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Case Number: 2013-0687-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander
Original OA/ID Number:
896
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
34
2
1
1
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. draft
Balkan Settlement Force Missions Statement. (1 page)
08/28/1995
P1/b(1)
002a. draft
Paper: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian
08/22/1995
P1/b(1)
Federation. (5 pages)
002b. memo
For Brigadier General Don Kerrick. Subject: Multilateral Equipping
08/22/1995
P1/b(1)
and Training of the Bosnian Federation. (I page)
003. cable
re: Bosnian Settlement Negotiations. (3 pages)
08/30/1995
P1/b(1)
004. email
Eric Schwartz to Sue Bremner, Richard Clarke, Ivo Daadler, et al.
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
Subject: FW: U.N. Preventing. (3 pages)
005. memo
For Sandy Vershbow and Leon Fuerth from David Scheffer and Jim
08/24/1995
P1/b(1)
O'Brien. Subject: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package. (4 pages)
006. paper
U.N. Actions for Implementation. (8 pages)
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
007. paper
Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF. (2 pages)
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
008a. letter
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English
08/14/1995
P1/b(1)
Translation] (3 pages)
008b. letter
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (2
08/14/1995
P1/b(1)
pages)
009. paper
Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)
08/25/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. draft
Balkan Settlement Force Missions Statement. (1 page)
08/28/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA)
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002a. draft
Paper: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian
08/22/1995
P1/b(1)
Federation. (5 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA)
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002b. memo
For Brigadier General Don Kerrick. Subject: Multilateral Equipping
08/22/1995
P1/b(1)
and Training of the Bosnian Federation. (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA|
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA)
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08.28. 95. 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
UNCLAS "Eyes ONLY"
CLASSIFICATION
WASH FAX COVERSHEET
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES
C
N
TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)
TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)
FROM Cables
OFFICE/DESK SecDEF
PHONE NBR 697-8151
SUBJECT AMB Holbrook Trip
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:
PAGES 2
(INCLUDING COVER)
HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
IMMEDIATELY/URGENT
NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR
EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY
TRANSMIT TO
AGENCY
INDIVIDUAL (NAME)
OFFICE
ROOM NBR
PHONE NBR
WHSR
Sandy Bershbow
REMARKS:
Deliver Per BGkerrick
WASH FAX OPERATOR (703) 769-9329/9391
SECDEF CABLES (703) 697-8151
UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION
"EYES ONLY"
THE
SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08.28. 95 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
B-4
2
TOT
1653
N
CABLES
SK
SW #
FAX
Please deliver to MR SLOCOMBE
and Me LODAC ASAP.
COL Lowe
1820/28 AUG
EYES ONLY
room per Brig Gow Kerrick (For SANDY Bershbow)
Also Relay to White House Situation
6 pages INcluding
this cover
/
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08.28. 95 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
3.
Aug 28, '95
Mr Slocombe/Lodic
1800 hrs
This is the Karadzic-Carter -
package as it Now stands. RH is still
working it with Harry Burnes. It moves
things porward but is far loss than what
We or the Bosnians want. Important
is what it doesn't demand
RH is trying to delay its
publications due to the stalling at
Sarajevo. He points out that this is only
Karadric to Carter. Not a US
gout. document on officially approved
by US.
NSC and State are getting copines,
Jim PARdew
PS A New, cleaned up version will
Go to Kornblem Meeting with
Izet delayed. May be photo of only
2
today.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08.28. 95 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
4
FAX COVER SHEET
The Carter Center
One Copenhill, Atlanta, GA 30307
Fax: 404-420-5196 Phone: 404-420-5189
Date: August 28,1995
Number of Pages (incl. cover sheet):3
To: Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke
Fax: 33 1 4312 2074: Attention Craig Kelley
From: Harry G. Barnes, Jr.
Director, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Program
Fax: 404-420-5196
Phone: 404-420-5189
Message:
Dick- Herewith the texts I have just received from Pale;they wee
delayed because of a power outage: I also attach a draft of a
statement President Carter is prepared to make.
The covering letter is the same as what 1 sent you on the
plane. Note that in several places the US Initiative is welcomed
and even accepted.
In the list of items, they dropped the reference to the
Grop
Contact but President Carter will spell that out In his statement.
In addition, Borko told me that Karadzic has very clearly
understood that the Contact Group Plan is part of the US initiative.
Item C introduces the word confederal which they say Bildt
gave them, but I got Karadzic's agreement to go back to the
parallel and special phraseology if confederal bothers you.
Item E is the second of the variations I sent them last night
that you said you would try to get acceptance of.
Item H we intend on our own to drop.
I will try calling you as soon as I get word that you have
received this.
