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9505159 [Congress and Russia]
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9505159 [Congress and Russia]
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Case Number: 2015-0183-S
MR
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Original OA/ID Number:
2314
Document ID:
9505159
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
46
2
7
1
V
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9505159
NSC/RMO PROFILE
RECEIVED: 06 JUL 95 12
TO: PRESIDENT
CHRON FILE
FROM: LAKE
DOC DATE: 08 JUL 95
GRIFFIN, P
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CONGRESSIONAL
CHINA PR
UN
MEXICO
NATO
HAITI
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: CONGRESSINAL DINNER MTG W/ MBRS OF CONGRESS 10 JUL
ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT
DUE DATE: 10 JUL 95 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DANVERS
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BELL
BLACKER
CLARKE
DANVERS
FRIED
HALPERIN
NSC CHRON
PONEMAN
VERSHBOW
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSJDA
CLOSED BY: NSMEC
DOC 2 OF 2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9505159
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 LAKE
Z 95070719 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002 PRESIDENT
Z 95070817 FOR INFORMATION
002
X 95071111 NOTED BY PRESIDENT
DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC DATE
DISPATCH FOR ACTION
DISPATCH FOR INFO
002 950708
VICE PRESIDENT
002 950708
WH CHIEF OF STAFF
002 950708
STEPHANOPOULOS, G
UNCLASSIFIED
recd 7/8
National Security Council
9am
The White House
5159
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC
INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG ARS A/O
Po
SEQUENCE TO
INITIAL/DATE
DISPOSITION
Harmon
Dohse
Sens
1
NOS
Soderberg
Berger
2
of
Lake
3
ADS
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4
Drs 7/8
Dalon
Records Mgt.
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
CC:
COMMENTS:
Exec Sec Office has diskette yes
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5159
7-11-95
THE WHITE HOUSE
Va
to
WASHINGTON
criticizing gov't
INFORMATION
July 8, 1995
- must goin rfreedom
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
outips men
who agus fgur in feedow
FROM:
ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN PG
- us memorred way
uscual or freeDom
SUBJECT:
Congressional Dinner with Members of Congress
fgur fration
car-
- Tugtwar in freedom
You are scheduled to have dinner with Speaker Gingrich, Senator
Daschle and Representative Gephardt on Monday evening, July 10.
Senator Dole was invited but is unable to attend.
The purpose of the meeting is to discuss foreign policy issues.
You will, therefore, be accompanied by the Vice President,
Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvilli,
Ambassador Albright, CIA Director Deutch, Leon Panetta, Tony Lake
and Pat Griffin. Speaker Gingrich specifically requested that
your foreign policy team be present at the dinner and that the
dinner be kept small.
Opening remarks for the dinner have been prepared (Tab A). The
general themes for the remarks are resources and the need for
America to remain engaged in the world; our policy toward Russia;
and Bosnia.
Dole's absence presents an opportunity on Bosnia to pull Gingrich
away from unilateral lift and refusal to support UNPROFOR/RRF.
The most important outcome of the dinner could be to convince
Gingrich that UNPROFOR's remaining, and support for the RRF, is
our best alternative. Accordingly, it is important that you take
the initiative to make this case with Gingrich (see talking
points on Bosnia) rather than let him convert the discussion into
his own tour d'horizon of the world.
In addition to these themes you may want to raise briefly:
China MFN: whether the House will take up a second
resolution other than the resolution of disapproval and what
such a resolution might contain (Tab B);
North Korea: the need for Congressional support for the
agreed framework at this crucial juncture;
The U.N. and peacekeeping: the need to establish a
Congressional-Executive dialogue on support for the U.N. and
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
REVISED
2
peacekeeping activities. Representative Hamilton and
Senator Kassebaum have already initiated bipartisan
discussions on U.N. reform and the need for increased public
and political support for the U.N. (Tab C); and,
Mexico documents: you may want to discuss with the Speaker
the impasse that seems to have arisen over the Congressional
request for documents pertaining to the Mexican economic
crisis (Tab D).
We have also prepared additional updated points on NATO expansion
(Tab E), Haiti (Tab F) and Defense related issues (Tab G).
