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Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
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Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
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Case Number: 2013-0687-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander
Original OA/ID Number:
897
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
34
2
1
2
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. cable
re: Sanctions Relief. (2 pages)
05/04/1995
P1/b(1)
002. paper
Status of Sarajevo and Bihac. (4 pages)
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
003. report
Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, #379. (4 pages)
05/09/1995
Pl/b(1)
004. note
For Sandy Vershbow from Wilma Hall. [partial] (1 page)
05/10/1995
b(6)
005. draft
Memcon: Meeting Between Vice President Gore and President
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
Tudjman of Croatia; May 7, 1995. (5 pages)
006. report
The Defeat of Krajina Serb Forces. (3 pages)
05/05/1995
P1/b(1)
007. cable
re: OPLAN 40104: French Paper on May 4 Meeting. (6 pages)
05/05/1995
P1/b(1)
008. draft
Talking Points for Use by Vice President Gore with Prime Minister
05/1995
P1/b(1)
Major. (2 pages)
009. memo
For Leon Fuerth, Rick Inderfurth, Kenneth Brill, et al. From Andrew
05/04/1995
P1/b(1)
Sens. Subject: Additional Principals Tasking. Record ID: 9520564. (1
page)
010. agenda
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID:
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
9520596. (1 page)
011. memo
For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: JCS Talking Points for
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
Congressional OPLAN 40104 Briefing. Record ID: 9503499. (5
pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA)
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
012. paper
Croatia and Bosnia: Danger of Escalation. (3 pages)
05/05/1995
P1/b(1)
013. cable
re: Appraisal of Situation. (3 pages)
05/06/1995
Pl/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. cable
re: Sanctions Relief. (2 pages)
05/04/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIAJ
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. paper
Status of Sarajevo and Bihac. (4 pages)
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. report
Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, #379. (4 pages)
05/09/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information I(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SV
StAte's
5,
later versin
added Sentence
n call define
Q
05/04/95
11:38
202 647 1369
EUR/RPM
EUROPEAN DIR
002
EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY
AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT
Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to
use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of
Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)
NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens
Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:
"Ministers decided
...
to offer NATO's protective air power
in case of attack against UNPROFOR"
NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without
further action, to support UNPROFOR.
UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by
UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:
member states, acting ... through regional
organizations,
may take all necessary measures, through
the use of air power,
in and around safe areas,
to
support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of]
its mandate
W
That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and
replying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian
convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770,
the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require
that actions by member states and regional organizations be
taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN,
respectively.
AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION
NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9,
1993, which read in part:
E
that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for
undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other
areas
measures including air strikes
NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation"
of safe areas.
The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air
power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General." This
has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.
UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are
770, 836 and 844.
05/04/95
11:38
202 647 1369
EUR/RPM
EUROPEAN DIR
003
-2-
AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE
NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9,
1994, which reads in part that NATO:
accepts
the request of the UN Secretary General to
launch air strikes,
at the request of the United Nations,
against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo
which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks
against civilians,
and
in response to artillery or
mortar attacks on Sarajevo,
and
in response to the
identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone
[and not under UNPROFOR control]
NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the
Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.
UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are
770, 836 and 844.
In addition to the UN/NATO authorities, collective
self-defense would authorize states to use air power at the
request of the Bosnian Government. Such use of air power could
be restricted by UN Security Council resolutions -- e.g., by the
establishment of the no-fly zone over Bosnia.
NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above,
does NOT apply to restrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by
diplomats or official delegations.
SECRET
20588
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 5, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
AV,
FROM:
BG DON KERRICK
10
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995
Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of
Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia held May 4, 1995.
