, continued
to grow at a rapid pace. The Government engaged in discussions of religious freedom issues with
the international community, welcoming several high-level foreign delegations.
Although the Government denies that it holds political or religious prisoners, and argues that all
those in prison are legitimately serving sentences for crimes under the law, an unknown number
of persons, estimated at several thousand, are detained in violation of international human rights
instruments for peacefully expressing their political, religious, or social views. Persons detained
at times during the year include political activists who tried to register an opposition party;
leaders of a national house church movement; and organizers of political discussion groups that
exceeded what the Government deemed the permissible level of dissent. Some minority groups,
particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uyghurs, came under increasing pressure as the
Government clamped down on dissent and "separatist" activities. In Tibet the reeducation
campaign aimed at monks and nuns was renewed, as was a rhetorical campaign against the Dalai
Lama. In Xinjiang, authorities tightened restrictions on fundamental freedoms in an effort to
control independence groups.
The Government took some actions to address international concerns in the area of human rights.
In October it signed the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but
gave no indication when the covenant would be ratified. In September the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) visited for the first time at the invitation of the
Government. The Government also continued to expand its human rights dialogs and exchanges
with other nations, and in October hosted for the first time an international human rights
conference in Beijing.
The authorities released a few political prisoners before their terms were over. Tiananmen
student leader Wang Dan was released on medical parole in April on the condition that he leave
the country for medical treatment. Liu Nianchun was released under the same conditions in
December. Both are now living abroad in exile. Catholic Bishop Zeng Jingmu and democracy
activist Pan Mingdong were released on medical parole before the end of their terms and
remained in China. Bishop Zeng was reportedly under house arrest at year's end. Zhang Xiaoxu
was paroled 6 years early, after having served 9 years of his 15-year sentence for involvement in
the 1989 student protests. However, at year's end several thousand others, including Li Hai, Han
Chunsheng, Liu Jingsheng, Chen Lantao, Liu Xiaobo, Chen Longde, Pastor Xu Yongze, Bishop
An Shuxin, Abbot Chadrel Rinpoche, Ngawang Sangdrol, Jigme Sangpo, and Ngawang
Choephel remained in prison for the peaceful expression of their political, social, or religious
views. Some of those who completed their sentences and were released from prison--such as Bao
Tong, senior aide to former Communist Party leaders--were kept under surveillance and
prevented from taking employment or otherwise resuming normal lives.
During the year, the Government launched new efforts to reform the legal system and widely
disseminated information about new legislation. It also initiated a highly publicized campaign to
"rectify" endemic problems such as corruption and abuse of power on the part of judges,
prosecutors, and police. A number of laws passed in recent years, if enforced effectively, hold the
potential to enhance citizens' rights--e.g., the Administrative Litigation Law, the Lawyers Law,
the State Compensation Law, the Prison Law, the Criminal Law, and the Criminal Procedure
Law. The revised Criminal Procedure Law, which came into effect in 1997, provided for the
defendant's right to legal counsel, an active legal defense, and other rights of criminal defendants
recognized in international human rights instruments. If fully implemented, this law would bring
China's criminal laws closer toward compliance with international norms. However, enforcement
of the new statute was uneven and incomplete and was violated in the cases of high-profile
dissidents. In an effort to strengthen enforcement, the Government issued additional, more
specific implementing guidelines.
The Government also expanded efforts to educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and especially
the public on the provisions of new statutes. China expanded its efforts to increase bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in the field of law.
In addition, some positive trends continued. The leadership continued governmental restructuring
efforts and took steps to create a more accountable and less intrusive government (under the firm
leadership of the Communist Party). The range of issues covered in the media--especially
regarding corruption and abuse of power--continued to expand. New initiatives were undertaken
to improve the transparency and accountability of China's judicial and legal systems;
nongovernmental-level village committee elections were expanded, giving citizens choices about
grassroots representatives, as well as introducing the principle of democratic elections; and at
least one experiment with township elections was conducted successfully (albeit not approved in
advance by the central Government).
Government efforts to separate the military and the Communist Party from commercial ventures
proceeded, as did campaigns against government corruption and smuggling. Social groups with
economic resources at their disposal continued to play an increasing role in community life.
Despite the sharp crackdown on political dissent at the end of the year, society as a whole
continued to be more open and diverse. Academics and government officials continued to debate
formerly taboo subjects such as political reform and democratization in official channels.
Satellite television broadcasts continued to be widely available, particularly in coastal provinces,
despite the Government's efforts to regulate the sale and use of satellite dishes. Cable television
also is available in many cities, including access to global news networks. As many as 6 million
citizens had access to the Internet, although the Government increased its efforts to try to control
the content of material available on the Internet. Overall, average citizens go about their daily
lives with more personal freedom than ever before: Higher disposable income, looser economic
controls, greater freedom of movement, increased access to outside sources of information,
greater room for individual choice, and more diversity in cultural life. However, authorities did
not hesitate to move quickly against those it perceived to be a threat to government power or
national stability. Citizens who seek to express openly dissenting political and religious views
continue to live in an environment filled with repression.
The Status of Women in Yemen
Their Entry into the Political Arena
emeni women rank low on almost every significant index of human development, except for
political rights. Women do not have acceptable access to basic health services, education,
safe water or adequate nutrition. They have unacceptably high birth and illiteracy rates.
The Constitution makes no difference between men and women, but tradition serves to
isolate them and limit the exercise of their talents. But Yemeni women do have the right to
vote and have exercised it-the only women in the Arabian Peninsula who can claim this
distinction. In addition, numerous signs point to a better future. Small groups of Yemeni
women, with varying degrees of government support, are determined to find a way out of the
cycle of poverty and ignorance experienced by most women.
Government policy supports the development of women in all sectors. but implementation is
slowed by resource constraints and ingrained attitudes among the men. All political parties
have issued communiqués supporting female political participation, which has established an
agreed baseline that cannot be reversed. But none of the parties include women in its senior
governing council; only one party nominated female candidates in the 1997 parliamentary
elections. Women do not occupy ministerial or sub-ministerial policy making positions, but
do now hold about 10 percent of all office directorships. Less than three percent of judges
are women, and all those are remnants of the former Marxist regime in the south.
The Social System Seeks to Protect, Not Empower Women
The population of Yemen is rural, poor, and socially conservative. Only 40 percent of girls
between the ages of 6-15 attend school. Women represent of 24 percent and 13 percent
respectively of secondary and university students. The law requires that a girl be 15 years
old in order to marry, but 12-year old brides are not uncommon. Arranged marriages are the
norm, although the woman may theoretically refuse a proposed husband. The law requires
that a woman have her father's or husband's permission to travel abroad, although this is
rarely enforced. The attitudes of a woman's male relatives are critical in determining the
degree of social and economic freedom she enjoys, including how much education she
receives. Violence against women exists, as it does everywhere, but is largely
undocumented. The legal system does not effectively protect women from violence - that is
the responsibility of her extended family.
Yemeni women and their families interpret the Quranic injunction to dress modestly in
different ways. The majority of women fully cover themselves in black, including a face veil
that reveals only their eyes. The rest cover their heads with the scarf ("hejab") and wear
either a long black coat or modified western dress of a long skirt with long jacket. Dress
does not unduly hinder women's activities. In Yemen, unlike Saudi Arabia, women can drive
and move freely in public. They are evident in the streets and marketplaces of the city, as
one journalist put it, "they walk without apology." University classes are coeducational,
although from grades 6-12, boys and girls tend to study in separate classes or schools.
Official statistics state that wamen constitute about 21 percent of the workforce. This badly
under-represents women's economic activity. Albeit unpaid, women do most of the manual
work on family farms - and agriculture supports about 80 percent of the population.
Hope is in the Vote and Leadership Development
Yemen is the only country on the Arabian Peninsula with a functioning-multi-party
Parliament elected by universal suffrage. In two separate parliamentary elections, in 1993
and 1997, Yemen's women have demonstrated that they take seriously the right to vote, to
run as candidates, and to govern. Energetic and determined women staff NGOs devoted to
empowering women.
Electoral Participation: They Need an "Emily's List"
More than 475,000 registered to vote in the first post-unity elections in 1993 (the total
number of registered voters was 2.5 million), about 17 percent of all adult women By 1997,
the number of women registered had doubled to more than 825,000, 28 percent of all eligible
adult women. Female voter registration to this extent was remarkable given that only about
26 percent of Yemeni women can read and write. The number of women who actually
turned out to vote, however, was substantially lower than the registration figures would have
predicted - no more than half actually cast a ballot in 1993 or 1997. Voter education was
inadequate for all voters; particularly so for women. Also, political parties did not follow
through with promises to recruit female candidates, which might have attracted more female
voters.
In 1993, 41 of approximately 3,000 candidates for Parliament were women, most of whom
ran as independents. Of the nearly 20 parties that competed. only two, President Saleh's
GPC (General People's Congress) and the YSP (Yemeni socialist party- the governing>
party of the former South Yemen) nominated women. The GPC nominated two, and the
YSP four. Two women won seats, both from the YSP, By 1997, the internal political context
had changes, presenting new challenges for women. The YSP boycotted the election, which
meant a loss of women candidates and an overall low voter turnout in the southern
governorates, the YSP's traditional power-base. Islaah, the second major political party in
the 1997 election, is an Islamist party that does not endorse female candidates, although it
heavily recruited them to participate as registration and poll workers and has since allowed
three to sit on one of its internal advisory councils. The GPC and a couple of small parties
put forward a few women candidates, but most withdrew prior to election day. The two
women who won seats were both from the GPC and from Aden, a city in which women have
historically had more opportunities for education and political participation than elsewhere in
Yemen.
The 1993 and 1997 elections proved that to be successful, women candidates must have the
backing of a major party. With the exception of the GPC, no other party will "risk" a seat on a
female candidate. The GPC is actively grooming more women for party leadership, has
appointment one to sit on an eight-person executive council, but as noted above, none yet
sits in the top council, and the GPC's commitment to nominate more women is as yet
untested.
Women in Government: Beyond Tokenism, not Yet at Critical Mass
The most senior woman in government is Amat At Alim Al-Souswa, previously Under,
Secretary of Information and recently named Yemen's first female ambassador as deputy
permanent representative to Yemen's UN mission in Geneva. Al-Souswa headed Yemen's
delegation to Beijing in 1995; in the years since, she has worked diligently to apply the
principles of Beijing inside Yemen. The Prime Minister recently ordered each minister to
have at least one woman office director, to promote women's affairs. There are already 95
female directors-general in the ministries, include the head of legal affairs in the Ministry of
Planning and the head of the Humanitarian Demining Program in the Ministry of Cabinet
Affairs: The Foreign Ministry has perhaps the most high-ranking women, with 32 women
diplomats. Not surprisingly, the number and seniority of women in various ministries reflects
the social and political views of the ministers. The profile is best in those ministries headed
by western-educated techno-reformers. There are no women in the military or security
services. There are 32 women judges in Aden, but Islamists have successfully prevented
the naming of female judges in northern Yemen. There are two female parliamentarians,
one of whom, Dr. Oras Sultan Naji, along with Amat Al-Alim Al-Souswa invited the First Lady
to visit Yemen.
The Pioneering Work of NGOs
Although few in number NGOs dedicated to advance women's rights and participation in
politics have had a positive impact: In early 1996, Sanaa University professor Raufa Hassan
and three men activists formed the Arab Democratic Institute (ADI). In the run-up to the
1997 elections, ADI organized domestic election monitoring, voter-education, and women's
education projects. Dr. Raufa has since broken with the ADI but has been instrumental in
founding other NGOs, and her Center for Women's Studies has initiated work in train-the-
trainer programs for women, focus group surveys, and other programs that would be
considered advanced even in the West.
The Yemeni Institute for Democracy Development (YIDD) also participated in civic education
prior to the 1997 elections and studied female voting patterns, which revealed that Yemeni
women routinely voted for the same candidate was their husband or father. YIDD's work
showed that in order to bring women further into the process, special materials and methods
will have to be developed for them.
Other female-dominated NGOs focus on disseminating information on family planning as
well as charitable activities, important contributions to building civil society.
At the instigation of Yemen's Beijing delegation, the government in 1996 created the National
Women's Committee to assist in formulating policies to implement the Beijing
recommendations. The Women's Committee has its own budget and reports directly to the
Council of Ministers. Prominent Yemeni women from politics, business and government
belong - most not only hold down full-time jobs, but also work full-time on the side at building
the capacity of NGOs. Ambassador Amat Al-Alim Al-Souswa acts as chair. While not a true
NGO, the NWC has broad-based representation and shows all the signs of a nascent NOW.
Education
High Illiteracy, Not Enough Schools
Overall illiteracy in Yemen is estimated at 62% with 74% illiteracy for females. The gap between
the literate and illiterate has remained relatively unchanged for the past ten years as school
enrollment rates remain low and the population growth rate remains extremely high, at 3.5%.
According to 1997 figures offered by Yemen's Central Statistical Organization, 73% of all
elementary-aged school children were enrolled in primary school. By ages 16-18, the enrollment
rate for secondary school children dropped to 26%.
These overall enrollment rates figures mask a bigger problem: enrollment of girls at all ages is
dismally low. According to the September 1998 National Strategy for Girls' Education, only
37.4% of girls aged 6-15 nationally are enrolled in primary school. Boys' enrollment for the same
age group is almost 71%. The gap between male and female enrollment in urban areas is only
9%, compared with a 40% difference in male-female enrollment in rural areas, where the vast
majority of Yemenis reside. Low enrollment rates among girls are compounded by high drop-out
rates among girls in primary schools.
The National Strategy recognizes that it is insufficient to provide equal educational opportunity,
which has existed in Yemen for years. The state must also provide the necessary conditions to
allow female students to pursue schooling through the secondary level. Therefore, the National
Strategy eliminated school fees and uniform requirements for all public school girls; provided
families food and other subsidies to encourage them to keep their girls in school; encouraged
more women to take up teaching posts, permitting more girls to study; raised qualitative
standards for female teachers; revised curricula to meet the needs of rural girls; and
strengthened political support for girls' education.
The ROYG is keenly aware of the need to boost educational expenditures to meet the needs of it
youngest citizens and to fund the National Strategy for Girls' Education. Its provisional 1999
budget increased funding for education by more than 5 million Yemeni Rials ($32,050 at the
current exchange rate), which represents an increase of 8.5% over 1998. However, in real
terms, because the value of the Rial has slipped by nearly 18% over the past year, the
educational sector is actually almost 2% worse off than in 1998.
Although secondary school enrollment jumped by 186% from 1990 to 1998, enrollment in
technical and vocational education rose by only 36%, and was only 4% of secondary and.
tech/vocational added together. Technical/vocational graduates entering the labor force are only
13% women.
At the university level, matters are not much better. In the wake of the Gulf War and return of
about 800,000 Yemeni expatriates from Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, the ROYG elected to
funnel as many college-aged returnees as possible into the state university system. While they
have long since graduated, Yemen's burgeoning population has kept enrollment beyond the
system's capacity. Since the early 1990s, Sanaa University has had an enrollment exceeding
100,000 students, overwhelming its available faculty and considerably diminishing the quality of
instruction. Mushrooming secondary graduates have kept the pressure on. At present its total
enrollment is 120,000, but its faculty totals 1,080 -- everything from instructors to full professors.
Freedom of Religion
An Islamic State: A Tradition of Tolerance
The Yemeni Constitution declares Islam the state religion and Islamic Shari ah as the source
of all legislation. Virtually all citizens are Muslims, either the Zadi branch of Shi'a or the
Shafa'i branch of Sunni, representing about 25% and 75% respectively of the total
population. There are also a few thousand Ismailis in the north. Approximately 500 Jews,
representing the remnants of one of the oldest Diaspora communities in the world, are
scattered in a handful of villages between Sanaa and Sa'ada in northern Yemen. Almost all
Christians are temporary foreign residents, except for a few Adeni families who trace their
origins to India. There are also a few Hindus in Aden who also trace their roots to India.
The Constitution confirms Yemen's adherence to the International Declaration of Human
Rights and guarantees that all citizens shall have equality of opportunity in political,
economic and cultural fields. The Government generally respects this right in practice
Yemen Is so overwhetmingly Muslim that societal discrimination is extremely limited.
Yemen's tiny number of religious minorities live in reasonable harmony with their Muslim
neighbors. They are free to worship according to their beliefs and to wear religiously
distinctive ornaments or dress. Nor is there any evidence of violence or discrimination
between the adherents of the two main Islamic sects. Religiously motivated violence is
neither Incited nor tolerated by Islamic clergy and leaders in Yemen.
Public schools do provide instruction in Islam, and not in other religions. However, almost all
non-Muslims are expatriates who attend private schools. Jews are allowed to instruct their
children in Judaism. Under Islam, the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. However, there are no known cases in
which the crime has been charged or prosecuted by Government authorities. There are no
reports of religious detainees or prisoners.
The Jewish Community - Here Since the Beginning
The Jews are the only indigenous religious minority. Descendants of one of the oldest
Diaspora communities in the world, their numbers have diminished dramatically from
several tens of thousands to a few hundred- due to voluntary emigration over the last fifty
years. Although the law makes no distinction and Jews are accorded full rights as citizens,
they are traditionally restricted to living in one section of a city or village and are often
confined to a limited choice of employment, usually farming or handicrafts (with 80% of the
Yemeni population rural farmers, this is not a major distinction). Jews are allowed to and do
own real property. They are respected for their craftsmanship and their silver work is highly
prized. Traditionally, tribal leaders in regions in which the Jews reside are responsible for
protection of the Jews in their area. A failure to properly provide this protection is considered
a serious personal dishonor.
The Christian Community - Foreign and Transient
Almost all Christians are temporary foreign residents, except for a few Adeni families of
Indian origin. Several churches and Hindu temples operate in Aden. No non-Muslim public
places of worship exist in the former North Yemen, largely because the north does not have
a history of a large, resident expatriate community as the former British Colony, Aden, does.
However, Christian church services are regularly held without harassment in private homes
or facilities such as schools, and these facilities appear adequate to accommodate the small
numbers involved. Although the Government does not allow the building of new non-Muslim
public places of worship, last year Yemen established diplomatic relations with the Vatican
and agreed to the construction and operation of a "Christian Center" in Sanaa.
Christian missionaries operate in Yemen and most are dedicated to the provision of medical
services. Invited by the Government, the Sisters of Charity run homes for the poor and
disabled in Sanaa, Taiz, Hodeidah and Aden. They have been invited to open additional
homes. The Government issues residence visas to priests so they may provide for the
community's religious needs. There is also a German Christian charitable mission in
Hodeidah, and a Dutch Christian medical mission in Sa'ada. An American Baptist
congregation has run a hospital in Jibla for over thirty years. The Anglican Church in Aden
also runs a charitable clinic. The Seventh Day Adventists operate a medical NGO, with
some USAID funds, in the rural areas of Hodeidah Governorate.
Occasionally individual elements of the security authorities, apparently acting without orders,
have subjected clergy to observation, sometimes reading their mail, ostensibly prevent
proselytizing. The Government took swift action to arrest the deranged individual who
murdered three nuns from the Sister's of Charity in Hodeidah in 1998.
Embassy Activity
The Embassy enjoys an active dialogue on human rights issues with both the Government of
Yemen and with NGOs and other individuals. No specific action in support of religious
freedom has been indicated given the Government's and society's general tolerance of its
religious minorities. Embassy officers, up to and including the Ambassador, meet from time
to time with representatives of the Jewish and Christian communities in Yemen.
Civil Society
Widening the Public Space
Yemeni citizens are working to expand their participation in the public sphere, be it the
political or non-governmental area. As in so many other aspects of life in Yemen, financial
constraints not only hinder the development of civic organizations, but also often produce
counterproductive behaviors among leaders competing for limited resources. Government
handling of NGOs can be arbitrary, although in general the Government supports activities
that further the overall social and economic goals of the state. NGOs devoted to promoting
awareness of human rights issues are relatively new and, not surprisingly, garner more
scrutiny and interference from the Government than social service groups. Leadership and
management training are critical for the development of voluntary organizations.
Brief History
The guidance of Islam and Yemen's rural traditions have long promoted local cooperation
and self-help efforts devoted to building mosques, schools, or other public works. In the late
19th and early 20th centuries, formal voluntary organizations flourished under British rule in
Aden, with the first groups devoted to charitable activities. Gradually cultural, literary and
political groups emerged. A number of newspapers, including the first English-language
daily in the Arabian Peninsula, published regularly. The Marxist people's Democratic
Republic of Yemen essentially eradicated the civil society in Aden and in the south that had
existed under the British.
In the north, rural cooperative development societies began in the early 1960s, channeling
the private remittances from Yemeni expatriate workers into the building of the rural
infrastructure. The cooperative movement reached its peak in the late 1970s. Its very
success led to it being co-opted by the national government in the early 1980s, effectively
eliminating private funding, which could not be adequately replaced by state monies.
