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[Kosovo]
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Case Number: 2008-0994-F-3
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Original OA/ID Number:
2746
Document ID:
9906260
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
46
4
11
2
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9906260
NSC/RMO PROFILE
RECEIVED: 19 AUG 99 12
TO: BERGER
FROM: KAIDANOW
DOC DATE: 09 SEP 99
HILL, C
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: KOSOVO
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: KOSOVO TWO MONTH ASSESSMENT
ACTION: NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED
DUE DATE: 25 AUG 99 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: SAPIRO
LOGREF:
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
KAIDANOW
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By or NARA, Date 517124
2.008-0994-F.3
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSGP
CLOSED BY: NSGP
DOC 2 OF 2
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9906260
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
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001 SAPIRO
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EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE up
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE 9/10
6260Red
PROOFED BY:
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COMMENTS:
Kosouo- Assessment
EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes
CONFIDENTIAL
6260 REDO
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
September 9, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
CHRISTOPHER HILL
FROM:
TINA KAIDANOW
the
SUBJECT:
Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment
Attached at Tab I is the 3-4 page assessment you requested for
the President.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By NARA, Date 517124
2008-0994-73
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 08/19/09
6260
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Kosovo: Progress Report
The air campaign ended nearly three months ago, and the
foundations for a peaceful, self-governing Kosovo are being laid.
As we approach the critical milestone of KLA demilitarization on
September 19, however, key challenges remain: (1) improving the
security environment; (2) establishing UNMIK's authority and
diminishing KLA control; and (3) providing emergency shelter for
all Kosovars before winter. The media has been slow to recognize
how much the situation has improved for most of Kosovo's
inhabitants since June 10. The longer term challenge remains
resolving Kosovo's future status in a manner that does not further
destabilize the region or plunge us into problems with the Allies
or Russia.
Improving Security. KFOR deployment is essentially complete,
with over 48,000 in theater and 41,300 personnel on the ground
in Kosovo. While the vast majority of Kosovars feel more secure
today because of KFOR and the number of violent incidents is
gradually declining, Serbs and other minority groups continue
to feel threatened. KFOR has taken steps to address the rash
of violence experienced last month, which include intensive
patrolling, local curfews, and measures to protect vulnerable
groups. These actions by KFOR, as well as the deployment of
Russian troops who are generally mistrusted by ethnic Albanians,
has increased the number of attacks against KFOR itself.
Improving security requires an integrated response. The effective
establishment and administration of UNMIK's civilian authority,
particularly the continued deployment of the International Police
Force (IPF) remain key areas of ongoing concern. UNMIK Head
Bernard Kouchner has performed well: although slow to deploy
civilian administrators, he has established a Kosovo Transitional
Council to provide Kosovar input into decisions. UNMIK is also
establishing commissions at the local level to deal with
education, communications, governance, health, pensions,
transportation, and public utilities. We need to continue
to provide support and, where appropriate, apply pressure to
2
accelerate UNMIK's effort to establish its presence on the ground.
Funding shortages remain a critical issue for the deployment of UN
personnel.
Deployment of international police has increased over the past few
weeks. Initially, it proved difficult to find qualified personnel
and absorb them quickly, and we pressed the UN to accelerate the
pace while maintaining appropriate standards. At present, over
1000 officers are on the ground, including 320 from the United
States. The UN plans to have 1,800 regular police and 205 border
police deployed by late September or early October. With Don
Grady (U.S.) now installed as Deputy Police Commissioner, we hope
that the rate of deployment can be increased further. We are
counting on a more robust international police presence to stem
violence, particularly against minorities, and encourage Serbs and
others who have fled to return. Kosovo's own multi-ethnic police
force is also beginning to take shape; an initial class of police
officers begins training this week and another 100 students will
enter the police academy every week thereafter.
