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Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [7]
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Somalia Files (1993 - 1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [7]
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Sean Darragh's Files
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Case Number: 2012-0659-F
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Folder Title:
Somalia Files (1993-1994): Somalia [Folder 3] [7]
Staff Office-Individual:
Global Affairs-Darragh, Sean
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V
FAX
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
**IF RECEIVED INCOMPLETE CALL (212)415-4444**
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2012-0659-f
FROM: Robert T
Room 3509
TO: 1) John Brimm
647-7369 647- 7369
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(FAX 1 ONLY)
3)
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(OFFICE/TEL #) (FAX # ONLY)
Commission of Inquiry
SUBJECT:
HANDLE AS:
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
H
URGENT
REMARKS:
(COM/CENTER USE ONLY - - DO NOT WRITE BELOW)
DACOM (CLASS)
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TOR IN TEL/UNIT
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COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ESTABLISHED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 885 (1993)
24 February 1994
Mr. Secretary-General,
We the undersigned, Chairman and members of the
Commission of Inquiry on Somalia, are pleased to submit
to the Security Council through you the attached Report
on our investigation of armed attacks on UNOSOM II
personnel which led to casualties among them, as called
for by paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 885
(1993).
Because we felt that the testimonies of General
Aidid and other senior officials of the Somali National
Alliance (SNA) would greatly assist our inquiry we
expended much effort and time in trying to obtain their
testimonies. Regrettably, we were not favoured with
their cooperation. For this reason we have no
alternative but to terminate the investigation and
submit our report. However, if at a later stage the
SNA is able to give testimony the investigation could
be resumed.
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York
3
We are grateful for the opportunity afforded us to
be of service to the International Community and we
thank you and all those members of the United Nations
Secretariat whose cooperation and assistance made our
task a pleasure.
Respectfully submitted:
m_82
Hon. Matthew M. S. W Ngulube,
(Chief Justice of Zambia),
Chairman of the Commission
Lt. General Gustav Hagglund,
(Chief of Defence staff, Finland)
Member of the Commission
Lt. General (Retired) Emmanuel A. Erskine,
(Former Force commander of UNIFIL)
Member of the Commission
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 885 (1993)
TO INVESTIGATE ARMED ATTACKS ON UNOSON II PERSONNEL
WHICH LED TO CASUALTIES AMONG THEM
Commission Members:
Hon. Matthew M. 8. W. Ngulube, Chairman
Lt. General Gustav Hagglund
Lt. General (Ret.) Emmanuel A. Erskine
Executive Secretary:
Mr. Winston Tubman
New York, 24 February 1994
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
Establishment and Mandate of Commission
1
Procedures for Conduct of Commission's Inquiry
2
Structure of the Report
3
I. THE CRISIS LEADING TO UN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
4
The power vacuum and resultant civil war
4
II. CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER IS INVOKED
6
Media coverage raises international concern about Somalia
6
The UNITAF Mandate
6
Ceasefire and disarmament under UNITAF
7
UNITAF's Departure
7
Wider United Nations mandate: UNOSOM II
8
Initial problems facing UNOSOM II
8
The scope of the Chapter VII mandate
9
III. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE ARMED CLASHES
10
The reconstitution of political institutions
10
The Establishment of the Somali Judiciary and Police
11
The situation in Kismayo
12
The Galcayo conference
12
Radio Mogadishu's Propaganda Against UNOSOM II
14
1
IV. THE WEAPONS INSPECTIONS AND OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
16
The Inspection Plan
16
The attacks on the Pakistani soldiers
17
V. FIGHTING BETWEEN UNOSOM II AND SNA MILITIA - "THE WAR" 20
A. United Nations offensive operations against USC/SNA
20
B. SNA offensive against UNOSON II
23
C. Offensive by non-UN forces
and cessation of hostilities
26
VI ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
28
Who carried out the 5 June attacks?
28
Why did the attacks occur?
30
Why were the casualties so heavy on 5 June?
34
why did UNOSOM II misjudge the situation?
35
Why did the events of 5 June evolve into a war?
36
Why were the hostilities so prolonged?
37
Did internal shortcomings within UNOSOM II
contribute to the number of casualties?
38
VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
40
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
42
11
LIST OF ANNEXES
Communications Between the Commission
and General Aidid
Annex 1
List of Interviews
Annex 2
Somali Political Movements
Annex 3
Military Actions
Annex 4
Synopsis of Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel
Annex 5
Map of 5 June Incidents
Annex 6
Map of 17 June UNOSOM II Cordon and
Search Operation in SNA Enclave
Annex 7
Map of Incidents of 17 June and 12 July
Annex 8
Map of Incidents of 2 July and 5 September
Annex 9
Map of Incident of 3 October
Annax 10
iii
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
885 (1993) TO INVESTIGATE ARMED ATTACKS ON
UNOSOM II PERSONNEL WHICH LED TO CASUALTIES AMONG THEM
INTRODUCTION
Establishment and Mandate of Commission
1. on 16 November 1993 the Security Council in resolution 885
(1993) authorized "the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry,
in further implementation of resolutions 814 (1993) and
837 (1993), to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel
which led to casualties among them".
2. The resolution further directed the Commission "to determine
procedures for carrying out its investigation taking into account
standard United Nations procedures" and requested the Commission
to "report its finding through the Secretary-General to the
Security Council as soon as possible, taking into consideration
the need for a thorough inquiry".
3. Paragraph 8 of the resolution requested the Secretary-
General, pending the Commission's report, to suspend arrest
actions against, persons not already detained pursuant to
resolution 837 (1993), who might be implicated in attacks against
UNOSOM II personnel.
4. The appointment of the Commission of Inquiry and the
establishment of its Secretariat were announced on 24 November
1993. The Commission was composed of:
Hon. Matthew M. 8. W. Ngulube (Chief Justice of
Zambia), Chairman of the Commission;
Lt. General (Retired) Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana),
Member;
(Former Force Commander of UNIFIL)
Lt. General Gustav Hagglund (Finland), Member.
(Chief of Defence Staff, Finland)
5. The Secretariat of the Commission was headed by an Executive
Secretary, Mr. Winston A. Tubman of the Office of Legal Affairs
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Mr. Tubman was
assisted by Mr. Osamu Shiraishi of the Centre for Human Rights in
Geneva (during the meetings in Mogadishu in December 1993 only)
and Mr. Luke Mhlaba of the Legal Department of UNOSOM II.
Administrative services were provided by Mr. Lars Skold of United
Nations Field Service, Captain Magnus Gustafsson of UNIFIL and
Ms. Mary Muturi of the Department of Political Affairs at the
3
13. The Commission made an aerial tour of the sites where
attacks on UNOSOM II took place or which were related to the
attacks.
14. From Mogadishu the Commission moved to Nairobi, where it
deliberated on its initial findings while making further efforts
to meet with USC/SNA leaders especially General Aidid, who were
then staying in the Kenyan capital, before writing its report.
Additional communications were exchanged with General Aidid (see
annex 1) but in the end no testimonies were given by the USC/SNA
leaders.
15. The Commission wishes to thank the Secretary-General, the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and
the UNOSOM II Force Commander and their staff, and all those who
gave testimony for their cooperation and assistance without which
the inquiry could not have been successfully undertaken.
16. The Commission would also like to acknowledge with gratitude
the courtesy and co-operation extended to it by officials of the
United States and Italian Governments on its visit to Washington
DC and Livorno.
17. During all of the above contacts and throughout its
deliberations the Commission was able to operate in a fully
independent manner and no attempt whatsoever was made by anyone
to infringe its independence.
structure of the Report
18. This report is in eight parts, followed by appendices. Part
I traces the development of the crisis which led to United
Nations intervention in Somalia. Part II explains the reasons for
the invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
enforce disarmament and part III is an account of the underlying
causes of the armed clashes between UNOSOM II and the SNA,
starting with attacks on Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993. Part
IV describes the weapons inspections and the outbreak of attacks
on UNOSOM II personnel on 5 June 1993, and part V discusses the
fighting between UNOSOM II and SNA militia in the aftermath of
the June 5 attacks. Part VI analyses the attacks and makes
specific findings of fact, while part VII makes some general
observations based on the attacks investigated. The report
concludes in part VIII with some recommendations, about UNOSOM II
in particular and peace keeping and enforcement in general. The
annexes at the back of the report provide additional material for
a better grasp of the facts relating to the attacks.
L THE CRISIS LEADING TO UN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
The pover vacuus and resultant civil war
19. The flight of President Mohamed Siad Barre on 26 January
1991 and the collapse of his Government left a power vacuum in
which political movements fought each other in a bitter civil war
for control of the country. By the end of 1991, Mr Ali Mahdi
Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, leading rival coalitions
of political movements, (see Annex 3 for a list of Somali
political movements) had emerged as the main contenders for
political power.
20. Their militias were pitted against each other in the capital
Mogadishu, the single most important strategic location in the
overall struggle for control of the whole country.
21. United Nations estimates indicated that as a result of the
civil war and drought 4.5 million people were threatened by
malnutrition and related diseases and that between November 1991
and April 1993, as many as 300,000 persons had died and 1.5
million were particularly at risk.
22. It was in such political chaos and the attendant human
tragedy, general mayhem and destruction of infrastructure and
property that the United Nations first became seized of the
Somali crisis, which it judged as constituting a threat to
stability in the Horn of Africa and to international peace and
security.
23. on 23 January 1992 resolution 733 (1992), which was to be
the first of several resolutions on the situation in Somalia, was
adopted by the Security Council. It imposed an embargo on arms
supplies to Somalia, requested the Secretary-General to increase
humanitarian assistance to the country and to contact the Somali
parties concerned with a view to securing their agreement to a
cessation of hostilities.
24. The principal objective of the United Nations's intervention
in Somalia was to avert a famine. To this end Security Council
resolution 751 (1992), adopted on 24 April 1992, established the
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM, later referred to as
UNOSOM I).
25. Although it was realised that the civil war was a
significant cause of the danger of famine, the United Nations did
not assume any direct responsibility for ending the fighting or
resolving the political impasse. UNOSOM I operated within the
context of a ceasefire agreement between Ali Mahdi and General
Aidid and covered the Mogadishu area only.
26. It sought merely to facilitate negotiation and agreement
among the Somali leaders, leaving the responsibility for the
restoration of peace and finding a political solution with them.
27. Resolution 751 also requested the Secretary General, in co-
operation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of
Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to
continue consultations with the Somali parties with a view to the
convening of a conference on Somalia national reconciliation.
28. Under the resolution, UNOSOM I was to deploy 50 unarmed
military observers to monitor the ceasefire and to provide
security for humanitarian operations. All important measures
undertaken by UNOSOM I in Somalia were therefore discussed with
and agreed to by General Aidid and Ali Mahdi before being
implemented.
29. The strategy of UNOSOM I was not to marginalise the Somali
de facto leaders but to take them along on every move. Hence
although the need to engage international military personnel to
provide security for relief operations had long been a United
Nations objective, their deployment could not take place until
August 1992 when the consent of the de facto Somali political
leaders was given.
II. CHAPTER, VII OF THE CHARTER IS INVOKED
30. UNOSON I proved incapable of meeting the challenge it faced
due to its small size and the limited scope of its mandate.
Consisting mainly of some 500 Pakistani troops who could not
leave the harbour and airport of Mogadishu due to lack of consent
of the de facto Somali political authorities, it was unable to
deter attacks on humanitarian relief convoys.
31. The need for the United Nations to obtain consent to its
Somalia operations from the rival political groups caused delays
in taking urgently required action while the situation in the
country continued to deteriorate. The absence of a national
government created a unique situation in which no central
authority with responsibility to enter into international
relations for Somalia existed.
Media coverage raises international concern about Somalia
32. Meanwhile, worldwide media coverage depicting ghastly
pictures of severely under-nourished or sick Somali women and
children facing certain death mobilised international opinion led
by United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to
demand a more effective international intervention in Somalia.
33. Following one of five options presented in a letter from the
Secretary General to its President dated 29 November 1992, the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, authorised in resolution 794 (1992) the use of force to
support humanitarian operations in Somalia.
34. In doing so, the Council was departing from its usual
practice of seeking the consent of the de facto Somali
authorities for its activities. Such consent was in conformity
with traditional United Nations paace-keeping practice.
35. Pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) the United Nations'
Chapter VII objectives in Somalia were carried out by the
Unified Task Force (UNITAF), an international coalition led by
the United States.
The UNITAF Mandate
36. The UNITAF mandate under Security Council resolution 794
(1992) was to use all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for the humanitarian relief
operations in Somalia. This contemplated the use of military
force, if necessary, to overcome obstruction of humanitarian
operations.
7
37.1 UNITAF, which at its peak had a troop strength of
approximately 37,000, began arriving in Somalia in December 1992
and was deployed in Mogadishu and the central and southern
regions of the country.
38. Although operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, UNITAF did not interpret its mandate as requiring
it to enforce disarmament of the Somali militias.
39. However, a general ceasefire agreement and a supplementary
agreement signed in Addis Ababa by the political movements on 8
and 15 January 1993 respectively provided for the encampment of
the militias and the handing over of their heavy weapons to a
ceasefire monitoring group consisting of UNITAF or UNOSOM I
personnel.
Coasefire and disarmament under UNITAX
40. Under the Addis Ababa agreements of 8th and 15th January
1993, the political movements began to implement the ceasefire
and disarmament arrangements on a voluntary and co-operative
basis. UNITAF/UNOSOM I establishhed a planning and monitoring
team while the Somalis appointed their representatives on the
ceasefire committee. In meetings held at UNOSOM I offices, a
step-by- step blue-print for disarmament and demobilization was
agreed. Cantonment sites were mutually chosen and transit sites
for demobilized fighters were earmarked. The militias placed
their heavy weapons in storage sites which they declared to
UNITAF, together with inventories of all weapons stored. UNITAF
then carried out routine inspections of these sites. The last
inspection conducted by UNITAF was in February 1993. There were
no formal modalities between UNITAF and the factions, a situation
inherited by UNOSON II.
41. From time to time, UNITAF also conducted weapons searches
and confiscations independently of the agreement signed by the
political movements. But these did not form part of a
comprehensive disarmament plan nor were they considered by UNITAF
as a central feature of its mandate. Thus the security situation
in Somalia remained volatile and attacks on personnel involved in
humanitarian work continued.
UNITAF'S Departure
42. Meanwhile, UNITAF was anxious to withdraw from Somalia and
hand over responsibility to the United Nations. UNITAF felt that
its intervention had been effective in averting disaster, and
that with the relative improvement in the security situation and
the provision of much needed food, medicines and other vital
necessities to Somalis, its essentially humanitarian mission was
accomplished.
43. Nonetheless, it was clear that this improvement could only
be sustained by a replacement force having capabilities
comparable to those of UNITAF.
Wider United Nations mandate: UNOSOM II
44. In this context, the United Nations Security Council adopted
its resolution 814 (1993) on 26 March 1993, expanding the size
and mandate of UNOSOM to include not only the protection of
humanitarian relief supplies and personnel but also to compel the
Somali militias to disarm. Thus unlike UNITAF, whose
participation in the disarmament process was subsidiary and
derived from the ceasefire and disarmament agreements of 8 and 15
January 1993, the new UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) was mandated to disarm
Somali militias under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
45. The new mandate authorised the use of force to overcoms
refusal by any of the militias to disarm. Such action, if it
occurred, would be the first direct challenge to the political
movements' military power. Ultimately, unless the militias
disarmed, a collision between them and UNOSOM II was inevitable.
Initial problems facing UNOSON II
46. UNOSOM II like any other peace-keeping operation was
confronted with problems at its establishment. Contingents needed
time to study the ground and familiarise themselves with a new
cultural and political environment, particularly the implications
of operating in a country in a state of civil war.
47. For the execution of its mandate, UNOSOM II had to develop
standard operating procedures (SOPs). The staff needed time,
expertise and structures to gather appropriate information to
effectively carry out its mission.
48. Before UNOSOM II could accomplish these objectives, the
events of 5 June occurred plunging it into a peace enforcement
role which greatly compounded its problems. Resolution 837 (1993)
requiring UNOSOM II to arrest those responsible for the 5 June
attacks further complicated its situation.
49. UNOSOM II was seriously short of the requisite staff with
experience to execute the enormous tasks assigned to it. The
Special Representative of the Secretary General stated that he
made sustained appeals to the United Nations Headquarters for
specific staff to be made available to the mission but these
could not be provided. UNITAF which could have assisted with its
staff was unfortunately also leaving the mission area.
50. Finally, the mission was ill-equipped with operational
materiel for the nature of its operations and the civil-war
environment. Some of the contingents lacked appropriate hardware
such as armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to protect their
troops from small arms fire.
The scope of the Chapter VII mandate
51. It is important to note that enforcement power or the
Chapter VII aspects of the UNOSOM II mandate under resolution 814
(1993) applied specifically to military matters such as
disarmament and ensuring that lines for the supply of relief
remained open.
52. Enforcement power did not extend to Somalia's political
process. There UNOSOM II's mandate was limited to assisting the
Somalis in their efforts to achieve national reconciliation and
the reconstitution of their political institutions.
53. Yet some of the major disagreements which created tensions
between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA centered on divergent views
about UNOSOM II's political mandate.
10
III, UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE ARMED CLASHES
54. Among the several incidents or situations which led to
hostilities between the USC/SNA the most significant were:
disagreement concerning the role of the factions in the political
reconstitution of Somalia; the establishment of the Somali
judiciary and police; the recapture of Kismayo by siad Barre's
son-in-law, General Hersi Morgan; the Galcayo conference; and
control of Radio Mogadishu.
The reconstitution of political institutions
55. Fifteen Somali political movements met in Addis Ababa in
March 1993 at a conference sponsored by the United Nations. At
the official closure of that conference on 27 March, the leaders
of the 15 movements signed the "Addis Ababa Agreement of the
First Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in
Somalia". The agreement was meant to be the basic framework for
Somalia's transition towards peace and the establishment of an
elected government.
