Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
441675559
label
Chernomyrdin [Viktor] / Ahtisaari [Martti] / [Military Technical Agreement] MTA [2]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
441675559
contentType
document
title
Chernomyrdin [Viktor] / Ahtisaari [Martti] / [Military Technical Agreement] MTA [2]
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council Kosovo Office (Clinton Adminisration)
Gregory Schulte's Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
441675559
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
otherTitles
7585617-20080994F-Seg3-001-003-2024
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
d0c77d3e605dd76a
ocrText
Case Number: 2008-0994-F3
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Chernomyrdin, [Viktor] / Ahtisaari, [Martti] / MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
Staff Office-Individual:
Kosovo Office-Schulte, Gregory
Original OA/ID Number:
1709
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
39
1
7
2
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. email
Greg Schulte to Michael Hurley, Carlos Pascual, Andrew Weiss et al.
05/31/1999
P1/b(1)
Subject: Milosevic ready to accept NATO's demands? (1 page)
002. email
White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Daniel
05/29/1999
P1/b(1)
Benjamin et al. Subject: [Possible agreement] (3 pages)
003. email
Bonnie Broadwick to Andrew Weiss and White House Situation
05/30/1999
P1/b(1)
Room. (2 pages)
004. memo
To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from
05/27/1999
P1/b(1)
Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #3 (Moscow-Bonn) (4 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709
FOLDER TITLE:
Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
2008-0994-F
vz6231
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
FROM : MISSION DE YOUGOSLAUIE PRES LIE PHONE NO. : 32 2 649 0878
May. 31 1999 03: 33PM P01
& per vorab Fax SOBOS
we'll
MISSION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FEDERALE DE YOUCOSLAVIE
AUPRES DE LUNION EUROPEENNE
Brussels, 31 May 1999
Avenue Emile Demos. 11
1000 BRUXELLES
No. 184/99
EU COUNCIL
Mr.Brian Crowe
Director general
PESC
URGENT
Rue de la Loi 175
Brussels
Dear Sir,
I should like to ask you to hand the attached letter to
the Presiding of the EU,Mr.Joshka Fisher, during today's GAC meeting.
Durs sincerely
Nikola Lukic
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
ENCL. LETTER of MR. LivadiN JOVANOVIC
FRY'S foreign AFFAIRS MINISTER,
ANDRESSED TO EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION
002
STATE DEPT -S/SR
0939 647 2020
00:80
06/02/99
FROM : MISSION DE YOUGOSLAUIE PRES UE PHONE NO. : 32 2 649 0878
May. 31 1999 03: 34PM F02
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAV7A
FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
31 May 1999
Mr. Chairman,
I understand that the issues related to the political settlement in Kosovo and
Metohija will be discussed today at the meeting of the European Union
Foreign Ministers.
Both the Yugoslav and Serbian governments continue to be deeply chgaged
in reaching a stable political settlement in Kosovo and Metohija, based on
principles which guarantee equality of citizens and national communities
within autonomy- self governance and with full respect of the integrity and
soverelgnty of the FR of Yugoslavia.
In this regard, as you are aware, the FR of Yugoslavia has accepted G-8
principles including a United Nations presence, mandate and other elements
to be decided by a UN Security Council resolution in accordance with the
United Nations Charter.
In order to achieve a successful solution, it is necessary immediately to end
the NATO aerial bombardment and to concentrate on a political agenda
aimed at reaching a stable and long-lasting political settlement.
In spite of the peace efforts by Yugoslavia and other countries and factors,
NATO resorts to a systematic killing of civilians and civilian destruction
resulting in the present escalation of the conflict.
Mr. Joseph Fischer
Chairman
Preparatory Meeting of the EU
Foreign Ministers
Brussels
003
D
STATE DEPT -S/SR
0939 647 2020
TO:80
06/02/99
FROM : MISSION DE YOUGOSLAUIE PRES UE PHONE NO. : 32 2 649 0878
May. 31 1999 03:34PM P03
2.
May I remind you of the catastrophic consequences of extended NATO
bombing which has caused so fur the death of thousands of civilians and
seriously wounding thousand others, including children, women, the sick, as
well as massive destruction of civilian structures (hospitals, refugee camps
and convoys), infrastructure, power and water supply systems, environmental
disaster, etc. All these are a crime against peace and humanity. The
consequences of NATO bombing are not only felt in Yugoslavia itself but
all around Europe.
While you are proceeding with your meeting, the latest NATO bombing
struck among other targets, a bridge and marketplace in Varvarin, a town
in Serbia, killing many civilians including children and seriously wounding
over sixty more people. Shortly after midnight, in an another Serbian town,
Surdulica, NATO warplanes hit directly a hospital and sanatorium killing
many patients including the elderly. Thus far, 13 bodies have been recovered
as rescue operation continues, but there is fear that the death toll is much
higher. Those are only the latest catastrophic instances illustrating the
humanitarian catastrophe affecting 11 million citizens of Yugoslavia and the
inhumane nature of NATO bombing focused on civilians, proving thereby
that NATO destruction continues to jeopardize the political process and to
underestimate peace efforts.
At the moment when serious diplomatic efforts are being made to reach R
political solution, the FR of Yugoslavia, as a European country which is
firmly committed to peaceful settlement, is expecting from the Ministerial
meeting of the European Union to condemn this senseless aggression and
demand its immediate cessation, undertaking thereby its part of historical
responsibility,
Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.
Zivadin Jovanovic
GESAMT SEITEN 03
00
STATE DEPT -S/SR
0939 947 2022
TO:80
06/02/99
0100, June 2, 1999
MEMORANDUM FOR STROBE TALBOTT
The 6/2/99 (A.M.) text has been reviewed by Sandy Berger, Jim
Steinberg, Leon Feurth, Jim Dobbins and Jim Bodner. We assume
that Doc Foglesong and George Casey have reviewed it on behalf
of the JCS.
We can agree to the text with two caveats:
First, Ahtisaari will need to make clear, as part of the
"further, previously identified, required elements" that:
suspension of NATO's air strikes also depends on the
demonstrable beginning of FRY withdrawal;
conclusion of a military-technical agreement should not be
allowed to slow the withdrawal.
Second, OSD requests that the "NATO" footnote be clarified to
read: "It is understood that NATO considers an international
security force with "substantial NATO participation" and
"unified command and control" to mean having NATO at the core.
This in turn means a unified NATO chain of command
"
Greg Schulte
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(WED) 6. 2'99 0:20/ST. 0 : 20/NO. 3760637612 P 1
WASHFAX
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SITE
4
8
019571
No. Pages
Message No.
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Attached
4
From: DEPSEC TALBOTT
(Officer name)
(Office symbol) (Phone number) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
RESULTS FROM JUNE 1-2 MEETING
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO: (Person/Office)
Phone no.
Room no.
WHSR
STEINBERG
SCHULTE
PASCUAL
FOR:
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS:
S/S Officer:
WATCH/FORMS/Form-Washfax seal cover.doc
3/1/99
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F3
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(WED) 6. 2'99 0:20/ST. 0:20/NO. 3760637612 P 2
June 2, 1999
TO:
P- Under Secretary Pickering
S/SA - Dobbins
S/P - Halperin/O'Brien
EUR- Grossman
FROM:
Talbott Party ( Levitsky)
FYI, attached is the result of today's efforts, at the Russians' and Finns' urging, to reach
an agreement on a common Atihisaari-Chernomyrdin script for their use in Belgrade.
Outstanding issues are use of the word "all" in the second bullet, and "Among the other
elements" in the footnote, which the Russians rightly read to mean that this paper does
not purport to state all of NATO's conditions for a suspension of military action.
Russians have not yet reviewed this text, which represents the results of the discussion.
We will meet with the Russians at 9 am local today to compare texts.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(WED) 6. 2'99 0:20/ST. 0 : 20/NO. 3760637612 P 3
TEXT 6/2/99 (A.M.)
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of
the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police, and para-military forces
according to a rapid timetable.
Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security
presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security presence with substantial NATO participation must be
deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe
environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of
all displaced persons and refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international
civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be
permitted to return to perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing mineficlds
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the
UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should
not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(WED) 6. 2'99 0:20/ST. 0 : 20/NO. 3760637612 P 4
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis
region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern
Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of
democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth
above in addition to agreement to further, previously identified, required elements."
A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among
other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and functions of
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international
civil mission
. Among the other elements: It is understood that NATO considers an international security force with 8
NATO core, or "substantial NATO participation," to mean a unified NATO chain of command under the
political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries,
partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units
would be under NATO command. It is understood that Russia's position is (to be filled in).
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:01 FAX 49 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
001
To: Jim Stein berg
From: Andrew Weiss
As discussed. 6 pages to follow
CC:- Schulte/Paschal
Attachments:
P.1: Fikes we are trying to make to
1st. part of joint document.
p.e: Fixes we are trying to make on
suspension based on SRB/MKA
guidance to Strobe.
p.3,4: Base document being worked off of.
P-5,6: original Ahtisaari document.
CC
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:01 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
002
Braft Levitsky /Suigerf
comments on Russian
mark-up of Ahtiscan
paper 6/1
Modify Russian mark up of Ahtisaari text (attached and numbered) for what is now
conceived nt as a joint script as follows:
1) okay
2) Crosses U.S./NATO redlines. See proposed fix at para. 10 below.
3) "Under UN flag" implies UN control and traditional UN peacekeeping operation.
"As may be required" suggests requirement for UNSCR. Options for fix:
Option 1:
This
Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and
language
security presences, acting under the UN Charter including Chapter VII, capable of
guaranteeing the achieving of common objectivcs.
proposed to Russians;
Option 2:
going
Deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and
in
security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter,
capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
circles
in
4) Russian use of "presence" consistent with G-8. Substitution of "substantial
discussion.
NATO participation" for "NATO core" could bc problematic, Russian change to
para. 11 even more so. Proposed fix: handle at para. 10 below.
5) Okay with deletions (Rambouillet reference preserved in para. 8).
6) Deletions blur authority of international security force, and could lead to
: misinterpretation of number of returns. Proposed fix, see para. 10.
7) Okay, UNHCR supervision sufficient for time being.
8) No change.
9) No change.
1066
003
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:02 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
10. SUSPENSION PARA
Option 1:
Keep reference to suspension, but move tricky points down to the spot where
suspension is discussed by modifying paragraph beginning "After agreement on
the above
to read:
"There will be a suspension of military activity after agreement on the key points
set forth above, the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, and acceptance of the
following additional points:
All military, police, and paramilitary forces will withdraw to elsewhere in Scrbia
(e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25
km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
The international security force with a NATO corc must be deployed under
unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced
persons and refugees.
It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a
NATO core" or "substantial NATO participation" to mean a NATO chain of
command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-
NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will
be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be
under NATO command. Special arrangements could bc put in place for Russian
forces.
The small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serhian personnel permitted to return
after withdrawals will act under the supervision of the international security force.
Juring the suspension of military activity, a military-technical agreement will be
rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and
para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The
discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the previously
determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalitics would include:"
Option 2:
"After agreement on the above " to the end of the document. Replace with:
"Suspension of military activity will requirc acceptance of the principles set forth
above in addition to agreement to further, previously identified, required elements.
A military-technical agreement will be then be rapidly concluded that would,
among other things, specify additional modalities including the roles and
functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:
"
2 066
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:02 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
004
Base Document
Ahtisaari Document
w/ Russian comments
used For Mark-Up
6/1
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of
the Kosovo crisis:
I
Immediate and veritiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
to
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police. and
2
para-military forces faccording to a rapid timctable= e.g., 7 days to complete
Naed
withdrawal; an defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zonc within
AOL
48 hours).
under Up camplies of
Deployment in Kosovo/under the UN flagiof an international operation consisting
3
of effective international civil and sccurity presences, endorsed and adopted by the
United Nations acting, as may be required, under Chapter VII of the Charter. capable
of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security force presence with a substantial NATO core
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to
establish a sate environment for all people in Kosovo and 10 facilitate the safe return in
their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international
civil mission presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial
S
autonomy within the FRY, to be decided by the Security Council of the United
Nations. Interim administration to provide transitional administration while
catablishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic sclf governing
institutions taking-into account the framework of the Rambouilles Accords to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
Atter full withdrawal an , a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
6
will be permitted to return-under the supervision of the international security force to
perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing mineficlds
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and
direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
8
agreement providing for a substantial sclf-govennent for Kosovo, taking full account
of the Rambodillet accords and the principles of sovercignty and territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region. and the
demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a semiement should
not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
9
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis
region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
Dango ouN)
3 30f6 of
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:03 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
005
2
with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy.
economic prosperity. stability, and regional cooperation.