Transforming the KLA. The biggest challenge we face is
transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from a military
organization into alternative civilian roles. We are under no
illusion that the KLA will cease to exist on the September 19
deadline. However, we are working closely with UNMIK and KFOR on
transformation and employment plans that hope to co-opt as many
KLA members as possible. The existence of such by 19 September
will help significantly undercut those elements who will try to
form an underground army. A Kosovo Corps that would employ up to
5,000 former KLA members to perform essential public and emergency
services is being negotiated by UNMIK and KFOR with the KLA
leadership at this time. Other opportunities include the new
Kosovar police force and counseling, training and placement
opportunities offered by the International Organization for
Migration. Preliminary estimates suggest that all of these
initiatives could accommodate over 10,000 people, theoretically
absorbing most KLA members.
On the ground, SRSG Kouchner and General Jackson are in the
process of negotiating a tough sell with the KLA, who envision the
transformation process as a "bridge to a Kosovar Army." In order
to keep the KLA leadership on board, they have had to show some
flexibility with our initial "red lines" -- no weapons, no guards,
no army. The latest proposal, which Kouchner will brief to the
UNSC on September 9, presents a civilian corps that includes a
small rapid reaction force and authorizes approximately 200
personnel to carry weapons for the protection of a few senior
3
Kosovo Corps officials and ten to fifteen Corps facilities. While
we work to improve both the terms and the palatability of the
UNMIK-KFOR plan, we are focusing on two essential points: The KLA
must demilitarize on September 19; and we must find a way to coopt
the bulk of KLA membership.
Addressing Humanitarian Needs. The biggest immediate humanitarian
challenge is ensuring that everyone has shelter before winter. As
anticipated, some Kosovar families are beginning to rebuild their
homes themselves, using remittances from abroad. Beyond these
individual efforts, however, donors are trying to assist those who
have returned to damaged homes to construct one to two
weatherproof rooms before winter, and to supply these homes with
stoves and fuel for heat.
The emergency shelter program was hampered in early August by
humanitarian supplies being trapped at the Macedonian border due
to tariffs imposed by the cash-strapped Macedonian government.
This issue has been resolved, but given the disruption of regional
supply lines, congestion remains an issue. KFOR is building a
bypass road at the Kosovo-Macedonia border and working to expand
rail capacity for humanitarian cargo. However, we anticipate that
some Kosovars will need to spend the winter with host families or
in collective centers, rather than in their own homes. Broader
reconstruction efforts are slated for spring, and the EU has
agreed to take the lead on them.
Conclusion. About 90% of refugees and displaced persons have
returned to Kosovo, but we must work harder to improve security
for everyone by using all KFOR and UNMIK resources available. We
will continue to urge the UN to interpret and apply broadly its
authority, while seeking to strengthen its financial situation by
breaking the deadlock on U.S. funds. We will also enhance our
efforts to co-opt, rather than confront, the KLA, but maintain our
agreed deadlines and consider carefully how to deal with the
weapons issue. Finally, we will fulfill our promise to meet basic
humanitarian needs in Kosovo this winter, but at the same time
strive to lower unrealistic expectations.
We will also maintain the strong cohesiveness that is largely
responsible for the degree of success so far. An unprecedented
degree of cooperation has emerged among the leading international
organizations -- UN, KFOR, OSCE and EU -- and the key Allies
comprising the Quint (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, and the
U.S.). We also are remaining in close touch with the Russians.
If we can maintain this strong sense of teamwork, I believe we
will be well prepared to meet the challenges described above.
CONF IDENTIAL
6260
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
August 19, 1999
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
FROM:
MIRIAM SAPIRO ms
Update
SUBJECT:
Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment
Attached at Tab I is the 3-4 page assessment you requested for
the President.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I Memo for the President
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By KONARA, DateS17124
2008-0994-F-3
CONFIDENTIAL
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 08/19/09
CONFIDENTIAL
6260
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
INFORMATION
White House Guidelines, May 517124 16, 2017
By
NARA, Date
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment
The air campaign ended two months ago, and we are at roughly the
point we anticipated: the foundations for a peaceful, self-
governing Kosovo are being laid, but each day we face
significant challenges. As we approach a critical 30-day period
that should end with KLA demilitarization, key challenges
include: (1) creating a secure environment for all the people
of Kosovo, including Serbs; (2) establishing UNMIK's authority
and diminishing KLA control; and (3) providing emergency shelter
for all Kosovars before winter. The media and others are quick
to judge our performance, often without recognition of how much
the situation has improved for most of Kosovo's inhabitants
since June 10. The longer term challenge remains resolving
Kosovo's future status in a manner that does not further
destabilize the region. That solution will depend in part on
whether Serb opposition efforts to unseat Milosevic succeed (the
subject of a separate memorandum).