The Constitution guarantees the rights of Yemenis to form NGOs. NGOs are governed by
Law no. 11 enacted in 1963, which establishes basic rules for organization and registration
and places NGOs under the monitoring authority of the Government, currently the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry has the right to abolish a society or freeze its activities
by administrative decision or through rejection of no-response to its application for renewal of
its license, granted for a period of 6 months to three years. Many associations operate freely
and effectively without licenses from the Government. Perhaps the largest problem faced by
NGOs is the inconsistent application of existing law and a sense of arbitrary interference by
Government. The Government recognizes the inadequacy of the current law governing
NGOs, but a draft law before Parliament has failed to pass due to numerous concerns that it
could be worse than the current law.
Three Phases of Civil Society Development
The civic landscape of Yemen can be divided into three main phases of development: ad hoc
and localized, usually rural, self-help cooperatives (building mosques, roads, etc.); organized
local, usually urban, welfare associations that address social problems (literacy and family
planning advocates); and associations organized around national political issues (such as
human rights and voter registration). The first category has existed since time immemorial
and has set the social precedent for citizens taking responsibility for their own environments.
A recent independent study indicates that rural farmers and villagers still depend on self-
generated civic organizations headed by a trusted member of the community to undertake
Population & Family Planning:
Overcoming Tradition; Providing Education
President Saleh has indicated his intention to declare the year 2000 as Yemen's year to focus on
population issues. In a promising start, the Minister of Public Health already has support for
the concept of child-spacing from the head of Yemen's largest Islamic charitable society. The
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) recently announced is commitment to
Yemen of $18 million over the next four years to support reproductive health and family planning
activities. Dr. Nafis Sadik, head of UNFPA, visited Yemen in early May 1999 and strongly
encouraged the government to create a parliamentary committee on women in development,
urging parliamentarians to contact their counterparts in Egypt, Indonesia and Iran, all of which
have led successful population control campaigns through Friday prayers at local mosques, TV
programs and other media avenues.
During Dr. Sadik's press conference, she was impressed by the many questions about family
planning and Islam. The Minister of Education commented that journalists knew the answers,
but wanted to use Dr. Sadik's responses to develop stories on the views of a Muslim woman.
The stories likely will be used in conjunction with an upcoming conference in Sanaa of religious
leaders on Islam and family planning. Religious leaders from Al-Azhar University in Egypt and
Iran have been invited to attend the conference and share their views with their Yemeni
counterparts.
Yemen's 1998 estimated population is 17.5 million, which at an annual growth rate of 3.5% is
expected to double by 2018. Half of that population is under 15 years of age. The mortality rate
for Yemeni children under the age of five decreased from 378 per thousand in 1960 to 100 per
thousand in 1998, but this level remains unacceptably high. High fertility rates (more than 6
children per mother, often spaced no more than one year apart) take a huge toll on the mother's
health and on her ability to ensure adequate nutrition and care for all of her children, and places
the average Yemeni family in severe economic distress as the cost of living continues to rise.
A USAID-funded Demographic Health Survey undertaken in 1997 and completed in 1998 shows
that Yemen has made some progress with respect to population control: the population growth
rate has declined since 1992 from 3.7% to 3.5% and the fertility rate has declined from 7 to 6.5.
During the same period, Yemen's national contraceptive prevalence rate has doubled from 7% to
13%. These indicators illustrate a positive trend, but Yemen still has a long way to go.
Recent U.S. assistance on population issues has been focused on training 220 community
midwives, on renovating and equipping 22 maternal and child health/family planning (MCH/FP)
units in district health units in the governorates of Hajjah, Hodeidah and Hadhramaut, and in
supplying a limited number of commodities, including contraceptives, to those centers. There
has been a notable increase in contraceptive prevalence in those areas in which USAID has
been involved. However, until Yemen's civil and religious leadership actively and vocally
campaign to limit Yemen's family size by spacing children more than one year apart, real
progress will be elusive.
Educating Women to Stem Population Growth
Yemen's firmly tradition-bound society holds a somewhat restricted perspective on the role of
women in society, including female education. Continued active support by both multilateral and
bilateral donors in the areas of female education and reproductive health will be required for the
foreseeable future to have any kind of lasting impact on Yemeni society. Those women
fortunate enough to have had educated fathers who understand and appreciate the value of
educating their daughters have been able to pursue their interests across an extremely broad
academic spectrum, including medicine, law, agriculture and engineering. Their individual and
collective impact on Yemeni society, although they are currently few in number, is considerable.
USAID currently is devoting a portion of available pipeline funds for teacher training, focusing on
female teachers. Yemen's woefully low female primary school enrollment rate (34.7% nationally)
is restricted to a great extent by a dearth of female teachers and adequate classroom (i.e.,
separate from boys) facilities. Were additional funding available to expand and extend USAID
programs in Yemen, primary emphasis would be placed on offering continued support to
MCH/FP facilities in rural areas, and to girls' education. Increasing female literacy rates and
reducing fertility rates would ultimately improve women's health, economic options, level of
meaningful political participation, and improve child health, thereby yielding benefits to the
development of Yemen's struggling economy. The return of Peace Corps volunteers to Yemen
also would have a marked impact on this Mission's ability to increase female access to education
and health care by the provision of female teachers and health care workers in rural areas.
U.S.-Yemeni Bilateral Relations
National Interests and National Values
US policy and programs in Yemen support the basic and complementary goals of
democratization and Yemen's regional re-integration. After a serious chilling of relations
following Yemen's opposition to Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91, our bilateral
relationship has recently begun to improve at an accelerating speed. Corollary goals include
cooperation on counterterrorism, population, health and literacy issues and economic
assistance. While we have a number of bilateral programs to support these goals, Embassy
Sanaa does not have an American staffed USAID presence or Peace Corps at this time.
Yemen sees both its fundamental interests and its fundamental values as compatible with
ours. Yemen, as a government and a people, is staunchly nationalistic but also open to
continued improved relations with the U.S. The Yemeni government (ROYG) and the people
are justly proud of what they have achieved in political and economic reform, and painfully
aware of their limitations and the challenges they face.
Democratization: A Core Value
A core value of US foreign policy has been the expansion and consolidation of democracy.
Our visible, active and concrete engagement in Yemen's efforts makes manifest not only to
the Yemeni people but also to others striving toward democracy the reality of our
commitment. Yemen is the only country on the Arabian Peninsula with a functioning
multiparty Parliament elected by universal suffrage. It already enjoys an active press, has
initiated judicial reform and is crafting local administration legislation. The Government of
Yemen has made a public commitment to and requested international donor technical
assistance on improvement of its human rights performance, reform of its judiciary, and
strengthening of its democratic institutions and civil society, including the empowerment of
women.
Regional Integration: A Core Interest
Regionally, Yemen has become a more reliable partner on global and regional issues of
importance to us. It continues to publicly support the Middle East Peace Process, to treat
Iran with respect but wariness, and to take a more constructive public stance on Iraqi
compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. It supports NATO's Five Points on Kosovo
and has sent humanitarian assistance to the refugees. Yemen has recently restored full
diplomatic relations with Kuwait, severed since the Gulf War. Although their lengthy border
remains undemarcated, Yemen and Saudi Arabia maintain an open dialogue and normal
relations. Yemen has played a constructive role in international fora, such as the Arab
League.
Yemen has cooperation with the United States and others on combating terrorism by taking
steps to deny safe haven to international terrorists and by continuing efforts, not wholly
successful, to rid the country of foreign extremists. To underscore its commitment to
counterterrorism, it has signed and sent to Parliament four international counterterrorism
conventions with two more in process. The USG has an active Anti-terrorism Assistance
Training program and otherwise seeks to assist and cooperate with the ROYG on terrorism
issues.
The US-Yemeni military cooperation relationship has improved at a pace with the overall
relationship. Yemen has a model humanitarian demining program financed mainly by the
USG; the US Navy has a bunkering contract at Aden port; we have signed a Defense Fuel
Storage Agreement; and there are joint exercises and training opportunities.
The Stakes
Yemen is not a lead player on many of our key regional objectives. It is not one of Israel's
neighbors, nor can it directly threaten Israel's security. It is neither a rogue state supporting
terrorism not is it procuring weapons of mass destruction nor is it threatened by a rogue
state. And it lacks both critical petroleum reserves and significant market potential for US
business. However, Yemen is in a position, to varying degrees to affect key US regional
interests.
A politically unstable, ideologically hostile and increasingly impoverished Yemen would
create an unacceptable destabilizing factor on the Arabian Peninsula and across the
strategic Bab al-Mandeb to the Horn of Africa. A central government unable to expand its
authority over the entire country would reopen Yemen as an attractive safe haven to
terrorists and other elements inimical to regional stability and safety, and increase the
vulnerability of Americans to terrorism and tribal kidnappings.
A stable, prosperous Yemen that perceives a stake for itself in both the bilateral relationship
with the U.S. and in construction relations with US regional allies is more likely to support
and cooperate on key regional objectives. Yemen's internal stability will depend upon the
institutionalization of its democratic and economic reform programs. The U.S. alone cannot
assure Yemen's stability; it is important the Yemen be regionally integrated as well.
The Challenges
The challenges Yemen faces, particularly population growth, widespread illiteracy and
resource depletion, threaten its efforts toward democratization, economic development and
political stability. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its geographic size
doubled in 1990 with unity; its infrastructure is primitive; its modern political history is less
than a decade old; and, its population, overwhelmingly rural and is traditionally greater than
that of its Arabian Peninsula neighbors combined.
Yemen's challenges are felt most strongly by its women. There is universal suffrage and the
right to hold elected office. Yemen has just named its first woman ambassador and there are
a number of impressive, talented women throughout the government and in the private
sector. At the same time, female illiteracy is approximately 7.4%; the fertility rate is 6.5 and
Yemen has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world. The
Government supports female education, health care, child-spacing and other central
women's issues, but lacks the resources to fulfill its commitment. Most donor assistance,
including the nominal US programs, is focused on these sectors.
Economic & Commercial Overview
Glum Statistics and Grim Prospects
Eighty to ninety percent of Yemen's citizens live below the poverty line. According to 1998
UNDP human development indicators, Yemen ranks 151 out of 174 nations, largely as a result of
its meager $300 annual per capita income, high maternal and infant mortality rates (14 per
1,000 live births and 100 per 1,000 live births, respectively ), and high level of illiteracy (62%).
Unemployment ranges between 36-40%.
Despite these glum statistics, the Republic of Yemen government (ROYG) remains committed to
the program of economic reform upon which it embarked in 1995 under the guidance of the IMF
and the World Bank. Since 1995, Yemen has made remarkable progress in achieving
macroeconomic stability. The currency was floated and stabilized, triple-digit inflation of the
early 1990s was reduced to approximately 6% in 1997 and 10% in 1998, and government
subsidies on basic market commodities such as wheat, wheat flour, gasoline, diesel fuel and
electricity have either been eliminated (in the case of gasoline and wheat) or significantly
reduced. However, Yemen has suffered in the past two years from the precipitous decline in
world oil prices and shock waves emanating from the Asia meltdown. Over the past four
months, Yemen's currency has dropped in value by 18%, largely as a result of meager rains and
the loss of a planting season.
The international multilateral and bilateral donor community, while feeling the growing global
pinch on development resources, has continued to support Yemen with over $2 billion in
economic assistance pledges over the next several years. Russia's accession to the Paris Club
in September 1997 proved a coup for Yemen's total bilateral debt obligations. Eighty percent of
Yemen's $6.7 billion debt to Russia, primarily for arms purchases from the former Soviet Union,
was forgiven outright. The remainder was rescheduled on Naples terms, reducing the debt by a
further 67% and refinancing the remainder (approximately $450 million) for 30 years.
The next phases of economic reform will prove much tougher to implement than the
macroeconomic stabilization Yemen has achieved over the past four years. All remaining
government subsidies (diesel fuel, electricity, water, sewage, and wheat flour) will be eliminated.
The country's inefficient, overstaffed, and often corrupt bureaucracy will be streamlined,
appropriately compensated and adequately trained. The ROYG must take action to stem a
population that is growing 3.7% annually and that is consuming scarce renewable water supplies
at 140-150% of recharge rate. It must create a transparent legal environment that can
objectively and independently resolve disputes. Finally, the ROYG must also find a way to
extend its authority appropriately throughout the entire country. Handling these issues will
require a deft political touch. The tolerance level of Yemen's public for further economic
hardship brought through the reform process is beginning to wear thin, leading to widespread
demonstrations in June 1998 when diesel prices were last raised.
While Yemen has only meager petroleum and natural gas reserves of its own, from which it
derives over 60% of its hard-currency revenues, Yemenis have a long tradition of trading. Most
of Yemen's current economic activities focus on trading, rather than on value-added production.
In addition, Yemen's lack of adequate infrastructure sometimes impedes foreign investment.
Although the government appears willing to allow private investors to expand Yemen's woefully
inadequate electricity generation capacity, the first attempt at a build-own-operate power plant
was not successful. Government revenues are insufficient to guarantee commercial power
purchase contracts. Outside the electricity sector, the World Bank and other donors are
financing road, water and sewage treatment projects.
Nevertheless, private sector investors can still find attractive opportunities in Yemen. U.S.,
French and Korean oil companies, along with the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources, formed
a liquefied natural gas (LNG) joint venture to process Yemen's 17 trillion cubic feet of proven
natural gas reserves for export. In the port of Aden, a new container terminal owned and
managed by the Port of Singapore Authority opened for business on March 19, 1999.
Development of the Aden Free Zone presents opportunities for manufacturing companies to
process and ship to the Gulf, the Subcontinent, and East Africa. On Yemen's Red Sea coast,
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) partially funded a feasibility study for a private
oil refinery at Ras Issa, north of the port of Hodeidah. The current worldwide refinery glut has
postponed any immediate plans to develop the Ras Issa facility. TDA also has partially funded
feasibility studies for a 200-bed private hospital in Sanaa, and a cement plant in Bajil, about one
hour east of Hodeidah.
Yemen's unique culture, history and geography offer attractive prospects for tourism
development. Plentiful stocks of fish and shellfish provide opportunities for packing and export.
Stunning coral reefs and the unique flora of Socotra Island offer extensive opportunities for
ecotourism. Steadily growing ship trade in Aden provides excellent prospects for skilled ship
maintenance and repair facilities. Furthermore, a major component of economic reform is the
planned or completed privatization of approximately 100 public sector enterprises.
Yemenis hold U.S. businesses and products in high regard; in 1997 and 1998, the U.S. ranked
third among suppliers of imports, after Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. U.S. exports
to Yemen rose by 16% in 1998, but still represents less than 10% of Yemen's total imports.
Despite the higher shipping costs of U.S. versus European or Asian products, U.S.
manufacturers and contractors should continue to benefit from opportunities emerging in Yemen.
Political Overview - Tribal Roots and Democratic Future
Democracy may be the only viable form of government for Yemen. Despite long stretches of
authoritarian rule, either under the Imam and the Republicans in the North or the British and
the Marxists in the South, Yemenis are fiercely independent and demand that their views be
heard - either in a traditional tribal setting or within emerging democratic institutions.
Yemen is not by any means a nation of young Jeffersonians; many of the currently powerful
are still unsure of participatory democracy and political rights. But, President Ali Abdullah
Saleh and key advisors, most especially his U.S.-educated Prime Minister, Dr. Abdul Karim
Al-Iryani, realize that democracy and economic reform offer the only hope for long-term
political stability and for improving the quality of life for Yemenis. Perhaps more importantly,
the Yemeni people are developing experience in civil society and the expectation of
participatory politics. It would be difficult, although not impossible, to turn back the political
clock.
Society, Geography and Tribes
Yemen's political and social development reflects its rugged, isolated terrain and its lack of
marketable resources. Most Yemenis live in picturesque but inaccessible villages and
depend upon animal husbandry and subsistence agriculture. Paved roads connect only the
largest towns. While most of the country has electricity, there are few phones and little
access to mass media, beyond government-controlled TV and radio. All central
governments have been weak, lacking in resources with which to project power into
scattered, remote villages. The situation is improving, but some areas remain beyond the
reach of government authority.
Yemen's social organization varies from region to region but still reflects the traditional,
decentralized tribal-clan structure. Somewhat weakened by external influences, tribal
traditions and organization still inform political and social life. Tribal affiliations are
particularly strong in the northern highlands of Yemen, where local shaykhs continue to
mediate local disputes, often providing quicker, "better" justice than can governmental courts.
It is less pronounced in the urban areas and virtually gone in the immediate Aden area, but
still provides the overlay. Craftsmen and tradesmen, such as butchers and bakers,
traditional judges (qadis) and descendents of the Prophet's family (sayyids) are outside the
tribal structure but under the local tribe's "protection." In fact, many of the urban and
educated look down on the rural tribal elements as little more than course country bumpkins
and the shaykhs as a throw-back to another era.
The essence of tribal identity is personal honor - of the individual, and by extension his tribe.
Honor requires that the powerful protect the weak, and that an assault on any member of the
tribe be viewed as an assault on the whole. Although, or perhaps because, Yemen is one of
the most heavily armed societies in the world, elaborate codes of behavior have developed
to forestall violence and avoid blood feuds. The seclusion and covering of women stems
largely from the fear that women are particularly vulnerable and thus by keeping them
separate they are shielded from harm and the tribe avoids potential for violence.
Heavy armed tribes can still engage government security forces in pitched battles and often
are better equipped qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The kidnapping of foreigners has
gone on intermittently for years as a way to force the government to respond to a tribe's
demand for better public services, such as schools, roads and clinics. The foreigners are
always treated as guests of the tribe and inevitably released unharmed.
Tribal structure increasingly overlaps modern political institutions. For example, the
paramount shaykh of the Hashid Tribal Federation serves as speaker of the Parliament and
head of the major opposition party, Islaah. Many prominent shaykhs or their relatives hold
seats in the parliament. One phenomenon worth watching is the extent to which tribal
hierarchy adapts and uses the structures of representative government, or resists and is
ultimately overtaken by them. Right now the Islaah party, which largely represents
conservative and tribal interests, is blocking passage of a local administration law which
would devolve authority to the governorates and below. Rather than viewing this as an
opportunity to legitimize their traditional authority with an elected title, they see it as a
competitive structure.
The Decision on Democracy
Yemen's decision to pursue democracy began in 1990 when the leaders of the republican
Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen (South Yemen) agreed to unite on democratic principles. Although public rhetoric
and quiet negotiations on unification had taken place over the past decade, the collapse of
the Soviet Union, PDRY's patron, undermined the viability of the PDRY and created
conditions for unification. Virtually unprecedented, the unification and launching of
democratization was agreed to directly amongst the parties involved and without force.
Yemen would be ruled by a President, there would be multiple political parties and an openly
contested elected Parliament.
The pacific nature of this unification is more remarkable given South Yemen's. For 140
years Aden was a British Crown Colony and sultans in protectorate status ruled the eastern
reaches. The YSP's roots lay in a violent, terrorist-style liberation war against the British; it
looked to the Soviet Union and the East Germans for political, security and economic
assistance; was one of the first states declared a state sponsor of terrorism; assassinated
President Saleh's predecessor; supported an insurgency against him for nearly ten years;
launched a major invasion at least once; experienced several internal coups with higher
casualties than the 1994 Civil War; and, had one of the most dismal human rights records in
the world. Further, the South had always and will continue to be at a disadvantage VS. the
North in population - there are approximately 7 North Yemenis to every South Yemeni, and
most of the southerners are in Aden.
The first free, multi-party parliamentary elections - which included universal suffrage - took
place in 1993. It produced a coalition government dominated by President Saleh's General
People's Congress (GPC; 40% of the seats) and the former PDRY ruling party, the Yemeni
Socialist Party (YSP at 20%). The Islamic Grouping for Reform (Islaah), a legal Islamist
opposition party, won about 20% of the seats, with other smaller parties, primarily Pan-
Arabists, dividing up the remainder.
Southern Discontent - the 1994 Civil War
Although the YSP obtained cabinet seats out of proportion to their electoral results, southern
leaders, who totally lacked a democratic tradition, began to feel that the democratic process
of the unified country might lead to their eventual marginalization. Aided by Saudi Arabia,
these former Marxists launched a civil war in the spring of 1994 to re-divide north from south.
The U.S. staunchly supported the unity of Yemen, and President Saleh achieved a decisive
victory over the secessionists in just seven weeks. A number of the YSP leadership chose
self-imposed if prudent exile. The secessionists have reconstituted themselves as an
externally financed, extra-constitutional opposition called the MOWJ.
The remnants of the YSP in Yemen have gone on to self-marginalize itself through a boycott
of the 1997 parliamentary elections and an unwillingness to disavow its secessionist and
Marxist past. Full integration of the south into a unified Yemen remains a major political
challenge. "Carpetbagger" charges are levied regularly.
The Government, for its part, has appointed a disproportionate number of southerners, albeit
GPC members, to cabinet and sub-ministerial positions, seeking to keep a "regional" balance
in all key government posts. It has also structured the electoral mechanisms for the 2000
presidential elections to allow for a YSP role, despite their lack of any parliamentary seats.
An Immature Political Elite
Democratization, political pluralism and the development of civil society in Yemen face
numerous long-term challenges. These are: an immature political elite, including the political
opposition that does not fully understand or appreciate the "ground rules" of the democratic
process; high illiteracy rates; and impoverished central government that cannot meet the
basic needs of its citizens.
The immaturity of the political elite is a nemesis to democratization. Yemen is a consensus
driven society and winner-take-all competition is uncomfortable for most Yemenis.