56. It stipulated a two-year transitional period during which
the supreme political organ and repository of Somali sovereignty
would be a Transitional National Council (TNC). Below it would be
18 regional councils and 92 district councils. The regional
councils would be composed of delegates drawn from the district
councils; members of the district councils would either be
elected or chosen by consensus in accordance with traditional
Somali practice.
57. The TNC would comprise one representative chosen by each of
the 15 political movements; three representatives from each
region one of whom would be a woman; and five additional members
representing Mogadishu.
58. As such, the Agreement ensured that the 15 political
movements would not dominate the transitional institutions.
Democratic participation was guaranteed through the restriction
of the number of TNC members appointed by the factions, the
reservation of a quota of TNC seats for women and the election or
popular selection of district council members.
59. Significantly, the Agreement of 27 March did not envisage a
specific role for the United Nations, beyond blandly inviting its
Secretary General and his Special Representative in Somalia, " in
accordance with the mandate entrusted to them by the Security
Council to extend all necessary assistance to the people of
Somalia for the implementation of this Agreement".
60. When the UN-sponsored conference adjourned on 27 March, the
Somali political leaders did not immediately disperse. They
11
continued their discussions in Addis Ababa and all 15 movements
signed a document titled "Agreements Reached Between the
Political Leaders at the Consultations Held in Addis Ababa, 30
March 1993".
61. This document went against the letter and spirit of the
Agreement of 27 March by stipulating that the names of the three
TNC members to be chosen from each district would be submitted by
the political factions, and that where the factions in a region
could not agree on a nominee, their differences would be settled
in Addis Ababa or in the particular region.
62. The 30 March document made no mention of any reservation of
seats for women. It stipulated a 45-day time-frame for the
nomination of TNC members, a deadline which gave insufficient
time to organize genuine elections at district council level.
63. Although it bore the signatures of the same leaders who had
signed the Agreement of 27 March, UNOSOM II never embraced the 30
March document and the stage was set for clashes between UNOSOM
II and some of the Somali political groups.
The Establishment of the Somali Judiciary and Police
64. UNOSOM II also exerted a significant influence on the
procedures for the appointment of Somali police and judges,
possibly frustrating the strategies of the USC/SNA and certainly
further engendering its hostility.
65. When UNOSOM II took over responsibility from UNITAF, under
an arrangement between UNOSOM I and UNITAF some judges had been
appointed by the USC/SNA and were presiding over what remained of
the courts in Mogadishu. In early May, a team of United States
Foreign Service officers assigned to UNOSOM II held a meeting in
Mogadishu with Somali lawyers and other local groups interested
in the rehabilitation of the judiciary in Somalia.
66. The meeting which was chaired by one of the US Foreign
Service experts on secondment to UNOSOM II, Ms. Ann Wright,
culminated in the setting up of a committee and the adoption of
procedures for the selection of judges. The selection procedures
allowed UNOSOM II to nominate some of the judges. The USC/SNA
resented the erosion of its power in this area and opposed the
selection of Judges by UNOSOM II and not by the TNC as provided
for in the 27 March Addis Ababa Agreement.
67. In similar vein, the promulgation of the Somali Penal Code
of 1962 as the criminal law in force in Somalia by the Special
Representative of the Secretary General was capable of being
interpreted by the USC/SNA as an overstepping of the UNOSOM II
mandate.
14
12
68. Further political frustration for the USC/SNA came when some
of its officers visited a prison in Mogadishu to deal with a
backlog of cases, only to be turned away by the new officer-in-
charge of the prison on the ground that they had no authority to
perform such a function.
69. The USC/SNA also felt that a police commission on which it
was represented and which had been set up by agreement between
General Aidid and Mr Mahdi was being sidelined by UNOSOM II.
The situation in Kismayo
70. While the Addis Ababa conference was in progress in March,
pro-Siad Barre forces under the command of General Hersi Morgan
used women and children to disguise their infiltration of weapons
into the southern port city of Kismayo, past the Belgian
contingent of UNITAF. General Morgan's forces managed to drive
out those of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, allies of General Aidid's
movement within the SNA.
71. Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess made a bold and undisguised march
towards Kismayo on 7 May in a bid to recapture the city. The
alerted Belgian contingent considered this a direct attack on
their positions and they repelled Jess' forces, inflicting
serious casualties. A Belgian soldier was injured by rifle fire
during this infiltration. Kismayo, Somalia's second city, had
special significance for General Aidid as his militia had
captured it in a fierce battle with forces loyal to Siad Barre.
72. The fall of Kismayo to General Morgan's forces angered the
SNA, which accused the Belgian contingent of intervening in the
fighting to protect General Morgan's militia and block Jess's
capture of Kismayo. They saw the Belgians' failure to prevent
General Morgan's infiltration into the city in March as evidence
of UNOSOM II's lack of impartiality.
73. In making this accusation, the SNA made little distinction
between UNITAF, which was in charge of Kismayo in March, and
UNOSOM II, which took over responsibility on 4 May 1993.
The Galcayo conference
74. After the Addis Ababa conference of March 1993, General
Aidid initiated consultations with Colonel Ahmed Abdillahi Yusuf,
Chairman of the Political, Defence and Emergency matters
Committee of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). These
consultations resulted in an agreement to hold a peace conference
for the central region of Somalia.
75. In General Aidid's view, participation in the conference
would be restricted to the political leaders of the region
concerned. UNOSOM II would provide logistical support for the
13
conference and security outside the conference hall. Somali
leaders not from the central region, would not be entitled to
attend the conference. General Aidid saw himself as the convenor
of the conference and would, as such, chair its proceedings and
establish its agenda. Nevertheless he invited the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Admiral
Jonathan Howe, to open the conference.
76. Later, when Ambassador April Glaspie, a United States
Foreign Service officer seconded to UNOSOM II was acting in place
of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General,
Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, who was on leave, UNOSOM II became
suspicious of Aidid's intentions. It sought to broaden
participation in the conference, especially to include General
Mohamed Abshir Mussa, Chairman of the SSDF.
77. Given the political rivalry between Abshir Mussa and
Abdullahi Yusuf within the SSDF, UNOSOM II suspected a plot by
General Aidid and Colonel Yusuf to undermine General Abshir
Mussa. Despite being informed by General Abshir Mussa that he was
fully aware of the conference being planned in Mogadishu, UNOSOM
II was not assured. When the conference was due to start UNOSOM
II, showing obvious deference played host to General Mussa and
provided him with transport and security in a bid to facilitate
his participation at the conference.
78. UNOSOM II also insisted that the conference would not be
presided over by General Aidid but by former President of the
Somali Republic, Alman Abdalla Osman, an Aidid enemy who on
arrival in Mogadishu immediately called for Aidid's arrest.
UNOSOM II's stance caused displeasure to General Aidid who
perceived UNOSOM II's behaviour as interference in Somali
politics.
79. Further disagreement between UNOSOM II and General Aidid
centred on the agenda of the conference. UNOSOM II took the same
position as Mr Mussa, by insisting that the situation in Kismayo
be on the agenda. General Aidid on the other hand argued that
problems involving other regions of Somalia would have to be
discussed at different fora with the concerned leaders. In the
end the joint UN/SNA conference was not held as planned with
General Aidid having to go ahead with a separate conference on
his own.
80. The various issues of contention between the SNA and UNOSOM
II became the subject of virulent propaganda on Radio Mogadishu,
controlled by the SNA, against UNOSOM II in particular and
foreigners in general.
14
Radio Mocadishu's Propaganda Against UNOSON II
81. Radio Mogadishu, a war prize of the SNA captured from Ali
Mahdi's militia, was particularly important as a means of
communication among General Aidid's followers given Somalia's
strong oral tradition and the low literacy rate of around 30 per
cent.
82. When relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA deteriorated
sharply in mid-May due to the events in Kismayo, the
disagreements over the Galcayo conference and selection of
judges, Radio Mogadishu broadcasts became markedly hostile to
UNOSOM II.
83. This hostility is reflected in transcripts of broadcasts
between 1 May and 4 June on the ave of the killing of 24
Pakistani soldiers. The broadcasts have a xenophobic tone,
especially starting on 11 May, when they accuse UNOSOM II and the
United States of being aggressors trying to colonize Somalia and
to establish a trusteeship. They speak highly of Somalia's
history of resistance to foreign domination and imposition.
84. UNOSOM II was very concerned about this propaganda which
gave a negative perception of the United Nations and could stir
up hostile sentiments torwards UNOSOM II personnel from the
Somali public.
85. At one point, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Somalia Admiral Howe had sought General Aidid's co-
operation in ensuring that this propaganda be stopped and General
Aidid had responded by calling for the establishment of a
committee to monitor the operations of all radio stations in the
country. However, such a committee was never established.
86. There was also concern within UNOSOM II that exclusive
control of Radio Mogadishu by General Aidid gave him an unfair
advantage over his political rivals to project his image and to
achieve his political ambitions. It was felt that the radio
station was a national asset to which all political movements
should have access. Indeed, representatives of other political
groups had written to UNOSOM II urging that the radio station be
taken away from the SNA's exclusive control.
87. Radio Mogadishu thus became another sore point in relations
between UNOSOM II and the SNA. There was some considerable debate
among UNOSOM II officials about whether Radio Mogadishu should be
shut down or otherwise taken off the air.
88. In mid-May, the Pakistani Brigade, which was responsible for
the southern Mogadishu area, was asked to draw up plans on how
Radio Mogadishu could be shut down or otherwise silenced if it
continued its propaganda against UNOSOM.
15
89. The Pakistanis informed UNOSOM II that they were unable to
do so as they did not have the personnel with the technical
expertise to handle such an operation. It was suggested that the
United States would supply the experts needed but no action was
taken and the initial plan appears to have been shelved.
90. Since Radio Mogadishu premises had been declared an
authorized weapons storage sits (AWSS), it was decided that
during the weapons inspections of 5 June US special forces
technicians would accompany the inspection team to survey the
radio installations.
91. Meanwhile General Aidid and other SNA leaders were aware of
discussions within UNOSOM on how to deal with the Radio Mogadishu
issue. Rumours spread within SNA circles that UNOSOM intended to
seize the Radio Station.
92. Given this context, the inspections of AWSS in southern
Mogadishu on 5 June could not have come at a worse time for
relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA.
93. Thus while UNOSOM II was charged with the responsibility of
assisting the Somali people in the rehabilitation of their
political institutions at the local, regional and national levels
its approach in carrying out this mandate as the foregoing
incidents show was increasingly alienating the USC/SNA, which
likened this approach to "trusteeship" or "colonization".
16
IV. THE WEAPONS INSPECTIONS AND OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES
94. Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the
weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine, or was merely a
cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio
Mogadishu. What is certain, however, is that the USC/SNA had
declared Radio Mogadishu as an AWSS. In the execution of its
mandate to disarm the factions and enforce a ceasefire, UNOSOM II
was perfectly entitled to carry out inspections of AWSS. In any
case UNITAF, despite interpreting its own mandate more narrowly,
had established the practice of conducting such inspections.
95. The inspections provided a perfect opportunity to enter and
survey the radio installations for any future operation should it
become necessary. UNOSOM II had decided that such an operation
might have to be carried out.
The Inspection Plan
96. Under the plan prepared by UNOSOM Force Headquarters,
General Aidid would be given 12 hours notice of the intended
inspection. Four Pakistani units would carry out an inspection of
the five sites declared by the USC/SNA to UNITAF.
97. of these, three units would inspect one site each and the
fourth would inspect two. Each unit would compile an inventory
of weapons inspected, report on their operational afficiency and
make a thorough reconnaissance for possible future operations. At
AWSS 5 (Radio Mogadishu), US special forces technicians would
make a survey of the radio broadcast and transmission equipment.
98. Each unit was of company size and included a team of
engineers and security personnel. The Pakistani Brigade was
tasked by UNOSOM II Headquarters to prepare an operational plan
for the inspections.
99. In case the inspection teams were refused access to the
sites, they were to force entry. All were aware of the
possibility of some hostile reaction to these inspections by the
Somali supporters of the USC/SNA and lack of co-operation from
its leadership.
100. In view of this risk, the Pakistanis had recommended that
either no notice be given or if given, that no inspection be
carried out until the SNA's reaction was communicated to them.
101. The letter notifying the SNA leadership of the inspection
was delivered by Lt. Colonel Kevin McGovern, UNOSOM Deputy Chief
of intelligence and Timothy Byrne, Chief, Ceasefire and
Disarmament Division, UNOSOM II Force Command, at General Aidid's
residence on 4 June, a Friday and thus a public holiday in
Mogadishu, at around 1700 hours.
17
102. The letter was addressed to Ambassador Alim, an adviser to
General Aidid who was not present. The letter was therefore
handed to Abdid Qaibdid, a member of Aidid's security who read it
in the presence of the UNOSOM officers and commented to the
effect that the SNA needed time to respond and that if UNOSOM
insisted on conducting the inspections as planned that would lead
to a war.
103. After delivering the letter, Lt Colonel McGovern recorded
the USC/SNA's objections to the inspection in a memorandum which
was signed by Colonel Giuseppe Pirotti, the UNOSOM Chief of
Intelligence. The memorandum was delivered by Lt Colonel McGovern
to Major-General Thomas Montgomery, Deputy UNOSOM Force Commander
and Commander of United States Joint Task Force (JTF). At the
time, Maj. -General Montgomery was acting Force Commander in the
absence of General Bir who was on leave.
The attacks on the Pakistani soldiers (see map, Annex 6)
104. At 0700 hours on 5 June 1993, UNOSOM weapons inspection
teams arrived simultaneously at the five AWSS in southern
Mogadishu.
105. At around 0830, at AWSS 5, the location of Radio Mogadishu,
a hostile crowd gathered as the inspection was in progress.
Thirty minutes later it had increased to some 200 men, women and
children. Several men were observed to be inciting the crowd
against the Pakistani soldiers. A man was shot and probably
killed when he tried to snatch a Pakistani soldier's rifle.
106. Notwithstanding this incident, the inspection was completed
by about 0930 and the inspection party safely withdrew.
107. Just as the Pakistani troops withdrew from AWSS 5, another
hostile crowd was assembling at Feeding Point 20 on National
Street. The crowd started throwing stones at the 12 Pakistani
soldiers manning this feeding point. From positions behind the
women and children in the crowd, weapons were fired at the
troops. The intensity of the attacks increased with rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) and hand grenades being used.
108. Three soldiers were killed at the feeding point and six were
taken prisoner, one of whom died in captivity.
109. Four APCs sent from a nearby strong point by the Pakistani
Brigade headquarters to resoue the soldiers at the feeding point
were obstructed by road blocks and ambushed by heavy machine-guns
positioned in surrounding buildings, and had to withdraw after
some soldiers were killed and others wounded.
18
110. More APCs dispatched from the opposite side of FP 20 were
also similarly obstructed, subjected to intense fire and forced
to withdraw.
111. Unable to help their own troops who were under attack, the
Pakistani Brigade at around eleven o'clock requested from UNOSOM
Force Headquarters the assistance of Italian tanks, which they
understood to be on 30 minutes' call. These tanks did not reach
Feeding Point 20 until after 1600 hours.
112. The Pakistani company returning from AWSS 3 (the
retransmission site for Radio Mogadishu) was ambushed as it
entered 21 October Road, on its way to the Brigade Headquarters
at the Stadium. Crowds erected road blocks to prevent the smooth
passage of the Pakistani vehicles, which were subjected to
increasingly intense fire from heavy machine-guns and Rocket
Propelled grenades (RPGs).
113. The Pakistanis came under the most fierce attacks as they
reached the vicinity of Check Point 89 opposite the Cigarette
Factory. At the same time, near-by Strong Points 42 and 50 also
came under fire from gunmen who mingled with the crowds.
114. The Pakistani Brigade ordered reinforcements from their base
at the Stadium, but the reinforcement units came under fire as
soon as they left the stadium. After entering 21 October Road the
reinforcement units were attacked by gunmen sheltering in the
Saudi Relief Agency Building on the right.
115. The reinforcement units finally entered an area of intense
criss-crossing fire in the vicinity of CP 89, opposite the
Cigarette Factory, where they and the vehicles returning from
AWSS 3 were trapped. Most of the troops in this area, including
members of the ORF, took shelter inside the Cigarette Factory.
116. At 1320 hours, US reconnaissance and Italian attack
helicopters arrived on the scene. Italian helicopters, unable to
locate the precise positions of opposing forces, opened fire with
machine-guns, injuring three Pakistani soldiers. The helicopters
withdrew after this error, and the SNA militia's machine-guns
remained in place and continued firing for the rest of the
afternoon.
117. At the end of the fighting later that afternoon, 24
Pakistanis were dead and 57 injured. Six Pakistani soldiers were
missing, one of whom died in captivity and five were released to
UNOSOM II two days later by an official of the SNA. Also injured
on 5 June were one Italian and three US soldiers.
118. The death of so many UNOSOM II forces in one day brought to
light the enormity of the challenge that the United Nations faced
in its mission to forcibly disarm Somalia. UNOSOM II had been
19
aware that the area of the 21 October Road around the Cigarette
Factory was inhabited by militia forces. But their battle
preparedness and the quality and quantity of their weapons was
not then entirely known.
119. Another serious question for UNOSOM II force command was
whether they had failed to react quickly enough to the appeals
for help by the Pakistani soldiers who were under attack. of
particular concern was the delay in despatching Italian tanks to
Feeding Point 20.
120. The Italian Brigade, however, denied having delayed in
responding to the appeals for assistance. They stated that
shortly after 1100 hours, their attack helicopters had carried
out operations in response to UNOSOM orders, and that they were
involved in support operations during most of the afternoon.
