Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
120361643
label
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid.-Late [2]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
120361643
contentType
document
title
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid.-Late [2]
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council European Affairs Office (Clinton Administration)
Alexander Vershbow's Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
120361643
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
otherTitles
42-t-7585499-20130687F-010-006-2016
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
8029bef61c3c2a62
ocrText
Case Number: 2013-0687-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander
Original OA/ID Number:
897
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
34
2
1
2
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. memo
For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject:
06/29/1995
P1/b(1)
Response to Gingrich and Dole. Record ID: 9505043. (2 pages)
002. memo
For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Use
06/28/1995
P1/b(1)
of Section 506(a)(1). Record ID: 9504963. (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2716
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)}
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
6/20/95
UNPROFOR: US QUESTIONS ON RAPID REACTION FORCE: UK RESPONSE
Q. What is the mission of the RRF?
Is it designed solely to
provide protection to existing UNPROFOR forces, or will it also
have a role in making UNPROFOR more effective in implementing
its mandate?
A. The mission is to reinforce UNPROFOR in order to reduce the
vulnerability of its personnel and enhance its capacity to carry
out its existing mandate. The RRF will provide the UNPROFOR
commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to
respond promptly to threats to UN personnel. It will reduce the
risk of casualties and harassment.
RRF missions could include:
- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or
threatened UN units;
- help with redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;
- facilitating freedom of movement where necessary.
The RRF will give the commanders additional capacities between a
strong protest and air strikes: increase tactical flexibility:
and have a deterrent effect. It will not change UNPROFOR's role
to peace enforcement. The status of UNPROFOR and its
impartiality will be unaffected.
Q. Will it have a role in breaking the siege of Sarajevo or in
resupplying the enclaves? Will it help protect the safe areas?
Will it secure Sarajevo airport?
A. The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR in its present
activities. These include negotiated efforts to end the siege
of Sarajevo, ensure resupply of the enclaves and deter attacks
on the safe areas.
Q- Will it come to the assistance of all UNPROFOR troops, or
just British, French and Dutch troops?
A. The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR as a whole.
Q. Who will make decisions on when to employ the force?
What command and control arrangements do you envision? Will the
force respond to orders from the Secretary General, from SRSG
Akashi? Who will be the military commander? Will the force act
independently of UN civilian control?
A. The force will operate under the existing UN chain of
command. It will be under the operational control of the UN
military commanders, who will continue to be under the overall
direction of the UN Secretary General and his Special
Representative. The specific tasks assigned to the RRF will be
determined by the UN commanders on the ground.
Q. What rules of engagement will the force have? Will they be
different from other UNPROFOR units?
A. The force will act under existing UN ROEs. The RRF will
operate under national uniform, UN flag and insignia but without
blue helmets or white vehicles.
Q. Is this the bulk of the European contribution to OPLAN
40104? How will this force differ from the forces Britain,
France and the Netherlands would contribute to an UNPROFOR
withdrawal?
A. The Europeans have made separate and substantive commitments
to the NATO withdrawal plan.
Q. How would this force coordinate close air support from NATO?
Would a dual key apply to close air support requests from the
RRF? Would this change the dual key arrangement for other
UNPROFOR units?
A. There will be no change to existing dual key arrangements.
Q. Will the RRF be available to assist operations in Croatia or
in Macedonia, if needed on an urgent basis?
A. The RRF is intended for operations in Bosnia, but will be an
integral part of the overall UN peacekeeping effort in the
region.
Q. Will the force act to protect civilians under attack?
A. Protection of civilians is part of the UN's mandate: how the
RRF will be used in support of this objective is a matter for
the ground commanders.
Q. Will the force have a role in delivering humanitarian
assistance?
A. Humanitarian assistance also remains a central part of
UNPROFOR's mandate. The precise role of the RRF in such
operations will be a matter for the ground commanders.
Q. Will the force have the capability and/or the authority to
rescue hostages?
A. The purpose of the RRF is not to rescue hostages. But its
missions could include emergency actions to assist isolated or
threatened UN units.
Q. What type of assistance are you looking for from the US?
(What has the US promised, how will it be funded? We need this
information to answer the Gilman letter.)
A. We want the US to fund its full share of the costs of the
RRF, to provide material assistance (Defense Secretary Perry has
already promised continued CAS, certain types of equipment,
strategic lift and an intelligence co-ordination cell), and give
the Force its full political backing.
Q. What logistics base will you use to support the force? Will
you use UNPROFOR, or is the force self supporting? Given the US
position on funding how will you keep the accounts separate?
A. The logistics and other detailed arrangements on the ground
are still being worked out.
Q. What circumstances will trigger the deployment to theater of
the standby French brigade? Who decides -- the French or the
UN?
A. As with other elements of the force, an offer of further
reinforcements would be a national decision for the troop
contributor concerned, in consultation with the UN. The
increase in UNPROFOR's authorised strength by up to 12,500
additional troops, agreed in SCR 998, provides sufficient
headroom to include the standby French brigade.
Q. What activities will the RRF engage in when not pursuing
protective measures? Can other UN units call on its help for
day-to-day activities, or are its mission and personnel sealed
off from those of the existing UNPROFOR?
A. The precise day-to-day tasks of the RRF, and other elements
of UNPROFOR, are a matter for the ground commanders.
202 456 9150:# 2/ 3
140
Estimated
130,000
Civilian
120
Fatalities
in
7036148976-
100
Bosnia/Croatia
1991-1995
As of 31 March 1995
80
*To Date
-1 3-95 .. 9:35 -- --
60
Bosnia
Croatia
40
CROATIA:
20
12,500 Killed/Missing
11,800
12,500
Since June 1991
2,430
*30
(Most Deaths Occurred
0
in 1991).
1992
1993
1994
1995
TOTAL
CROATIA
SENT BY:
202 456 9150:# 3/ 3
UNPROFOR
Casualties in
286
Balkans
Bosnia
344
45
1992-1995
7036148976-
36
Other
297
Croatia
153
Injuries
37
19
Wounded-
TOTALS:
Combat
; 6- 3-95 ; 9:35 :
Macedonia
17
Combat deaths:
55
0
Other deaths:
95
1
Other
Wounded in combat: 504
0
Other injuries:
705
Deaths
Other
105
Combat
Areas*
7
12
Deaths
0
As of 31 March 1995
0
200
400
SOURCE: March 1995 UNPROFOR Facts Sheets
* Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro
SENT BY:
Congress of the United States
Mashington, DC 20515
June 29, 1995
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material,
transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has
essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.
