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Bosnia - July 1994 [4]
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Case Number: 2013-0687-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Bosnia - July 1994 [4]
Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander
Original OA/ID Number:
851
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
34
1
10
2
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001a. letter
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Warren Christopher. [English
07/19/1994
P1/b(1)
Translation] (1 page)
001b. letter
Unknown to Unknown. [Russian Translation] (3 pages)
07/19/1994
P1/b(1)
002. cable
re: Contact Group NATO Reps on NMA Planning. (4 pages)
07/18/1994
Pl/b(1)
003. email
White House Situation Room to Kathleen Witowksy, Alexander
07/08/1994
Pl/b(1)
Vershbow, Don Kerrick et al. Subject: July 5 Bosnia Ministerial
Meetings. (8 pages)
004. cable
re: Bosnia: Planning to Implement Contact Group Proposals. (5 pages)
07/10/1994
P1/b(1)
005a. note
Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger. (1 page)
07/06/1994
P1/b(1)
005b. paper
Bosnia: Lifting the Arms Embargo. (10 pages)
07/1994
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA}
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
07/19/94
10:55
202 647 0555
EUR EE
002
BOSNIA-H :RZEGOVINA
WHAT IS THE U.S. INTEREST?
O
While the Bosnia conflict dies not pose an immediate threat
to our security or warrant inilateral U.S. involvement, we
do have interests involved which demand that we lead the
way to a workable peace agr ement and to help enforce it.
Our interests include:
-- preventing the spread 0 the fighting into a broader
European war that could threaten both Allies and the
stability of newly demo ratic states in Central and
Eastern Europe, and leal to serious rifts with Russia;
-- proving that NATO can E ill be a credible force for
peace in the post-Cold tar era, in this first ever
involvement of NATO out lide a NATO country;
-- stemming the destabiliz ng flow of refugees from the
conflict and helping to stop the slaughter of innocents.
WHAT ARE WE DOING?
Politically
C
On July 5, the Contact Grou we established in March
(composed of U.S. Russian EU, and UN representatives)
presented the Bosnian side with a territorial package
that would form part of a S ttlement preserving Bosnia as a
single union within interna ionally recognized borders.
-- The package, which woul place 51 percent of Bosnia
under the control of th Bosniac-Croat Federation and
49 percent under the CC trol of the Bosnian Serbs,
contains incentives for both sides to encourage
acceptance of peace.
-- Incentives for the Fede ation, should it accept the
plan, include internati nal assistance with settlement
implementation and help with reconstruction.
-- Incentives for the Bosn an Serbs, should they accept
the plan and pull back O within 19 percent of the
Bosnian territory, incl de phased suspension of UN
economic sanctions agai st Serbia.
-- If the Serbs reject the map, Ministers agreed to apply
gradually escalating pr. ssure through extension of
exclusion zones to othe safe areas, new exclusion
zones, and stricter enf recement of existing zones.
UUJ
-- They also agreed that a; a last resort, a decision by
the Security Council to lift the arms embargo could
become unavoidable.
The efforts of the Contact ;roup that led up to the July
Ministerial include a preli inary Ministerial in May, which
set out agreed principles and parameters to guide a Bosnia
settlement and served as a lemonstration OE international
unity and resolve to bring thout peace in the region.
In February and March, we b okered the Federation agreement
between the Bosnian government and members of the Bosnian
Croat minority. The Federa ion Agreement has improved the
prospects for an overall se tlement, helped end the
fighting in central Bosnia, and reopened humanitarian
convoy routes.
Working with and through the UN Security Council, we are
helping to maintain one of :he most thorough sanctions
regimes in history on Serbia.
We are committed to seeing hat those responsible for war
crimes are brought to justime.
Strategically.
We have long indicated our villingness, under certain
conditions, to help impleme it a final peace settlement in
Bosnia.
