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Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
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120361539
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Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
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Alexander Vershbow's Files
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Case Number: 2013-0687-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander
Original OA/ID Number:
850
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
34
1
10
1
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. cable
re: USD Slocombe and Bosnian Vice President Ganic. (5 pages)
01/25/1995
P1/b(1)
002. cable
re: Pale Responds Positively. (5 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
003. cable
re: Pale Hesitates. (5 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
004. paper
UNPROFOR Augmentation. (4 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
005. letter
To Secretary of State Warren Christopher from Bosnian President
01/22/1995
P1/b(1)
Alija Izetbegovic. (1 page)
006. paper
Duplicate of 004. (4 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
007. agenda
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 26, 1995. Record ID:
01/23/1995
P1/b(1)
9520085. (1 page)
008. paper
Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)
01/18/1995
P1/b(1)
009. report
Key Disagreements. (1 page)
01/21/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. cable
re: USD Slocombe and Bosnian Vice President Ganic. (5 pages)
01/25/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA)
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA|
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SECRET
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 24, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Assistant to the Vice
Chief of Staff to the
President for National
President of the
Security Affairs
United States
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Central Intelligence Agency
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Secretary
Department of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee
Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995
Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion of North Korea. (S)
And
for
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Summary of Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By
02
NARA, Date 5/28/2014
2013-0687-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
Tab A
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: January 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
OVP
Anthony Lake
Leon Fuerth
State
DOD
Peter Tarnoff
Secretary William Perry
UN
CIA
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Acting Director William
Studeman
JCS
White House
ADM William Owens
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle
Summary of Conclusions
RUSSIA/CHECHNYA
1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and
around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces
will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps
augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to
produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the
Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in
reaction to Chechnya. Action: CIA. (S)
2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of
public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the
prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not
seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable
solution, e.g., installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
Declassify on: OADR
r 5/9/2014
2010-0533-M
SECRET
2
prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that
comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be
consistent. (S)
3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage
we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian
officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in
further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the
scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian
participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. Action: NSC and State to
develop a game plan. TS)
4. Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with
Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge
our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals
agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the
Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the
President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. Action:
State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if
needed. &
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Bosnia:
1. Principals reviewed the status of the cease-fire and
cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to
renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that
Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that
will arise in the negotiations but that the USG must be careful
to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the
Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing
impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term
diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as
preparation for a future discussion by Principals. Action:
State. (s)
2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on
Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for
handling the Silajdzic visit. Action: State. (s)
Croatia:
3. Principals reviewed options available for responding to
President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in
Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important
strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals
SECRET
SECRET
3
directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting
with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the
risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a
reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the
occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of
the UNPROFOR contingent. Action: OSD/State +S)
4.
Principals discussed the potential difficulties of
withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes
place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political
and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action:
State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of
U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.
7
Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:
5.
Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress
following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked
that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up
briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of
defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the
Congress to put the President in the position of having to use
the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for
publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.
13)
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 23, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
NB
AN
DP
THROUGH:
NICHOLAS BURNS/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL PONEMAN
FROM:
JOHN BEYRLE toB
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995
Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary
of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting held January
20, 1995. This summary covers the discussion on Chechnya and
Bosnia. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion on North Korea, for distribution to the wider
group of agencies represented in that part of the meeting.
Donald Kerrick; PK Steve Aoki
SA
Concurrence by:
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab
I.
Approve Q Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By vz
NARA, Date 5/9/2014
2010-0533-M
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. cable
re: Pale Responds Positively. (5 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA)
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. cable
re: Pale Hesitates. (5 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
004. paper
UNPROFOR Augmentation. (4 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SECRET
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Bosnia:
1.
Principals reviewed the status of the ceasefire and
cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to
renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that
Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that
will arise in the negotiations, but that the USG must be careful
to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the
Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing
impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term
diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as
preparation for a future discussion by Principals. Action: State.
2.
Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on
Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for
handling the Silajdzic visit. Action: State.
Croatia:
3.
Principals reviewed options available for responding to
President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in
Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important
strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals
directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting
with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the
risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a
reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the
occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of
the UNPROFOR contingent. Action: OSD/State
4.
Principals discussed the potential difficulties of
withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes
place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political
and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action:
State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of
U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.
Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:
5.
Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress
following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked
that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up
briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of
defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the
Congress to put the President in the position of having to use
the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for
publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
R
5/9/2014
7010-0533-M
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
005. letter
To Secretary of State Warren Christopher from Bosnian President
01/22/1995
P1/b(1)
Alija Izetbegovic. (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
006. paper
Duplicate of 004. (4 pages)
01/24/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995ª
Scrbia and Montenegro have asseried
the formation of a joint independent
Austria
state, but this entity has not been)
formally recognized as a state by the
United States.