We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition
to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of
approximately $35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to
acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide
$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we
oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive
application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down
defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15
letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to
restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.
Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed
operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are
necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by
General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to
veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air
defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny
Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same
conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided
to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous
command arrangements.
We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military
personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political
sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such. it is essential that the rules of engagement be
immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should
such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.
Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the
RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most
fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and
standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF
deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement
the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N.
designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with
NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our
view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is
enough - the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.
Sincerely,
BOB DOLE
Congress of the United States
Hashington. DC 20515
June 15, 1995
The President
The White House
Washington
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President
Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that
the Administration and the French government would like to pass a
resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this
afternoon.
Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the
Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about
authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen
of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not
been consulted nor provided with critical information about the
mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this
new operation.
Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government
and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their
forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally.
It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary
to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac
informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed
of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not
be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date
crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point
explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes
the RRF.
President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S.
political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of
this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's
decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect
UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that
any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of
the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the
resolution will not be assessed to U:N. member states; and (2) no
additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be
incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you
choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs
should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose
funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent
with our discussion with President Chirac.
We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and,
most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th
letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be
promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should
have been answered in the consultation process required by law.
To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is
unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us
of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may
share it with our colleagues.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for
measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way
be interpreted as support for the present European and
Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As
we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental
differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We
believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly
failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach,
withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.
Sincerely,
Now Drif NEWT GINGRICH
BOB DOLE
Congress of the United States
lashington. DC 20515
June 13, 1995
The Honorable Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We were dumbfounded to learn yesterday that the
Administration intends to vote in favor of a United Nations
Security Council resolution as soon as tomorrow that will
substantially increase the authorized personnel strength of the
UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, thereby increasing the
cost of that operation by an estimated $520 million per year.
This critically important piece of information was revealed
to Congress yesterday for the first time at a staff briefing two
days before the planned Security Council vote. Undersecretary of
State Peter Tarnoff neglected to mention this detail in his
testimony before the International Relations Committee about
Bosnia last Thursday, June 8th. Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow also
failed to mention it when he briefed the International Relations
Committee about Bosnia on Friday, June 2nd.
We are deeply disappointed by what appears to be an
unwillingness on the part of the Administration to fully inform
Congress about the spiraling costs of its Bosnia policy.
We also are deeply concerned by what this episode suggests
about how the Administration intends to handle changes to U.N.
peacekeeping operations in the future. The total lack of
consultation with Congress about this costly decision is utterly
inconsistent with the understandings we thought had been reached
about consultation in such cases in section 407 of P.L. 103-236,
the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995". The ease with which the Administration has avoided the
meaningful consultation that section 407 was intended to require
underscores the urgent need to revise that section along the
lines set forth in H.R. 7, the "National Security Revitalization
Act"
We urge the Administration to oppose any resolution in the
United Nations Security Council that would significantly increase
the size and cost of the UNPROFOR operation until you have fully
briefed our Committees and provided written answers to the
following questions:
1. How much will the resolution add to the cost of
UNPROFOR, and how much of that additional cost will be
assessed to the United States?
2. What source of funding does the Administration intend to
utilize to pay the increased cost to the United States? If
the Administration intends to seek additional or
supplemental appropriations, have budget offsets been
identified, and if 80, what are they?
3. To the degree that the resolution will have the effect
of reimbursing France, the United Kingdom, and other
countries for the cost of the new Rapid Reaction Force they
are deploying to Bosnia, why is the United States not
receiving similar reimbursement for the costs of its new and
existing commitments in support of UNPROFOR?
4. Has the United States sought United Nations
reimbursement for its logistics, air support, and other
activities in support of UNPROFOR? If not, why not?
5. What additional military obligations would the United
States undertake pursuant to the Security Council resolution
or any bilateral agreements with France, the United Kingdom,
or other countries?
If the Administration proceeds to vote in favor of a
Security Council resolution increasing the size and cost of
UNPROFOR without adequate consultation and without providing
satisfactory answers to these questions, we will have little
choice but to oppose any Administration request for the
authorization or appropriation of funds to pay for the increased
cost to the United States.
Sincerely,
Baie BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International
Relations
HAROLD ROGERS
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State and Judiciary
Veleposlanstvo Republike Hrvatske u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama
Embassy of the Republic of Croatia to the United States of America
2343 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20008
tel. (202) 588 5899 fax (202) 588 8937
June 30, 1995
The Honorable
Alexander Vershbow
Director for Europe and
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
The Old Executive Office Building
Room 368
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. Vershbow,
Enclosed please find a copy of the letter Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Croatia, Dr. Mate Granić, sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr.
Boutrous Boutros Ghali, on June 28, 1995.
I am also enclosing a memo with attachments on the direct and active involvement of the
Belgrade regime in the occupied territories of Croatia, which has significantly increased
in the last few days. This involvement has consisted of sending military equipment and
soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro into Croatia. This is an example of what I have
been stressing in our recent conversations.
Sincerely,
Kresimir Piril
for
Professor Dr. Petar Šarčević
Ambassador
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER
H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York
Zagreb, 28 June 1995
Your Excellency,
The Croatian Government is extremely alarred and concerned by, the latest developments
in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and by the direct
implications and consequences of these developments for the occupied territories of Croatia.
The degree of involvement of the Belgrade regime on behalf of their proxies in Croatia and
the level of its intervention in the occupied territories of Croatia has increased in a
significant way recently, and in the last few days in particular. Your Special Representative
Mr. Yasushi Akashi was informed of this matter of critical importance on 26 June 1995 in
Zagreb.
The related developments in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)"
and the occupied territories of Croatia constitute: (i) unauthorized direct military
-
intervention by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" across an
international border of 8 sovereign state, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and relevant Security Council resolutions; (ii) 8 continuation of a policy of occupation
pursued by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in violation of
General Assembly resolution 49/43; (iii) a violation by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)" of the border blockade established by resolution 943 (1994) and
reaffirmed by resolution 988 (1995).; and (iv) & grave breach of international humanitarian
law by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" which amounts to
a war crime.