Concurrence by:
Rick Saunders
m@
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at
Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Van Tbind NARA, Date 6/2/2014
2013-0687-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
20588
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Assistant to the Vice
Office of the Representative
President for National
of the U.S. to the UN
Security Affairs
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of State
COL. T. R. PATRICK
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Secretary, Joint Staff
Associate Director for National
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Security & International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, May 4, 1995 (S)
Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions w/Attachment
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 6/2/14
SECRET
2013-067-F
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
20588
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: May 4, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 1:30pm - 2:30pm
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia (S)
PARTICIPANTS:
Chair:
OMB:
Samuel R. Berger
John Burnim
USUN:
OVP:
David Scheffer
Leon Fuerth
James O'Brien
Rick Saunders
CIA:
State:
Douglas MacEachin
Peter Tarnoff
Norm Schindler
Richard Holbrooke
Robert Frasure
JCS:
LTG Wesley Clark
DOD:
BG John Walsh
Walter Slocombe
Joseph Kruzel
NSC:
Alexander Vershbow
BG Don Kerrick
Summary of Conclusions
1.
Deputies met to discuss a strategy for dealing with the
Contact Group deadlock on what degree of sanctions relief to
offer Milosevic in return for genuine recognition of Bosnia, and
the accompanying strategy for Ambassador Frasure to pursue in the
next Contact Group meeting and in a follow-on private meeting
with Milosevic. Deputies agreed that we should continue to
pursue a strategy, in close coordination with the Bosnian
Government, that supports the Bosnian Government's goal of
gaining genuine recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
within its internationally recognized borders in return for
limited sanctions relief and a closure of the border with Bosnian
Serb territory.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
iz 10/1/2013
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
2
2.
Deputies agreed that Ambassador Frasure should continue to
stand on the existing USG position in upcoming Contact Group
discussions. In the follow-on meeting with Milosevic, Ambassador
Frasure should emphasize that the U.S. will not support any
efforts to lift sanctions until the Contact Group plan is
accepted by the Pale Serbs, and that while we might consider a
longer sanctions suspension period (e.g. 180 days), any extension
of suspended sanctions would require a positive UNSC vote. He
should also inform Milosevic that the U.S. is not prepared to
support release of frozen financial assets. Deputies agreed
that, if it becomes clear in the meeting with Milosevic that an
element of lift is necessary to complete an otherwise acceptable
deal, the U.S. should consider (but not offer at that meeting)
lifting sanctions against certain media and information-related
activities. Deputies asked that Leon Fuerth and Ambassador
Frasure confer on the appropriate financial sanctions language
for presentation to the Contact Group. (Action: OVP/State) (S)
3. Deputies discussed the renewed fighting in Croatia and a
strategy to prevent escalation. They agreed that the U.S. should
press President Tudjman and the Krajina Serbs to halt military
operations and exercise restraint. They agreed to press the
Croatians at all levels to adopt an accommodating position that
could include the demilitarization of the recaptured areas, the
return of Serb civilians to their homes, and the reestablishment
of UNCRO authority in Sector West and other areas of conflict.
If Croatia is willing to take these steps, the U.S. would support
the presence of Croatian civilian police in Sector West and the
removal of all RSK military forces. (Action: State) (S)
4. Deputies discussed the steps to be taken to ensure the
Croatians are aware of the U.S. view of their military actions.
They agreed to support a UNSC resolution condemning incursions by
all sides in Sectors South and East and calling for the
restoration of UNCRO authority in all areas. Deputies directed
that the Croatians be immediately informed of our deep concerns
and endorsed a Vice Presidential meeting with President Tudjman
in London as a useful forum for registering U.S. concerns about
Tudjman's military actions. (Action: State/OVP) (3)
5.
Deputies also discussed the importance of warning the
Krajina Serbs of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in
Zagreb. They agreed that we should be prepared to bypass the
dual-key system if a NATO response were not approved by the UN.
They directed military options be developed for retaliatory
action, both unilateral and through NATO. (Action: JCS)
6.
Deputies discussed briefing the Congress on OPLAN 40104 and
directed that the talking points be cleared before the briefings
are scheduled. (Action: JCS draft talking points; NSC/State
schedule briefings) (S)
SECRET
MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
(FR) 05.05. 95 15:02 NO. 1460017949 PAGE
2
SECRET
1 May 1995
INFORMATION PAPER
Subject: Military Options for Reopening Sarajevo Airport (U)
1. (U) Purpose. To provide options to reopen Sarajevo airport
for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2. (U) Background. Sarajevo air operations have been
periodically interrupted by the Bosnian Serbs since the beginning
of the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces control the area
surrounding the airport and the major land routes into Sarajevo.