Slovenia
Hungary
UNPROFOR HQ
LJUBLJANA
Croatia Command
JO ZAGREB
T
UN
Sector
Argentine
Belgian
Serbia
Croatia
R
West
UN
HQ Sector West
Sector
East Russian
Jordanian
Ukrainian Jordanjan R
Nepalese
Danish
HQ
Sector
North
Poles
UN
Sector
Pula
North
Bihac
Czech
UN
Bosnia and
Jordanian
Sector
South
HQ Sector
Herzegovina
South
Canadian
Knin Kenyan
SARAJEVO
Sibenik-
Divulje
Italy
Adriatic
Split
Sea
Ploce
UN contributing nations
D
Montenegro
Argentina
855
Canada
789
Czech Republic
967
Denmark
875
Croatia
Jordan
1,244
Kenya
970
Lithuania
32"
Battalion
Nepal
895
Poland
1,180
Major support base
Russia
905
Ukraine
553
Serb-control area
Headquarters element in Zagreb
2,764b
a
Support units
2,682
b
Logistic and other support units
are not depicted.
Total
14,711
0
50 Kilometers
"Colocated with Danes
b Elements supporting Bosnian operations could remain.
0
50 Miles
Unclassified
734539 (R00446) 1-95
UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
the formation of joint independent
Austria
state, but this entity has not been)
formally recognized as a state by the
United States.
Slovenia
Hungary
UNPROFOR HQ
LJUBLJANA
Croatia Command
UT ZAGREB
UN
Sector
Argentine
Belgian
Serbia
Croatia
X
West
UN
HQ Sector West
Sector
Ukrainian Jordanjan
East Russian
Jordanian
Nepalese
Danish
HQ
Sector
North
Poles
UN
21
Sector
Pula
North
Bihac
Czech
UN
Bosnia and
Jordanian
Sector
South
HQ Sector
Herzegovina
South
Canadian
Knin Kenyan
SARAJEVO
Sibenik
Divulje
Italy
Adriatic
Split
Sea
Ploce
UN contributing nations
D
Montenegro
Argentina
855
Canada
789
Czech Republic
967
Denmark
875
Croatia
Jordan
1,244
Kenya
970
Lithuania
32"
Battalion
Nepal
895
Poland
1,180
Major support base
Russia
905
Ukraine
553
Serb-control area
Headquarters element in Zagreb
2,764
a
Logistic and other support units
Support units
2,682 b
are not depicted.
Total
14,711
0
50 Kilometers
a Colocated with Danes.
b Elements supporting Bosnian operations could remain.
0
50 Miles
Unclassified
734539 (R00446) 1-95
SECRET
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 23, 1995
:
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
NB
AV
DP
THROUGH:
NICHOLAS BURNS/ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/DANIEL PONEMAN
FROM:
JOHN BEYRLE J.B
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting, January 20, 1995
Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary
of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting held January
20, 1995. This summary covers the discussion on Chechnya and
Bosnia. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion on North Korea, for distribution to the wider
group of agencies represented in that part of the meeting.
Donald Kerrick; DK Steve Aoki
SA
Concurrence by:
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo to agencies at Tab
I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A. Summary of Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
12 NARA, Date 5/28/2014
By
2013-0687-F
SECRET
Tab I
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
LEON E. PANETTA
Assistant to the Vice
Chief of Staff to the
President for National
President of the
Security Affairs
United States
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Central Intelligence Agency
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Secretary
Department of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee
Meeting on Chechnya and Bosnia on January 20, 1995
Please pass to the Principáls the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. A separate memorandum will summarize conclusions from
the discussion of North Korea. TST
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Tab A
Summary of Conclusions
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By
02
NARA, Date 5/28/2014
2013-0687-F -F
SECRET
/
SECRET
20089
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions
Meeting of NSC Principals Committee
DATE: January 20, 1994
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:35 - 4:00 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
OVP
Anthony Lake
Leon Fuerth
State
DOD
Peter Tarnoff
Secretary William Perry
UN
CIA
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
Acting Director William
Studeman
JCS
White House
ADM William Owens
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg
NSC
Alexander Vershbow
John Beyrle
Summary of Conclusions
RUSSIA/CHECHNYA
1. The Principals reviewed the situation on the ground in and
around Grozny and discussed the likelihood that Russian forces
will continue to face opposition from irregular forces, perhaps
augmented by outside mercenaries. The CIA was requested to
produce a short (2 pg) paper analyzing the implications of the
Chechnya affair for surrounding ethnic regions (e.g., Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Abkhazia) and actions those regions may be taking in
reaction to Chechnya. Action: CIA.