3
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08. 28. 95 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
5
РЕПУБЛИКА CPIICKA
ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
CAPAJEBO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO
TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
28 August 1995
Dear President Carter,
In order keep you informed about our position, I wish to convey the
following message to you and to ask that you do all you can to use it to
promote the earliest possible resumption of peace talks on Bosnia.
You should know that the Republika Srpska welcomes the current US
peace Initiative and reiterates its commitment to a peaceful solution. In
the light of this, the Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate a
comprehensive peace agreement which could lead to the formation of
a Union constituted by the Republika Srpska and the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outstanding territorial Issues between
the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina
would be settled in the course of the negotiations.
To provide an indication of the provisions which we believe should
guide the negotiations, I am attaching a statement which sets forth the
basis for our willingness to accept the US peace initiative as a
welcome effort.
Your sincerely,
Dr Regovan Karadzic
President Republic
4
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
(MO) 08.28. 95 13:17 NO. 1460109554 PAGE
9
The Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate a comprehensive
peace agreement, on the basis of the current US peace Initiative,
which could lead to the following arrangement:
A. A union may be constituted by the Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
B. There shall be balanced and equal treatment of the Republika
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
C. Both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina shall have the right to establish confederal relationships
with neighboring countries.
D. Any future political arrangements brought about by any community
within either the Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina will not change the status of the other side, as described
in subparagraphs A, B, and C.
E. The territorial proposal contained in the US peace initiative will
remain the basis for settlement and will be open for adjustment to
benefit the interest of both parties.
F. The full catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms as
set out in International instruments will be respected, including the
right of refugees and displaced persons to be able to return to their
homes of origin, which must be an overall process.
G. As soon as agreement is reached on recommencing peace talks,
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 31 December 1994 will be
reinstated on a permanent basis.
H. Nothing will be agreed until all is agreed.
5
(MO) 08. 28.
95 13:17
NO. 1460109554 PAGE
7
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEFENSE/CCC
Holbrooke's needs. J.C.
DRAFT
Harry: I think these other points would will be necessary to meet
I have just received a message from Dr. Radovan
Karadzic in which he welcomes the current US peace initia-
tive in Bosnia. Let me list several of the main points:
The message advocates the earliest possible resumption
of peace talks, and sets forth the basis for his willingness
to accept the US peace initiative, (which is understood to
include the earlier Contact Group Plan), as well as other
elements. As soon as agreement is reached on recommencing
peace talks, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of De-
cember 31, 1994 will be reinstated on a permanent basis.
He believes the talks can lead to a comprehensive peace
agreement within which the outstanding territorial issues
between the sides can be settled. The 51-49 parameter of
the
US peace initiative who remain the basis for settlement and
will be open for adjustment through negotiation to benefit
the interests of both parties.
In addition, there is an acknowledgement that in any
future Bosnian entity the full range of human rights and
fundamental freedoms will be respected, including the right
of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes
of origin.
This is an important statement which I have already
shared with the US government. Peace will not come easily,
but there is good reason to take Dr. Karadzic's statement
and put it to the test, and to seek comparable helpful ef-
forts from all the other parties involved to move rapidly to
talks.
6
IX
SECRET
SUBJECT: Sanctions Relief Issues for Deputies Discussion
Deputies agreed that sanctions against Belgrade (except for frozen assets) will be suspended once
there is a signed agreement and lifted upon implementation. This paper lists remaining sanctions
relief issues and indicates how the OVP proposal addresses each. OVP discussed the proposed
sanctions relief package with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and his negotiating team on 8/24.
Where appropriate, the team's views on these issues are also listed.
1.
Duration of offer: Open-ended or finite?
OVP plan says finite - offer is withdrawn if there is no peace agreement by a date specified (tbd),
but Contact Group has option of returning to a "neo-Bildt" approach. The negotiating team likes
the idea of a limited-time offer but does not want to specify a termination date prior to getting the
FRY's initial reaction to the overall relief plan.
2.
When are sanctions and the border closure on Pale suspended?
The OVP plan suspends sanctions against Pale and allows opening the border once initial
implementation steps are accomplished. These might include initial withdrawal of forces to
territorial limits, safe deployment of the NATO implementation force, achievement of specified
milestones in the PIF's peace enforcement mission, and/or other clearly identifiable performance
criterion.
The negotiating team proposed keeping the border closed between the FRY and the Bosnian
Serbs until the settlement is fully implemented. In any event, the team recommends reserving
decision on timing of Pale sanctions suspension and opening the border until we have a better idea
of how the power struggle between Belgrade and Pale will play out.
3.
When are Pale sanctions lifted?
The OVP plan lifts Pale sanctions after FRY sanctions are lifted to help guarantee continued
Bosnian Serb good behavior.
4.
How long should Belgrade be held responsible for Pale's actions?