121. The Italian Brigade Commander said he had brought an
armoured platoon and tank company closer to Mogadishu on his own
initiative from their base at Balad, and had intervened to assist
the Pakistanis in their sector although this was the
responsibility of the QRF. According to the Italian Brigade
Commander, the order from UNOSOM II force headquarters to use the
tanks had been given at 1400 hours, and the company had then
moved to the old Port for a briefing (arriving at 1500 hours),
before proceeding to FP 20.
122. The ferocity of the attacks and the death of so many UNOSOM
II forces in one day proved to be the turning point in UNOSOM's
operations in Somalia. The inadequacy of the military equipment
and lack of preparedness of UNOSOM II forces for such armed
confrontation was starkly demonstrated.
123. UNOSOM II officials and military commanders became more
convinced of the need to take decisive action to disarm the
factions in Mogadishu or at least to substantially reduce their
capability to wage war. Authority for such action was already
contained in Resolution 814 (1993) of the Security Council, but a
more specific authorization to take action against those
responsible for the attacks on the Pakistani soldiers was granted
in resolution 837 (1993).
124. Without investigation, blame for the attacks of 5 June was
laid on the USC/SNA. The reaffirmation of the UNOSOM II mandate
and the authorization of punitive action against the SNA
leadership was given in resolution 837 (1993), which was adopted
by the security Council the next day.
20
Y. FIGHTING BETWEEN UNOSON II AND SMA MILITIA - "THE WAR"
125. The resolution resulted in a virtual war situation between
UNOSOM II and the SNA, as the two sides attacked each other over
a period of four months. A comprehensive list compiled by UNOSOM
II showing the military actions of both sides is given as Annex 4
to this report. A synopsis based on reports of the main
incidents involving UNOSOM II is contained in Annex 5.
126. There seems to be three distinguishable phases to the armed
conflict: the first phase characterised by United Nations
offensive operations; the second showing the SNA having the
initiative; and the third when independent US special forces took
up the offensive on behalf of UNOSOM II.
A. United Nations offensive operations against USC/SMA
127. In resolution 837 (1993) the Security Council expressed
grave alarm at the "premeditated armed attacks launched by forces
apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)"
against the Pakistani forces. The resolution also condemned
strongly "the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the
USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel".
128. It reaffirmed "that the Secretary General is authorised
under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures
against all those responsible for the armed attacks... including
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to
establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout
Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions
and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and
punishment".
129. In what amounted to a direct targeting of the SNA's top
hierarchy, the resolution requested the Secretary General to
"inquire into the incident with particular emphasis on the role
of those factional leaders".
130. In apparent acknowledgement of UNOSOM II's lack of readiness
for a major confrontation, the resolution urged the rapid and
accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the
full requirements of 28,000, all ranks, as well as equipment" in
accordance with the Secretary General's report of 3 March 1993.
131. Resolution 837 (1993) set the stage for a massive show of
force by UNOSOM against the SNA. The timing of the commencement
of such action depended on the UNOSOM II forces being ready in
terms of available manpower and equipment.
132. One further reason why the military operations against the
21
SNA could not begin immediately, despite the further authority
given by resolution 837 (1993) on 6 June, was that planning was
required. Additionally, operations could not commence without
jeopardising the safety of the Pakistani soldiers who were being
held in captivity, or international civilian staff, who had to be
re-located to Nairobi while the UNOSOM II headquarters moved
from the vicinity of the Kilometre 4 traffic circle to the more
secure premises formerly used by the US Embassy.
133. While the United Nations was making preparations for the
military showdown, the USC/SNA reaction to the 5 June attacks on
the Pakistanis was somewhat contradictory. Early reaction praised
the valour shown by the Somali people in demonstrating against
and resisting UNOSOM forces. But there was no direct admission by
the USC/SNA militia of responsibility for the attacks on the
Pakistanis. Instead, the statements attributed to the USC/SNA
leadership, including General Aidid, and broadcasts on Radio
Mogadishu, condemned what was described as wanton attacks by the
UNOSOM forces on peaceful Somali demonstrators.
134. At the same time, General Aidid called for an impartial
inquiry into the causes of the attacks. As it became clear that
the United Nations was preparing to use force, General Aidid
offered to use his influence to calm the situation in Mogadishu
-
and called on the United Nations to use peaceful means in
handling the crisis.
135. UNOSOM II felt they could not accept anything short of
General Aidid and his top lieutenants submitting themselves to a
judicial process to determine whether they were implicated in
the attacks in any way. UNOSOM II believed that their hands in
the matter were tied by the express wording of resolution 837
(1993).
136. Air strikes by UNOSOM II, followed by ground sweeps and arms
searches in the heart of the so-called "Aidid enclave" a part of
southern Mogadishu where General Aidid and other top USC/SNA
leaders lived or had property, heralded what was to become a
virtual war between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA forces.
137. The UNOSON II offensive started on 12 June 1993, with
aerial bombardments of the SNA's weapons sites, including Radio
Mogadishu, which were all destroyed. The Somalis reacted by
staging a demonstration involving women and children near the
Pakistani strong Point (the former Egyptian Embassy) at Kilometre
4.
138. A shoot-out occurred involving the Pakistanis and
unidentified Somali gunmen, resulting in the death of an unknown
number of Somalis, as the crowd marched towards the Pakistani
unit's position. Later, some reports corroborated Pakistani
accounts that the Somali gunmen had fired into the crowd in a
22
deliberate attempt to give the impression that the Pakistanis
were shooting unarmed civilians.
139. The 13 June incident at Kilometre 4 revealed the tactical
dilemmas faced by UNOSOM II forces in conducting combat
operations in the midst of a hostile civilian population.
140. On 17 June UNOSOM II launched a major cordon and search
operation in the SNA enclave (see Annex 7). The operation had
been carefully planned and rehearsed for days. All participating
contingents had agreed to every step to be taken.
141. The operation began at 0130 hours, with AC-130 gunships
attacking residences of the SNA leaders. Before each strike the
targeted building was illuminated and its occupants requested by
loudspeakers to move out. Before sunrise the area was cordoned
off by Moroccan and Italian forces and then Pakistani forces
carried out the weapons search.
142. Moroccan forces came under intense fire and had to be
rescued by the French. Five Moroccan soldiers, including the
battalion commander were killed and 40 wounded. The Moroccan
stated that lack of information about SNAs strength and
disposition, loss of the element of surprise occasioned by
several rehearsale of the operation and the vulnerable location
of the cordon contributed to the high casualties. Thereafter
UNOSOM did not carry out any multinational search operations of
this magnitude.
143. The next major operation was conducted by Pakistani forces
at "Atto's Garage" on 28 June. The Pakistani forces came under
heavy fire during an attempted search of the site and were forced
to withdraw. Two of their soldiers were killed and two others
injured.
144. on 2 July Italian forces carried out a major search
operation in the Heliuaa Village (see Annex 9), one kilometre
south of the Pasta Factory. The Italian Brigade Commander had
forwarded the operational plan for this exercise to his higher
authority in Italy for approval before its commencement.
145. According to the description of the events of that day by
the Italians, the operation was carried out in a hostile
atmosphere, with crowds throwing stones at the forces. The
Italians stopped the search and, on their withdrawal, were
ambushed on Imperial Road, and suffered three dead and 29
wounded.
146. The Italians managed to extricate their forces who were
caught in the ambush, and evacuated Strong Point 42 which was
under attack.
23
147. The incident brought to a head the controversy which had
been simmering for some time between the UNOSOM II Force Command
and the Italian Brigade command. The Italians favoured a softer
approach and emphasised discussion and negotiation and felt that
this approach had achieved good results whereas the strict
enforcement policy of the UNOSOM II Command had caused the heavy
casualties in the Pakistani sector. On 22 June, the Italians had
protested against a QRF sweep of the SNA weapons sites carried
out in the Italian sector, without prior consultation. The
Italians said the QRF had left them to face the tension created
by the sweep.
148. The UNOSOM II Force Command wished to teach the SNA a lesson
on 2 July by attacking Pasta Factory in full force, and felt that
this goal was frustrated and the SNA morale was boosted when the
Italians decided to disengage from the battle and also to
withdraw from strong Point 42. The UNOSOM II force command also
claimed that the Italians had not returned fire when attacked on
2 July but the Italians insisted on the contrary.
149. The Force Commander ordered the Italians to retake Strong
Point 42 by 10 July. on 9 July the Italians reoccupied Strong
Point 42 following negotiation with the SNA instead of using
force as the Force Commander had assumed. The Force Commander
felt that the Italian approach reduced the effectiveness of
UNOSOM II's punitive action against the SNA. The Italians were
even accused of leaking information, letting arms pass through
and paying bribes to the SNA so that their forces could be spared
from the militia's attacks. The Italians denied these accusations
and maintained that in accordance with common UNOSOM II practice,
they only gave food and paid for services rendered, and that
their policy of negotiation had helped them maintain peace in
their sector.
150. The controversy received considerable publicity and may have
contributed to the change in the pattern of the conflict during
the first part of July.
B. SNA offensive against UNOSOM II
151. 1 of this report clearly indicates that during the first
month after the attacks of 5 June against the Pakistanis, there
were very few attacks initiated by the SNA. UNOSOM II had the
upper hand and all casualties occurred in connection with the
UNOSOM II offensive operations.
152. After 2 July the SNA gradually took the initiative. UNOSON
II initiatives ware limited to a faw search and sweep operations
conducted mainly by the ORF. On the contrary the SNA increased
its attacks dramatically from 6 July onwards. The feeling of
being at war is reflected in UNOSON II fragmental orders
24
(fragos). Until 8 July they refer to UNOSOM II's adversaries as
"hostile forces". After that date, the fragos use the phrase
"enamy forces".
153. The bombing of the Abdi house on July 12 (see Annex 8) may
also have contributed to the change in the pattern of the
conflict. In earlier operations, for instance on 17 June, UNOSOM
II had taken great pains to ensure that residents had time to
abandon a house before it was bombed. The 12 July operation was
intended to eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants.
Therefore no warning was given in advance.
154. The casualties suffered in this operation were considerable.
UNOSOM II estimated the number of Somali dead at 20; the
International Committee of the Red Cross had figures of 54 dead
and 161 injured while the SNA put the figure of those killed
at 73.
155. Some accounts contradicted information given by UNOSOM II
about the nature of the meeting at the Abdi House on the day it
was bombed. These accounts maintained that the meeting was that
of elders of the Habr Gedir clan who were discussing how to make
peace with UNOSOM II.
156. From the date of this incident, the SNA closed its ranks and
Somalis appear to have stopped giving information to UNOSOM II.
UNOSOM II became more cautious in its operations.
157. In June the SNA had used mainly small arms, hand grenades,
rocket-propelled grenades and machine-guns. From 6 July mortar
attacks became more and more frequent. At first they were
inaccurate and often the shells did not explode; gradually they
became more accurate. The mortar attacks were considered by
UNOSOM II as the most difficult to counter, keeping both military
and civilian personnel in a state of constant alert and fear.
Total casualties caused by mortar fire numbered one killed and
nineteen wounded.
158. Ambushes against United Nations vehicles became more
diversified. In addition to attacks by firearms and RPGs, mines
and command detonated explosives were used. To avoid being
targeted, a fleet of United Nations vehicles were kept in
Mogadishu harbour and unmarked leased cars with Somali number-
plates were used in southern Mogadishu. Somali and national flags
were flown on vehicles instead of the United Nations flag in the
hope of avoiding attacks. Total number of casualties suffered in
ambushes between 2nd July and 3rd October was 21 killed and 46
wounded.
25
159. From 10 August helicopters came under fire more frequently.
Mainly small arms and RPGs were used. The first UNOSON II
casualties from such attacks were suffered on 2 September and the
first helicopter was shot down on 25 September.
160. The overall pattern of the hostilities indicate that
although there were engagements in almost all of south Mogadishu,
the 21 October Road, especially around the Cigarette Factory, was
a major flash point. Some testimonies indicate that the area was
a virtual militia barracks. There was also a considerable
presence of militia around the Pasta Factory.
161. It is significant that the Pakistani soldiers on September 9
were attacked from positions in the same buildings as on 5 June
around the Cigarette Factory area. But in this area the presence
and sometimes participation of women and children in the combat
sectors posed the danger of unacceptable levels of civilian
casualties and a major handicap to UNOSOM II forces.
162. The ambush of a Nigerian convoy advancing towards strong
Point 42 on 5 September (see Annex 9) caused the heaviest
casualties of that month in one single incident. When the
Nigerian forces arrived at strong Point 42 (Pasta Factory) to
take over from the Italian Brigade at dawn on 5 September a crowd
of hostile Somalis greeted them with a demonstration and called
for their departure.
163. The Somalis were apparently unhappy that the Nigerians would
not maintain the same relations as the Italians had with the
local population.
164. The differences of approach between the various contingents
were manifested once again when the Italians and Nigerians
encountered Somali protesters. The Nigerians apparently fired
their weapons while the Italians started conducting negotiation.
165. While the Nigerians stated that they were fired upon by the
Somalis, the Italians maintained that a Nigerian soldier at the
SP lost his nerve and fired into the crowd. The Nigerians also
alleged that Italians refused to come to their assistance during
the attack. The Italians stated that they were not aware of the
ambush and were not able to monitor the Nigerians request for
reinforcement since they were on different communication
networks.
166. The Nigerians further suspected that their forces were "set
up" for the ambush by the Italians, but the Commission was unable
to find any supporting evidence of that. But the suspicions
between the Italians and other UNOSON II forces were bound to
occur given their pursuit of divergent policies in Somalia.
25
C. Offensive by non-UN forces and cessation of hostilities
167. The difficulties faced by UNOSOM II, especially the failure
to capture General Aidid despite the offer of a US$25, 000 bounty
for any one who might assist in that regard, gave indications
that the United Nations' military objectives might not be
achieved.
168. While the United Nations was making every effort to protect
its personnel and at the same time search for General Aidid, a
special task force of United States Rangers was dispatched by the
US Government to Mogadishu. The Rangers operated under a
separate command from that of UNOSOM II. Their operations were
notified to UNOSOM II, but often, only a short time in advance.
169. The Rangers' specific mission was to capture and arrest
General Aidid and other high level USC/SNA leaders. Their first
operation was an embarrassment as they mistakenly surrounded UNDP
premises. The next four operations were successful. The sixth
operation on 3 October (see Annex 10) resulted in the heaviest US
casualties in Somalia.
170. The aim of the 3 October operation was to capture top
General Aidid followers meeting at the olympic Hotel. Although
these leaders were captured and taken away, the operation turned
into a disaster when two helicopters were shot down and almost a
company of the Rangers were trapped in a deadly firefight with
Somali militia.
171. This operation had been carried out entirely by the Rangers,
and only very short notice was given to the UNOSOM II force
command. When the Rangers were trapped, a rescue task force was
assembled but was ambushed in the Kilometre 4 area and had to
withdraw. An integrated rescue force composed of Rangers, US ORF,
Pakistani tanks and Malaysian APCs was assembled.
172. Even this rescue team met stiff resistance which slowed down
its advance towards the position of the trapped rangers. The
surviving and injured rangers were finally rescued in the early
hours of 4 October at the crash site of one of the helicopters.
173. Casualty figures for this operation were 18 US soldiers
killed (16 Rangers and 2 QRF), 1 Malaysian killed, 78 US, 9
Malaysian and 3 Pakistani soldiers wounded. The pilot of one of
the helicopters was captured and shown on TV around the world. on
6 October a mortar shell caused 13 more US casualties in the
Mogadishu airport.
174. Following these incidents the United States reversed its
policy and announced that all US forces would be withdrawn from
Somalia by 31 March 1994. This decision by the United States
Government deprived UNOSOM II of its most potent single national
27
contingent. Subsequently, European Governments with contingents
serving in UNOSOM II also announced their intention to withdraw
their troops by the same date.
175. The decision by the US Government left the United Nations
with little choice but to change its policy and abandon the hunt
for Aidid. The SNA announced a ceasefire on 8 October. The war
was over.
39
VI ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
176. In analysing the attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and the
resulting casualties, the Commission established the following
questions:
1. Who carried out the 5 June attacks?
2. Why did the attacks occur?
3. Why were the casualties so heavy on 5 June?
4. Why did UNOSOM II misjudge the situation?
5. Why did the 5 June attacks evolve into a war?
6. why were the hostilities so prolonged?
7. Did UNOSOM II's internal shortcomings contribute to the
number of casualties?
177. The first four questions relate to the 5 June attacks while
the last three relate to the fighting after resolution 837 was
adopted.
178. By analysing the facts relating to the attacks and
subsequent clashes, the discussion below seeks to find answers to
these questions.
Who carried out the 5 June attacks?
179. In its resolution 837 (1993) although the Security Council
all but flatly accused the SNA of the attacks on UNOSOM II troops
of June 5 it nevertheless requested the Secretary-General to
investigate the attacks. Subsequently Professor Tom Farer,
conducted an inquiry which found that the SNA and in particular
its leader General Aidid bore responsibility for the 5 June
attacks.
180. Neither General Aidid nor any of his officials had given
testimony to the Farer investigation which ultimately based its
findings largely on circumstantial evidence. The present
Commission studied the Farer report in depth particularly the
transcripts of testimonies taken by Farer.
181. But unlike Farer, the Commission's task was to find facts
and not to find fault or ascribe blame. The Commission has not
made the same extensive reliance on circumstantial evidence as
Professor Farer did. Instead considerable effort was made by the
Commission to obtain direct testimony from the SNA and in
particular to hear from General Aidid himself, his answer to the
charge that it was his SNA which attacked the UN Forces on 5
June.
182. Unfortunately, the General did not give testimony to the
Commission. It is, however, important to note the remarks
attributed to General Aidid in an interview published in the 30
January 1994 issue of a Nairobi newspaper STANDARD ON SUNDAY,
29
when asked: "How did (24) Pakistani soldiers meet their death.
?
Was that not part of the bloody clashes between the foreign
forces and the Somali people?"