2. The Principals agreed on the need for a careful line of
public comment that welcomed positive developments, like the
prospect of eventual free elections in Chechnya, while not
seeming to cheerlead blindly for what might prove an unacceptable
solution, e.g. installation of a puppet regime. Press guidance
SECRET
SECRET
2
prepared for the President's use was circulated to ensure that
comments by Principals or their spokespersons would be
consistent.
3. Principals discussed the need to identify points of leverage
we may be able to use to influence Yeltsin and other Russian
officials to make the right choices on reform issues and in
further steps in Chechnya. Such points could include the
scheduling of the next summit, or the nature of Russian
participation in Halifax G-7 meeting. Action: NSC and State to
develop a game plan.
4.
Ambassador Albright discussed persistent problems with
Russian positions at the U.N. which directly counter or challenge
our interests, most notably the UNMIH mandate issue. Principals
agreed that if attempts over the coming week to convince the
Russians to support the U.S. position are unsuccessful, the
President should seek Yeltsin's support in a letter. Action:
State to continue diplomatic efforts; NSC to draft letter, if
needed.
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Bosnia:
1.
Principals reviewed the status of the ceasefire and
cessation of hostilities agreement and Contact Group efforts to
renew negotiations on a political settlement. They agreed that
Deputies should review territorial and constitutional issues that
will arise in the negotiations, but that the USG must be careful
to avoid any appearance of departing from its commitment to the
Contact Group plan. Recognizing the possibility of a continuing
impasse in the negotiations, Principals directed that a mid-term
diplomatic strategy paper be prepared for Deputies' review as
preparation for a future discussion by Principals. Action: State.
2. Principals discussed the upcoming Washington visit of
Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the impact it could have on
Congressional support for unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
State undertook to circulate a paper outlining a strategy for
handling the Silajdzic visit. Action: State.
Croatia:
3.
Principals reviewed options available for responding to
President Tudjman's decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate in
Croatia when it expires on March 31. Recognizing the important
strategic interests that the U.S. has in Croatia, the Principals
directed that talking points prepared for USDP Slocombe's meeting
SECRET
SECRET
3
with President Tudjman be appropriately modified to focus on the
risks of the decision on the ground, our commitment to a
reinvigorated diplomatic effort aimed at reintegration of the
occupied areas, and our support for retention of at least part of
the UNPROFOR contingent. Action: OSD/State
4.
Principals discussed the potential difficulties of
withdrawing UNPROFOR from Croatia, in the event withdrawal takes
place, and asked the Deputies to promptly review the political
and military aspects of supporting UNPROFOR withdrawal. Action:
State and JCS prepare papers on political and military aspects of
U.S./NATO support for withdrawal of UNPROFOR/Croatia.
Congressional and Public Affairs Strategy:
5.
Principals discussed next steps in dealing with Congress
following the previous week's interagency briefings and asked
that an unclassified version of LTG Clark's testimony on
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo be prepared for follow-up
briefings on the Hill. Principals agreed on the importance of
defeating a vote on unilateral lift rather than allowing the
Congress to put the President in the position of having to use
the veto. They also agreed to defer a decision on the timing for
publishing Secretary Perry's op-ed.
JAN 23 '95 14:31 R: 2110M T1.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE P.1
&
STATE OREGON
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400
OREGON 50
office.)
STATES
STATE
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
117
OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY
To:
Don Kerrick
Organization:
NSC
Phone:
456-9151
Fax:
456-9150
John Klekas
From:
Organization:
OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:
703-69 7-6026
Fax:
703-695-6506
January 23
Date:
Pages Including this
4
cover page:
Comments:
This is the same as what I sent you late last week --
The ones you wanted Hoh to rework and Chris Hill, Joe Kruzel and supposedly.
Vershbow said were OK.
Meanwhile, we're sending a FAX to Slocombe
today to ascertain what he ultimately did say to Tudjman.
JAN 23 '95 14:31 R 2110M T1
P.2
CROATIA
Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman
The U.S. understands that your intentions are good, but we worry that the
consequences of the course you have chosen will prove disastrous for your people and
for our bilateral ties.
We are very concerned by your announcement to end UNPROFOR's current mandate
in Croatia because it increases the risk of renewed Serbo-Croat war.
Without international monitors maintaining the separation of Croatian and Krajina
Serb forces, troops will move into the resulting vacuum, and clashes are inevitable.
In the current climate of both sides feeling strong, escalation into conflict along the
entire confrontation line seems unavoidable.
This includes fighting in Sector East, which would invite Serbian intervention, as well
as the prospect of Serb rocket attacks on Croatian cities.
If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick,
decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia
in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members
of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S.
combat involvement in this region, on any side.
Besides the human casualties that all sides would suffer in the event of hostilities,
diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement would suffer, particularly as regards
Belgrade's willingness to pressure Pale and Knin.
We share your view that the status quo in Croatia must not continue indefinitely, a
position that the Security Council endorsed in the January 17 Presidential Statement.
Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with
the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
We fully support UNPROFOR's presence, which makes an important contribution to
peace and stability in the region, and encourage you in the strongest possible terms to
reconsider you decision and accept its continued operation in Croatia.
1
01/20/95
JAN 23 '95 14:32 R 2110M T1
P.3
Should it prove impossible to maintain UNPOROFOR in its current form, we believe
that the most essential elements of UNPROFOR must continue their operations:
-- Monitoring the March 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
-- Maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia;
-- Facilitating implementation of the December 1994 Agreement on Economic
Confidence-Building Measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-to-Belgrade
highway;
-- Escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
-- Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.
If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the
Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
The U.S. would be unable to support you, not because we disagree with your
objectives, but because we cannot maintain good relations with a government that
fails to pursue all peaceful means for resolving its disputes.
We note that talks on a political settlement between Croats and Serbs have never been
seriously pursued and we believe it is essential to launch a negotiating process.
Toward that end, we are undertaking a major effort to invigorate the diplomatic track.
You can expect to see results within a week.
You cannot expect understanding from Washington for any actions that result in war
before a real attempt is made to negotiate your differences.
The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected
to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory
resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question.
Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity
to make clear the depth of our concern.
2
01/20/95
JAN 23 '95 14:33 R 2110M T1
P.4
We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November
Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
These include:
-- Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
-- Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education
and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as
your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
-- Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being
stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well
as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and
science and technology projects.
Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and
make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and
your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to
UNPROFOR's presence.
3
01/20/95
SECRET
20085
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 23, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
MR. LEON E. PANETTA
Assistant to the Vice
Chief of Staff to the
President for National
President of the
Security Affairs
United States
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
Department of State
Central Intelligence Agency
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Secretary
Department of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
(S)
There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia on Thursday,
January 26, 1995, 12:00-1:00pm, in the White House Situation
Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. Taskers for
papers and agenda are attached at Tab A. 18t
Ante
for
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Attachment
White House Guidelines,
Tab A
Agenda
September 11, 2006
By
V2 NARA, Date 5/28/2014
7013-0687-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
007. agenda
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, January 26, 1995. Record ID:
01/23/1995
Pl/b(1)
9520085. (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA|
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SECRET
20085
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
January 23, 1995
Sandy:
Agencies have been
ACTION
notified about taskings
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
on UNPROFOR/Croatia
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW N
withdrawal planning
THROUGH:
listed in the agenca.
FROM:
DON KERRICH
Sandy !
SUBJECT:
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia
Attached at Tab I is your memorandum and agenda for the Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia to be held on January 26, 1995.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Will Itoh to initial the memorandum to agency
counterparts at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to counterparts
Tab A Agenda
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By V7
NARA, Date 5/28/2014
2013 - 0687 -F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
008. paper
Bosnian Peace Talks. (4 pages)
01/18/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2664
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
UN Troops in Croatia, January 1995ª
Serbia and Montenegro have asserted
the formation of joint independent
Austria
state, but this entity has not been)
formally recognized as 8 state by the
United States.
Slovenia
Hungary
UNPROFOR HQ
LJUBLJANA
Croatia Command
"II ZAGREB
UN
Croatia
Sector
Argentine
Belgian
Serbia
West
UN
HQ Sector West
Sector
Ukrainian Jordanian
East Russian
Jordanian
Nepalese
Danish
HQ
Sector
North
2
Poles
UN
Sector
Pula
North
Bihac
Czech
UN
Bosnia and
Jordanian
Sector
South
HQ Sector
Herzegovina
South
Canadian
Knin Kenyan
SARAJEVO
Sibenik
Divulje
Italy
Adriatic
Split
Sea
Ploce
53
UN contributing nations
D
Montenegro
Argentina
855
Canada
789
Czech Republic
967
Denmark
875
Croatia
Jordan
1,244
Kenya
970
Lithuania
32"
Battalion
Nepal
895
Poland
1,180
Major support base
Russia
905
Ukraine
553
Serb-control area
Headquarters element in Zagreb
2,764h
a
Support units
2,682 b
Logistic and other support units
are not depicted.
Total
14,711
0
50 Kilometers
4 Colocated with Danes.
b Elements supporting Bosnian operations could remain.
0
50 Miles
Unclassified
734539 (R00446) 1.95
4
001
01/23/95 10:06
202 647 0967
EUR. SA
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
Facsimile Number (202) 647-0967
DELIVER TO:
FROM:
Sandy Vershbow
Amb. Frasure
Name
Name
NSC
Agency & Room #
Room #
(202) 456-9150
FAX No.
456-9151
647-1126
Office Ext.
Office Ext.