We have taken a leadership ole in all key NATO decisions
on the Bosnian crisis. Specifically, we led the way on:
-- the June 10, 1993 decis on to provide close air support
to UNPROFOR troops unde attack;
-- the August 9, 1993 decision to threaten the use of air
power in the event of Serb strangulation of Sarajevo
and other safe areas;
-- the February 9, 1994 le : ision Lo establish an exclusion
zone around Sarajevo;
-- the April 22, 1994 decision to establish an exclusion
zone around Gorazde.
O
We have deployed troops to the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia as part of the UN 'ROFOR force in the area to
prevent spillover of the conflict.
0
We have warned Milosevic that we will respond in the event
of Serb-inspired violence il Kosovo.
On the humanitarian front
0
We have provided the larges : quantity of humanitarian
assistance to the region of any nation.
U
Tu date, the U.S. Governmen has contributed over $530
million in humanitarian ass slance since our efforts to
assist the former Yugoslavi began in FY 1991. The U.S. is
the major single-mation fool donor, has performed over
three-quarters of all airdrops, and has transported over
30,000 metric tons of aid b. airlift to Sarajevo.
We also participate in a me lical evacuation program which
has brought 264 patients (2.14 adults and 60 children) with
152 family members to the United States, and have admitted
over 5000 Bosnians as part f our refugee resettlement
program.
On the other hand, we recog tize that Bosnia is a first and
foremost a European problem on which our European allies
have quite properly taken t le lead. Our negotiating
initiative is based on earl er EU efforts to reinvigorate
the settlement process and roduce a final settlement.
Is aid getting through? What in e humanitarian conditions like?
O
Since the Federation Agreem nt was signed in March,
humanitarian conditions hav improved in much of the areas
controlled by the Bosnian 9 vernment and the Bosnian
Croats. Relief convoys are reaching territory held by the
government and the Bosnian :roats from the Croatian coast
with only minor difficultie
Conditions are less stable n isolated areas. Although
fairly well-supplied now, E. :cess to Sarajevo and the
eastern enclaves (Goražde, :rebrenica and Zepa) is
controlled by the Bosnian S rbs who can and do periodically
prevent aid from getting th ough as they did during their
assoult upon Goražde in Apr 1.
All areas of Bosnia appear .0 have sufficient food to meet
basic subsistence needs.
Relief efforts by air are e so coordinated by UNICR.
Airlift operations continue to Sarajevo. Airdrops have
been scaled down due to the the increasing availability of
relief commodities delivere by road to nearly all areas
and are currently being cor ucted on an as-needed basis.
0
Work continues on the repai of public utilities in
Sarajevo, and nearly all of the city's residents now
receive water, electricity ind natural gas for several
hours each day.
Why not just lift the arms emba go on Bosnia?
0
Unilaterally lifting the ar is embargo would be a tragic
mistake that would undermine the settlement process. This
step would break the cohesion of the NATO Alliance, risk a
controntation with Russia, and erode the effectiveness of
other UN sanctions against itates like Libya and Irag. We
may well reach the point where the international community
decides to lift the arms empargo, but now is not the time.
The Senate's decision to re ect the Dole amendment was a
wise move that has already olstered our diplomatic efforts.
drafted: EUR/EE/BCG: SDremner/JMc re
SEEEYYUG 8684 x72452 6/22/94 (I vised)
cleared: EUR: AVershbow
EUR/EE: :TSnell/RErdman
C:TLoar
IO/PHO: AKelleran
PM/ISP: SIngalsbe
RP/A/O:KFoster
RP/ENSA:MMetrinko
AID/EN1/EUR/FY:WErdahl
AID/BHR/OFDA: TDolan
EUR/RPM: DMcElhaney
PA: PBass
P:DRussell
S/P: SFlanagan
Vershbow, Alexander R.
From:
Jonathan H Spalter
To:
VERSHBOA
Cc:
RECORDS@A1@OEOB
Subject:
new bosnia guidance
Date:
Thursday, July 21, 1994 2:42PM
KOREA
New Developments
-
US officials will meet with North Korean representatives at
11:00am in New York to discuss date for resumption of
talks.