183. General Aidid replied: "Let me put this vary clearly and
properly. on 5 June, 1993 a contingent of UNOSON II troops, most
of them Pakistani soldiers attacked and occupied Radio Mogadishu
station - the radio relay area and the main roads in the city -
areas which are controlled by the SNA. Thousands of Somali
citizens who were angered by the illegal occupation of the radio
station by UNOSOM II troops, took to the streets near the
station. This was a very peaceful demonstration. The Pakistani
troops, without caution and warning then opened fire on the
peaceful demonstrators. They (Pakistani) killed three people on
the spot. This was the incident which triggered off the
widespread rioting which resulted in the death of 35 Somalis and
fifteen more injured. It was a result of the crossfire that the
Pakistani troops unfortunately also lost their lives. But that
is how every military confrontation goes. There were also
valuable lives of Somali people lost in the process. There was
no particular intention to murder the Pakistani troops". Remarks
to similar effect expressed by General Aidid are reflected in
transcripts of broadcasts of 5 and 6 June on Radio Mogadishu.
184. General Aidid's response raises several revealing questions.
The Somali crowds were angry at the seizure of Radio Mogadishu,
the General claims, yet surprisingly their spontaneous
demonstrations have been characterized as peaceful. This is
unusual and unlikely.
185. since the area of the demonstration was "controlled by the
SNA" the demonstrations and the shootings very likely were
similarly controlled. If the Somalis saw Pakistani troops
"without caution and warning" open fire on the peaceful
demonstration killing three, the resulting deaths of the
Pakistani troops more likely were an act of retaliation rather
than of unfortunate crossfire.
186. In the absence of a more convincing explanation from the
USC/SNA, the Commission believes that the SNA orchestrated the
attacks. The reasons for believing so may be summarised into
three as follows:
Firstly, all the attacks occurred within an SNA controlled area.
Secondly, the attacks were not random, but were well-coordinated
and simultaneous. Thirdly, they took place in an area which is
inhabited by SNA militia and, especially along the 21 October
Road, in the vicinity of locations known to have been weapons
depots for the army under the previous Government of siad Barre
which was overthrown.
187. UNOSOM reports and previous investigations have labelled the
30
attacks as having been pre-planned and pre-neditated. The
Commission has not found any conclusive evidence to support that
view. The SNA had taken south Mogadishu in fierce fighting from
its main rival in a civil war that had not yet ended. It is
likely that extensive preparations had been made by the SNA for a
resumption of hostilities in Mogadishu. The well-armed militia
lived in former army barracks and other facilities along the
routes where the attacks of 5 June occurred. Consequently they
were very familiar with the entire area. The SNA's communication
methods assisted by Radio Mogadishu broadcasts were able to
dispatch messages very fast. Demonstrations, road blocks and
deployment of militia forces could be effected on very short
notice as many later events showed during the clashes after 5
June.
188. Therefore it is quite possible that the attacks on 5 June
were orchestrated by the SNA on the spur-of-the-moment after the
11
inspections had begun.
WDY did the attacks occur?
189. Everyone from UNOSOM II who gave testimony to the Commission
stated that clashes between UNOSOM II and the Somali armed
factions were seen as inavitable. Therefore, when the events of 5
June occurred their timing and magnitude were a surprise but not
the events themselves.
190. The reason for the feeling that clashes were inevitable is
easier to understand than to explain. By the first half of 1993
when UNOSOM II was established the United Nations had had forty
years experience in international paace-keeping. Everyone knew
what peace-keeping meant: namely, the end of armed clashes or a
war brought on by a ceasefire between opposing forces which the
United Nations stapped in to monitor. The United Nations'
intervention moreover would take place only upon the consent of
the warring parties, and force would not be used by UN troops
except in self defence.
191. There was, therefore, little by way of precedent to guide
the non-consensual intervention by the United Nations in Somalia
which was carried out through UNITAF and UNOSOM II. The scale of
physical devastation, famine and inability to deliver
humanitarian assistance due to the civil war compounded by the
absence of a government in Somalia provided the justification for
a forceful United Nations intervention.
192. Problems attendant on the United Nations' operations in
Somalia became evident from the very onset when the question
arose whether UNITAF would disarm the militias of the Somali
factions by force. The UN Secretary-General in exchanges with US
President Bush contended that UNITAF had so committed itself but
the United States, the lead nation of UNITAF, maintained the
31
contrary. Force would be used only to remove obstructions to the
relief effort the United States maintained; if no such threats
were posed and if the weapons of the militias were not menacing
there would be and indeed there was no significant confrontation
between UNITAF and them. UNITAF operated under Chapter VII but
did not seek to disarm the militias; its primary interest was the
securing of deliveries of international aid. In addition, it did
not seek to marginalise or confront, but to take the Somali
political movements along on every move.
193. UNOSOM II interpreted its mandate as not merely authorizing
but requiring it to disarm the militias. This was in clear
contrast to the way in which UNITAF had viewed its mandate.
194. Taken by themselves, the inspections would not necessarily
have appeared threatening. The weapons storage sites were after
all under the control of the factions themselves - the arms
stored in the storage sites had been collected and deposited
there by the factions themselves. UNITAF would perform only a
monitoring role. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement as incorporated
in Security Council resolution 814 UNOSOM II was empowered to
take forceful action to disarm the militias.
195. If the inspections had uncovered discrepancies in the
weapons supposedly stored, as UNOSOM II suspected they might, a
non-confrontational typical UN paace-keeping approach would have
obliged UNOSOM II to call the SNA's attention to its disarmament
obligations. If the SNA persisted in breaches of those
obligations, a more forceful action by UNOSOM II might then be
appropriate. Instead of proceeding in such a manner to exhaust
peaceful remedies, UNOSOM II decided, as it had the right and
authority to do by virtue of resolution 814, that its very first
inspection would if necessary be carried out by military force.
It moreover took pains to make the USC/SNA aware of that decision
by the ultimatum-like letter of 4 June giving notice of the
inspection.
196. In hindsight, it could be argued that it would have been
better if UNOSOM II had postponed its inspections of AWSS on 5
June 1993 for the following reasons:
The AWSS had been established by the militias and located in
militia faction strongholds. They were guarded by the
militias and were totally outside the control of UNOSOM II.
Weapons had been stored in the AWSS at the will of the
political movements which controlled the various militias.
Access to sites and modalities for inspections might have
been discussed and mutually agreed between UNOSOM II and
respective Somali political movements. Such an arrangement
could have been incorporated into a standing operating
32
procedure (SOP) for inspections.
The SNA's hostile reaction to the inspection notification
was a clear indication that the militias might use violence
to resist the inspections.
197. UNOSOM II officials decided to proceed with the planned
inspections despite the SNA's strong objections because they felt
that they had the mandate to use force to execute their tasks and
therefore there was no need to discuss or negotiate with SNA on
the matter.
198. UNOSOM II's decision that force would, if necessary, be used
to carry out the inspections was not taken in isolation nor in a
context of calm co-operation between UNOSOM II and the SNA.
Quite the opposite was the case, as demonstrated by the Radio
Mogadishu propaganda broadcasts.
199. Apart from the irritation caused over Radio Mogadishu,
relations between UNOSOM II and the SNA had deteriorated
dangerously over the Galcayo Conference which the SNA had
proposed and UNOSOM II had agreed to support. That Conference,
to deal with essentially regional as opposed to national issues,
was the SNA's idea. UNOSOM II's role would be to assist rather
than to control. This role of assisting was consistent with
UNOSOM II's mandate on political issues as set out in Security
Council Resolution 814 (1993) as well as in the Report of the
Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 on which that Resolution was
based.
200. Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked to establish UNITAF
and UNOSOM II for two main reasons: to obviate the need for
consent by Somalia to UN actions deemed necessary inside Somalia
to safeguard international peace and security and, secondly, to
authorize the use of armed force to keep open the channels for
the delivery of food and relief supplies to Somalia. Under UNOSOM
II Chapter VII was also relied upon for the compulsory
disarmament of the militias.
201. Security Council Resolution 814 (1993) invokes Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter and confers enforcement powers upon
UNOSOM II. In doing so it distinguishes between two powers: the
power to disarm Somali militias and the power to assist the
Somali people in the restoration of their country's political
structure and organs. UNOSOM II was empowered to enforce
disarmament by the use of military force under Chapter VII of the
Charter if force was considered necessary. But regarding the
rebuilding of Somalia's political structure and organs of
governance UNOSOM II's role was limited to rendering assistance
to rather than imposing solutions upon the Somali people.
202. It is against the foregoing background that UNOSOM II's
actions should be viewed. Added to them was the action taken by
the UNOSOM to declare the Somali Penal Code of 1962 as the
applicable law in Somalia. UNOSOM II in all these instances went
33
beyond assisting and was imposing. The important question in
this regard was not whether the substance of UNOSON II's actions
were for the benefit of the Somali people, but whether they were
accepted by all the Somali parties or within UNOSON II's mandate.
203. Reference was repeatedly made in testimonies of UNOSON II to
the Addis Ababa Agreements of January and March 1993 signed by
the various Somali political movements. UNOSOM II maintained that
these agreements conferred upon it powers to enforce upon the
Somali political groups various legal commitments they had
assumed. The invoking by UNOSOM II of these Agreements of the
factions as a basis of its powers might lead to some confusion if
viewed independently of the Security Council resolution 814
(1993) which established UNOSOM II. Resolution 814 (1993) spells
out UNOSOM II's mandate which only the Security Council can alter
or expand. since the resolution did not grant UNOSON II powers
to impose political solutions on the Somali people, none of the
Somali factions could empower UNOSOM II to do so. UNOSON II's
mandate in the political area was to assist the Somalis achieve
political reconciliation and re-build political structures.
204. For UNOSOM II to effectively carry out its mandate of
assisting the Somalis, there had to be the agreement or at the
very least the acquiescence of all the Somali parties. If the
Addis Ababa Agreements were adhered to by all the political
movements UNOSOM II could assist them implement it; once they
disagreed as to its implementation UNOSOM II could not force
them.
205. The insistence by UNOSOM II on enforcing political
arrangements previously agreed but no longer accepted by all the
political movements would amount to an imposition.
206. The manner in which UNOSOM II dealt with the two agreements
signed at Addis Ababa by fifteen Somali political movements, on
27 March and 30 March 1993 not only cast doubt on whether UNOSOM
II was properly interpreting its mandate on political matters,
but also revealed an inconsistency in its approach. The March 27
Agreement provided among other things for the reconstitution of
Somalia's political institutions by the Somali society generally
including a specifically mentioned role for women.
207. The 30 March Agreement, concluded by the same fifteen Somali
groups whose leaders signed the 27 March Agreement gave the
leading, almost exclusive role in the reconstitution of Somalia's
political institutions to those political movements.
208. UNOSOM II preferred the agreement of 27 March to that of 30
March and has proceeded to implement the former accord. If
UNOSOM II's preference coincided with a consensus among the
Somalis there would be nothing wrong with UNOSOM II's assisting
to implement that consensus.
34
209. In the absence of such a consensus, however, for UNOSOM II
to impose what amounted to a political solution on Somalia was
1)
inconsistent with its mandate under Security Council resolution
814 (1993).
210. As of June 4 UNOSOM and SNA were on a collision course. The
SNA which considered itself as the leading force in the
overthrowing of the former government and the main building block
of any future government of Somalia was pushed and marginalized
by UNOSOM actions on a wide front: the Galcayo Conference, the
Penal Code, the court appointments, the interpretation of the
Addis Agreements and the control of Kismayo. Radio Mogadishu had
criticized these UNOSOM II actions in harsh language and agitated
the population in South Mogadishu. Rumours of UNOSOM II plans to
seize Radio Mogadishu, the SNA's main power base, floated and
were actually confirmed to the SNA leadership by UNOSON II
personnel.
211. It was in this atmosphere of rising tension that UNOSOM II
suddenly decided to carry out its first ever inspection of SNA
weapon sites including the highly sensitive Radio Mogadishu. It
was effected against strong objections and warnings by the SNA
who clearly considered them provocative. The size and military
strength of the inspection teams left no doubt that UNOSOM II had
decided to use force if necessary to impose its will.
212. Although UNOSOM II apparently misjudged the general
situation and made some ill-advised decisions the Commission
feels that this in no way justifies the viciousness of the SNA
reaction on 5 June.
Why were the casualties so heavy on 5 June?
213. The main reason for the extent of casualties on 5 June was
that UNOSOM was completely unprepared for such ferocious attacks
which came as a lightning surprise. This is evidenced among
other things by the fact that several key personnel ware away on
the morning of 5 June, particularly the Force Commander, the
Chief of Operations and the top political advisers.
214. Some members of the Ceasefire and Disarmament Committee were
happily unaware of the whole inspection exercise and actually
meeting in South Mogadishu when the attacks began. The bulk of
the ORF, the main Force reserve for military challenges, was in
Kismayo which UNOSOM considered at that time a more volatile
place. Secondary reserves were not alerted from other
contingents to assist the Pakistanis in case of emergencies.
That is why, for instance, the Italian tanks could not be
mobilised early to go to the assistance of the troops at FP20
when they came under attack.
35
215. The failure to inform the Pakistanis about the SNA's hostile
reaction to the inspection notification letter is also a relevant
factor in assessing the number of casualties from the 5 June
attacks.
216. The Pakistani commanding officer in his operational plans
for the inspection recommended that he be informed of the SNA's
response to the notification. The Pakistanis testified that they
would have reorganized their inspection teams and equipped them
with stronger fighting and protective vehicles to enhance their
military posture had they been aware of the SNA's response.
217. In the absence of this information, the inspection teams
kept to their soft-skin vehicles which made the men intensely
vulnerable, resulting in heavy casualties.
218. Better information on attackers preparation and military
capabilities for sustained but limited armed hostilities could
have helped Pakistani inspection teams to have been better
prepared to withstand the attack with minimum casualties.
219. Even though the staff of the Force Command and the Pakistani
contingent expected some opposition to their inspection, they
could not assess the possibilities of armed confrontation, which
came as a surprise to the entire UNOSOM command, both in
magnitude and ferocity. The achievement of surprise on the part
of the SNA militia partly accounted for the high level of
casualties on the Pakistan inspection troops.
Why did UNOSON II misiudge the situation?
220. There was a lack of proper coordination between UNOSOM II
Military Planning Division and the Political Division,
responsible for coordinating ceasefire and disarmament matters.
Being fully aware of the sensitivity of Radio Nogadishu, the head
of the Political Division concedes that he would have advised
against the inspection of the cantonment site close to the radio
station, under those circumstances, if he had been informed about
the planned inspection.
221. UNOSOM II did not have a sufficient number of trained and
experienced civilian advisers to assist in the decision-making
process. However, the Commission finds that UNOSOM II could have
consulted its more experienced staff who were then available and
could have given useful advice on the sensitivity of the AWSS
inspections, which could possibly have had an important impact on
the decision to proceed with the planned inspection. Lack of co-
ordination between the military and political divisions and
inappropriate political advice contributed to the misjudgement of
the sensitivity and timing of the inspections.
36
222. Those political advisers who were specifically consulted
apparently did not appreciate the political ramifications of the
inspections and regarded them as a purely military affair.
223. There were no seasoned peacekeepers among UNOSOM military
leadership to advise on the modalities of United Nations
disarmament inspections and other useful practices learned during
45 years of United Nations peace-keeping.
224. The transition from a fighting posture to peace-keeping is
indeed a very difficult one for any professional soldiers. The
use of force to achieve one's objective is at the heart of the
military profession.
225. In peace-keeping the force and the enforcement action should
be regarded as the last resort after all peaceful means have been
exhausted. There was no one to teach the basics of peace-keeping
to UNOSOM HQ and contingents.
226. Consequently it was natural for the officers to resort to
the tools they were trained for, to the use of force,
particularly since they felt resolution 814 gave them the right
to do so. False assessment of SNA capabilities in relation to
own assets made them to believe it was as well safe to do.
227. Witnesses from UNOSON have emphasized to the Commission the
deficiencies in intelligence gathering means and personnel. They
see it as a major reason to the misjudgment of the situation on 5
June. The worst case scenario, as predicted by UNITAF,
visualized large demonstrations but nothing more as a reaction to
the 5 June inspection.
Why did the events of 5 June evolve into a war?
228. After the 5 June attacks UNOSOM understandably was furious.
It was natural to call for punitive action to be taken against
those who had killed and wounded large numbers of United Nations
soldiers who as it was felt, had only tried to carry out the
mission given to them by the world community.
229. with the outrage all over the world on the attacks the
Security Council could do nothing less than to authorize the
arrest and detention of the perpetrators.
230. Resolution 837 was interpreted by UNOSOM II to authorize not
only the hunt for Aidid and other SNA leaders but as well the
destruction of SNA power sources, the Radio Station and the
weapon stores. However, the war did not break out immediately or
suddenly after the passing of Resolution 837 but evolved
gradually. United Nations personnel, both civilian and military
had to be relocated to safer areas. Tanks, attack planes, attack
helicopters and armoured personnel carriers had to be brought in
37
to facilitate offensives against SNA.
231. These offensives began with careful avoidance of collateral
damage and avolved through the SNA response gradually to virtual
urban warfare. It is arguable whether resolution 837 really
initially envisaged bombing of houses, garages radio stations and
1
meetings. Presumably the war, when it started, followed its own
dynamics.
232. If the weapons inspection of 5 June was not an enforcement
action by UNOSOM II on the SNA then Security Council resolution
837 (1993) adopted the next day clearly was. The clashes between
UNOSOM II and the SNA thereafter were a direct result of the
implementation of resolution 837.
233. UNOSOM II not only found itself at war in the wrong
environment it was probably also handicapped in prosecuting that
war because the US QRF and later the ranger operation, all of
which had connotations of war, were not under UNOSOM's control.
If these operations were not under UNOSOM II the question arises
as to whether they were authorized by the United Nations. If
they were not, then the SNA's right to defend itself was even
more appropriate, and hence the evolution of the entire situation
into a war.