The OVP plan reduces the extent to which Belgrade is held accountable for Pale's behavior at the
point when Pale sanctions and the border closure are suspended. Prior to this time, full sanctions
against Belgrade are reimposed if the Bosnian Serbs impede operation of the PIF, violate the
cease-fire, block humanitarian supplies, or otherwise violate provisions of the settlement. Once
Pale sanctions are suspended, Bosnian Serb misbehavior will lead to reimposition of sanctions and
the border closure against Pale. Sanctions against Belgrade would be reimposed only if Belgrade
failed to close the border or otherwise support Pale sanctions.
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
SECRET
R 10/1/2013
SECRET
2
5.
What are our minimum reimposition requirements?
a.
The OVP plan calls for automatic reimposition of sanctions (as outlined in item 4.) if the
PIF commander declares that his force cannot accomplish its peace enforcement mission because
of action by the Pale Serbs. The negotiating team recommends that there also be provisions for
automatic reimposition if Pale blocks implementation of political aspects of the agreement, as
reported by whatever international body is charged with implementing political commitments.
b.
The OVP plan also allows reimposition of sanctions by a vote in the UN Security Council
so that members of the Security Council can credibly threaten reimposition to punish behavior
that does not trigger the automatic reimposition of sanctions. There are two options:
1.
Sanctions are suspended for a finite period (60-120 days). The UNSC must vote
to extend sanctions relief at the end of each period. A veto by any permanent member
would prevent the extension of sanctions relief and force reimposition.
2.
Sanctions are suspended for an indefinite period, but any permanent member of the
Security Council can call for their reimposition at any time based on evidence that the
Serbs are reneging on the settlement. Three out of the five permanent members must
agree for reimposition to take place.
6.
Should there be a Croatia linkage?
OVP plan makes recognition of Croatia a condition for final lift of FRY sanctions. The
negotiating team agrees that the U.S. plan must contain a Croatia linkage. At issue is whether
progress in Eastern Slavonia should be linked to lift of UN economic sanctions, or to easing the
"outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, membership in international organizations, etc.).
7.
Should there be a linkage to the War Crimes Tribunal?
OVP plan has no such linkage, although it may possible to tie cooperation with the Tribunal and
progress on other issues (such as Kosovo) to the pace at which Serbia is allowed to re-enter the
international political and financial community.
SECRET
SECRET
Sanctions Relief Strategy - 8/25/95
All parties reach a settlement by a specified date,
including, inter alia:
All FRY sanctions (except for frozen assets)
A country-wide cease-fire
suspended subject to reimposition provisions
Free access for relief supplies
outlined below
Belgrade reaffirms border closure
Option I: Upon initial implementation of
settlement, e.g.:
Withdrawal of forces
Safe deployment of PIF
PIF begins peace enforcement mission
Et cetera
Sanctions and border closure against Pale
OR
suspended subject to reimposition provisions
outlined below
Option II: Upon full implementation of
settlement, e.g.:
PIF completes peace enforcement mission;
begins withdrawal
Pale meets political requirements specified in
settlement
At full implementation as defined in the
All FRY sanctions lifted
settlement and when implementation force
begins withdrawal/hand-of of missions
Frozen assets released (subject to claims)
Progress made towards E. Slavonia
settlement
Six months after full implementation
All sanctions against Pale lifted
Reimposition mechanisms:
Automatic reimposition upon report by implementation force commander or other international body charged with
responsibility for supervising political aspects of implementation that Pale and/or Belgrade is impeding
implementation or otherwise failing to fulfill obligations.
By direction of UNSC:
Option I: Sanctions suspended for finite period (60-120 days); UNSC must vote to extend sanctions relief at end
of each period.
Option II: Sanctions suspended for indefinite period; any of Perm-5 can call for reimposition vote; sanctions
reimposed if 3 of Perm-5 vote for reimposition.
SECRET
3/4
SUBJECT: REVISED Sanctions Relief Time Line
SECRET
This time-line illustrates reimposition arrangements and how primary accountability could be shifted from Belgrade to Pale during the
implementation process.
FRY sanctions suspended
Sanctions against FRY
reimposed if
-Cease-fire breaks down
Pale sanctions and border closure suspended
Border not closed
Sanctions against Pale and border closure reimposed if
Pale impedes PIF
-Cease-fire breaks down
FRY sanctions
deployment or otherwise
Pale impedes PIF or otherwise reneges
lifted
reneges
Humanitarian relief blocked
Humanitarian relief
Pale sanctions
blocked
If Belgrade fails to close border against Pale, full sanctions
lifted with time
against Belgrade are automatically reimposed.
delay
Offer on table
Negotiation
Implementation
?
Follow-on
Now
Signed
Point at which implementation is sufficiently
PIF hands off mission to
Settlement, NLT
advanced to warrant shifting primary
follow-on force
date TBD
accountability for future progress from Belgrade
to Pale. Exact definition TBD
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. cable
re: Bosnian Settlement Negotiations. (3 pages)
08/30/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
(SA)
08.26.