--
Bob Gallucci is in Seoul, and will be visiting Tokyo,
Beijing and Moscow for consultations on North Korea. Met
with President Kim, and other senior leaders.
-
Dan Poneman briefed President Ford yesterday in Colorado.
-- There is action on the Hill through Dole/Murkowski
amendment and Stark amendment to constrain US flexibility
in dealing with North Korea. Guidance to come.
Key Themes
--
Based on North Korea's commitment to freeze major elements
of its nuclear program during a new round of talks between
our nations, we agreed to resume talks on July 8.
--
The death of Kim II Sung adds a new element of uncertainty
to the picture.
- We will have discussions today with the North Koreans
through the New York channel on a date to resume the talks.
-- We shall continue to be steady, persistent and pragmatic in
proliferation regime.
- We will continue to press for full North Korean compliance
with the NPT, IAEA and the North-South denuclearization
agreement in the context of our overall settlement.
--
At the same time, we will continue to ensure that we meet
our security commitments to the Republic of Korea. We will
take whatever prudent measures are necessary for the
Page 1
defense of our forces in South Korea and to assist in the
defense of that nation.
On New York Talks
--
State Department officials are meeting this morning with
North Korean representatives in New York to discuss a date
for resumption of talks. I have no read-out at this time.
On Succession
--
There is no reason to believe that there will not be a
transition to Kim Jong il.
@
--
We hope that North Korea will quickly resume the dialogue
they had begun with us under Kim il Song.
On supplying a new reactor to North Korea
--
In the second round of talks with the United States last
graphite nuclear technology to light-water technology.
Recently, North Korea has reiterated this position.
--
We welcomed that proposed shift to a nuclear program less
suited to nuclear weapons production, and plan to address
this issue in the third round.
(If Pressed)
-
We have never said that the United States would supply
North Korea a reactor, rather that we would help them make
the transition to a less dangerous technology.
On North-South Dialogue
-
We understand that the summit has been delayed and that the
two sides will need to work out the details.
(If Pressed)
-
Obviously this is a period of uncertainty but it is in
everyone's interest to see that dialogue continue.
@
BOSNIA
New Developments
--
The Bosnian Serb response is generally being viewed as a
"no" by the Contact Group.
--
Bosnian President Izbetgovic, according to Reuters, told a
Page 2
news conference that his government has withdrawn its
unconditional acceptance in light of Serb's refusal to
accept the plan. We are seeking clarification.
--
The Contact Group will report to their foreign ministers on
the responses. The report and next steps will be discussed
in a ministerial which will convene on or near July 30th.
--
We understand the Russians will continue to work with the
Bosnian Serbs over the next ten days to urge them to
reconsider.
--
In Sarajevo, on July 21, a US C-141 aircraft participating
in the UNHCR-led airlift of humanitarian aid was hit by a
single shot of small arms fire. Damage was minor.
Aircraft continued on to Split. Expect airlift to continue
after normal suspension.
On the Parties Responses
--
Bosnian Serbs have regrettably not accepted the plan.
-
We are seeking clarification of recent reports Izbetgovic
is withdrawing his unconditional acceptance.
(If Pressed)
-
We understand the Russians will continue to urge the
Bosnian Serbs to reconsider their response before the
ministerial convenes on the 30th.
--
We certainly hope the Serbs will accept the Contact Group
proposal before the ministers meet. It is up to the Serbs.
On Next Steps
--
We intend to continue the course we have charted with our
Contact Group partners, with the proposed map remaining the
basis for an agreement.
- Now the issue is being referred to the foreign ministers of
the Contact Group, who will meet on the 30th to consider
next steps.
--
As we have said, there will be consequences for rejecting
the plan.
--
Our Contact Group representatives will continue to work on
the incentives and disincentives package so that the
ministers will be able to make decisions on next steps when
they meet at the end of the month.
