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MEMORANDUM TO WOMEN'S MEETING PARTICIPANTS
DATE:
July 1, 1997
FROM:
Kim Widdess
SUBJECT:
Meeting #1 With Researchers
On Thursday, July 10 at 9am, we will have our first meeting with outside researchers. Harrison
Hickman of Harrison/Brown research will join us for a briefing, accompanied by Jo Blum, Vice
President of Government Relations at NARAL and James Wagoner, Executive Vice President at
NARAL.
Enclosed are suggested readings from Harrison for the meeting. Please call myself or Robin
Leeds if you have any questions or concerns.
Thank you.
den- Jen-Jillle I'll he
Nicole- it would Jen be great could itattund
in Portugal-
and I know its the
you or this or meeting. ,k
DPC staff unter
but....
Niase
JUN-30-97 MON 12:40 PM
NARAL
FAX NO. 202 973 3070
P.02
The Journal of Politics
JP
Volume 57, Number 1, February 1995
Published by the University of Texas Press in association with the
Southern Political Science Association
JUN-30-97 MON 12:40 PM
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FAX NO. 202 973 3070
P. 03
RESEARCH NOTES
It's Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting
in the 1992 Presidential Election
Alan I. Abramowitz
Emory University
This article uses date from the 1992 American National Election Study to analyze the influence of
abortion attitudes on candidate choice in the 1992 presidential election. Despite the general belief that
the presidential election was decided almost exclusively on economic issues, attitudes toward abortion
had 1 significant influence on candidate choice in the overall cloctorate. Although the issue divided sup-
parters of both parties. far more "pro-choice" Republicans than "pro-life" Democrats defected from
their party's presidential candidate. Abortion had a stronger influence on candidate choice than any
other policy issue included in the study. including affirmative action, social welfare, defense spending,
the Gulf War, and the death penalty. Furthermore. among roters who were aware of the parties' posi-
rions and for whom abortion was 2 salient issue, abortion had 2 much stronger influence on candidate
choice than any other issue, including the state of the economy.
A
bortion would appear to clearly fit Carmines and Stimson's (1980) definition of
an "easy issue." Not only has the issue been on the political agenda since at least
1980, but abortion is clearly a symbolic and emorional issue that involves policy
ends rather than means As such, abortion is an easy issue for voters to understand.
This is reflected by the extremely small proportion of citizens who are unable or
unwilling to offer an opinion on the issue-less than 1% of respondents in the 1992
American National Election Study, for example.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly from the standpoint of policy vot-
ing, the issue of abortion cuts across party lines. Despite the dramatic differences
between the parties' platforms and presidential candidates, the issue of abortion
continues to sharply divide rank-and-file supporters of both parties. In fact, citi-
zens of higher socioeconomic status who normally vote Republican tend to favor 1c-
galized abortion, while lower SES citizens who normally vote Democratic tend to
favor greater restrictions on abortion (Baker, Epstein, and Forth 1983; Legge 1987:
Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1992). Thus, many rank-and-file Democrats and Re-
publicans hold positions at odds with those of their party and its presidential candi-
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Poliocal Science
Association. Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Sept. 2-5, 1993.
THE JOURNAL or POLITICS. Vol. 57. No. 1. February 1995. Pp. 176-86
© 1995 by the University of Texas Press. P.O. Box 7819. Austin, TX 78713-7819
JUN-30-97 MON 12:41 PM
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It's Abortion, Stupid
177
dates. In 1992, however, the issue of abortion appeared to divide Republicans much
more than Democrats. In fact, both President Bush and Vice President Quavle
sought to downplay the importance of the issue during the campaign to minimize
defections by pro-choice Republican voters.
Researchers have uncovered evidence of policy-based voting on abortion in some
recent senate and gubernatorial elections-particularly those that featured clear and
well-publicized differences over abortion policy (Cook, Jelen. and Wilcox 1993a,
19936; see also Howell and Sims 1993). In their analysis of exit poll data from 10
gubernatorial elections that took place after the Supreme Court's 1989 decision
permitting greater state regulation of access to abortion (Webster V. Reproductive
Health Services). Cook, Jelen. and Wilcox (1993a) found that
abortion
position
had a greater impact on vote choice than state economic conditions in eight of
ten states," and "abortion was a stronger predictor than even partisanship in Penn-
sylvania" (1). Based on these findings, there are strong reasons to believe that abor-
tion attitudes may have had a significant influence on voting decisions in recent
presidential elections.