The Bosnian Serbs have the capability to attack aircraft in
flight and while unloading on the airfield. Aircraft are
threatened by both antiaircraft weapons and conventional direct
and indirect ground systems. The Bosnian Muslims also have the
capability, though to a lesser extent, to interdict air
operations. UNPROFOR has documented numerous occasions of BiH
fire.
3. (S) Discussion. The following options are available for
consideration for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Sarajevo:
Assumptions:
New UNSCR (s) required to implement a military option will
be adopted by the Security Council.
A parallel diplomatic effort to secure the opening of
Sarajevo will be undertaken.
OPTION 1: Secure Sarajevo Airport - forcibly secure and maintain
a DMZ around Sarajevo. Create a demilitarized zone (8-10km)
around Sarajevo airfield which denies the Bosnian Serbs from
employing weapons against aircraft that are in flight or on the
ground. This option could require up to a division sized force
to secure the airfield and remove the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian
Muslim presence from the immediate area.
UNPROFOR Action:
UNPROFOR seize (if necessary) and establish
administrative control over the Sarajevo airport
Secure airfield perimeter and approaches using a
combination of troops equipped with means of acquisition
for various types of attack. May include night vision
devices, GPS, artillery acquisition battery.
Take direct action to secure high terrain and buildings
from belligerents. Move civilians outside of airport
safe zone (2-3km). Combatants excluded inside 8-10km
zone.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 13526
Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR
R 10/1/2013
NATTONAL MILITARI CENTER
US. UD.
10:03
NO.
1400017949 PAGE
3
SECRET
Roving security patrols along approaches to the airport.
Requires mounted and dismounted patrols monitoring out to
10 km from the airport.
NATO Airborne AC-130 and helicopter response capability
to attack sniper/mortar/artillery positions. Consider
use of a ground quick reaction force.
Belligerent Reaction:
"Administrative" harassment by Serbian officials at the
airport.
Threats from Bosnian Serb government in Pale, e.g.,
refusing to guarantee the safety of UN flights.
Employ random sniping incidents due to the particular
vulnerability of aircraft
Small arms fire directed either at aircraft or ground
personnel. Will be disruptive even if not directed at
airport operations per se.
Random or continuous mortar and artillery attacks
designed to damage the airfield, aircraft or simply to
disrupt operations.
Employment of man portable IR surface to air missiles/AAA
designed to directly attack aircraft.
Employment of longer range systems (heavy artillery, SA-
2s from ranges of 30-50kms).
Horizontal escalation elsewhere in B-H; hostage taking,
attacks on ground convoys, attacks on UN personnel,
disruption of utilities into Sarajevo and other enclaves.
BiH may target UNPROFOR attempting to blame the BSA in
order to encourage a NATO response against the BSA.
Counteraction:
Difficult if not impossible to counteract Bosnian Serb
horizontal escalation/asymmetric responses.
Recommended Force Enhancements:
Counterbattery radar, NODs, GPS, and other long range
acquisition devices linked to means of reaction.
Up to a brigade dedicated to airport security with heavy
quick reaction force, up to a brigade sized force to
remove combatants from the Sarajevo airport area.
AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support
Air assault capability (company sized)
SECRET
2
NATTONAL COMMAND CENTER
(PR) US. UD.
yo
10:03
NO. 140001 7949 PAGE
4
SECRET
Pol Mil Considerations:
UNPROFOR/Allies unlikely to support "offensive" operation
to open airport.
Additional troop contributions to support new mission
unlikely.
Allies could call for large US troop and equipment
contribution.
Bosnian Serbs could advertise DMZ as form of ethnic
cleansing.
Risk Assessment:
Irrespective of any of the military measures taken, the
absolute safety of transport/civilian aircraft cannot be
guaranteed given the threat environment.
Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with
limited logistics base.
Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft
(especially helicopters, transport, and AC-130s) in a
semi-integrated air defense network.
UNPROFOR would be required to redeploy forces to support
this option which could create increased risk in other
areas. Only French, UK, Dutch, Canadian forces capable
of accomplishing tasks associated with this option.
Without significant force enhancements, UNPROFOR forces
outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force
casualties.
Airport sits astride confrontation line; will be
difficult to establish which party is responsible for
firing.
OPTION 2: Use CAS and air strike packages to support delivery of
humanitarian aid flights. Marshall significant NATO air package
to surpress immediate threats around Sarajevo airport as aid is
flown into and unloaded at the airfield. Package could include
integration of target acquisition systems to assist in locating
indirect firing systems. Given the nature of the threat
surrounding the airfield, target acquisition (rifleman, AA gun,
mortar) would be extremely difficult. As a consequence, the
ability to deliver effective suppressive fire against these type
targets would be extremely difficult.
SECRET
3
NATTONAL MILITARI CENTER
(r.K)
UD. UD.
95 15:03
NO. 1460017949 PAGE
5
SECRET
UNPROFOR Action:
Deploy target acquisition system to Sarajevo airfield.
Deploy TACPs to Sarajevo area.
Package aid deliveries so that CAS/air strike packages
support specified high density delivery periods.
Clearly state intent to use NATO air support for
protecting aid deliveries into Sarajevo.
Specify target categories (high value, artillery pieces,
headquarters in Sarajevo vicinity) that NATO may strike
in response to Serb attack on humanitarian aid flights.
Belligerent Reaction:
Continued "administrative" harassment by Serbian
officials at the airport. Blocking aid outside airport.
Threats from Bosnian Serb government refusing safety of
flights.
Hostage taking - placing hostages at weapons sites.
Direct attack against humanitarian flights.
BiH may manipulate NATO's intent to use air power to
their advantage.
Counteraction:
Direct attack against targets engaging aircraft.
Direct attack against Bosnian Serb high value targets.
Recommended Force Enhancements:
AC-130 aircraft.
EW CAP (EA-6B, EF-111s).
Pol-Mil Considerations:
Troop contributing nations unlikely to support air option
due to concern for safety of deployed troops.
"Dual key" arrangement remains key factor in control of
air strikes.
Could require significant US contribution in terms of air
assets.
Bosnian Serbs likely to use collateral damage as media
weapon against US/NATO. Given this scenario, attempts to
suppress sniper/mortar fires in an urban environment have
a high potential for collateral damage.
SECRET
4
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
(FR) 05.05.
95 15:03
NO. 1460017949 PAGE
6
SECRET
Risk Assessment:
Air power alone insufficient to protect humanitarian aid
flights and keep airfield open. Threat/target difficult
to identify and acquire (snipers, mortars, urban
environment, mountainous topography).
Support aircraft (AC-130) at high risk in semi-integrated
air defensé network.
Bosnian Serbs can react in ways (hostage taking, utility
shut-down) which limit the effectiveness of air power
options.
High probability of collateral damage and fratricide.
OPTION 3: Open and maintain a road corridor from the Adriatic
coast to Sarajevo (15km through Bosnian Serb held territory).
UNPROFOR Action:
Enhance convoy ability to protect themselves by employing
a graduated range of security responses from self
protection through heavy force (armor/Infantry Fighting
Vehicle) security escorts.
UNPROFOR can create and employ a "Quick Reaction Force"
consisting of heavy ground maneuver units, assault
forces, and possibly helicopters.
To counter interdiction efforts UNPROFOR can obtain and
employ combat engineer units/assets moving with convoys
or reacting to specific points.
Provide each convoy with TACPs and continuous overhead
air escort (helo/fixed wing).
Belligerent Reaction:
Incidents of civil disobedience on the part of the
population, e.g. crowds blocking roads.
Halt and delay convoys with intent to delay aid delivery
or steal ("tax") contents of the convoys.
Sniping or other acts of random violence to intimidate
and disrupt or stop convoys.