' 95
16:30
NO.
1460120178
PAGE
3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SERPM 2628
Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement
Assumption: It will be important that the U.S. offer the
perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any
settlement package -- both to help build political support among
allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to
assist in creating an environment within which the
Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be
stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would
have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing
circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in
both scope and application.
Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should
concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures
geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of
confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective
would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire
contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on
disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons
control, and transparency.
More specifically, this might include (perhaps within
the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):
-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated
confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for
mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).
-- Ban of certain military activities, including
aircraft activities, in selected areas.
-- Establishment of heavy weapons
collection/deactivation sites.
-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links
among opposing local commanders under the active
oversight of the Implementation Force.
-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring
all of the above measures by designated elements of the
Implementation Force.
As progress is made with each of these measures, we would
seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would
presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to
build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military
implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its
basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be
eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration
of UN/OSCE observers.
Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should
be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support
the ceasefire and settlement, the U.S. should be prepared to
offer at an appropriate political
(SA) 08.26.
95 16:30
NO.
14601201
PAGE
4
DEPARTMENT or STATE
with an emphasis on a commprehensive approach to the problems of
the former Yugoslavia.
The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for
confidence-building/arms control measures for would be
strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with
the specific aim of éliminating disparities and capabilities for
launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional
level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations
and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures
might be examined as contributions to a more stable military
balance.
Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation
and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although
the intention should always be to transfer any such the
negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an
appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties
involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control
regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first
instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the
expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
004. email
Eric Schwartz to Sue Bremner, Richard Clarke, Ivo Daadler, et al.
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
Subject: FW: U.N. Preventing. (3 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA|
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
005. memo
For Sandy Vershbow and Leon Fuerth from David Scheffer and Jim
08/24/1995
P1/b(1)
O'Brien. Subject: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package. (4 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)|
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA)
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information l(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
006. paper
U.N. Actions for Implementation. (8 pages)
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
007. paper
Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF. (2 pages)
08/26/1995
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
2013-0687-F
vz2757
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA|
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA|
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute I(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
(SA)
08.26.
95
16:30
NO.
1460120178
PAGE
3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SERPM 2628
Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement
Assumption: It will be important that the U.S. offer the
perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any
settlement package -- both to help build political support among
allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to
assist in creating an environment within which the
Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be
stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would
have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing
circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in
both scope and application.
Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should
concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures
geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of
confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective
would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire
contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on
disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons
control, and transparency.
More specifically, this might include (perhaps within
the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):
-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated
confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for
mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).
-- Ban of certain military activities, including
aircraft activities, in selected areas.
-- Establishment of heavy weapons
collection/deactivation sites.
-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links
among opposing local commanders under the active
oversight of the Implementation Force.
-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring
all of the above measures by designated elements of the
Implementation Force.
As progress is made with each of these measures, we would
seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would
presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to
build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military
implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its
basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be
eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration
of UN/OSCE observers.
Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should
be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support
the ceasefire and settlement, the U.S. should be prepared to
offer at an appropriate political
(SA) 08.26.
95 16:30
NO.
1460120178
PAGE
4
DEPARTMENT 01. STATE
with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of
the former Yugoslavia.
The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for
confidence-building/arms control measures for would be
strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with
the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for
launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional
level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations
and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures
might be examined as contributions to a more stable military
balance.
Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation
and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although
the intention should always be to transfer any such the
negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an
appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties
involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control
regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first
instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the
expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
UNITED TAIRE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: LEON PANETTA
FROM:
Anthony Lake
Alice Rivlin
SUBJECT:
Administration Priorities for Foreign Assistance
Congressional appropriations action on foreign assistance has been cut dramatically from
your budget request. The House cut FY 1996 funding to $11.9 billion, which is $1.6 billion,
or 12 percent, below the FY 1995 levels and $2.8 billion below the request. Moreover, since
a few large programs are to be funded at or near the request level, the cuts to other foreign
assistance programs would be even more draconian. (See table at Tab 1.)
The Senate Appropriations Committee is supposed to take up this budget in the middle
of September. We have some opportunity to improve upon the low House levels in this process
since the Senate has allocated at least $375 million more for foreign assistance in the aggregate.
The amount may even be higher (by $68 million), depending on yet to be determined Senate
budget scoring rules for the Israel loan guarantees.
A basic issue for you to decide is whether to use these funds to pay for economic
reconstruction in Bosnia, or whether to use them for a variety of other purposes from among
other Treasury, State and AID programs. The $443 million available is in the same ballpark
that the State planners would like to see for the Bosnian economic plan.