Despite the strong potential for policy-based voting on abortion, the issue re-
ceived relatively little attention from journalists or scholars in connection with the
1992 presidential election. Almost all election analysts agreed that the state of the
economy was the primary, if not the exclusive, issue in the minds of voters and that
only 2 small minority of activists cared about social issues such 25 abortion (White
1993). This view was expressed very clearly by the siogan prominently displayed 2t
Clinton campaign headquarters: "it's the economy, stupid." However, the remain-
der of this article will bc devoted to exploring the possibility that the 1992 presi-
dential election wasn't exclusively about the economy and that, for many voters,
"it was also abortion."
DATA: THE 1992 AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY
The 1992 American National Election Study provides the data for this analysis.
The study included 2 single question asking respondents about the legal status of
abortion. This question asked respondents to choose one of four policy alternatives
ranging from most to least restrictive: abortion should never be allowed; abortion
should be allowed only in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother;
abortion should be allowed as long as "a clear need" exists; and abortion should not
be limited because it is "2 woman's choice." Although the survey also included
questions dealing with parental consent, spousal notification, and federal funding
of abortions for poor women, I used the question dealing with the legal status of
abortion to analyze the impact of abortion attitudes on voter choice because this is
the central issue that has divided the parties since 1980.
In 1992, respondents were also asked, for the first time in the history of the
national election studies, to give their perceptions of the positions of the
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates on abortion, using the same
JUN-30-97 MON 12:42 PM NARAL
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Alan I. Abramowitz
four policy alternatives. These questions allow us to measure the accuracy of vot-
ers' perceptions as well as their own policy preferences.
The NES survey did not include any questions asking respondents to rate their
concern with abortion compared with other issues. However, as in previous years,
the 1992 survey did include several scries of open-ended questions asking respon-
dents what they liked and disliked about the political parties and presidential can-
didates. what they regarded as the most important differences between the two
major parties, and what they considered the most important problems facing the
country. These questions were used to measure respondents' concern about abor-
tion by coding the answers according to whether or not abortion was mentioned.
The assumption here is that the more concerned a voter was about abortion, the
more likely it is that he or she would have mentioned abortion in response to one or
more of these open-ended questions.
In addition to abortion, the 1992 NES survey included questions about 2 wide
variety of issues including the death penalty, affirmative action, social welfare pol-
icy, defense spending, and the Gulf War. Respondents were also asked to evaluate
their personal financial situation and the state of the national economy. These ques-
tions allow us to compare the influence of abortion attitudes on the vote with that of
economic conditions and other policy issues.
Results
Among all respondents in the 1992 National Election Study, 47% opposed any
restrictions on abortion; 14% favored permitting abortion if "a clear need" existed;
29% favored permitting abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the
mother's life; and only 10% opposed abortion under any circumstances. Those
respondents who reported voting in the presidential election were slightly more
liberal-49% opposed any restrictions on abortion; 15% favored allowing abor-
tion if "2 clear need" existed; 27% favored allowing abortion only in cases of rape,
incest or danger to the mother's life; and only 9% opposed abortion under any
circumstances.
It appears from these results that the extreme "pro-life" position adopted by the
Republican party in its platform had almost no support among the American pub-
lic and that even the slightly less restrictive position taken by President Bush was
out of line with the views of most of the electorate. Under these circumstances, it is
understandable that Bush, Vice President Quayle, and other Republican party
leaders sought to downplay the importance of the party's stand on abortion during
the campaign by emphasizing the party's tolerance of diverse views on the issue.
The GOP's problem with regard to abortion policy becomes even more clear
when we examine the views held by rank-and-file party supporters. Table I shows
the abortion views of Democratic, Republican, and independent voters. Not only
did more than two thirds of Democrats and independents favor one of the two
pro-choice alternatives but so did 2 majority of Republican voters Barely one in 10
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TABLE 1
ABORTION POSITION OF VOTERS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Party Identification
Abortion Position
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Never allowed
8%
7%
11%
Rarely allowed
23%
17%
36%
If clear need
13%
17%
15%
Woman's choice
56%
50%
39%
Total
1-30
01%
101%
601
418
453
Source: 1992 American National Election Study.
Note: Based on respondents who reported voting in presidential election. Percentages may not total
100 due to rounding.
Republicans supported the position of the GOP platform and only 36% agreed
with the slightly less restrictive position taken by President Bush.
The results in table I again indicate the strong potential for partisan defection
over abortion, particularly among Republicans, 54% of whom were on the opposite
side of the issue from their party's candidate. Even among Democrats, however, 2
sizable minority of voters-31%-
osition that clearly conflicted with that
of their party and its presidential candidate. But did abortion attitudes influence
the candidate preferences of either group of partisans or of independents?
Table 2 shows the relationship between abortion policy preference and presiden-
tial vote among all voters and among Democrats, independents, and Republicans.