Attacks on convoys to prevent delivery of aid or as a
punitive measure in response to UNPROFOR (or opposing)
belligerent actions.
Belligerents may stop/delay aid by interdicting LOC.
Barricade roadway
Mine road segments
Destroy bridges
Block tunnels
SECRET
5
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
(FR) 05.05.
' 95 15:03
NO. 1460017949 PAGE
7
SECRET
Counteraction:
Difficult to counteract Bosnian Serb indirect responses -
mining roads, destroying bridges (72 choke points on the
Ploce - Sarajevo route).
Recommended Force Enhancements.
Up to a brigade for route security (approx 15 km)
Quick Reaction Force (mech and air assault).
1-2 engineer battalions.
AC-130, CAS, and helicopter support.
MP units.
Pol-Mil Considerations:
Additional troop contributions to support new mission
unlikely.
UNPROFOR/NATO allies could call for significant US
contribution.
UNPROFOR unlikely to accept full enforcement of mandate.
Risk Assessment:
Bosnian Serb indirect/asymmetrical responses can halt aid
delivery.
Current UNPROFOR forces not capable of providing robust
ground escort package. Without enhancements, UNPROFOR
forces would be outmatched by Bosnian Serb forces.
Difficulty maintaining sophisticated equipment with
limited logistics base.
Cannot guarantee the survivability of aircraft
(especially helicopters, AC-130s) in a semi-integrated
air defense network.
Increased probability of UNPROFOR ground force
casualties.
Routes parallel numerous hot spots near the active
confrontation line. Convoys may encounter indirect fire
from the fighting.
NOTE: These options were developed based on the assigned mission
reopen Sarajevo airport. The options are intentionally robust
based on the threat capabilities and areas required to be
secured. An air strike only package directed against high value
targets throughout Bosnia was not considered. This approach
could be perceived as purely offensive and unrelated to the
SECRET
6
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
(FR) 05.05. 95 15:03 NO. 1460017949 PAGE
8
SECRET
direct opening of the airport at Sarajevo. The danger to relief
operations and UNPROFOR troops could rise dramatically given this
approach to reopening Sarajevo.
5.
(S) Recommendation. The military options are high risk,
high cost operations. Unless the US is willing to employ ground
forces to support the securing of Sarajevo airfield and/or the
coastal route to Sarajevo, it is unlikely that UNPROFOR or NATO
will support a military option. At this time, the Joint Staff
recommends against executing a military option.
Prepared by Balkans Working Group, J-5, EURDIV
X49435
SECRET
7
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004. note
For Sandy Vershbow from Wilma Hall. [partial] (1 page)
05/10/1995
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
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Freedom of Information Act - - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
May 10, 1995
NOTE FOR SANDY VERSHBOW
FROM:
Wilma Hall Wilma
Anthony Lake's ofc
SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Stephen Chesine
Mr. Chesin called today (from Canada) to say that
through you Mr. Lake has requested preparation of some
materials from him. He referenced a February 24
letter.
He is following up about coming to Washington to
discuss it with Mr. Lake.
I told him that you and Mr. Lake were both travelling;
that I would pass this message to your office to have
upon your return.
Mr. Chesin can be reached at: 613/235-4597
[004]
(b)(6)
CC: Kathy Veit
MAY-10-95 WED 10:45
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
FAX NO. 6132302121
P.01
Date: May 10, 1995
To: Anthony Lake, NSC
From: Stephen Chesine, Ottawa, Tel. Home (613) 235-5497 . evenings
Re: Your reference letter from Alexander Vershbow dated Feb. 24, 1995
I have been developing the material
There are changes in light of new developments
Would like to meet in Washington
Wish to add to the material in person
Believe that a meeting in person would facilitate a more productive
approach to the material
Allows me to present material that I believe to be significant but must
remain in verbal form
The Bottom Line: Federal District Properties
A precedent for other disputes
The basis of any civilized solution
The basis of stability in the Region
Upholds the life and liberty of the children, the elderly and the innocent
Stephen Chesine
SECRET
DECL: OADR
Bosnia Diplomatic Strategy: Sarajevo Airport
The Problem
After their successful challenge to the French at the
illegal Sierra-4 checkpoint and their even more humiliating
treatment of Contact Group representatives at Sarajevo airport,
the Bosnian Serbs know they can keep bullying the United
Nations and get whatever they want. The UN has no fall-back
position for its talks with Karadzic; it long-ago ruled out the
option of enforcing its control of the airport and the environs
of Sarajevo. In his initial report on the situation, the
Secretary General made it clear that the airport could be kept
open only with the parties' agreement.