After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a
suspension of military activity, during which a military-tcchnical agreement will be
10
rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb
military and police leadership to spccify the withdrawal modalities for military, police,
?
and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. Such
modalities would include.
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a
buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical arcas of operation
mission Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international civil
It is understood that the substantial NATO participation considers "all international
security force with a NATO core" to would mean a NATO chain of command under the
political direction of the NAC in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All
NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the
international security force presence. NATO units would be under NATO command.
Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces. similar to the HOR/SFOR
model, including consultations on international security foree operations. The Russian
units will not be under the NATO command.
4 066
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:03 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
a
006
Ahtisanci: document
6/1/99
Original Ahtisaari
Paper
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of
the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and
para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete
withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within
18 hours).
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed
and adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable
of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and
refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international
civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within
the FRY to bc decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into
account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful
and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will
be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to
perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and
direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of
5066
02/06 ' 99 WED 00:03 FAX 19 2223905346
EMB CONTROL ROOM
007
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should
not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis
region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of
democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will
be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be
rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the
FRY/Scrb military and police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for
military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of returning
personnel. The discussion and achieving of this agreement shall not extend the
previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. Such modalities would
include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delincation of a huffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international
civil mission
It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core"
to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in
consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partnors, and other
countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units
would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could bc put in place for Russian
forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security
force operations.
6 of 6
NOTE FOR SANDY AND JIM
Subject: Developments in Bonn
Again, Sandy may have more detail on the following from Strobe,
but here's what I know on the political and military
discussions.
Political. Russians were adamantly opposed to "hammer and
anvil" duo script and insisted on a unified script.
Basis for the unified script is the previously revised Finn
paper, further revised by the Russians, then "elaborated"
during today's discussions, then modified at ST's instructions
after ST spoke to Sandy and MKA. Script should be on the way
back imminently; Greg is trying to track it down.
The unified script, however, would not be enough to get a
bombing pause. ST recognizes that the Russians and our Allies
would need to understand that before Ahtisaari and Strobe go
in. (Rather than speculate on the missing pieces in the
script, it is probably better to wait and see it.)
Strobe has asked for comments on the paper ASAP; Greg will
coordinate as soon as he gets the paper.
Unsolicited reaction: it is unclear what we get from presenting
Milosevic a new position that is not enough to warrant a
suspension. Worst case scenario would be that Milosevic accepts
the presentation in full, even signs it. Then the Euros and the
Russians say we should take this as the basis for a suspension -
in effect increasing pressure on ourselves to back off NATO's
conditions. The separate 1-on-1s could also be dangerous; it
eliminates our ability to counter inaccurate portrayals by
Cherno.
Is there an alternative to the unified script? Unclear to me at
this point given the levels at which this has been discussed.
Perhaps one option would be to play hard ball and insist on the
two separate scripts since this was Cherno's idea to begin with.
Military. Russians now talking about a "substantial" NATO role,
a NATO presence in Kosovo to perform humanitarian and
engineering task, but not NATO command and control. Russians
hated idea of PJC political control.
CC: Greg
Carlos
June (
FOR SANDY AND JIM
News from Bonn is incomplete; discussions still very much in
process, so I'm hesitant to put anything on e-mail at this time.
Three points and process recap:
1. Russian proposal is more a formula for a bombing pause than
a detailed peace proposal. Per Andrew, at best it might be
turned into part of the "hammer" script reinforced by details in
the "anvil" script. The Russians had not give the proposal to
Ahtisaari as of this morning. We will know more after Strobe,
Cherno and Ahtisaari meet (see 4 below).
2. Cherno wants a UN blessing for the trip. Strobe has raised
with MKA and she has asked State to follow up with UN.
3. Military talks: opened, went for 5 minutes, then Russians
said that they had to wait to talk. Not clear if they are
negative on our ideas or whether they first want "political"
discussions to occur.
4. Process: ST met with Cherno, then with Ahtisaari, then with
Cherno again. As of 9:35 am (EST), ST was still waiting for
trilateral meeting to start.
Carlos
CC: Grag ,Tony
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P
1
0
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
99 MAY 30 P7:23
B
S/S #
019538
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
No. Pages 1+5
FROM
Officer name
Office Symbol
Extension
Room #
Col John Bell
EUR/RPM/
647-3374
6513
TO
Agency
Officer name
Extension
Room No.
NSC
Greg Schulte
456-9102
OSD/BTF
CDR Jim Fraser
695-6539
JCS/BTF
Col Jack Donovan
614/9431
USNATO
AMB VERSHBOW; Doug MCELHANEY
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
Pol/Mil Considerations for Russian Participation in KFOR
FOR
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
X
REMARKS
Attached is to provide and complement pol/mil discussions with
Russia above the mil-to-mil structural issues re potential Russian
participation in KFOR. Need your comments by 11:00, Monday, May
31. Please provide comments via Wash-fax or voice to Peter Hinz at
(202) 647-3405.
S/S Officer:
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: n Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F3
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P 2
1
CONFIDENTIAL
NATO/Russia Consultations on Military Aspects of Kosovo Implementation
This paper lays out a mechanism for creating and managing the political
framework which overlays the practical and operational arrangements by
which Russia would participate in KFOR. It offers ways in which Russia
could characterize its relationship with NATO and help manage the domestic
political consequences of participating in a NATO-led operation in Kosovo
only shortly after NATO has been bombing Yugoslavia. More importantly, it
not only provides an opportunity to revive the NATO-Russia relationship and
imbue it the "serious" content the Russians sought in the PJC prior to the
Kosovo crisis. This option would be presented to Russia for consideration as
part of further discussions concerning Russian participation in KFOR.
I.
Objectives
1. Reinvigorate NATO-Russia relations.
2. Protect integrity of NATO's command structure and the NAC's
position as ultimate political authority for KFOR.
3. Ensure all arrangements for political authority over KFOR
maintain or increase the force's effectiveness.
4. Maintain/protect the principle of NATO's right to independent
action/non-subordination to other institutions or organizations.
5. Provide Russia to maximum extent possible a politically acceptable
mechanism to enable it to participate in NATO-core KFOR.
II.
Assumptions
U.S. supports maximum practicable involvement of Russia within full
range of Kosovo implementation aspects, including KFOR, short of
subordinating NATO decision-making in any way.
In U.S. interest to rejuvenate NATO/Russia relationship and PJC
specifically
Russians want to participate in KFOR but need ways to manage domestic
political considerations and fallout stemming from working w/ "NATO
bombers" after hostilities.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
By
1/2
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0494-F3
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P 3
CONFIDENTIAL
NATO chain of command, command structure, pol/mil framework are
mechanisms used for KFOR operation
UNSCR requests regional organizations to establish security presence,
defers to them on composition/structure, etc.; also requests the
organizations to report to the UNSC at regular intervals.
III.
Underlying Principles
Shared interest in regional peace and stability: full implementation of the
G-8 principles for resolution of the Kosovo conflict
Principles enshrined in the Founding Act, especially respect for the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states and the inviolability of
borders and peoples' right to self-determination as enshrined in the
Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents.
NATO and Russia's shared interest in identifying as many opportunities
for joint decisions and joint action as possible.
Recognition that neither NATO nor Russia has a veto over the actions of
the other; both retain their respective rights to independent action and
decision-making.
Russia will retain national control of of its forces.
IV.
Consultation Mechanisms
1. PJC/Ambassadorial level meets regularly (default is monthly, perhaps
more frequently during early stages of the mission) to:
consult on KFOR OPLAN prior to NAC approval (consistent with
process established by new Pol-Mil Framework for Partner
Participation)
review and monitor progress toward accomplishing KFOR mission
and objectives;
review changes to KFOR mission and objectives; Russian approval
required only for those aspects that directly affect Russian troops.
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P 4
CONFIDENTIAL
review and consult on regular reports on military implementation
to the UNSC]
this is an illustrative list of examples for consultation - would expect
additional topics to be added
2. Experts-level PJC (perhaps Policy Coordination Group) meets as
needed - perhaps weekly or bi-weekly to discuss more detailed issues
or address ad hoc issues as they arise, such as:
receive bi-monthly report from NMA's
assessing progress in implementing individual mission tasks
(including establishing safe and secure environment, demilitarizing
KLA, etc.);
soliciting Russian views on areas for improved coordination and
communication between the civil mission and the security force, as
appropriate and necessary;
assessing, clarifying and, as needed, recommending changes to
broad political guidance for SACEUR and KFOR chain of
command (as requested by SHAPE or identified by the NAC).
Experts' work might include joint field assessments in Kosovo and
consultations with KFOR elements to facilitate assessments. In this
way, Russia could have direct access to KFOR field elements
throughout Kosovo.
could examine whether some smaller, or more informal set of staff
consultations could substitute for formal experts' discussions.
3. PJC Troika could be used to:
discuss and review Russia's perspective and position on time-
sensitive requests from KFOR chain of command for additional
guidance, or clarification of existing guidance;
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P
5
4
CONFIDENTIAL
consult informally on aspects of KFOR mission implementation
when full-blown PJC is not warranted or impractical.
4. Informal consultations and coordination between SYG Solana and the
Russian representative to the PJC, at their discretion and as they
deemed useful and necessary.
5. Russia would be able, both in determining the agenda for PJC
meetings and via the "any other business" provision, to raise and
provide NATO countries its views on any issue related to the security
aspects of Kosovo implementation and KFOR's mission (except issues
within the purview of the KFOR military chain of command).
V.
Timing
Any and all of the mechanisms outlined above could be activated as soon
as Russia indicates an interest in doing so and an intention to contribute
forces to KFOR.
In that event, Russia would have the opportunity to be heavily involved in
the conceptual and operational planning for KFOR.
VI.
Red Lines
The PJC would not directly provide guidance to NATO military
authorities; that remains the sole prerogative of the NAC.
Russia would be actively and frequently consulted regarding KFOR's
mission. Its assessments of and recommendations on the force,
particularly on the role of its forces, would be carefully considered by the
NAC. It would not have a veto over NAC decisions concerning KFOR.
None of the consultative arrangements outlined in this paper would violate
the principles of unity of command; common mission/purpose; common
rules of engagement; or impinge upon the ability of SACEUR/KFOR
commander, in consultation with their respective Russian counterparts, to
establish additional measures to ensure accomplishment of KFOR's
mission.
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SUN) 5.30'99 19:30/ST. 19:28/NO. 3760637546 P 6
5
CONFIDENTIAL
NATO's consultations with Russia would not disadvantage other Partners
participating in KFOR (though we must recognize that some of the
consultative mechanisms employed will duplicate NATO's consultations
with partners contributing to the force).
CONFIDENTIAL
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 8:31 AM
To:
Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.;
Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.;
Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri,
Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.;
Leavy, David C.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam
E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject:
YUGOSLAVIA-EUROPE-AHT
CLASS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORIG:
Reuters
PREC:
RUSH
TOR:
990531081833 R0313053
a1018
^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-EUROPE-AHTISAARI
^EU agrees to send mediator to Belgrade
BRUSSELS, May 31 (Reuters) - European Union foreign
ministers agreed on Monday on the principle of sending Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari to Belgrade this week on a mission to
try and secure peace in the Kosovo crisis.
Diplomats said the visit was pretty likely" and could
take place as early as Wednesday, following a meeting between
Ahtisaari and the U.S. and Russian Balkans envoys Strobe Talbott
and Viktor Chernomyrdin in Bonn on Tuesday.
Those talks would be followed by a meeting of the three
envoys with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, they said.
Ahtisaari, the EU Balkans envoy, could then brief the
15-nation bloc's leaders at their two-day summit in Cologne,
Germany, starting on Thursday, they added.
Diplomats said Ahtisaari would be expected to meet Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade in a bid to get him to
translate into deeds his reported acceptance of a peace formula
worked out by the eight big (G8) powers.