In the electorate as 2 whole, and among independents, Bush led among those who
favored restrictions on abortion and among those who favored limiting abortion to
situations in which "2 clear need" existed. However, Bill Clinton won a decisive
majority among the large bloc of voters who opposed any restrictions on abortion.
Ross Perot, who took a pro-choice stance during the campaign, also did better
among pro-choice voters than among voters who favored restrictions on abortion.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of table 2 is the asymmetrical impact that
abortion had on supporters of the two parties. Abortion attitudes apparently had
little or no impact on Democrats. In fact, Clinton received his strongest support.
88% of the vote. among the small group of Democrats who favored a complete ban
on abortion. In contrast, support for Bush was substantially higher among Re-
publicans who favored 2 ban on aborrion (88%) than among Republicans who
opposed any restrictions on abortion (65%). Altogether, pro-choice defectors con-
stituted 17% of all Republican voters in 1992 whereas pro-life defectors constituted
only 6% of all Democratic voters. However, the large majority of pro-choice
Republican defectors voted for Perot rather than Clinton. It appears that the cco-
nomically conservative Texas billionaire represented 2 more palatable pro-choice
alternative than Clinton for many pro-choice Republicans.
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Alan I. Abramowitz
TABLE 2
1992 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY ABORTION POSITION
AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Percentage Voting for
Bush
Clinron
Perot
All Voters
Never allowed (n = 1397
48
40
12
Rarely allowed (n = 436)
46
38
16
If clear need (* = 237)
4?
39
19
Woman's choice (n = 803)
22
58
20
Democrats
Never allowed (n = 49)
6
88
6
Rarely allowed (n = 135)
13
78
9
If clear need (n - 80)
12
79
9
Woman's choice (n = 337)
5
84
11
Independents
Never allowed (n = 40)
50
22
28
Rarely allowed (n = 138)
45
33
22
If clear need (* = 90)
41
2°
30
Woman's choice (n = 289)
16
54
29
Republicant
Never allowed (n = 49)
88
6
6
Rarely allowed (n = :62)
75
8
17
If clear need (n = 67)
79
6
15
Woman's choice (n = 175)
6;
12
23
Source: 1992 American National Election Study.
Why did abortion attitudes have a stronger impact among Republicans than
among Democrats? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine two of the
conditions for policy-based voting: knowledge and concern. Table 3 shows the
level of awareness of party differences on abortion and the salience of abortion
among various groups of voters. Voters were classified as knowledgeable if they
placed Bush on the pro-life side of the abortion issue and Clinton on the pro-choice
side. They were classified as concerned about abortion if they mentioned abortion
at least once in response to the open-ended questions concerning national prob-
lems, party differences, and likes and dislikes about the parties and candidates.
Despite the fact that the two major parties have raken well-publicized and
sharply contrasting positions on abortion since 1980, only 51% of all survey re-
spondents, and only 59% of those who actually voted, knew what those positions
were. The remainder either did not know one or both candidates' positions or
placed one or both candidates on the wrong side of the issue Thus. more than two
fifths of the voters did not meet even the minimal condition for policy voting.
JUN-30-97 MON 12:43 PM
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TABLE 3
KNOWLEDGE OF CANDIDATES ABORTION POSITIONS AND SALIENCE OF
ABORTION BY SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Know Positions
Know Candidates'
and Abortion
Positions
Salient
(%)
(90)
All coters
59
14
ARE
17-29
56
28
30-39
64
30
40-49
59
24
50-64
62
20
65+
50
14
Sex
Male
61
22
Female
56
15
Race
White
60
26
Black
49
8
Education
0-11th Grade
35
7
Graduated high school
SI
18
Some college
60
26
Graduated college
76
35
Income
Lower
49
14
Middle
61
28
Upper
67
28
Party identification
Democrat
59
18
Independent
56
23
Republican
62
31
Abortion position
Never allowed
52
32
Rarely allowed
58
26
If clear need
54
14
Womun's choice
62
24
Source: 1992 American National Election Study
Nore. Percentages based on respondents who reported voting in presidential election
JUN-30-97 MON 12:44 PM
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FAX NO. 202 973 3070
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Not surprisingly, knowledge of the presidential candidates' positions on abortion
was strongly related to socioeconomic status. Barely one third of voters who did not
complete high school were aware of both candidates' positions compared with more
than three-fourths of college graduates. Similarly, two thirds of upper income vor-
ers knew both candidates' positions compared with less than half of lower income
voters. At least on the issue of abortion, the potential for policy-based voting was
much greater among well-educated and affluent voters than among less-educated
and economically deprived voters
Despite the rather strong relationship between SES and knowledge, Republican
voters were only slightly more knowledgeable about the candidates' positions than
Democratic voters. Thus. the asymmetrical impact of abortion on partisan defec-
tion rates cannot be explained by the overall level of knowledge of Democratic and
Republican voters. However, the data in table 3 indicare that aborrion was a more
salient issue among Republicans than among Democrats. Almost one third of
Republican voters mentioned abortion 2t least once in response to the open-ended
questions compared with fewer than one fifth of Democratic veters. This differ-
ence was largely 2 by-product of racial and socioeconomic differences between sup-
porters of the two parties: concern with abortion was strongly related to education
and was much greater among whites than among blacks
The data in table 3 show the absolute levels of awareness and concern about
abortion among party's supporters. However, the potential for excy-based
voting also depends upon the extent of selective perception and concern among
party supporters. We need to know whether voters who disagreed with their party's
stance on abortion were aware of this conflict and whether they cared about the
issue, Therefore, table 4 shows the level of awarness and concer I about abortion
among pro-choice and pro-life Democrats and Republicans.