Why were the hostilities so prolonged?
234. There seem to have been two main reasons why the hostilities
went on until 8 October. UNOSOM II was unsuccessful in its
endeavours to hunt down General Aidid and to suppress the SNA's
resistance; and UNOSOM II believed it would succeed in these
efforts given time.
235. UNOSOM's failure to win the war was partly due to internal
short-comings discussed in connection with question 7. Some
UNOSOM Commanders claimed that they could not achieve their
objectives because their hands were tied and they could not
resort to equally inhuman practises as their adversaries. on the
other hand it seems that UNOSOM offensives were rallying the
Habre Gedir clan behind Aidid and his lieutenants and increasing
their resolve. UNOSOM II's pursuit of enforcement action in South
Mogadishu among a civilian population already traumatised by war
quickly became a nightmare. UNOSOM II was clearly aware of this
danger and therefore evacuated most of its civilian personnel to
Nairobi but the Somali civilians had nowhere to go. Later,
contentions by UNOSOM II that women and children were used by the
SNA as human shields would have carried greater weight had it not
been UNOSOM II itself which after 5 June initiated military
actions using modern and powerful weapons within an urban area.
236. Experience has shown that even the most careful targeting
and precision bombing cannot avoid collateral damage. The
38
attacks on Digfer Hospital, Abdi house and other sites in
Mogadishu certainly caused collateral damage apart from raising
concerns as to whether they were proper military targets.
237. Since this reality appears not to have been taken into
account, the impression given is that UNOSOM II had gone into a
war of retaliation not just against the militia who could not be
adequately isolated but against all Somalis in South Mogadishu.
238. To its credit UNOSOM II on many occasions was careful to
warn of impending military action in particular areas. This was
correct and good to avoid the civilian casualties but not for the
UNOSOM II troops who because of these warnings were exposed to
attacks. Caught in a dilemma UNOSOM II was forced to erect a
wall of separation between its peace-keeping and its war-making
personae - where its civil authorities were often kept in the
dark about military actions. This dual role, exercised
simultaneously, caused harmful confusion within UNOSOM II and,
worse yet made it possible for UNOSOM II to be portrayed simply
as an enemy of the Somali people.
239. Because the Somalis, certainly those in the SNA, became
targets of UNOSOM II's attacks after 5 June their counter-
attacks prolonging the war should be seen in that context.
240. After 2 July UNOSON II was increasingly bunkered down in its
positions whereas SNA activities and attacks multiplied. UNOSOM
assessments, however, show repeatedly unfounded optimism. (See
5 for examples). No reconciliation attempts were made by UNOSOM
nor, it appears by the United Nations in New York before the
disaster in October.
Did internal shortcomings within UNOSON II contribute to the
number of casualties?
241. UNOSOM lacked the time, expertise and requisite intelligence
to accurately evaluate the dispositions, strength and
capabilities of the SNA against whom they had to operate.
242. UNOSOM did not appreciate the fact that the Somali attackers
were well armed men, reasonably skilled and well commanded by
former officers of the National armed forces who had received
adequate training for command and control. They had been capable
of militarily driving out siad Barre, who was supported by the
national armed forces, with all their arsenal of heavy war
materiel, both in equipment and manpower resources. The Somali
armed men fighting UNOSOM were not a bunch of rag-tag armed
militia but a reasonably well organised and trained group under a
good command structure. To fight against or militarily oppose
such armed men by UNOSOM therefore required better, well
coordinated command and control mechanism, fighting vehicles that
provide both fire-power and protection, good communication system
39
and adequate knowledge of the terrain. UNOSOM's deficiency in
all these areas resulting in its inability to respond effectively
to the armed hostilities of 5th June, subsequent confrontations
and excessive casualties is largely attributable to the fact that
it was not militarily prepared for them.
243. The Force Commander of UNOSOM II was not in effective
control of several national contingents which, in varying
degrees, persisted in seeking orders from their home authorities
before executing orders of the Forces Command.
244. Many major operations undertaken under the United Nations
flag and in the context of UNOSOM's mandate were totally outside
the command and control of the United Nations, even though the
repercussions impacted crucially on the mission of UNOSOM and the
safety of its personnel.
245. Situations such as in UNOSOM II operations where some
contingent commanders resort to home authorities for clearances
to carry out tasks assigned to them have obviously created
immense difficulties for the Force Commander. This practice has
been necessitated by the casualty factor. This partly accounts
for the long delay in arrival of reinforcements responding to
requests to support the Pakistani inspection teams when they
found themselves in great difficulties on 5 June hostilities.
Delays in execution of important tasks bordering on emergencies
to support units in distress have contributed to increased loss
of lives of troops.
246. Furthermore, where reaction from home authorities is in
conflict with UNOSOM II instructions, this practice has resulted
in the contingent commander being compelled to disobey the
instructions of the Force Commander, thereby creating political
confrontation between the contributing government and the United
Nations as the sponsoring authority. such situations have
occurred and have not been helpful to the cohesiveness of the
command of UNOSOM II.
247. The principle of unified command applicable to United
Nations peace-keeping operations is even more essential in peace
enforcement operations. The quick response by the Malaysian and
Pakistani Contingents to join the QRF to rescue the Task Force
Ranger on their 3 October 1993 operation helped to save lives,
clearly demonstrating the efficacy of Unified Command.
248. The various shortcomings had an impact on the number of
casualties but were not the decisive factor.
40
VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
249. Because the mandate of UNOSOM II was based on Chapter VII of
the Charter it is fundamentally different from UNOSOM I, a
traditional peace-keeping and humanitarian mission. The
difference is so significant that it needs to be clearly
communicated to the troop contributing countries. Similarly the
nature, purpose and justification of the intervention under
Chapter VII need to be explained to the Somalis.
250. If the actions by UNOSOM II on 5 June were enforcement
actions as the SNA had been given unmistakable reasons to view
them, then the ensuing clash was not a peace-keeping but a peace
enforcement operation.
251. with the United Nations having recognised that no Somali
government existed, UNOSOM II faced a human rights dilemma when
it had to detain people in executing its mandate. In the absence
of courts, detentions came to be seen as arbitrary, exposed
UNOSOM II to criticism and had to be stopped.
252. For all of the foregoing reasons peace enforcement by UNOSOM
II inside Somalia within the context of a civil war did not
enhance the United Nations' peaceful and humanitarian image.
253. The finding that a country is without a government as was
done by the United Nations concerning Somalia has such far
reaching legal and political consequences that careful criteria
for invoking it seem required. If the United Nations operates in
a country it has thus characterized, it necessarily has to bear
responsibility for at least some of the basic state concerns
traditionally appertaining to a government and that could
invariably raise the spectre of a United Nations trusteeship or
nec-colonialism.
254. It is vital for units to be in a position to respond to
requests for emergency fire support or reinforcement from other
neighbouring units without having to wait for an order or
authorization from Force headquarters in such an operation.
However, such spontaneous responses are only possible if units
have common communication facilities. In the absence of such
facilities on 5 June the Pakistanis could not make a direct
request to the Italian brigade for assistance with tanks; neither
could the Nigerians make direct communication with the Italians
at Strong Point 42 when the Nigerians were ambushed only a short
distance away.
255. Many senior political advisors in UNOSOM II especially on
sensitive political issues lacked experience and knowledge of
United Nations peace-keeping practices and were insensitive to
the local culture's requirements.
41
256. While the United Nations might undertake Chapter VII
operations in reliance upon assurances of support from member
states, there is no guarantee that such member states will honour
these assurances. The Somali experience demonstrates the risk of
member states withdrawing their support, thus leaving the United
Nations in the lurch to face the consequences of an unfinished
operation.
257. The need to satisfy the United Nations' requirement for
reliable information and intalligence gathering capability is
important if peace enforcement operations are to be successfully
carried out.
258. Whenever there are casualties home governments tend to
become more and more involved. It is essential to have means for
coordinating policy, concept of operations and operational
procedures. There was no forum for such coordination at United
Nations Headquarters since the military staff committee with
representation from all participating countries which the Charter
requires to direct Chapter VII operations has not been
established. In traditional peace-keeping operations the
necessary coordination in the field has normally been carried out
by terms of reference issued by the Secretary-General and through
SOPs issued by FC and approved by the Secretary-General.
Neither of these guidelines were to be found in UNOSOM II. The
main reason for this rather crucial deficiency seemed to have
been the total lack of peace-keeping experience among UNOSON II
ranks and understaffing of UNOSOM II Headquarters during the
initial period.
259. Use of force, and deadly force in particular, tends to
create a cycle of vengeance that gradually escalates the
conflict. The United Nations is helpless if confronted with the
inhumane and unscrupulous means a reckless militia can resort to
on home turf.
260. Nations are not prepared to accept substantial casualties
for causes unrelated to their national interests. This fact puts
severe limitations on peace enforcement operations.
261. In hindsight it seems that the mandate given to UNOSOM II,
at least as it was interpreted, was too pretentious in relation
to the instruments and to the will to implement it.
42
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
262. Enforced disarmament in Somalia has proved unattainable
without exposing international staff, both military and civilian,
to hostile attacks resulting in casualties. Therefore in the
present context, forced disarmament of the militias under Chapter
VII should be abandoned.
263. The United Nations should not insist on a particular
political formula for the resolution of the Somali conflict, but
should within the framework of the fundamental principles and
goals of its charter assist all Somali political movements to
reach consensus on political reconciliation and the re-building
of the institutions of governance.
264. Without prejudice regarding who bears legal liability, ex
gratia payments should be considered for those innocent Somali
civilians who suffered injury as a consequence of UNOSOM II's
implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993).
265. To this end, it may be convenient to set up a mechanism
under the United Nations to determine the criteria for granting
such payments.
266. The United Nations Headquarters should maintain a sufficient
pool of appropriately trained and experienced personnel who can
be made available to every new field peace-keeping mission.
267. When inviting Governments to participate in newly
established peace-keeping missions, the United Nations should
request them to include in their contingents some senior
officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers with
peace-keeping experience.
268. The practice of utilizing observers with wide and varied
peace-keeping experience, at the initial stages of some newly
established peace-keeping missions, should be adopted as a
principle by United Nations Headquarters for the establishment of
its peace-keeping missions.
269. Armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and other protective
vehicles and gear are essential to protect troops and reduce
casualties especially in peace enforcement operations. They
should be made. available for all participating contingents.
270. The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further
peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of
states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake
enforcement operation, the mandate should be limited to specific
objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate
means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted.
43
271. The United Nations should, where necessary, continue peaca-
keeping operations of the traditional type under its Charter, but
with increased emphasis on preventive diplomacy, assistance in
peaceful nation-building efforts and preparedness to respond
quickly to emergencies.
272. Political control of United Nations peace-keeping operations
should rest fully with the Secratary-General and there should be
a unified command. However, the command structure for any peace
enforcement action which the United Nations may undertake needs
further study.
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
ESTABLISHED BY SC RESOLUTION: 885 71585,
NEMOR ANDUN
10 December 19
TO:
H.E. General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman, Somali National Alliance
Ghion Hotal, Room 119
FAX NO:
(251-1) 515-381
FROM:
Chief Justice Matthew S. W. Ngulube and
Chairman of the Commission
FAX NO: (212) 963-3082
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
After one week in Somalia, the Commission of Inquir
established by the Security Council in Resolution 885 (1993) ≤
anxious to meet with you and other senior officials of the SNA t
hear your side of the events concerning the armed attacks 1
Mogadishu in which many UNOSON personnel and Somali citizens has
been killed. UNOSON'S side of the events has been fully recorde
and explained to the Security Council but the SKA's side has yet +
be told. We assure you that the Commission is independent ar
impartial and seeks only to find the facts rather than to plac
blame. Once the facts are known the whole world will come to knc
what went wrong 50 that the proper measures can be taken to prever
their recurrence. He therefore would be pleased, if it 1
convenient to you, to travel next week to Addis Ababa to meet wit
you and other senior officials of the SNA. If any other time <
place is preferred by you for meeting with the Commission we shal
make ourselves available.
XAFISKA OUDDOOMIYAHA
SOMALI NATIONAL
(CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE)
ALLIANCE
Ref: SNA/X&/G/0613/93
Date. 17/12/1993
To:
The Commission of Inquiry
Fax No. (212) 953-3062
Mogadishu. Somalls
631020 PS03
Dear Sta.
Refer to your fax dated on Dec. 10,1993. We acknowledge the receipt of
your fax and have recorded the massage k contained.
We would like to express our reservations on the commission's
Independence and neutrality. We believe that the commission la not free
from the Influence of the UN Secretary-Gineral who himself is a part of the
June 5 controversy.
However, 1 am requesting the immediate and unconditional release of the
SNA leaders and supporters unlawfully abducted and Imprisoned. before
having any contacts or meeting with the commission.
Mohamed Mardis Farsh Aidid
SOMALI
INFORMATION
Chairman
N
ALLIANCE
1993-12-20
14:55
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON SOMALIA
ESTABLISHED BY SC RESOLUTION 885 (1993)
9 February 1994
SAFARI CLUB HOTEL
P.O. Box 43564 Nairobi
Tel. 330621/ Fax 331201
H.E. General Mohamed Farah Aidid
Chairman, Somall National Alliance
Serena Hotel
Nairobi
Your Excellency,
The Commission of Inquiry is now in the process of winding up Its
Investigation and preparing Its report in Nairobi. As we have not
until now received any response to our letter to you dated on 20
January 1994, we are taking this opportunity to send you another
copy in case the previous one was not delivered or was otherwise
mishandled.
The Commissioners are due to leave Nairobi for New York on 15
January 1994.
Since we consider It of utmost importance to achieve a balanced
investigation, we wish renew our invitation to you to meet with the
Commission. The Executive Secretary is available for a preparatory
meeting with yourself or any of your representatives to clarify any
preliminary Issues if necessary.
Sincerely yours
Matthew musay S.W. Ngulube
Chief Justice of Zambia
Chairman of the Commission
- 2 -
The commission is at the hilton hotel and I would really be
most grateful to receive some indication on our request since, it
will be necessary to conclude the inquiry in the near future.
Sincerely yours
mmDX
Matthew M.S.W Ngulubs
Chief Justice of Zambia &
Chairman of the Commission
-
(
1
0
. 2 -
We will continue to request the Security Council to
Appoint a new Commission or expand your commission's
mission and composition. We hope that you will assist in
making this request possible.
In the meantime, should you have further questions
concerning our position, please fael free to contact us.
Sincerely Yours.
Maidis
Mohamed Parah Aidid
Chairman
SOMALI
N.
S
ALLIANCE
- ANNEX 2 -
INTERVIEWS
DATE
PERSON INTERVIEWED
1.
3-4 Dec. 1993
Dr. Kapungu and Runo Bergstrom
2.
14 Dec. 1993
Lt. Col. Emmanuel Eihoda (NIG)
3.
15 Dec. 1993
Col. Asif Duraix Akhtar (PAK)
4.
15 Dec. 1993
Lt. Col. Mohamad Hamid Khan
(PAK)
5.
15 Dec. 1993
Col. Maj. Omar Essakalli (MOR)
6.
16 Dec. 1993
Lt. Col. Tariq Salim Malik (PAK)
7.
16 Dec. 1993
Maj. Umar Farooq Durani (PAK)
8.
16 Dec. 1993
Lt. Col. Sher Akbar Khan (PAK)
9.
17 Dec. 1993
Lt. Gen. Cevic Bir (TURK)
(Force Commander.)
10. 18 Dec. 1993
Capt. Abdi Latif (MAL)
11. 19 Dec. 1993
Amb. Richard Bogosian - US
Liaison Office
12. 17 Dec. 1993
Amb. Lansana Kouyate (DSRSG)
13. 10 Dec. 1993
Five detainees at UNOSON
Detention facility in Mogadishu
14. 08 Dec. 1993
Osman Hassan Ali (Atto)
15. 08 Dec. 1993
Omar Salad
16. 10 Jan. 1993
Maj. Gen. Baril and
Elizabeth Lindenmayer
17. 11 Jan. 1994
Lt. Col. Salvatore Iacono
(ITALY)
18. 12 Jan. 1994
Amb. April Glaspie (USA)
19. 12 Jan. 1994
Amb. Robert Gosende (USA)
20. 17 Jan. 1994
Brig. Gen. Loi and Officers
of the Italian UNOSOM contingent
ANNEX 2
2
21. 17 Jan. 1994
Maj. Parotti (ITALY)
22. 25 Jan. 1994
Lt. Col. Samuel Butler, U3 Plans
officer
23. 25 Jan. 1994
Omar Halim, Chief of Staff
(UNOSOM II)
24. 25 Jan. 1994
Kenneth Menkhaus, Special
Political Advisor to the SRSG
25. 26 Jan. 1994
Col. Ward, Chief Operations
Officer
26. 26 Jan. 1994
Mr. Don Teitelbaum, SRSG's
Advisor/US State Department
27. 26 Jan. 1994
Lt. Col. Kevin McGovern, Deputy
Chief
Military Information Officer
28. 27 Jan. 1994
Col. Casper, Commander QRF on 3
Oct.
29. 28 Jan. 1994
Admiral Jonathan Howe, SRSG
30. 28 Jan. 1994
Maj. Gen. Montgomery, Deputy
Force Commander
31. 29 Jan. 1994
Amb. L. Kouyate, DSRSG
- 3
1. Somali Africans Muki Organisation (SAHO)
Mr. Mohamed Ramadan Arbow, Chairman
2. Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
Mr. Mohamed Farah Abdullahi, Chairman
3. Somali Democratic Novement (SDM)
Mr. Abdi Muse Mayow, Chairman
4. Col. Mohamed Nur Aliyou, Chairman (sna)
5.
Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
Mr. Ali Ismael Abdi, Chairman
6. Somali National Front (SNF)
General Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi, Chairman
7. Somali National Union (SNU)
Dr. Mohamed Ragis Mohamed, Chairman
8. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
General Aden Abdillahi Noor, Chairman
9. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (sna)
Col. Ahmed Omar Jess, Chairman
10. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
General Mohamed Abshir Musse, Chairman
11. Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) (sna)
Col. Abdi Warsame Isaaq, Chairman
12. United Somali Congress (USC) (sna)
General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman
13. United Somali Congress (USC)
Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman
14. United Somali Front (USF)
Mr. Abdurahman Dualeh Ali, Chairman
15. United Somali Party (USP)
Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hashi, Chairman
ANNEX 4
MILITARY ACTIONS
5 JUNE - 22 OCTOBER 1993
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SMA ACTIONS
UNOSOM ACTION
05-11 June
05 - Major 3 sided ambush +
05 - Scheduled inventory
secondary ambush at
of 5 SNA Weapons
78-20. 25 KIA, 57 WIA
storage Sites.
(Pak), 2 WIA (US).
05 - old UNOSON compound
attacked with small
arms and two FRAG
grenades.
07 - Destroyed (8) 155mm +
105mm Arty. (2)
Technicals.
12-18 June
12 - Coordinated series of
actions to remove
Radio Mogadishu from
SNA control and 3
previous authorized
weapons sites.
13 - Anti-UNOSOM
13 - Air strike against
demonstration, 4
unauthorised SNA
Somalis killed near
weapon storage sites
former Egyptian
(Osman Atto).
Embassy.
Technicals and 20
large containers of
small arms.
15 - 2 Suspected arms
locations raided.
17 - Air ground search for
arms. Aidid compound
- large cache found.
KIA: 4 (Mor), 3 (Pak);
WIA:3 (Fra), 8 (Pak),
4 (US), 2. (Ita), and
39 (Mor).
19-25 June
19 - ORF destroyed 36 Arty
pieces.
22 - RGP (1) attack on
22 - ORF destroys SNA
University Compound.
weapons site. Tanks,
APCs, Arty, Crew
served weapons + small
arms
25 - RPG (1) attack on New
Port.
26-02 July
28 - In search of Atto's
28 - Atto's Garage searched
Garage.
2 KIA, 2 WIA (Pak).
30 - ORF attacks Atto's
Garage.
02 - Italian forces
02 - Italian sweep Pasta
ambushed. 3 KIA +
Factory.
29 WIA.
2
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SNA ACTIONS
UNOSON ACTION
03-09 July
03 - RPG (1) attack at
Airport.
06 - Mortar (2) attack
06 - ORF cordon + search.
Airport.
Weapons seized.
07 - Four Maanta Somali
employees and two
Somali policemen
killed in ambush.,
07 - Mortar (2) attack
Airport.
08 - Ambush of Marine
vehicles. 1 WIA.
09 - Ambush of UNOSON
vehicles.
09 - Mortar (2) attack
Embassy Compound.
10-16 July
10 - New Port sniper,
10 - ORF search Medina
3 WIA (French)
area.
12 - "Abdi House" attacked.
4 international
journalists beaten to
death by Somalis.
13 - Mortar (3) attack
Sword Base.
14 - Mortar (Unk) attack
Sword Base.
14 - RPG (3-4) attack New
Port.
14 - Mortar (4) attack
Airport.
17-23 July
17 - Mortar (1) attack
17 - ORF weapon sweep.
Sword Base.
18 - Mortar (3) + RPG (3)
attack Airport.
19 - 3 separate patrols
ambushed.
20 - 2 convoys + separate
vehicle fired on. 2
WIA Zimbabwe.
23 - Pakistani APC hits mine
23 - SP-1 receives small
arms fire.
24-30 July
25 - 2 US Humvees ambushed.
2 WIA (US).
25 . 84mm RR (3) attack on
Sword Base.
26 - Malaysian APC ambushed
at CP-31.
28 . RPG (3) attack sword
28 - ORF weapon sweep.
Base.
3
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SNA ACTIONS
UNOSOM ACTION
31-06 August
01 - Pakistan/ search: 1 -
60 + 1 60MM mortar.
03 - Mortar (8) attack
University Compound
+ Embassy Compound.
03 - Mortar (6) attack
Airport.
03 - RPG (1) attack Airport.
04 - Brown & Root vehicle
hits mine.
04 - Mortar (4-6) attack
Hunter Base
04 - Mortar (7) attack
Embassy Compound.
05 - Italian convoy ambushed 05 - ORF helicopter
Nations Road.
destroys 2 technicals.
05 - Mortar (5) attack Sword
Base.
07-13 August
08 - US Humvee command
detonated mine. 4 KIA.
08 - Mortar (6) attack
Embassy Compound.
08 - Mortar (4) attack
University Compound.
10 - QRF helicopter
10 - UNOSON Force clear 21
receives small ares
October Road of road-
fire (3 separate
blocks.
incidents).
10 - Mortar (4) attack
Airport.
11 - QRF aircraft destroys
technical.
12 - QRF + Pakistani forces
conduct search.
14-20 August
15 - ORF weapons search.
16 - Malaysian conducted
search. Two 560mm
mortars found in
Benadir Hospital.
19 - U.S. convoy vehicles
damaged by command
detonated mine.
4 WIA.
19 - ORF helicopter
receives small area
fire.
20 - ORF helicopter
receives small ares
fire and possible
RPG fire.
20 - Mortar (6-7) attack
University Compound.
4
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SNA ACTIONS
UNOSON ACTION
21-27 August
21 . ORF helicopter
receives small arms
fire and possible RPG
fire.
22 - U.S. convoy (22
vehicles), one vehicle
destroyed by command
detonated mine; Ambush
with small arms + RPGs.
6 WIA.
22 - Mortar attack (1)
University compound.
23 - RPG (1) Airport;
Damage to 5 Italian
helicopters + 1 fuel
bladder.
24 - RPG (1) and mortar (4)
24 - Somali shot and killed
attack Sword Base.
attempting to escape
24 - QRF helicopter fired
from the detention
at with two RPGs.
center.
26 - QRF helicopter hit by
26 - Lead elements of US
possible dud RPG; 6
Rangers arrive.
inch hole in stabilizer.
26 - Mortar attack (4) Sword
Base.
27 - Rocket attack (1)
Embassy Compound, Dud
in Botswana tent.
28-03 Sept.
28 - Mortar attack (1) Sword
Base.
28 - Mortar attack (1)
Airport.
29 - Mortar attack (3) Sword
Base.
29 - RPG attack (3) Airport.
29 - Mortar attack (12)
Airport.
29 - RPG attack (3)
University Compound.
30 - Mortar attack (1)
30 - Ranger raid on
Sword Base.
UNDP/SKA C.
31 - Mortar attack (9)
Airport; 1 MI-17
damaged, 1 fuel
bladder raptured.
01 - Mortar attack (1)
01 - Bangladesh forces
Airport.
seixed weapons cache,
01 - ORF helicopter fired
five 20mm twin mounts,
on with small arms.
one 30mm single mount,
two 12.7mm HMGs.
02 - QRF helicopter hit by
small arms and RPG,
1 WIA.
5
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SNA ACTIONS
UNOSOM ACTION
03 - Mortar attack (1)
Airport.
04-10 Sept.
04 - Mortar attack (3)
Sword Base.
04 - Mortar attack (3)
sword Base.
05 . Nigerian ambushed on
Balad Road SP-19 to
SP-42. *KIA, 10 WIA,
1 MIA also 2 Pakistanis;
WIA in secondary ambush
21 October Road.
05 - ORF helicopter hit by
small arms and RPG. 1
WIA.
05 - Mortar attack (3)
Sword Base.
05 - Mortar attack (2)
Airport.
06 - Mortar attack (1)
Airport.
06 - RPG attack (1)
Airport.
06 - Mortar attack (2)
Airport.
07 . Mortar attack (1)
07 - Ranger TF raid 17
Sword Base.
detainees. 2 WIA.
08 - RPG attack (3)
Airport.
09 - Pakistani attacked on
21 October Road while
clearing roadblock
near SP89. Pak: 1 KIA,
2 WIA. U.S. 3 WIA/Lost
1 tank and 1 bulldoser.
09 - Mortar attack (4) Sword
Base.
10 - Pakistani SP-31 mortar
fire.
10 - Mortar attack (1)
Embassy Compound.
10 - Mortar attack (1)
University Compound.
10 - Mortar attack (10)
Sword Base.
10 - Mortar attack (5)
Sword Base.
10 - Mortar attack (4)
Sword Base.
10 - Mortar attack (2)
Airport.
10 - Mortar attack (6)
Airport.
8
WEEK (SAT-FRI) SNA ACTIONS
UNOSOM ACTIONS
international TF.
KIA: 15 (US), 1 (Mal).
WIA: 78 (US), 9 (Mal),
3 (Pak).
04 - Mortar attack (3)
New Port.
04 - Mortar attack (2)
Airport.
06 . Mortar attack (2)
Airport. 1 KIA,
12 WIA (US).
07 - Mortar attack (4)
Airport.
07 - RPG attack (2) Airport.
08 - Intruder cuts fuel pod
at Airport.
09-15 Oct.
09 - ORF reports possible
09 - AC-130 test fires
mortar attack on
weapons.
Airport (1) round.
12 - Pipeline between
Seaport and Airport
sabotaged.
15 - Mortar attack (1)
Airfield Somalis
killed and wounded.
16-22 Oct.
20 - ORF helicopter was
fired on by RPG.
- ANNEX . 5
SYMOPSIS OF THE ATTACKS ON THE PERSONNEL OF UNOSON II WHICH LED
TO CASUALTIES AMONG THEM AS DRAWN FROM OFFICIAL REPORTS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS
{MAY - NOVEMBER 1993}
Date
Incident
7 May
Kismayo was attacked by the SPM-Jess (SPM-SNA) faction
early in the morning on 7 May by 100-200 men, trying to
infiltrate the city from different sides. The attempt to
take back the town from General Morgan was pushed back by
the Belgian troops. During this period the Belgians
conducted each day a number of "show-of-force" operations
such as mobile road blocks, day and night patrols as well
as active reconnaissance and helicopter surveillance. The
military activity and screening activities obstructed the
infiltration and enabled the Belgian troops to engage the
militia of Omar Jess at an early stage. One Belgian
officer was shot and wounded. An estimated forty Somalis
of the attacking force were either killed or wounded.
13 May
In the town of BARYWEINE one Morrocan was killed at a
checkpoint by an unknown Somali. Weapon and magazine of
the soldier were reported missing.
5 June
At 9 o'clock in the morning, less than one day after
notice had been given, teams of UNOSOM weapon inspectors
arrived simultaneously at the five Authorized Weapon
Storage sites (ANSSs) in southern MOGADISHU which the
USC/SNA, the faction controlled by Aideed, had previously
identified as the places where their heavy weapons had
been deposited. A company of Pakistani troops accompanied
each team. Shortly thereafter violence began with
firefights and crowd disturbances all over South
Mogadishu. The inspections had been completed, on the
whole without incidents when, angry crowds began to
gather in vicinity of kilometre four ( K4,) kilometre
five ( K5,) and kilometer seven ( K7.)
Outside ANSS 5, which was also the site of RADIO
MOGADISHU, a crowd began to gather by the gate. By 09.00
hrs, it had increased to some 200 men, women and
children. Several men appeared and ware perceived to be
fanning and inciting the crowd. Reportedly, one Somali
was shot and killed or wounded, when he tried to seize
the rifle of a Pakistani soldier. One eyewitness stated
that armed Somali militiamen joined the crowd and began
shooting at the Pakistani soldiers outside the RADIO
STATION, wounding two soldiers. The inspection was
completed by 09.30 hrs.
-ANNEX-5 .
the buildings along the road and the side streets. The
Pakistani troops were exposed to increasingly intens
fire including heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) near CP 89. 8P 42 and SP 50 were also
under fire. Gunmen fired at the Pakistanis and then
disappeared into the crowd of mostly women and children.
Reinforcements sent from the Pakistani headquarters to CP
89 received fire as soon as they left the STADIUM. As
they approached CP 89, they were drenched with
concentrated fire that ripped through the sides of their
trucks and scout cars. Gunmen in the SAUDI RELIEF AGENCY
BUILDING on 21 OCTOBER ROAD started shooting, creating a
withering crossfire. Roadblocks were continuously
fortified and more troops were trapped around CP 89. Most
of the troops in the area, including a Quick Reaction
Force (QRF) unit, took shelter inside the CIGARETTE
FACTORY.
At 13.20 hrs, US reconnaissance and Italian attack
helicopters arrived. Friendly machine gun fire from the
Italian helicopter wounded three Pakistani soldiers. No
rockets were fired at the Somali machine gun posts which
continued firing to the end of the afternoon.
There were multiple reports of random gunfire and other
violence at various locations, particularly along the US
EMBASSY to K7 areas. Two US soldiers were shot near K4
and evacuated to the US HOSPITAL. Gunfire and violence
continued throughout the day to include: random
firefights between UN and Somali; shots being fired at
AIRPORT and SWORD BASE personnel; an attempted
penetration of the U.S EMBASSY COMPOUND by approximately
50 Somalis; an attack against UN residences; small arms
fired against a U.S. helicopter near the AIRFIELD and 60
mm mortar fire near the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES COMPOUND
south of the NEW FORT.
The total number of casualties was 24 Pakistanis killed,
57 Pakistanis wounded, 1 Italian wounded and 3 US
personnel wounded.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. Mr. Osman Atto, responding to a question on the
incident on 5 June 1993, stated that he heard that the
fighting started at the RADIO STATION at 10.30 a.m. on 5
June. Mr. Atto claimed that the letter from the UNOSOM
announcing that there would be inspection of the AWSS was
3
- - ANNEX - 5
never received by the members of the Cease Fire
Committee. It was delivered instead to the "ambassador",
another person on the staff of General Aidid but
unconnected to the Cease-fire Committee at 5.00 p.m.
Friday. Prior to that for quite sometime in the city, a
rumour was circulating that UNOSOM wanted to take over
the radio Mogadishu. Atto stated that if the letter
announcing the inspection had been received by a member
of the Cease Fire Committee, the incident of 5 June would
not have happened.
b. Reports state that Pakistani troops did not possess
armoured fighting vehicles, helicopters or armoured cars.
The greater part of the casualties were taken while the
Pakistani troops travelled in soft skin vehicles while
going to reinforce ambushed strongpoints. The apparent
lack of armoured protection and firepower along with
effective aerial cover to protect troops resulted in the
high number of casualties. Despite the preparations of
the Pakistani troops of the AWSS inspection, the furious
reaction was not anticipated. The Pakistani reports
describe previous relations as friendly between their
troops and the Somali population. Therefore the element
of surprise added to the gravity of events. No hostile
actions were expected.
C. There have been widespread allegations that the
requested reinforcements were delayed because the
contingents, in this case the Italians, had to consult
their government before responding to the requests
thereby delaying the assistance from the time of the
request between 10.00 am and 11.00 am until 16.50 p.m.
d. The SNA's AWSS fell within the Pakistani area of
responsibility while those belonging to Ali Mahdi were in
the Italian area. The Italians had allegedly notified the
Cease-fire and Disarmament Division (U-3) that they had
recently conducted an inspection of the Ali Mahdi AWSS
and found little weaponry. They therefore saw no point in
checking them again. In fact, the notification concerned
the fact that the Ali-Mahdi sites had been disestablished
in March 1993, a decision made by the commander of the
AOR (Area of Responsibility).
e. One senior officer within UNOSOM expressed the view
that he felt "[the] business of inspecting the weapon
sites was just to camouflage the operation against the
radio station".
4
-ANNEX-5 -
f. Another senior officer with a commanding post
perceived the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM as if the
contingents operated under the same rules of engagement
as those applied by UNITAF. This meant to stop vehicles,
confiscate weapons, to retaliate when fired upon and to
carry out searches on the basis of received intelligence.
g. Prior to the 5 June inspection the Pakistania had
expressed the view that because there could be serious
repercussions from the inspection, advanced warning
should not be given the SNA as that would give them the
opportunity to react against the inspections. If prior
warning had to be given, the Pakistanis expressed the
need for them to be told of the reaction of the Somalis.
They claim they were not made aware of the angry USC-SNA
reaction prior to the inspection. Had they been told they
would not have undertaken the inspection in such an ill
prepared posture as they did.
12 June In response to the 5 June incident and pursuant to the
mandate given to it by Security council Resolution 837,
UNOSOM initiated operations, including attacks on
selected targets in Mogadishu. On the morning of 12 June,
AC-130 SPECTRE gunships attacked and destroyed the
CIGARETTE FACTORY, ambush site of 5 June, AWSS 3 and AWSS
5, disabling RADIO Mogadishu, the STATION belonging to
USC-SNA. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) attacked and
damaged AWSS 1, reattacked AWSS 3 and seized AWSS 4, the
radio station re transmission site.
13 June The operations conducted on 13 June (and 14 June) were
strikes done by AC-130 gunships on to UNOSOM known
illegal arms and ammunition caches in the USC-SNA enclave
of the city. The targets were ATTO'S GARAGE on 13 June
(and AIDEED'S GARAGE on the 14 June).
A large crowd estimated 1,500 to 3,000, composed
predominantly of women and children, marched down VIA
LENIN towards the strong point K4. A man carrying a flag
appeared and began exhorting the crowd through his
megaphone. Pakistani troops fired warning shots without
any effect. Meanwhile a much smaller crowd, no more than
60 people, was approaching the roundabout from the other
side of the arch. Gunmen were spotted at the corners of
two side streets on VIA LENIN nearest to the roundabout.