Ahtisaari's visit would be the first official EU contact
with Milosevic since he was indicted last week by the U.N.
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia on charges
of war crimes for his role in allegedly orchestrating the ethnic
cleansing of non-Serbs in Kosovo.
In a statement issued during regular consultations in
Brussels, the ministers said they `expect Belgrade to translate
its reported statements into a firm, unambiguous and verifiable
commitment to accept the G8 principles and a UNSC (United
Nations Security Council resolution)."
Four G8 countries -- Italy, France, Germany and Britain --
were represented at the EU talks.
The ministers also said they were open to a European
Commission plan to propose a new kind of relationship to Balkan
countries like Albania and Macedonia -- but also Croatia and
Bosnia -- bearing the fallout of the crisis in neighbouring
Yugoslavia.
RB-- 05/31/99 08:02:00
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Sunday, May 30, 1999 11:13 PM
To:
Pascual, Carlos E.; Roberts, Michael W.; Saunders, Richard M.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler,
Ralph H.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject:
SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY
SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS
CLASS:
CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:
310302Z MAY 99
MSGTO:
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 1857
ORIG:
SECSTATE WASHDC
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
SSN:
0742
TOR:
990530230902 M3884133
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 100742
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/09
TAGS: PREL, RS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV
CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (S) NIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED TO ENSURE DELIVERY AT
OOB IN MOSCOW MAY 31. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE
FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN
MINISTER IVANOV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
2. (C) BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR IGOR SERGEYEVICH:
AS WE AGREED WHEN WE TALKED ON SATURDAY, THE DAYS AHEAD
ARE CRUCIAL. THE WEEK BEGINS, APPROPRIATELY, WITH A PHONE
CALL BETWEEN OUR PRESIDENTS. THEN YOU AND | WILL TALK.
WE ALL AWAIT VICTOR STEPANOVICH'S READ-OUT ON HIS FOURTH
MISSION TO BELGRADE. WE ALSO HOPE THAT BY MID-WEEK, WE
WILL HAVE FURTHER INDICATION OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP'S
INTENTIONS BASED ON A JOINT CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI MISSION
THERE. YOU RAISED WITH ME - AND, I KNOW, WITH OTHERS -
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE VICE PRESIDENT OR I SHOULD
COME TO BONN FOR THE TRILATERAL ON TUESDAY. WE HAVE
CONSIDERED THE MATTER CAREFULLY AND CONCLUDED THAT, FOR
PURPOSES OF THE NEXT STEP IN THIS PROCESS, WE THINK STROBE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE U.S. YOU AND I CAN TALK
MID-WEEK ABOUT OUR GETTING TOGETHER, EITHER BILATERALLY OR
AT THE G-8 OR BOTH. AS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT, HE STANDS
READY TO HELP AS APPROPRIATE ONCE WE HAVE A FULLER
PICTURE BASED ON THE COMING CRITICAL DAYS.
SINCERELY,
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
(NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW)
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
END TEXT
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
ALBRIGHT
V2
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F3
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 12:25 PM
To:
Blinken, Antony J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Hurley, C. Michael; Pascual,
Carlos E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject:
KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN
CLASS:
CONFIDENTIAL
DTG:
311600Z MAY 99
MSGTO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1600
ORIG:
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PREC:
IMMEDIATE
SSN:
2478
TOR:
990531121417 M3884410
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012478
NODIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSY HELSINKI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/09
TAGS: PREL, RS, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN
(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR JAMES F. COLLINS.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) I SAW FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND CURRENT
RUSSIAN BALKAN ENVOY VIKTOR CHERNOMYRDIN IN THE
AFTERNOON OF MAY 31 TO GET A READ-OUT ON HIS TRIP LAST
WEEK TO BELGRADE AND TO LOOK AHEAD TO THIS COMING WEEK.
CHERNOMYRDIN BEGAN BY NOTING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A LOT
OF DETAIL TO GIVE ME BECAUSE THE GOR HAD NOT YET
DECIDED FOR ITSELF EXACTLY WHERE THINGS STAND AT THE
MOMENT. I HAD REQUESTED AN EARLIER MEETING WITH
CHERNOMYRDIN, BUT COULD ONLY MEET WITH HIM ON THE 31ST
BECAUSE HE ONLY BRIEFED YELTSIN THE DAY BEFORE. HE
SAID HE WOULD SEE STEPASHIN AT AROUND 5:00 PM LOCAL
TIME TODAY.
LAST WEEK'S MEETING
2. (C) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT IN THE ALMOST 10 HOURS
OF MEETINGS HE HAD IN BELGRADE MAY 28 WITH HIM,
MILOSEVIC:
-- AGREED TO THE G-8 PRINCIPLES, SOMETHING
CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY DONE, AT LEAST
NOT IN THEIR COMPLETE FORM, AS ADOPTED.
-- HAD "ABSOLUTELY NO REACTION" TO THE INDICTMENT
AGAINST HIM BY THE ICTY.
-- DID NOT APPEAR DIFFERENT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY
FROM THE PREVIOUS VISITS.
-- LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR
DISCUSSION AND THAT THERE ARE STILL CHANCES FOR A
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
3. (C) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT THE SERB MILITARY, IN
By
2
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
HIS VIEW, DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING IN ANY
1
7008-0994-73
TROUBLE. HE SAID THE ARMY IS NOT YET REALLY ACTIVE AND
IS PREPARING ITSELF FOR "THE WORST." THEY TOLD HIM
THAT THEY WILL BE READY TO KILL "TWO OR THREE ENEMIES
FOR EVERY SERB KILLED" AND "TWO OR THREE FOR EVERY
HOUSE DESTROYED." CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THERE WERE NO
INDICATIONS FROM BELGRADE OF ANY NEW INFLEXIBILITIES
REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE PROCESS.
THIS WEEK'S MEETINGS
4. (C) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID HIS CURRENT PLAN IS TO GO TO
BONN TO MEET WITH AHTISAARI, SCHROEDER AND THE U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE ON TUESDAY, JUNE 1. HE THEN EXPECTS TO
GO TO BELGRADE WITH AHTISAARI. I TOLD HIM I EXPECTED
HIS U.S. INTERLOCUTOR TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY.
NOTED THAT STEPASHIN WOULD BE CALLING WASHINGTON TODAY
AND THAT THE SECRETARY PLANNED TO SPEAK WITH IVANOV AS
WELL. CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT GENERALS IVASHEV AND
ZAVARZIN WOULD BE GOING AS PART OF THE RUSSIAN TEAM AND
INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE MILITARY DISCUSSIONS
WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. OVERALL, HE WAS
ADAMANT THAT THE "BIG ISSUES" NEED TO BE RESOLVED
FIRST, AND THE MILITARY PEOPLE MUST WORK OUT THE
NECESSARY DETAILS REGARDING NUMBERS AND SPECIFIC
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS.
5. (C) LAYING OUT THE MAIN ISSUES OF CONTENTION THAT
REMAINED AFTER LAST WEEK'S MEETINGS HERE
WITHDRAWALS, THE MAKE-UP AND ORGANIZATION OF A SECURITY
FORCE, AND THE UNSCR AND OVERALL UN RELATIONSHIP TO THE
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE I ASKED CHERNOMYRDIN IF HE
SAW ANY NEW AREA COMING TO THE FORE IN BELGRADE THAT
THE U.S. SHOULD COME TO BONN PREPARED TO ADDRESS IN
DETAIL. CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT HE SAW NO SUCH NEW
ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SAW AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
PROGRESS AT THIS JUNCTURE AND THAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS
WOULD BE CRITICAL. EMPHASIZING AGAIN THAT THE BIG
ISSUES MUST BE TACKLED HE SAID THAT WE NEED NOW MORE
THAN EVER TO AVOID AMBIGUITIES AMONG OURSELVES AND
WITH MILOSEVIC.
6. (C) CHERNOMYRDIN SAID THAT THE KLA WOULD BE A BIG
PROBLEM FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. HE EXPRESSED
CONCERNS ABOUT THE KLA'S CURRENT ACTIVITY AMONG THE
REFUGEES. ON REFUGEES, HE EXPRESSED THE GENERAL BELIEF
THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE YOUNGER REFUGEES WOULD
NOT WANT TO RETURN TO KOSOVO. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE
PROBLEM OF LACK OF DOCUMENTATION FOR RETURNING REFUGEES
AND SUGGESTED THAT, SINCE ALBANIA IS EVEN POORER THAN
KOSOVO, THERE MIGHT BE ALBANIANS FROM ALBANIA TRYING TO
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 012478
NODIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS EMBASSY HELSINKI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/09
TAGS: PREL, RS, SR
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: MAY 31 MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN
GO INTO KOSOVO WITH THE GENERAL REFUGEE POPULATION.
(NOTE: IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THIS WAS HIS IDEA OR IF THE
SERBS HAD MENTIONED IT TO HIM. END NOTE.)
7. (C) COMMENT. CHERNOMYRDIN REALLY DID NOT GIVE ME
A LOT, AND I SENSED THAT HE HAD NOT DONE THE NECESSARY
TALKING WITH ALL THE PLAYERS HERE YET IN THE WAKE OF
HIS FRIDAY TRIP TO BELGRADE. HE ENGAGED IN NO
2
POSTURING AND SEEMED VERY SERIOUS ABOUT HIS UPCOMING
TRIP TO GERMANY AND THE FRY. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT
ENERGIZED TO TACKLE THE "BIG ISSUES" AND AT THE SAME
TIME, ENGAGE IVASHEV AND THE RUSSIAN MILITARY ON SOME
OF THE RELATED BUT MORE DETAILED QUESTIONS. HE DID NOT
TRY TO SELL ME ON A "ZONAL" APPROACH AND IMPLIED THAT
THAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENT AS WELL AS THE COMMAND
STRUCTURE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE WAS SEEN BY THE
GOR (OR HIM) AS "DETAILS." REGARDING THE "CRITICALITY"
OF THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, HE APPEARED TO BE IMPLYING THAT
THE PROCESS IS NOW LEADING UP TO A MAKE-OR-BREAK POINT
AT THE G-8 SUMMIT.
COLLINS
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 11:37 AM
To:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
@KOSOVO; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine
Subject:
Political Consultation Arrangements for Russian Participation in KFOR [CONFIDENTIAL]
Sandy -
CC: Don
At 2:00, the JCS will brief you and MKA on ways to incorporate the Russians into KFOR
from a military perspective. They are likely to propose an "SFOR-Plus" model, with
special command arrangements for the Russian contribution.
In parallel, State has developed a framework for political consultations on KFOR
operations. This mechanism relies on regular meetings of the PJC at ambassadorial
and subordinate levels to consult on planning and operations, as well as use of the PJC
Troika (SecGen, Russian amb, and one NATO amb) to discuss and review Russian's
position on time-sensitive requests for guidance from the KFOR chain of command.
The political framework provides for PJC consultation, but not decision-making. As with
SFOR, the NAC would retain the sole prerogative for providing guidance to KFOR, and
Russia would not have a veto over NAC decisions.
The State framework, which is being cleared interagency, meets all of our concerns
about unity of command and "NATO at the core". It is unlikely, however, to look
attractive to Moscow, which will probably want greater assurance that its views will be
taken into account.
As we did in Bosnia, I would recommend nailing down the military arrangements before
negotiating the political arrangements. Otherwise likely disagreements on the political
side could overturn what progress we've been able to achieve on the military side.
Carlos and Andrew agree.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
n
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0994-I3
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 9:52 AM
To:
Allen, Charles A.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.;
Braden, Susan R.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.;
Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri,
Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.;
Leavy, David C.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Sapiro, Miriam
E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject:
YUGOSLAVIA-G8
CLASS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORIG:
Reuters
PREC:
URGENT/SNAP
TOR:
990531094656 R0313292
a1256
^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-G8 URGENT
^Yugoslavia confirms acceptance of G8 principles
BELGRADE, May 31 (Reuters) - Yugoslavia on Monday confirmed
its acceptance of the principles laid down by the big power
Group of Eight countries, the state news agency Tanjug said.