Whatever your decision, we need to communicate quickly the Administration's
preferences, especially to Senator Leahy, who is anxious to know what improvements we seek.
White House staff solicited views of State, Treasury and AID, which differ greatly with
each other. The following proposed allocation reflects our views, assuming you do not choose
to use these funds for Bosnian reconstruction. We have chosen to ignore some bureaucratic
imperatives in favor of funding good program choices. If you agree with the allocations, we
will inform the agencies and work with Senator Leahy to gain their acceptance with the Senate
Appropriations Committee. The table at Tab 2 shows the agency proposals and our
recommendations.
Multilateral Development Banks ($235 million increase). There is White House and agency
consensus that the International Development Association (IDA) is the Administration's highest
priority for additional funds. The total desired spending for this account would be $810 million.
IDA concessional lending goes to the poorest countries in Africa and elsewhere, and it leverages
economic reform by multiplying resources from other contributing countries. With funding in
FY 1997, this would allow the United States to complete its previous funding pledges, albeit a
year late.
Economic Support Funds ($78 million increase). In addition to Israel and Egypt, this flexible
account can provide grant aid to key countries such as Turkey, Haiti and, potentially, Bosnia.
Excluding the Middle East peace process recipients, the total for this account would be $284
million.
Anti-Crime Initiatives ($15 million increase). This funding would pay for a variety of initiatives
against such problems as money laundering.
Newly Independent States ($25 million increase). The proposed increase would bring this
account up to a total of $605 million. The low House level reflected Congressional displeasure
towards Russia, in part due to the Chechnya situation.
AID personnel reduction plan ($30 million increase). The House-proposed 10 percent cut ($52
million) in AID's operating expenses in FY 1996 will oblige the agency to reduce its staff and
close many overseas missions. To meet short term budget targets, the high up-front costs of
reductions in force can require agencies to lay off significantly more staff than otherwise
desirable. In AID's case, it could have to lay off as many as 1,000 staff in FY 1996, when the
planned permanent reduction is 500 staff. These funds would only be used to downsize AID.
Global Environmental Facility ($20 million increase). This World Bank-managed pool of funds
is intended to counter the potential, adverse, environmental consequences of regular development
projects. The total for this facility would be $50 million, carrying out a US pledge of multi-year
support for the GEF.
International Organizations and Programs ($20 million increase). This account makes
contributions to the UN Development Program as well as organizations working on non-
proliferation, population and environmental problems. The total level for this account would
be $175 million.
Peacekeeping Organizations ($15 million increase). This account is a flexible source of funding
to meet political needs abroad. The total for this account would be $83 million.
Partnership for Peace Program ($5 million). A small amount of funding would also be sought
for Foreign Military Financing to support the Partnership for Peace program.
-2-
Setting aside the issue of Bosnia, the above allocations reflects consensus recommendation
among the Executive Office of the President as to your priorities. Unless you wish us to do
otherwise, we intend to pass these allocations back to the relevant agency heads. Assuming you
agree, we will work with the agencies to begin discussions with Senator Leahy and other
members of the Appropriations Committee on these priorities.
Decision:
Hold these funds for possible use in Bosnia?
Approve the above allocation, passback to relevant agency heads?
Discuss further?
-3-
FY 1995
FY 1996
FY 1996
FY95 VS FY96
Foreign Operations Subcommittee
Enacted 1
Request
House 2
House
Middle East econ. & military assist. (ESF/FMF)
5,218,200
5,243,200
5,243,200
25,000
Israeli Loan Guarantee Program
---
68,000
68,000
Other Economic Support Fund (ESF)
232,400
381,100
206,400
-26,000
Peacekeeping Operations (voluntary)
72,000
100,000
68,300
-3,700
Other Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Grants
44,279
132,020
81,279
37,000
Assistance to the New Independent States
686,900
788,000
580,000
-106,900
Assistance for Central and Eastern Europe
359,000
480,000
324,000
-35,000
International Narcotics Control
120,244
228,000
130,000
9,756
Export-Import Bank of the United States
831,779
870,000
831,779
Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC)
106,944
95,000
85,000
-21,944
Refugee Assistance (incl. emergency prgm)
721,000
721,000
721,000
International Disaster Assistance (AID)
169,998
200,000
200,000
30,002
Debt Restructuring for the poorest countries
7,000
27,000
7,000
Jordan Debt forgiveness
275,000
---
-275,000
Other Debt Restructuring
15,000
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB's) & IMF
International Development Association (IDA)
1,175,000
1,368,168
575,000
-600,000
Other Soft Loan (AfDF, IDB Spec. Ops, ADF
251,513
452,611
100,000
-151,513
Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
90,000
110,000
30,000
-60,000
Hard Loan (IBRD, ADB, IDB, EBRD)
120,624
149,280
131,339
10,715
Enhanced Structural Facility (IMF)
25,000
25,000
---
-25,000
Other MDB's
143,743
223,806
193,800
50,057
Subtotal, MDB's & ESAF
1,805,880
2,328,865
1,030,139
-775,741
AID Program Funds
Develop. Assist. & Develop. Fund for Africa
2,009,602
2,102,000
1,183,000
-826,602
Children and Disease Program Fund
592,660
592,660
Subtotal, AID program funds
2,009,602
2,102,000
1,775,660
-233,942
AID Operating Expenses
515,527
529,027
465,750
-49,777
Aid Personnel Reduction Costs
International organizations & prgms (IO&P)