Improving Security. As I mentioned in the memorandum I sent you
on KFOR's effectiveness, the force is nearly up to full
strength, with approximately 40,500 troops deployed.
Nonetheless, while the vast majority of Kosovars feel more
secure today because of KFOR, Serbs and other minority groups
are now threatened. Although the number of incidents of inter-
ethnic violence has remained relatively steady for the past
month, there is little sign that the violence is dissipating.
KFOR continues to take steps to address the heightened tensions,
which include more intensive patrolling, applying local curfews,
deploying its Quick Reaction Forces, increasing aerial
surveillance and taking other measures to protect vulnerable
groups. These increased actions by KFOR, as well as deployment
of Russian troops mistrusted by Kosovar Albanians, has increased
the number of attacks against KFOR itself.
CONFIDENTIAL
CC: Vice President
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 08/19/09
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Although KFOR has deployed more quickly than expected, its
overall strength will be less than initially projected and some
key countries are already considering ways to draw down.
Possible steps to improve security include seeking an
accelerated and possibly larger deployment of multinational
specialized units (MSUs) (e.g., carabinieri) and reviewing other
aspects of the force structure to ensure sufficient mobility and
capabilities.
Improving security, of course, requires an integrated response,
including the effective establishment and administration of
UNMIK's civilian authority, particularly the deployment of the
International Police Force (IPF) and the creation of an
indigenous Kosovar police force. UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner
has performed better than expected: although slow to deploy
civilian administrators, he has established a Kosovo
Transitional Council to provide Kosovar input into decisions.
UNMIK has also established commissions at the local level to
deal with education, communications, governance, health,
pensions, transportation, and public utilities.
Unfortunately, the deployment of international police is not
proceeding as quickly as we would like. It has proven difficult
to find qualified personnel and absorb them quickly, and we
continue to press the UN to accelerate the pace while
maintaining appropriate standards. At present, over 700
officers are on the ground, including 135 from the United
States. The UN plans to have 1,800 regular police and 205
border police deployed by September 20. With Don Grady (U.S.)
now installed as Deputy Police Commissioner, we hope that the
rate of deployment can be increased slightly and that the force
will have adequate surge capacity to respond to crises. We are
counting on a more robust international police presence to stem
the flow of Serbs leaving and encourage those who have fled to
return.
Transforming the KLA. One of the biggest challenges we face is
transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from a military
organization into alternative civilian roles. We are under no
illusion that the KLA will fully demilitarize before September
19. In fact, we suspect elements will try to form an
underground army (at roughly the same time we may get pressure
from the FRY to allow Serb security forces back into Kosovo to
protect historic sites). Although the KLA is turning over
weapons to KFOR, we do not have an accurate count of overall KLA
holdings and arms smuggling continues. To encourage
demobilization, we are working with KFOR and UNMIK to establish
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIA
3
several alternative employment opportunities and incentives,
including a Kosovo Emergency Service Corps (KESC) that would
employ 1,500 to 3,000 former KLA members to perform essential
public services. Other opportunities include staffing the new
Kosovar police force and taking advantage of counseling,
training and placement opportunities offered by the
International Organization for Migration. Preliminary estimates
suggest that these opportunities could accommodate about 9,000
people, thereby theoretically absorbing most KLA members.
We have run into two problems, however: the KLA's desire to
control the selection process for jobs and -- more serious --
the KLA's continuing focus on forming a civilian defense
organization. The KLA Demilitarization Accord allows for the
"formation of an army in Kosovo on the lines of the U.S.