The Croatian Government has already documented in several letters that the "Army of
Yugoslavia" is actively engaged in Croatia by sending material from Serbia and Montenegro
to the occupied territories; by directing the paramilitary units on the occupied territories
through about 6,000 Belgrade-commissioned officers sent to these territories for that
purpose; by paying the wages of those officers and of other members of the proxy
government and military; and, by forcibly mobilizing citizens of the "Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina for military service in the occupied territories of Croatia (S/1995/229,
S/1995/401, A/50/229).
The forcible mobilization is proceeding on a large scale. As of 14 June 1995, over 4,500
mobilized men were transferred against their will while a further 500 volunteers were also
transported to the occupied territories of Croatia. The transfer of military personnel from
Serbia and Montenegro, across the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
under the control of Bosnian Serbs, is a direct violation of the Security Council resolutions
752 (1992), 820 (1993), 871 (1993), 943 (1994), and in particular 988 (1995). The soldiers
are being transported in vehicles provided by the "Army of Yugoslavia", across the
Serbia/Bosnia border at Raća, since 14 June 1995, and entering the occupied territories of
Croatia at Dvor, since 15 June 1995. The mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro and
reinforcement of the paramilitary forces in the occupied territories is expected to continue.
The majority of those mobilized in Serbia and Montenegro and sent to Croatia are civilians,
but a significant number of conscripts are members of the special forces of the "Army of
Yugoslavia". Some are also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
According to the information available to the Government of the Republic of Crostia, the
primary goal of the Belgrade authorities in this regard is to use the transferred special units
of the "Army of Yugoslavia" to further strengthen and reinforce their stronghold in the area
of Slunj in Croatia, and thereby secure the occupation of this region, as well as to amass
considerable forces for further engagements in the strategically important region of Bihac
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Security Council declared "safe area".
As additional evidence of the direct and increasing involvement of the "Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in Croatia, I should like to draw your attention to
the fact that the commander of the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Lt Gen. Mile
Mrksić, prior to his present assignment, served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff of
the "Army of Yugoslavia", and was responsible for its special forces. Lt. General Mrkšić
was also the JNA officer responsible for the siege of Vukovar. Moreover, only during the
month of June 1995 the following other senior "Army of Yugoslavia" commissioned
officers were assigned for duty in the occupied territories of Croatia:
1.
Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Kragujevac corps,
transferred to the 39th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Petrinja, Croatia, on
9 June 1995.
2.
Lt. Colonel Vučeković from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 11th corps
of the so-called Army of RSK in Croatia, on 23 June 1995.
3.
Colonel Uros Despotović from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 70th
paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in
June 1995.
4.
Colonel Milivojević from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 70th
paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in
June 1995.
5.
Lt-Colonel Milos Cvjetjčanin from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 2nd
Amounted of the so-called Army of RSK brigade in Croatia, in June 1995.
6.
Colonel Milorad Stupar from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Pančevo Special Units
corps, transferred to the paramilitary Special Forces of the so-called Army of RSK
corps in Croatia, in June 1995.
Furthermore, OD 13 June 1995, two "Army of Yugoslavia" tank units totalling 26 M-84
MBTs operated by the "Army of Yugoslavia" 211th Annored Brigade, were sent from from
Nis, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in Stunj, in the
occupied territories of Croatia in sector Glina. On 12 June 1995, one unit of armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) consisting of 10 vehicles operated by the "Army of Yugoslavia"
Second Motorised Brigade was sent from Valjevo, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and deployed in the same region in Croatia, at Banovina. In addition, on
19 June 1995, the "Army of Yugoslavia" supplied equipage for two Mi-8 rotary-wing
aircraft located at the Udbina airport in the occupied territories, sector Knin, through the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Your Excellency,
I would also like to inform you that as of May 1995, a total of 320 Serb paramilitary troops
remain in the zone of separation (ZOS), in violation of the 29 March 1994 cease-fire
agreement and resolution 994 (1995). Of these, 70 are in sector "Vukovar", 50 in sector
"Glina", and 200 in sector "Knin". On 22 June 1995, two new platoons of paramilitary
personnel were deployed in the ZOS in the vicinity of Kasić, in scctor "Knin", directly
threatening the civilian traffic on the Zadar . Maslenica highway, and on 23 June 1995, two
additional platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS near Osijek. The
transfer of soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro may have contributed to a troop build-up
in the ZOS.
The aforementioned facts clearly indicate that the Croatian Serb paramilitary forces are a
proxy of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" -- organized,
equipped, controlled, trained and commanded by the "Army of Yugoslavia". The
government in Belgrade must therefore be held fully accountable for conducting open
military intervention against a UN Member-State and occupying parts of the sovereign
territory of that State.
In this regard, the Government of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)" must also be held accountable for grave breaches of international
humanitarian law. The forcible mobilization of ethnic Serb citizens of the Republic of
Crostia into paramilitary units which are hostile to their country of citizenship, and in which
the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" are
involved, represents a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 51,
and is war crime (1945 London Agreement).
The blatant violation of international humanitarian law and violation of relevant United
Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 988 (1995). by the "Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" can not be condoned. My Government hereby
submits that the above information should be fully addressed in the upcoming Security
Council review of the suspended sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 988 (1995). The
Croatian Government is of the firm view that the above developments constitute a serious
breach of resolution 988 (1995), and therefore, the suspended parts of the sanctions regime
must be re-instituted without delay. The Crostian Government is also of the view that the
Security Council should consider, with utmost urgency, and condemn in the strongest terms
the most resent acts of interference by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)" into the internal affairs of Croatia, and take appropriate measures in the spirit
and the letter of General Assembly resolution 49/43 and Security Council resolutions 871
(1994) and 994 (1995). The condoning of this serious border violation and silence about
Belgrade's intervention in Croatia would be a very serious setback for the situation in the
occupied territories of Croatia and for the peace process in the region in general.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Mate Granic
M. Gaic
Veleposlanstvo Republike Hrvatske u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama
Embassy of Republic of Croatia to the United States of America
2343 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20008
Congressional Affairs tel (202) 588 5899, ext. 26 fax (202) 588 8938
TO:
Members of the U.S. Congress
FROM:
Dr. Petar Sarčević, Ambassador
DATE:
June 30, 1995
RE:
BELGRADE REGIME RESPONDS TO OFFERS FOR SUSPENSION OF
SANCTIONS BY STEPPING UP ITS INTERVENTION IN THE
CROATIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
It is with deep concern that I write to you regarding the dangerous build-up of the
Yugoslav army forces in the occupied territories of Croatia.