They began firing at the EGYPTIAN EMBASSY building where
the Pakistani troops were positioned. Sniper fire was
seen to come from a nearby building. shots were fired
from behind the front rows of the crowd. All of a sudden
armed men appeared on the scene and began firing at the
. - ANNEX - 5
Pakistanis and into the crowd. It appears from the
evidence that the incident was staged, for the benefit of
the international press, to show "a massacre of non-
combatants" by Pakistani forces. According to the
Pakistani commanding officer, when all firing ceased,
eight Somali persons appeared to have been hit. The
actual number of casualties could not be confirmed. There
were no casualties among the Pakistani troops.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. A report by African Rights claims that Pakistani
troops opened fire at the crowd killing at least 10
civilians. Shots were also fired from both sides of the
streets where demonstrators gathered. The report claim
a total of 20 people were killed in the incidents.
b. Amnesty International expressed concern about this
incident when it says some 20 Somali civilian
demonstrators, including women and children, were killed
by UNOSOM II Pakistani forces who had come under fire
from gunmen in the vicinity. Their concern was about the
fact that Pakistani forces may have used lethal force in
violation of UN law enforcement guidelines such as the UN
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials.
C. In a statement from a Pakistani commander it is
alleged that the Somali snipers were firing into the
crowds apparently to create the false impression that the
Pakistani soldiers were targeting women and children.
*17 June. Forces Command initiated strikes against targets in the
vicinity of the Aideed enclave in MOGADISHU. The first
phase commenced at 01.30 hrs on 17 June when Forces
Command engaged AC-130 SPECTRE gunship in air strike
against selected targets in the Aideed controlled part of
MOGADISHU. Damaged targets included suspected weapon
caches, AIDEED'S RESIDENCE, JESS' RESIDENCE and ATTO'
RESIDENCE. Warnings were given by loud speaker teams to
enable non-combatants to clear the area.
The second phase began with Moroccan and Italian forces
moving to isolate the enclave. French forces established
a screen along 21 OCTOBER ROAD, and Pakistani forces
conducted the clearing operation. The forces initially
met limited resistance in carrying out their tasks. At
05.20 hrs, when the Moroccan forces were engaged in
roadblock clearing, they encountered a crowd of 1,000
6
- ANNEX-5
people, mainly women and children. The crowd was
dispersed by teargas. Simultaneously, French troops
killed four snipers in the CIGARETTE FACTORY area.
At approximately 09.30 hrs, crowds, now armed, approached
the Moroccan forces. The USC-SNA militia led the crowd
with women and children in front to within handgrenade
range (35 m) bafore engaging Morrocan forces. At 09.45
hrs weapons of all calibers fired heavily at the Moroocan
forces from the DIGFER HOSPITAL and the buildings in its
neighbourhood. The Moroccans sustained twelve casualties
in this firing alone. Fighting continued several hours
and attack helicopters had difficulty in giving support
to the Moroccan forces which were too close to the
militia's heavy machine guns. By the end of the fighting,
over 100 of General Aideed's militiamen were captured.
UNOSOM forces had confiscated large quantities of
weapons, including artillery rounds, rocket-propelled
grenades, TOW anti-tank missile, mortar launcher, rifle
grenades, hand grenades and a large number of small arms.
The UNOSOM casualties included 5 Moroccans killed, 1
Pakistani killed, 40 Moroccans wounded, 1 Pakistani
wounded, 3 US wounded and 3 French troops wounded in
action. Unconfirmed reports indicate' that over 150
Somalis were killed in the fighting.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. The UNOSOM operational intent for the extensive
operation was to continue to put pressure on USC/SNA
militia and secure the main lines of communication and
key facilities in the city. UNOSON Forcas Command also
wanted to continue offensive operations to saver local
command and control of SNA militias. The UNOSOM
estimation was that it required precise fires directed at
key targets within the city followed by an aggressive
cordon and search operation. The stated objective was to
neutralize the command and control of the USC/SNA
militia, drive the militia from their base of operations,
and conduct disarmament within southern MOGADISHU in
order to restore humanitarian relief operations in the
city.
b. The UNOSOM assessment of the operation was that the
intense air and ground operations yielded the military
objectives they had sought. The security situation in
MOGADISHU was deemed to be in the hands of General Aideed
and it was stated that if he relented from his campaign
of illegal tactics and disruption of humanitarian
7
- ANNEX- 5
activities, UNOSON should be able to rapidly enter the
next phase of planned operations. At this point it wa
felt from the UNOSOM operational command that the
situation was in a period of consolidation, hopeful that
growing pro-UNOSOM sentiment would erode General Aideed's
political influence so as to fully strip him of his
power.
C. It was stated that although UNOSOM remained
militarily ready to respond to Aideed and his militia,
the official objective was to avoid confrontation with
him and to continue the disarmament process throughout
the country. However, it was strongly stated that force
structure and logistic support were, as it had been
emphasized continuously for months, absolutely essential
to the success of the humanitarian mission.
d. Statement from Moroccan commander that intelligence
was insufficient for the operations and that this led to
the fatal sniper attacks from DIGFER HOSPITAL rooftops
and other buildings outside the cordon-and-search
operation area forcing the troops to change their plans.
Furthermore, there had been unconfirmed allegations of
helicopter air-cover fire on own troops.
17-28 Jun.
The situation in Mogadishu was characterized as
tense, but stable with increasing escalations from
the USC/SNA by means of nightly harassment of
UNOSOM installations with rocket-propelled grenades
and small arms fire, weekly anti-UNOSOM
demonstrations and increasingly frequent roadblocks
along 21 OCTOBER ROAD, LENIN ROAD, NATIONAL STREET,
and ARMED FORCES ROAD.
*28 June.
At 14.15 hrs a Pakistani force had been sent to
carry out search operations at a compound known as
Atto's garage (in the vicinity of GRID 376 291).
During the search operations the Pakistanis were
attacked by a Somali militia force of approximately
fifteen men armed with AK-47 rifles, machine guns,
grenades, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7).
During the attack some soldiers became isolated and
were later extracted by Pakistani forces. U.S.
Cobra helicopters provided support during the
extraction operation.
Two Pakistanis were killed and three were wounded, an
unknown number of Somalis were killed or wounded.
- - ANNEX - 5
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a.General Aideed had threaten to start a guerilla war on
26 June, utilizing hit and run tactics against UNOSOM II
Forces.
b. Continued complaint from Forces Command that
insufficient equipment would continue to cause
unnecessary casualties until equipment should be
available to the Pakistani Brigade. Despite this UNOSOM
was said to have good cause to be optimistic. Forces
Command was perceived to be growing rapidly. The addition
of armoured vehicles was expected to greatly enhance the
ability within Mogadishu and the cradibility throughout
Somalia. According to the UNOSOM assessment, Aideed's
support was slipping away, the UNOSOM strategy was
consequently believed to be proving effective. UNOSOM
thought it was "patiently" applying pressure consistent
with the force security requirements and with the overall
operational plan.
c. Criticism from the Pakistani command that the
incident had vividly magnified the fact that search of a
suspected place must not be undertaken in future unless
dedicated tanks and gunships were incorporated in such
operations. The Italian response regarding search and
coordinated operations in the target area had also given
birth to a lot of apprehensions. The political
considerations pursued by the Italians were believed to
have over ridden the military operations.
d. There exist widespread allegations that Italian
troops neither carried out requested search for missing
Pakistani soldier in ATTO HOUSE compound nor allowed the
Pakistani troops to do the needful.
*2 July. Italian forces were attacked by militia fighters on the
northern portion of 21 OCTOBER ROAD, in vicinity of the
PASTA FACTORY. At 06.00 hrs the Italian Brigade conducted
a cordon and search operation in the area 1 km south of
the PASTA FACTORY (in vicinity of GRID 400 302). The
actual search was done in the vicinity of GRID 402 295
and a 350 m radius of surrounding area. The operation was
to be conducted in the HALIUAA village area with two
buses and one helicopter in addition to ground forces. At
08.50 hrs three Italian soldiers were slightly wounded
during the search operations by stones thrown at them.
Fire was reported coming from PASTA FACTORY. At 09.30
hrs, the search continued in the area of the PASTA
FACTORY. As the Italians had completed their task and
9
-ANNEX-5
were returning along BALAD ROAD/IMPERIAL ROAD, they ca 1
across road blocks and received heavy fire from Somali
militia. One Italian soldier and one Somali policeman
were injured in this incident and one vehicle was
destroyed. From this time heavy fighting was ongoing and
at noontime Italian tanks had fired on the PASTA FACTORY.
The Italian troops located at GRID 402 302 were
withdrawing receiving fire from the top of PASTA FACTORY.
Seven Italians, three Somali police were wounded. At
12.02 hrs the Deputy Force Commander gave authority for
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Cobra helicopter gunships to
angage the PASTA FACTORY and instructed the Italian
Liaison Officer to ensure that friendly locations were
known.
At 12.30 hrs the intelligence unit (U-2) reports to the
Joint Operations Command (JOC) that they are in progress
of planning an AC-130 SPECTRE air strike on the PASTA
FACTORY. At 12.32 hrs the firing in vicinity of PASTA
FACTORY was reported to be still continuing and was
heavy, including rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) and
heavy machinegun. At 12.45 hrs Italian forces were
reportedly withdrawing from their locations. One tank had
at that moment been fired on by anti-tank fire.
At 13.00 hrs Quick Reaction Force was ready to attack and
five minutes later QRF attack helicopters were starting
to engage targets. Helicopters were directed to attack
tops of building only. Italian Liaison Officer also later
verified that Italian troops were not in that area at the
time of helicopter fire. At 13.13 hrs Italian forces had
withdrawn 500 m SW of PASTA FACTORY. Due to ground fire
two Italian helicopters were damaged and an Italian truck
was hit by rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire. At 13.17
hrs Deputy Force Commander (DFC) informed QRF fire from
helicopter to PASTA FACTORY to be stopped. At that time
the Italians confirmed that there were no more enemy in
the factory area and that their forces were returning to
their compounds.
Three Italians were killed and 30 wounded in the
incidents. Strongpoints 42 and 19 were abandoned in this
incident and the return had to be negotiated later the
same month. 67 Somali were reportedly killed and 103
wounded and another 7 arrested.
10
-ANNEX-5
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. The conduct of periodic reconnaissance of the PASTA
FACTORY and MARACHIO's GARAGE had been ordered to be
carried out at least once a week.
b. Intelligence (U-2) reports show that no reason for
the attack against Italian forces was given by any
faction. Reliable sources had indicated that the SNA
militia was aware of the Italian cordon and search
operation and the attack against them appeared to have
been planned well in advance.
c. The incident raised fear within Forces Command that
the will of coalition forces to pursue the aggressive
operations were undercut by events. This forced UNOSOM to
assume a more defensive posture. Allegations hardened
regarding the refusals of the various contingents to
implement orders given by FC to the UNOSOM troops, either
due to lack of equipment or to national authorities'
requirement to negotiate before engaging in military
operations against USC/SNA. Later in mid-July the
accusations against the Italians included that direct
negotiation had been held with the USC/SNA and that the
USC/SNA militia had greater freedom of movement in the
Italian area than elsewhere.
7
July
In this incident four Maanta Somali employees and two
Somali policemen were killed in an ambush. At 06.45 hrs,
near BENEDIR HOSPITAL by the ZOBBE BUILDING, Major Ahmed
Jama from CID (Criminal Investigation Department) and at
that time working for MAANTA, the UNOSOM daily news
bulletin, and Yusuf Ali Sheikh, the driver together with
four other persons were stopped by two cars carrying
eight persons with guns. Major Madadal and Yusuf Ali
Sheikh were killed on the spot. The other four were taken
away along with the car. Shortly after the killing, four
men, all belonging to the Haber Gider clan, arrived at
the scene to check the bodies of the two persons killed.
Later four bodies were said to have been dumped at a
place called GUBTA, in an area controlled by Ali Mahdi
supporters.
of the six persons killed, the major and Captain Mu a
Hagi Abdi, from ORIENTAL POLICE STATION, belonged to the
Isac clan, and the four others were Ali Mahdi supporters.
The perpetrators of the killing ware allegedly Aideed
supporters from the Saad clan.
11
- ANNEX - 5
9 July
Introduction of mortar fire into UNOSOM installation .
from the USC/SNA in addition to daily roadblocks and
small scale ambushes both daylight and night time. A
targeting of Us facilities could be noticed.
*12 July. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) conducts an operation against
USC/SNA command and control centre, 'ABDI HOUSE' under
direction of UNOSOM. Four international journalists were
killed by a Somali crowd.
At 10.15 hrs, the Quick Reaction Force conducted a raid
on the house of Abdi Abdiid which was described as "a
major SNA/Aideed militia command and control centre,
serving as a militia meeting site, staging area and rally
point". The raid was carried out on the basis of
information that meetings would be held at the centre,
and that the militia leaders would likely attend. Scout
Weapon Teams from an US Task Force initiated the attack
with TOW anti-tank missiles and 20 mm fire. Once the
preparatory fires were completed, a company size air
assault was conducted on to the house, as other elements
from the Task Force secured the area of operations. After
a short fire fight in the compound, the airborne rangers
searched and cleared the area, and retreated nine minutes
later. The QRF had no casualties.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. According to UNOSOM announcement, the Somali militia
casualties included 20 deaths, all male adults. There
were no women or children present at the ABDI HOUSE at
the time of the raid. Two Somalis wounded were detained.
It was also announced that in the figures of those
injured in the attack, there were no women, children or
innocent civilian bystanders.
b. The ICRC announced that the Somali casualty was 215,
including 54 dead. Aidid supporters distributed a list of
73 names who they claimed vera killed in the attack,
including women and children. They also claimed that
hundreds were wounded. The casualty allegedly included
participants in the political meeting in the ABDI HOUSE
and civilians who were nearby.
C. The African Rights report alleged that an enraged
crowd of residents turned upon the international
journalists who were covering the scene of the attack and
killed four of them. It was also stated that the
journalists were taken to the scene by members of SNA,
12
- ANNEX- 5
who were then unable to protect them from the wrath of
the people.
/
d. The UNOSOM expectations counted on tanks to begin
arriving 13 July and complete by 16 July, providing
significant operational ability and enabling the embolden
forces to reassert themselves in the city.
e. The UNOSOM assessment was that the Pakistani and
Italian forces were now patrolling more aggressively and
establishing strong points to reopen locations and
reverse the trend toward increasing violence against
vehicles and compounds which had been witnessed over the
previous week. UNOSOM sought to maintain pressure on
Aideed and was in the process of positioning forces to do
so.
f. An early unconfirmed report indicated that possibly
30 top SNA officials were present in the ABDI HOUSE at
the time of the attack. The report also indicated that as
many as 18 may have been killed (six were reported to be
still in the rubble of the house). In the afternoon of 12
July, the source reported that armed men were in the
streets of Mogadishu hoping to exact revenge on the UN.
The SNA had apparently put a price on the head of any US
soldier or UN personnel killed.
g. Forces Command assessed that the strike against the
ABDI HOUSE dealt a major blow to Aideed's militia and
more precisely to their command and control ability. The
attack was stated to tangibly change the scenario from
static defense security to active pursuit of Aideed and
that UNOSOM had regained the momentum needed to keep the
SNA/USC threat off balance.
h. Concerns expressed by Amnesty International that
dozens of unarmed civilians were killed, including some
of the UN's own interlocutors from Somali political or
sub-clan groups.
8 Aug
US HMMWV jeep was struck by a command detonated mine in
MOGADISHU near HUNTER BASE on MEDINA ROAD as two MP
vehicles were patrolling on JALLAD SIAD STREET in the
MEDINA DISTRICT between SP16 and SP3. As the vehicles
passed a crossroad in vicinity of GRID 314 238, heading
from SP3 towards SP16, the first vehicle (the platoon
leader's) was hit by an electrically controlled explosive
charge device located on the side of the road. The
explosion hit the centre of the vehicle, completely
13
-ANNEX-5
destroying the vehicle and mutilating the bodies. Three
MPs were killed immediately. The forth MP died of wounds
received due to the explosion.
a. This was the second incident of this type; the first
occurred on the 4 August against a Brown & Root
(logistics contractor) vehicle and the assessment was
that this marked an attempt to step up the threat on
UNOSOM.
22 Aug
In a U.S. convoy of 22 vehicles was attacked; one vehicle
was destroyed by command detonated mine and an ambush
with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)
ensued. six Americans were wounded.
*5 Sep
A major militia engagement ensued against deployed forces
on BALAD ROAD near the PASTA FACTORY. The attack was
directed against Nigerian soldiers during the hand-over
of responsibility from Italian to Nigerian forces in
vicinity of SP 42. In a related incident, a Pakistani
patrol attempting to aid a Nigerian unit was attacked as
it travelled along 21 OCT ROAD.
on the morning of Sunday 5 Sep Nigerian forces were
scheduled to begin transfer of control from the Italian
to Nigerian forces (beginning at 05.00 hrs). The Nigerian
Battalion was moving from BELET UEN to MOGADISHU. At
about 04.00 hrs, crowds were reported gathering in
vicinity of 8P42 which is in the NE corner of the city,
on BALAD ROAD, near the PASTA FACTORY, a known militia
stronghold. Nigerian forces arrived at SP42 at
approximately 06.05 hrs to assume control of the strong
point from Italian forces. A local elder confronted the
Nigerian forces demanding that they should have an
agreement with him before taking over from the Italians.
The Nigerian Company Commander told the elder that they
were not yet taking over but merely coordinating transfer
with Italian forces. The actual transfer was to be
complete by 23.59 hrs on 6 Sep. The elder, as reported by
the Nigerian contingent, said "the Nigerian troops will
see" and he left.
Five minutes later the Somalis opened fire on the
Nigerian soldiers. At about 07.00 hrs the situation had
deteriorated and the Nigerians requested reinforcements
who were sent from the OLD PORT northward through SP19 to
extricate the trapped Nigerian force. An Italian convoy
en route to BALAD returned to NEW PORT. Italian Liaison
Officer reported that the Italian Chief of Staff was at
SP42 07.45 hrs attempting to calm the population. Italian
14
-ANNEX-5 .