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:
REMARKS:
Page¹
Of 2 Pages (including cover page)
01/23/95
10:06
202 647 0967
EUR SA
002
"The Contact Group having consulted extensively with the parties,
announces that negotiations, with the aim of achieving a
comprehensive peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will resume in
early February. These negotiations, which will be conducted by the
Contact Group, will be on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact
Group Plan as a starting point and are scheduled to last for two
months."
THB NEW YORK TIMBS INTERNATIONAL MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 1995
A5
U.S. Embassy Officials in Bosnia at Odds Over Talks With Serbs
Jackovich's present recall even be-
contact group peace map. which was
fore the Ambassador knew that he
initially portrayed as a take-it-or-
was going back 10 Washington. Mr.
leave-it plan.
Holbrooke was described as the ar.
But the Serbs do not want to ac
again on Monday before the expect-
atory visit in December. The man
Dissent has long racked the shift-
chilect of the new American policy.
cept a plan that would divide their
By ROGER COHEN
ed arrival in Sarajevo of his contact
who accompanied Mr. Redman at
ing American diplomatic approach
Shortly before he left for Washing.
territory into what they say are inde-
Specialie The New York Tunes
group colleagues. Thus the United
that time was Mr. Menzies, who took
to Bosnia In 1992, at the beginning of
ton, Mr. Jackovich confided to peo-
fensible and economically weak
SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzego-
States. in a sharp reversal of policy,
up his post in November and also
the war, several diplomats quit the
ple who know him that he found the
fragments. The most they have of.
vina, Jan. 22 - Sharp dissent
has now taken the lead In talks with
accompanied Mr. Thomas today.
State Department because of what
Serbs' ability to set the agenda in
fered is to resume talks "on the
emerged at the American Embassy
the Serbs.
It was Mr. Redman's visit that
they regarded as the Bush Adminis-
Bosnia excruciating and the Clinton
basis of the contact group plan."
in Sarajevo today over the Clinton
Mr. Jackovich's absence from Sa:
initiated the Clinton Administra-
tration's Inadequate response to the
Administration's reluctance to use
American officials said that the
Administration's decision to change
rajevo at a time when Mr. Thomas
tion's softening toward the Serbs.
Serbs' policy of killing or evicting
even mild force to back up diploma-
fact Mr. Thomas went alone to Pale
its policy and engage in direct nego-
and Mr. Menzies are visiting Pale
This continued later in December
Muslims in the territory they held.
cy dismaying.
was insignificant. They said other
nations with the Bosnian Serbs de-
fits a pattern established over:the
when former President Jimmy Car-
The Serbian policy has been toned
The aim of Mr. Thomas during his
contact group officials were due to
spite their rejection of an interna-
last two months.
ter - clearly acting for the Adminis-
down since then and the killing has
current visit is 10 persuade Mr. Ka-
arrive on Monday and Mr. Thomas
tional peace plan.
The Ambassador was also called
tration - engaged to the shurtle di-
stopped, but forced evictions and
radzic and the Muslim-led Bosnian
simply took advantage of a couple of
The dissent centered on what one
away shortly before Charles E. Red-
plomacy between Pale and Sarajevo
mistreatment of Muslims continue
Government to agree 10 resume po-
spare days In Europe to pursue talks
official described as attempts by the
man, who used to have Mr. Thomas'
that led to the current cease-fire.
Officials said Assistant Secretary
litical negotiations on a peace settle-
with the Serbs. Up to now, the con-
State Department to oust the Ameri-
job and is now Ambassador to Gar
Once again, while Mr. Carter was
of State Richard C. Holbrooke had
ment. The Bosnian Government In-
tact group officials have always act.
can Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor
many, went to Pale on an explor-
here, Mr. Jackovich was out of LOWN
spoken to Mr. Menzies about Mr.
sists that the Serbs first accept the
ed together.
Jackovich, who has always rejected
direct talks with the Serbs until they
accept the peace plan. He was re-
called to Washington on Wednesday
for what were officially described as
"consultations."
These are not consultations,
said the official, who spoke on condi-
tion of anonymity. "They have of-
fered Mr. Jackovich another ambas-
sadorship and they are trying to ease
him out because he opposes bringing
the Serbs to the negotiating table in
this way."
Charity Dennis, a State Depart.
ment spokeswoman, said she had no
information on why Mr. Jackovich
was in Washington at such a sensi-
live time in Bosnia. Mr. Jackovich
did not respond to two calls to his
Virginia home.
Charles H. Thomas, the United
States envoy to Bosnian peace nego-
liations, carried out the new Ameri-
can policy. today by going to the
Bosnian Serbs' stronghold of Pale
and meeting with their leader, Rado-
van Karadzic. The change in policy
"Was announced on Thursday in a
letter from Secretary of State War-
ren Christopher to Bosnia's Presi-
deni, Alija Izelbegovic.
