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Deborah Perroy Declaration (filegate) [1]
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Case Number: 2006-1066-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
Deborah Perroy Declaration (Filegate) [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Legal Advisor-Derosa, Mary
Original OA/ID Number:
3409
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
39
5
7
3
V
FEB-18-2000 17:08
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.02/11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CARA ALEXANDER, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
Civil Action Nos.
)
96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
JOHN MICHAEL GRIMLEY, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD RE:
PERROY DECLARATION
Plaintiffs, by counsel, respectfully submit this reply to the Government Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with the declaration of a former National
Security Counsel staffer Deborah Perroy.
FEB-18-2000 17:08
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.03/11
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiffs seek to supplement the record in this matter with a relevant, probative and important
declaration from a former National Security Counsel ("NSC") staffer, Ms. Deborah Perroy. In her
declaration, Ms. Perroy swore, under oath, that while working in the Clinton White House, she
witnessed Director of NSC Administration J. Robert Manzanares and an assistant, Masha L. Dimel,
looking through files in a safe that she knew to contain FBI and CIA background information on
Reagan and Bush Administration NSC staffers, including such well-known persons as Admiral John
Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. See Declaration of Deborah Perroy, attached as
Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record, at para. 4. In addition, Ms. Perroy testified
that Manzanares and Dimel were making some sort of list as they examined the files. Id. Ms. Perroy
also testified that Manzanares and Dimel had no legitimate reason to be accessing the files. Id. at
para. 7. Ms. Perroy further testified that the incident occurred after normal working hours, and that
Manzanares and Dimel reacted as if they had been caught doing something improper. Id. at para. 5.
In their opposition, the Government Defendants do not dispute that Ms. Perroy saw
Manzanares and Dimel going through personnel security files on NSC staffers. In fact, Manzanares
and Dimel effecti vely admit that the incident took place as Ms. Perroy describes. They only deny that
they were looking at the personnel security files on former NSC staffers. The incident thus presents
yet another example of example of misuse of information in confidential, government files by the
Clinton White House. That Manzanares and Dimel deny reviewing the personnel security files of
former NSC staffers only demonstrates that further investigation of this incident is warranted, just as
the Court has authorized Plaintiffs to investigate the release of information from Ms. Linda Tripp's
confidential U.S. Department of Defense personnel file and the release of letter written by Ms.
2
FEB-18-2000 17:08
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460
P.04/11
Kathleen Willey to President Clinton by the Clinton White House. 1 See April 13, 1998 Memorandum
and Order at 6-7 ("The question becomes whether plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue discovery
into [the Tripp] and other matters bearing on the obtaining and misuse of government files in order
to create the inference that it is reasonable to conclude that FBI files were obtained and misused in
the instant case. The court concludes that this is a permissible inference for plaintiffs to pursue.");
June 15, 1998 Memorandum Opinion at 8-9; July 10, 1998 Memorandum and Order at 22. Based
on Ms. Perroy's declaration, it certainly is likely that the FBI files of many class-members were
maintained in the NSC safe, in addition to being maintained improperly in the Office of Personnel
Security and elsewhere in the Clinton White House. A motion for leave to depose Manzanares and
Dimel will be forthcoming.
Predictably, the Government Defendants also makes what has become the standard response
of the Clinton White House whenever it is caught engaging in improper, if not illegal, conduct. It
tries to denigrate Ms. Perroy in an attempt to undercut the evidence that she offers. In order to rebut
these specious charges, Ms. Perroy has executed a second declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit 1,
that is self-explanatory.
Ms. Perroy was in error about the date of her resignation, an innocent mistake for which she
apologizes to the Court. Nonetheless, this innocent mistake cannot and does not detract from the
importance of her testimony and the obvious conclusion that, in addition to Filegate, the Clinton
White House misused information in confidential, government files on numerous occasions.² As the
1
As the Court may recall, these letters were maintained by the Clinton White House's Office
of Records Management as official records, not the personal records of the President.
2
As part of their transparent attempt to undercut Ms. Perroy's powerful declaration, the
Government Defendants released, onto a public record, documents that they admit are from Ms.