@
Page 3
--
The necessary planning is underway at the UN and in NATO so
that we will be in a position to implement the ministers'
decisions.
On the Attack on the US C-141 in Sarajevo.
--
Initial reports indicate that one American was injured. No
further information is available at this time.
Responsibility for the attack is not known.
-
UN investigation is underway.
--
Condemn senseless acts that impede a humanitarian mission
and endangers lives of crews.
Key Themes
--
United States, Germany, Britain, France and Russia --
members of the Contact Group -- agreed on a realistic
territorial proposal as a basis for a political settlement
to the Bosnian conflict.
-
The proposal would preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single
union within its internationally recognized borders, while
providing viable territory for the Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats.
- It would significantly roll back Bosnian Serb territorial
gains and "ethnic cleansing," while providing a reasonable
territory for the Serb people within Bosnia.
--
The proposal is not perfect but we shouldn't make the best
the enemy of the good. If war continues, there will be
more killing, more ethnic cleansing and more human
suffering.
-- Contact Group Foreign Ministers agreed on incentives and
disincentives to encourage the parties to accept the
proposal and make clear the serious consequences if they do
not.
-- The Bosnian Serbs could now face increased pressure,
including as a last resort, a lifting the arms embargo
against the Bosnian Government.
--
We hope they will both seize this opportunity for peace.
Page 4
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001a. letter
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to Warren Christopher. [English
07/19/1994
P1/b(1)
Translation] (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001b. letter
Unknown to Unknown. [Russian Translation] (3 pages)
07/19/1994
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. cable
re: Contact Group NATO Reps on NMA Planning. (4 pages)
07/18/1994
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIAJ
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA|
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. email
White House Situation Room to Kathleen Witowksy, Alexander
07/08/1994
P1/b(1)
Vershbow, Don Kerrick et al. Subject: July 5 Bosnia Ministerial
Meetings. (8 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
004. cable
re: Bosnia: Planning to Implement Contact Group Proposals. (5 pages)
07/10/1994
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia July 1994 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2640
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
July 5 Bosnia Ministerial
O
Very encouraged by results of Tuesday's Ministerial
meeting on Bosnia. Peace process has reached a
decisive point.
United States, European Union and Russia -- members of
the Contact Group -- agreed on a realistic territorial
proposal as a basis for a political settlement to the
Bosnian conflict.
--
Proposal would preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as
a single union within its internationally
recognized borders, while providing viable
territory for the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats.
--
It would significantly roll back Bosnian Serb
territorial gains and "ethnic cleansing,"
while providing a reasonable territory for
the Serb people within Bosnia.
In addition to approving the proposed territorial
solution, Ministers also agreed on a range of
incentives and disincentives for the parties to
encourage them to accept the proposal, and to make
clear the serious consequences if they do not.
--
In the event the Bosnian Serbs reject the
proposal, it was agreed that they would face
increased pressure to reconsider, including
the option, as a last resort, of lifting the
arms embargo against the Bosnian Government.
--
Unprecedented international solidarity
underpinning this effort.
The Contact Group presented the proposal to the parties
today (Wednesday) in Geneva, and they have two weeks to
consider it. We hope they will both seize the
opportunity for peace.
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BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL
Q:
The Contact Group has presented a take-it-or-leave-it
plan to the Bosnian parties -- a plan that basically
ratifies ethnic cleansing in several areas. Could you
explain how you're thinking shifted on this, how you
came to believe that stopping the war was more
important than taking the moral high ground?
A:
We have said from the very beginning that the Bosnian
tragedy can only be ended at the negotiating table and
not on the battlefield. This has always meant that
there would have to be a compromise of some kind.
But we have also said from the start that the Bosnian
Government -- and the Bosnian Muslims in particular
have been the main victims in this war, and that a
settlement has to meet their needs as a first priority.
The Contact Group proposal is consistent with these
principles:
It would preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
single union within its internationally
recognized borders.
It would provide an economically viable
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation,
including access to the sea.