In contrast to his previous visits to
Bosnia, Mr. Thomas was not accom-
panied by the officials from Russia,
Britain, France and Germany, the
countries that with the United States
make up what diplomats call the
contact group.
Until last month, when cracks be-
gan to appear in the Clinton Admin-
Istration's policy of isolating the
Bosnian Serbs until they accepted
the contact group plan, such visits to
Pale were barred.
Mr. Jackovich stood strongly be.
hind this former policy of using dip-
lomatic Isolation, military threats
and economic pressure to compel
the Serbs to bend.
Bill on Thursday. the day after Mr.
Jackovich was recalled 10 Washing.
lon, his deputy at the Embassy. John
Menzles, went to Pale for unpubli-
cized talks with the Bosnian Serbs.
"Yes I went to Pale," Mr. Menzies
said, but declined to give further
details.
It was on Thursday that Mr. Chris-
toggeristelles in President
VIC arrived, explaining that the Unit-
ed States had decided "10 resume a
dialogue with Pale" because of the
'new opportunities afforded by a
four-month cease-fire that went into
effect on Jan. 1.
Thus even before Mr. Izelbegovic,
who was then in Cairo, had time to
respond 10 Mr. Christopher's letter,
the ranking American diplomat in
Sarajevo had gone 10 Pale. The town
near Sarajevo is the capital of what
the rebel Serbs in Bosnia call their
republic. The Serbs who hold 70 per-
cent of Bosnian territory after 33
months.of war.
A United Nations Security Council
"resolution approved last September
calls for an end 10 any political dia-
logue with the Serbs until they ac.
cept the contact group plan in full.
This plan would obtige the Serbs 10
give up a third of the land they hold
and accept 49 percent of Bosnia, with
the balance going 10 a Muslim-Croat
federation.
Mr. Christopher's letter said the
-American decision to engage the
Bosnian Serbs In a dialogue was
conditional on the roads into Saraje-
vo being opened. The roads into this
encircled city were still closed today
THB NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 1995
A5
U.S. Embassy Officials in Bosnia at Odds Over Talks With Serbs
Jackovich's present recall even be-
contact group peace map, which was
fore the Ambassador knew that he
initially portrayed as a take-it-or-
was going back to Washington. Mr.
leave-it plan.
Holbrooke was described as the ar-
But the Serbs do not want to ac-
again on Monday before the expect-
atory visit in December. The man
Dissent has long racked the shift
chitect of the new American policy.
cept a plan that would divide their
By ROGER COHEN
ed arrival in Sarajevo of his contact
who accompanied Mr. Redman at
Ing American diplomatic approach
Shortly before he left for Washing.
territory into what they say are Inde-
lunes
group colleagues. Thus the United
that time was Mr. Menzles, who took
to Bosnia. In 1992, at the beginning of
LON, Mr. Jackovich confided to peo-
fensible and economically weak
SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzego-
States. in a sharp reversal of policy,
up his post in November and also
the war, several diplomats quit the
ple who know him that he found the
fragments. The most they have of-
vina, Jan. 22 - Sharp dissent
has now taken the lead in talks with
accompanied Mr. Thomas today
State Department because of what
Serbs' ability to set the agenda in
fered is to resume talks "on the
emerged at the American Embassy
the Serbs.
It was Mr. Redman's visit that
they regarded as the Bush Adminis-
Bosnia excruciating and the Clinton
basis of the contact group plan."
In Sarajevo today over the Clinton
Mr. Jackovich's absence from Sa-
initiated the Clinton Administra-
tration's inadequate response to the
Administration's reluctance to use
American officials said that the
Administration's decision 10 change
rajevo at a time when Mr. Thomas
tion's softening toward the Serbs.
Serbs' policy of killing or evicting
even mild force to back up diploma-
fact Mr. Thomas went alone to Pale
its policy and engage in direct nego-
and Mr. Menzies are visiting Pale
This continued later to December
Muslims in the territory they held.
cy dismaying.
was insignificant. They said other
tistions with the Bosnian Serbs de-
fits a pattern established over:the
when former President Jimmy Car-
The Serbian policy has been toned
The aim of Mr. Thomas during his
contact group officials were due to
spite their rejection of an interna-
last two months.
ter - clearly acting for the Adminis-
down since then and the killing has
current visit is to persuade Mr. Ka.
arrive on Monday and Mr. Thomas
nonal peace plan.
The Ambassador was also called
tration - engaged in the shuttle di-
stopped, but forced evictions and
radzic and the Muslim-led Bosnian
simply took advantage of a couple of
The dissent centered on what one
away shortly before Charles E. Red-
plaracy between Pale and Sarajevo
mistreatment of Muslims continue.
Government 10 agree to resume po-
spare days in Europe to pursue talks
official described as attempts by the
man, who used to have Mr. Thomas's
that led to the current cease-fire.