3
FEB-18-2000 17:09
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.05/11
Court has held previously, these other instances of misuse are relevant to rebut the Government
Defendants' disingenuous claim that Filegate was an "innocent bureaucratic snafu." See, e.g., April
13, 1998 Memorandum and Order at 6-7.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion to
Supplement the Record with this important and probative evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.
H Lancy Klayman, Esq.
D.C. Bar No. 334581
Paul Of
Paul J. Oranedes Esq.
D.C. Bar No. 429716
Suite 725
501 School Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024
(202)646-5172
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Perroy's personnel and personnel security files. See Declaration of Marsha L. Dimel at para. 14;
Declaration of Charles C. Easley at para. 4. This unauthorized release constitutes yet another
violation of the Privacy Act.
4
FEB-18-2000 17:09
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.06/11
SECOND DECLARATION OF DEBORAH PERROY
I, Deborah Perroy, hereby states as follows:
1.
I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.
2.
On February 3, I was contacted by a representative of Judicial Watch, Inc. and was alerted
to the point made in the Government Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Supplement the Record ("Opposition") that I had left the Clinton White House in
September, 1994 rather than September, 1993. A subsequent review of the documents
contained in the Opposition (documents which I did not have at the time of my January 7,
2000 declaration) has led to me to conclude I was inadvertently mistaken in the date of
my resignation, which did occur in September, 1994.
3.
1 sincerely apologize to this Coun for this innocent mistake, which was not intended in
any way to mislead this Court.
4.
In their Opposition, Government Defendants argue that since I left the Clinton White
House in 1994, it therefore follows they had properly obtained my FBI file information in
October. 1993 and properly requested it again in March, 1994. I do not believe that
DP
explanation as, based on my experience, the FBI background files on NSC staff such as
myself were maintained by the NSC itself, not by the Office of Personnel Security.
Page 1 of 5
FEB-18-2000 17:09
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.07/11
02/10/00 08:00 FAA 606 090 0100
5.
Furthermore, the documents the Government Defendants use in support of their
Opposition contain confidential information which is admitted to have come from my
"personnel security file." the release of which J believe violates my rights under the
Privacy Act. I did not authorize the Clinton White House to release any information from
my personnel security file and am outraged that they have. One of the documents
attached to the Opposition's Third Declaration of Charles Easley contains written
comments about me which, in addition to being false, harm my reputation. In other
words. whatever the alleged timing of their obtaining of my FBI file information, the
Clinton White House has now done what I had feared they would do for coming forward
and telling the truth in good faith - use the contents of my confidential government files
in an effort to smear my good name. Also, based on my experiences working in the
Clinton White House. it was common knowledge among Clinton White House staff that
Hillary Clinton had a deep, however unfounded. mistrust of the holdover White House
employees from the previous administration (Chris Emery, Billy Dale and his Travel
Office colleagues, and Linda Tripp. to name but a few examples). All this calls into
question in my mind their initial motives in obtaining material from my FBI file in the
first place.
DP
6.
In his declaration, Robert Manzanares denies that he was technically a "political
appointee," but he misconstrues my use of the phrase. His position was "political" in the
sense that, based on my experience, the position he held would never be filled by
someone who was not loyal to the President's political agenda.
Page 2 of s
FEB-18-2000 17:10
02/16/10 09:38 FAX 202 545 5188
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.08/11
7.
Contrary to the Opposition's effort to denigrate the breadth of my responsibilities and
knowledge of NSC operations and staff responsibilities at the Clinton White House, I
knew in great detail about the responsibilities of Manzanares and Dimel at the time I
worked with them at the Clinton White House. Contrary to Manzanares' and Dimel's
claims, I was very much aware of Manzanares' job duties and responsibilities, as 1
worked closely with him on a day-to-day basis. Manzanares knows this lumself, since he
constantly assigned to me important tasks outside my formal job responsibilities as a
financial management officer, including tasks concerning highly sensitive national
security matters which I do not feel comfortable discussing publically.
8.
To be clear, I am aware of the distinction between personnel files (containing dates of
employment, salary histories, etc.) and personnel security files (containing CIA and FBI
information). I caught Manzanares and Marcia Dimel accessing personnel security files,
which they themselves have now admitted to doing on repeated occasions.