During the past several weeks the international community has been engaged in
intensive negotiations with the Belgrade regime over suspension of sanctions in
exchange for the normalization of relations with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Concurrently, the Belgrade regime stepped up its intervention in Croatia's occupied
territories. Croatia has obtained copious evidence that documents the active
engagement of the Yugoslav army in Croatia by:
sending material from Serbia and Montenegro to the occupied territories;
directing the paramilitary units on the occupied territories through Belgrade-
commissioned officers sent to these territories for that purpose;
paying the wages of those officers and of other members of the proxy
government and military;
forcibly mobilizing citizens of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Serbia
and Montenegro) and ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina for military service in the occupied territories of Croatia.
Taken together, the above evidence (see Attachment) is tantamount to yet another
breach of the internationally recognized borders that UNCRO is supposed to protect, as
well as fortifying the unlawful occupation of Croatia's territories. At the same time,
this evidence represents an additional build-up in the region, and specifically, threatens
the adjacent Bihać safe area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation could result in
a renewed attack from occupied Croatian territories on this important Bosniac enclave.
My Government would then be placed in a very difficult position in light of its sincere
efforts to meet and honor the obligations in bilateral agreements with Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
I appeal to you to keep abreast of developments in both the occupied territories of
Croatia and neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your highest consideration of this
escalating situation is essential.
ATTACHMENT
Evidence of Forcible Mobilization
The forcible mobilization is proceeding on a large scale and is expected to continue.
As of June 14, 1995, over 4,500 mobilized men were transferred against their will and
a further 500 volunteers have been transported to the occupied territories of Croatia.
In addition, there has been a dramatic increase in the transfer of military personnel
from Serbia and Montenegro through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Soldiers have been transported in
vehicles provided by the Yugoslav army and entering the occupied territories of
Croatia. The primary objective of Belgrade authorities is to further strengthen and
reinforce their hold in the area of Slunj in Croatia, and thereby secure the occupation
of this region and amass considerable forces for further engagements in the
strategically important region of Bihać (UN "safe area") in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Evidence of Direct and Increasing Military Involvement in Croatia
The very fact that the commander of the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Lt. Gen.
Mile Mrkšić, prior to his present assignment, served as Assistant Chief of the General
Staff of the Yugoslav army, demonstrates the level of military involvement of
Belgrade authorities in the occupied parts of Croatia. Mrkšić was responsible for the
special forces of the Yugoslav army and the JNA officer responsible for the siege of
Vukovar.
Other evidence of Serbian military involvement in Croatia include the following. On
June 13, 1995 two Yugoslav army tank units totalling 26 M-84 MBTs operated by the
Yugoslav army's 211th Armored Brigade, were sent from Niš, Serbia, across the
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in Slunj, in the occupied territories
of Croatia in sector Glina. In addition, on June 12, 1995 one unit of armored
personnel carriers (APCs) consisting of 10 vehicles operated by the Yugoslav army
Second Motorized Brigade was sent from Valjevo, Serbia, across the border with
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in the same region in Croatia, at Banovina.
Furthermore, on June 19, 1995 the Yugoslav army supplied equipment for two MI-8
rotary-wing aircraft located at the Udbina airport in the occupied territories, sector
Knin, through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I
Source:
Letter sent by the The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to the United
Nations Secretary General on June 28, 1995,
2
Croatia has also brought to the attention of the United Nations evidence that
throughout June 1995 the following senior officials of the Yugoslav army
commissioned officers were assigned for duty in the occupied territories of Croatia:
Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk from the Yugoslav army Kragujevac corps,
transferred to the 39th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Petrinja, Croatia,
on June 9, 1995.
Lt. Colonel Vučeković from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 11th corps
of the so-called Army of RSK in Croatia, on June 23, 1995.
Colonel Uroš Despotović from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 70th
paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia,
in June 1995.
Colonel Milivojević from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 70th
paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia,
in June 1995.
Lt. Colonel Milos Cvjetičanin from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 2nd
Armored of the so-called Army of RSK brigade in Croatia, in June 1995.
Colonel Milorad Stupar from the Yugoslav army Pančevo Special Units corps,
transferred to the paramilitary Special Forces of the so-called Army of RSK
corps in Croatia, in June 1995.
Violation of the Zone of Separation (ZOS)
As of May 1995 a total of 320 Serb paramilitary troops remain in the zone of
separation (ZOS), in violation of the March 29, 1994 cease-fire agreement and UN
Security Council Resolution 994 (1995). Of these, 70 are in sector "Vukovar", 50 in
sector "Glina", and 200 in sector "Knin". Furthermore, on June 22, 1995 two new
platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS in the vicinity of Kašić,
in sector "Knin", directly threatening the civilian traffic on the Zadar-Maslenica
highway. On June 23, 1995 two additional platoons of paramilitary personnel were
deployed in the ZOS near Osijek.
3
REINFORCEMENTS TO THE PARAMILITARY FORCES
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA
FROM "ARMY OF YUGOSLAVIA"
JUNE 1995
Date:
Reinforcement type:
Number
From:
To:
EQUIPMENT
12 June
Armored Personnel Carriers
10
2 motorized brig.