Officials said Assistam Secretary
litical negotiations on a peace settle-
with the Serbs. Up to now, the con-
State Department to oust the Ameri-
job and is now Ambassador to Ger-
Once again, while Mr. Carter was
of State Richard C. Holbrooke had
ment. The Bosnian Government in-
(act group officials have always act-
can Ambassador to Bosnia, Victor
many, went to Pale on an explor
here, Mr. Jackovich was out of town.
spoken to Mr. Menzies about Mr.
sists that the Serbs first accept the
ed together.
Jackovich, who has always rejected
direct talks with the Serbs until they
accept the peace plan. He was re-
called to Washington on Wednesday
for what were officially described as
'consultations.'
These are not consultations,
said the official. who spoke on condi-
tion of anonymity. "They have of.
fered Mr. Jackovich another ambas-
sadorship and they are trying to case
him out because he opposes bringing
the Serbs to the negotiating table in
this way."
Charity Dennis, a State Depart-
ment spokeswomen, said she had no
information on why Mr. Jackovich
was in Washington at such a sensi-
live time in Bosnia. Mr. Jackovich
did not respond to two calls to his
Cellular One service with
Virginia home.
Charles H. Thomas, the United
States envoy to Bosnian peace nego-
tiations, carried out the new Ameri-
can policy. today by going to the
30 minutes anytime for only
Bosnian Serbs' stronghold of Pale
and meeting with their leader, Rado-
van Karadzic The change in policy
was announced on Thursday in a
letter from Secretary of State War-
ren Christopher to Bosnia's Presi-
dent, Alija Izetbegovic.
In contrast to his previous visits to
Bosnia, Mr. Thomas was not accom-
panied by the officials from Russia,
Britain, France and Germany, the
countries that with the United States
make up what diplomats call the
contact group.
Uniti last month, when cracks be-
gan to appear in the Clinton Admin-
Istration's policy of isolating the
Bosnian Serbs until they accepted
199
the contact group plan. such visits to
Pale were barred.
Mr. Jackovich stood strongly be-
hind this former policy of using dip-
lomatic isolation. military threats
and economic pressure to compel
every
the Serbs to bend.
Bill on Thursday, the day after Mr.
Jackovich was recalled to Washing.
month
ton, his deputy at the Embassy. John
Menzies, went to Pale for unpubli-
cized talks with the Bosnian Serbs.
"Yes, I went to Pale," Mr. Menzies
said, but declined to give further
details.
It was on Thursday that Mr. Chris-
a President Izetbego-
VIC arrived. explaining that the Unit-
ed States had decided "10 resume a
dialogue with Pale" because of the
new opportunities afforded by a
for your entire first year.
four-month cease-fire that went into
effect on Jan. 1.
Thus even before Mr. Izetbegovic,
Now you can get Cellular One service for less than $1.00 a day. That's because for a limited
who was then in Cairo, had time to
respond to Mr. Christopher's letter,
the ranking American diplomat in
time, when you sign up for a year on our $39.99 a month plan,
Sarajevo had gone 10 Pale. The town
Sign up now and get
near Sarajevo is the capital of what
the rebel Serbs in Bosnia call their
up to $1000 in discounts on
which includes 30 minutes of airtime. we'll give you a year's
republic. The Serbs who hold 70 per-
everything from CD's to
cent of Bosnian territory after 33
hotels from Entertainment
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worth of $15.00 coupons* to apply against your monthly
A United Nations Security Council
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"resolution approved last September
calls for an end 10 any political dia-
bill. Each month you use one of them, our $39.99 plan
logue with the Serbs until they ac-
cept the contact group plan in full
This plan would oblige the Serbs (0
costs $24.99! If you choose one of our other annual plans,
give up . third of the land they hold
Sign up now and
and accept 49 percent of Bosnia, with
the balance going to a Muslim-Croat
these coupons will apply." You also get the largest local
also get a $125 Instant
federation.
rebate when you
Mr. Christopher's letter said the
-American decision to engage the
calling area In the Tri-state region. No added roaming
buy any dual-mode
digital phone."
Bosnian Serbs in a dialogue was
conditional on the roads into Saraje-
charges from Boston to D.C., and now no daily surcharges
vo being opened. The roads into this
encircled city were still closed today
when Mr. Thomas went to Pale.
anywhere in North America. All of this makes it a great time to get Cellular One
Mr. Thomas plans to go 10 there
listed
below.
or
call
-800-IMAGINE.