359,000
425,000
155,000
-204,000
Peace Corps
231,345
234,000
210,000
-21,345
Special Defense Acquisition Fund
-282,000
-220,000
-220,000
62,000
Other Programs
272,015
348,452
244,100
-27,915
Technical adjustments
-216,136
-281,146
-281,146
Total, Foreign Operations Subcomm
13,539,977
14,746,518
11,925,461
-1,614,516
1. FY 1995 values include supplemental appropriations and rescissions.
2. CBO scoring estimates $68M in BA & OL for Israeli Loan Guarantees -- OMB scores program at zero.
Headroom Given House Funding
House-Passed Funding Levels
11,925
(House did not use its entire allocation)
Senate 602(b) Allocations
12,300
(Senate allocation is $100M higher and they intend to use it all)
Headroom
375
Additional Headroom Potential
Senate-directed scoring of Israeli Loan Guarantee Program
68
Total Potential Headroom
443
Proposed Allocation of Headroom
House
Consensus
EXOP
Key Accounts/Programs
Passed
State
Treasury
AID
EXOP
Consensus
International Develop. Assoc (IDA)
575
225
260
225
235
810
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
206
50
---
50
78
284
Crime Control/International Narcotics
113
15
---
10
15
128
Global Environ. Facility (GEF)
30
20
49
---
20
50
AID Personnel Reduction Costs
---
30
---
30
30
30
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
81
5
---
---
5
86
Assistance to the NIS
580
15
---
15
25
605
International Orgs & Prgms
155
35
---
25
20
175
Peacekeeping Operations
68.3
---
---
---
15
83
Asian Bank soft loans
100
5
70
---
---
100
World Bank hard loans
23
5
5
---
---
23
Inter-American Bank soft loans
---
10
21
---
---
---
Europ. Bank for Reconst. & Dev
69
---
13
---
---
69
Enhanced Struct. Adj. Facility (IMF)
---
5
5
---
---
Poorest Country Debt Forgiveness
7
10
20
11
---
7
AID Development Assistance
**
1,247
10
---
60
---
1,247
AID Housing Guarantee
7
---
16
---
7
Total/ Proposed Increase
3,262
440
443
442
443
3,705
Notes:
* The Request included $100M for UNICEF. The House provided for UNICEF in a new account.
The EXOP consensus option level does not include funding for UNICEF. It is assumed that he Senate will fund it
in the IO&P account.
**
House mark for Dev. Assist. does not include @$492M for children's programs funded in the new account
referenced above. It is assumed that the Senate will provide much of this funding in the Development
Assistance account.
SECRET
21002
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 24, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LEON FUERTH
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Assistant to the Vice
Associate Director for
President for National
National Security &
Security Affairs
International Affairs
Office of Management and
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Budget
Executive Secretary
Department of State
MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Agency for International
Office of the Representative
Development
of the U.S. to the
United Nations
COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:
Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia, August 23, 1995 (S)
Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)
Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Tab A
Summary of Conclusions
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By vz
NARA, Date 7/31/14
2013-0687 - F
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
21002
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 23, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:35 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (S)
PARTICIPANTS:
CHAIR
OMB
Sandy Berger
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent
OVP
Leon Fuerth
CIA
Richard Saunders
Dennis Blair
Norman Schindler
STATE
Strobe Talbott
AID
James Steinberg
Thomas Dine
John Kornblum
Dalena Wright
Ralph Johnson
JCS
DEFENSE
Wesley Clark
John White
John Walsh
Walter Slocombe
Jan Lodal
NSC
Sandy Vershbow
USUN
Richard Clarke
David Scheffer
Donald Kerrick
(via secure video)
Stephen Flanagan
James O'Brien
Summary of Conclusions
Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement
1. Deputies met to finalize development of an integrated
political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace
settlement. They reached agreement on several eléments and
tasked papers on several issues that require further analysis.