It would significantly roll back Bosnian Serb
territorial gains and ethnic cleansing. The
Serbs, who now occupy over 70 percent of
Bosnia, would have to settle for 49 percent
of the land.
Most areas which had a Muslim or Croat
majority under the 1991 census would be
within the Muslim-Croat Federation.
No, the proposal isn't perfect. Some ethnic cleansing
would not be reversed. But this would have been the
case under the Bosnian Government's own proposals of
last fall, which accepted the idea of a territorial
compromise with separate Muslim, Croat and Serb
entities.
The fact that President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister
Silajdzic have recommended approval of the proposal by
their Parliament indicates that the Bosnians themselves
recognize it is a reasonable and realistic compromise.
It is also important to remember that this is the first
peace plan that is supported strongly by the U.S.,
Russia and the European Union, and is backed up by a
commitment to strong action to see the process through.
--
If the parties agree to the plan, we have
pledged to help implement the settlement and
to contribute to Bosnia's reconstruction.
--
In the event the Bosnian Serbs reject the
plan, however, we, the Russians and the
Europeans have agreed that the Serbs will
face increased pressure to reconsider. This
includes the option, as a last resort, of
lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian
Government.
We shouldn't make the best the enemy of the good.
If the war continues, there will be more killing, more
ethnic cleansing, more human suffering for the besieged
peoples of Bosnia. And we don't think the Bosnian
Government could achieve as good a result by military
means, even if the arms embargo were lifted.
In sum, the Contact Group proposal represents a good
deal for the Bosnian Government, one that rolls back a
lot of Serb ethnic cleansing. And it is the first
international proposal that includes the leverage to
encourage the parties to accept. We are encouraged by
the Bosnian Government's positive reaction, and call on
the Serbs to seize the opportunity for peace.
CC: Records
( RECORDS )
CC: Alexander R. Vershbow
( VERSHBOW )
Contact Group's Peace Plan Compared to Areas of Control, July 1994
Hungary
Serbia and Montenego have asserted
ZAGREB
the formation of joint Independent
Slovenia
state, but this entity has not been
*
formally recognized 05 a stote by
the United States.
Croatia
Vojvodina
(autonomous
province)
Prijedor
Federation
Federation
Bihac
Banja Luka
Brcko
Doboj
Serb
Proposed
Joint Croat/
Serb
Muslim control
Tuzla
Kljuc
area
Zvornik
Jajce
Proposed
Federation
Serbia
Bosnia)and
Srebrenica*
area
Herzegovina
Zepa
SARAJEVO
Federation
Sarajevo district
*
under UN
Gorazde
supervision
UN-patrolled
area
Adriatic
Serb
Mostar
Sea
I
Serb-controlled area
Montenegro
Croat-controlled area
Muslim-controlled area
Croatia
Muslim separatist-
PODGORICA
controlled area
*
0
40 Kilometers
Albania
0
40 Miles
732754 (R00389) 7-94
Contact Group's Peace Plan Compared to Areas of Control, July 1994
Hungary
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
ZAGREB
the formation of joint independent
Slovenia
state, but this entity has not been
*
formally recognized 03 state by
the United States.
Croatia
Vojvodina
(autonomous
province)
Prijedor
Federation
Federation
Bihac
Banja Luka
Brcko
Doboj
Serb
Proposed
Joint Croat/
Serb
Muslim control
Tuzla
Kljuc
area
Zvornik
Jajce
Proposed
Federation
Serbia
Bosnialand
Srebrenica
area
Herzegovina
Zepa
SARAJEVO
Federation
Sarajevo district
*
under UN
Gorazde
supervision
UN-patrolled
area
Adriatic
Serb
Mostar
Sea
I
Serb-controlled area
Montenegro
Croat-controlled area
Muslim-controlled area
Croatia
Muslim separatist-
PODGORICA
controlled area
*
0
40 Kilometers
Albania
0
40 Miles
732754 (R00389) 7-94