Opposition leaders are reluctant to put their party platforms - and their personal prestige -
on the line in an open election. The YSP boycotted the 1997 elections rather than face
defeat. The Islaah leadership would prefer to seek a deal with the GPC for cabinet seats
than openly contest the presidential election. A supreme irony of the current process is the
majority party's increasingly desperate attempts to convince the opposition parties to field a
credible candidate against Ali Abdullah Saleh in the October elections. The President and
his party understand that a 60% vs. 40% victory in a credible election will have more
international legitimacy than a 90% referendum result.
but A Vigorous Process
Despite these formidable obstacles, democracy seems to be taking root in Yemen. The
1997 Parliamentary elections were judged by international observers to be free and fair. The
electoral campaign witnessed vigorous efforts by Yemeni NGOs to encourage registration,
particularly among women, and to conduct domestic monitoring of the actual voting. The
parliament is as yet no match for the power of the Presidency, but shows signs of developing
greater independence. The GPC dominates, but party members on more than occasion
have rejected important draft laws they found inadequate or unacceptable. The Parliament
also regularly calls for cabinet members to defend legislation and budgets.
The Yemenis are intent upon developing a democratic system that meets international
standards, but reflects their own unique history and culture. How they will address issues
such as tribal authority and north-south rivalry and suspicions is not clear. Whatever comes
out will, however, be uniquely Yemeni.
Qat: Not a Drug, But a Social Drag
It is difficult to get an accurate picture of Yemen without taking into consideration the widespread
social allure and economic consequences of qat consumption. Qat (catha edulis forsskal) is a
hedge-type shrub with shiny leaves cultivated largely in the highlands of Yemen and Ethiopia.
Its tender young leaves, when chewed and stored in the cheek (resulting in the ubiquitous
"baseball bulge"), provide a mildly stimulating, sometimes euphoric effect and a sense of well-
being. Western qat chewers have equated the effect to drinking 10 or 15 cups of espresso.
There is little evidence to indicate that qat is physically addictive, although some heavy chewers
may find it temporarily psychologically addictive. Other side effects sometimes attributed to qat,
including oral lesions and even cancer, are usually more directly attributable to applied
pesticides that have not been properly washed from the leaves before chewing.
Qat chewing sessions (sometimes euphemistically called "social sessions") generally take place
in the afternoons after lunch. Heavy qat chewers chew daily; others limit their qat chewing to
Thursday and Friday afternoons (the Yemeni weekend). Large quantities of qat are consumed
during celebratory occasions, including weddings and funerals, when the decedent's friends and
family gather to reminisce and ponder the meaning of life. Businessmen discuss deals over qat;
civil servants and parliamentarians iron out their differences; and students and journalists claim
to do their best studying and writing while chewing qat.
Some businessmen and leading Cabinet officials in Yemen privately decry the many wasted
productive hours consumed with qat chewing, but at the same time recognize qat's role as a
great social equalizer. Qat sessions are one of the few places where drivers and servants often
will chew with the head of household and honored guests offering a valuable opportunity for
both better to understand the lives and interests of the other. While some leading businessmen
eschew qat in favor of longer, more productive work hours, even they acknowledge that some of
the their best business deals have been concluded during qat sessions, when all parties are
relaxed and prone to philosophical discussion and free exchange of ideas.
Some speculate that the exponential increase in qat chewing over the past ten years is the direct
result of Yemen's declining economy: if the average Yemeni had the incentive not to chew qat
(read: a better-paying job), fewer productive hours would be spent in costly chews. There does
appear to be a rough correlation between higher education and lower consumption of qat; most
well-educated businessmen and government officials either don't chew qat at all, or restrict their
chewing to weekend sessions. Certainly, for the less well-off, the economic impact of qat is
staggering:
-- Yemenis spend about 400 billion rials ($2.8 billion) each year on the qat trade, more than the
annual state budget.
-- Qat accounts for about 33% of agricultural production, and represents almost 10% of GNP.
Since the money generally is circulated domestically, it can provide enough income to keep
farmers down on the farm, stemming urban migration. However, no foreign exchange or
investment capital is generated, as would be if exportable crops were grown instead.
-- Agricultural acreage devoted to qat increases annually at about 14%, usually at the expense of
exportable products such as coffee, cotton and vegetables. Land planted with qat is 5 times
greater than that planted with grapes and dates; 10 times greater than that planted with
bananas, and equals two-thirds of total land planted with coffee and tobacco combined.
-- Yemeni families, on average, spend more than 63% of their income on qat.
-- Depending on its quality, qat can cost anywhere between 300 Yemeni rials ($2) per bundle to
70,000 YR ($457) per bundle. This, in a country whose annual per capita GDP is less than
$300. The average Yemeni man consumes at least one bundle per qat chewing session; more
for ceremonial occasions such as weddings and funerals. (Prompted largely by boredom, qat
chewing is increasingly evident among middle- and upper-class women.)
-- Qat chewers, in each session, spend at least 4 hours in social chewing that otherwise might be
used more productively.
There is a nascent trend in Yemen to eradicate qat both as an agricultural mainstay and as a
part of everyman's daily budget. The Society for Combating Qat is targeting youth and teaching
them the dangers and costs of qat consumption. While the Society's efforts are unlikely to yield
measurable results in the short term, widespread media coverage its campaign has received
lately, coupled with similar calls in the Yemeni Cabinet and Parliament, are giving Yemenis
something to think about, or at least to chew over.
Health:
The Impact of One Visionary Minister
The Republic of Yemen currently is blessed with a vigorous and visionary health care reform
pioneer in its Minister of Public Health, Dr. Abdullah Abdul Wali Nasher. Since becoming
Minister in May 1997, Dr. Nasher has decentralized the Ministry's budget, introduced openly
advertised, merit-based hiring practices, turned around a miserable public hospital by putting the
right manager in place, and outlined his priorities to improve and expand Yemen's minimal health
care system. In September 1998, Dr. Nasher officially launched a comprehensive health care
reform program in Yemen. As Dr. Jacques Baudouy, World Bank Director of Human
Development for the Middle East and North Africa said, it was the first time he had ever seen a
reform strategy developed without World Bank participation.
The Ministry's program was driven by Yemen's woeful health care statistics, including the
worsening of some health indicators, such as malnutrition, during this decade, and a government
per capita health care budget of about $3.00. Yemen's budget problems exacerbate the lack of
essential drugs and services, an immunization rate of less than 28%, and poor geographic
access. Because of its extensive high mountainous regions, only 30% of Yemen's rural
population has access to health care; only 50% of Yemen's total population has access overall.
Maternal and child health indicators are particularly dire, and compare poorly against those of
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Some statistics:
Maternal mortality rate:
1,000-1,400 per 100,000 births
Fertility rate:
6.5
Prenatal care:
26%
Postnatal care:
5%
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate:
13%
Comparative Statistics (from UNICEF's State of the World's Children 1999)
Yemen Egypt
Jordan
Under 5 Mortality Rate 1997
(per 1,000 live births):
100
73
24
Percentage of low birth
weight newborns (1990-97)
19%
10%
7%
Percentage of births
attended by trained personnel
1990-97
43%
56%
97%
Yemen Egypt
Jordan
Percentage of women
immunized for tetanus (1990-97)
17%
61%
40%
The fundamental aims of Yemen's health care reform program are:
Make health care less expensive by providing good quality health services closer to where
people live and decreasing the cost of drugs. Drugs and transportation are the two highest
health care costs to patients, making up between 64 and 82% of out-of-pocket health care
expenditures.
Emphasize preventive health services, which offer a much higher cost savings than curative
care. Many cases of infant and child mortality could have been prevented through timely
immunizations and treatment.
Make more efficient use of limited government resources through improved budgetary and
management systems, including decentralization of funding and authority to the district level
-- closer to where the people who need those services live.
Limit the government's service delivery role to what is financially and technically feasible.
Encourage private sector health providers and NGO health providers to work in partnership
with the Ministry of Public Health in meeting national health goals.
Increase resources flowing into the government health care sector by allocating more funds
from the national budget, and by introducing cost-sharing and community financing schemes.
Develop health policies and implementation strategies that target adequately the needs of
women. Yemen's low female-to-male health provider ratio makes it culturally difficult for
Yemeni women to access health care. Staff hiring and incentive policies, monitoring
indicators and all aspects of the Ministry's work need to become gender-sensitive.
Dr. Nasher's accessibility and vision have led to a dramatic increase in both bilateral and
multilateral activity in the health sector over the past several years. For example, USAID's
Options for Family Care project trained and graduated 220 community midwives in the
governorates of Hajjah, Hodeidah and Hadhramaut, and have renovated and equipped 22
maternal and child health units in district health centers. Continuing assistance in the health
sector is vital to Yemen's goal of reducing its population growth rate.
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Children's Issues:
Not Exploitation, but Economics
The Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) is aware of the problem of young children in the
workplace, but is at odds on how to effect changes in its child labor situation in the short run.
Yemen in 1991 signed the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is also a
signatory to Arab conventions on children's rights. Since late 1997, the ROYG has been working
proactively with UNICEF, WHO and the ILO to draft a national strategy on child labor. The
strategy and its associated law have not yet been finalized Yemen has been stymied in its
efforts to achieve substantial progress on this issue by other overarching priorities, such as its
stagnant economy.
Yemen's child labor problem is largely the result of a distressed national economy that cannot
provide schools for all children or jobs for all adults who need work. Most of Yemen's employed
children are working in family-run subsistence agriculture. Girls take on substantial household
duties within the home as young as eight years old. To augment meager family incomes, a few
children work for non-family enterprises such as small urban shops or restaurants. According to
1994 census data (the latest available), approximately 6.5% of Yemen's workforce is comprised
of children, most of whom belong to Yemeni immigrant families returning from the Horn of Africa.
According to existing Yemeni labor laws, children under 15 are generally prohibited from
working. However, Yemen's current economic distress makes enforcement of the law difficult. If
the authorities prohibit many 8-15 year-olds from working, their families, often headed by only
one parent, will have no other source of income. Due to a lack of educational opportunities,
these children would not go to school, but could end up on the streets, unsupervised and
uncontrolled.
There is no evidence in Yemen of forced or bonded child labor, nor of any commercial sex
industry in this conservative Islamic county. With half of its 17.5 million population under the age
of 15, and an unemployment rate approaching 40%, Yemenis out of necessity accept an "all able
hands in any employment opportunity" approach.
when me
security
pressure S reate
child labor
FROM : EMERGING DEMOCRACIES FORUM
FAX NO. : 202 265 2412
Jun. 22 1999 12:49PM P1
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES FORUM
FAX COVER SHEET
THE NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND
TO: Noa meyer
THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
FAX #: 456-2581
In Partnership with:
FROM:
UNITED NATIONS
Natalic Emerging C. Democracies Sunf [email protected] Forum Rebecca #
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT
FOR DEMOCRACY
DATE:
June221999
WESTMINSTER
FOUNDATION FOR
DEMOCRACY
PAGES: 3
And the Governments of:
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JAPAN
THE NETHERLANDS
THE UNITED KINGDOM
THE UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON, DC 20036 202-328-3136 FAX: 202-939-3166 EMAIL: [email protected] HTTP://WWW.NDI.ORG
FROM : EMERGING DEMOCRACIES FORUM
FAX NO. : 202 265 2412
Jun. 22 1999 12:50PM
P2
The National Democratic Institute. 06/21/99
Women in Yemen - Statistics
Population
Total
Women
16,387,963
8,025,158
Life Expectancy
Yemen
World
Arab States
women
61
65
72.
men
57
62
69
Population Growth
Yemen
World
Arab States
3.3%
1.2%
3.2%
Literacy - age 15 and over who can read
Yemen
World
Arab States
women
39%
71.5%
63.7%
men
53%
83.7%
78.7%
Women in Parliament(there are currently two women in the Yemeni parliament)
Yemen
World
Arab States
Both Houses
0.7%
12.8%
3.4%
Lower house
0.7%
13.3%
3.6%
Upper house
0.0%
10.6%
2.5%
Women's Rights
The Constitution of Yemen guarantees women equal opportunity in political, economy,
social and cultural fields. Women's rights. in terms of marriage, divorce, remarriage,
inheritance and household requirements, are dictated by the Islamic tenets and Islamic
religious law, or Shari'ah.
1
FROM : EMERGING DEMOCRACIES FORUM
FAX NO. : 202 265 2412
Jun. 22 1999 12:50PM P3
The National Democrate Institute, 06/21/99
Women in Yemen's Ancient History
Women played a prominent role in Yemen's ancient history. The Queen of Sheba, ruler
adultify
of the kingdom of Southern Arabia in the 10th century BC, remains one of Yemen's best
%
known rulers and is infamous for her meeting with King Solomon during biblical times.
Told of Solomon's infinite wisdom, she undertook a long and difficult journey to
Jerusalem to test his wisdom and bear witness to his acts. Fascinated by Solomon, the
Queen of Sheba bestowed, "a hundred and twenty talents of gold, and of spices very great
store, and precious stones," upon him and returned to South Yemen, singing his praises
throughout the land.
Queen Arwa ruled Yemen for forty years and is considered the most distinctive of
Yemeni women after the Queen of Sheba. While her husband, the crown prince, lay
mile
this
paralyzed in bed, Arwa took over the responsibilities of the crown. As ruler of Yemen,
stom
Queen Arwa raised the economic growth of the state and standard of living of the people
by taking great care in agriculture and social issues, such as education. She appointed
state ministers and province governors to maintain this stability. Queen Arwa is also
remembered for the many monuments, schools and mosques she built in Yemen. When
she died, she was buried in the mosque she had built during her reign.
Increased Role of Women in Elections
In 1993 the first parliamentary elections in newly unified Yemen enfranchised women,
the first in the Arabian peninsula to do SQ. But difficulties and confusion regarding voter
registration meant that fewer than 20 percent of the women who were eligible registered
to vote and fewer still voted on election day. In preparation for parliamentary elections in
1997 Raufa Hassan, Yemen's leading feminist and founder of the first Women's studies
program in the region (also an unsuccessful candidate in the 1993 parliamentary
elections), worked to organize women to be knowledgeable voters. The organization she
helped found, the Arab Democratic Institute, a non partisan independent civic
organization that hired 11 women as regional organizers who then hired 74 consistency
coordinators. Targeting 63 constituencies where fewer than 500 women had registered
for the 1993 elections, these women fanned out throughout Yemen to educate women
about the elections. Gathering village women where they lived in someone's home or
during village weddings, these women discussed voting procedures, women's rights and
the importance of casting an informed ballot. The program was popular and reached out
to thousands of women, providing them with the information and skills necessary to
participate in politics. In part as a result of the efforts of the women Hassan organized,
825,984 women were added to the voter lists prior to the 1997 elections (there had been
478,566 women registered in 1993). Women voted in proportions similar to men on
election day
2
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The Yemcni Civil War-1994
The Process of Unification
Although the Yemeni people have long shared a common ethnic and cultural identity, for
most of its recorded history, Yemen constituted a single political entity for only brief
periods. Prior to 1990, the Ottoman Turks ruled all of Yemen for a short period in the
late seventeenth century.
The modern political history of Yemen began in 1962 when northern republicans, aided
by Egypt, overthrew the Imam, a quasi-feudal/quasi-religious despot. In 1967,
revolutionary forces in the south threw the British out of Aden, ending about 130 years of
British colonization. North Yemen became the Yemen Arab Republic; it began with an
effort to establish democratic and republican institutions, but autocratic traditions were
stronger than fledgling efforts to democratize. Although never a true democracy, the
leaders of North Yemen governed more often than not within a broad social and political
consensus of tribal and urban elements. South Yemen became the Pcoples' Democratic
Republic of Yemen and quickly adopted a classic Marxist-Leninist ideology. The PDRY
was a repressive dictatorship and state-sponsor of terrorism that survived economically
due to the financial support of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the
late 1980s paved the way for unification.
During the 1970s and 80s relations between the two Yemens swung widely between
armed conflict and occasional agreements to unify. Two major border wars erupted in
1972 and again in 1979, both of which ended in political agreements to take steps toward
formal unification. In the mid-1980s leaders of both the North and South adopted a scries
of practical measures that increased social and economic cooperation between the two
countries. Despite numerous setbacks, cooperation continued and culminated in an
agreement in late 1989 to unify the two countries within one year. The new unified
Republic of Yemen was announced in May 1990 along with a thirty-month period of
transition to allow for the complete merger of state institutions and the reorganization of
political life.
The infant new state was almost inunediately undermined when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Attentions were diverted to the crisis, and as a result of its failure to support the U.S.-led
coalition, Yemen suffered grievous economic losses. Nearly 2 million workers were
expelled from Saudi Arabia; all economic assistance from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia
dried up; and the United States drastically cut back on its foreign assistance to Yemen.
The Civil War
The new Republic of Yemen decided upon a democratic model, based on open,
multiparty elections. Successful parliamentary elections took place in 1993 and produced
a coalition government among the General Peoples' Congress, the party of President
Saleh, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), the party of south Yeinen, and Islaah, the
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Islamic Grouping for Reform. The YSP's position in government was proportionally
greater than its electoral results--thc YSP won only 20 percent of the seats in the
Parliament. Despite the success of the elections, the unity itself was threatened by on-
going competition between the leaders of the former north and south Yemen. The vice-
president, who was the former president of South Yemen, began to boycott the
government. In fact, the institutions of government, particularly the two armed forces,
never actually merged into single, unified institutions. Former southern leaders also
realized that a democracy would not work to their advantage, since the population of the
south was roughly only about 25 percent of the total population of Yemen. The President
refused to entertain the southern proposal of an elected Senate based on equal
representation of all the governorates (as in the United States). The former southern
leaders retreated to their former capital, Aden, and began speaking openly of a need for a
"federation," which was widely interpreted as a withdrawal of support for unity. Efforts
at mediation and reconciliation failed. In late April 1994, a battle between northern and
southern army units erupted. After about of month of fighting, the former president of
South Yemen announced secession and the creation of a separate Democratic Republic of
Yemen. Saudi Arabia provided funds to the secessionists. The United States offered its
strong political support for a unified Yemen. Within seven weeks, northern forces
prevailed, the former southern leadership fled the country, and unity survived.
The Aftermath of the Civil War
Popular support for a unified Yemen remains widespread. Although the followers of the
exiled former secessionists continue to mount relatively meaningless efforts to destabilize
the country, there is almost no political support for redividing the country. Nevertheless,
as a result of the northern military victory, the government of President Saleh placed
northerners in most sensitive security positions in the southern governorates, creating a
Yemeni version of "carpetbaggers." Many of these northern officials have also used
their powers to acquire valuable property in the south and in Aden. (Granted, most of
this property was confiscated from its original owners by the communists in the late
1960s and early 1970s, but it nonetheless rankles that it is now in the hands of outsiders.)
Thus there is lingering ill will in the south based on the perception that the southern
governorates do not enjoy their rightful share of resources and power.
The Yemeni Socialist Party remains a legal, functioning political party. But the party is
internally divided between unreconstructed Marxists and a reform wing that realizes it
must become a social democratic-style party in order to survive in a democratic Yemen.
So far, the old guard prevails, and the party boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections,
contributing to lower voter turnout than in 1993 and exacerbating southern feelings of
marginalization. Unless the party turns itself around soon, it will become meaningless as
a political player.
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Saying
1. A frequently cited reference, particularly in terms of women's role in Yemen, is to
Queen Arwa who ruled Yemen for 50 years during the early 12th century AD. She was
considered a gifted ruler, patron of writers and architects, and builder of public works.
2. A tradition ("hadith") of the Prophet Mohammad is: "Faith is Yemeni, and wisdom is
Yemeni."
3. The following is a quote from a poem by Gazal Madgashia, the first female Yemeni
poet (19th century) and considered a pioneer in women's liberation. The line has also
been memorialized in a Yemeni song:
"Equal, equal oh slaves of God, equal
No one is bom free and another is bom slave"
4. The First Lady, in her remarks during the event with USAID and Fulbright
scholarship alumni could mention the recent death of Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Saqqaf
an activist in the field of press freedom, human rights, and civil society in Yemen. He
had a Fulbright Fellowship himself and was the prime mover in organizing the Fulbright
Alumni Association in Yemen, Only in his mid-40s, his tragic death in a freak accident
on May 31 has shaken reform-minded Yemenis badly.
5. A very Yemeni greeting, that could nicely be used in Arabic for a greeting would be:
"Assalam Tahiya."
6. A verse from the Holy Quran attributed to God: and those affairs are a matter of
counsel." (This is widely interpreted as divine support for demcracy.)
7. Another verse from the Holy Quran attributed to Queen Bilquis (the historic Queen of
Sheba) was: "Oh chieftains, pronounce for me in my case, I decide no case until you are
present with me." (This is another traditional support for the concept of the consent of
the governed.)