9.
To reiterate. I personally saw the personnel security files of current and former White
House staffers (Reagan, Bush, and Carter) in the safe. I witnessed Manzanares and Dimel
later accessing personnel security files from this same safe.
DP
10.
Prior to Manzanares's tenure at the Clinton White House, no one other than the CIA
liaison (or "NSC Security Officer") had access to the files at issue here. In fact,
Page 3 of 5
FEB-18-2000 17:10
CIVIL DIVISION
01/10/00
202 616 8460 P.09/11
Manzanares couldn't have even accessed them himself until shortly before his tenure
ended because he didn't have the combination to the safe until then. It was shortly after
Manzanares requested and received the combination to the CLA liaison's safe that I
witnessed him and Dimel accessing the personnel security files stored there.
11.
The day after I caught Manzanares and Dimel accessing the personnel security files in the
CIA liaison's office, [ was so upset that I told my colleague Ms. Helen Pahlke, who was
the Assistant Personnel Director for the NSC at the time. Ms. Pahike expressed shock
and surprise that Manzanares and Dimel had accessed the personnel security files and
suggested I inform the CLA liaison herself. I informed her about what I had witnessed
and she too expressed shock and surprise that Manzanares and Dimel had accessed the
personnel security files in her safe (it should be remembered that she initially questioned
why she should give Manzanares the combination to her safe in the first place). She said
to me that she would find out what had happened. I never heard back from her on this
issue.
12.
Based on my experience at the Clinton White House, Manzanares and Dimel did not
"routinely" work together until 7:30 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. Because of my commute, I was
usually the first to arrive in the morning (at around 5:00 a.m.) and the last to leave in the
DP
evening (often as late as 8:00 p.m.). It was extremely rare that they both would be there
after normal working hours.
Page 4 of S
FEB-18-2000 17:10
02/18/00 09:37 ras CUL 000 ----
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P. 10/11
13.
Manzanares' and Dimel's excuses for why they routinely accessed personnel security files
after hours in the CIA liaigon's office seem to me just that - excuses. Based on my
experience working in the NSC. which was several years longer than Manzanares' one
year tenure, absolutely no one other than the CIA liaison accessed personnel security
files. The idea that "calls" came in. after hours. checking to see if NSC staffers had
certain security clearances necessary for meetings is simply not the way, based on my
experiences in The White House, that either Reagan, Bush, or Clinton White Houses'
operated. NSC staffers wouldn't be NSC staffers if they didn't have the proper security
clearances. Frankly, the idea that Manzanares or Dimel would get calls after hours asking
for checks of NSC security clearances for meetings the next day is absurd and is
obviously a contrived, after-the-fact explanation. 1 worked "after hours" during my entire
P
tenure at The White House and never, based on my experience there, do I recall such
incidents occurring.
I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 15,
2000 in the Commonwealth of Virginia
Page 5 of 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Person
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CARA ALEXANDER, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
Civil Action Nos.
)
96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
JOHN MICHAEL GRIMLEY, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
V.
)
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD RE:
PERROY DECLARATION
Plaintiffs, by counsel, respectfully submit this reply to the Government Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record with the declaration of a former National
Security Counsel staffer Deborah Perroy.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiffs seek to supplement the record in this matter with a relevant, probative and important
declaration from a former National Security Counsel ("NSC") staffer, Ms. Deborah Perroy. In her
declaration, Ms. Perroy swore, under oath, that while working in the Clinton White House, she
witnessed Director of NSC Administration J. Robert Manzanares and an assistant, Masha L. Dimel,
looking through files in a safe that she knew to contain FBI and CIA background information on
Reagan and Bush Administration NSC staffers, including such well-known persons as Admiral John
Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North. See Declaration of Deborah Perroy, attached as
Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement the Record, at para. 4. In addition, Ms. Perroy testified
that Manzanares and Dimel were making some sort of list as they examined the files. Id. Ms. Perroy
also testified that Manzanares and Dimel had no legitimate reason to be accessing the files. Id. at
para. 7. Ms. Perroy further testified that the incident occurred after normal working hours, and that
Manzanares and Dimel reacted as if they had been caught doing something improper. Id. at para. 5.