Referring to nonexistent precedents and claiming that the
airport is Serb territory merely managed by the UN, Karadzic
and his minions have threatened to fire on UN aircraft carrying
anything but UNPROFOR military personnel. On April 27, the
Serb commander overseeing the airport turned back a plane with
civilians aboard and Karadzic announced that he will never
allow foreign diplomats to land at Sarajevo, "especially
diplomats from hostile nations, like Iran and the United
States.'
Prognosis: Humiliation and Strangulation
In the end, the UN may be able to maintain the airport as a
logistical base for its own severely limited activities, but
unless the UN can persuade the Bosnian Serbs otherwise,
Sarajevo will lose its air link to the outside world. The GOBH
will be isolated and the city will be strangled by closure of
land routes.
And the Serbs may go further. In recent weeks, the Bosnian
Serb Army has made obvious preparations for a massive attack on
Sarajevo -- digging tank emplacements, replacing wooden and
sandbag revetments encircling the city with reinforced
concrete, etc. General Smith has said he expects the Serbs to
"pick off the enclaves one-by-one" and then go for "the real
prize enclave -- Sarajevo itself."
In response to these moves, the GOBH is certain to take
into its own hands the future of its capital city. The B-H
Army has already engaged in probing actions north and south of
the city -- possibly setting the stage for an all-out offensive
to punch one or two corridors into Sarajevo from nearby
government-controlled territory. As Bosnian Vice President
Ganic has stated, "We want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and do
its job while the Serbs want UNPROFOR to stay in Bosnia and not
do its job.' In the case of Sarajevo, the Bosnians will not
long accept an UNPROFOR that is powerless to counter the Serbs.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
VZ 10/1/2013
SECRET
-2-
Our Limited Options
The key to keeping UNPROFOR on the ground and to avoiding
the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia is to take
aggressive and decisive measures to keep Sarajevo Airport open
for all traffic. The legal authority exists to do so and
military options are being prepared. * But if we are truly
serious, we must begin immediately to build a consensus among
our allies and at the UN, threatening realistic consequences
for inaction.
Among our options are the following:
-- Usingrexisting authority to permit NATO air activity of the
following sorts:
1) Close air support in defense of UNPROFOR troops at the
airport, who have in recent days been shelled by the
Bosnian Serbs;
2) Air strikes based on the fact that Sarajevo is being
strangled;
3) Air strikes based on the fact that the exclusion zone is
being violated.
Diplomatically, we could begin with the following steps:
-- Consulting immediately with allies bilaterally, at NATO and
at the UN on Serb non-compliance with relevant UNSC
resolutions, which call for unhindered delivery of
humanitarian assistance including "safe and secure access"
to Sarajevo Airport, and provide for the use of force to
protect the Sarajevo safe area. The UN Security Council is
to act Wednesday to issue a Presidential Statement on the
airport that will call for its re-opening in accordance
with the 1992 Airport Agreement.
Convening a meeting of the NAC to discuss military measures
to ensure compliance with relevant UNSC resolutions.
-- Arranging calls by the Secretary to Hurd, Juppé and
Kozyrev, letting them know that a failure to open the
airport on acceptable terms will make a Ministerial
impossible.
Raising the issue at the May 5 Contact Group meeting in
Paris.