8. "Yemen is a land of wealth and welfare. It is the land of incense. Its people love
freedom and they enjoy it greatly. (Amistenes, Greek historian, 194 BC)
9. A traditional saying: "Sana'a should be visited no matter how far the journey."
NOTE: These sayings were gathered from a number of sources and I cannot personally
verify all the attributions. For example, I never heard of Amistenes (No. 8). I'm no
scholar of ancient Greece, so he could have bcen real. And I did that that quote.
like
18/06 '99 VEN 01:06 FAX 0039 091 6377243
WH CONTROL ROOM
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To: Laura Schiller
From: Katy Button
- -vital Voices list (not final)
- vital Voices talking points
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As of 06/16/99 7:45 PM
Eight Participants (all English speaking)
Haiti
Nadine Perrault
Nadine is one of the leading women in Haiti in the area of civic education and rule of
law. She is a Vital Voices of the Americas alum. Nadine was involved in setting up the
Vital Voices follow-up conference for Haiti last May and is working with women
throughout the region to plan for the Vital Voices of the Caribbean in September '99.
Subject: Vital Voices Haiti conference - May '99 and planning for the Vital Voices
of the Caribbcan - September '99.
Iceland
Sigridur Duna (Sig rid a)
Sigridur is a former Member of Parliament and a university professor. She was selected
by the Prime Minister of Iceland to serve as the Executive Chair of the Women in
Democracy/Vital Voices of the Baltics and Russia Conference to be held in Iceland in
October 1999. As one of the leading women in Iceland, she has been an active and
effective partner with the USG Vital Voices team.
Subject: Women in Democracy/Vital Voices of the Baltics and Russia
Italy
Maria Grazia Giammarinaro (Maria Gratzia)
Maria, a native of Palermo, is the Director of the Office of Legislation of the Italian
Ministry of Equal Opportunity. She is a judge and an expert on trafficking legislation in
Italy. She was instrumental in initiating the very successful US - Italy Working Group to
Combat Trafficking. In July, Maria will accompany the Italian delegation to the U.S. and
continue to work with the President's Interagency Council on Women to integrate anti-
trafficking projects into Vital Voices.
Subject: Vital Voices Trafficking Project
Kuwait
Participant not yet confirmed
The Emir of Kuwait has recently moved to enfranchise women. After the next voter
registration period in February 2000, women in Kuwait will be able to vote and run for
elected office for the first time. We are in contact with our embassy in Kuwait to select a
roundtable participant who could play a significant role in linking Kuwait women to
Vital Voices partners and democracy projects in other parts of the world. Our embassy is
already working with the President's Interagency Council on Women on Vital Voices
political and leadership exchanges for the fall.
Subject: Upcoming Vital Voices exchanges for Kuwaiti women
Mongolia
Leramgherel Rinchin (pronunciation to follow)
This participant is a Mongolian Member of Parliament who has a strong reputation for
civic leadership.
Subject: Future Vital Voices Democracy projects in Asia
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As of : 06/16/99 7:44 PM
Northern Ireland
Pearl Sagar
Pearl is a founding member of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and coordinates
Vital Voices follow-up activities in Northern Ireland. Her involvement with and practical
approach to follow up has allowed women in Northern Ireland to take ownership of Vital
Voices. Last year, the British government honored her with an OBE for her work in
peace building, community development and political leadership.
Subject: Vital Voices of Northern Ireland follow-up projects
Somalia
Nasri Adam (Naz ree Adam)
Nasri is a 29-year-old Somali woman born and raised in Kenya. When Nasri was 22, war
broke out in Somali. She left her safe job as a bank teller in Kenya to work for peace and
demobilization in Somalia. She joined a women's development organization, which
provided women with education, mediation training and healthcare. Nasri founded the
organization's Peace Center. Through the Peace Center, she recruited 150 militiamen
and persuaded them to trade in their weapons for classes in literacy, technical skills and
English in hopes of finding work other than as mercenary soldiers. All 150 militiamen
stayed in the program. Many have carried out community work after graduating. She is
currently working on projects with Vital Voices partners.
Subject: Vital Voices Africa / Women in Peacekeeping and Armed Conflict
Argentina
Maria Rosa De Martini or
Monique Thiteux Altschul
These two women are both Vital Voices of the Americas alumnae. One will be selected
to join the roundtable. Both are leaders in their country for their work in civic education
and rule of law.
Subject: Vital Voices Latin America Follow-up
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Vital Voices Roundtable Alternates
AFRICA
Tanzania
Margaret Sitta
Works with a legal rights NGO in Tanzania.
Subject: Vital Voices Africa
Kenya
Grace Githu
Subject: Vital Voices Africa
South Africa
llona Tip
Subject: Vital Voices Africa
EASTERN EUROPE AND EUROPE
Moldova
Corina Mihaela Leca
Works with a legal education and human rights NGO in Moldova.
Subject: Vital Voices Vienna follow-up activities
Iceland
Magnca P. Hjalmarsdottir
Executive Director of Conference on Women and Democracy/Vital Voices of the Baltics
and Russia.
THE AMERICAS
Bolivia
Nardi Suxo
Works on conflict resolution in Bolivia
Subject: Vital Voices of the Americas follow-up activities
Brazil
Ina Ouang
Works a various democracy projects in Brazil
Subject: Vital Voices of the Americas follow-up activities
Colombia
Clara Fonnegra
Works on justice, corruption, and legal issues in Colombia
Subject: Vital Voices of the Americas follow-up activities
18/06 99 VEN 01:08 FAX 0039 091 6377243
WH CONTROL ROOM
005
As of : 06/16/99 7:44 PM
HRC Closing Talking Points
for
Global Vital Voices Roundtable
I am delighted to see some of my good friends from the Vital Voices
global network - and to meet those of you who are committed to
launching new Vital Voices partnerships in your countries.
I have been inspired to hear about how you are sharing ideas and
concrete projects to strengthen women, like yourselves, who are making
democracies work.
I hope you will continue to work with my Vital Voices team in the U.S.
government. Our Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said that
supporting women as the builders of democracies is not just the right
thing to do but the smart thing to do and this has become an important
U.S. foreign policy goal.
The movement towards democracy that has been unleashed by all your
work is so powerful and effective. It is truly changing the way
economies and governments (including my own) operate.
We know that we cannot get from where we are to where we want to be
in the coming years without women taking the tools of opportunity into
their own hands.
I am fully committed to making sure that Vital Voices continues to be an
effective means to make women's voices heard all over the globe.
Thank you for all your efforts.
PAGE
2
2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1995 Agence France Presse
Agence France Presse
July 04, 1995 19:41 Eastern Time
SECTION: International news
LENGTH: 1414 words
HEADLINE: Reconciliation proves elusive a year after Yemen's civil war
BYLINE: Hamoud Mounassar
DATELINE: SANAA, July 5
BODY:
Yemen has started to emerge from its economic and diplomatic isolation but
left national reconciliation for later, a year after holding on to its unity in
the fire of battle.
President Ali Abdallah Saleh has consolidated his power, begun talks with
international financial institutions and embarked on normalization with Saudi
Arabia which he had infuriated with his support for Iraq in 1990-1991.
But south Yemen has been deprived of its own leadership since Saleh's
northern-based forces captured Aden on July 7 after defeating socialist-led
forces in a two-month civil war.
The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), which had governed Aden since the former
south Yemen gained independence from Britain in 1967, was ousted from the
coalition government in Sanaa last October.
It was the price it paid for trying to secede from the 1990 union it had
entered into with north Yemen.
The YSP, discredited by the defeat and its leaders' flight into exile, is
only a shadow of its former self, diplomats said. Its 50 MPs in the 301-seat
parliament have failed to shine or unite with other opposition groups.
"In my opinion, there is now nobody to represent the interests of the south,
Sheikh Tariq Abdullah, a lawyer, said in Aden. "The YSP party members who stayed
in Yemen lack initiative and courage."
Not only have opposition calls for reconciliation fallen on deaf ears, but
the authorities are still using the socialists as scapegoats, blaming the
country's economic and other ills on them.
YSP members were detained following protests in March against price hikes for
gasoline and services.
"In the last three months, people have been arrested for writing graffiti and
distributing pamphlets," according to Ahmad Hussein Bilal, chairman of the
official human rights organization in Aden.
PAGE
3
Agence France Presse, July 04, 1995
Yemen faces many dilemmas in trying to revive its economy.
After parliament last October re-appointed him president for five years,
Saleh raised prices and simplified exchange rates to meet calls for reform
outlined by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
But the measures -- which were to have been for five years and instead cut
back to three years -- were considered token gestures by a government fearful of
political unrest, according to economists and bankers.
Saleh must also overcome objections from his coalition partner, the Islamic
fundamentalist Al-Islah, to cut subsidies on basic goods and deflate a bloated
bureaucracy.
If he wants to attack the endemic corruption denounced by Al-Islah, the
president would have to alienate powerful businessmen, UN experts said.
And Yemen has little room for maneuver with a foreign debt of eight billion
dollars and an inflation rate estimated at 65 percent officially -- at 150
percent by UN experts.
Despite its June reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, Yemen does not expect
Riyadh and Kuwait City to renew aid or allow the same number of Yemenis to find
jobs as in the past.
Only some of the 800,000 Yemenis expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1990 can
expect to return to their jobs there.
These economic links were worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually for
Sanaa.
Although it produces 380,000 barrels of oil per day, it is not enough to meet
the needs of 15.8 million people.
Its only hope is the privatization of southern companies and the creation of
a free trade zone in Aden, but the zone is still only on the drawing board and
the privatization plan could be exploited by northerners.
"Privatization will cause the north to buy up the south,' a UN official
warned.
mou/lc/hc
AFP
The "Prosperity Store," shutters pulled down and graffiti scrawled over it,
mirrors some of the larger problems besetting Aden a year after the end of civil
war.
The appliance store was shut down in 1993 as the family fought over who was
the rightful heir, foreshadowing the fraternal strife that ripped Yemen apart
for two months until July 7 last year.
A year after Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh's northern forces captured
Aden by defeating southern socialists led by Ali Salem al-Baid, the store
PAGE
4
Agence France Presse, July 04, 1995
remains shut and rest of the city appears squalid and rundown.
The authorities blamed south Yemen's troubles on the socialists, who ruled
since south Yemen gained independence from Britain in 1967 until July 1994, four
years after it merged with north Yemen.
"The corruption of the courts and security forces was inherited. We can't
change things in one day," according to Aden province's deputy governor, Wahid
Rashid.
Diplomats and foreign aid agency experts said that corruption was widespread
throughout Yemen, not just in the south.
But Sheikh Tariq Abdullah, a business lawyer, said the Yemen Socialist Party
(YSP) was so steeped in corruption that it "boasted it was better at it than the
northerners."
The YSP was discredited by its defeat and the flight of its leaders and some
party members have since joined Saleh's General People's Congress or the Islamic
fundamentalist party Al-Islah.
Both parties re-established order and calmed some of the extremists who had
pillaged a church, cemeteries and the city's only brewery after the city fell
last year.
If alcohol is no longer found except in Aden's one major hotel, the
fundamentalists control only the Qaluwa neighborhood.
"If there is a danger, it's in the economic area, and unemployment could fan
discontent," the deputy governor said.
Three people died when riots broke out here in March after the authorities
doubled prices for gasoline and services, independent sources said.
In a sign that the problems are not just economic, a dozen people were
injured in fighting two weeks ago between supporters of soccer teams from Aden
and the northern capital Sanaa.
In spite of its ruined infrastructure, weak management and endemic
corruption, Aden is beginning to attract some investors.
Saudi investors, with Yemeni agents and Western experts, are interested in
trade and construction, while Japanese businessmen are studying prospects in the
south and southeast, bankers and officials said.
Investors are also attracted by plans for a free trade zone, although more
has to be done.
After three years of discussions the zone's regulations remain vague and its
future uncertain. The problem, a banker said, is "the absence of services and
too much red tape.'
pmr/lc/hc
PAGE 5
Agence France Presse, July 04, 1995
AFP
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE: July 04, 1995
PAGE
6
3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1994 Jane's Information Group Limited,
All Rights Reserved
Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book
December 31, 1994
SECTION: MIDDLE EAST; Pg. 85
LENGTH: 3705 words
HEADLINE: Civil War in Yemen
BYLINE: Dr Andrew Rathmell
BODY:
Yemen is probably the least known, and certainly the poorest, part of
the Arabian Peninsula. Yet in the late spring of 1994, it attracted
international attention as rival leaders plunged the country into a
civil war in which up to 7000 died and which caused anything up to
US$4 billion worth of damage to the southern port city of Aden alone.
With the rout of the southern secessionist forces in July,
international interest again dissipated. The conflict, however, had
major regional repercussions since it highlighted the divided and
unstable state of politics in the Gulf. Differing reactions to the
war led to splits in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as well as
reinforcing divisions between 'Desert Storm' enemies.
The civil war, was between leaders of the General People's Congress
(GPC) and Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the majority parties in the
north and south respectively, which had been uneasy partners in a
unified state since May 1990. Escalating tensions during late 1993
and early 1994 culminated in a northern military offensive aimed at
destroying the southern armed forces and leadership. Southern leaders
declared their secession from the union but were unable to win
foreign recognition and their forces were gradually ground down by
the north's superior numbers.
The collapse of the south has enabled the northern leadership to
exclude their YSP rivals from power and to extend their control over
the whole of the country. The victorious leadership has, however,
faced problems as it now has to share power with its Islamist allies
who helped it win the war, as well as facing the prospect of
continued YSP resistance on a diplomatic level, if not in the form of
guerrilla action. At the same time, the war has added an extra burden
to the country's already frail economy. It had been hoped that
Yemen's newly discovered oil reserves would enable it to overcome its
economic backwardness but oil companies are now shying away from this
unstable corner of the Arabian Peninsula.
Background
In the recent past, the two Yemens existed as quite separate
entities, despite a strong emotional commitment to unity among the
people. Imams of the Zaidi sect forced out the Ottoman occupiers in
PAGE
7
Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
the mid-seventeenth century but an Egyptian army, acting on behalf of
the Turks, regained control in the early 19th century. Great Britain
occupied the small port of Aden in 1839 and by the 1870s had gained
the loyalty of tribes in the Hadramawt, so consolidating a de-facto
division of the country between Britain's sphere of influence in the
south and an Ottoman administration based in Sana'a. The Turks were
effectively ousted in 1911 after an uprising led by Imam Yahya bin
Muhammad. Between the wars, Yahya grudgingly accepted the UK-imposed
border with the south despite clashes between the two sides.
Yahya was assassinated in 1948 but his son Ahmad succeeded him and
kept the north stable, if isolated, from the outside world and run on
traditional lines. In the south, the UK sought to ensure the
stability of what had become a major military base by uniting the
south's tiny sheikhdoms into the South Arabia Federation. Three years
after this, in 1962, Imam Ahmad died and Sana'a was taken over by
nationalist officers who declared the formation of the Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR). The officers immediately called on Egypt for
assistance and there followed a long-drawn out civil war between the
Egyptian-backed republicans and the royalists who were backed by
Saudi Arabia. In 1970, after the royalists had failed to capture
Sana'a, the two sides agreed on the establishment of a compromise
government.
The south, meanwhile, gained its independence as the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967 after a four year
guerrilla war which pitted UK forces against the National Liberation
Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY).
The NLF subsequently defeated FLOSY in the post-independence struggle
for power. The new rulers imposed rigid central control, Marxist
economic policies and became reliant on assistance from the Soviet
bloc as a series of purges pushed the country ever further to the
left.
In 1974, the YAR's president fell to a southern assassin and Colonel
Ali Abdullah Saleh emerged to unite an increasingly factionalized
country. After elections for a 150-member Consultative Council in
1988, he was re-elected to a second five-year term, which coincided
with the beginning of oil production in the YAR.
The south did not enjoy such firm rule and the NLF, transformed into
the YSP, was riven by chronic internal divisions. In 1978, Soviet and
Cuban troops took part in inter-factional fighting and the PDRY
launched a full-scale assault on the YAR in 1979. After the failure
of this attack, Ali Nasser Muhammad returned to the presidency of the
south and worked with Saleh to ease relations. Resumed conflicts in
the south in 1985 and 1986 killed 2000 people and disrupted relations
but with the appointment of Haidar Abu Bakr al Attas as president of
the PDRY the situation stabilized.
Starting in 1986, Attas and Saleh laid the groundwork for unity. With
the loss of Soviet support the south's economic fortunes plunged and
the north realized that only unity would allow the new oilfields,
concentrated in the border region, to be fully exploited. The unity
declared in May 1990 was a top-down attempt to merge two very
PAGE
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Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
different political and economic systems and the new republic went
through a severe shock during the 1990-91 Gulf War with the expulsion
of some 800000 Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the
united government, with Saleh as president and Ali Salim al Bidh, a
long-standing YSP official, as vice-president initially functioned
passably well.
Build-up to the Break
For the south, unity soon soured. Economic expectations had been
raised but instead the population experienced rapid inflation and
declining living standards. The discovery of oil in the Hadramawt, on
stream since September 1993, encouraged southerners to think that
they would be better off independent of the inefficient and grasping
northern government.
The YSP also had its particular grievances. From unity until the
April 1993 elections, it shared power equally with the GPC but in the
elections the GPC won over half of the 302 seats contested. The
northern dominated tribalist/Islamist Islah (Islamic Reform Grouping)
was in second place with the YSP relegated to a powerless third
place. The YSP saw its influence in the post-election government
reduced proportionally and further threatened by Saleh's proposals to
curtail the powers of the vice-president. The YSP leadership
additionally felt itself threatened by a wave of assassinations which
were attributed to Islah-linked elements tolerated by Saleh.
In September 1993, Bidh removed himself to Aden and refused to
co-operate further until his demands for constitutional reform were
met. On 20 February 1994, the rival leaders met in Amman to sign the
so-called 'Pledge and Accord' document which envisaged far reaching
changes including the disarmament of the tribes, the separation of
powers and the decentralization of government. Saleh, however,
clearly had no intention of abiding by this compromise agreement and
within days his troops were moving to oust Bidh by force.
The War
Tension had existed between northern and southern forces since late
1993 but in late February 1994 northern forces put into operation
what must have been previously formulated plans to neutralize
southern units in the north, prevent the movement of southern forces
in northern-controlled zones and to exert control over the areas
around their units based in the south. These moves were a prelude to
what Sana'a hoped would be a rapid move on Aden where the southern
leaders could be arrested.
The confused nature of the fighting and the lack of clear front lines
early in the conflict was a result of the exchange of units between
north and south. On unity the armed forces of the YAR and PDRY were
not merged, instead brigades were stationed in the territory of the
other region. Bidh had attempted to withdraw his units from the north
but Saleh, the nominal supreme commander, had resisted this.
The major northern garrison in the south was the 8000-strong Amaliqa
PAGE
9
Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
Brigade headquartered at Zinjibar on the coast. Initial clashes
resulted from attempts by troops of this brigade to prevent the
movement of southern forces through their checkpoints. The north's
main initial thrust was directed at neutralizing the south's units in
the north in order to clear the route to Aden and to protect Sana'a's
rear area. Three southern brigades had been stationed in the north
after union. An infantry brigade was based at Harf Sufyan, in the far
north of the country; the Third Armoured Brigade was encamped at
Amran, north of Sana'a; and the Basuhib Artillery Brigade was at
Dhamar, on the Sana'a-Aden road. Starting on 26 February, the
infantry brigade was surrounded and eliminated by northern artillery
and armour. The Third Brigade was dealt with next in heavy fighting
during April that disabled some 85 of the 200 tanks engaged. The
Artillery Brigade was attacked by the north's Republican Guards and
defeated on 4 May, opening the road southwards.
By the middle of May, the south was under assault from all sides. The
five northern brigades stationed on the border were advancing on Aden
from the north and northwest. The Amaliqa Brigade had been reinforced
and was moving along the coast from the east. Southern reinforcements
from the Hadramawt, however, helped to take the pressure off Aden's
defenders and the south's internal lines of communication as well as
superior artillery and airpower stalled the northern onslaught. The
southern air force and 'Scud' surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) were
used to hit government installations in Sana'a, Hodeida and Taizz as
well as targeting population centres in the capital.
Southern airpower was of limited use in the mountains of the central
front and the north's weight of numbers told in the decisive battle
for the al-Anad military complex which lasted from 13-24 May. The
loss of this sprawling Russian-built base was a blow to the southern
air force and put the north in a position to hit Aden with SS-21
'Scarab' SSMs.
On 21 May, the YSP leadership declared their secession and the
formation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). Bidh and his
colleagues clearly hoped that foreign recognition would be
forthcoming and that their covert backers, notably Saudi Arabia,
would come openly to their aid. The US Government, however,
cautioned its allies against taking sides in the war and GCC member
Qatar showed itself openly sympathetic to the north. Facing these
divided counsels, Riyadh took a cautious line and failed to act
decisively. Its main overt assistance came on 27 May when it lobbied
the UN Security Council (UNSC) to impose a cease-fire.
UNSC Resolution 924, passed on 1 June, called for a cease-fire and
despatched the veteran Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi on a fact
finding mission. Saleh at first railed against this interference but
subsequently went along with the charade of offering cease-fires and
negotiations at the same time as intensifying military operations. By
mid-June, Aden was under bombardment. The oil refinery had been put
out of action and municipal water and electricity supplies disrupted.
The town was packed with refugees and aid agencies issued dire
warnings regarding the likely spread of disease. A new front had also
been opened in the east where northern forces had sealed off the
PAGE
10
Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
coastline leading to Bidh's new headquarters in Mukalla.