Key legislative initiatives that have occurred this year in the
House include:
HR 7: passed the House earlier this year as part of the
Contract with America;
FY 96 State Department Authorization bill and Foreign
Assistance Act: passed earlier this year, we lost 12
Democrats and picked up 16 Republicans on final passage, you
issued a veto threat on the bill;
FY 96 Defense Authorization bill: passed this spring and
contained a number of problems; and,
FY 96 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill: House will
resume action on the bill when it goes back into session
next week. While the bill cut our foreign aid request by
nearly $3 billion, it, nonetheless, enjoyed wide bipartisan
support coming out of committee. Members understood that
the bill was likely to be the best they were going to get
for foreign assistance this year.
The Senate has yet to take action on any major foreign policy or
national security bills. They could take up the FY 96 State
Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act shortly
after returning from recess. The Senate Armed Services Committee
passed out the FY 96 Defense Authorization bill, which, like the
House bill, has many problems. The bill will likely come to the
floor before the August recess.
Attachments
Tab A
Opening Remarks/Bosnia
Tab B China MFN
Tab C U.N.
Tab D
Mexico
Tab E
NATO Expansion
Tab F Haiti
Tab G Defense Related Issues
2
Senator Kassebaum have already initiated bipartisan
discussions on U.N. reform and the need for increased public
and political support for the U.N. (Tab C) ; and,
Mexico documents: you may want to discuss with the Speaker
the impasse that seems to have arisen over the Congressional
request for documents pertaining to the Mexican economic
crisis (Tab D).
We have also prepared additional updated points on NATO expansion
(Tab E), Haiti (Tab F) and Defense related issues (Tab G).
Key legislative initiatives that have occurred this year in the
House include:
HR 7: passed the House earlier this year as part of the
Contract with America;
FY 96 State Department Authorization bill and Foreign
Assistance Act: passed earlier this year, we lost 12
Democrats and picked up 16 Republicans on final passage, you
issued a veto threat on the bill;
FY 96 Defense Authorization bill: passed this spring and
contained a number of problems; and,
FY 96 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill: House will
resume action on the bill when it goes back into session
next week. While the bill cut our foreign aid request by
nearly $3 billion, it, nonetheless, enjoyed wide bipartisan
support coming out of committee. Members understood that
the bill was likely to be the best they were going to get
for foreign assistance this year.
The Senate has yet to take action on any major foreign policy or
national security bills. They could take up the FY 96 State
Department Authorization bill and Foreign Assistance Act shortly
after returning from recess. The Senate Armed Services Committee
passed out the FY 96 Defense Authorization bill, which, like the
House bill, has many problems. The bill will likely come to the
floor before the August recess.
Attachments
Tab A Opening Remarks/Bosnia
Tab B China MFN
Tab C U.N.
Tab D
Mexico
Tab E NATO Expansion
Tab F Haiti
Tab G Defense Related Issues
TALKING POINTS
At a defining moment for America's foreign policy.
Decisions we make now will chart our course into next
century.
Some people believe that with Cold War won, we can retreat
from world.
Others see in every injustice in the world a just cause for
American intervention.
Must navigate between extremes of indiscriminate
intervention and irresponsible isolationism. That means not
making every one of the world's problems our own. But also
means recognizing that, to meet obligations and seize
opportunities of our era, America must continue to lead.
In turn, must have resources to lead, and spirit of
bipartisanship for that leadership to be effective.
Some legislation now before Congress would harm ability to
continue to make American people more safe and secure.
Would deny us resources we need to lead.
Objective
security
shat
Let me touch on some specific concerns:
Decise
Humros
Proposed resource cuts are shortsighted and dangerous.
We spend less of GDP on aid than any other major
industrial country -- about 1 percent. It is less
costly -- in terms of money spent and lives lost -- to
rely on foreign aid and diplomacy now than to send in
troops later.
Attack on President's constitutional prerogative to
conduct foreign policy also unacceptable. No President
-- Democrat or Republican -- could accept these
restrictions because they threaten President's ability
to protect and promote American interests. Proposed
legislation would tell President which countries he may
or may not deal with.
If in effect last year, would have prevented us from
concluding deal with North Korea to dismantle nuclear
program. Legislation would restrict our ability to
take part in and lead U.N. operations -- forcing choice
in face of crisis between acting alone
or not at all.
Legislation would also unilaterally reorganize foreign
affairs agencies by abolishing ACDA, AID and USIA.
Effort to reinvent government is just as important for
2
foreign affairs agencies as for domestic programs.
Committed to continuing downsizing already begun
seriously and successfully at ACDA, AID, and USIA as
well as State.