Banovina
[Valjevo]
[sector Glina]
13 June
Main Battle Tanks M-84
26
211 armored
Slunj
brigade [Nis]
[sector Glina]
19 June
Anti-Armor Ordinance for
2
"Army of
Udbina airfield
Mi-8 rotary-wing aircraft
Yugoslavia"
[sector Knin]
PERSONNEL
4 June
volunteers
100
Serbia
Plaski [Knin]
13 June
volunteers
800
Serbia
Knin [Knin]
13 June
forcibly mobilized
150
Serbia
Batnoga [Glina]
14 June
forcibly mobilized
300-400
Serbia
Vukovar
14 June
forcibly mobilized
400-500
Serbia
Slunj [Glina]
15 June
volunteers
100-120
Serbia
Plaski [Knin]
16 June
forcibly mobilized
700-800
Novi Sad
Slunj [Glina]
17 June
forcibly mobilized
2000-2300
Serbia
Slunj [Glina]
17 June
volunteers
80
Serbia
Soskovci
TOTAL
4600-5200
OFFICERS
Date:
Name:
Rank:
From:
To:
9 June
Slobodan Tarbuk
Colonel
Kragujevac Corps,
39 Corps
"FRY"
26 June
N. Vuckovic
Lt. Colonel
"Army of Yugoslavia"
11 Corps
June
Uros Despotovic
Colonel
"Army of Yugoslavia"
70 brig. [Plaski]
June
Milivojevic
Colonel
"Army of Yugoslavia"
70 brig. [Plaski]
June
Milos Cvjeticanin
Lt. Colonel
"Army of Yugoslavia"
2 arm. brig/
spec. Corps
June
Milorad Stupar
Colonel
Commando brigade
Spec. Forces
Pancevo, "FRY"
Corps
Source: Letter from Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, Head of the Croatian Government's Commission for
UNCRO, to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, June 28, 1995
4
JUN-29-95 THU 9:00
P.06
6-28-85
1
11:33
1
SECURITY COUNCIL-
212 745 831618 Z/ 2
The Republic of Boside and Herzegovina
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sarajevo
28 June. 1995
H.H. Mr. beder Graf Zo Rantrau
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York
Excellency:
In our lotter dated 14 June 1995, (8/1995/483) and noted is Security Commit resulution
998 (1995), we responded to and Issued our severeign consent to the deployment of the
"Ranid Reaction Capability as a reinforcement to UNPROFOR In provious latter of
29 March 1995 (8/1995/245) and also noted in resolution 962 (1995), WD outlined our
concerns founding the lack of Implementation and erosion of the United Nations mandate
in the Republic of Boania and Harzogovina. These concerns have # been addressed so
far. In fact, there has been 1 continuing and acceinted emaion of the implementati of
the United Nations mandate since our letter of March 29.
Most recently, the "safe area - exclusion send" in and around Samjevo has been totally
vacated and left unenforced by UNPROPOR in contradiction to existing Security Council
Resolutions and NATO decisions. This fact is all but confirmed and sanationed in the
UN Secretary General's letter of June 21, 1995 to H. B. Waly Class, the NATO Hearatory
General Furthermore, UNPROPOR, and by extension NATO, on at least two occasions
refused to enfores the "no By Road" il specifically mandated by Resolution Bid (1993).
We take nots that Resolution 998 (1995) specifically reaffinned the existing mindates
of
UNPROFOR and commitment to Implement such mandate in the Republic of Bosins and
Hernegovise. We am disappointed that recent actions have not matched the words
expressed therein, and have been Inconsistent with the terms of Resolution 998 (1995)
and our consent given thereto. This lack of action bas provided us with a most
unfavorable Impression regarding the commitment of the Repid Resction Force, and
systems UNPROPOR'S will to Implement the relevant Essurity Cousell
Once ugain, this perception has been confirmed by the letter of Mr. Januahl Akashi to the
Karadxis Serbs.
Therefore, we hereby give the formal notice of our Invention to review the eximplen of
our sovernign content to UNPROFO in the Republic of Boania and Hussgovina. in this
context, we formally request consultations with the Security Council, the Secretary -
General and bis representatives, regarding the Intentions and actual measures in
Implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, we me prepared to
consider all relevant contingencies consistent with the review of one consultations,
Please accept, Bacallency, the funewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Sincerely,
Muhamed
Minister
Dod Talking Points--Srebrenica
-Serb attacks against the civilian population of Srebrenica and the Dutch
peacekeepers seeking to protect and help them is a raw aggression against the
international community and the peace process. Serb seizure of the enclave has
created thousands of new refugees and another humanitarian crisis for the people
of Bosnia. This Serb action is clearly an outrage.
-US policy in Bosnia continues to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict
based on the international efforts of the UN, NATO and the Contact Group.
-Our efforts to strengthen the role of UNPROFOR, to support deployment of the
RRF and to pursue a diplomatic process reflect this conviction.
-The US continues to work with the UN, our alles and the Contact Group to ensure
that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the
Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Serb authorities to allow full
access by UNHCR to the civilian refugees in the enclave.
--Serbian authorities in Belgrade must make clear in word and deed that in joins
with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, Belgrade
should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of
the Pale Regime.
- US objectives in this conflict have been consistent:
--Reduce human suffering
--Prevent the conflict from spreading.
--Achieve a peaceful settlement which preserves a viable Bosnian State.
--Keep US forces out of the war in Bosnia as a combatant
--Support our allies and friends on the ground and preserve NATO.
-Continue to believe that the best means to promote balance US interests with the
peace process is through the UN and NATO.
-We do not believe that the fall of Srebrenica means the collapse of
UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.
RRF
-We continue to believe the deployment of the RRF is the correct action. There is
no assurance that the RRF could have prevented the fall of Srebrenica, but
UNPROFOR would have been more capable of responding with military force
than it is today.
Unilateral Lift
-We recognize the frustration with the UN and the loss of Srebrenica, but that
frustration should not lead to precipitous action which could make the situation
worse and place the responsibility for UNPROFOR withdrawal on the US.
The Bosnian Government demonstrated at Srebrenica that it is not ready to defend
its population. Pouring arms into Bosnia will not solve this problem in time to
prevent even a larger humanitarian disaster.
Unilateral lift of the arms embargo is a tempting reaction to current events.
Recognize that it will cause the withdrawal of UN forces at a time when the
Government of Bosnia is not sufficiently capable to defend itself. Under those
circumstances. those who have tried to make UNPROFOR work will place
responsibility for conditions in Bosnia on the US.
TALKING POINTS ON BOSNIA
What is happening in Srebrenica is utterly deplorable.
United States is working with our Allies and UNHCR to seek to
address urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.
Events of the past few days underscore the importance of
strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission
more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have
supported been in country, it would have provided options for
peacekeepers which were not available.
Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is not pleasant, but
the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the
arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive
UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and the United States in.
CONFIDENTIAL
5052
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, DC 20506
June 30, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW BV
FROM:
NELSON DREW RD
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Gingrich and Dole on RRF
Funding
Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President
transmitting a revised letter for the President to send to
Gingrich and Dole on RRF funding.
Concurrence by:
Bill Danvers
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing RRF Support, 6/29/95
Tab B Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing Increase Funding for
RRF, 6/15/95
Tab C Ltrs from President to Gingrich and Dole
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Va Zbind NARA, Date 6/3/2014
243-0687-F
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
5052
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN
SUBJECT:
Response to Gingrich and Dole on RRF Funding
Purpose
To provide letter responding to points raised in the Gingrich/
Dole letter of opposition to our support of the RRF.