During June and early July, the two sides frantically lobbied outside
powers. Iraq, Libya, Sudan and, to a lesser extent Iran, expressed
their backing for the north which had been sympathetic to Iraq during
the 1990-91 crisis. They also supplied limited material assistance to
Saleh's forces. Saudi Arabia made moves to protect the south, partly
as it regarded a divided Yemen as in its interests and partly out of
anger with Saleh for supporting Saddam Hussein. Nonetheless, although
the kingdom covertly supplied arms to the YSP, it refrained from
taking direct military action which could have tipped the balance.
The crisis was settled on the battlefield rather than by diplomacy.
On 7 July, Aden fell and the YSP leadership fled ignominiously into
exile. For several days tribesmen in the employ of the north pillaged
Aden before the army could restore order. This was done by mid-August
and the victorious Saleh could begin the process of rebuilding a
unified state.
Settling Scores
In prosecuting his campaign against the YSP, Saleh had relied on
assistance from a variety of groups which expected political
compensation after the war. GPC leaders were keen to assert their
control over the country and immediate steps were taken to unify the
two armies to prevent a recurrence of separatist tendencies. There
was however ambivalence over the future role of the YSP. As early as
the end of July, reconciliation talks were held between Sana'a's
Planning Minister Abdel Karim al Iryani and Abu Bakr Attas. Sources
in the GPC indicated that they were keen for the YSP to play a role
in future governments in order to counterbalance the growing
influence of the Islamist Islah. Saleh went as far as to extend an
amnesty to most of the officials of the YSP who had been involved in
the secessionist movement.
Despite these initial gestures, Saleh's attitude to the YSP has
remained generally unforgiving. When a new government was finally
formed in early October it contained no formal YSP representation and
was instead dominated by the GPC and Islah. Saleh has consistently
denounced the exiled leaders of the short-lived DRY as traitors and
demanded that they return to stand trial. His uncompromising attitude
is particularly noteworthy since officers loyal to Ali Muhammad, who
fled to Sana'a after the 1986 civil war, were instrumental in guiding
northern forces in their advances in the south. Despite early hopes
that Saleh may seek to achieve stability through reconciliation with
this wing of the YSP, there has been no sign that Ali Muhammad will
return from his Damascus exile.
The mainstream of the YSP collapsed in disarray after the defeat and
has put up little credible opposition since. Bidh fled to Oman where
the government, anxious to restore good relations with Yemen,
promptly gagged him. Other prominent leaders such as Abd al Rahman al
Jifri, who supervised the defence of Aden, have been given sanctuary
by Saudi Arabia. In the weeks after the collapse of the DRY they
threatened Sana'a with protracted guerrilla war but in practice seem
PAGE
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Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
to have done little. Aden has suffered from terrorism and small-scale
insurgency in recent months but this appears to be linked to Islamist
militants rather than the YSP. In late September, the exiled
leadership, prodded into action by Riyadh, launched a National
Opposition Front but this has so far not attracted widespread
support.
Inside the country, the YSP has been engaged in bitter
recriminations. It elected a new leader, Ali Obeid Muqbel, to replace
Bidh and distanced itself from the secessionist leadership. GPC
leaders have however insisted that the new YSP leaders cannot be
considered as responsible partners until the exiled leadership are
turned over.
Islah has meanwhile been cashing in the debt owed to it by Saleh for
its support in the conflict. Its leader, Sheikh Abdullah Al Ahmar,
has insisted that the party respects multi-party democracy and
rejects violence. Nonetheless doubts remain, as with Islamist parties
across the region, as to whether the party will adhere to this
promise once in power. For now the party is concentrating on cultural
and social issues, imposing its strict form of Islam on the country.
Soon after the war, Islah militiamen flogged several Adenis caught
drinking alcohol and the party won a potentially significant
constitutional amendment which makes the Sharia the basis of law,
rather than merely a basis, as it was before.
Economic Failure
The conflict was a disaster for the Yemeni economy, frail at the best
of times. GDP growth had actually been a respectable 3.4 per cent in
1993, after years of decline, but the impact of the war reversed
these gains. The economy is likely to contract by around 10 per cent
over the next two years. Inflation, already high at around 55 per
cent, is set to rocket to around 150 per cent in 1995. The value of
the riyal, which averaged between 75 and 80 to the dollar before the
fighting plummeted to a low of 112 to the dollar in June and 1994's
current account deficit is set to widen from 1993's already painful
US$626 million.
The big hope of both northern and southern leaders in recent years
was that oil would reinvigorate the impoverished country. Yemen has
traditionally relied on unproductive agriculture for the majority of
its employment. This has been supplemented by a small manufacturing
base and a domestically-orientated service sector. In 1987,
commercial exploitation of the Marib block in the north began and, in
late 1993, the Masilah block in the eastern Hadramawt went on stream.
Exploration is now concentrated in the Shabwah area that straddles
the old north-south border.
Optimistic officials have in the past predicted a possible output of
500000 barrels per day (pre-war output was 350000) and in 1991
government receipts from oil exports had already reached over US$450
million. The recent instability has however made the international
oil companies look again at their exposure in Yemen. In the latter
stages of the war, oil installations in Aden, Marib and at the Red
PAGE
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Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
Sea terminal of Ras Issa suffered damage. Since the war, some of the
companies have faced problems in renegotiating their concessions with
Sana'a and exiled YSP leaders have threatened them with sabotage if
they strike deals with Saleh's officials. Combined with the
inhospitable Yemeni terrain and widespread tribal banditry, these
factors may well serve as deterrents to further significant
investment.
The Regional Impact
Aside from its disastrous impact on the domestic situation in Yemen,
the war exacerbated divisions in the Gulf and the Middle East in
general. Iraq, which has long had military ties with the north, and
which before the imposition of UN sanctions in 1990 supplied oil to
the country, came out openly for Saleh. Despite southern claims,
there is little evidence that Baghdad supplied weapons or personnel
in any significant quantity. Similarly, Libya and Sudan stood firmly
behind the north, partly out of sympathy for its anti-Saudi stance,
partly due to the prominence of Islamists in the north's camp.
Saudi Arabia swung behind the south, despite its detestation of the
YSP's socialism. Kuwait was also a more or less open supporter of the
secessionists and both countries supplied some materiel covertly.
More than anything else, the two governments were concerned at the
prospect of having to face a populous pro-Iraqi power to their south.
Qatar, largely because of its own bilateral border disputes with
Riyadh, took the dramatic step of breaking GCC ranks and supporting
Yemeni unity.
Since the end of the conflict, only Saudi Arabia has continued to
openly back the defeated party. Oman has moved rapidly to develop a
working relationship with the new regime. Muscat has handed back all
of the weapons that southern personnel who fled to Oman brought with
them and has exchanged official visits. Riyadh, in contrast, has
cosseted the YSP exiles and given them platforms from which to speak.
In doing so it is carrying on a long tradition of backing Yemeni
rebels as a way of applying pressure. Saleh has responded with
vociferous complaints at Saudi intervention and has threatened to
take action over the disputed border between the two countries. He
may have given support for a small group which appeared in the late
summer calling for the 'liberation' of the Saudi provinces of Najran
and Assir, two areas long claimed by Yemen.
Outlook
By late October, Saleh and the GPC appeared to be in firm control of
the country. The new government, formed in early October, had Abd
al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani as Prime Minister and Abd al-Karim Ali al-Iryani
as Foreign Minister. The cabinet was dominated by the GPC but Islah
had members in proportion to their 65 parliamentary seats (the GPC
has 140 seats). Excluded from power, YSP leaders inside the country
took a conciliatory line but warned of renewed instability in the
south if the grievances which had provoked the rebellion were not
met. Saleh was however not interested in compromise. He moved ahead
with plans to consolidate his control by merging the country's armed
PAGE 13
Jane's Intelligence Review - Year Book, December 31, 1994
forces and banning officers from holding party membership. Once these
plans were completed no future YSP leadership would have the military
tools with which to counter the GPC.
Sana'a's uncompromising approach is likely to store up trouble for
the future. With the economic situation worsening there is little
prospect of Saleh being able to buy the loyalty of southerners.
Islah's growing influence will alienate the more liberal Adenis.
Without determined external backing, however, there is little that
south Yemenis can do to maintain their autonomy.
Dr Rathmell is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies,
Exeter University and editor of the Gulf States Newsletter.
JIR References: Joffe G, 'Yemen - The Reasons for Conflict', Vol 6,
No 8, pp 314-316. Wyllie J, 'Yemen - On the Brink', Vol 6, No 3, pp
130-131. Wyllie J, 'Yemen in Conflict - Strategic Implications', Vol
6, No 8, pp 366-367.
GRAPHIC: Photograph 1, A southern Yemeni T-55 MBT, part of a force which
encircled the major northern garrison in southern Yemen at Zinjibar in early
May. At the time of unification, the YAR army comprised one armoured, three
mechanized and nine infantry brigades while the PDRY army was organized into one
armoured and three mechanized brigades and nine infantry regiments. Little
effort was made to integrate the armed forces following unification.;
(Photograph 2, AFP/PA News) ; Photograph 3, A southern Yemeni 130 mm M-46 field
gun shells northern forces on 22 May. The south's superior artillery and air
force was able to delay but not defeat northern forces.; (Photograph 4, AFP/PA
News) Photograph 5, Southern Yemeni troops using 122 mm BM-21 multiple rocket
launchers in the defence of Aden on 26 June. On 7 July, the city fell to
northern forces and YSP leaders fled into exile.; (Photograph 6, AFP/PA News)
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE: April 20, 1995
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7TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1994 The Daily Yomiuri
The Daily Yomiuri
August 8, 1994, Monday
SECTION: Pg. 6
LENGTH: 2631 words
HEADLINE: Different picture of civil war in Yemen
BYLINE: Mohamed H. Heikal
BODY:
The recent internecine battles that raged in Yemen were depicted as scenes
from a civil war between the northern and southern sides of Yemen. But if we
look at what happened from a broader perspective, a different picture emerges,
one with ramifications extending beyond the borders of Yemen. In fact, the war
was a chapter in a continuing struggle over the future of the Arabian Peninsula.
Involving powerful forces representing global and regional interests, the
struggle is rendered still more complex by nationalistic, sectarian and tribal
factors. It did not begin with the outbreak of fighting in Yemen; rather, the
fighting was a sign that the struggle had reached a critical point.
To understand the issues at stake, it is necessary to look at a map of the
Arabian Peninsula, for the best explanation of political motives and dynamics
can usually be provided by geography. The map shows it to be a large land mass
forming the underbelly of the Gulf, important both in terms of its strategic
location and its considerable oil resources. Politically, the peninsula is made
up of a group of states which, despite their enormous wealth, are fragile and
vulnerable to external threats. This is due to two factors, one related to
demography, the other to legitimacy. All are sparsely populated; all governed by
regimes whose legitimacy is still at the early stages of development, being
either dynastic or, at best, tribal. This is true of all six Gulf states in the
peninsula: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Oman.
But the Arabian Peninsula is also home to another state, Yemen, which was,
until the 1960s, a marginal, not to say absent, player. At that time, the
British occupied the south, whose hospitable terrain made it easy to control,
and left the mountainous and rugged north under the rule of one of the crueliest
and most despotic dynasties in the annals of history. Founded by Hamid el-Din,
it came to an end in 1962 with the death of Imam Ahmed, who had ruled his people
with a mixture of sorcery, poison and imprisonment in dank highland caves. After
his death, a revolution broke out, whose leaders embarked on a drive to
modernize the country. This proved to be no easy task, especially as the process
of modernization was accompanied by calls for the reunification of the two
Yemens and an end to British rule in the south.
The revolution in Yemen provoked deep unease among the rulers of the other
Arabian Peninsula states, who feared that it set a dangerous precedent for their
own subjects. But even more worrying than the risk of contamination from new
ideas and sociopolitical structures inspired by different ideological models,
however, was the fact that, at approximately 14 million, Yemen's population
stands at roughly double the combined populations of all the other countries
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The Daily Yomiuri, August 8, 1994
in the peninsula. Moreover, its strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea,
with a southern coastline abutting onto the Indian Ocean, gives it a strong
geopolitical advantage.
Ironically, Yemen's high population density worried not only the rulers of
neighboring countries, but also its own prerevolution rulers, albeit for
different reasons. The last Imam adamantly refused to conduct a census on the
grounds that he did not want to invite the envy of other countries and provoke
the evil eye! On the other hand, the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia did permit
a census to be taken in his kingdom, but found the population count to be so low
that he locked the results up in his desk for fear they would detract from his
aura of majesty. The census, taken in 1965, showed the population of Saudi
Arabia to be 5 million, of whom 1 million were Yemeni migrant workers. But the
Saudi king's decision not to go public with the results was prompted not only by
considerations of prestige and image; he must have realized that disclosing
results which showed the population of his kingdom, together with those of all
the other Gulf states, to be just half the population of Yemen was tantamount to
inviting Yemen to live up to its potential as a leading player in the Arabian
Peninsula.
That is probably why Saudi Arabia has always been opposed to the unification
of North and South Yemen. One of King Fahd's brothers once told me that when
their father, the legendary King Ibn Saud, who founded the kingdom and gave it
his name, was on his deathbed, he summoned his children (he had 102, of whom 64
were sons) and enjoyed them to "beware of a united Yemen, for it will be a
menace for you and for the kingdom you are inheriting." But for a long time
after this warning, Ibn Saud's sons and heirs had no reason to worry that Yemen
represented any real threat; after all, it was not only divided, but very poor.
Their father's advice acquired new relevance, however, following the unification
of Yemen in 1990 and the discovery of oil in both the north and the south.
The political temperature in the underbelly of the peninsula was driven still
higher by what was happening along its spine, where Iran and Iraq, each with
claims toward the peninsula, were pursuing their own regional agendas. The
revolution which erupted in Iran in 1979 gave it a new weapon with which to
extend its influence far beyond its borders, namely, Islam. Iraq, for its part,
sought to consolidate its position with the counter-weapon of pan-Arabism. Thus
the spine of the Arabian Peninsula exerted growing pressure on its soft
underbelly. To realize how heavy the pressure was, it is necessary only to
remember that the population of Iraq is 20 million and of Iran 60 million.
Moreover, both countries are rich oil producers with solid industrial and
agricultural bases and strong armies equipped with the latest in military
technology, Soviet in the case of Iraq, American in the case of Iran, especially
in the days of the shah.
As though all this were not enough, powerful global interests have vital
stakes in the peninsula, notably, of course, the United States, whose influence
is predominant in this complex region today. However, the United States is not
averse to allowing Britain, the former colonial power, to play a role,
especially in arms sales. And, after the U.S. eagle has had its fill, and the
old British lion has fed on the remains, there might even be some scraps left
over for France. Finally, there are neighboring regional powers, the most
important being Turkey, Egypt and Syria, who would also like to see any morsel,
however small, fall their way.
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The Daily Yomiuri, August 8, 1994
The rulers of the states occupying the soft underbelly of the Arabian
Peninsula, in collaboration with other powers, subtly played on the
contradictions between the two regional powers on the peninsula's spine, and
succeeded in deepening the rift between them. This led to the first Gulf war,
which bled the two countries dry. The Gulf states sided with Iraq in the war
because they saw pan-Arabism as a lesser evil than the siren song of militant
Shiite Islamism coming out of Iran, which they feared could galvanize the
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Iranian Shiites in their countries--a
particularly alarming prospect for Saudi Arabia, whose oil producing Eastern
Province is predominantly Shiite.
When the war ended eight years later in victory for Iraq, Baghdad invoked
pan-Arabism to claim what it saw as its rightful due for saving its Gulf allies
from the scourge of an Islamic Shiite revolution. But the price it exacted was
exorbitant: no less than an entire Gulf state, Kuwait. It was not only the
countries in the peninsula's soft underbelly who refused to pay the price; they
were joined by all those who had a stake, real or potential, in the region, from
the powerful eagle and the old lion to the hopefuls, European and Middle Eastern
alike, hovering on the sidelines for tidbits to fall their way. And so the
second Gulf war broke out under the command of former U.S. President George
Bush, who used the plains of the Tigris and Euphrates to demonstrate the power
of new weapons designed initially for use against the Warsaw Pact.
But that was not the end of the story, for great wars are not limited to the
movements of armies, whether victorious or vanquished, and it is a truism that
war is the midwife of revolution. A struggle in which so many interests, factors
and factions were intermeshed has opened the door to questions, ideas and
aspirations, many of them legitimate, like, What is the role of the people under
the suzerainty of sheikhs, families and tribes? Where are human rights and the
rule of law in these societies? What happened to the fabulous oil riches these
rulers amassed? What is the use of the arms pouring into the region--in the
period 1980-1990, arms sales to the region reached a staggering $1 trillion--and
who is the enemy they will be used against?
Thus no sooner had the cannons of the Gulf wars fallen silent than voices
began to be raised, first softly then more and more stridently, in the soft
underbelly of the Arabian Peninsula. At a time the countries on the spine, Iran
and Iraq, seemed subdued following the devastation visited on them by war, the
southernmost tip of the peninsula, Yemen, began to exist a growing influence on
its environment, largely because unification was accompanied by freer elections
than had ever before been seen in the region. Although this in itself was a
healthy phenomenon, the problem is that in politics, health, like disease, can
be contagious, especially when it is linked to the call for freedom.
But the realities on the ground were far more complex than a liberal moment
which saw the voluntary unification of one people separated into two political
entities in the 19th century, who had entered the 20th century totally
unprepared and whose aspirations as they stood on the threshold of the 21st
century were beyond their ability to fulfill them. The gap between the two is
dangerous one, because dreams can collide with realities on the ground at any
moment, especially if forces opposed to those dreams actively play on the
contradiction between dreams and realities.
And so the dream of unity which the people of Yemen had nurtured for SO long
collided with reality practically at the moment of its realization. All too
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The Daily Yomiuri, August 8, 1994
soon, the problems which were to plunge Yemen into a dangerous crisis began to
emerge, some due to internal, others to external, factors.
On the internal front, the leadership of North Yemen imagined that democracy
in the new state of Yemen meant counting votes and allocating parliamentary
seats accordingly. However, as South Yemen's population was only 2 million
versus 12 million in the North, this understanding of democracy created a
feeling in the South that the merger between the two was closer to annexation
than it was to unification.
At the same time, the former Marxist leaders of South Yemen were severely
shaken by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union,
and believed their salvation lay in speeding up the process of unification. They
hurriedly embarked on negotiations with the North, in the hope that unification
would serve as a bulwark against the upheavals convulsing many other parts of
the world following the collapse of socialism.
In a way, the unification of Yemen was like a shotgun wedding that was never
properly consummated, not only because external parties were actively working
against it, but also because of internal personal, tribal and financial factors.
These manifested themselves in patterns of behavior that can only be explained
in terms of nomadic desert communities constantly on the move in search of green
pastures or water holes in a vast sea of sand. Some examples worth mentioning:
The vice president of Yemen, who was the president of South Yemen before
unification, left the capital, San'a, in a huff and returned to his old
headquarters in Aden, where he was joined by the prime minister, also from the
South. Meanwhile, their fellow southerner, the foreign minister of Yemen,
remained in San'a to defend the constitutional legitimacy of the unified
country.
Some of the leaders of the former Marxist ruling regime in the South, who had
carried out bloody purges in which hundreds of thousands perished, and who were
more often than not motivated by tribal, rather than ideological,
considerations, began to employ the same tactics in the northern capital, San'a,
which was now the capital of Yemen, sometimes killing off their own people in
the ruling regime.
The petroleum minister, who also hailed from the South, granted an oil
concession to a company with Saudi connections, stipulating in the agreement
that royalties were to be transferred to the place he designated by ministerial
decree. When the time came for him to issue the decrees, the leadership of Yemen
was already divided among itself, so he simply ordered the company to transfer
tens of millions of dollars to the southern capital, Aden. But as there was no
government in Aden after unification, the transfer was made to the Yemeni
Socialist Party, headed by the former president of South Yemen, the vice
president of Yemen, who was then sulking in Aden.
Some of the Arab leaders who tried to mediate in the crisis, including Sultan
Qabus of Oman, President Mubarak of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, soon
realized that the warring parties were driven by old vendettas and resentments
and discontinued their efforts, which were, at any rate, often at
cross-purposes.
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The Daily Yomiuri, August 8, 1994
Some of the Gulf states intervened in the crisis for reasons of their own:
Saudi Arabia because it saw the unification of Yemen as a threat, Kuwait because
it wanted to punish Yemen for its pro-Iraqi stand in the second Gulf war.
--Indeed, there are signs that the civil war was meant to end with the
division of Yemen not only into two parts again, but into three: North, South
and the central province of Hadramut, where most of the oil reserves are located
and which overlooks the Indian Ocean.
In one of the more bizarre episodes of this strange war, the U.S. Fleet in
the Red Sea intercepted two Egyptian ships carrying Saudi arms to the
secessionists in Aden. Washington appealed to all Arab governments to refrain
from intervening in the Yemen crisis, warning that the entire Arabian Peninsula
was poised on the brink of a dangerous abyss.