The data in table 4 show that selective perception and concern were major ob-
stacles to policy-based voting on abortion, especially among Democrats. Only 39%
TABLE 4
SELECTIVE PERCEPTION AND CONCERN: AWARENESS OF CANDIDATES'
POSITIONS AND CONCERN ABOUT ABORTION AMONG PARTISANS
Democracs
Republicans
Pro-Life
Pro-Choice
Pro-Life
Pro-Choice
Unaware
61%
28%
22%
44%
Aware. not concerned
27%
51%
38%
32%
Aware and concerned
11%
21%
40%
24%
Total
99%
100%
100%
100%
186
414
210
249
Source. 1992 American National Election Study
Note: Percentages may not total 100 duc to rounding
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TABLE 5
THE INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND CONCERN ON ISSUE-BASED VOTING
Percentage for Clinton among Voters
Unaware of
Aware but
Aware and
Abortion
Candidates
Abortion not
Abortion
Position
Positions
Salient
Salient
Never allowed
72
42
8
Rarely allowed
63
46
12
If clear need
39
54
60
Woman's choice
54
86
75
Tau
- 12*
10**
63"
"
520
465
323
Source: 1992 American National Election Study.
Note: Based on Bush and Clinton voters only
01, **p .001.
of pro-life Democrats knew that their position was opposed by their party and
its presidential candidate On the other hand. 56% of pro-choice Republicans
knew that their position was opposed by their party and its candidate. Further-
more, only 11% of pro-life Democrats were both aware of the difference between
the parties' positions and concerned about abortion compared with 24% of pro-
choice Republicans.
The impact of knowledge and concern on issue-based voting is clearly shown in
table 5. This table displays the relationship between abortion attitude and presi-
dential vote among three types of voters: those who were unaware of the positions
of the two major-party candidates, those who were aware of the candidates' posi-
tions but for whom abortion was not 2 salient issue, and those who were awarc of
the candidates' positions and for whom abortion was 2 salient issue. Because the
NES survey did not measure awareness of Peror's position on abortion, this table is
limited to Clinton and Bush voters.
Knowledge and concern dramatically affected the relationship between abortion
attitudes and the vote. Among voters who were not aware of the candidates' posi-
tions on abortion, the relationship is weak and in the wrong direction-voters who
supported abortion rights were less likely to vote for Clinton than those who op-
posed abortion rights. This inverse relationship is probably attributable to the fact
that "oters who supported abortion rights tended to be somewhat higher in socio-
economic status than those who opposed abortion rights. In contrast, among both
groups of voters who were aware of the candidates' positions on abortion, and espe-
cially among those for whom abortion was a salient issue, abortion actitudes were
strongly related to candidate preference in the expected direcrion-voters who
supported abortion rights were much more likely to vote for Clinton than those
who opposed abortion rights.
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Alan 1. Abramowitz
TABLE 6
THE INFLUENCE OF ABORTION ATTITUDES ON THE VOTE:
RESULTS OF PROBIT ANALYSES
All Voters
Aware and Concerned
Independent
Change in
Change in
Variable
Coeff.
Ratio
Probability
Coell.