In accordance with our consistent policy of peace and
defence of freedoms, Yugoslavia has accepted the G8 principles
and thinks a U.N. Security Council resolution, in accordance
with the U.N. charter, should enable the transfer of the
resolution of the crisis from the military to the political
sphere," it said.
RB-- 05/31/99 09:31:00
1
FROM,DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5.29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 1
WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
99 MAY 20
8
B
S/S #
019530
MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
No. Pages 1+48
FROM
Officer name
Office Symbol
Extension
Room #
Col John Bell
EUR/RPM/
647-3374
6513
TO
Agency
Officer name
Extension
Room No.
NSC
Greg Schulte
456-9102
OVP
Leslie Davidson
JCS/BTF
LTC Ben Allen
614-9431
OSD/BTF
CDC GREG KAUFMAN
695-6539
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari Texts (Sat afternoon version, 3:40)
FOR
CLEARANCE
INFORMATION
X
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
REMARKS
Latest version given to EUR DAS Jim Swigert. He will be making call
to Jon Levitsky in Helsinki. He may tweak Chernomyrdin text in order
to make it more acceptable to Russians which is problematic. U.S.
desired text at bullets 6 and 10 is not now acceptable. He will
indicate to Levitsky our red-line in the Ahtisaari text.
S/S Officer:
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 12/14/2023
2008-0994-73
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5. 29' 99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 2
/
Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)
To move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the
following principles:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces.
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and
adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common
objectives.
An effective international security presence must be deployed under unified command and
control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO
countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international
security presence.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
After the suspension of hostilities verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military,
police and para-military forces, Belgrade authorities will plan for be allowed a small, agreed
number of personnel in Kosovo to perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil and security presences
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction
of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the
UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5.29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 3
2
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity,
stability, and regional cooperation.
After the suspension of military activity beginning of verifiable and rapid withdrawal from
Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces on terms to be elaborated by President
Ahtisaari, a military-technical agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal
modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo. Such modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule
Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo
Equipment associated with Yugoslav/Serb personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5.29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P
4
3
Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the
Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression In Kosovo.
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-
military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air
defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and
adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command
and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil
mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the
Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in
Kosovo.
After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be
permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the
following functions:
liaison with International civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction
of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal,
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the
UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5. 29' 99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 5
4
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
This will include the Implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity,
stability, and regional cooperation.
After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a
suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly
concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and
police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military
forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of
this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of
withdrawals. Such modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation
of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international
civil mission
It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to
mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with
non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will - be
eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO
command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the
IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5. 29' 99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 6
5
Belgrade Script: Part One (Chernomyrdin)
To move toward the resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on the
following principles:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces.
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and
adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common
objectives.
An effective international security presence must be deployed under unified command and
control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. All NATO
countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international
security presence.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
After the verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and para-military
forces, Belgrade authorities will be allowed a small, agreed number of personnel in Kosovo
to perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil and security presences
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction
of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the
UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
FROM. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5. 29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P
7
6
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity,
stability, and regional cooperation.
After the beginning of verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and
para-military forces on terms to be elaborated by President Ahtisaari, a military-technical
agreement will be rapidly concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police,
and para-military forces, and the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo.
Such modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule
Yugoslav/Serb Personnel in Kosovo
Equipment associated with Yugoslav/Serb personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5. 29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 8
7
Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of the
Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression In Kosovo.
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police, and para-
military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air
defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours).
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and
adopted by the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified command
and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to
facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil
mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim administration to
provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions taking into account the framework of the
Rambouillet Accords to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in
Kosovo.
After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be
permitted to return under the supervision of the international security force to perform the
following functions:
liaison with International civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and direction
of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal,
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the
UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(SAT) 5.29'99 16:32/ST. 16:30/NO. 3760637531 P 9
8
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.
This will include the Implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity,
stability, and regional cooperation.
After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there will be a
suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical agreement will be rapidly
concluded by the leadership of the international security force and the FRY/Serb military and
police leadership to specify the withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military
forces, and the roles and functions of returning personnel. The discussion and achieving of
this agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of
withdrawals. Such modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation
of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international
civil mission
It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO core" to
mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC in consultation with
non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners, and other countries will - be
eligible to contribute to the international security force. NATO units would be under NATO
command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Russian forces, similar to the
IFOR/SFOR model, including consultations on international security force operations.
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 11:00 AM
To:
Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Black, Steven K.; Blinken, Antony J.;
Braden, Susan R.; Brody, Richard J.; Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.;
Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.; Elkind, Jonathan H.; Faranda, Regina D.; Flanagan,
Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael;
Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Pascual,
Carlos E.; Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Segal, Jack D.; Stromseth, Jane E.;
Tedstrom, John E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.
Subject:
FEDERALREPUBLICOFYUGOS
CLASS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORIG:
FBIS
PREC:
RUSH
TOR:
990531095201 F0313300
F1130
FBIS S 130MAY31
UNCLAS 2Y
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: Milosevic Reiterates Acceptance of
G8 Principles LD3105134099 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-
Croatian 1300 GMT 31 May 99
[FBIS Translated Text]
The president of the republic, Slobodan Milosevic, today held
a meeting with top state officials. They discussed the issues of importance
for the peaceful political solution to the problem, as discussed during
the talks between President Milosevic and senior officials of Yugoslavia
and Serbia with Viktor Chernomyrdin, special envoy of Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, and his team.
It was said that the tabled proposals aimed to bring about the
cessation of the aggression against Yugoslavia and re-establish of peace,
and to pave the way for the political solution to the open issues in
Kosovo-Metohija.
The importance was stressed of the view shared by the international
community and our country that the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] must be respected, and of
the commitment that the autonomy of Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija] in Serbia
would be drawn in such a way so as to safeguard the equality of all
citizens and ethnic groups, which is the key to the political solution.
In line with our consistent policy of peace and defence of freedom,
the FRY has accepted the G8 principles and believes that the UN Security
Council, in line with the UN Charter, should now make it possible with
its resolution to move the solution to the crisis from the military
to the political track, which implies the return of the UN to its basic
role of safeguarding peace and stability.
The return of refugees to their homes and the resolution to humanitaria
n problems caused by the incessant bombardment are a priority of state
authorities. It was said that the FRY would make an active and direct
contribution to finding a peaceful political solution, and to its consistent
implementation, and thus ensure that the open issues are overcome successfully
The activities of the NATO aviation against civilian targets
words indistinct], such as in Varvarin and Surdulica, and other
1
grave crimes committed against humanity therefore deserve an even stronger
condemnation. Massacres and crimes committed by the NATO aggressor on
a daily basis are the most serious warning to the world [words indistinct]
peace efforts.
It was also said during the meeting that the competent authorities,
state companies and utilities had displayed a high degree of professionalism
and dedication in dealing with the serious consequences of the air strikes,
which were going on day and night, on facilities of vital importance
to the population, and that they were making great effort to ensure
the functioning of vital systems -- water supply, power supply, health
care, provision of foodstuffs and basic economic activities in the country
-- as much as possible. The employees and experts of
these services were praised for their great effort and achieved
results.
Top state leadership also praised the unity of the armed forces
and the people in the defence of the country, adding that the tasks
in the state of war were being successfully carried out.
THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATI
ON IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.)
ENDALL) 31 MAY 1351z FBIS NNNN
FBIS 05/31/99 09:36:00
2
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 12:43 PM
To:
@NSA- Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
@ADHOC KOSOVO; @RUSSIA- Russia/Ukraine; @WHSR WH Situation Room
Subject:
FW: 5/31 MKA-Ivanov call readout [CONFIDENTIAL]
Original Message
From:
Weiss, Andrew S.
Sent:
Monday, May 31, 1999 12:36 PM
To:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject:
5/31 MKA-Ivanov call readout [CONFIDENTIAL]
PLEASE PASS TO SANDY and JIM ASAP
Ivanov told MKA that the Russians have worked up a very serious proposal that will be
presented tomorrow. "I didn't sleep for two nights working on it." He said today's phone
call was very good, provides basis for a good discussion tomorrow.
MKA said that it's not so important what we do together, but where Milosevic is. Ivanov
cut her off and said, regardless of what Milosevic agrees to do, Russia will stick to what
we say we'll do.
MKA began to say that KFOR must be robust. Ivanov cut her off and said you'll see
from our proposal that we don't want a disorganized force.
MKA began to talk about need for total withdrawal of FRY forces. Ivanov cut her off
again and said, you'll see our proposal is serious.
Ivanov then put Primakov on the line. (MFA was hosting a farewell for him today.)
Primo said he's going to Switzerland to give lecture and get medical treatment.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
n
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-094-A
1
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. email
Greg Schulte to Michael Hurley, Carlos Pascual, Andrew Weiss et al.
05/31/1999
P1/b(1)
Subject: Milosevic ready to accept NATO's demands? (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709
FOLDER TITLE:
Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
2008-0994-F
vz6231
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. email
White House Situation Room to Charles Allen, Robert Bell, Daniel
05/29/1999
P1/b(1)
Benjamin et al. Subject: [Possible agreement] (3 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709
FOLDER TITLE:
Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
2008-0994-F
vz6231
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Saturday, May 29, 1999 9:38 AM
To:
Allen, Charles A.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.;
Brown, Keirn C.; Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.;
Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri, Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley,
C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.;
Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Sigler, Ralph H.; Stromseth, Jane E.; Vaccaro,
Jonathan M. (Matt)
Subject:
RUSSIA:MoreonYugoslavi
CLASS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORIG:
FBIS
PREC:
RUSH
TOR:
990529080251 F0304215
F9079
FBIS S 079MAY29
UNCLAS 3A
RUSSIA: More on Yugoslavia Agreeing to Russia Settlement Plan LD2905115499
Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in English 1140 GMT 29 May 99
[By Mikhail Shevtsov
]
[FBIS Transcribed Text]
MOSCOW, Nay 29 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian president's Balkan envoy
Viktor Chernomyrdin during his May 28 visit to Belgrade laid before
the Yugoslav leadership a plan of settlement of the Balkan crisis.
An informed source in Moscow told Itar-Tass on Saturday that
the plan envisions a halt to NATO's bombing, reduction of the Yugoslav
army and police strength in Kosovo province and the start of a peacekeeping
operation under the auspices of the United Nations.
The sources said the Yugoslav side "has fully agreed to the Russian
draft of the plan".
Under the plan, contingents of troops of NATO states paticipating
in the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia are to be deployed in Albania
and Macedoania and to be tasked with sealing off the conflct region
and keeping the Kosovo Liberation Army out of it, and with attending
to humanitarian relief of Kosovo refugees.
Peacekeeping forces of NATO countries that stayed away from the
air operations are to be introduced to the border area of Kosovo to
reinforce border control and secure stability in areas in their charge.
Military contingents of neutral countries, including Russia and
other CIS members, would be stationed in the remaining territory of
Kosovo with the task of policing security and refugee return.
The plan calls for placing the general leadership of the peace
operation on the United Nations Security Council, with a commander of
peacekeeping forces to be appointed from a neutral country. A chief
of staff could be a representative of a NATO country that took no part
in the military action against Yugoslavia.
The source said Yugoslavia "has fully agreed to the Russian draft
of the plan an expressed a readiness to go along with a number of additional
concessions".
1
"in particular, Belgrade could agree to the use of reconnaissance
planes of NATO and Russia in control of its withdrawing its troops.
Besides, an expansion of the border area would be possible, as
well as incorporation of elements of NATO's control system into staff
bodies of the peacekeeping operation's command.
Overall, Russia-proposed plan and Yugoslavia's readiness for
compromise solutions open a realistic way to settlement of the Balkan
crisis with heed for stances of all concerned parties, the source said.
[Description of Source: ITAR-TASS World Service - Main government information
agency.]
THIS REPORT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATI
ON IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.)
ENDALL) 29 MAY 1202z FBIS NNNN
FBIS 05/29/99 07:47:00
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. email
Bonnie Broadwick to Andrew Weiss and White House Situation
05/30/1999
P1/b(1)
Room. (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709
FOLDER TITLE:
Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
2008-0994-F
vz6231
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
2014-0546-m(1.72)
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
10/2/2018 KBH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN
If Yeltsin says Milosevic is now ready to make the hard decision
on his part, and the time has come for hard decisions on our
part
First, let me say how much I appreciate Russia's diplomatic
efforts -- and yours in particular. This is a hard and
important issue for both of us, not least because of its
relevance to U.S. -Russian relations and my own relationship
with you.