Background
The attached letters have been revised in line with your
instructions.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached letters to Senator Dole and Speaker
Gingrich reaffirming administration policy of support for our
Allies in the RRF and rejecting the Dole and Gingrich policy
conclusions, and authorize public release of the letters if the
Dole/Gingrich letter is made public.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A Gingrich/Dole letter opposing RRF support, June 29, 1995
Tab B Gingrich/Dole letter opposing increased funding for RRF,
June 15, 1995
Tab C Letters to Gingrich and Dole
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Va Zbrul NARA, Date 6/3/7014
70B-0687-7
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
Chief of Staff
Congress of the United States
ashington, DC 20515
June 29. 1995
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material.
transportation. and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has
essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.
We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition
to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of
approximately $35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to
acquiescing in additional assessed contributions. your administration is proposing to provide
$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we
oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive
application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down
defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15
letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to
restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.
Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed
operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are
necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by
General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to
veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air
defenses. around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny
Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same
conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided
to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous
command arrangements.
We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews - or any other U.S. military
personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political
sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such. it is essential that the rules of engagement be
immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should
such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.
Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the
RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most
fundamental questions could not be answered .. questions about the mission, goals. and
standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF
deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement
the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N.
designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with
NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our
view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is
enough - the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.
Sincerely,
Neut Jingich GINGRICH
BOB DOLE
Congress of the United States
ashington. BC 20515
June 15, 1995
The President
The White House
Washington
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President
Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that
the Administration and the French government would like to pass a
resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this
afternoon.
Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the
Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about
authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen
of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not
been consulted nor provided with critical information about the
mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this
new operation.
Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government
and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their
forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally.
It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary
to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac
informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed
of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not
be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date
crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point
explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes
the RRF.
President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S.
political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of
this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's
decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect
UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that
any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of
the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the
resolution will not be assessed to U:N. member states; and (2) no
additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be
incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you
choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs
should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose
funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent
with our discussion with President Chirac.
We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and,
most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th
letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be
promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should
have been answered in the consultation process required by law.
To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is
unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us
of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may
share it with our colleagues.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for
measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way
be interpreted as support for the present European and
Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As
we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental
differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We
believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly
failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach,
withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.
Sincerely,
NowDer NEWT GINGRICH
BOB DOLE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Speaker:
I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to
provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) in Bosnia.
The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under
existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of
Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of
our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national
interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support
our Allies.
Having reviewed the alternatives and their likely consequences, I
am convinced that UNPROFOR's continued presence is vital. Were
UNPROFOR to withdraw, there would be no substitute for its
critical role in allowing the parties to end the all-out war that
existed prior to its deployment (thus reducing civilian
casualties from over 130,000 in 1992 to under 3000 last year),
assisting UNHCR in providing aid to over 2.8 million Bosnians, or
maintaining peaceful relations among the Federation partners in
most of central Bosnia. I agree that more is needed, as do our
Allies: that is why they have called for creation of the RRF.
Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of
UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a
split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict
would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the
Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to
insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially
dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.
Your concerns about the level and nature of U.S. support for the
RRF overlook the fact that it is our NATO Allies who will be
putting in the forces, bearing most of the burden, and taking
most of the risks. They deserve our support, both politically
and materially. At the same time, given the already-considerable
U.S. contributions to operations in the former Yugoslavia, we
have gained Allied agreement that financing the RRF should not be
done on a business-as-usual basis. Accordingly, I have insisted
that the bulk of the funding be provided through voluntary
2
contributions. The partial U.S. funding using UN assessments of
$35 million -- less than 8% of total RRF costs -- is limited to
meeting our obligations under previously agreed UNPROFOR force
ceilings.
Because of the importance that we and other Allies attach to the
RRF as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR, I strongly believe it
is in the U.S. interest to make a voluntary contribution as well.
Our Allies need U.S. assistance in transporting their forces to
the theater of operations, as well as equipment to make the RRF
more effective in dealing with provocations. As we have
explained in our Congressional consultations in recent days, this
is precisely the kind of assistance that existing drawdown
authorities were designed to facilitate.
Finally, I must strongly reject your unfounded assertion that my
Administration would acquiesce in any decision that would subject
American military personnel to unnecessary danger. As you are
aware, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) packages are now
an integral part of every Deny Flight mission. NATO planes are
authorized to respond -- without a UN dual-key -- if surface-to-
air missile sites display hostile intent.
At the same time, you cannot expect NATO or UNPROFOR commanders
to acquiesce in decisions that would subject their personnel to
unnecessary danger. Once the RRF is deployed, the ground
commanders will have the means to better protect their forces.
Only under these circumstances could you expect the prospects for
a more robust NATO air policy to be enhanced.
Our Allies are continuing to refine the rules of engagement and
the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF. I will continue to
support a robust RRF mission statement and insist on strong
measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces participating in
Deny Flight and other air operations.
As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Leader:
I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to
provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) in Bosnia.
The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under
existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of
Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of
our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national
interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support
our Allies.
Having reviewed the alternatives and their likely consequences, I
am convinced that UNPROFOR's continued presence is vital. Were
UNPROFOR to withdraw, there would be no substitute for its
critical role in allowing the parties to end the all-out war that
existed prior to its deployment (thus reducing civilian
casualties from over 130,000 in 1992 to under 3000 last year),
assisting UNHCR in providing aid to over 2.8 million Bosnians, or
maintaining peaceful relations among the Federation partners in
most of central Bosnia. I agree that more is needed, as do our
Allies: that is why they have called for creation of the RRF.
Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of
UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a
split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict
would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the
Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to
insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially
dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.
Your concerns about the level and nature of U.S. support for the
RRF overlook the fact that it is our NATO Allies who will be
putting in the forces, bearing most of the burden, and taking
most of the risks. They deserve our support, both politically
and materially. At the same time, given the already-considerable
U.S. contributions to operations in the former Yugoslavia, we
have gained Allied agreement that financing the RRF should not be
done on a business-as-usual basis. Accordingly, I have insisted
that the bulk of the funding be provided through voluntary
2
contributions. The partial U.S. funding using UN assessments of
$35 million -- less than 8% of total RRF costs -- is limited to
meeting our obligations under previously agreed UNPROFOR force
ceilings.
Because of the importance that we and other Allies attach to the
RRF as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR, I strongly believe it
is in the U.S. interest to make a voluntary contribution as well.