Like the North in the American civil war, North Yemen managed to preserve
unity by force of arms. But while unity could be sustained in the first case
because the Atlantic served as a buffer against outside intervention. Yemen's
newly restored unity does not enjoy that kind of geographical protection.
Surrounded as it is by hostile forces, Yemen is probably aware that its victory
on the battlefield marks only the end of one chapter in what promises to be a
long saga. For Saudi Arabia will not tolerate a strong, unified Yemen on its
doorstep. Moreover, Riyadh is worried that victory might tempt San'a to reopen
the files on its historical claims to Jizan and Najran, which Saudi Arabia
annexed by war in the '30s. As far as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf sheikhdoms are
concerned, the military victory scored by Northern forces in Yemen has opened a
Pandora's box of troubles that must be slammed shut as quickly as possible.
As matters now stand, the entire Arabian Peninsula is caught in a limbo
between a past that refuses to go away and a future that remains tantalizingly
out of reach. Between the two is a present fraught with historical rivalries,
inherited suspicions and seething resentments, a present that is trying to cling
to an anachronistic status quo even as change, already long overdue, is knocking
on the door.
(Mohamed H. Heikal, Egyptian journalist and writer, was editor in chief of
Al-Ahram newspaper for 18 years.)
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Copyright 1999 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
January 6, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition
SECTION: PART A; WORLD; BRIEFING/MIDDLE EAST; NEWS ANALYSIS; Pg. A14
LENGTH: 691 words
HEADLINE: Tribal Yemenis hold power;
National government is relatively ineffective
BYLINE: Brian Whitaker; LONDON GUARDIAN
DATELINE: LONDON
BODY:
LONDON - The hostage tragedy in Yemen highlights the often tenuous control of
the government over its people.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh might give the appearance of a strongman,
having been in power since 1978, but he has stayed there less by the iron fist
than by tactical alliances with the country's quarrelsome factions.
Among them are the tribes, especially influential in the north, which have
their own traditional laws and recognize government authority only when it suits
them. Often, they have their own militias, too.
For several months tribal fighters in Marib oil province have been
confronting the security forces with some success. Since June they have blown
at least 19 holes in the pipeline on which Yemen depends for 40 percent of its
oil revenue.
A complicating factor during the early 1990s was that Yemen also became a
haven for "Arab Afghans" - Muslim volunteers from various countries who had
fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
In Yemen, under the name "Jihad," the Arab Afghans formed a loose alliance
with various southern Yemenis who harbored grievances against the Marxists. The
Marxists ruled southern Yemen until 1990 and later formed a power-sharing
government with Mr. Saleh's supporters in the north.
Much of the more remote part of Yemen is lawless in the sense that it
conducts its affairs beyond the purview of the state and its legislation.
That doesn't mean, however, that behavior in these areas is unregulated;
citizens are expected to meet the standards set by convention, tribal law and
Islam. The state has learned from painful experience that intervention brings
risks, and it tends to keep interference to a minimum.
Individual Yemenis, too, tend not to look to the state for protection; by
custom, personal security is a matter for the individual and his household.
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The Washington Times January 6, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition
The tradition of self-defense, at the more decorative end of the scale, is
represented by the "jambiyya," a broad, curved knife worn as a token of
manhood and held in place by a broad, brightly colored belt. According to one
Yemeni doctor, the most common knife injuries are stomach wounds inflicted by
wives seizing their husbands' jambiyyas during an argument.
Further up the scale is the pistol or Kalashnikov rifle carried by those
involved in blood feuds, or for protection when traveling through remote or
unfamiliar places. By tradition, guns are also fired into the air at Yemeni
weddings. Accidental deaths are common.
Important or wealthy figures routinely employ armed guards at the gates of
their houses or to accompany them on journeys. In the case of an important
sheik, this may extend to a private militia, which can be supplemented by
reserves from the tribe when needed.
Within the tribal area, such forces fulfill to some extent the law-and-order
role that elsewhere would be assumed by the state. In a few cases, wealthy
individuals also operate their own prisons.
According to the Interior Ministry, there are about 50 million privately
owned firearms in Yemen - more than three per person. At a famous market
outside San'a, one can purchase anything up to a rocket launcher or an armored
car.
People carry guns because others carry them and because the authorities do
not or cannot provide adequate protection.
The inadequacy of law enforcement is due partly to the lack of means and
partly to the lack of inclination. Yemen has less than one police station for
every 100,000 people. As in many poor countries, the police are poorly paid and
thus less resistant to bribery.
The suggestion from Yemeni government sources was that Jihad elements rather
than tribal bandits were behind the kidnapping of the 16 tourists - which may
help to explain the unusually violent outcome.
For several years authorities have waged a less-than-vigorous campaign
against Jihad and the "Arab Afghans." On one hand, under pressure from Western
governments, they want to be seen to be doing their bit to combat terrorism.
But on the other, they lack the resources - and, in the view of some observers,
the will - to do so effectively.
* Distributed by Scripps Howard.
GRAPHIC: Photo, Yemenis, who on average own three firearms per capita, hold
their weapons above their heads in a show of support for candidate Abdullah
al-Buchri in Koneib before April 1997 elections., By Reuters
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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The Independent (London)
January 13, 1999, Wednesday
SECTION: COMMENT; Page 3
LENGTH: 1145 words
HEADLINE: Forget the gunboats - it's time for good old-fashioned diplomacy; We
must live with the consequences of giving fundamentalism a foothold in
strategically vital Yemen
BYLINE: Anne McElvoy
BODY:
A MONTH ago, Yemen was just the mysterious Arabia Felix where they built
houses on top of rocks, chewed qat through the long hot afternoons and produced
the odd unsettling, but distant coup. Now, events at the tip of the Arabian
Peninsula have interposed themselves rudely on Robin Cook's torrid career.
Instead of Britain accusing Middle East nationals of being party to terrorism,
we find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of our own citizens being
accused of plotting kidnappings and bombings in Yemen.
The trail of terror and confusion leads back, via the Internet, to the less
exotic setting of Finsbury Park, from where Abu Hamza advertises his Islamic
training camp with due regard for equal opportunities: "Special lectures for
sisters regarding women and the role of women in the field of Jihad". His bark
may be worse than his bite. We should be suspicious when so much attention is
focused on a single loudmouth prepared to deliver soundbites about the need to
avenge Anglo-American "state terrorism". Mr Hamza has been preaching his views
in the Finsbury Park mosque for some time. I imagine that they are rather well
known to MI5 and the counter- terrorism squad.
Free speech is always the democratic principle we are keenest to throw away
when it is others who are to be silenced, not us. It might not be very nice of
Mr Hamza to carry in his Internet site passages of Osama bin Laden's philosophy
such as: "The walls of oppression cannot be demolished except in a hail of
bullets, but one could not ban it without coming down on every other
revolutionary group which believes in violent final conflict to resolve the
class struggle, in the name of animal rights or to end repressive male hegemony.
That has never proved an effective approach to stifling dissent.
Mr Hamza is not really the problem. More important is what his son (sought
by the Yemeni authorities) and step-son (under arrest there) were doing there
and how justified the Sana'a government is in its accusations against them. It
would be a more rash person than I who would claim to know whether those
detained are being fitted up by the Yemeni government or whether they are guilty
of plotting the violence of which they are accused. The Foreign Office's dilemma
is that it is exerting itself for people who may turn out to have been
terrorists, many of whose supporters are no enthusiasts for Western freedoms.
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The Independent (London), January 13, 1999
As things stand, the accused are being held without charge and are being
denied access to their lawyer, so Britain is duty-bound to help. I see no
justification for the charge that Mr Cook has bungled things by delay, beyond
a general desire to kick a politician when he is down. The pressure at such
times is always to proceed with a bang and a rush - never to take things
steadily.
But some situations defy haste. This one, which combines internal tribal
feuds, the undigested aftermath of the unification of Yemen, the ill-feeling
generated by Britain's participation in the Iraq bombing raids and the
sensitivity in Sana'a about the bungled hostage-release, demands a lot of
looking before the leap.
Some 10 years ago I spent a summer visiting diplomatic friends in Yemen, the
most beautiful country I have ever seen. I have never been SO hot as I was at
the vast Marib damn, nor as exhilarated by the terraced mountain slopes,
negotiated by heavily laden donkeys far more speedily than by our four-wheel
vehicles.
of fundamentalism, the only hint was being stoned by a crowd of women as a
"Nazarene", having been foolish enough to stray into a religious area. The
kidnapping of Westerners was an occasional inconvenience, politely conducted in
order to extort roads and clean water from the government, swiftly concluded.
That was before the unification of Yemen. The Cold War imposed its brutal
simplicities here as it had in other troubled parts of the globe. The north was
pro-Western, the south the heart of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence in
the Middle East, where the Russians and East Germans sought - hopelessly - to
centralise control in a tribal land by seeking to restrict the days on which qat
could be chewed.
After the Berlin Wall fell, the Sana'a government re-imported
fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia in order to chase out the Marxists in the
south. Unification was in vogue everywhere. The West supported integration,
believing that it would increase stability in the region. But we were cavalier
about the terms on which it happened.
Whether Western governments would have approved of Mr Hamza planting
explosives on behalf of the mujahedin also is a matter of dates. Osama bin Laden
was a useful tool against Western enemies at the time. The end of the Cold War
meant a realignment of friends and enemies whose less ethical implications were
forgotten in the general relief and triumphalism nicely parodied (except he
meant it) in PJ O'Rourke's boast: "We kicked Commie ass."
The trouble is, we live now with the consequences of how we kicked Commie
ass in Afghanistan - a country bleeding itself to death - and helped give
fundamentalism a foothold in the strategically vital country of Yemen. Using
the sword of Islam against the hammer and sickle was a high-risk policy and we
pay the price today.
I have had my doubts about Mr Cook as Foreign Secretary. Mr Blair's lavish
praise of his "superb" performance was rank hyperbole. But on Yemen, he has the
opportunity to rehabilitate himself by showing that he can hold his nerve in a
situation which can not be resolved by the more dramatic means of mercenaries or
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The Independent (London), January 13, 1999
gun boats. This one needs good, old-fashioned diplomacy
At the mention of the words "British nationals", however, rampant
irrationalism sets in. Already, those who wish to raise the temperature of an
already tragic situation - with three Britons dead - are recommending Libyan
embassy tactics. Apart from the practical objection that the prisoners are being
held, inconveniently, in Aden and not in St James' Square, an all-out
confrontation with the Yemeni authorities would simply play into the hands of
Islamicists seeking to strengthen their grip on power.
Yesterday, Michael Howard compared the alleged tardiness of the Government
in dealing with the prisoners in Yemen, with the stream of prisoner releases in
Ulster. As the Conservatives support the Good Friday agreement, this was
off-message even by their own standards.
More seriously, his attack on Mr Cook risked fuelling aggression among some
of the prisoners' supporters towards the British government. It was a shameful
performance, the worse for coming from an intelligent and experienced former
minister who knows that there are times when the national interest demands that
the Opposition behaves loyally in order not to make a dangerous situation worse.
This is one of them.
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Birmingham Post
January 19, 1999, Tuesday
SECTION: Pg. 13
LENGTH: 926 words
HEADLINE: YEMEN A LONG WAY FROM THE GARDEN OF ADEN;
CHRIS GRAY CHARTS THE HISTORY OF YEMEN, THE ARAB COUNTRY THAT HAS NOW BECOME A
BY-WORD FOR TERROR.
BYLINE: Chris Gray
BODY:
Kidnappings, terrorist executions and torture have hardly been out of the
headlines since the New Year began.
They have all been coming from one of the smaller countries in the Middle
East, which normally rarely figures in news bulletins, even when that turbulent
region is at the centre of the world's attention.
Its relative obscurity made it an attraction for the more adventurous
British tourist, such as the group who travelled there with the Explore travel
company before Christmas.
Their horrific experience, when members of the group were kidnapped and four
killed in a rescue attempt, propelled Yemen into the British public's
consciousness.
Since then, five British Muslims have been arrested in Yemen on suspicion of
terrorist activity, another hostage has been released and the trial has started
of the Yemenis accused of murdering the four tourists.
Every day seems to reveal another frightening aspect to the country.
In fact the terrible events in the Yemen have occurred partly because it is
in the last decade that it has become more accessible than at any time in its
history.
Although Britain had a presence in Yemen for more than a century, it was
restricted to the city of Aden and its surrounding area, near to the Red Sea and
the shipping route that led north to the Suez Canal.
Britain ruled the city for 129 years and held protectorate status over its
hinterland until 1967, but it was always in conflict with the Hamid al-Din
dynasty, which ruled the country after Turkish occupation collapsed at the end
of the First World War. D uring the reign of Imam Ahmad, clashes with Britain
occurred regularly and Ahmad sought protection from Cairo, resulting in a
short-lived pact between Yemen, Egypt and Syria.
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Birmingham Post, January 19, 1999
On his father's death in 1962, Ahmad's son, Muhammed al-Badr, ruled for only
a week, before a military coup led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal proclaimed a
republic.
Backed by the United Arab Republic, this new regime was known as the Yemen
Arab Republic (YAR).
A civil war followed between the republic, backed by Egypt, and Royalist
forces, backed by Saudi Arabia.
The war continued until 1970, when the republic was finally recognised by
Saudi Arabia.
In the meantime, the British had held on to Aden against fierce guerilla
fighting, but in 1967 were forced to withdraw, making way for a new state, the
People's Republic of South Yemen, to be established.
The new republic relied heavily on economic support from Communist countries
and became the first and only Arab Marxist state.
In 1970 the republic's name was changed to the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen (PDRY).
It existed in a state of mutual distrust with the other Yemen republic to
the north and tension broke out into a series of short border wars in 1972, 1978
and 1979.
Two presidents of the YAR were assassinated during this period. But under
the Presidency of Ali Abdullah Salah of the Hashid tribe, in the late
seventies/early eighties, the stability of the YAR steadily improved.
By the end of 1981 a constitution had been drafted to implement a peaceful
merger between the two states.
Unification was delayed by political instability in the PDRY and it was not
until May 22, 1990 that the merger was made official.
The new country was named the Republic of Yemen. The border was opened and
demilitarised, although the border with Saudi Arabia remained in dispute.
Currencies were declared valid in both of the former countries and a
referendum sealed the unification of the Yemen.
Since then the Yemen slowly became more accessible.
Although there was no major tourist industry, visitors were welcomed on a
modest scale, and Yemeni society became more modernised.
However, it was still plagued by conflict and the coalition Government set
up in 1993 of the General People's Congress, the Islamic Islah and the Yemeni
Socialist Party was unstable.
The elites from the former northern and southern republics remained at each
others' throats and after occasional clashes a new civil war broke out in May
1994.
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The Northern forces proved victorious, taking Aden in July and a new
coalition Government of the General People's Congress and the Islamic Islah was
formed.
In theory the country is now a democracy, but human rights organisations are
deeply concerned about the activities of Yemen's security forces.
Despite producing about 400,000 barrels of oil a day, Yemen remains one of
the world's poorest countries and life expectancy is only 50.
Most of its 14 million population still work in agriculture, which produces
mainly subsistence crops for consumption at home.
Politically the country has never been fully reconciled with the West and
was seen as supporting Iraq during the Gulf War, which led to Saudi Arabia
banning Yemeni nationals from working in Saudi Arabia.
Events in the Gulf appear to have sparked the recent outbreak of terrorism,
which are seen as revenge attacks made in response to the British and American
air strikes on Iraq.
Many Yemenis emigrated to Britain to escape the turmoil and civil war
occurring in their homeland.
Now some of the original immigrants fear some of their offspring are growing
up to see their adopted home as the enemy and turning instead to the values of
Islamic fundamentalist extremists who believe Yemen should throw off Western
-style rule and become an Islamic nation.
British citizens who travel to the country have now been proved highly
likely to be caught in the cross-fire.
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The Independent (London)
January 31, 1999, Sunday
SECTION: NEWS; Page 18
LENGTH: 974 words
HEADLINE: They chant of bitterness and hell; Patrick Cockburn in Yemen on a
country paralysed by tribal conflict and weak government
BYLINE: Patrick Cockburn
BODY:
We are the Awaleq
Born of bitterness,
We are the nails that go into the rock.
We are the sparks of hell.
He who defies us will be burned.
THUS RUNS the tribal chant of the Awaleq, one of Yemen's most powerful
tribes. Nor are they alone in their fierceness. In the mountains of Abyan
province, east of Aden, are the Kazam, a warlike tribe famous for their generous
hospitality to strangers arriving in their lands.
But the well-fed guest should be wary as he bids farewell to his hosts.
Once he travels out of their territory, the tribesmen of the Kazam consider him
fair game. The laws of hospitality no longer apply. He becomes, in their own
phrase, "a good back to shoot at" and the Kazam are known locally for the
excellence of their marksmanship.
Neither the Awaleq nor the Kazam are exotic remnants on the margins of
Yemeni society. The central government in the capital, Sanaa, with little real
power of its own outside the main cities, is wary of offending them. In one of
the poorest countries in the world, it wages a constant battle to assert itself
against a host of rivals who may have a tribal, political or religious base.
The city of Aden and the countryside around it is full of signs of this
conflict. The airport roof is supported by freshly rebuilt raw concrete columns,
repairing the damage caused by bombing during the Yemeni civil war in 1994, when
the south of the country, united with the north only three years before, tried
to secede with the backing of Saudi Arabia.
The political legacy of the war is a constant topic of conversation in the
former British protectorate, where the domination of officials from the north is
deeply resented. One well-informed Yemeni observer said: "I think the hatred now
is greater than it was during the war."
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The Independent (London), January 31, 1999
Leaving Aden to the east along the Chinese-built coast road, there are a few
holiday chalets under construction on the seashore to the right, but nothing
to the left where there are extensive mine fields. On the outskirts of the city
there is a shanty town, home of some of the 850,000 Yemeni workers expelled from
Saudi Arabia in 1990 when Yemen took a neutral stance after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. Their expulsion devastated the Yemeni economy, which has never
recovered.
The coast road is considered safe from kidnappers but, further north in
Abyan province, 16 tourists were kidnapped in December by Abu Hassan, the
Islamic militant now on trial, and four tourists, three Britons and an
Australian, were killed during a rescue attempt.
This was a shock: no foreigner had been hurt in more than 100 kidnappings by
the tribes. None the less, hostage-taking has become a recognised way of putting
pressure on the government. Yemen is famous in the Arabian peninsula for the
quality of its honey. Hives were traditionally kept in hollowed-out tree logs on
metal stilts to protect them from ants. A year ago the police angered one tribe
by destroying some of its prized hives. The tribe demanded compensation from the
government. When nothing happened they put up a checkpoint on the main road and
kidnapped a Chinese person to underline their grievance.
The central government is weak, but Yemen is also more democratic than most
of the Arab world. There is an embattled but vigorous opposition press. When Abu
Hassan, the kidnapper, was put on trial earlier in the month, state-owned Yemeni
television broadcast 45 minutes of his tirade from the dock against the
government.
Into this violent, anarchic and suspicious world eight British Muslims and
two Algerians with French passports entered last year. They say their purpose
was the innocent study of Arabic and Islam. The prosecution at their trial in
Aden which resumed yesterday says their real aim was to form the "Aden cell" of
the Supporters of the Sharia (Islamic law), the group formed by Abu Hamza
al-Masri, the militant Islamic cleric of Finsbury Park, north London.
It was not a visit likely to end well. Two of the eight Britons now under
arrest in Yemen are related to Abu Hamza who openly denounces the Yemeni
government as not fully Muslim because it does not follow Islamic law. One is
his stepson Mohsin Ghalain, a rusty haired 18-year-old student, and the other
his full son Mohammed Mustapha Kamil, also 18, who was arrested last week. A
third member of the group is engaged to marry Abu Hamza's sister-in-law.
In a suspicious country, these relationships were bound to cause suspicion,
even if the intentions of the visitors from Britain were entirely academic and
religious. There is reason to think that the suspicions grew early.
Yemeni sources have told The Independent on Sunday that their investigation
started in early December when they detained but later released, after 10 hours
of interrogation, a Yemeni named Mohammed Nader at Aden airport.
But it was the kidnapping by Abu Hassan of the tourists on 28 December which
turned the arrests in Aden four days earlier into a cause celebre. When it was
revealed that he had used his mobile phone from his scrubland encampment to seek
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advice from Abu Hamza in London, the Yemeni government saw a triangular
conspiracy. The fanatical sheikh in London, the kidnappers in Yemen with whom he
was in contact, and the group in Aden strongly linked to him by family ties.
"Perhaps they found a string and are trying to turn it into a rope," said
one Yemeni. Torture is routine in Yemeni jails. As a Yemeni saying about such
interrogations has it: "They can make a zebra say he is a gazelle."
In some respects, Yemen has managed to get the worst of all possible worlds.
It freely allowed television cameras into the courtroom - but got no credit for
this because pictures of men with marks of torture were immediately flashed
around the globe.