In their opposition, the Government Defendants do not dispute that Ms. Perroy saw
Manzanares and Dimel going through personnel security files on NSC staffers. In fact, Manzanares
and Dimel effectively admit that the incident took place as Ms. Perroy describes. They only deny that
they were looking at the personnel security files on former NSC staffers. The incident thus presents
yet another example of example of misuse of information in confidential, government files by the
Clinton White House. That Manzanares and Dimel deny reviewing the personnel security files of
former NSC staffers only demonstrates that further investigation of this incident is warranted, just as
the Court has authorized Plaintiffs to investigate the release of information from Ms. Linda Tripp's
confidential U.S. Department of Defense personnel file and the release of letter written by Ms.
2
Kathleen Willey to President Clinton by the Clinton White House. 1 See April 13, 1998 Memorandum
and Order at 6-7 ("The question becomes whether plaintiffs should be allowed to pursue discovery
into [the Tripp] and other matters bearing on the obtaining and misuse of government files in order
to create the inference that it is reasonable to conclude that FBI files were obtained and misused in
the instant case. The court concludes that this is a permissible inference for plaintiffs to pursue.");
June 15, 1998 Memorandum Opinion at 8-9; July 10, 1998 Memorandum and Order at 22. Based
on Ms. Perroy's declaration, it certainly is likely that the FBI files of many class-members were
maintained in the NSC safe, in addition to being maintained improperly in the Office of Personnel
Security and elsewhere in the Clinton White House. A motion for leave to depose Manzanares and
Dimel will be forthcoming.
Predictably, the Government Defendants also makes what has become the standard response
of the Clinton White House whenever it is caught engaging in improper, if not illegal, conduct. It
tries to denigrate Ms. Perroy in an attempt to undercut the evidence that she offers. In order to rebut
these specious charges, Ms. Perroy has executed a second declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit 1,
that is self-explanatory.
Ms. Perroy was in error about the date of her resignation, an innocent mistake for which she
apologizes to the Court. Nonetheless, this innocent mistake cannot and does not detract from the
importance of her testimony and the obvious conclusion that, in addition to Filegate, the Clinton
White House misused information in confidential, government files on numerous occasions.² As the
1
As the Court may recall, these letters were maintained by the Clinton White House's Office
of Records Management as official records, not the personal records of the President.
2
As part of their transparent attempt to undercut Ms. Perroy's powerful declaration, the
Government Defendants released, onto a public record, documents that they admit are from Ms.
3
Court has held previously, these other instances of misuse are relevant to rebut the Government
Defendants' disingenuous claim that Filegate was an "innocent bureaucratic snafu." See, e.g., April
13, 1998 Memorandum and Order at 6-7.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion to
Supplement the Record with this important and probative evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.
H D.C: Bar No. 334581
Lancy Klayman, Esq.
Paul C Paul J. Oranedes(Esq.
D.C. Bar No. 429716
Suite 725
501 School Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 646-5172
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Perroy's personnel and personnel security files. See Declaration of Marsha L. Dimel at para. 14;
Declaration of Charles C. Easley at para. 4. This unauthorized release constitutes yet another
violation of the Privacy Act.
4
02/18/00 06:34 FAX 202 010 6100
J.
002
SECOND DECLARATION OF DEBORAH PERROY
I, Deborah Perroy, hereby states as follows:
1.
I have personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.
2.
On February 3, I was contacted by a representative of Judicial Watch, Inc. and was alerted
to the point made in the Government Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Supplement the Record ("Opposition") that I had left the Clinton White House in
September, 1994 rather than September, 1993. A subsequent review of the documents
contained in the Opposition (documents which I did not have at the time of my January 7,
2000 declaration) has led to me to conclude I was inadvertently mistaken in the date of
my resignation, which did occur in September, 1994.
3.
I sincerely apologize to this Court for this innocent mistake, which was not intended in
any way to mislead this Court.
4.
In their Opposition, Government Defendants argue that since I left the Clinton White
House in 1994, it therefore follows they had properly obtained my FBI file information in
October, 1993 and properly requested it again in March, 1994. I do not believe that
PP
explanation as, based on my experience, the FBI background files on NSC staff such as
myself were maintained by the NSC itself, not by the Office of Personnel Security.