National Guard in due course," as part of a political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future. Viewing this provision
as authorization to form a civilian defense organization, the
KLA has already asked us for 6,000 uniforms. We have so far
maintained our "red lines" no weapons, no guards, no army --
and deferred the creation of such a group at least until we are
satisfied with demilitarization.
Addressing Humanitarian Needs. The biggest immediate
humanitarian challenge is ensuring that everyone has shelter
before winter. As anticipated, some Kosovar families are
beginning to rebuild their homes themselves, using remittances
from abroad. Beyond these individual efforts, however, little
reconstruction will be completed until spring, given limited
time and supply, and logistical constraints. Instead, donors
are trying to assist those who have returned to damaged homes to
construct one to two weatherproof rooms before winter, and to
supply these homes with stoves and fuel for heat. To facilitate
this, relief agencies are distributing winterization shelter
kits to rural villages. Donors are now beginning to focus on
urban areas, where there could be up to 40,000 families
requiring shelter.
The emergency shelter program has been hampered by a few
problems. Until last week, many supplies were trapped at the
Macedonian border because Skopje was seeking to impose taxes on
humanitarian items that normally receive free passage. This
issue has been resolved, but given the disruption of supply
lines through Belgrade and competition among military,
commercial and private traffic, there remains a backlog at the
Macedonian border. KFOR is building a bypass road that will
help relieve congestion by the end of September. Meanwhile,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
humanitarian agencies are working with KFOR to expand rail
capacity for humanitarian cargo and prioritize the movement of
humanitarian convoys on congested roads, as well as utilize the
Pristina airport. Relief agencies have also had to look outside
the region for supplies, which has caused further delays. DOD
is examining ways that it can help resolve some of these
problems, but we anticipate that some Kosovars will need to
spend the winter with host families or in collective centers,
rather than in their own homes.
Some Kosovars are disgruntled that donors are focusing on
emergency shelter instead of helping them to rebuild their
homes, but donors and relief agencies believe this is the best
way to ensure that shelter can be provided before winter.
Broader reconstruction efforts are slated for spring, and the EU
has agreed to take the lead on them. We clearly need to do a
better job of explaining to Kosovars, the press and the public
our role and objectives, so that expectations become more
realistic.
Conclusion. While implementation has proceeded faster than
first appeared possible, it also is clearly not fast enough.
About 90% of refugees and displaced persons have returned to
Kosovo, but we must work harder to improve security for everyone
by using all available resources of KFOR and UNMIK. We will
continue to urge the UN to interpret and apply broadly its
authority. We will also enhance our efforts to co-opt, rather
than confront, the KLA, but within our "redlines" and agreed
deadlines. Finally, we will fulfill our promise to meet basic
humanitarian needs in Kosovo this winter, but at the same time
strive to lower unrealistic expectations.
We will also maintain the strong cohesiveness that is largely
responsible for the degree of success so far. An unprecedented
degree of cooperation has emerged among the leading
international organizations -- UN, KFOR, OSCE and EU -- and the
key Allies comprising the Quint (the UK, Germany, France, Italy,
and the U.S.). Unlike the initial stages of Dayton
implementation, we have been able to avoid, for the most part,
an unhelpful split between the military and civilian components
of implementation. If we can maintain this strong sense of
teamwork, I believe we will be well prepared to meet the
challenges described above.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6260
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
By NARA, Date 517124
2008-0994-1.3
FROM:
SAMUEL BERGER
SUBJECT:
Kosovo: A Two-Month Assessment
The air campaign ended two months ago, and we are at roughly the
point we anticipated: the foundations for a peaceful, self-
governing Kosovo are being laid, but each day we face
significant challenges. As we approach a critical 30-day period
that should end with KLA demilitarization, key challenges
include: (1) creating a secure environment for all the people
of Kosovo, including Serbs; (2) establishing UNMIK's authority
and diminishing KLA control; and (3) providing emergency shelter
for all Kosovars before winter. The media and others are quick
to judge our performance, often without recognition of how much
the situation has improved for most of Kosovo's inhabitants
since June 10. The longer-term challenge remains resolving
Kosovo's future status in a manner that does not further
destabilize the region. That solution will depend in part on
whether Serb opposition efforts to unseat Milosevic succeed (the
subject of a separate memorandum).