Second, Viktor Stepanovich has obviously been doing hard work
on your behalf. I'm very much looking forward to getting a
full report from Strobe, who will meet with Viktor and
Ahtisaari in Bonn on Tuesday.
I hope Viktor and Ahtisaari will go to Belgrade together on
Wednesday. That will give us a fresh reading on where
Milosevic stands on the key issues.
But let me be clear. Milosevic knows what he has to do to
stop the bombing. We cannot eliminate any of the essential
details that need to be nailed down to bring this conflict to
an end.
Think you and I should talk as soon as possible after
Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari complete the mission.
If Yeltsin says, "We can't delay hard decisions any longer --
we've got to accelerate and upgrade this process right now.
Enough stalling - enough going around in circles. "
Boris, I'm as determined as anyone to keep the diplomacy
moving forward as quickly as possible. But there are a couple
of points I hope you' 11 understand.
First, I need the report from the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari
mission as a basis for my own judgement about where Milosevic
is.
Second, the conditions I laid out for you back in mid-April
still stand. The two most important of those conditions are,
first, that NATO must be at the core of the peacekeeping
SECRET
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify on: 4/19/09
SECRET
2
operation; this is essential to get the refugees back; it is
important that other nations participate, too. Second, there
can't be any armed Serbs still in Kosovo or we will just have
a new civil war there.
NATO cannot change these conditions for very simple reasons:
anything short of these conditions will not lead to a lasting
peace.
If Yeltsin says that Milosevic has already agreed to the G-8
principles, a NATO presence in Kosovo, and to withdraw his
troops -- so stop the bombing
I hope you'r right about Milosevic's commitments. But the G-
8 principles are general. This would not be the first time
he's claimed to accept the G-8 principles or made promises to
the international community and failed to follow through with
important issues.
Both details and actions here are critical. Let's see how the
Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mission goes and what they find out.
Essential that Milosevic agree to effective international
security presence. That means NATO at the core, a unified
command for the peacekeepers, and contributions from countries
like Russia.
That's the only way we can get an effective solution and not
just empty promises that will fall apart.
If Yeltsin says, together we can end this thing, but you need to
send the Vice President or the Secretary of State to Bonn on
Tuesday, not Talbott
First, you need to know that all important decisions will be
mine.
Al is deeply involved, as you know from the amount of time he
spent with Viktor a month ago. He' 11 remain involved.
Madeleine works every day on this problem, especially with
Foreign Minister Ivanov. They talked on Saturday and will be
talking again in a couple of hours. They're probably going to
be meeting in the near future.
For purposes of the Bonn meeting, I want Strobe to head our
team. He speaks for me in this meeting. He has full
SECRET
SECRET
3
authority. You have my word. Al and I have relied on him on
these matters since the very beginning of our partnership.
What I need now, Boris, is a better sense of what Milosevic is
prepared to do, and Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari are best able
to do that together -- together they can pin Milosevic down on
the details.
The next step should be to get Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari and
Strobe back together. The one after that is Chernomyrdin and
Ahtisaari go to Belgrade. Then, you and I should talk again.
If Yeltsin says that the U.S. keeps adding new conditions or
hanging up the diplomacy on "details." "
We're sticking to the very same conditions I raised with you
when we talked on April 25. This has been our bottom line in
every discussion.
Viktor and Strobe have spent many hours together, and I
believe they' ve made progress. Let's instruct them to make
more progress on Tuesday.
If Yeltsin calls for a UN-led force or a neutral commander for
the peacekeeping force
My core objectives are to allow the refugees to return,
protect all the civilians of Kosovo - and that means the Serb
minority, make sure there is humanitarian access, and provide
autonomy for Kosovo while protecting Yugoslavia's territorial
integrity.
You and I have gone over these objectives and we agree. The
real issue is how to achieve them.
That is why I have to insist on a international security force
with NATO at the core. I have said before that the force does
not have to have a NATO label. But NATO has to be there for
the KLA to disarm and the refugees to return.
We cannot risk another disaster with the UN at the helm like
Somalia or the early days in Bosnia before you and I worked
out a new approach at Hyde Park.
If Yeltsin rants about NATO's bombing, casualties,
"politicization" of the Milosevic indictment, etc.
SECRET
SECRET
4
You and I have talked about this before. Frankly, it disturbs
me to hear you talk as though NATO is the root of the problem.
Milosevic's brutality is the root of the problem.
Russia and the U.S. worked together on a peaceful solution for
14 months before Milosevic made it impossible for me and our
Allies to avoid use of force.
I can't believe you'd let Milosevic wreck everything you'
done to create cooperative relations between Russia on the one
hand and the U.S., France, Germany, and Britain on the other.
There's no question what Milosevic stands for: he's a
Communist who wants to restore the Communist past in the
Balkans - and to wreck your relations with the West. That's
one of many reasons why we cannot let him succeed.
If he threatens to end Russia's diplomatic initiative
I hope you don't, since I think Russia is playing a
constructive role. I think any problem in the world is more
likely to be solved if the U.S. and Russia are working
cooperatively, even if we have some disagreements.
But I know you' 11 make a decision based on Russian national
interest, so I'll respect your decision whatever it is. But
we want you engaged.
Speaking for myself, I can promise you that the U.S. will keep
working for an acceptable diplomatic solution - preferably
with Russia.
If Yeltsin threatens not to come to Cologne or threatens that it
will be a bad meeting
Look, Boris. The G-8 exists because of you. And, for that
matter, because of my vigorous support for creating the G-8 to
demonstrate Russia's integration with the world's major
democracies.
You'll handle the meeting -- including your participation --
as you see fit.
Let me tell you how I'll handle Cologne. If, together, we've
been able to achieve a breakthrough on Kosovo on what all of
us agree are acceptable terms, I'll lead the applause for you
as a peacemaker.
SECRET
SECRET
5
If, however, Milosevic is still holding out, and the military
conflict is still under way, I'll use Cologne to highlight
Russia's diplomacy and -- if Russia is still pursuing that
diplomacy -- to concentrate our further efforts on getting a
solution as soon as possible.
If Yeltsin suggests a common press line on the call.
First, we should tell everyone that our personal
representatives are meeting again on Tuesday in Bonn and will
also meet with Chancellor Schroeder who holds the presidency
of the EU and the G-8.
Second, we should say that we both firmly committed to working
together, along with our European partners, to find a
diplomatic solution.
Third, we stressed that Chernomyrdin's efforts are very
important and that Russia is a key player on the diplomatic
track.
SECRET
ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS FOR POTUS WITH STEPASHIN
Monday, May 31, 1999
Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister. I'm delighted to hear from you. Please
give my best wishes to your President.
[Pause for reply]
You've taken on a huge job. It's important not just for Russia but for the
world, and certainly for U.S.-Russian relations. I hope in the course of your
work and mine, our paths will Cross and, in due course, I hope you and Al Gore
will be able to continue the bilateral commission.
I know that in addition to all your other duties, you've been closely involved in
supervising Russian diplomatic efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
We've heard from President Ahtisaari how impressed he was by his meeting
with you last week.
As President Yeltsin and I have discussed, the U.S. supports Russian
diplomacy.
As you know - and Boris and I have been candid about this, as well - Russia
and the U.S. have got some pretty profound disagreements about how to deal
with the Belgrade leadership.
But we also have what I feel are some crucial common interests:
We agree on the broad outlines of what a peace should look like;
We're working together on getting the message to Milošević about what it
will take to get the bombing stopped.
We're working together on the composition of both a security force and an
international civilian presence that would go into Kosovo to implement an
agreement.
I also wanted to stress one critical issue that I have asked Strobe to take up in
Bonn - and that is how much of the diplomatic initiative that we have been
working on will be accepted by President Milosevic.
We still don't know how Milosevic will respond. We need to think carefully
about this, and be sure we have the right responses that keep the pressure on
Milosevic to accept the views of the international community - regardless of
what his initial reactions might be.
Despite all the attention we have had to focus on Kosovo, I also want to make
sure we do not forget other pressing issues in the bilateral relationship. We
need to get U.S.-Russian relations on the right track of cooperation and mutual
benefit.
Anyway, Mr. Prime Minister, this is an important week, and you can be sure
that I'll be following developments closely.
Pause for reply
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Saturday, May 29, 1999 1:59 PM
To:
Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers
Cc:
@VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive
Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject:
RE: URGENT -- Schroeder/Ahtisaari/Cherno meeting in Berlin is off [CONFIDENTIAL]
URGENT - -- PLEASE PASS TO JIM
Following may be relevant for call to Schroeder. Eric Edelman just called again.
Markov (Cherno's side kick) called Steiner and suggested that the Tuesday trilat
(Cherno-Ahti-ST) now take place in Bonn. Finns are trying to turn this off. Ahtisaari
thinks that the Russians are sensing the panic in Europe and are trying to exploit it.
Original Message
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Saturday, May 29, 1999 1:23 PM
To:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @COMM - WHSR Comm Officers
Cc:
@VP - VP Natl Security Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WHSR - WH Situation Room;
@ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject:
Schroeder/Ahtisaari/Cherno meeting in Berlin is off [CONFIDENTIAL]
PLEASE PASS TO JIM ASAP
Eric Edelman called from Helsinki to say that Chernomyrdin has told Ahtisaari that he
cannot agree to meet with Schroeder on Sunday in Berlin. Cherno said that he
hasn't been able to get in to see Yeltsin and that he has more work to do in Moscow.
The Tuesday trilat meeting in Helsinki (Cherno-Ahti-ST) is still on. Cherno did not
provide much of a substantive update on his talks in Belgrade, other than to say
"things had been very difficult, things are very complicated, all issues had been
raised in Belgrade, and that more needs to be done."
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By n NARA, Date 12/14/2023
7008-0994-K3
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent:
Friday, May 28, 1999 3:49 PM
To:
Hachigian, Nina L.
Cc:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Subject:
Initial Press Line on Chernomyrdin Visit to Belgrade [UNCLASSIFIED]
We have seen reports that Chernomyrdin was "very satisfied" with his talks today in
Belgrade and that he hopes to return next week with President Ahtisaari.
We have also heard the statement from Milosevic's office indicating that the FRY
"accepts the basic principles of the G-8 and agrees with a resolution in accordance
with the U.N. charter that would be brought by the UN Security Council."
We of course welcome any progress that has been made in bringing Milosevic to
accept the conditions necessary to achieve our objective of bringing the refugees
home with security and self-government.
Based on the G-8 principles, this includes the withdrawal of all Serb forces from
Kosovo and the deployment of an international security force with NATO at its core.
We look forward to hearing a report from Chernomyrdin on his visit.
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
WHSR
Sent:
Friday, May 28, 1999 3:39 PM
To:
Allen, Charles A.; Babbitt, James F.; Baker, James E.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel;
Black, Steven K.; Blinken, Antony J.; Braden, Susan R.; Brody, Richard J.; Brown, Keirn C.;
Busby, Scott W.; Butler, Lawrence E.; Crowley, Philip J.; Davidson, Leslie K.; Ebitz, Todd D.;
Elkind, Jonathan H.; Faranda, Regina D.; Flanagan, Stephen J.; Gordon, Philip H.; Guarnieri,
Valerie N.; Hammer, Michael A.; Hurley, C. Michael; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Klein, Brian P.;
Leavy, David C.; Miller, Laurel E.; Moyn, Samuel A.; Naplan, Steven J.; Pascual, Carlos E.;
Sapiro, Miriam E.; Schulte, Gregory L.; Schwartz, Eric P.; Segal, Jack D.; Sigler, Ralph H.;
Stromseth, Jane E.; Tedstrom, John E.; Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt); Weiss, Andrew S.;
Wippman, David
Subject:
YUGOSLAVIA-RUSSIA
CLASS:
INTERNATIONAL
ORIG:
Reuters
PREC:
RUSH
TOR:
990528152617 R0298793
a3035
^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-RUSSIA
^Russian envoy satisfied by talks with Milosevic
BELGRADE (Reuters) - Russian Kosovo envoy Viktor
Chernomyrdin said he was ``very satisfied" with talks he had in
Belgrade with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's
Beta news agency reported Friday.