Page 1 of 5
02/10/00 09:35 FAX 202 648 3199
11
003
5.
Furthermore, the documents the Government Defendants use in support of their
Opposition contain confidential information which is admitted to have come from my
"personnel security file," the release of which I believe violates my rights under the
Privacy Act. I did not authorize the Clinton White House to release any information from
my personnel security file and am outraged that they have. One of the documents
attached to the Opposition's Third Declaration of Charles Easley contains written
comments about me which, in addition to being false, harm my reputation. In other
words. whatever the alleged timing of their obtaining of my FBI file information, the
Clinton White House has now done what I had feared they would do for coming forward
and telling the truth in good faith - use the contents of my confidential government files
in an effort to smear my good name. Also, based on my experiences working in the
Clinton White House, it was common knowledge among Clinton White House staff that
Hillary Clinton had a deep, however unfounded. mistrust of the holdover White House
employees from the previous administration (Chris Emery, Billy Dale and his Travel
Office colleagues, and Linda Tripp. to name but a few examples). All this calls into
question in my mind their initial motives in obtaining material from my FBI file in the
first place.
DP
6.
In his declaration, Robert Manzanares denies that he was technically a "political
appointee," but he misconstrues my use of the phrase. His position was "political" in the
sense that, based on my experience, the position he held would never be filled by
someone who was not loyal to the President's political agenda.
Page 2 of 5
02/18/00 09:38 FAX 202 648 5199
001
7.
Contrary to the Opposition's effort to denigrate the breadth of my responsibilities and
knowledge of NSC operations and staff responsibilities at the Clinton White House, I
knew in great detail about the responsibilities of Manzanares and Dimel at the time I
worked with them at the Clinton White House. Contrary to Manzanares' and Dimel's
claims, I was very much aware of Manzanares' job duties and responsibilities, as I
worked closely with him on a day-to-day basis. Manzanares knows this himself, since he
constantly assigned to me important tasks outside my formal job responsibilities as a
financial management officer, including tasks concerning highly sensitive national
security matters which I do not feel comfortable discussing publically.
8.
To be clear, I am aware of the distinction between personnel files (containing dates of
employment, salary histories, etc.) and personnel security files (containing CIA and FBI
information). I caught Manzanares and Marcia Dimel accessing personnel security files,
which they themselves have now admitted to doing on repeated occasions.
9.
To reiterate, I personally saw the personnel security files of current and former White
House staffers (Reagan, Bush, and Carter) in the safe. I witnessed Manzanares and Dimel
later accessing personnel security files from this same safe.
DP
10.
Prior to Manzanares's tenure at the Clinton White House, no one other than the CIA
liaison (or "NSC Security Officer") had access to the files at issue here. In fact,
Page 3 of 5
02/18/00 09:38 FAX 202 648 3199
005
Manzanares couldn't have even accessed them himself until shortly before his tenure
ended because he didn't have the combination to the safe until then. It was shortly after
Manzanares requested and received the combination to the CLA liaison's safe that I
witnessed him and Dimel accessing the personnel security files stored there.
11.
The day after I caught Manzanares and Dimel accessing the personnel security files in the
CIA liaison's office, I was so upset that I told my colleague Ms. Helen Pahlke, who was
the Assistant Personnel Director for the NSC at the time. Ms. Pahike expressed shock
and surprise that Manzanares and Dimel had accessed the personnel security files and
suggested I inform the CIA liaison herself. I informed her about what I had witnessed
and she too expressed shock and surprise that Manzanares and Dimel had accessed the
personnel security files in her safe (it should be remembered that she initially questioned
why she should give Manzanares the combination to her safe in the first place). She said
to me that she would find out what had happened. I never heard back from her on this
issue.
12.
Based on my experience at the Clinton White House, Manzanares and Dimel did not
"routinely" work together until 7:30 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. Because of my commute, I was
usually the first to arrive in the morning (at around 5:00 a.m.) and the last to leave in the
DP
evening (often as late as 8:00 p.m.). It was extremely rare that they both would be there
after normal working hours.
Page 4 of S
02/18/00 09:37 FAX 202 646 5199
000
13.