Our Allies need U.S. assistance in transporting their forces to
the theater of operations, as well as equipment to make the RRF
more effective in dealing with provocations. As we have
explained in our Congressional consultations in recent days, this
is precisely the kind of assistance that existing drawdown
authorities were designed to facilitate.
Finally, I must strongly reject your unfounded assertion that my
Administration would acquiesce in any decision that would subject
American military personnel to unnecessary danger. As you are
aware, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) packages are now
an integral part of every Deny Flight mission. NATO planes are
authorized to respond -- without a UN dual-key -- if surface-to-
air missile sites display hostile intent.
At the same time, you cannot expect NATO or UNPROFOR commanders
to acquiesce in decisions that would subject their personnel to
unnecessary danger. Once the RRF is deployed, the ground
commanders will have the means to better protect their forces.
Only under these circumstances could you expect the prospects for
a more robust NATO air policy to be enhanced.
Our Allies are continuing to refine the rules of engagement and
the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF. I will continue to
support a robust RRF mission statement and insist on strong
measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces participating in
Deny Flight and other air operations.
As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
06/29/95 THU 14:38 FAX
NSC LEG AFFAIRS
002
Congress of the United States
Mashington, DC 20515
June 29, 1995
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material,
transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has
essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.
We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition
to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of
approximately $35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to
acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide
$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we
oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive
application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down
defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15
letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to
restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.
Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed
operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are
necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by
General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to
veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air
defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny
Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same
conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided
to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous
command arrangements.
We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military
personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political
sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such, it is essential that the rules of engagement be
immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should
such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.
NSC LEG AFFAIRS
003
06/29/95 THU 14:38 FAX
Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the
RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most
fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and
standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF
deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement
the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N.
designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with
NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our
view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is
enough - -- the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.
Sincerely,
BOB DOLE
J-5 EUROPEAN DIVISIN
J-5 EUR DIV PENTAGON
Page
1
Job 753
Jun 29 Thu 09:49 1995
UNCL
29
Jun
95
CLASSIFICATION
DAY
Z-TIME
MONTH
YEAR
THE JOINT STAFF
J-5
DIRECTORATE
JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
FACSIMILE COVER SHEET
ORIGINATOR
LTC Doug Lute
J5/EurDiv
(703)693-5608
NAME
OFC. SYM
FAX#
cover +1
( )
-5605
TEXT PAGES
SUBJECT & CLASSIFICATION
SECURE FAX#
AUTOVON#
AUTHORIZED RELEASER'S PRINTED NAME, RANK, TITLE AND SIGNATURE
REMARKS Please clear attached memo authorizing us military
personnel in Croatia for purpose of RRF air/sea lift
support. Call clearance to LTC Lute, (703)614-9431/2/5
ADDRESSEE
ORGANIZATION
OFC. SYM
NAME
PHONE
202-
NSC /Eur
I
Sandy Vershbow
456-9151
202-
State / Eur
Chris Hill
647-0608
JSISC#
TIME OF TRANSMIT
VERIFYING OFFICIAL
J-5 EUROPEAN DIVISIN
J-5 EUR DIV PENTAGON
Page
2
Job 753
Jun-29 Thu 09:50 1995
1001/001
7036046541
DSAA OPERATIONS
-
63/28.95
14:30
OF INVOICE
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-2800
Should see Tony knows this? The
He
info.
In reply refer to:
I-04325/95
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THROUGH:
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
FROM:
LTG Thomas G. Rhame, Director, DSAA
(Prepared by J. Hursch, 604-6609, x317)
SUBJECT:
Approval of Deployment in Former Yugoslavia of U.S. Personnel
Associated with Lift of Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM
PURPOSE: To authorize deployment of Air and Sealift Support Element to Split, Croatia. in
support of lift provided to the Rapid Reaction Force under drawdown authorities.
DISCUSSION: The State Department has notified Congress of the President's intent to
drawdown under the authority of Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act up to $15
million in defense articles and services to provide emergency military assistance in support of
transportation requirements nccessary to move the RRF personnel and equipment to Bosnia.
Included in this drawdown are air and sealift of British, Dutch. and French forces to Split,
Croatia. Successful completion of this mission requires deployment of an air and sealift
support element from approximately 30 June to 15 August, composed of 75-100 personnel, to
assist in the unloading of aircraft and ships. The cost of these forces will be included in the
drawdown authority.
RECOMMENDATION: Approve deployment of a air and sealift support element to Split,
Croatia, in support of the movement of RRF personnel and equipment.
COORDINATION
JOINT OGC STAFF Tross
OSD/ISA
OSD/S&R
DTS
SECDEF DECISION:
6/29 0700
(NEED To COOLD of
Approved
GJCS when All CooRD
IS COMPLETE BEFORE
Disapproved
gouy TO SEEDEF]
Other
thebed
Brunde
JTF
CONFIDENTIAL
5043
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
June 29, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH:
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW N
FROM:
NELSON DREW ID
SUBJECT:
Presidential Response to Gingrich and Dole on RRF
Funding
Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President reaffirming
our policy on the RRF and preparing a response to Gingrich and
Dole on RRF funding.
Concurrence by:
Alan Kreczko, Dick Clarke, DC/M Randy Beers, CB/M Bill
NUM
Danvers
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing RRF Support, 6/29/95
Tab B Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing Increase Funding for
RRF, 6/15/95
Tab C President Decision on 506 Drawdown Authority for
Initial RRF Lift
Tab D Ltrs from President to Gingrich and Dole
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Vh 7514 NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687-F
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. memo
For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject:
06/29/1995
P1/b(1)
Response to Gingrich and Dole. Record ID: 9505043. (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2716
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Congress of the United States
Mashington, DC 20515
June 29. 1995
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material.
transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has
essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.
We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition
to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of
approximately $35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to
acquiescing in additional assessed contributions. your administration is proposing to provide
$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we
oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive
application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down
defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15
letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to
restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.
Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed
operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are
necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by
General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to
veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air
defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny
Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same
conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided
to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous
command arrangements.
We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military
personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political
sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such. it is essential that the rules of engagement be
immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should
such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.
Mr. President. it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the
RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most
fundamental questions could not be answered questions about the mission, goals. and
standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF
deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement
the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N.
designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with
NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our
view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is
enough - - the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.
Sincerely,
GINGRICH
BOB DOLE
Congress of the United States
ashington. BC 20515
June 15, 1995
The President
The White House
Washington
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President
Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that
the Administration and the French government would like to pass a
resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this
afternoon.
Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the
Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about
authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen
of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not
been consulted nor provided with critical information about the
mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this
new operation.
Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government
and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their
forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be
respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally.
It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary
to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac
informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed
of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not
be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date
crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point
explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes
the RRF.
President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S.
political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of
this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's
decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect
UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that
any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of
the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the
resolution will not be assessed to U:N. member states; and (2) no
additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be
incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you
choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs
should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose
funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent
with our discussion with President Chirac.
We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and,
most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th
letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be
promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should
have been answered in the consultation process required by law.
To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is
unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us
of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may
share it with our colleagues.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for
measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way
be interpreted as support for the present European and
Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As
we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental
differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We
believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly
failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach,
withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.
Sincerely,
Now Drif NEWT GINGRICH
BOB DOLE
C
4963
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1995
Presidential Determination
No.
95-29
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of
Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations
in Support of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under
Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 506 (a) (1) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2318 (a) (1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that:
(1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires
immediate military assistance to a foreign country
or international organization; and
(2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
law except section 506 of the Act.
Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnishing of up to $12,000,000
in defense services from the Department of Defense to provide
immediate transportation support necessary to move the Rapid
Reaction Force personnel and equipment to Bosnia.
The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this
determination to Congress and arrange for its publication in the
Federal Register.
William G. Chinton
Dear Mr. Speaker:
I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to
provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) in Bosnia.
The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under
existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of
Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of
our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national
interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support
our allies.
I will of course not subject U.S. air crews or other personnel to
unnecessary danger. We are currently discussing the rules of
engagement and the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF with
our allies. I am supporting a strong RRF mission statement and
appropriate measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces
participating in Deny Flight and other air operations.
While certain aspects of UN activities in Bosnia fall short of
our goals in important ways, UNPROFOR's continued presence is
vital. Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of
UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a
split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict
would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the
Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to
insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially
dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.
As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
NEW DRAFT
reflects
Slocombe
tixes
Dear Mr. Leader:
I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to
provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force
(RRF) in Bosnia.
The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under
existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of
Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of
our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national
interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support
our allies.
I will of course not subject U.S. air crews or other personnel to
unnecessary danger. We are currently discussing the rules of
engagement and the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF with
our allies. I am supporting a strong RRF mission statement and
appropriate measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces
participating in Deny Flight and other air operations.
While certain aspects of UN activities in Bosnia fall short of
our goals in important ways, UNPROFOR's continued presence is
vital. Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of
UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a
split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict
would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the
Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to
insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially
dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.
As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. memo
For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Use
06/28/1995
P1/b(1)
of Section 506(a)(1). Record ID: 9504963. (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]
2013-0687-F
vz2716
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate 8 Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA|
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CONFIDENTIAL
4963
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
June 28, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
FROM:
R. RAND rf BEERS
SUBJECT:
Presidential Determination Authorizing a 506 (a) (1)
Drawdown for Bosnia
The President yesterday authorized formal notification to
Congress of his intent to direct Defense to drawdown up to $15
million in goods and services for the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
in Bosnia. Congress was notified yesterday. The necessary time
has passed, and we are asking the President to sign the
Presidential Determination. Because of complications related to
the transfer of equipment, this PD covers only lift.
Concurrence by:
Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers Ffr Nelson Drew,
AK
OMB
2fr
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.
Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Determination
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Jan 26M NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687 F
CONEIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
4963
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Presidential Determination
No.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of
Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations
in Support of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under
Section 506 (a) (1) of the Foreign Assistance Act
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 506 (a) (1) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2318 (a) (1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that:
(1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires
immediate military assistance to a foreign country
or international organization; and
(2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
law except section 506 of the Act.
Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnishing of up to $12,000,000
in defense services from the Department of Defense to provide
immediate transportation support necessary to move the Rapid
Reaction Force personnel and equipment to Bosnia.
The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this
determination to Congress and arrange for its publication in the
Federal Register.
SENT BY:STATE/D/EEA
; 6-29-95 ; 1:58PM ;
2026470414-
202 456 9150;# 1
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
B
S/S #
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages
FROM: (Officer Bill name Page
Serbia TF 736-4932
1950.
(Office symbol)
(Extension)
(Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
Extension
Room No.
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
456-9151
FOR:
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS:
as you requested
S/S Officer:
SENT BY:STATE/D/EEA
; 6-29-95 ; 1:59PM ;
2026470414-
202 456 9150;# 2
UNCLASSIFIED
HOME E DEFT SSC
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
50
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400 -2400
3)2.71 STATE
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY APPAIRS
FAX TRANSMITTAL
TO:
David Scheffer
ORG/ROOM:
Sanctions Task Force
OFFICE PHONE:
FAX #: 202-736-4550
FROM: OASD/ISA (EUROPEAN/NATO AFFAIRS)
PENTAGON, ROOM 4D762
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400
Sir - From H. Shocomb
OFFICE PHONE: (703) 695-6516
Received in the
SENT BY: Time Walton
Task Force at 5:00pm
DATE: 28 June
Bll Pope
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 2
6/28
URGENT(DELIVER IMMEDIATELY)
IMPORTANT
ROUTINE
From under Sucretary slocembe
REMARKS: Please to Farmoff
pass
UNCLASSIFIED FAX 24 HRS/7 DAYS A WEEK (703)695-6506
CLASSIFIED FAX FROM 0700-1700 MON-FRI (703)695-4812
UNCLASSIFIED
SENT BY:STATE/D/EEA
; 6-29-95 ; 1:59PM ;
2026470414-
202 456 9150:# 3
28 Jun 95
Talking points on Serb Radar Net
One of the basic conditions of the sanctions suspension is that
Belgrade not provide military support to Pale.
--
We have reason to believe that, in fact, the Belgrade Serb radar
system is used to provide air traffic information to the Bosnian Serbs
which they use for air defense purposes.
Thus, Belgrade is providing military support of the most
fundamental kind -- current operational intelligence -- to Pale.
This is particularly serious as it threatens aircraft and their
crews engaged in enforcing UN mandates, notably the NFZ, and
standing ready to provide CAS to UNPROFOR forces.
The US therefore believes that it is an essential condition of
any extension of the current sanctions relief that Belgrade agree to
take effective action to cease providing information about air traffic
to the Bosnian Serbs and to confirm to the UN that such information
is not being provided.
LR)