Chernomyrdin said he was sure that he would return to
Belgrade next week with (Finnish President and European envoy
Martti) Ahtisaari," it said, citing comments made to Russian
reporters at the airport before leaving Belgrade.
A statement from Milosevic's office read on state television
said the international community had accepted the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and Belgrade had
accepted principles agreed by the Group of Eight.
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepts the basic
principles of the G-8 and agrees with a resolution in accordance
with the U.N. charter that would be brought by the U.N. Security
Council," it said.
Belgrade had previously indicated the principles were
acceptable but noted they were very vague and said its attitude
would depend on how they were interpreted.
They include a withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, the stationing
of an international security presence and return of ethnic
Albanian refugees to Kosovo, hundreds of thousands of whom have
fled since NATO began bombing.
^REUTERS
RB-- 05/28/99 15:10:00
1
28. MAY. 1999
10:37
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
NO.188
P.1/4
Copies to:
To Pascual
leslie
From: Wass
Greg
stuart
Juck
As d iscussed. Russian redraft of
Finnish paper; Hammer/ anuil paper,
Chemo-athored command streeture. Pls.
pass to 6000 & Leslie.
-5 pages to follow- -
Russian
[chimo]
UN Security
Guarantees confirming
NO. P.2/4
Proposal
Council
basic principles of the
NO.188
Cherno-authored
command structure
Russia - - NATO Founding Act
Mandate
Russia - NATO
PJC
Special Rep of the UN
Secretary General
SHAPE
Deputy Supreme
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
Commander
(Russia)
Civilian Aspects of
the Operation
Commander
Deputy CDR Russian
Multinational
Rep & Neutral State
Forces
Multinational Staff/CoS
28.MAY.1999 10:38
NATO Representative
Significant Presence of
Sector CDRs
Russian and Neutral Reps
within the Staff
28. MAY. 1999 10:38
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
NO. 188
P.3/4
HAMMER & ANVIL STRATEGY
Paper used by strobe
GENERAL PRINCIPLES (G-8 BONN STATEMENT)
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and paramilitary forces,
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presenocs, endorsed and adopted by UN, capable of
guaranteeing achicvement of common objectives.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the UNSC.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons/unimpeded access of humaniterien aid organizations.
Political process towards establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial sclf-
government. taking full account of Rambouillet accords, principles of FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity. and UCK
domilitarization.
Comprehensive approach to economic development/stabilization of region.
Requirements:
Milosevic must agree to above principles. and to withdraw from Kosovo the VJ, MUP and paramilitary forces deployed
there.
Belgrade may reintroduce and maintain in Kosovo, after cessation of hostilities, small number of personnel to liaise with
presences: mark and clear minefields; maintain presence at Serb patrimonial sites and key border crossings.
Belgrade must also agree to essential specifics below,
SSENTIAL SPECIFICS ("Elaboration of Conditions" paper as augmented by Helsinkl document)
Accept deployment of effective ISP with NATO at the core. This means NATO chain of command under political direction
of NAC In consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners and other countries eligible to
contribute. NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put in place for Rusalan forces,
similar to IFOR/SFOR model.
ISP must be authorized to establish sate environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate safe return to their homes of
all displaced persons and refugees. (Authorities and status of ISP same as IFOR/SFOR under Annex 1A of Dayton Peace
Accords.)
Withdrawal means "all:" "all" means "all:" withdrawals from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia must bc completed according lu
a precise and rapid timetable within E matter of days (e,g., 7 days to complete withdrawal: air defenses withdrawn outside a
25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours). ISP moves in over the same period. Any return of MUP or VJ personnel, after
appropriate vetting, will follow complete withdrawal according to a precise timetable.
Returning Serb presence will be subject to strict and cnforceable numerical limits, and confined to narrowly defined
functional roles and clear rules ("roles and rules"): No. 1 rule is that KFOR commander is arbiter and supervisor of any
returning Serb presence.
Creation of Interim administration (as part of International civil mission) under which people of Kosovo enjoy substantial
autonomy within FRY; interim administration to provide transitional administration until democratic sclf-governing
institutions established.
Refugee returns to occur under supervision and direction of UNHCR in consultation with KTOR commander and Civil
Presence Head,
Understanding that settlement negotiations between parties should not delay creation of democratic self-governing
Institutions.
Relevant issues (see below) to be resolved rapidly in a military-technical agreement.
JENNAND WALK
HOURN TREASE DD continued (PS oppropriate) community,
on 223 understanding that KEOR/NATO reservo THE
above of Macking VPA mille
itery-technical agreement:
All withdrawal modalities for VJ/MUP and paramilitaries, Including width of buffer area in Scrbia beyond which forces must
be withdrawn and precise and rapid timetable for withdrawals.
All
nost-withdrawal
28. MAY. 1999 10:38
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
NO. 188
P.4/4
Accords.)
Withdrawal means "all:" "all" means "all:" withdrawals from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia must be completed according t
a precise and rapid timetable within a matter of days (e.g., 7 days to complete withdrawal; air defenses withdrawn outside.
25 km mutual safety zone within 48 hours). ISP moves in nver the same period. Any return of MUP or VJ personnel, afte
appropriate vetting. will follow complete withdrawal according lo a precise timetable.
Returning Serb presence will bc subject to strict and enforceable numerical limits, and confined to narrowly define
functional roles and clear rules ("roles and rules"): No. 1 rule IS that KFOR commander is arbiter and supervisor of an
returning Serb presence.
Creation of interim administration (as part of international civil mission) under which people of Kosovo enjoy substantla
autonomy within FRY; interim administration to provide transitional administration until democratic sclf-governin
Institutions established.
Refugee returns to occur under supervision and direction of UNHCR in consultation with KFOR commander and Civ
Presence Head.
Understanding that settlement ncgotiations between parties should not delay creation of democratic self-governin-
institutions.
Relevant Issues (see below) to be resolved rapidly in a military-toohnical agreement.
SURFEND
below be confirmed OTHERS (ce appropriate) informational commaning Kosovo Albanians
GRE AWC reserve right to reaume military UII response to
THE Blocking sencius len of willit watechnikal adreemen on multarily acceptable) terms:
Military-technical agreement:
All withdrawal modalities for VJ/MUP and paramilitaries, including width of buffer area In Serbia beyond which forces mus
be withdrawn and precise and rapid timetable for withdrawals.
All post-withdrawal modalities for any returning FRY personnel, including:
Terms of reference for functional responsibilities.
Strict and enforceable limits on equipment associated with their presence.
Precise timetable for their return.
Clear delineation of their limited geographical areas of operation.
Clearly defined and enforceable rules governing their relationship to KFOR commander and Civil Presence Head.
Other arrangements:
Establishment of international police torce with executive authority to create, train, and equip multiethnic local police forces
Modalities of KLA demilitarization.
28. MAY. 1999 10:39
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
NO. 189 5/28
Russian Redraft of Finn
To be stop the NATO military operation and resolve the Kosovo crisis an agreement should Paper
reached on the following principles:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
5/28 5.00am)
(now reworked being
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police, and para-military forces.
by Finns
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences,
endorsed and adopted by the United Nations capable of guaranteeing the
again.)
achievement of common objectives.
ch.7
The international security presence with the participation of NATO countries must
be deployed under unified command and control and-authorized to establish a safe
environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international
civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and
Ramb?
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
smart
Anagreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian security personnel may remain in Kosovo
to perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil and security presences
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and
direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region,
and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing
institutions.
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis
region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern
28.MAY.1999 10:39
EMB CONTROL RM BRU 32 2 5082807
NO. 1892
P.2/2
Europe with broad regional order to cooperation. further promotion of
democracy, bywhow? and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, agreement there will will
After be a suspension agrecment of on military the above specify activity. the withdrawal during which modalities a military-technical for military, police, Such and
be para-military rapidly concluded forces, and to the roles and functions of remaining personnel.
modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule (bufferzone]
Remaining Personnel
Equipment associated with remaining personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security and civil presences ISF+GL
missions
NATO countries, partners, and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the
international security presence. NATO units would be under NATO command.
I
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5.28'99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 1
WASHFAX RECEIPT
Department of State
B
8
S/S #
MESSAGE NO
019500
CLASSIFICATION
NO. PAGES
Confidential
FROM: PARdew
State
(Officer Name)
(Office Symbol)
(Extension)
(Room Number)
MESSAGE
DESCRIPTION:
Script for Belgrade
TO: (Agency)
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION
ROOM NO.
NSC
Schults
OSD
USDP slocombe /Kaufmaw
Lcs
Con DONOJON
OVP
Davidson
FOR:
Clearance
Information
Per Request
Comment
REMARKS: Pls provide comments to part one by 1700
Provide commits to John Bell, RPM
adds/deletes in the RUSSIAN text are by Altisaari.
S/S Officer:
RPM- 647-3374
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VL Date: 12/14/2023
7008-0994.F3
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5.28'99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 2
CONFIDENTIAL
May 28, 1999
TO:
S/SA - Ambassador Pardew
FROM:
S/P - Jon Levitsky JL
SUBJECT: Attached Notional Chernomyrdin "Hammer and Anvil"
Script for ASAP Review
Please find attached for interagency review a notional
script for use by Chernomyrdin in a joint trip to Belgrade
with President Ahtisaari as a part of the "hammer and
anvil" strategy. Jim Swigert tells me he gave you a heads
up that this would be on the way. The script has been
approved by President Ahtisaari and the Deputy Secretary.
I am also attaching for reference the script that President
Ahtisaari intends to use on such a trip. (This script has
already been reviewed by the interagency and was
distributed in Moscow by the Finns yesterday.) Request
that you coordinate interagency review of the notional
Chernomyrdin script by COB Washington on Friday if
possible, Noon on Saturday at the latest. Any comments or
changes will have to be vetted and coordinated with
Ahtisaari. Timing necessary to permit delivery in Moscow
on Monday morning after Ahtisaari consultation, assuming
Ahtisaari decides to go ahead with this approach after
getting read out from Chernomyrdin of word from Belgrade.
You can reach me through ops here in Helsinki over the
weekend. Thanks for the help, and sorry for the quick
turnaround.
To avoid any uncertainty in Washington, a few words on the
purpose of the papers. The concept, as the Deputy
Secretary has laid it out for Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari,
is as follows. Chernomyrdin would use the first script to
go as far as he can in support of NATO positions without
crossing Russia's redlines. Ahtisaari would then use the
second script to make the critical points on which we have
not reached agreement with the Russians. (The bold type in
the Ahtisaari script identifies those issues that are not
covered by the Chernomyrdin script, and which it will be
especially important for Ahtisaari to emphasize.) The two
would agree not to undermine each other in the discussion.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
CONFIDENTIAL
V2
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F3
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5. 28'99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 3
CONFIDENTIAL
The first (Chernomyrdin) script is a modified version of a
document that the Russians passed to us yesterday after
reviewing the Ahtisaari script. Changes to the Russian
original are shown in the text. The Russian paper directly
contradicts a number of key U.S. positions (e.g., NATO core
and "all out"). This modified version aims to push the
Russians as far as they are likely to go in our direction,
while making the rest of the text ambiguous and not
directly contrary to our positions.
If used, this script will represent Russia's position
rather than that of the USG. It therefore does not seek to
encompass all of our bottom lines. Some of the packaging -
- at President Ahtisaari's specific request -- is also
probably not what we would choose, although he is 'not
seeking to water down our substantive positions. Please
ask the interagency to focus its review accordingly on
ensuring that the script does not cross U.S. red-lines or
contradict the positions to be stated by President
Ahtisaari.
NSC requests clearance by Schulte/Pascual. Please also get
a chop from S/P - Halperin/O'Brien. Thanks.
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5.28'99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 4
Resetan Paper of 5/26/99 Belarade Script: Pert One (Chernomyrdin)
To stop the NATO military operation YYY resole ve move toward the
resolution of the Kosovo crisis an agreement should be reached on
the following principles:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in
Kosovo.
Verifiable and rapid withdrawal from Kosovo of military,
police, and para-military forces.