These papers and a further and more detailed iteration of the OSD
paper on the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) will be reviewed at
another Deputies Meeting on Monday, August 28 (Action: OSD). (S)
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Deputies will also review a paper for Principals summarizing key
recommendations and issues for decision (Action: NSC) -(S)
2. Overall Concept: Deputies agreed that our goal in
implementing a settlement is to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
single state comprised of two highly autonomous units. Our
priority is to ensure the survival of the Bosniac-Croat
Federation; this should be accomplished in the context of unity
with the Bosnian Serb entity along with rights of association
with Croatia and Serbia. TST
Deputies agreed that the Peace Implementation Force (PIF)
should be deployed primarily (but not exclusively) in Federation
territory. The operational commander should have broad authority
for self-protection of the force and to enforce the cease-fire
and separation of forces against incidents initiated by any
party, using overwhelming force if necessary. At the same time,
Deputies agreed the PIF should have defined limits on the scope
of its responsibilities and operational conduct. The Deputies
agreed that the response to massive violations of the agreement
would be "evenhanded but asymmetrical." In the event of Bosnian
Serb violation of the agreement, the PIF should be authorized to
respond using air and ground forces, but this response should
follow a ladder of escalation. In the event of serious Bosnian
Government violation of the agreement, the PIF would withdraw.
Deputies further agreed the PIF should not disarm the parties and
that some tasks, such as demarcation of borders and resettlement
of civilians, could be accomplished by civilian officials or
agencies. (S)
Taskings: State to draft brief overall mission statement
for the PIF reflecting the limited tasks above. NSC to write a
short paper identifying possible additional tasks for the PIF
that may prove necessary, for example, if the settlement
establishes a stronger central government or Bosnia-wide
institutions. CIA to do an assessment of the Bosnian
government's conception of a settlement and how this may alter
the PIF's mission. OSD to do detailed mission statement as part
of OSD paper. (S)
3. Gorazde: Deputies noted that Principals, in light of
Bosnian Government resistance to trading Gorazde for other
territories, had requested an examination of the requirements for
ensuring the viability of Gorazde if it remains part of the
Federation under the terms of a settlement. (S)
Taskings: DOD and CIA to assess implications for the PIF
and the longer-term defense requirements for Gorazde following
the departure of the PIF, using the Contact Group map as the
baseline, but considering territorial improvements (e.g., larger
corridor) as well. (S)
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4.
Arms Limitations: Deputies agreed that our goal of
establishing a stable military balance could best be achieved by
a hybrid approach that would support enhancement of the self-
defense capabilities of Federation armed forces (ABH and HVO) in
tandem with efforts to reach agreement among all the parties to
certain arms limitations or reductions. They agreed to
separation zones (DMZs) and to examine inventory limits on CFE
treaty limited equipment. They agreed that an arms control
regime should have a regional context.
Taskings: State, in coordination with OSD, to develop
detailed options for narrow DMZs, separation of heavy weapons
and/or exclusion zones, overall limits on heavy weapons and
confidence-building measures that could be included as part of
the settlement and/or pursued following implementation of a
settlement.
(S)
5. Exit Strategy: Deputies agreed that we need to establish a
date certain for completion of the PIF mission. There was a
consensus that the PIF should be terminated by the end of 1996.
At the same time, we should identify mission-essential tasks that
we would seek to complete prior to that date, although the PIF
would withdraw whether or not all those tasks had been
accomplished.
(S)
Taskings: State to draft an initial timeline paper defining
political, economic and military benchmarks for accomplishment of
critical tasks. CIA to do an assessment of how the parties would
react to knowing there was a date certain. (S)
6.
National Participation/Funding: Deputies agreed that the
PIF would be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO involvement.
While there would be a UNSC resolution authorizing NATO to
conduct the mission, there would be no dual key or other
limitations on NATO command and control. Deputies agreed that no
Ally should be excluded, but that the need for NAC consensus
would force us to deal with Greek approval of Turkish
participation. Deputies acknowledged that operational efficiency
might be compromised by involvement of non-NATO forces but
recognized that non-NATO participation will be politically
necessary and, in some respects, desirable (e.g., as a proving
ground for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO
forces) Non-NATO forces would be under NATO operational control
similar to a CJTF.
(S)
On funding, Deputies agreed that we would seek to follow the
normal NATO approach, i.e., NATO and other contributors would pay
their own way, with common costs assessed according to a variant
of the NATO infrastructure formula. Funding arrangements more
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advantageous to the U.S. would be difficult to negotiate with our
Allies, but will be explored.
Taskings: JCS/OSD to examine the political/military
requirements and constraints of making the PIF a NATO-plus force,
involving PFP partners and other non-NATO militaries. This
should draw on previous NATO planning for implementation of the
Vance-Owen plan (40103) and UNPROFOR extraction (40104). OSD/JCS
to complete a cost estimate for the probable U.S. contribution to
the PIF. The Peacekeeping Funding Group to reexamine
alternative cost-sharing arrangements among the participants.