Ratio
Probability
Parry Id
469
13.00
.34
1551
5.35***
.38
Ideology
295
4.92***
.15
295
1.83*
IS
Welfare
.050
2.33**
.07
.027
0.46
04
Affirm act
.053
1.73"
00
.070
0.94
.03
Death penalty
-.004
-0.09
-.00
009
0.08
8
Defense $
-.043
0.84
-02
.025
0.18
01
Gulf war
-014
-0.15
- 00
-391
-1.34
-.12
Fam finances
-064
-1.06
-03
-101
-0.67
-.04
N&t economy
-.188
-4.51***
- 11
-.172
-1.55
-11
Abortion
.129
2.92***
.08
.519
3.97*
.28
Age
.002
-0.57
-.01
-010
-0.89
-.07
Sex (female)
-368
-2.83***
- 07
.139
0 45
03
Race (black)
.703
2.41**
.09
-1044
-1.26
-.13
Education
.070
-0.96
-.03
-.295
-1.53
-12
Fam income
-.007
-0.58
-.02
.026
083
.06
Constant
- .387
.633
Source: 1992 American National Election Study.
Noce: Dependent variable is presidential voic, coded as "1" for Clinton and "0" for Bush. Change in
probability is estimated effect of increase of one standard deviation on each independent variable on
probability of voting for Clinion for YOLCE with initial probability of 50
", < .05; "P < 01; ***P < 001
To compare the influence of abortion attitudes on candidate choice with that of
economic conditions and other policy issues, I conducted two probit analyses, one
for all Clinton and Bush voters and one for those Clinton and Bush voters who
were aware of the candidates' positions on abortion and for whom abortion was 2
salient issue. This second analysis included approximately one fourth of all Clinton
and Bush voters. in addition to abortion, the policy issues included in the probit
analyses were affirmative action, social welfare, defense spending, the death
penalty, and the Gulf War. Other independent variables were national economic
conditions, family finances, party identification, liberal-conservative identification,
age, sex, race, education, and family income. The results of these probit analyses
are presented in table 6.
Among all Clinton and Bush voters, party identification, ideology, and national
economic conditions had the strongest effects on candidate choice. Thus, our results
'The specific questions used to measure these characteristics and attitudes will be provided on re.
quest by the suthor.
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185
support the Clinton campaign's slogan, "it's the economy, stupid." However, 25 in-
dicated by the estimated effects of each variable on the probability of voting for
Clinton, abortion had the strongest effect of any of the policy issues included in the
analysis, including the Gulf War, defense spending, affirmative action, and social
welfare. Furthermore, abortion attitudes had 2 much stronger effect on candidate
choice among the subset of voters who were aware of the candidates' positions on
abortion and for whom abortion was a salient issue: the estimated coefficient for the
abortion variable was almost four times larger for the "aware and concerned group
than for the entire electorate. In fact, among these "aware and concerned" voters,
the influence of abortion attitudes far outweighed that of any variable except party
identification, including evaluations of national economic conditions. For this
group of voters, which included approximately one-fourth of the electorate, a more
accurate slogan would have been, "it's abortion. stupid."
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the seneral belief that the 1992 presidential election was decided almost
exclusively on economic issues, our analysis of voter decision making indicates that
attitudes toward abortion had a strong influence on candidate choice in the overall
electorate. Furthermore, approximately one fourth of all major party voters were
aware of the candidates' positions on abortion and mentioned abortion at least once
in response to the open-ended questions dealing with national problems, party dif-
ferences, and likes and dislikes about the parties and candidates. Among these
aware and concerned voters, aborrion had 3 much stronger influence on candidate
choice than any other issue, including the state of the economy.
These findings demonstrate the importance of examining issue publics in assess-
ing policy voting. In the case of abortion, members of this issue public were dispro-
portionately white, affluent, and well-educated. As a result, abortion had a much
greater impact on the Republican party than on the Democratic parry. The
Clinton-Gore ticket sufferred few defections from pro-life Democrats because
most of these Democrats either didn't know the candidates' positions on abortion
or didn't care about the issue. In contrast, the Bush-Quayle ticket sufferred 2 sub-
stantial number of defections from pro-choice Republicans, although most of these
Republican defectors cast their ballots for Perot rather than Clinton.
Abortion is one of 2 number of divisive social issues that have emerged on the
political agenda in recent years. The prominence of issues such as abortion. gay
rights, and sexual equality reflects the increased influence of single-issue and ideo-
logical activists in both major parties. In recent years, gay rights and feminist ac-
tivists have achieved considerable influence within the Democratic party while
conservative evangelicals have strongly influenced the Republican parry's presi-
dential nominating process and platform.
Social issues are likely to remain the subjects of intense partisan conflict in the
future and the findings reported in this article suggest that these issues have the
JUN-30-97 MON 12:46 PM NARAL
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Alan [. Abramowitz
potential to cause widespread defections among partisans who oppose their own
party's position. In 1992, it was the GOP that sufferred the bulk of these defections
over the issue of abortion. However, the Democratic party is also deeply divided
over social issues, 25 indicated by the recent debate over gays in the military While
these social issues may not be as important to most voters as the state of the econ-
omy. they can be expected to play a visible role in future presidential campaigns
and to strongly affect the voting decisions of 3 substantial segment of the American
electorate.