*See accompanying papers
SECRET
EXISTING AUTHORITY FOR NATO AIR ACTIVITY
AROUND SARAJEVO AIRPORT
Within limitations, the UN and NATO have the authority to
use air power in response to restrictions placed on the use of
Sarajevo Airport, based on the following:
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)
NATO Authority: Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens
Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:
"Ministers decided
to offer NATO's protective air power
in case of attack against UNPROFOR"
NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without
further action, to support UNPROFOR.
UN Authority: UNSC 836 Res. (June 4, 1993), reaffirmed by
UNSC Res. 844 (June 18, 1993) provides that:
member states, acting
through regional
organizations,
may take all necessary measures, through
the use of air power,
in and around safe areas,
to
support UNPROFOR in the performance of [certain aspects of]
its mandate
"
That mandate includes deterring attacks on the safe areas, and
treplying to obstruction of movement of UNPROFOR or humanitarian
convoys throughout Bosnia. In addition, under UNSC Res. 770,
the UN may request NATO to use force to facilitate delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. These resolutions require
that actions by member states and regional organizations be
taken in "close cooperation" or in "coordination" with the UN,
respectively.
AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO STRANGULATION
NATO Authority: Based on NAC decisions of August 2 and 9,
1993, which read in part:
"
that the Alliance will make immediate preparations for
undertaking, in the event of strangulation of Sarajevo and other
areas
measures including air strikes
"
NATO may conduct air strikes in response to the "strangulation"
of safe areas.
The NAC decision also makes clear that "the first use of air
power shall be authorized by the UN Secretary General.' This
has been termed the "dual key" arrangement.
UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are
770, 836 and 844.
-2-
AIR STRIKES IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SARAJEVO
EXCLUSION ZONE
NATO Authority: Based on the NAC decision of February 9,
1994, which reads in part that NATO:
accepts
the request of the UN Secretary General to
launch air strikes,
at the request of the United Nations,
against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo
which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks
against civilians,
and
in response to artillery or
mortar attacks on Sarajevo,
and
in response to the
identification of any heavy weapons [inside] the exclusion zone
[and not under UNPROFOR control]
NATO may conduct air strikes, at the UN's request, if the
Sarajevo exclusion zone is violated.
UN Authority: As with CAS, implementing UN resolutions are
770, 836 and 844.
NOTE: UN and NATO authority to use air power, as noted above,
does NOT apply to Lrestrictions on the use of Sarajevo Airport by
diplomats or official delegations.
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Memcon: Meeting Between Vice President Gore and President
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Sens. Subject: Additional Principals Tasking. Record ID: 9520564. (1
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SECRET
20564
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
May 2, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
N
FROM:
DON KERRICK
K
SUBJECT:
Additional Principals Tasking on OPLAN 40104
Unanswered Policy Questions
The Bosnia IWG is continuing to develop answers to the unanswered
policy questions relating to OPLAN 40104. Attached memorandum
formalizes Principals request for a post-UNPROFOR political and
diplomatic strategy to focus IWG efforts.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memorandum to the
agencies at Tab I.
Approve 12 Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to Agency Counterparts
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By V2
NARA, Date 7/1/2014
2013-0687-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
20596
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
May 8, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Assistant to the Vice
Associate Director for National
President for National
Security and International
Security Affairs
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Department of State
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
COL. T. R. PATRICK
Department of Defense
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN
SUBJECT:
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia
(S)
There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia
on May 9, 1995, 1:00-2:30 p.m., in the White House Situation
Room. Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is
attached at Tab A. (S)
Executive Secretary
Windwar Andrew D. Sens
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Tab A
Agenda
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Van The NARA, Date 6/2/2014
20B-0687-F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
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Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
010. agenda
Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID:
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
9520596. (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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DATE
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011. memo
For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick. Subject: JCS Talking Points for
05/08/1995
P1/b(1)
Congressional OPLAN 40104 Briefing. Record ID: 9503499. (5
pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
012. paper
Croatia and Bosnia: Danger of Escalation. (3 pages)
05/05/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA|
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
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Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
013. cable
re: Appraisal of Situation. (3 pages)
05/06/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - May 1995: Early [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2699
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(I) of the PRA
b(I) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.