JAN 20 '95 19:07 R 2110M T1,
PREPENTE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE P.1
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400
STATES 50
19,100 grants STATE
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
1117
OASD / EUROPEAN POLICY
To:
Don Kerrick
Organization:
NSC
Phone:
456-9151
Fax:
456-9150
From:
John Klekas
Organization:
OASD/ISA (Eur)
Phone:
703-897-6026
Fax:
703-695-6506
Date:
1/20/95
Pages Including this
cover page:
4
Comments:
This is a complete text of the Slocombe TPs
for Croatia, i.e., it incorporates the additions Chris Hoh
just made this evening. Kruzel won't look at this
until tomorrow morning but, if you can clear this tonight,
it will likely be all set to go with Kruzel when he gets
on the plane tomorrow. Please advise.
Urgent
JAN 20 '95 19:07 R 2110M T1
P.2
CROATIA
Talking Points for Meeting with President Tudjman
The U.S. understands that your intentions are good, but we worry that the
consequences of the course you have chosen will prove disastrous for your people and
for our bilateral ties.
We are very concerned by your announcement to end UNPROFOR's current mandate
in Croatia because it increases the risk of renewed Serbo-Croat war.
Without international monitors maintaining the separation of Croatian and Krajina
Serb forces, troops will move into the resulting vacuum, and clashes are inevitable.
In the current climate of both sides feeling strong, escalation into conflict along the
entire confrontation line seems unavoidable.
This includes fighting in Sector East, which would invite Serbian intervention, as well
as the prospect of Serb rocket attacks on Croatian cities.
If war occurs, we do not believe you have sufficient military capability for a quick,
decisive victory. War will be long, costly and risk intervention by Serbia.
You should not be under any illusion you will have U.S. military support for Croatia
in the event you choose a military option. From my discussions with many members
of Congress of both parties, I can assure you that there is no support for any U.S.
combat involvement in this region, on any side.
Besides the human casualties that all sides would suffer in the event of hostilities,
diplomatic efforts to achieve a peace settlement would suffer, particularly as regards
Belgrade's willingness to pressure Pale and Knin.
We share your view that the status quo in Croatia must not continue indefinitely, a
position that the Security Council endorsed in the January 17 Presidential Statement.
Nevertheless, our good bilateral relations are predicated on Croatia's cooperation with
the Security Council and international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
We fully support UNPROFOR's presence, which makes an important contribution to
peace and stability in the region, and encourage you in the strongest possible terms to
reconsider you decision and accept its continued operation in Croatia.
1
01/20/95
JAN 20 '95 19:08 R 2110M T1
P.3
Should it prove impossible to maintain UNPOROFOR in its current form, we believe
that the most essential elements of UNPROFOR must continue their operations:
-- Monitoring the March 1994 cease-fire and separation of forces agreement;
-- Maintaining headquarters operations for continuing UNPROFOR missions in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia;
-- Facilitating implementation of the December 1994 Agreement on Economic
Confidence-Building Measures, including the opening of the Zagreb-to-Belgrade
highway;
-- Escorting humanitarian convoys to Bihac and Banja Luka; and
-- Maintaining a liaison office in Knin.
If your actions result in war, Croatia will again become part of the problem in the
Balkans rather than part of the solution and will find itself alone.
The U.S. would be unable to support you, not because we disagree with your
objectives, but because we cannot maintain good relations with a government that
NO
fails to pursue all peaceful means for resolving its disputes.
We note that talks on a political settlement between Croats and Serbs have never been
seriously pursued and we believe it is essential to launch a negotiating process.
Toward that end, we are undertaking a major effort to invigorate the diplomatic track.
You can expect to see results within a week.
You cannot expect understanding from Washington for any actions that result in war
before a real attempt is made to negotiate your differences.
The planned intensification of bilateral military cooperation that I originally expected
to discuss with you will be difficult to take forward unless there is a satisfactory
resolution of the UNPROFOR mandate question.
Rather than cancel my visit, however, my government wanted to use this opportunity
to make clear the depth of our concern.
2
01/20/95
JAN 20 '95 19:09 R 2110M T1
P.4
We would like to go ahead this year with programs discussed during the November
Bilateral Working Group session in Zagreb.
These include:
-- Acceptance of Croatian students this year at the Marshall Center;
-- Croatian attendance at courses organized under our International Military Education
and Training Program (IMET) made possible by U.S. funding in FY 95, as well as
your Government's offer to cover additional costs;
-- Initiation of a military-to-military Contact Program that could lead to a team being
stationed in Zagreb on a permanent basis.
Your announcement on UNPROFOR, however, puts these plans in jeopardy, as well
as other bilateral programs like the opening of consulates, exchange visitors, and
science and technology projects.
Unless we can be reasonably sure that Croatian action will not reignite hostilities and
make these programs impossible to carry out, they will have to be put on hold.
I would therefore be very interested in your assessment of the current situation and
your view of what to expect in the coming months from Croatia in regard to
UNPROFOR's presence.
3
01/20/95
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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Key Disagreements. (I page)
01/21/1995
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 850
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - January 1995 [4]
2013-0687-F
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