Manuscript submitted I December 1993
Final manuscrips received 20 May 1994
REFERENCES
Baker. Ross, Laurily Epsrein, and Rodney Forth 1983 "Matters of Life and Death Social, Political,
and Religious Correlates of Antrudes on Abortion." Emerican Policies Quarterly 9 57-102.
Carmines, Fdward G., and James A. Stimson. 1980. "The Two Faces of Issue Voring." American
Political Science Review 74:78-91.
Cook. Elizabeth A., Ted G. Jelen, and Clyde Wilcox. 1992. "Berween Two Absolutes. American Public
Opinion and che Policies of A hartion. Boulder: Westview
Cook. Elizabeth A., Ted G. Jelen. and Clyde Wilcox. 1994. "Issue Voring in Gubernatorial Elections:
Abortion and Post-Webster Polities." Journal of Politics: 56: 187-99.
Cook, Elizabeth A. Ted G. Jelen. and Clyde Wilcor 1993. "Issue Voting in U.S. Senate Elections:
The Abortion Issue in 1990." Presented It the annual meeting of the Western Political Science
Association.
Howell, Susan, and Robert Sims. 1993. "Abortion Arricudes and the Louisiana Governor's Election."
American Politics Quarterly 21:54-64.
Legge. Jerome. 1987. "The Determinants of Attitudes coward Aborrion in the American Electorate."
Western Political Quarterly 36:479-90.
White, John K. 1993. "The General Campaign: Issues and Themes." In America's Choice: The Election
of 1992. ed. William Crotty. Guilford: Dushkin.
Alan I. Abramowicz is professor of political science, Emory University, Atlanta,
Georgia 30322.
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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
INITIALS: 2014-0536-5 10 DATE: 07/29/15
TO:
Interested Parties
FROM:
Kate Michelman
RE:
Pro-Choice Strategy
DATE:
June 20, 1997
Overview
In recent years, pro-choice forces have had to adjust to new political realities: a Congress
firmly under anti-choice control, complacency among pro-choice voters, and a re-energized and
well-financed anti-choice movement. In addition, the difficult and protracted battle over
late-term abortion has left pro-choice organizations on the defensive and off message.
It is time to get back on track. We believe, and NARAL's research shows, that the
pro-choice movement has the winning messages and issues to shift the debate back to more
favorable ground. The pro-choice arsenal contains powerful and effective messages that
resonate with Americans - messages that were overshadowed by the fight over late-term
abortion. There are several strategic advantages to emphasizing our core message of keeping
politicians out of private reproductive health decisions ("Who Decides?") and to broadening the
message to include early prevention and an expansion of women's reproductive choices ("Make
Abortion Less Necessary"). These messages will help us resume our conversation with
mainstream America, return pro-choice organizations to more proactive ground, and put
opponents of choice on the defensive. At this juncture in the fight over late-term abortion,
we must move quickly to scize the initiative. We cannot afford to wait.
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History
After extensive public opinion research, NARAL developed the "Who Decides?"
message in conjunction with the pro-choice mobilization around the Supreme Court's 1989
decision. Webster V. Reproductive Health Services. NARAL's "Who Decides?" public education
campaign in 1989 and 1990 shifted the debate from the question of whether abortion is right or
wrong to the question of who makes the abortion decision -- politicians or the individual woman
with her physician. Pollster Harrison Hickman wrote at the time:
"When the issue is presented as a question of the proper role of government and
whether or not current laws on abortion should be changed to make abortion
illegal, the majority support our pro-choice position This is why reducing the
issue to one simple policy-based question ("Who decides?") works so well: It
frames the very complex matter of abortion rights on the dimension where voters
most readily accept our view."
In 1991. NARAL field tested its hypothesis that placing abortion along a continuum of
reproductive choices, including pregnancy provention, would create an even broader pro-choice
constituency. Our public-opinion research found overwhelming support for this expanded
mission:
"For NARAL and other pro-choice forces, the advantages of moving in a broader
thematic direction are numerous. Strategically, this adjustment moves NARAL
toward a more mainstream position and. in the process, helps expose some of the
most unpopular, extremist elements of the anti-choice movement. Politically, this
makes it easier to attract public and elite support for our proposals and, in time, to
develop and pass a more expansive and attractive legislative agenda
[T]his
thematic approach grounds our arguments for abortion rights in a larger context.
giving our supporters something to fight for in addition to continuing the fight
against encroachments on abortion rights."
That poll found that 89 percent of pro-choice voters and 73 percent of swing voters (the
N
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"mushy middle") on abortion strongly support reducing the number of unplanned pregnancies
through increased access to sexuality education and birth control.