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and
security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United
Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common
objectives.
The An effective international security presence with the
participation of NATO countries must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe
environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the
safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and
refugees. All NATO countries, partners and other countries
will be eligible to contribute to the international security
diesence.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a
part of the international civil presence under which the
people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations.
Interim administration to provide transitional administration
while establishing and overseeing the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants
in Kosovo.
In After the suspersion of hostilitie:... Belqrade: authorities
wije plan for 7. small, agreed number of Yuganiev and Serbion
accurity personnel may remain in Kosovo to perform the
following functions:
liaison with international civil and security presences
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5.28'99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 5
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons
under the supervision and direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded
access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for a substantial
self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the
Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties
for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment
of democratic self-governing institutions.
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
with broad international participation in order to further
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and
regional cooperation.
After
agreement
on
the
shove
are
beginning of Verifiable
there
will the it the suspension of military
activity on tems to be el aborat by President Ahliszari,
during watch a military-technical agreement will be rapidly
concluded to specify the withdrawal modalities for military,
police, and para-military forces, and the roles and functions
of Yuapsiav/Serb personnel IN Kinsiovo. Such
modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed
schedule
Yegos/av/Setb Personnel in Yosovo
Equipment associated with yugustav/serb personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security
and civil presences
NATO nountries, partners, and other countries will be eligible
contribute 1:0 the internatienal security presence. HATE units
world be under NAMO
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5. 28' 99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 6
Belgrade Script: Part Two (Athisaari)
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move toward a resolution of
the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo to elsewhere in Serbia of all military, police,
and para-military forces (according to a rapid timetable: e.g., 7 days to complete
withdrawal; air defense weapons withdrawn outside a 25 km mutual safety zone
within 48 hours).
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences,
endorsed and adopted by the United Nations acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
The international security force with a NATO core must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in
Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and
refugees.
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international
civil mission under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the FRY to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. Interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions
taking into account the framework of the Rambouillet Accords to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
After full withdrawal, a small agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return under the supervision of the international security
force to perform the following functions:
liaison with international civil mission and international security force
marking/clearing minefields
maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites
maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision and
direction of the UNHCR and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE 4A
(FRI) 5. 28' 99 15:19/ST. 15:18/NO. 3760637494 P 7
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should
not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis
region. This will include the implementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern
Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of
democracy, economic prosperity, stability, and regional cooperation.
After agreement on the above and the beginning of verifiable withdrawals, there
will be a suspension of military activity, during which a military-technical
agreement will be rapidly concluded by the leadership of the international
security force and the FRY/Serb military and police leadership to specify the
withdrawal modalities for military, police, and para-military forces, and the roles and
functions of returning personnel. Such modalities would include:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased. detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn
Returning Personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities
Timetable for their return
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation
Rules governing their relationship to international security force and international
civil mission
It is understood that NATO considers "an international security force with a NATO
core" to mean a NATO chain of command under the political direction of the NAC
in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners,
and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force.
NATO units would be under NATO command. Special arrangements could be put
in place for Russian forces, similar to the IFOR/SFOR model, including
consultations on international security force operations.
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Friday, May 28, 1999 8:17 AM
To:
Pascual, Carlos E.; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject:
RE: Strobe Update [CONFIDENTIAL]
PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM -- Time Sensitive
Update as of 8:00 am (EDT) on Friday
Ambassador Edelman and Lyvytsky met today with Ahtisaari to again discuss the
game plan for a possible trip to Belgrade. After further thought, Ahtisaari backed
away from his insistence (e-mail below) on a unified script Ahtisaari/Cherno script.
Proposal now is to review two scripts which are still being worked in Helsinki:
(1) a new version, edited by the Finns, of a Russian redraft of the paper Ahtisaari
gave Cherno on Thursday. I know this is confusing. This is the paper that
combined the G-8 principles and NATO conditions, but (as Strobe put it) the
Finns adapted to their music. The Russians then watered down key elements.
The Finns are adding back essential points with the help of Lyvytsky and
Edelman. This would be the script for Cherno.
(2) The original Finn script would be delivered by Ahtisaari, but with added
emphasis given to some of the key NATO points since these items would be
watered down in the Cherno script.
Lyvytsky will send these scripts back for overnight review. Do not know if they will
be sent to Greg or Dobbins.
Ahtisaari will call Cherno tonight or Saturday morning to see how the trip went. If it
went reasonably, then Ahtisaari will forward the two proposed scripts to Cherno as
early as Saturday or Sunday. If the trip went poorly, Ahtisaari may hold off forwarding
the scripts for a few days.
Plan is still for a trilateral meeting on Tuesday, and for Ahtisaari and Cherno to go to
Belgrade on Wednesday.
Original Message
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Thursday, May 27, 1999 7:08 PM
To:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject:
Strobe Update [CONFIDENTIAL]
PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM
I'm told that Strobe talked to Sandy with a readout on the latest developments; the following is probably less than you
already know (but as much as I know).
As I understand from Andrew, Strobe and Ahtisaari met again after they met with Schroeder. Ahtisaari had two
requests. (1) Rather than pursue the hammer and anvil strategy, that they work with Chernomyrdin on a common
script to reduce the risk of disagreement. (2) That Cherno, Ahtisaari and Strobe meet again next Tuesday in Helsinki
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
1
By
V2
NARA, Date 2023/12/14
2508-0994-F3
to work on the script and hold open the prospect for a Cherno/Ahtisaari trip to Belgrade on Wednesday. I understand
that Strobe agreed to meet in Helsinki.
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
004. memo
To [Madeleine] Albright, [Sandy] Berger, and [Leon] Fuerth from
05/27/1999
P1/b(1)
Strobe Talbott. Subject: Trip Report #3 (Moscow-Bonn) (4 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Kosovo Office (Schulte, Gregory)
OA/Box Number: 1709
FOLDER TITLE:
Chernomyrdin, [Victor]/Ahtisaari, [Martti]/ MTA [Military Technical Agreement] [2]
2008-0994-F
vz6231
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Wednesday, May 26, 1999 2:31 PM
To:
@NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc:
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @ ADHOC KOSOVO
Subject:
Update from Moscow [CONFIDENTIAL]
PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND JIM - TIME SENSITIVE
Understand that Strobe is trying to call Sandy or Jim, so you may already have more
detail than I have below. Key points:
Chernomyrdin and Athisaari have decided that they will not go to Belgrade tomorrow
given the news about Milosevic's indictment.
The first half of the trilateral meeting revisited old circular arguments about Serb
force withdrawal, ISF, allegations of constantly adding new conditions. Stepashin
then called Chernomyrdin with news of the indictment. Chernomyrdin came back to
the room very negative, reiterating his previous line that Russia will not deliver
NATO's ultimatum.
Depending on how the dust settles from the indictment, Athisaari held open the
prospect of a trip to Belgrade before next Wednesday's EU summit, allowing him to
report to the summit the results of the trip. While not stated, Athisaari will obviously
be concerned about meeting with an indicted war criminal.
Strobe has reluctantly agreed to another trilateral meeting tomorrow at 10:00. That
will be on the wires momentarily.
Athisaari to Bonn tomorrow. Strobe may accompany. No Strobe meeting with
Stepashin.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
n
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
2008-0994-F
1
Schulte, Gregory L.
From:
Pascual, Carlos E.
Sent:
Wednesday, May 26, 1999 1:46 PM
To:
Schulte, Gregory L.
Subject:
FW: NODIS from Albright to Ivanov [CONFIDENTIAL]
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
Original Message
Department of State Guidelines, November 6, 2015
From:
Tarver, J. Sean
VL
Sent:
Wednesday, May 26, 1999 1:29 PM
By
NARA, Date 12/14/2023
To:
Pascual, Carlos E.
2008- 0994- F3
Subject:
NODIS from Albright to Ivanov [CONFIDENTIAL]
Sir,
Here is the NODIS cable you requested.
PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL SSN: 6275MSGID: M3877029OAACZYUW RUEHCAA6275 1451106-
CCCC--RHEHAAX. ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK O 251104Z MAY 99 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC FM: SECSTATE
WASHDC TO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: ////
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 096275
NODIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/24/09
TAGS: PREL, RS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV
CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY STROBE TALBOTT FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (CONIACT PRECEDENCE REQUIRED TO ENSURE DELIVERY AT OOB IN
MOSCOW ON MAY 25. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER IVANOV AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR IGOR SERGEYEVICH:
I AM WRITING TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT STROBE'S
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW THIS WEEK. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL
IF YOU WOULD RECEIVE HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL TO
REVIEW HOW YOU SEE THE IMMENSE AND IMPORTANT CHALLENGE WE
ARE WORKING ON TOGETHER. HE WILL, AS HE DID LAST WEEK AND
THE WEEK BEFORE, STAY IN TOUCH WITH YOU DURING HIS STAY,
INCLUDING AFTER HE JOINED VICTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT
AHTISAARI FOR THEIR FOLLOW-UP TRILATERAL ON WEDNESDAY.
I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS I STRESSED LAST WEEK IN
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY AND AS I SAID THIS PAST WEEKEND IN
SEVERAL PUBLIC APPEARANCES, THAT RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY HAS BEEN
A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO BRING A
LASTING, STABLE AND JUST PEACE TO THE BALKANS. AT THE
HEART (I'M TEMPTED TO SAY, AT THE CORE) OF U.S.-RUSSIAN
DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION HAS BEEN THE WORK YOU AND I HAVE
DONE TOGETHER. THAT IS ONE OF MANY REASONS I WAS GRATIFIED
WHEN STROBE SENT WORD TO ME LAST FRIDAY THAT PRIME MINISTER
STEPASHIN HAD ASKED YOU TO REMAIN AT YOUR POST.
WE ARE MOVING INTO WHAT COULD BE A CRITICAL PERIOD. I
GATHER THAT VICTOR STEPANOVICH IS CONSIDERING TAKING
ANOTHER TRIP TO BELGRADE ON THURSDAY. AS I UNDERSTAND FROM
TALKING TO PRESIDENT AHTISAARI EARLIER TODAY, HE WILL
DECIDE, BASED ON THAT SAME MEETING, WHETHER TO ACCOMPANY
VICTOR STEPANOVICH. STROBE WILL REPORT BACK TO ME so THAT
PRESIDENT CLINTON AND I CAN DETERMINE OUR VIEW AND PUBLIC
POSTURE WITH REGARD TO A JOINT TRIP.
THE STANDARD WE WILL USE WILL BE SIMPLE: WILL A JOINT TRIP
SERVE TO CLARIFY, IN MILOSEVIC'S MIND, WHAT HE MUST DO IN
ORDER FOR THERE TO BE A SUSPENSION IN AIR STRIKES AND THE
BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S
DETERMINATION TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS - NAMELY, A PHASE IN
WHICH NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE IN SUSPENSION (THEIR
RESUMPTION REMAINS A "SWORD OF DAMOCLES") WHILE FOUR OTHER
THINGS ARE OCCURRING:
THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL MUP, VJ AND PARAMILITARY FORCES;
THE DEPLOYMENT INTO KOSOVO OF AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY FORCE;
--THE RETURN TO KOSOVO OF THE REFUGEES AND THE RETURN TO
THEIR HOMES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS;
-- THE ESTABLISHMENT IN KOSOVO OF AN INTERIM
ADMINISTRATION, AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL MISSION,
TO PROVIDE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION WHILE CREATING
DEMOCRATIC, SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS;
FOR US TO ENTER THAT PHASE, BELGRADE MUST ACCEPT NATO'S
FIVE CONDITIONS AND BEGIN VERIFIABLE WITHDRAWALS.
AS I SEE OUR WORK TOGETHER OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS, SINCE
OUR MEETING IN OSLO, IT HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON ONE OBJECTIVE
ABOVE ALL OTHERS: TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM CLARITY AND AGREEMENT
ON THE VARIOUS CONDITIONS AND ON WHAT THOSE CONDITIONS MEAN
IN PRACTICE. THERE ARE,OF COURSE, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ON VARIOUS ISSUES. BUT I THINK WE'VE
BEEN MAKING STEADY PROGRESS IN NARROWING THOSE DIFFERENCES.