Manzanares' and Dimel's excuses for why they routinely accessed personnel security files
after hours in the CIA liaison's office seem to me just that - excuses. Based on my
experience working in the NSC. which was several years longer than Manzanares' one
year tenure, absolutely no one other than the CIA liaison accessed personnel security
files. The idea that "calls" came in. after hours. checking to see if NSC staffers had
certain security clearances necessary for meetings is simply not the way, based on my
experiences in The White House, that either Reagan, Bush, or Clinton White Houses'
operated. NSC staffers wouldn't be NSC staffers if they didn't have the proper security
clearances. Frankly, the idea that Manzanares or Dimel would get calls after hours asking
for checks of NSC security clearances for meetings the next day is absurd and is
obviously a contrived, after-the-fact explanation. 1 worked "after hours" during my entire
P
tenure at The White House and never, based on my experience there, do I recall such
incidents occurring.
I swear under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 15,
2000 in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Perry
Page 5 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on February 16, 2000 true and correct copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD RE: PERROY DECLARATION was served via first
class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on the following:
Attorneys for Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation and Executive
Office of the President:
James J. Gilligan, Esq.
Elizabeth J. Shapiro, Esq.
Julia Fayngold Covey, Esq.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
P.O. Box 883
Washington, DC 20044
Attorneys for Defendant Hillary Rodham Clinton:
David E. Kendall, Esq.
Paul B. Gaffney, Esq.
Marcie R. Ziegler, Esq.
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY
725 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
Poul
Orlanedes
JAN-28-2000 14:45
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460
P.01/10
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
MD
P.O. Box 883
Washington, D.C. 20044
Perioy
decl.
January 28, 2000
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
TO:
SHELLI PETERSON
456-7024
MARY DeROSA
456-9110
BOB MANZANARES
647-0866
FROM:
JIM GILLIGAN
Phone No.
(202) 514-3358
Fax No.
(202) 616-8460
THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 10 PAGES INCLUDING
THE COVER PAGE IN THIS TRANSMISSION.
MESSAGE:
Shelli, Mary, Bob:
Here's the revised draft of the declaration, which I am sending
to Bob by messenger for his signature. It reflects changes and
suggestions from all concerned.
JG
JAN-28-2000 14:45
CIVIL DIVISION
202 616 8460 P.02/10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
CARA LESLIE ALEXANDER,
)
et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
Civil Action Nos.
V.
)
96-2123/97-1288 (RCL)
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
)
CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS
)
Defendants.
)
)
)
MICHAEL JOHN GRIMLEY,
)
et al.,
)
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Plaintiffs,
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V.
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)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
)
INVESTIGATION, et al.,
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Defendants.
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)
DECLARATION OF J. ROBERT MANZANARES
J. Robert Manzanares, for his declaration pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am the Executive Director of the Bureau of African
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, a position I have held since
June 1998. From June 1993 July 1994, I was detailed from the
State Department to the National Security Council ("NSC"), where
I held the position of Director of Administration. I have
personal knowledge of the matters attested to herein.
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2. I have read the Declaration of Deborah Perroy, dated
January 7, 2000 ("Perroy Decl. "). Ms. Perroy states that on one
occasion, shortly before my assignment to a foreign post (the
U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, see 6, 15, below), she observed me
and my assistant, Marsha Dimel, reviewing personnel security
files in the office of the "CIA liaison." Perroy Decl., 1 4.
(She is apparently referring to the office of the NSC Security
Officer, which was located in the same office suite as my own,
Room 397 of the Old Executive Office Building. The NSC typically
filled the position of Security Officer with security personnel
detailed from the Central Intelligence Agency, or other
intelligence agencies.)
3. Ms. Perroy does not identify, or even claim to know,
whose files Ms. Dimel and I were supposedly looking at on this
occasion. Nor does she purport to explain, or even to know, why
we were examining these files. Yet she intimates that we were
reviewing the files of former NSC staff from prior, Republican
administrations for some improper political purpose, based on her
claim that the personnel security files of former NSC staff were
maintained in this office, and her view that I, whom Ms. Perroy
describes as a "political appointment, " had no "legitimate
reason" for accessing these files. Perroy Decl. 1
4, 7.