Based on its research, NARAL began a limited advertising campaign in 1991 aimed at
the 40 percent of the electorate who are swing voters on choice. One ad stated:
"[T]o us. being pro-choice means having real choices. It means working to
improve our nation's reproductive health care policies. It means working to
reduce the need for abortion
That's why we're working for better sex
education. more effective birth control. improved methods of contraception and
pre- and post-natal care."³
While attempts were made to raise the resources to launch a national "Real Choices"
advertising campaign, other major developments captured public attention and prevented the
campaign from moving beyond its initial stage. In 1991, pro-choice organizations were forced to
respond to the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme Court and the threat posed
by an increasingly hostile judiciary.
This was also the period when choice became a major electoral issue. Beginning with the
1989 victories of governors Doug Wilder and James Florio and continuing in the 1990 and 1991
elections, pro-choice forces organized and delivered the votes of Americans who understood the
legal and political threats to a woman's freedom to choose. These electoral efforts culminated in
the 1992 election of a pro-choice President. "Who Decides?" messages motivated pro-choice
voters, while then-Governor Clinton appealed to women voters across party lines with the theme
of making abortion "safe, legal and rare." According to a major academic study of the 1992
election:
"Abortion had a stronger influence on candidate choice than any other policy
issue included in the study, including affirmative action, social welfare, defense
spending, the Gulf War, and the death pcnalty."⁴
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Victory, however, came at a tremendous cost. President Clinton's election led voters to
believe -- erroneously -- that the right to choose was secure. The salience of the issue
diminished, and Americans curtailed their financial contributions to pro-choice organizations.
These factors made it virtually impossible to sustain a "Real Choices" campaign.
Nevertheless, the demonstrated power of the "Real Choices" direction led NARAL in
early 1994 to officially adopt a broadened mission and name change. If there was any doubt
about how a more comprehensive pro-choice agenda would be received, it vanished when both
the New York Times and the Washington Post lauded the efforts of NARAL and Planned
Parenthood in this area:
"Today nearly one out of three American babies is born to an unwed mother. For
parent and child the economic and educational prognosis is grim -- reason enough
to believe that NARAL and Planned Parenthood, which announced a similar
initiative last year. have picked a good time to begin making sure that women
have real choices."
But, once again, political developments led NARAL to suspend its "Real Choices"
campaign. In 1994, anti-choice forces, capitalizing on pro-choice complacency, organized,
mobilized and turned out their supporters in the mid-term elections. Congress foll firmly under
anti-choice control.
Today, anti-choice stalwarts chair almost every committee with jurisdiction over women's
reproductive health and press their advantage by successfully attaching anti-choice riders to
spending bills. With only 33 fully pro-choice Senators and 135 fully pro-choice House members
in the most anti-choice Congress since Roe V. Wade, abortion opponents maintain a crucial
advantage in shaping the public debate on abortion. The late-term abortion issue is a prime
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example
Proponents of 8 ban on late-term abortion shifted the focus of the debate from the woman
to the abortion procedure and from early pregnancy termination to second and third trimester
abortion. Late-term abortion has become the anti-choice movement's lead assault against a
woman's freedom to choose, dominating the legislative debate and news media coverage of
abortion.
The agenda-setting and opinion-shaping nature of the late-term abortion debate has had a
significant impact. Its effect is analogous to the mid-80s film. the "Silent Scream," which used
ultrasound to depict the developing fetus. Both the "Silent Scream" and late-term abortion
focused new attention on the fetus. However, in the 80s, anti-choice forces were unable to
capitalize on their momentum to pass legislation because the House remained under pro-choice
control and the Senate returned to pro-choice control in 1986.
Legislative and Public Education Strategy
Pro-choice forces need to refocus on our core messages. NARAL's research and analysis
demonstrate that a proactive legislative and public education campaign to protect choice and to
make abortion less necessary is both sound public policy and a vehicle to return us to more
favorable pro-choice ground.
NARAL's research, including focus groups conducted in April. 1997. underscores the
continued support for safe, early abortion and programs to prevent unplanned pregnancy,
especially emergency contraception. The analysis of the focus groups found:
"[M]embers and nonmembers alike respond positively to initiatives that broaden
the issue on our terms -- emergency contraception and RU-486 are the most
obvious examples. These issues and initiatives help them -- and NARAL -- move
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back to a pro-active posture rather than simply trying to hold back the advance of
the other side."6
A pro-choice legislative and public education campaign should include early
reproductive choices that help reduce the high rate of unintended pregnancy, as well as working
to defend the fundamental right to choose. The components can include: improving awareness
of, and access to, emergency contraception: mandating insurance coverage for contraception and
ensuring adequate funding for family planning programs: increasing resources for contraceptive
research end development, and promoting comprehensive sexuality education in the nation's
schools. These initiatives will improve reproductive health, expand reproductive choices, help
reduce unintended pregnancy, and promote the value of personal responsibility.