STROBE'S ASSIGNMENT THIS WEEK IS TO TRY TO NARROW THE
DIFFERENCES FURTHER, IF POSSIBLE TO THE POINT WHERE THE
U.S. CAN SUPPORT A JOINT CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI MISSION TO
BELGRADE. WE WANT TO DO SO, SINCE THE MISSION COULD SERVE
TWO POSITIVE PURPOSES: IT COULD INCREASE THE CHANCES THAT
MILOSEVIC WILL INDEED TAKE'THE STEPS NECESSARY TO SUSPEND
THE BOMBING; AND IT COULD CONSOLIDATE RUSSIA'S KEY ROLE IN
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE, WHICH WE CONSIDER-AN IMPORTANT
GOAL, GIVEN THE ROLE RUSSIA HAS PLAYED IN THE PAST AND THE
ONE WE HOPE IT WILL PLAY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PEACE.
HOWEVER, I MUST, IN ALL CANDOR, ALSO STRESS A CONCERN - AND
A FIRM PRINCIPLE THAT WILL GOVERN THE PRESIDENT'S AND MY
RESPONSE TO WHAT HAPPENS IN MOSCOW THIS WEEK. ANY
AMBIGUITY OR IMPRECISION WITH REGARD TO WHAT THE CONDITIONS
MUST MEAN IN PRACTICE WILL ENCOURAGE MILOSEVIC TO HOLD OUT
IN THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT HE CAN GET A "BETTER DEAL."
THE RESULT WILL BE TO PROLONG THE CONFLICT, SINCE NATO WILL
HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE THE BOMBING.
IN MY VIEW, A CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI INITIATIVE CAN HELP
HASTEN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND A SUSPENSION OF BOMBING
ONLY IF THERE IS MAXIMUM CLARITY BETWEEN US - AND WITH
MILOSEVIC - NOT JUST ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, SUCH AS THOSE
WE WROTE INTO THE BONN G-8 STATEMENT, BUT ON WHAT I WOULD
CALL THE ESSENTIAL SPECIFICS. THOSE INCLUDE THE
REQUIREMENT FOR ALL VJ, M-UP AND PARAMILITARIES TO COME OUT.
ONLY AFTER THEIR WITHDRAWAL WILL SOME FRY PERSONNEL BE
ALLOWED TO RETURN TO PERFORM SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS UNDER THE
DIRECT SUPERVISION OF THE KFOR COMMANDER.
YOU TOLD ME ON THE PHONE LAST WEEK THAT YOU FELT THAT THE
U.S. WAS ADDING CONDITIONS. THAT IS SIMPLY NOT CORRECT.
WHAT WE ARE DOING - PROPERLY AND NECESSARILY, I BELIEVE
IS PRESSING FOR GREATER PPRECISION BETWEEN US ON WHAT THE
2
WORDS THAT WE ARE USING MEAN IN PRACTICE, SO THAT
UNDERSTANDINGS LIKE THOSE WE. REACHED IN RAMBOUILLET, OSLO
AND BONN AND THAT WE HAVE ENSHRINED IN DOCUMENTS LIKE THE
G-8 MINISTERIAL STATEMENT DO NOT TURN INTO DANGEROUS,
EVEN CATASTROPHIC MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN KOSOVO, THUS
JEOPARDIZING THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION AND
THE LIVES OF THE PEACEKEEPERS.
LET ME RETURN TO A POSITIVE POINT: FROM STROBE'S REPORT
LAST WEEK, IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH MR. CHERNOMYRDIN MAY HAVE
HAD SOME SUCCESS IN PERSUADING MILOSEVIC TO ACCEPT FORCES
FROMNATO COUNTRIES INSIDEOF KOSOVO AS PART OF THE
SECURITY PRESENCE. THAT WOULD BE A STEP IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD STILL LEAVE MILOSEVIC WELL SHY
OF THE LINE HE MUST CROSS IF THE BOMBING IS TO BE
SUSPENDED. ONLY IF THE SECURITY FORCE HAS NATO AT ITS
CORE WILL IT BE "EFFECTIVE"; ONLY THEN WILL IT BE ABLE TO:
ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT;
-- ATTRACT HOME PEACEFUL ALBANIAN REFUGEES;
PROTECT ETHNIC SERB CIVILIANS;
DETER AND DEAL WITH VIOLENT ELEMENTS AMONG BOTH THE
ETHNIC SERBS AND ALBANIANS;
ENSURE MAXIMUM SAFETY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS IN
KOSOVO, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN;
PROTECT THE LIMITED NUMBER OF FRY PERSONNEL WHO WILL,
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE VJ, MUP AND PARAMILITARIES,
RETURN TO PERFORM CERTAIN SPECIFIED FUNCTIONS AND
DEMONSTRATE FRY SOVEREIGNTY.
THE SECURITY FORCE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH NONE OF
THOSE DAUNTING TASKS IF IT WERE A FORMAL, BLUE-HELMETED
UNITED. NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, WITH RUSSIAN TROOPS
UNDER DIRECT'RUSSIANCONTROL ALL THE WAY UP THE CHAIN AND
THE WHOLE OPERATION UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF A REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL- AN ARRANGEMENT
THAT IS DOUBLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO BE ACCEPT OR BE PART
OF THE MEETINGS LAST WEEK, ESPECIALLY THE CONVERSATION YOU
HAD WITH STROBE ON FRIDAY AND HIS SUBSEQUENT ONE WITH
VICTOR STEPANOVICH, UNDERSCORED THE NEED FOR GREATER
CLARITY ON BOTH OUR PARTS. AS WE UNDERSTAND WHAT WE HEARD,
RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT NATO-COUNTRIES-AT-THE-CORE,
BUT IT IS NOT CURRENTLY.PREPARED TO ACCEPT NATO AS AN
ORGANIZATION PLAYING THE "CORE" ROLE IN THE SECURITY FORCE.
I GATHER THAT MEANS THAT THE IFOR/SFOR MODEL, EVEN IN SOME
NEW VARIANT, WILL NOT WORK IN KOSOVO.
THAT POSITION RAISES A REAL QUESTION OF WHETHER, EVEN IF
RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A
PEACE THAT MEETS THE STIPULATED CONDITIONS, RUSSIA WILL
FEEL ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE THAT
FOLLOWS. IF NOT, IT WOULD BE A SHAME.
THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF STROBE'S TEAM, GENERALS FOGLESONG
AND CASEY, WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF SECRETARY COHEN AND
GENERALS SHELTON AND RALSTON, HAVE SPENT THE WEEKEND AND
TODAY WORKING HARD. WHEN THEY GET TO MOSCOW, THEY WILL BE
PREPARED TO RE-ENGAGE WITH YOUR SIDE ON THESE ISSUES. AS I
SEE IT, THIS KNOTTY PROBLEMHAS TWO DIMENSIONS THE FIRST
THAT WE SHOULD TRY, IF POSSIBLE, TO RESOLVE THIS WEEK, THE
SECOND THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO RESOLVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
THEREAFTER.
THE IMMEDIATE TASK IS WHAT NATO INSISTS BELGRADE MUST
ACCEPT AND AGREE AS A CONDITION FOR SUSPENSION OF BOMBING.
IF'A CHERNOMYRDIN-AHTISAARI TRIP IS GOING TO ACCELERATE THE
ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN THE BOMBS STOP FALLING, IT MUST
LEAVE MILOSEVICWITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING THAT NATO IS
3
NOT GOING TO BE JUST INSIDE KOSOVO, ON THE GROUND IT IS
GOING TO BE LEADING THE OPERATION IN COOPERATION WITH
RUSSIA AND OTHER NON-NATO TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.
LET ME REITERATE TWO IMPORTANT QUALIFIERS THAT YOU AND
HAVE DISCUSSED BEFORE:
FIRST, NATO-AT-THE-CORE DOES NOT MEAN A NATO-ONLY KFOR.
NON-NATO COUNTRIES RUSSIA, FINLAND, UKRAINE, SWEDEN AND
OTHERS WILL BE THERE-TOO, ALL WORKING HARMONIOUSLY AND
EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER. AND OUR NATO-AT-THE-CORE CONDITION
DOES NOT PREJUDGE WHAT THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE BETWEEN
KFOR AND THE UN. NOR DOES IT REQUIRE THAT NATO'S NAME BE
IN THE DESIGNATION OF THE FORCE OR IN A CHAPTER VII UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.
SECOND, HOW EXACTLY KFOR IS ORGANIZED AND DEPLOYED ITS
SIZE, COMPOSITION, STRENGTH, COMMAND STRUCTURE, RULE-OF-
ENGAGEMENT ARE MATTERS FOR THE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO
WORK OUT AMONG THEMSELVES. THE KEY POINT THAT
MILOSEVICMUST UNDERSTAND IS THAT HE WILL NOT HAVE A VETO
OVER HOW THOSE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, EITHER BEFORE
SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OR DURING THE SUSPENSION.
AS I GATHER YOU TOLD STROBE ON FRIDAY, "IF BELGRADE ACCEPTS
NATO, THAT'S UP TO BELGRADE." WE AGREE. BUT IF BELGRADE
DOES NOT ACCEPT NATO AND IF IT DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT
IT MUST ACCEPT OUR DEFINITION OF NATO-AT-THE-CORE IT MUST
ACCEPT THE INESCAPABLE, NON-NEGOTIABLE FACT THAT THE
MILITARY CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE. OUR HOPE, THEREFORE, IS
THAT BELGRADE WILL SEE IT IN ITS OWN INTERESTS TO ACCEPT
NATO AT THE CORE OF SECURITY PRESENCE.
ONLY IF VICTOR STEPANOVICH AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI AGREE ON
A WAY OF HANDLING THIS ISSUE IN BELGRADE SATISFACTORILY
I.E., IN A WAY THAT GETS THE MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE HOST AND
THAT DOES NOT OCCASION CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE TWO GUESTS
CAN WE, THE U.S., SUPPORT THEIR JOINT MISSION.
BUT THAT DOES NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE VICTOR STEPANOVICH
AND PRESIDENT AHTISAARI TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION WITH
MILOSEVICON THE EXACT COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THE SECURITY
PRESENCE. IN FACT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE
INAPPROPRIATE FOR THEM TO DO SO, SINCE THE COMMAND
STRUCTURE IS NOT HIS BUSINESS. IT IS, OF COURSE, VERY MUCH
OUR BUSINESS, RUSSIA'S AND THE U.S.'S AND URGENT BUSINESS
INDEED.
SO THE QUESTION, IGOR, IS WHETHER WE CAN FIND A WAY,
ACCEPTABLE BOTH TO RUSSIA AND NATO, OF RECONCILING TWO
REQUIREMENTS. OURS IS THAT NATO BE, IN A MILITARILY
MEANINGFUL (AND EFFECTIVE) WAY, "AT THE CORE" OF KFOR
I.E., IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES UNITY OF COMMAND (ALL TROOPS
IN KOSOVO UNDER A SINGLE COMMANDER);-YOUR REQUIREMENT, AS I
UNDERSTAND IT, IS THAT RUSSIA'S OWN FORCES NOT SERVE
DIRECTLY UNDER NATO AS SUCH.
IN THIS REGARD, THERE ARE REAL, PRACTICAL LIMITS TO HOW
IMAGINATIVE WE CAN BE, SINCE THERE ARE LIFE-OR-DEATH ISSUES
OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND FORCE-PROTECTION INVOLVED.
AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, TOWARD THE END OF STROBE'S FRIDAY
MEETING WITH VICTOR STEPANOVICH, AMBASSADOR IVANOVSKY AND
OTHERS ON FRIDAY, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE
ORGANIZATION CHARTS THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR CIVILIAN AND
MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION IN KOSOVO IN WAYS INTENDED TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE RUSSIAN NEEDS AND
SENSITIVITIES.
STROBE AND HIS TEAM ARE COMING PREPARED TO RESUME
DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHERS.
4
NATURALLY, IGOR, I STAND READY TO TALK TO YOU AT ANY TIME
AS THIS IMPORTANT WEEK UNFOLDS.
SINCERELY,
MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
(NO-SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW)
END TEXT
ALBRIGHT
DIST: <^DIST>
SIT: PASCUAL WEISS
SIT: NODIS
5