G-3 (Operations Section) warned Nigerian Liaison Officer
that he should tell his headquarters not to send
additional troops to SP42 in order to avoid worsening the
situation. The Italian G-3 was informed that a Nigerian
unit intended to move from SP19 to SP42 and that the
commander of SP19 was trying to dissuade them from doing
so. The reinforcements were ambushed north of SP19
between SP19 and SP42, about 500 E south of the PASTA
FACTORY. All casualties took place at the deliberate
ambush site. Intense fighting took place between 07.00
hrs and 09.30 hrs. By 09.45 hrs the Nigerian Liaison
Office had reported seven dead. Sporadic fighting lasted
until approximately 13.00 hrs when the situation was
relatively calm. Nigerians had by then returned to their
camp at the OLD PORT and only Italians were at SP19 and
42.
In a related incident, a Pakistani patrol, moving along
21 OCT ROAD to assist the Nigerian forces, was struck by
small arms fire and two Pakistanis were wounded.
Italian forces helped to extract a killed Nigerian from
the ambush site. They also encouraged Nigerian forces to
return to their camp and allow the situation to settle.
The Italian forces resumed control over SP19 and 42.
There were no more violent incidents until 13.50 hrs when
an Italian patrol near SP19 fired on a speeding civilian
vehicle which would not stop for a check. Two Somalis
were killed and five wounded.
Seven Nigerians were killed and 8 wounded, 2 Pakistani
and 3 US were also wounded in action.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. The situation in MOGADISHU was assessed to include
continued tension and militia activity directed again t
UNOSOM II Forces by suspected USC/SNA forces at the time
for 5 September. The intensity of the SNA nightly attacks
had increased. Based on the conditions of some of the
munitions being used and the sporadic methods of ene Y
fire control, UNOSOM had indications that Aideed's forces
continued to suffer a shortage of ammunition. Further,
UNOSOM had received continued indications that support
for Aideed within the Haber Gider clan had deteriorated
within the previous weeks.
b. Nigerian statements claimed that they had failed to
sign an agreement with local Somali similar to the one
Italians had signed at SP 42. The Italian Regiment
Commander had allegedly agreed to summon the elders for
15
-ANNEX-5
discussions with the Nigerians at 16.00 hrs on 5
September. The Italian Company Commander had during the
initial firing until dawn intermittent discussions with
the Somali leader and the Italian Commander had requested
that the Nigerians should move away from the vicinity of
the position of their APC 50 as not to draw fire unto
them.
C. Nigerians had entertained suspicionf that the
Somalis must have been notified in advance about the
hand-over of troops this time of the day. The Nigerians
report a nonchalance attitude on the part of the Italians
towards the plight of the Nigerians and an Italian
refusal to give fire support. Furthermore, there were
allegations referred also in the media of disputes
between Italians and UN/US as reason behind the Italian
transfer out of Mogadishu.
d. Lack of APCs aggravated the impact of the roadblock
ambush. Statements that the Italians had a good
arrangement with the local Somali and that they were
there with the consent of the elders persited as strongly
as they were denied by the Italians.
9 Sep
A Pakistani patrol was ambushed while clearing a road
block on 21 OCT ROAD near SP-69. At about 13.25 hrs when
Pakistani forces were attempting to clear 21 OCTOBER ROAD
of roadblocks, three tanks and three or four APCs were
attacked. The Pakistani troops were under fire of 106 mm
recoilless rifles from near the CIGARETTE FACTORY. QRF
helicopters came to give air support to the Pakistani
troops, allowing them to return to their base. At about
16.15 hrs, some 1,000 Somalis moved toward a roadblock
removed by U.S. and Pakistani forces near SP 89. QRF
helicopters again intervened to assist the ground forces.
one Pakistani M 48 tank and US bulldozer were destroyed.
The tank was hit by a 106 an recoilless rifle raid and
heavy machine gun fire and caught fire. The bulldozer was
destroyed by two TOW missiles. Intense militia activity
in the vicinity of the CIGARETTE FACTORY continued until
after dusk. One Pakistani was killed. Two Pakistanis and
three US troops were wounded.
Excerpts from interviews and reports
a. Roadblocks for the days prior to 9 September had
become a nuisance for UNOSOM. The roadblocks were removed
three or four times daily to be reerected by women and
children. The Somalis allegedly made a deliberate ambush
16
- - ANNEX - 5
using anti tank/auto weapons including recoilless rifles
and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) in combination with
effective roadblocks. The Pakistani report states that
casualties were considerably less due to good protection
and support by tanks and helicopters from US ORF. Though
the tanks were of great assistance they proved to be
totally unreliable being of old models with petrol
engines.
b. This incident was followed by media accusations of
indiscriminate fire by UNOSOM troops on Somali crowds.
UNOSOM admitting "numerous" casualties on the Somali side
among the combatants, denied the allegations, which
remain unconfirmed.
C. Two Pakistani tanks were moving behind the American
APCs to give them rear cover while dozers cleared the 21
October Road. Normally, a Pakistani Commander states,
they would have returned fire while withdrawing, but they
could not leave the area as the Americans were out of the
vehicles and had taken up fighting positions. When one
tank commander took his head up to address the Somalis
using a megaphone he was fatally wounded when the Somalis
fired a salvo at his tank.
d. The Pakistanis were still using M48 A2 Tanks of 1957
model with 90 mm guns. In October they received M48 A5
tanks (diesel engines) with 105 mm guns, dispatched from
Pakistan on 20 September.
15 Sep
At 1930, at the NEW PORT facility, sniper shots fired
from abandoned buildings in front of MARTENI HOSPITAL
killed two Italian soldiers who were doing physical
exercise training under the lights at the NORTH PIER. At
10.20 hrs, three mortar rounds exploded on the UNOSOM
Headquarters compound between the Norwegian company
Headquarters building and the old kitchen. The raids
caused no structural damage but caused personnel
casualties. Among the 11 wounded were: 2 Pakistanis, 2
Norwegians, 1 US officer, 3 Somali civilians and 3 UNOSOM
civilians.
21 Sep
A Pakistani armoured personnel carrier (APC) was hit by
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) on AFGOOYE ROAD, near
the BENADIR HOSPITAL. This day Osman Atto, one of
Aideed's top advisors and financier was captured. At
06.00 hrs, a mobile patrol of two tanks and two APCs wa
sent from the Pakistani contingent compound via K4 and K7
to SP 69. At 06.15 hrs, the patrol encountered a
17
- - ANN N X - 5
roadblock near BENADIR HOSPITAL on AFGOOYE ROAD. The
patrol encountered another roadblock at GRID 340 246. At
06.25 hrs, while crossing this roadblock, one APC was hit
with an RPG-7 round from an unknown direction. The APC
was hit in the fuel tank and caught fire. Eleven
Pakistani soldiers abandoned the APC and were evacuated,
but three including one officer, trapped inside could not
be rescued, due to the intensity of flames and explosion
of the ammunition inside the APC. Three Pakistanis were
killed and seven wounded, including two seriously burned.
24 Sep
At 06.15 hrs, a Somali truck approached SP 7 from the
direction of AFGOOYE ROAD. When the truck was stopped, a
Somali jumped from the back of the truck and began firing
at the Pakistani soldiers. A Pakistani soldier received
five gunshots wounds to the right arm, right and left
thigh. The gunman was shot and killed by a soldier.
25 Sep
A Quick Reaction Force helicopter engaged by small arms
fire crashed. During ensuing search operations, Pakistani
and US soldiers were fired upon and wounded.
At about 02.10 hrs, one U.S. UH-60 A/C 'Black Hawk'
helicopter was shot by small arms fire, crashed and was
destroyed in the vicinity of GRID 376 247. Two U.S. crew
members were wounded and evacuated to' the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) HOSPITAL. The remaining three U.S. crew
members were confirmed dead. During the rescue operation
heavy gunfire came from the VILLA SOMALIA area. Three
Pakistani soldiers and three U.S. soldiers received
gunshot wounds. Three US soldiers were killed, 5 wounded
and 1 Pakistani was wounded in action.
27 Sep
Two Pakistani armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were
ambushed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7s) and
small arms in vicinity of K7. At 13.45 hrs, two APCs, on
routine patrol between SP 7 and K 4, received small arms
and RPG fire in the vicinity of GRID 336 248. Three RPGs
were fired, two of which missed and one hit the leading
APC. One officer and a soldier were seriously wounded.
At about 1405, two more Pakistani APCs were ambushed in
the vicinity K7 by two Somalis with RPGs and small ares.
Two Pakistani soldiers were wounded in the incident. The
RPGs missed the APCs.
UNOSOM casualties this day was one Pakistani killed and
three wounded in action.
28 Sep
At 20.20 hrs, Turkish Company guards at GATE 8 reported
that there were armed Somalis in a factory building
1
w - ANNEX - 5
opposite the gate. The Somalis fired rifle grenades
towards the EMBASSY COMPOUND. Grenades exploded Y ry
close to the HEADQUARTERS BUILDING. A Norwegian soldier
was seriously wounded. Pakistanis reported they saw the
launcher in the vicinity of BENADIR HOSPITAL.
At 2030, four mortar rounds were fired into SWORD BASE
from GRID 3433 2598 close to DIGFER HOSPITAL. Two
soldiers were wounded.
*3 Oct Two separate incidents occurred this day. The minor
incident involved a command detonated mine which
destroyed a US Marine HMMWV (3 US soldiers wounded). The
major incident that occurred was a result of UNOSOM
operations to capture personnel. Ranger Task Force
conducted a raid in HAWILWDAAG area and seized 24
detainees including two key Aidid aides. The UNOSOM
forces received an extremely heavy and prolonged militia
response. Two helicopters were shot down, US Rangers were
trapped and relieved after lengthy and harsh fighting by
international Task Force, numerous vehicles were engaged.
The Ranger mission commenced at approximately 11.30 hrs
on 3 Oct. The task force rangers had received information
that Aideed's advisors held a meeting 'near the OLYMPIC
HOTEL. The critical execution portion began at 15.45 hrs.
Twenty four detainees were captured including two key
Aideed advisors; three of the detainees later died. As US
troops and UH-60 A/C Black Hawk helicopters ware
dispatched to evacuate the Rangers with the detainees,
one Black Hawk helicopter was shot down at 16.10 hrs.
The ground troops of approximately 100 men moved to the
crash site under intense fire with additional casualties.
At 16.49 hrs a second helicopter was shot down.
A first rescue attempt was made by US Rangers and US QRF
from the airfield through LENIN ROAD but were ambushed
and forced to move back. The situation at the crash site
was considered stable as they had been resupplied and had
air cover.
Elements from the mission had requested standby support
to be available at 15.37 hrs. The Quick Reaction Force
ORF was notified at 15.37 hrs and Pakistani and Malaysian
forces were notified at 16.15 hrs.
These elements, upon direction of the Deputy Forc
Commander (DFC) and the Quick reaction Force (ORF)
commander, immediately began preparations for movement to
the port area where a rescue task force was to be
19
- - ANNEX - 5 -
organized. The Quick Reaction Command (QRC) of the ORF
was the operational control to Task Force Rangers from
16.35 hrs to 19.07 hrs, when they returned to QRF
control. The rescue Task Force elements moved between
16.40 hrs and 18.45 hrs to assemble for the Task Force
Commander's briefing.
At 19.30 hrs the Pakistani Brigade reported they
responded to a Joint Operations Centre (JOC) report of
1,000 Somalis in the vicinity of GRID 246 253 by readying
strongpoints (SPs) to assist trapped U.S. personnel who
where in the OLYMPIC HOTEL area.
The Task Force Commander briefed the operational plan at
19.45 hrs. Task Force elements departed the airfield to
join with other elements at the new operation staging
area. The Task Force departed the NEW PORT at 23.00 hrs.
One of the three Task Force companies remained in the
port in reserve. At 23.20 hrs four tanks and three APCs
left the port to support US QRF operations. The two Task
Force companies which deployed reached SP207 at 23.45
hrs. One of the companies remained at SP207 to act as a
tactical reserve for the company which was to move to the
northern rescue site (crash site #1). From the time the
Task Force reached SP207 until arrival at their
respective objectives (crash site #1 and #2), the Task
Force elements came under heavy sniper and rocket-
propelled grenade (RPG) fire and reinforced road blocks.
The elements were decisively engaged in prolonged fire
fights enroute to their respective objectives. A road
block was encountered at GRID 370 244; main tank gun
employed to blow it up quickly so as to maintain momentum
and allow the movement to be resumed. Soldiers at SP207
and tanks received fire from numerous Somali positions.
They suppressed fire with coordinated tank and dismounted
fires. During defense of SP207 an officer was wounded by
gunshot. He was avacuated to a field hospital and was
reported in stable condition. Tanks and APCs were
successful in dominating their area of operations while
ORF helicopters engaged flank targets in adjacent built
up areas. At 00.05 hrs one mortar round exploded close by
the armoured squadron ammunition dump near the STADIUM.
The elements arrived at their objectives at 02.28 hrs and
02.31 hrs respectively on the morning of 4 Oct 93. They
seized their objectives and extracted more than 70 U.S.
soldiers and returned again, under intense fire, through
SP207 to the STADIUM. At 02.40 hrs mortar rounds (unknown
number) exploded near the tanks. Several rocket-propelled
grenade (RPG) rounds were fired. Vehicles kept moving
20
- -ANNEX-5
responded aggressively, thereby silencing the attackers.
An enemy mortar positioned at GRID 3697 2520 was engaged
by Pakistani 81 mm mortars. Firing was halted after two
salvos due to helicopters in the area. Tanks and APCs
covered withdrawal of UNOSON forces. Some soldiers were
recovered in Pakistani tanks and APCs, others were
recovered to SP207 for transport in other APCs. During
fighting between SP207 and the STADIUM a Pakistani
soldier received shrapnel wounds in his face. Tank
refualling was carried out at great risk by three APCs
which came through a mined route to a position 800 - east
of target area.
They arrived at the STADIUM at 06.32 hrs. By 10.30 hrs on
4 Oct all QRF soldiers were escorted up to SP31 through
the 21 Oct BYPASS ROAD.
3 US soldiers were killed in action, 36 wounded, 1
Malaysian killed, 10 Malaysian wounded, 1 Morrocan killed
and 10 wounded, 3 Pakistani and 1 Italian wounded. An
additional 15 US killed in action and 57 wounded were not
listed in official UNOSOM casualties.
An estimation from UNOSOM states that 300-500 Somalis
were killed and more than 700 wounded in the clashes.
Excerpts of interviews and reports
a. The Executive Summary states the operation as one
where a heavy joint and combined multinational task force
was alerted, moved at night, briefed, deployed at night,
and successfully executed, at night, under intense combat
conditions, their rescue plan to extract 70 soldiers
(with wounded) in approximately eight hours. The summary
states explicitly that there were no "time lapse" or
"time gaps" since such operations are inherently complex.
b. A Pakistani report states that the initial raid was
exclusively planned by the Rangers. The plan was not
communicated to other coalition contingents hence no
contingency planning to support the operation by
coalition contingents was done. The reports claim that
QRF took seven hours to plan the rescue operation.
C. A Pakistani commander states that nobody was told
about the Ranger operation. After the Americans had had
their planning meeting at 10.30 the Pakistanis were told
by the Brigadier general commanding the Rangers that 75
people were stranded at the helicopter crash site. He
said he had sent teams to go and rescue rangers but each
21
-ANNEX-5
time the rescue teams had been fired upon and forced to
return. The Pakistani assignment was to protect the
Americans while they went to the crash site, to seal off
the area while the Americans went to extricate the
Rangers, and to protect them during withdrawal from the
area.
d. The Pakistani tanks were old and did not have night
vision. The tanks were the 1957 model M48 A2 petrol tanks
with 90 mm gun. They ran out of fuel during the operation
and had to be brought one by one to a nearby strongpoint
for refuelling. The Pakistani commander pictures his
troops as "sitting ducks" in the tanks. Asked whether the
high figure of casualties was due to the fact that those
wounded had to stay there the whole night before being
moved, the Pakistani commander replied that contact was
made at 02.00 hrs, but that they failed to make contact
with those at the crash site until they left. The
Pakistani task was to cordon off the area. The Pakistani
said they took a long way to get to the crash site and
the Americans had difficulty making contact with the
Rangers due to hostile action from the Somalis on the
way.
a. A Malaysian Commander testified that they were
informed about 17.30 hrs to go to the NEW SEAPORT to give
reinforcements for an operation by the Americans. They
arrived at the NEW SEAPORT at 18.50 hrs. At that time one
other Malaysian company had already arrived. The
Malaysian troops provided only APCs and not any assault
troops which instead were replaced by Americans. The
troops set off at about 20.00. At 23.55 the progress of
the troop was slow in entering the objective due to
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire, snipers and mortar
fire. The Malaysian commander states that night vision
equipment was available but that he had been called to
duty so suddenly that he had no time to bring it with
him.
f. Concern expressed by Amnesty International about
large number of civilian casualties during the 3 Oct
actions.
4 Oct
Belgian helicopter pilot killed while conducting a
reconnaissance in the vicinity of YAONTOY, 20 km north of
KISMAYO.
14 Oct
In Baidoa Region, at 5 km northwest of the village of
BUUR DHUHUNLE, a Greek noncommissioned officer (NCO) wa
shot and killed. The NCO was travelling in a vehicle
22
-ANNEX- 5
from WADJID to ODDUR when it was forced to stop because
of a Somali on Somali clash.
12 Nov
Bandits engaged by patrol shoot and kill Italian soldier
on BALAD ROAD as the Italian patrol attempted to respond
to the bandits.
13 Nov
At 06.50 hrs, one marked UNOSOM vehicle was stopped by
four gunmen while travelling along DAMWADAG ROAD. A
UNOSOM personnel fired at the gunmen, killing one and
wounding another, which ignited a gun battle, resulting
in the death of the personnel who started shooting and
two other UNOSOM personnel wounded.
23
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