So let me be clear: Will veto authorization legislation now
before Congress if it comes to my desk in current form. Ask
you for bill I can sign -- a bill that maintains our
resources, protects the President's authority to conduct
foreign policy, and reflects bipartisan spirit.
Also deeply concerned by efforts in Congress to undermine
our aid to Russia and other NIS.
Nothing more important to long term security of our country
than successful transformation of Russia and other former
Soviet republics into democracies that respect the rule of
law and rights of their people.
q
consultation.
'Wio's
2
isolation: Rouring Wccomium
3
Team
(Firms surden, Dutch)
4
multo Designasytum
muxityey. D.
Vision. China VN (contact as for soc)
3
Bosnia
There are three fundamental points want to make to you about
Bosnia.
First, convinced that we should make every effort now
to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia and make it work better.
Second, the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is essential to
that effort.
Third, we must support it, materially and financially.
Let me tell you why I reach those conclusions. But let me
first put this in context.
Always believed that we have four basic -- but limited --
interests in Bosnia:
First, to try to reduce the level of violence and human
suffering.
Second, to press for a peace agreement that upholds the
integrity of Bosnia.
Third, to prevent the war from spreading into an even
wider conflict.
Fourth, to maintain as much cohesion within NATO on
Bosnia as is possible. We must keep faith with our
NATO allies who have troops on the ground there.
Bosnia remains extremely difficult, as it was when I arrived
here. But as we press for a resolution, let's not lose
sight of the results that have been achieved -- in part by
UNPROFOR, in part by NATO and in part with U.S. persistence.
The war continues, but at greatly reduced levels.
There were 130,000 Bosnian civilians killed in 1992;
2,500 in 1994;
2.8 million Bosnians depend on the UN for food and
medicine. 50,000 tons of supplies have been delivered
in the longest humanitarian relief effort in history;
A three-way conflict has been transformed into a two-
way conflict, with the Bosnian-Croat Federation we
helped broker continuing to hold. This has great
strategic significance; nearly all of central Bosnia is
now at peace.
4
Through the no-fly zone, we have kept the war out of
the air over Bosnia and with our deployments in
Macedonia and other warnings, we' kept the war from
spreading beyond Bosnia.
So as bad as it is, it could be worse, and we could make it
much worse if we do the wrong things.
I see three alternative courses of action that lie before
us.
First, we could, as some have urged, commit NATO forces,
with a major U.S. component, to the ground war in Bosnia and
seek a resolution on the battlefield.
Convinced that this is a prescription for disaster.
Do not believe that the political problems that
underpin this conflict can be resolved on the
battlefield nor do our military leaders see any
prospect for a quick military termination of the
conflict.
More importantly, I reject-- and vast majority of
American people reject -- committing American ground
forces to fight and die in a protracted ground war in
Bosnia. Our interests do not warrant it. Will not
cross that line.
Second, we could lift the arms embargo unilaterally and arm
the Bosnians. I know this has great appeal and if this
current effort to strengthen UNPROFOR fails and they decide
to leave, I will press for multilateral lift. But for the
U.S. to force UNPROFOR out -- as unilateral lift inevitably
would do -- would be a disaster and damaging to our national
interest.
The Europeans would leave, absolved of responsibility
with their own publics by a U.S. action that endangered
the lives of their soldiers.
Such a potentially dangerous withdrawal operation would
involve a large number of U.S. forces.
The humanitarian situation would sharply deteriorate,
with massive refugee and relief crises (120,000
potential refugees in the Eastern enclaves alone)
The Bosnians, at minimum, would expect us to carry out
airstrikes while they arm and help them cope with the
delivery of humanitarian aid. Our military leaders
5
believe that neither can be done effectively without
some ground presence, or a prolonged period of advance
training for Bosnian forces.
The fighting most likely will escalate and spread --
possibly involving Croatia, Serbia and beyond.
Believe unilateral lift thus risks all our interests in
Bosnia.
The third course -- one I believe we must pursue -- is to
support current effort of our allies to strengthen UNPROFOR
while we persist in effort to bring parties to a negotiated
agreement.
At a moment when French, British, Dutch and now Germans
are saying "we will send more troops and stiffen our
capacity to defend UNPROFOR and carry out the mission
more effectively", it would be profound mistake to
reject that effort.
Believe the Europeans are serious about Rapid Reaction
Force.
Chirac, Major, Dutch and Germans have said they want to
add muscle to their troops on ground so that, by being
better able to defend themselves, they can carry out
mission more effectively.