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Copyright 1999 Midland Independent Newspapers plc
Birmingham Post
February 20, 1999, Saturday
SECTION: Pg. 21
LENGTH: 786 words
HEADLINE: DEATH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN NATION HIT BY HARDSHIPS;
DIVING OIL PRICES AND SECURITY FEARS ARE DRAGGING YEMEN'S ECONOMY DOWN
BYLINE: Alistair Lyon In Sanaa
BODY:
Yemen, among the Arab world's poorest countries, has stuck to arduous
measures to put its economy to rights, but plunging oil prices and recent
kidnaps of foreigners have kept the outlook bleak, analysts have warned.
"It will be a very tough year," said the World Bank's resident
representative, Mr Gianni Brizzi.
Yemen produces about 400,000 barrels a day of crude, and oil exports
provided some 70 per cent of revenue before world oil prices dived nearly a year
ago.
Central Bank Governor, Mr Ahmed Abdul-Rahman al-Samawi, said last year's
budget had been prepared assuming an oil price of $ 18 a barrel. This year's
assumed a price of $ 12.
"Oil prices are still depressed and likely to remain so," Mr Brizzi said.
"The shock has had a profound impact on the economy and it will be
aggravated by the impact of the security situation on tourism."
Western countries have tightened warnings about travel to Yemen after a
spate of kidnappings of foreigners.
Four Western tourists were killed in December in a shoot-out between their
Muslim militant captors and Yemeni troops.
Yemen wins high marks from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
for its adherence to a demanding structural adjustment programme launched in
1995.
Mr Brizzi said: "Since 1995 Yemen has made tremendous progress on
macroeconomic management. Previously there was high inflation, multiple exchange
rates, a high budget deficit and foreign exchange problems.
"Things have improved dramatically, without reaching all the targets."
Mr Samawi said foreign reserves now exceeded pounds 600 million, a cushion
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Birmingham Post, February 20, 1999
equivalent to more than five months of imports.
Yemen responded to the oil price shock by slashing its development budget by
one third and cutting petrol and other subsidies in June, which provoked price
riots.
"The authorities deserve to be commended for holding to the programmed
fiscal stance in the first months of 1998 despite the unexpected sharp decline
in oil prices and the shortfall in external financing, as well as for holding to
- and not rescinding - the June administered price increases despite the strong
public reaction,' an IMF report said.
Mr Brizzi said much more needed to be done in financial and fiscal reform.
Poor public administration, corruption and a deficient judicial system were
deterring private investment.
"Our expectation was that private sector investment would come in once the
macroeconomic situation was controlled. This has not happened last year or this
year, he said.
"If investors can't calculate the cost of doing business in Yemen, they
won't come.' II
Government hopes of luring investors are pinned on Aden, where a new
container port is due to open next month.
A senior European diplomat said this was the only potential bright spot he
could see for the Yemeni economy.
"The hope is that this will focus attention on Aden as a major international
port and that the industrial area and free zone will take off with large-scale
investment, " he said.
Economic growth at around five per cent a year has not kept pace with
Yemen's exploding population growth of about 3.5 per cent annually, one of the
highest in the world.
The population, estimated at anywhere between 16 million and 20 million, is
set to double in the next 20 years or so. Per capita income has declined to no
more than pounds 171 a year, against an average of pounds 344 for sub-Saharan
Africa.
"The middle class is dying," said Ms Marta Colburn, resident director of the
American Institute for Yemeni Studies.
"In 1984 a teacher's salary was worth about pounds 600. Now it is less than
pounds 60. The private sector opportunities are just not there."
Mr Habib Hammam, representative of the UN Children's Fund, said the economic
reform programme had imposed severe hardships, with 30 per cent of Yemenis now
living below the poverty line compared to 20 per cent previously.
"I am expecting an increase in malnutrition and child and maternal
mortality," he said.
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"Child mortality is already high at 110 deaths per 1,000 live births, or 200
child deaths a day. "
Mr Hammam said Yemen had pleased the international community with its
commitment to economic reforms and its developing democracy, but was
experiencing teething pains.
"They are putting in place all the right building blocks in a serious way
and they deserve all the help they can get to really be put on their feet, " he
said.
"It is extremely important for the government to counter austerity with
visible social services such as water, health and education. Otherwise, if
people have no outlet, things can blow - and no one can afford things to blow in
Yemen."
GRAPHIC: Bleak outlook: A town west of Sanaa, Yemen, which is one of the poorest
countries in the Middle East.
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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LEVEL 1 - 69 OF 161 STORIES
Copyright 1999 Deutsche Presse-Agentur
Deutsche Presse-Agentur
March 2, 1999, Tuesday, BC Cycle
03:34 Central European Time
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 710 words
HEADLINE: FEATURE: Yemen's Jews and Moslems live in fragile balance
BYLINE: By Hans Dahne
DATELINE: Sanaa
BODY:
"The Jahudi (Jew) will not open his shop again. I have bought his silver
jewelry,' Adel says, answering questions on why a Moslem has taken over a Jewish
silver shop with an evasive "Maschakil (Problems)
With every passing sale Adel opens up to relate a family drama.
"The daughter of the Jew married a Moslem and converted to Islam. Her father
wrote a document indicating that she had reconverted to Judaism, and his
son-in-law shot him.
"He is now facing a court of law and will probably be executed. Whoever
kills is killed. "
Jews and Moslems strive to create the appearance that the incident has not
unsettled the fragile balance between the groups in Saada. In this northern
Yemeni town most of the around 1,000 Jews left in Yemen carry on their widely
known craft as silversmiths.
"No, there is no problem between Moslems and Jews. Everything is "adi" -
relaxed. We are brothers," the men in the tea-house say. Jussif, the dead Jew's
son, does not want to say anything.
Some 450 Jews still live in Saada, according to Raja Sagar, a researcher
living in Sanaa, and there are rumours that there are even Jews abroad who would
like to return.
"The Jews belong to the tribe and are therefore entitled to its protection,"
she says. By contrast with the Moslems they do not carry a curved dagger and are
not required to do military service.
"But everybody has a Kalashnikov at home. The women have even adapted to
local custom and go veiled in public," Sagar says.
The Jews can be distinguished by their hair locks, but like the Moslems they
chew Khat leaves, which contain a mild stimulant.
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"The Jews speak Hebrew at home and Arabic in public," Sagar says.
"It's a kind of tacit agreement. The Moslems pretend that they don't
know and the Jews that they don't do it." Sagar says the Yemeni Jews
have remained "pure and orthodox" because there have been few
external influences.
The thirteen centuries of co-existence between Jews and Moslems in Yemen
have resembled a roller-coaster ride. At the beginning of the sixth century, in
the pre-Islamic era, King Dhu Nuwas ordered a mass conversion to Judaism. The
Islamic period began in 630, and Jews and Christians had to pay taxes in
exchange for protection.
There were two crises - one in 1676 when a Messianic cult of approaching
salvation unleashed fear and another in 1792 when the imams ordered synagogues
to be destroyed.
By decree Jews had to differentiate themselves from Moslems through their
clothing; they were allowed neither to bear arms nor to wear jewelry, and when
travelling by donkey they had to adopt the women's riding position.
From the middle of the 19th century the first organized emigration
to Palestine took place. The United Nations resolution on the
founding of the state of Israel led to a "shameful outbreak of
violence" perpetrated by an "incited mob" against the Jews, according
to eyewitness reports.
During the unrest in Aden on December 2, 1947, for example, 82 Jews were
killed, 106 of 170 Jewish shops were plundered and almost all cars belonging to
Jews were set alight.
Mass flight ensued.
Under the auspices of "Operation Flying Carpet", more than 48,300 Yemeni
Jews left for Israel between 1948 and 1951, with another 6,000 leaving later.
According to the statistics office there are 182, 700 Jews of Yemeni origin now
living in Israel.
Many have settled in the cities of Rosh Ha'ajin and Petach Tikva in the Tel
Aviv area.
There are no official relations between Yemen and Israel. "There has thus
far been no Israeli delegation to Yemen, and Yemen does not accept anyone with
an Israeli visa, " Interior Minister Hussein Mohammed Arab says.
"There are Jews in Yemen. They have the advantage of being treated like any
other citizen. They have the same rights, they can travel at any time, they can
go where they want and return. Some have even taken part in elections."
Especially with regard to freedom to travel Moslem Jews feel that they are
at a disadvantage.
"Jews are not constrained any more, " an official at the Information Ministry
says. They get visas to the United States without any difficulty. We don't. To
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Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 2, 1999
them we are Moslem terrorists. " dpa da/le ps
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Copyright 1999 Agence France Presse
Agence France Presse
April 12, 1999 16:11 GMT
SECTION: International news
LENGTH: 299 words
HEADLINE: Yemen government promises to reform electoral lists
DATELINE: SANAA, April 12
BODY:
Yemen's government on Monday promised to reform the country's electoral lists
prior to October's presidential elections, following protests of irregularities
from the opposition.
"The process of rectifying the lists should begin on the ground over the next
three weeks," the head of the electoral commission's information department,
Mansur Ahmed Saif, told a press conference here.
He added that some 13,000 people from Yemen's 18 political parties would
participate in the effort.
The opposition has protested that half a million voters have registered
twice, out of a total of 4.6 million people eligible to vote. The opposition has
also said it is under-represented on the electoral commission.
Yemen is to hold its first free presidential elections in October following
an amendment to the country's constitution.
Official sources say President Ali Abdallah Saleh has been in talks with
opposition leaders to settle disagreements about the elections and the
commission charged with preparing them.
The president's mandate, which began in 1978, expires in October. He is
presently the only candidate, but the constitution stipulates that he must have
at least one competitor.
The elected president will have a term of five years, renewable once.
Parliamentary elections were held in 1997. They were won by Saleh's party
which now, together with its political allies, controls about two-thirds of the
parliament's seats.
General Saleh was nominated in 1978 by North Yemen's parliament, which
subsequently renewed his mandate in 1983 and 1988.
When Yemen was re-united in 1992, the parliament nominated him president of
the new state. It renewed his mandate for a further five years in 1994.
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Yemen is the only republic in the Arabian peninsula.
mou-sam/sw/bsm
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Copyright 1999 Agence France Presse
Agence France Presse
April 13, 1999 09:27 GMT
SECTION: International news
LENGTH: 296 words
HEADLINE: Yemen president urges opposition to name election candidates
DATELINE: DUBAI, April 13
BODY:
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh on Tuesday urged the opposition to
nominate their candidates for the state's first presidential elections in
October.
"We think there should be a maximum of 10 candidates
and we have
encouraged political parties to hold meetings to nominate their candidates,'
Saleh said in an interview with the United Arab Emirates' Al-Khaleej daily.
Asked whether he himself would be a candidate, the president, who has held
power since 1978, said "it is too early to say."
"It is up to the (ruling) General People's Congress to decide at its meeting
in July who its candidate for the elections will be,' he added.
The president's mandate expires in October, following a change in the
constitution. There must be at least two candidates for the election in the
Arabian peninsula's only republic.
The elected president will have a term of five years, renewable once.
Parliamentary elections were held in 1997. They were won by Saleh's party
which now, together with its political allies, controls about two-thirds of the
parliament's seats.
Meanwhile, Saleh said it would be "difficult to pardon" five former southern
leaders condemned to death in 1998 for seceding during the country's 1994 civil
war.
"They were the principal cause of bloodshed
In any case, even if they are
(pardoned), they will not return to Yemen because they have financial interests
abroad, " he said.
Commenting on relations with Kuwait, which soured when Yemen supported Iraq's
1990 invasion of the emirate, the president said he wished to normalise them.
"We read in the press (in March) the comments by Kuwait's foreign minister
that he would invite his Yemeni counterpart, but we have not received this
invitation yet, II he said.
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Copyright 1999 British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
April 29, 1999, Thursday
SECTION: Part 4 The Middle East; ALGERIA; ME/D3521/MED
LENGTH: 297 words
HEADLINE: US Central Command chief meets president, premier
SOURCE: Source: Republic of Yemen TV, San'a, in Arabic 1800 gmt 27 Apr 99
BODY:
[38]
Excerpts from report by Yemeni TV on 27th April
President Ali Abdullah Salih today received Gen Anthony Zinni, commander of
the US Central Command, who is currently visiting Yemen. They discussed aspects
of bilateral relations and fields of cooperation between Yemen and the United
States, especially cooperation in the military area. They also discussed the
work of the US team of experts in Yemen in the field of mine clearance - mines
which were planted by the secessionists during the war of sedition and secession
in the summer of 1994 - and the removal of some wrecked ships in Aden port. The
two sides also reviewed several issues and developments of common interest.
Zinni stressed the US's eagerness to advance cooperation ties between the two
friendly countries in various political, economic, military, and other fields.
He expressed appreciation for and admiration of the progress Yemen has made in
the area of democratic practice and development, including what was accomplished
in Aden free zone.
For his part, the president welcomed Gen Zinni and noted the continuous
advancement of bilateral relations and cooperation. He pointed out that there
are wide horizons for enhancing and developing these relations in the interest
of the two friendly countries. He voiced appreciation for the US assistance in
the field of mine removal
Prime Minister Abd al-Karim al-Iryani also received Gen Zinni today. During
the meeting, the two sides reviewed aspects of cooperation between Yemen and the
United States, especially in the area of mine removal and training Yemeni
experts in this field. The prime minister commended the level of relations
between the two friendly countries
General Zinni left San'a today concluding a two-day visit
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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The Associated Press
The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These
materials may not be republished without the express written consent of The
Associated Press.
May 17, 1999, Monday, PM cycle
ADVANCED-DATE: May 10, 1999, Monday, PM cycle
SECTION: International News
LENGTH: 983 words
HEADLINE: Women in Iran, Qatar, Yemen can vote but not dress as they please
BYLINE: SCHEHEREZADE FARAMARZI, Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: DOHA, Qatar
BODY:
One woman running for office hid behind a black veil, spoke to male voters
only by telephone and refused to show her face on television or posters
throughout her campaign.
Another faced men in person, but showed them only her eyes through a slit in
her veil. A third let men see her face, but her hair and her body were swathed
in a cloak and scarf.
The three candidates live in Middle Eastern countries - Qatar, Yemen and Iran
- where women not only can vote, but can play a role in government. Yet they
must do SO under conditions Western women would find undemocratically
restrictive.
"We live in a very conservative society
We have to play by the rules,"
said Wadha al-Suwaidi, the head of Qatar University's teaching college and the
candidate who refused to show her face during recent Qatari municipal
elections.
Some Islamic scholars see no contradiction in the imposition of the veil and
the extension of electoral rights. They maintain that Islam has always given
women rights and that the veil is a privilege, because it frees women from
unwanted male attention.
Other observers see a real attempt by Islamic societies to adapt to the
modern world, allowing certain freedoms while retaining traditional values
symbolized by dress codes.
But skeptics say the veils reveal insincerity. States that are at heart anti-
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democratic keep their women cloaked and allow them to vote only to gain
international acceptance and perhaps money from agencies that make aid
conditional on reforms and women's rights, the critics say.
"They can use the jargon of democratization and election as a way to
legitimize themselves, appear to be modern and counter the claims of
authoritarianism, said Shiva Balaghi, associate director of the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies at New York University.
Such academic arguments seem of little interest to the women wearing veils
and casting votes in the Middle East. Yemeni women, for instance, are more
concerned with issues like jobs and illiteracy.
Yemen, with a population of 16 million, is by far the Arabian Peninsula's
most democratic country, and women there, almost all of whom wear veils, have
traditionally had a role in public life.
Rauffa Hassan al-Sharki, director of the women studies program at San'a
University, says the veil is part of Yemeni tradition.
Modernization does not mean local customs "should vanish," she said. Yemeni
women wear veils as a result of tradition and social pressures.
Women make up 28 percent of Yemeni first-year college students, but the
percentage drops in later years either because women leave to marry or are
forced to quit by parents who accuse them of having relationships with male
classmates.
In Yemen, where a candidate in 1997 parliamentary elections campaigned in a
veil that revealed only her eyes, two women sit in the 301-seat Parliament. A
woman is deputy information minister and a sizable number of lawyers and
professors are women.
Under the Marxist regime that governed southern Yemen after independence from
Britain in 1967, women served as judges - a role forbidden to women under most
interpretations of Islamic law - and even as leaders of the ruling party. When
the north and south merged in 1990, social disruptions that followed gave women
a chance to take a bigger role.
But with the victory of the conservative north in a 1994 civil war, women
lost many of their gains. Today, women activists see politics as their arena of
struggle.
Women have a similar outlook in Iran, separated by culture and language from
the Arab states. While the majority of Arab countries are from the mainstream
Sunni Muslim sect, Persian Iran is predominantly Shiite Muslim.
From beneath the long and constraining garments Iran's constitution requires,
Iranian women are showing a growing determination to moderate the hard-line
policies and strict social guidelines put in place by the late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, father of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
"We are trying to give women their full Islamic rights," said Suheila
Jelowdarzadeh, who campaigned and won in cloak and scarf in 1996 national
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elections and now is one of 13 women in the 270-member parliament. As she spoke,
she constantly adjusted her black chador, a sheet-like cloak draping her from
head to toes.
It was largely Iranian women's and young people's votes that in May 1997
elected moderate President Mohammad Khatami. He named a woman as one of eight
vice presidents, and a few women occupy senior government posts.
In February municipal elections, where there were only 5,000 women among the
330,000 candidates, women stunned Iranians by winning seats in at least 20
cities, including three out of 13 in the capital, Tehran. In the provincial town
of Zanjan, 10 of the 15 seats went to women.
"I think the Iranian state has reached a point of no return," said Balaghi,
the New York University researcher.
"They have admitted enough women, enough people with more moderate views into
the governmental system, that I don't think that they will be able to go back to
a totally conservative authoritarian form of Islamic government again. They may
have opened a Pandora's box."
Qatar's emir, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, started his people toward
democracy in March by holding his country's first democratic election and
letting women vote and run for office.
Still, none of the six women candidates won seats on the Municipal Council.
Qatar is a country where women themselves are usually the most outspoken
advocates of restrictive customs. Although no law requires them to, almost every
woman in Qatar wears the veil.
"The majority of women lack brains and are submissive," said Shoaa al-Yousuf,
a female professor of biological science at Qatar University.
She faces her male classes at the university draped in a black cloak that
envelops her from head to foot, with a slit for her eyes.
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Copyright 1999 British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
May 21, 1999, Friday
SECTION: Part 4 The Middle East; EGYPT; ME/D3540/MED
LENGTH: 2615 words
HEADLINE: President Salih interviewed by Egyptian news agency on various issues
SOURCE: Source: MENA news agency, Cairo, in English 1622 gmt 19 May 99
BODY:
[32]
In a wide-ranging interview, President Salih has talked about " terrorism"
and Yemen's relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as with the
Horn of Africa countries. He also mentioned economic problems, such as the
economic burden on Yemen of Somali refugees, coupled with the marked increase in
Yemen's own population, the decline in remittances from Yemenis overseas and the
return home of 1.2 million of these expatriates. Salih added that on 22nd May he
would address the nation in order to invite all political groups and parties to
present their presidential candidates for the elections in October. He also
mentioned his campaign to replace kat-chewing by sports. The following is the
text of a report on the interview by the Egyptian news agency MENA; subheadings
inserted editorially:
San'a, 19th May: President [Ali] Abdullah Salih characterized Egyptian-Yemeni
ties as strong. No-one can impair them, he told MENA Editor in Chief Mahfuz
al-Ansari on Wednesday [19th May].
He highlighted the special and distinguished relations he maintains with
Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and said they are both working for elevating
economic cooperation between their two countries to the same level. Yemen's
markets are fully open for the Egyptian products, reputed for their high
quality, he added. Referring to the projected joint bank and shipping line
between both countries, President Salih held such projects as capable of opening
wide the scopes of cooperation between Egypt and Yemen.
Turning to his country's relations with Riyad, President Salih termed them as
"good" , adding that there remain only two points in the file of the border
dispute between them to have it all settled. He further told the agency's editor
that ties with Kuwait were normalized, with the Gulf War file finally closed.
He refused to name Aden Port as a US base. It is rather an international
petrol station, he said.
On the Horn of Africa, the Yemeni president said it is a vital region for us.
He and President Mubarak are making endeavours to solve the conflict between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Hostilities raged between the two Horn countries in
February after a nine-month cease-fire.
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"Terrorism"
President Salih denied that his country sponsors terrorism, adding that the
Jihad leaderships are now on trial in the court of law. The accused in the cases
of terrorism involve, besides Yemenis and Egyptians, also Algerians, Sudanese,
Britons, Libyans and Syrians, as well as others from other Islamic states, he
told MENA editor in a nutshell.
Economic relations with Egypt
The economic relations between Egypt and Yemen do not match the bilateral
strong and time-honoured political ties and the businessmen from both sides are
to blame for this, President Salih told Ansari.
A preparatory committee is now arranging for the meeting of the Higher Joint
Committee that will be held at the level of prime ministers in both countries in
June, said the president. The preparatory committee will undertake the
assessment of the projects carried out and the agreements signed and diagnose
the reasons of disruption which obstructed the implementation and propose
solutions, said Salih in an interview with [the] MENA editor in chief.
He proceeded, saying: "We in Yemen prefer the Egyptian products and
commodities as this is part of the policy of integration we seek to achieve with
Egypt in order to set the scene for a larger pan-Arab integration. Our markets
are open for Egypt and the sister countries. The private sector is assigned a
major role and is responsible for the success of the Egyptian-Yemeni cooperation
and its translation into concrete projects and applicable agreements."