7. Joint Commission: Deputies agreed that a Joint Commission
with local subsidiaries should be established (comprising NATO,
the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) to resolve problems in
implementing the military aspects of a settlement. This might
have national and regional components. Deputies also agreed that
there would be other aspects of settlement implementation
(political, economic, humanitarian) that could be beyond the
purview of the Joint Commission, and that we needed to develop a
concept for how these would be handled and whether there would be
a senior Secretary General's Representative for NATO, the UN or,
perhaps, the OSCE. They agreed that any arrangement should
exclude interference with the operation of the PIF (i.e., no dual
keys). (3)
Tasking: State to draft a paper on the political analogue
to the Joint Commission for implementing the non-military aspects
of a settlement. (S)
8. Population Movements: Deputies agreed that the parties
should have primary responsibility for population movements, with
international relief agencies (UNHCR) providing secondary
support. The PIF should generally avoid involvement in
population movements, but it should be prepared to protect UNHCR
personnel, aid convoys, and refugees in transit as necessary.
Deputies also agreed that restitution and other forms of
compensation were alternatives to resettlement that we should
encourage the parties to explore. (S)
Tasking: State and USUN will do a paper on policy toward
population movements, forced departures and associated
enforcement mechanisms. (S)
Post-War Reconstruction Assistance
9.
Deputies agreed that we urgently need a conceptual framework
and initial plan for post-war regional reconstruction, as well as
rough estimates of the overall cost, and the preferred cost-
sharing among the U.S., EU, Japan and Islamic countries. They
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also expressed concerns about the difficulties of offsetting the
U.S. contribution to the program on the basis of reductions in
other programs. Deputies agreed that we would actively pursue
the EU's offer to take the lead and press the EU, Japan and the
Islamic states to clarify their contributions to the package.
Deputies agreed that, in order to encourage Bosnian Government
flexibility in the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke should be
in a position by Monday to suggest the size of the U.S.
contribution that the President will seek from the Congress in
the event of a settlement (between $500 million and $1 billion
over 3-5 years) They also agreed that we needed to inform the
Congress immediately of our thinking on post-war reconstruction
in the context of consultations on the progress of the U.S.
diplomatic initiative.
(S)
Taskings: State to develop a post-war reconstruction
program for the region, in coordination with NSC, OMB, AID and
other agencies. State to draft talking points for a call by
National Security Advisor Lake to Spanish Foreign Minister Solana
to reconfirm the EU's willingness to take the lead on
reconstruction and to offer the parties such carrots as EU
association and enhanced market access. State and NSC to draft
talking points for Holbrooke's use with the Bosnians on
August 28. State and NSC to draft a gameplan and talking points
for Congressional consultations August 26-28; these points should
be in the context of an overall review of the status of the peace
initiative and should also reference our commitment to
participate in an implementation force if there is an agreement
they will explain our goals and why solid U.S. financial backing
is essential
(S)
Sanctions
10. Deputies affirmed agreement on the main elements of our
approach to sanctions relief for the FRY in the context of the
U.S. diplomatic initiative: all UNSC sanctions, except those
governing frozen assets subject to claims, would be suspended
once there is a signed agreement; there would be a complete
lifting of sanctions once implementation of the plan is
completed; and Belgrade would receive less sweeping suspension of
sanctions if it failed to agree to a solution for Eastern
Slavonia at the time of signature. It was agreed that Deputies
would need to decide at their next meeting how long we should
hold Belgrade accountable for the actions of the Pale Serbs, and
what would be the precise conditions for sanctions lifting. (S)
Tasking: OVP to circulate a paper on a proposed sanctions
strategy, highlighting the 4 or 5 fundamental issues needing
Deputies' attention, including the sanctions reimposition
mechanism and linkages to a Croatia settlement and war crimes, in
preparation for the Deputies' meeting on August 28. (S)
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DOCUMENT NO.
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008a. letter
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English
08/14/1995
P1/b(1)
Translation] (3 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
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008b. letter
Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (2
08/14/1995
P1/b(1)
pages)
COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
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financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Duration of offer?
-- Open ended or finite time span?
-- If offer withdrawn, what hapens then?
When does the FRY get sanction relief?
-- Upon start of negotiations & satisfaction of other conditions?
-- or upon formal completion of an agreement?
When are sanctions on Pale suspended?
When are FRY sanctions lifted?
When are sanctions on Pale lifted?
=
Are FRY and Pale treated the same throughout?
-- If different, for what purpose and how?
Reimposition
Respons
mechanism:
-- Automatic mechanisms
to Pa renew?
-- Set review peirods with votes OF review?
-- Right of challenge with votes to extend?
What to do about a Croatia linkage?
- Decomple?
- other.
- Delay final lift ?
Whether & how to include a war crimes linkage?
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Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)
08/25/1995
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COLLECTION:
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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896
FOLDER TITLE:
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Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA|
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.