These efforts will advance our goal of making abortion less necessary. They will allow
us to speak in a way that has the broadest possible consensus and that addresses the moral
concerns of swing voters. And they will reveal the true intentions of opponents of choice, who
want to deny women control of reproductive decisions and access to reproductive health services.
While in the short-term we may be unable to enact legislation because of the current
makeup of Congress, our campaign will lay the groundwork for success in a more hospitable
Congress. Moreover, this approach can rejuvenate pro-choice activists and supporters working
toward a common, positive goal at the state and federal levels. Pro-choice organizations will be
able to broaden their message, reclaim support among the majority of Americans, and establish
the context for subsequent pro-choice electoral work.
A high Impact public education campaign is critical to refocusing the abortion debate.
Indeed, the anti-choice movement has used this strategy to its advantage. NARAL's research
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shows that the "Life, What a Beautiful Choice" advertising campaign by the DeMoss Foundation
helped lay the groundwork for the anti choice legislative assault on late-term abortion and is
having 2n impact on public attitudes about reproductive choice. The NARAL Foundation, with a
grant from the Packard Foundation, is conducting critical new research for an effective and
proactive advertising campaign that will articulate the values underlying the pro-choice position.
The campaign is intended to give the "mushy middle" on reproductive choice a moral and ethical
framework in which to ground their pro-choice beliefs and to recoup some of the erosion of
public support for the freedom to choose. Another critical audience for the pro-choice message
is the post-Roe generation. the first to come of age with abortion as a constitutionally protected
right. The Pro-Choice Education Project is taking the lead in devising a public education effort
specifically targeted to young women. We must begin to lay the groundwork now and build
toward : more intensive public education campaign in January 1998 on the 25th anniversary of
Roem Wide.
Electoral Strategy
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, abortion remains a potent factor electorally. In
the 1992 presidential campaign. Bill Clinton won 17 percent of Republican voters because of his
support for the freedom to choose.⁷ A 1996 NARAL poll found that 39 percent of voters
considered abortion to be the single most or one of the most important issues for them. 8 Voters
must be educated, however, about the candidate's position on choice.
A NARAL focus group this year found that voters were surprised to learn that the House
and the Senate are both solidly anti-choice. And they said that their election decisions would be
influenced by their concern that their Member of Congress might vote to restrict abortion rights.
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Aside from late-term abortion, most voters do not know about the 53 congressional votes taken
on choice during the 104th Congress. Despite efforts by individual pro-choice Members, the
Democratic leadership has been unwilling to use the abortion issue -- as they have used the
environment and Medicare -- to dramatize the impact of radical right control of Congress.
In the 1998 mid-term elections, anti-choice forces will attack pro-choice Members'
opposition to a ban on late-term abortion. It is critical for pro-choice candidates to begin using
messages now that resonate with the pro-choice majority and not wait to be attacked on late-term
abortion. Pro-choice candidates must quickly establish their support for the right to choose and
for pregnancy prevention, and they must characterize their opponent's positions on these issues as
extreme.
Emphasizing positive messages early and often and staying focused on that agenda will
enable pro-choice candidates to set the terms of the political debate. By stressing the importance
of keeping politicians out of women's reproductive lives ("Who Decides?") and prevention
("Make Abortion Less Necessary"), pro-choice candidates can deliver messages that will find
overwhelming support among their constituents.
Finally, a "Real Choices" prevention campaign will expose the fissure in the anti-choice
community between those who support contraception and those who oppose it. Tactics that help
derail the anti-choice movement will speed pro-choice efforts to get back on track. The time to
begin is now.
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Endnotes
1. Hickman, H. (1991, May). [Confidential working paper 1991-1]. Unpublished memorandum
to National Abortion and Reproductive Rights (NARAL) Strategy Group, Washington, D.C.
2. lbid.
3. NARAL "Real Choices." The Washington Post. July 7, 1991. P. A7 (advertisement).
4. Abramowitz, A.I. (1995, February). It's Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992
Presidential Election. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 176-86.
5. Expanding the meaning of choice (1994, January 17). The New York Times, A16.
6. Pickman, H. (1997, April). Unpublished memorandum to NARAL. Washington, DC.
7. Abramowitz, A. I. It's Abortion, Stupid. pp. 176-86.
8. Hickman H. (1996, August). Unpublished memorandum to NARAL, Washington. D.C.
9