British and French have told us they want maximum
authority over RRF with their commanders on the ground
(Janvier & Smith)
Have spoken with BBG. He understands that using RRF SO
UNPROFOR can fulfill its mandate is last real
opportunity that does not depend on a long and bloody
war to resolve fate of Bosnia.
RRF must be given chance to succeed. It is sort of tool we
would have preferred some time ago, and, at very least, it
puts in place forces which could diminish the requirements
for U.S. forces if UNPROFOR withdrawal became necessary.
If it is to have an opportunity to succeed, the U.S. must
support it -- politically and financially.
Have agreed that increases to the size of UNPROFOR
beyond the 44, 870 we were committed to before RRF
should not be borne through assessed contributions.
6
Our Allies have agreed to a voluntary fund for costs to
cover additional troops up to the new ceiling of
55,370. We will work to obtain contributions from
others.
Our principal contribution will be provided by drawing
down defense goods and services within a $50 million
ceiling. This will enable us to provide air and sea
lift, close air support, intelligence and equipment
without compromising readiness in any way.
Believe these are exactly sort of circumstances that
existing drawdown authorities were designed to cover.
However, to insure that equipment goes to Allies we
designate, and not to U.N., it is necessary to exercise 614
authority. The alternatives -- transferring sensitive U.S.
military equipment to the U.N., or forcing our Allies to do
without equipment that could save lives in an emergency --
are ones I know Congress would not choose to impose.
In addition we are considering in-kind contributions of
up to $10 million in national programs for Close Air
Support and intelligence.
We will honor our commitments to pay our share of
UNPROFOR up to its previously authorized ceiling of
44,870. Those authorized by UNSCR two weeks ago
raising the ceiling to over 55,000 will be covered
under the voluntary mechanism.
Fundamental issue is this: at moment that our allies are
saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into
UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if effort
works, or do we take this moment to pull rug out from under
them, undertake costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal
operation, and assume for ourselves responsibilities for
aiding and protecting Bosnians?
I believe we must try to make RRF work as we continue to
press for a negotiated solution.
CHINA
Don't need to tell you we're at a very difficult period in
our relationship with China. Hot issues include upcoming
MFN vote, Harry Wu's detention, China's continuing over-
reaction to the visit by President Lee, nonproliferation
issues.
On MFN, want to emphasize my continuing belief that
delinkage of MFN and human rights was correct decision last
year and should not be overturned this year.
Determined campaign we waged at the UN Human Rights
Commission this year demonstrated my continuing commitment
to aggressive pursuit of human rights issues, even in the
face of Chinese criticism and threats.
Interested in your assessment of the Congressional mood on
the MFN issue, particularly in light of recent developments,
such as the detention of Harry Wu. Are pursuing Harry Wu
case vigorously.
PRC has grossly over-reacted to President Lee's visit, both
by suspending many aspects of their engagement with us,
including the withdrawal of Ambassador, and by issuing
threats that additional steps will follow unless we take
steps to "fix the problem".
Over long term China has as much at stake in mutually good
relations as do we.
But crucial not to undermine Chinese faith in our commitment
to a one-China policy, which has been the foundation of our
relationship since normalization in 1979.
Must oppose Congressional initiatives on UN membership for
Taiwan and appointment of Special Envoy for Tibet.
PEACEKEEPING AND UN REFORM
UN can play an important role in protecting US national
security interests; especially in regards to newly emerging
transnational threats.
Management of UN must also be reformed. Bureaucracy must be
reduced and duplicative and wasteful efforts eliminated.
Halifax Communiqué a good start - but we need specific
reforms.
PDD-25 on Peacekeeping has been successful. We have led UN
to adopt most of our approach to new peacekeeping
operations.
Still a way to go: some operations need to be reviewed for
viability, UN conflict prevention and rapid response
capability needs to be improved.
MEXICO
Have made clear our willingness to ensure that Congress
provided all relevant information concerning the peso
bailout.
As required by statute, we have delivered thousands of
documents to Congress. Also identified small group of
deliberative documents which are sensitive - offered to make
these available for reading.
Only 14 documents to which Congress should not have direct
access. Four are memoranda of conversation with foreign
heads of state; ten are deliberative documents with my
personal annotations.