4. Ms. Perroy's suggestion that Ms. Dimel and I were
reviewing the personnel security files of former NSC staff for
some sort of improper purpose is absolutely false. As Director
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of Administration, I was responsible for all matters of
financial, personnel, facilities and space management at the NSC.
These duties encompassed managerial responsibility for personnel
security. (Personnel security was the process by which NSC staff
underwent the necessary background checks by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI"), and sometimes other investigative
agencies, to assess their suitability for employment and to
obtain clearances for access to classified information.)
Accordingly, from time to time I, as Director of Administration,
and Ms. Dimel, acting as my assistant, had reason to check
information in the files of current NSC staff (such as their
clearance for access to classified information) for legitimate
personnel security reasons. See 13, below. But at no time did
I, or to my knowledge, Ms. Dimel, ever review the personnel
security files of former NSC staff, for any purpose, let alone an
improper one. Based on my knowledge, Ms. Perroy would not be in
a position to suggest otherwise, and, as a matter of fact, most
Tof her supporting assumptions are mistaken.
5.
First, neither I nor Ms. Dimel was a "political
appoint [ee] " Perroy Decl.
,
7.
For more than twenty years I
have been a career Foreign Service Officer, serving under
Republican and Democratic administrations alike since 1979. I do
not now hold, nor have I ever held, a political appointment with
the U.S. government.
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6.
Prior to obtaining my current position at the Bureau of
African Affairs, in June 1998, I was enrolled for approximately
one year in a State Department executive training program known
as Senior Seminar. From 1979 to June 1997, I held various other
career Foreign Service Office positions, including Administrative
Counselor for the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv (1994-97) (the
position to which I was transferred immediately following my NSC
detail) i Supervisor, Post Management Officers, Bureau of Near
Eastern/Asian Affairs (1991-93) (the position I held immediately
prior to my NSC detail) i Senior Watch Officer, State Department
Operations Center (1990-91) i Administrative Officer, U.S.
Embassy, Reykyavik (1987-90) ; Administrative Officer, State
Department Travel Support Staff (1985-87) (providing overseas
trip support for then-President Reagan and Vice President Bush) ;
Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign
Buildings Operations, Asia/Pacific Region (1984-85) ; Junior
Officer Rotational Position, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City (1981-84) ;
and Regional Budget & Finance Officer for West Africa (1979-81)
7. In 1993, during my assignment as Supervisor of Post
Management Officers for the Bureau of Near Eastern/Asian Affairs,
the NSC Executive Secretary asked me to accept a detail as
Director of Administration, a non-political staff position. The
NSC Executive Secretary at the time was also a career Foreign
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Service Officer on detail from the State Department. I had
worked with him during my tenure as Senior Watch Officer at the
State Department Operations Center.
8. I accepted the detail and held the position of NSC
Director of Administration from June 1993 to July 1994, as stated
above. When my detail began, Marsha Dimel already held the
position of Support Assistant to the Director of Administration,
likewise a non-political position on the NSC staff. She had
served in that capacity under my two predecessors as Director of
Administration. Because of her experience, I decided to retain
her in that position.
9.
Second, based on my knowledge, Ms. Perroy would not be
in a position to know whose files were or were not maintained by
the NSC Security Officer. See Perroy Decl.
4.
Ms. Perroy was
a Financial Management Officer whose primary responsibility was
to oversee the budget for classified computer systems supplied to
the NSC by the Department of Defense. She worked under the
supervision of the NSC Director of Systems and Technical
Planning, Col. David Herrington (himself a detailee from the
Department of Defense), who in turn reported to me. Ms. Perroy
had no duties or responsibilities relating to personnel security,
or to the handling of personnel security files. She did not work
with or for the NSC Security Officer, the NSC staff person with
day-to-day responsibility for personnel security matters, who
also reported directly to me.
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10. Ms. Perroy states that she had responsibility of some
kind for the maintenance of "NSC personnel and other files/
rosters. " Perroy Decl. 3. But that still does not explain
how she would know whose personnel security files the Security
Officer kept on hand. Personnel files and personnel security
files are separate and distinct sets of files containing
different types of information. Personnel files contain
information about an employee's position, grade, salary,
benefits, and the like. Personnel security files contain FBI
background reports and other information used to determine an
individual's fitness for employment and for a security clearance.