Improving Security As I mentioned in the memorandum I sent you
on KFOR's effectiveness, the force is nearly up to full
strength, with approximately 40,500 troops deployed.
Nonetheless, while the vast majority of Kosovars feel more
secure today because of KFOR, Serbs and other minority groups
are now threatened. Although the number of incidents of inter-
ethnic violence has remained relatively steady for the past
month, there is little sign that the violence is dissipating.
KFOR continues to take steps to address the heightened tensions,
which include more intensive patrolling, applying local curfews,
deploying its Quick Reaction Forces, increasing aerial
surveillance and taking other measures to protect vulnerable
groups. These increased actions by KFOR, as well as deployment
of Russian troops mistrusted by Kosovar Albanians, has increased
the number of attacks against KFOR itself.
CONFIDENTIA
CC: Vice President
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 08/19/09
CONF IDENTIAL
2
Although KFOR has deployed more quickly than expected, its
overall strength will be less than initially projected and some
key countries are already considering ways to draw down.
Possible steps to improve security include seeking an
accelerated and possibly larger deployment of multinational
specialized units (MSUs) (e.g., carabinieri) and reviewing other
aspects of the force structure to ensure sufficient mobility and
capabilities.
Improving security, of course, requires an integrated response,
including the effective establishment and administration of
UNMIK's civilian authority, particularly the deployment of the
International Police Force (IPF) and the creation of an
indigenous Kosovar police force. UNMIK Head Bernard Kouchner
has performed better than expected: although slow to deploy
civilian administrators, he has established a Kosovo
Transitional Council to provide Kosovar input into decisions.
UNMIK has also established commissions at the local level to
deal with education, communications, governance, health,
pensions, transportation, and public utilities.
Unfortunately, the deployment of international police is not
proceeding as quickly as we would like. It has proven difficult
to find qualified personnel and absorb them quickly, and we
continue to press the UN to accelerate the pace while
maintaining appropriate standards. At present, over 700
officers are on the ground, including 135 from the United
States. The UN plans to have all 1,800 regular police and 205
border police deployed by September 20. With Don Grady (U.S.)
now installed as Deputy Police Commissioner, we hope that the
rate of deployment can be increased slightly and that the force
will have adequate surge capacity to respond to crises. We are
counting on a more robust international police presence to stem
the flow of Serbs leaving and encourage those who have fled to
return.
Transforming the KLA. One of the biggest challenges we face is
transforming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from a military
organization into alternative civilian roles. We are under no
illusion that the KLA will fully demilitarize before September
19. In fact, we suspect elements will try to form an
underground army (at roughly the same time we may get pressure
from the FRY to allow Serb security forces back into Kosovo to
protect historic sites). Although the KLA is turning over
weapons to KFOR, we do not have an accurate count of overall KLA
holdings and arms smuggling continues. To encourage
demobilization, we are working with KFOR and UNMIK to establish
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
several alternative employment opportunities and incentives,
including a Kosovo Emergency Service Corps (KESC) that would
employ 1,500 to 3,000 former KLA members to perform essential
public services. Other opportunities include staffing the new
Kosovar police force and taking advantage of counseling,
training and placement opportunities offered by the
International Organization for Migration. Preliminary estimates
suggest that these opportunities could accommodate about 9,000
people, thereby theoretically absorbing most KLA members.
We have run into two problems, however: the KLA's desire to
control the selection process for jobs and more serious the
KLA's continuing focus on forming a civilian defense
organization. The KLA Demilitarization Accord allows for the
"formation of an army in Kosovo on the lines of the U.S.