Nothing to do with Mexican peso bailout, everything to do
with mutual respect for the core prerogatives of two
branches of government. Essential foreign heads of State
know that their conversations with President of United
States will remain confidential. Similarly, essential that
President communicate with advisers in confidence.
Willing to have Ab brief the contents of these documents in
detail.
Our certification met legal requirement. The issue was
reviewed carefully by Ab Mikva and the Justice Department
prior to certification. While your lawyers may disagree,
suggest we put issue behind us, concentrate on making sure
that Congress has information to assess bailout, consistent
with Presidential prerogatives.
EUROPEAN SECURITY/NATO ENLARGEMENT
U.S. has historic opportunity to extend EuroAtlantic
democratic community.
We seek NATO enlargement to project stability, consolidate
democracy in CEE, as NATO did in Western Europe. Also, NATO
enlargement can help insure against reform's failure in
Russia.
December NAC Ministerial tasked study of enlargement's
implications -- "how and why" -- as basis for
discussion with interested Partners this fall.
Study nearing completion and outlines some of
expansion's details. Among basic principles: no
dilution of the Alliance, no "free rides" for new
members, no second class NATO membership.
While NATO will and should make no formal commitments,
we see no need for dramatic changes in NATO's military
posture.
Have given great deal of thought to Russia. Seek to anchor
democratic Russia in new, inclusive European security system.
To do so, will seek to develop formalized NATO-Russia
relationship in parallel with NATO enlargement.
Used Moscow Summit to launch NATO-Russia track.
Seek to address exaggerated Russian fears but without
Russian veto or wedge driving. Russians believe their
vocal opposition can derail process, seek de facto
veto. Should respond to this through patience,
steadiness.
No dates or short lists of candidates; premature to decide
"when and who." Point is to move step by step, but
consistently and transparently.
HAITI ELECTIONS
Counting of ballots is almost completed. Despite debate
among political parties, no indication of widespread fraud
or systematic irregularities. Both the voting and counting
have been accomplished in an environment of relative calm.
OAS best case estimates call for reruns in approximately 11- -
15 out of 133 total precincts. UN estimates have run as
high as 29 precincts. Both these numbers are well below the
IRI estimates of over 70%.
Real danger that political parties that did not fare well at
polls will attempt to undermine democratic process.
Aristide and international community remain fully engaged
and are working hard to reach acceptable solution with
political parties.
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL
Appreciate prompt consideration of defense authorization
proposal, but both bills raise serious constitutional,
national security and budget concerns.
Bills authorize billions more than necessary for defense,
money that comes at the expense of other national priorities
in foreign and domestic accounts:
Waste hundreds of millions on unnecessary, high-
priced weapons systems, in missile defense area;
House bill includes $1.2 billion for unneeded B-2
bombers.
Other funding goes to unneeded and unrequested
programs, including Guard and Reserve equipment and
continued production of older-technology systems
such as F-15, 16, and 18 fighters.
House bill eliminates important way to directly reduce
threat to America's security by setting unwarranted
conditions on money requested to eliminate nuclear systems
in former Soviet Union, while both bills significantly
reduce Nunn-Lugar funding.
House bill infringes on President's authority to deploy U.S.
forces in support of UN peacekeeping by limiting my ability
to place forces under UN command.
House bill's restrictions on funding to commence contingency
operation, and necessity to submit supplemental requests to
continue an operation, are unwarranted restrictions on my
authority.
The bill's funding prohibition seeks to prevent negotiating
any ABM/TBD demarcation with Russia and legislation calls
into question the ABM Treaty -- raising significant
international legal issues, as well as the President's
constitutional authority to interpret and apply it.
Language of Senate bill conflicts with ABM Treaty by
requiring the deployment by 2003 of national missile defense
system at multiple sites.
5159
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DC 20506
July 6, 1995
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
her
FROM:
WILLIAM C. DANVERS
SUBJECT:
President's Meeting with Members of Congress at
Congressional Dinner
The President is scheduled to meet with Members of Congress at
dinner Monday, July 10. Attached at Tab I is the memo for the
President, and Tabs A-H are opening remarks and proposed talking
points for the President on issues that may be raised.
Copy provided to:
Clarke, Fried, Vershbow, Halperin, Poneman,
Bell, Blacker
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A
Opening Remarks
Tab B China MFN
Tab C U.N.
Tab D
Mexico
Tab E
NATO Expansion
Tab F Haiti
Tab G Defense Related Issues
Tab H Russia
Attachments may have
been edited for format
by Exec Sec