During my tenure, NSC personnel security files were maintained in
locked filing cabinets in the office of the Security Officer,
whereas NSC personnel files were kept separately in cabinets
located in the common office space of our suite.
11. In any case, even if the files of former NSC staff were
still located in the office of the Security Officer at the time
Ms. Perroy states she observed us there, that still would not
alter the fact that I never reviewed the files of former NSC
staff for any purpose whatsoever. Indeed if, in fact, the
Security Officer retained the files of former NSC staff, I was
not even aware of it.
12. Third, Ms. Perroy opines that I had no "legitimate
reason" to review the personnel security files of NSC staff.
Perroy Decl.
7.
Once again, based on my knowledge, Ms. Perroy
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would not be in a position to know what legitimate reasons I
might or might not have to review personnel security files. Ms.
Perroy was my subordinate, two levels removed from my position in
our office hierarchy. She was a Financial Management Officer
primarily responsible for oversight of a single budget, whose
duties did not encompass the broad array of administrative
matters, including personnel security, for which I was
responsible. She was therefore not in a position to know what
matters did or did not fall within the legitimate scope of my
duties, or what valid reasons I might have for my activities as
Director of Administration.
13. In fact, while day-to-day responsibility for personnel
security was delegated to the Security Officer, it fell to me, as
Director of Administration, with ultimate managerial
responsibility for personnel security, to handle matters of
personnel security that might arise in the Security Officer's
absence. For example, the NSC Security Officer at the time
alluded to in Ms. Perroy's declaration, see
15, below,
generally left work between 4:00 and 4:30 in the afternoon. From
time to time, our office would receive a telephone call after the
Security Officer had already left for the day, asking if NSC
staff members scheduled to attend a meeting the next morning were
cleared for access to a particular type of classified
information. On these occasions it was up to me, with the
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assistance of Ms. Dimel, to check the personnel security files of
the staff members in question to ascertain whether they had the
requisite security clearances.
14. Ms. Perroy states that, on the occasion she observed me
and Ms. Dimel reviewing personnel security files, she had come
upon us "after normal working hours. " Perroy Decl
5.
However, Ms. Dimel and I routinely worked until 7:30 or 8:00 in
the evening, to keep up with the many administrative matters that
had to be addressed on a daily basis, as well as those additional
matters that arose because of the transition from the Bush to the
Clinton Administration, such as replacement of departed staff.
15. Apart from having seen myself and Ms. Dimel reviewing
personnel security files, Ms. Perroy also states that she
resigned from the NSC in September 1993, supposedly six months
before the White House made a request for her FBI background
investigation report. Perroy Decl
7. I know nothing about
this or any other White House request for FBI background
information on Ms. Perroy. But I can say that she is mistaken
when she states that she resigned in September 1993. When I left
the NSC in July 1994 for my post at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv,
Ms. Perroy was still employed by the NSC. Indeed, she herself
states that she witnessed myself and Ms. Dimel looking through
NSC personnel security files [s]hortly before" I left for my
"foreign post. II
Id.,
4.
The event she states she witnessed,
then, must have taken place "shortly before" July 1994.
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16. In paragraph 5 of her declaration, Ms. Perroy alludes
to the fact that I requested the combinations to the safes of all
persons employed in our office. I asked for the combinations so
that if a staff member who kept materials locked in a safe were
out sick, and someone else had a legitimate need for those
materials, then they could come to me for access to them. This
is a standard administrative practice that I have followed in
many of the positions I have held during my career.
17. In paragraph 6 of her declaration, Ms. Perroy states
that I had several meetings with Craig Livingstone, but that she
is not aware of the substance of those meetings. I had a number
of discussions with Mr. Livingstone, the sole purpose of which
was to address the delays in obtaining White House passes for NSC
staff members. Several staff members complained to me about the
length of time it was taking to obtain their passes, and so I met
with Mr. Livingstone on a number of occasions to inquire what
could be done to speed up the process.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct.
Executed on: January
, 2000
J. ROBERT MANZANARES
9