National Guard in due course," as part of a political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future. Viewing this provision
as authorization to form a civilian defense organization, the
KLA has already asked us for 6,000 uniforms. We have so far
maintained our "red lines' no weapons, no guards, no army
and deferred the creation of such a group at least until we are
satisfied with demilitarization.
Addressing Humanitarian Needs. The biggest immediate
humanitarian challenge is ensuring that everyone has shelter
before winter. As anticipated, some Kosovar families are
beginning to rebuild their homes themselves, using remittances
from abroad. Beyond these individual efforts, however, little
reconstruction will be completed until spring, given limited
time and supply, and logistical constraints. Instead, donors
are trying to assist those who have returned to damaged homes to
construct one to two weatherproof rooms before winter, and to
supply these homes with stoves and fuel for heat. To facilitate
this, relief agencies are distributing winterization shelter
kits to rural villages. Donors are now beginning to focus on
urban areas, where there could be up to 40,000 families
requiring shelter.
The emergency shelter program has been hampered by a few
problems. Until last week, many supplies were trapped at the
Macedonian border because Skopje was seeking to impose taxes on
humanitarian items that normally receive free passage. This
issue has been resolved, but given the disruption of supply
lines through Belgrade and competition among military,
commercial and private traffic, there remains a backlog at the
Macedonian border. KFOR is building a bypass road that will
help relieve congestion by the end of September. Meanwhile,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
humanitarian agencies are working with KFOR to expand rail
capacity for humanitarian cargo and prioritize the movement of
humanitarian convoys on congested roads, as well as utilize the
Pristina airport. Relief agencies have also had to look outside
the region for supplies, which has caused further delays. DOD
is examining ways that it can help resolve some of these
problems, but we anticipate that some Kosovars will need to
spend the winter with host families or in collective centers,
rather than in their own homes.
Some Kosovars are disgruntled that donors are focusing on
emergency shelter instead of helping them to rebuild their
homes, but donors and relief agencies believe this is the best
way to ensure that shelter can be provided before winter.
Broader reconstruction efforts are slated for spring, and the EU
has agreed to take the lead on them. We clearly need to do a
better job of explaining to Kosovars, the press and the public
our role and objectives, so that expectations become more
realistic.
Conclusion. While implementation has proceeded faster than
first appeared possible, it also is clearly not fast enough.
About 90% of refugees and displaced persons have returned to
Kosovo, but we must work harder to improve security for everyone
by using all available resources of KFOR and UNMIK. We will
continue to urge the UN to interpret and apply broadly its
authority. We will also enhance our efforts to co-opt, rather
than confront, the KLA, but within our "redlines" and agreed
deadlines. Finally, we will fulfill our promise to meet basic
humanitarian needs in Kosovo this winter, but at the same time
strive to lower unrealistic expectations.
We will also maintain the strong cohesiveness that is largely
responsible for the degree of success so far. An unprecedented
degree of cooperation has emerged among the leading
international organizations UN, KFOR, OSCE and EU - and the
key Allies comprising the Quint (the UK, Germany, France, Italy
and
theus).
and us). Unlike the initial stages of Dayton implementation, we
have been able to avoid, for the most part, an unhelpful split
between the military and civilian components of implementation.
If we can maintain this strong sense of teamwork, I believe we
will be well prepared to meet the challenges described above.
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6364
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Tony:
Thank you for your letter suggesting that
Dayton host a meeting of the Stability Pact
of
of
for Southeast Europe later this year.
I am pleased to hear the
remain actively engaged in promoting peace in
the Balkans. The efforts of the University
the city, the Chamber and others can make a
real contribution to seeing that the promise
of the Dayton Peace Agreement is realized.
STUTE
We are now hard at work
maintainothe
momentum of the Sarajevo Summit and launch of
the Stability Pact. However, I believe it is
important that Stability Pact meetings be held
in the region or nearby in Europe to highlight
the importance the region's integration into
the rest of Europe plays in achieving the
Pact's objectives.
again
Thank you for your interest in the Stability
Pact. I look forward to working with you and
other Members of Congress to sustain support
for this important initiative.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Tony P. Hall
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515