President Salih admitted that the lack of a navigational [shipping] line
between Yemen and Egypt also marks a colossal hindrance to cooperation and trade
exchange, although its operation was agreed on during the latest meeting of the
Joint Higher Committee in San'a. " The establishment of an Egyptian-Yemeni bank,
which was also endorsed, has not yet come to existence in spite of its vital
importance."
Arab solidarity; Horn of Africa
Commenting on the current political situation and the wave of rapprochements
and reconciliations now taking place among Arab countries and whether this would
mark a prelude to an Arab summit, President Salih said: "We are pro any
endeavours by Arab leaders to overhaul the cracks in the inter-Arab relations
and restore solidarity. The Arab nation is undergoing a state of incoherence and
division due to the Gulf crisis and its repercussions. President Husni Mubarak
and, likewise, UAE President Shaykh Zayid Bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, are obviously
exerting tremendous efforts in that direction."
"We, like President Mubarak, are trying to settle the Ethiopian-Eritrean
dispute because the security of the Horn of Africa is part and parcel of the
Arab region's. Yemen in particular is suffering from the volatile situation in
Somalia and receives many Somali refugees who flee the fighting there and add to
our economic and social burden, " President Salih said.
President Salih urged the Arab League to call on Arab leaders to hold a
summit that might regain the lost solidarity and to take during this summit
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measures necessary to render it regular with a pre-set agenda. He recalled that,
since 1981, no ordinary Arab summit has ever been held and all the summits held
were emergency ones. "We are not inferior to the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) which convenes regularly and we will support the league to stabilize the
regular system," " said Salih.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
Asked where did the border talks with Saudi Arabia reach, Salih said the
problem is on its way for settlement and the process of demarcation in
accordance with Ta'if Agreement signed in 1934 is about to conclude.
"Only two points have not yet been settled and each side is presenting its
view in that regard until they are sorted out on a fair basis," added Salih. The
real difference is on pinpointing the demarcation lines set in Ta'if Agreements
and both the Saudi and Yemeni sides have sincere desire to get through it
peacefully," said Salih. "We have waded through a large part of this problem
since we embarked on negotiations in 1995 and I think that a final solution will
be reached soon," President Salih said.
Asked whether detente with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would materialize in the
return of Yemeni workers to the kingdom and resumption of assistance to San'a,
Salih said: "A limited return of Yemeni workers to Saudi Arabia has been allowed
and, to be frank, the situation will not be the same as it was before the Gulf
War. "The kingdom no longer has such huge projects that need the previous number
of manpower because it had been saturated with the infrastructure works.
Concerning the visit by Foreign Minister Abd-al Qadir Bajammal to Kuwait, it
came at the invitation of Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti foreign minister.
Normalization of ties with Kuwait is not that strange as our relations are
already strong and distinguished."
President Salih argued that the stance of Yemen was not truly depicted by the
media during the Gulf War. "Yemen remembers that the Kuwaitis had been
supporting it since its September Revolution. But a misunderstanding was created
by the foreign media during the Gulf crisis, although we were not involved in
the conflict," argued Salih.
Eritrea and Ethiopia
Citing the circumstances in which the relations between Yemen and its old
ally, Eritrea, were back to normal after the arbitration decision on [the]
Hanish islands came in favour of San'a, President Salih recalled that his
relations with Eritrean President Isayas Afewerki date back to pre-independence
when Yemen used to support Afewerki, then leader of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Eritrea.
"The crisis of [the] Hanish islands then popped up and the relations were
subsequently affected. And after the arbitration decision, President Afewerki
visited me twice: once in Aden and another in San' a. And whatever were the
external or regional motivations that charged this dispute in the Red Sea, both
me and Afewerki recognized that a war will lead nowhere, neither will it serve
the stability and security in the area, let alone the navigation in the Red Sea.
And hence we decided to resort to arbitration which is a civilized way we
prescribe for the settlement of all disputes."
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On Yemen's efforts to end the current dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia,
President Salih said he sent a letter via his minister for legal affairs to
Ethiopian Premier Meles Zenawi maintaining that Eritrea has accepted all OAU
resolutions regarding the dispute and agreed to sign a relevant framework. "The
Ethiopian answer that came read: All the Eritrean forces have to pull out first
from the territories they occupied," added Salih.
He noted that Egypt and Libya interfered to solve the problem and voiced hope
all their efforts would be capped with success.
Economic problems
Three years ago, President Ali Abdullah Salih engaged in a hard battle for
reform only to see the Yemeni field littered with more problems such as
unemployment, price hike and stagnation. These problems emerged within the
process of the reform programme which kicked off in cooperation with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
In his comment, President Salih said: "Indeed, so many problems broke out
once the economic reform programme started. But unless we launched this
programme the dollar price against the Yemeni currency would have amounted to
1,200 rials now. The programme enabled us to stabilize the dollar rate at 160
rials. I preferred the economic measures to investments and the programme left
unescapable negative effects. But reform was an inevitable remedy to stop the
economic deterioration and rehabilitate the destruction brought about by war."
"We issued treasury bonds, raised the interest rates on the savings in rials,
although we knew that this could badly affect development and economic growth.
We faced this with the creation of the Social Security Network (Social Fund)
which curbs the impact of development on the people. This network spends about
29bn rials to tone down the impact reform measures.'
Salih said the latest oil price plunge aggravated the problem and caused a
drop in the foreign currency. He added that the baby boom in Yemen, where the
population index has now spiralled to 18m people, gobbling up any growth
surplus, has further added oil to the fire.
The decrease in the expatriates' hard currency remittances and the mass
return of workers abroad also was tantamount to a catastrophe, he remarked.
Given this gloomy background, the importance of the economic reform became an
unavoidable surgery to rescue the country from a real disaster, said Salih.
"Frankly speaking, this was an apparently intended scheme to drive the people to
revolt by herding expatriates back home in extremely dire economic conditions,"
noted Salih, adding that the reform was the lifeboat. Salih set the number of
returnees at 1.2 million.
Politics
Asked whether his vast political activity in north and south Yemen and his
recent meetings with leaders from the Socialist Party were meant to shore up
national unity and at the same time serve as a prelude to the October
presidential election, Salih made clear that his meeting with the party
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The British Broadcasting Corporation, May 21, 1999
leaderships [as received] was one with a party that is active on the Yemeni
arena as a whole and not in its capacity as a body representing the south.
Speaking of conditions in the south, Salih said southern governorates were
being accorded greater care since the July 1993 secessionist attempt.
Various issues
Drawn on reports on deals with the US regarding military arrangements or
bases in Aden, Salih dismissed the reports by saying that the Americans already
were present in the region and needed no new bases. Salih, asserting that Aden
port was open to all, added that Egyptian companies were taking part in
construction work there.
We also have an Egyptian company investing in Sumatra island [as received;
possibly Socotra] to turn it into a tourist site and build hotels, chalets and
resorts, he said.
Salih said his country is seeking to lure more foreign investments and cited
a new law on offering facilities to investment companies. He said that during
his recent visit to Singapore, an island country he greatly admired, he agreed
with officials there on helping in setting up the free-trade zone in Aden.
Speaking of huge natural gas reserves in Yemen, Salih said some 11 trillion
cu.m. of natural gas with a turnover of 33bn dollars would expectedly be
exported over the coming 25 years.
- [Ansari] Mr President, you stand accused of letting terrorists find refuge
in Yemen, is this true?
- [Salih] May God never forgive those who had put in the heads of our
Egyptian brethren that we sheltered terrorists.
Yemen condemns terrorism and rejects any terrorist action, Salih said, adding
that his country had deported every foreigner who entered the country illegally,
be they Egyptian, Libyan, Algerian, Syrian, Sudanese or from any other Islamic
country. Salih went on to say that Yemen, like other countries, suffered from
terrorism and cited the repeated kidnappings of foreigners in the near past as
proof of such a plight.
Salih refuted Internet threats by Islamic Jihad to Yemeni authorities that
the group would resume abduction of foreigners. All the leaderships of Jihad
along with its cadres are now behind bars pending trials, he said. Salih
attacked Yemeni tribesmen who kidnap foreigners as an arm-twisting tactic to
force the government to comply with demands for improving services and deemed
their action tantamount to political terrorism. Salih was convinced that such
abductions were likely to scare off tourists.
Asked if he planned to run again for the presidency in the coming October
election, and whether other candidates were allowed to compete, Salih said he
was not till now a presidency candidate.
Were there other candidates?
Salih responded by saying he would address a speech to the nation on 22nd
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The British Broadcasting Corporation, May 21, 1999
May, inviting all political organizations and parties to come forward with their
presidential hopefuls, within the context of the concept of peaceful power
rotation. Of course many Arab brethren will not believe me when I call others to
step forward and have a go at the presidency, joked Salih who said he had been
president for the past 21 years. The Yemeni constitution mandates that two
candidates at least should come forward for the presidency and that 10
candidates is the limit, he said.
Asked to confirm reports that he was personally spearheading a campaign
against kat, an indigenous plant with narcotic effects, Salih was quick to say
he was. But in view of the fact that the habit is so entrenched in Yemeni
society that it has become everybody's cup of tea, according to Salih, the
president was taking the campaign easy. Admitting that he himself was an
occasional chewer, Salih said he was preaching sports as an alternative. Salih
said he received many letters from different parts of Yemen purporting that
local leaderships have kicked off the habit and embraced sports instead.
Salih was happy to say that he had succeeded in convincing a number of his
inner circle, such as Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, to discontinue the
habit. Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Abd-al Qadir Bajammal, according to
Salih, remains faithful both to the centuries-old pastime and the new
introduction of sports.
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
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LEVEL 1 - 14 OF 161 STORIES
Copyright 1999 New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Berhad
Business Times (Malaysia) (Malaysia)
May 22, 1999
SECTION: Diplomatically writing; Pg. 4
LENGTH: 1276 words
HEADLINE: A new democracy comes of age
BYLINE: By Mohamad Taha Mustafa
BODY:
THE Republic of Yemen will celebrate the ninth anniversary of its National
Day today.
On the 22nd of May 1990, all artificial barriers erected by the colonial
powers and protected by the political tendencies of the Cold War vanished.
These events gave birth to a United Yemen and this in turn, contributed
greatly to the stability and peace of our region and facilitated the joint
efforts of all the Yemeni patriots - who held different political agendas
- in building the country.
Yemen is a democratic, parliamentary republic, with a free market
oriented economy. The country enjoys a good reputation within the region
due to its political principle of non-interference as far as the affairs
of its neighbours are concerned and its defence of peace as well as its
cooperation within the region in particular and the world in general.
The relationship between Yemen and Malaysia dates back to the 15th
Century. Historians of the Malay culture and civilisation have always
acknowledged the crucial role played by the Yemeni merchants, Ulama and
Muftis - especially from Hadramout - in the Islamisation process which
started among the Rajas and the high strata of the Malays, converting the
Malay people into Islam.
Today, Islam has become a symbol of the identity and being of the Malay
society.
However, it was not until January 1998, that the two countries took a
solid step towards strengthening their relations with Yemen by
establishing a resident mission in Kuala Lumpur.
This move laid the foundations for the official visit by His Excellency
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President of the Republic of Yemen, to Malaysia.
This was an important milestone in our bilateral relationship and it took
place from 11 to 14 February last year, upon an invitation from the then
Yang di-Pertuan Agong, His Majesty Tuanku Jaafar and the Government of
Malaysia.
During his visit, President Ali Abdullah Saleh held many official talks
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Business Times (Malaysia) (Malaysia) May 22, 1999
with Malaysia's Honorable Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad.
During these talks, the leaders underlined the unique character of our
bilateral relations which are based upon a common history, sanguineous
ties and culture as well as a need to fill the gap caused by many years of
separation through the boosting of an economic and trade partnership.
The presidential visit culminated with the signing of four important
agreements. The Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation
Agreement which laid the foundations for the establishment of an Inter-
Governmental Joint Committee; the Trade Incentive Agreement; the
Investment Guarantees Agreement and a Memorandum of Understanding between
the Malaysian Authority for Industrial Development and the Yemen
Investment Authority.
Economic and trade ties may be the milestones by which the future
aspirations of our two countries are assessed, but we must never
underestimate our cultural ties. As the honorable Malaysian Prime Minister
once mentioned, the people of Yemen were the first people from the West to
come to Malaysia.
During my first year in Kuala Lumpur, I had the pleasure of being
exposed to the many vivid facets of the Malaysian people and was
pleasantly suprised by their keen interest in interacting with the people
of Yemen.
Representatives of the Malaysian business community have visited Yemen
as part of delegations and in separate groups in order to make their own
assessment of the opportunities available in my country. The Yemeni
Embassy, in cooperation with Malaysian institutions such as Matrade,
organised a seminar on "Doing Business with Yemen and the Investment
Opportunities".
The first official visit of a Malaysian high official to Yemen was
headed by Datuk Paduka Dr Abdul Hamid Othman, a Minister in the Prime
Minister's Department. The visit took place in September 1998 and resulted
in a better understanding of our profound relations.
The most important visit by a senior Malaysian Minister was the visit
made by the Honourable Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Syed Jaffar Albar, Foreign
Minister of Malaysia. This visit took place in April 1999. The Minister
was accompanied by an important business delegation.
The official talks, during this visit, reflected the fact that our views
on international and regional relations coincided in many important ways
and revealed our willingness to further strengthen our cooperation within
the framework of the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the United
Nations as well as on a bilateral basis.
The economic outcome of the visit was also positive with both parties
having discussed the refining of Malaysian oil in the Aden Refinery,
investments in the Aden Free Zone and infrastructure projects such as
those involving power production.
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Business Times (Malaysia) (Malaysia) May 22, 1999
I would now like to spend a little time giving you a political and
economic perspective of Yemen. Yemen is first and foremost, a democratic
country.
Yemen has held two democratic elections during the last nine years. They
were held in 1993 and in 1997 with the participation of all the political
parties in the national arena. These eletions were conducted with total
freedom as well as transparency and have been recognised by all the
necessary international and regional monitors as well as observers.
Yemen is facing yet another democratic experience this year with its
presidential elections. This is the first time that a president will be
elected through a direct popular vote. Another matter on the agenda this
year will be the approval of extended jurisdiction for local governments.
The framework of the decentralisation process will give a more profound
tone to our democracy.
For its crucial role in the implementation of democratic structures,
Yemen has been given the honour of hosting the International Summit of
Newly Established Democracies, this year.
In the economic arena, the Government of Yemen has reiterated its
unfailing commitment to economic, administrative, judicial and industrial
reform in order to create the most conducive climate for foreign direct
investment.
In line with these objectives, the project to convert the city of Aden
into a Free Trade Zone is fast becoming a reality with the culmination of
the first phase.
Foreign investment is being sought and encouraged in almost every aspect
of the economy, from infrastructure projects such as roads, power plants
and sewerage and wastewater treatment facilities, to agriculture, fishing
and oil production.
The country's laws provide sufficient guarantees to foreign investors
seeking to undertake projects either unilaterally or through joint
ventures with local investors. The laws also guarantee the free and smooth
transfer of capital and all profits in any convertible currency.
Economic reforms have been further strengthened by a set of political
and legislative reforms which are aimed at liberalisation through
privatization, reforming trade and fiscal policies, the lifting of all
restrictions on imports and the phasing out of price controls.
The reforms have received widespread international recognition from
well-respeted financial institutions which have recognised and
acknowledged the real growth of our economy.
These reports have also helped to boost international confidence in the
Republic of Yemen.
Finally, I would like to thank Business Times and the Malaysian media
for their interest in Yemen, its people, business, culture and politics. I
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Business Times (Malaysia) (Malaysia) May 22, 1999
think that the press can contribute highly in bringing our two countries
and their peoples together.
The writer is the Ambassador of Yemen to Malaysia.
GRAPHIC: Picture - President Ali Abdullah Saleh (left) and Mohamad Taha Mustafa
committed to economic, administrative, judicial and industrial reform to
create a conducive climate for foreign investment.
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Copyright 1999 British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political
Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring
May 25, 1999, Tuesday
LENGTH: 337 words
HEADLINE: YEMEN: SALIH URGES PARTIES TO NOMINATE CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
SOURCE: Republic of Yemen Radio, San'a, in Arabic 2013 gmt 24 May 99
BODY:
Excerpts from report by Yemeni radio on 24th May President Ali Abdullah
Salih stressed that the presidential elections, which will take place in Yemen
for the first time this year, will be a new experience for the society, who will
get acquainted with the peaceful rotation of power. He said that Yemen has come
a long way in political awareness.
In an interview with the Lebanese Space Channel LBC broadcast last night, he
said, that the most important condition of presidential candidacy is that
whoever gains confidence will maintain unity as a historic achievement. If this
condition is met, the people will elect that person, regardless of the party he
belongs to.
Salih called for all political parties and cliques to nominate their
candidates for the presidential elections. He said that there will be a general
public conference to determine presidential candidates. The president said: We
call all political forces to nominate their candidates, whether as members of
parties or as independent people in Yemen, whoever they may be. All Yemeni
citizen have the right to nominate themselves for the presidency.
He added that Yemen was among the first countries to adopt the democratic
system. He said that San'a will host a conference for the nascent democratic
nations next month. He added that this conference has not emerged from a vacuum,
but it reaffirms that Yemen is a democratic country
Answering a question on Yemen's request to join the Gulf Cooperation Council
GCC , the president said: We consider the council to be a good accomplishment
towards Arab, economic and political integration, as well as Arab unity. He
added: We exist, whether as members of the council or not. We have good
relations with Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and
Qatar.
On the borders issue with Saudi Arabia, he stressed that what has been
accomplished through dialogue, meetings, the memorandum of understanding and
committees is a good step towards solving the issue.
LANGUAGE: English
LOAD-DATE: May 25, 1999
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Page 2
LEVEL 1 - 4 OF 161 STORIES
Copyright 1999 Guardian Newspapers Limited
The Guardian (London)
June 5, 1999
SECTION: The Guardian Features Page; Pg. 24
LENGTH: 596 words
HEADLINE: Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf;
Editor of the free-est press in the Yemen
BODY:
Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, who has died in a car accident aged 48, was a
courageous warrior whose weapons were paper, ink and computers. As editor and
publisher of the Yemen Times, he took the country's ostensibly liberal press law
at its word -and regularly suffered the consequences.
Saqqaf, an economics lecturer at Sana'a University, launched his paper in
1991 during the political spring that accompanied Yemen's first steps towards
democracy. It was one of several dozen new titles thrust upon a 60 per cent
illiterate public. Many disappeared, and the Times should have been among the
first to hit the rocks. It was published entirely in English, apart from the
occasional page in French. This was Saqqaf's masterstroke. His paper was able to
get away with saying things, because there was no danger of inflaming the
masses. But the authorities became apprehensive when they realised that it was
read by every foreign diplomat and businessman in Yemen.
He ran the paper from a cramped office just outside the walls of the old
city. The first time I met him, after listening to his views on the Yemeni
economy, delivered at high speed, I asked him for a copy of the paper. 'You'll
have to pay for it, he said. 'I'm a capitalist." I handed over the money -
slightly less than 10p. Within a few years, the Times had become Yemen's most
influential paper and the most successful commercially. I met Saqqaf in his
large new offices where he gave me a bundle of back issues. 'Don't you want me
to pay for them?" I asked. 'Ah!" he replied, 'In those days I was a POOR
capitalist." The Times's first brush with the law was farcical. The information
minister could not read English, so articles had to be translated into Arabic
for him. The translator made a mistake which led to the paper being prosecuted -
and acquitted -for something it had never said. In 1994, shortly after Yemen's
war of secession, Saqqaf was briefly imprisoned without charge and the paper's
computers seized. Another time, the paper's landlord decided to throw them out.
When Saqqaf was out of town, the landlord invited the entire staff to lunch and,
while they were eating, changed the locks on their offices.
In 1995, the Times won the American NPC's award for freedom of the press.
This marked a recognition abroad of its efforts, as Saqqaf put it, 'to make
Yemen a good world citizen". Last year, the paper was threatened with
prosecution over an article which listed foreign aid Yemen had received under
the headline: "Where did it go?" Innocently put, but readers were left in no
doubt that money had been siphoned off.
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Page 3
The Guardian (London), June 5, 1999
Occasionally, he imagined the government feared him more than they did.
Saqqaf, summoned to the presidential office, said: 'If you're going to offer me
money or a job, I won't take it." The president, taken aback, replied: 'I
wasn't intending to offer you either." Co-opting opponents is an old Yemeni
tactic, and in 1997 Saqqaf was appointed to the new upper house of parliament,
the consultative council. Frustrated at its ineffectiveness, he resigned,
telling the president it was 'a lethargic organ". He was persuaded to return.
There was always something in Saqqaf's boldness that pointed towards a
tragic end. On June 2, he had lunch with the minister of labour. On the way back
he was hit by a car. The death of a critic of the government is liable to arouse
suspicions.
Saqqaf is survived by his wife Aziza and four children.
Brian Whitaker Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf, journalist and human rights
campaigner, born 1951; died June 2, 1999
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE: June 7, 1999
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