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Case Number: 2006-1066-F.
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
FBI - House [3]
Staff Office-Individual:
Counsel's Office-Sherburne, Jane
Original OA/ID Number:
CF 396
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V
tes
Union Calendar No. 469
104th Congress, 2nd Session
House Report 104-862
INVESTIGATION INTO THE WHITE HOUSE
AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
SECURITY OF FBI BACKGROUND INVES-
TIGATION FILES
INTERIM REPORT
NINETEENTH REPORT
BY THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
27-368 CC
WASHINGTON 1996
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE OF REPPESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 28, 1996.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania, Chairman
Washington, DC.
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
DAN BURTON, Indiana
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Govern-
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Minois
TOM LANTOS, California
ment Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the committee's
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
nineteenth report to the 104th Congress.
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Chairman.
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New
(III)
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, JR., New Hampshire
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
York
STEPHEN HORN, California
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
GARY A. CONDIT, California
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
RANDY TATE, Washington
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
Columbia
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
Carolina
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR., Maryland
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
(Independent)
JAMES L. CLARKE, Staff Director
KEVIN M. SABO, General Counsel
JUDITH McCoY, Chief Clerk
BUD MYERS, Minority Staff Director
(II)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 28, 1996.
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
Hon. NEWT GINGRICH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR. Pennsylvania, Chairman
Washington, DC.
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
DAN BURTON, Indiana
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Govern-
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
TOM LANTOS, California
ment Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the committee's
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
nineteenth report to the 104th Congress.
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Chairman.
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New
(III)
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, JR, New Hampshire
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
York
STEPHEN HORN, California
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
GARY A. CONDIT, California
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
RANDY TATE, Washington
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
Columbia
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
Carolina
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR., Maryland
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
(Independent)
JAMES L. CLARKE, Staff Director
KEVIN M. SABO, General Counsel
JUDITH McCoY, Chief Clerk
BUD MYERS, Minority Staff Director
(II)
CONTENTS
Page
I. Executive summary
1
A. Introduction
1
1. The conduct of White House officials
2
2. The conduct of the FBI
3
B. The matter of the FBI files
4
1. The discovery of the files: Travelgate to Filegate
4
2. The discovery of the Billy Dale file
5
3. White House's changing explanations for "Filegate"
6
4. A "file clerk" caused the problem-June 5, 1996
6
5. The General Accounting Office caused the problem-June 6,
1996
7
6. "An innocent bureaucratic mistake"-June 7, 1996
7
7. The Secret Service caused the problem-June 10
7
8. Procedural safeguards against "innocent snafus"
9
9. Livingstone and Marceca
10
10. Secret Service hearings
13
11. FBI internal investigation and report
13
12. Attorney General Reno refers FBI files investigation to Judge
Starr
14
13. Improper contacts with the FBI
15
16
C. Findings
D. Recommendations
17
II. White House Office of Personnel Security
18
A. History of the Office of Personnel Security
18
1. White House Security Office practice and procedures
19
2. Updating the background files
20
3. The transition from the Bush administration
22
B. Clinton administration personnel and operations of the office
23
1. Who hired Craig Livingstone?
23
2. Craig Livingstone's quest for the Military Office
30
3. Livingstone's duties as Director of the White House Office
of Personnel Security
31
34
4. Livingstone's salary requests
5. Livingstone brings on new staff
35
III. Detail of Anthony Marceca to the White House
36
36
A. Introduction
B. Marceca parlays his political background with Craig Livingstone
37
into a White House position
1. Marceca's request for a detail to the White House
39
40
2. The With House requests Marceca
3. Marceca has access to the White House before his detail
41
C. Marceca's introduction to the White House Office of Personnel
41
Security
41
1. Introduction
42
2. Discrepancies in Marceca's testimony
44
D. Marceca begins the Update Project
44
1. Introduction
2. Marceca's understanding of the Secret Service lists
45
3. Marceca's explanation of the Update Project
46
49
4. The "Dead Bin"
51
5. Marceca's other duties
51
E. Marceca's detail ends
1. White House attempts to extend Marceca's detail
51
2. Marceca does advance for the Clinton administration
53
55
IV. Initial discovery of "Tony's Files"
(V)
VI
VII
Page
Page
A. Lisa Wetzl's backgound
56
1. Ms. Wetzl, who had no experience, should not have assumed
1. Pre-employment steps
105
a. Security interview
105
the amount of responsibility she undertook
56
2. Limited inquiry
b. Submit to a drug test
105
58
B. Lisa Wetzl discovers "Tony's Files"
c. An initial name check
105
59
d. An extensive FBI name check
105
1. Wetzl to complete "Update Project"
59
e. Obtaining a temporary pass
106
2. Marlin Fitzwater, or too many files
59
C. The "Update Project" is redone by Lisa Wetzl
f. Obtaining a permanent pass
106
60
1. Wetzl destroys the Secret Service list
C. Background investigations of Clinton White House staff
107
60
2. Process by which the project is completed
1. White House staff provided minimal cooperations to the FBI
107
61
3. Extra files are boxed up and archived
2. Problems in the background investigations of Clinton adminis-
62
V. White House Counsel's Office discovery of FBI files
tration staff
108
62
A. Billy Dale's file
D. Secret Service concerns
109
62
1. Office of Records Management responds to subpoena
1. Delays in submitting background investigations to the Secret
62
Service
109
2. White file House Counsel determines that FBI file is a personnel
2. The Secret Service raised concerns about the content of the
63
3. Natalie Williams passes on information to Wendy White
background files
110
63
4. Wendy White's handling of Billy Dale file
E. White House drug testing program
111
64
a. May 21, 1996-orders the Dale file from OPS
F. CIA compartmented clearances
112
64
B. Chairman Clinger's June 5, 1996 statement
64
1. The committee receives 1,000 pages
VIEWS
64
2. Chairman Clinger's statement on the Billy Dale file
65
VI. FBI involvement in the files matter
Additional views of Hon. William F. Clinger, Jr., Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
65
A. Director Freeh initiates investigation
Hon. Constance A. Morella, Hon. John L. Mica, and Hon. Dick Chrysler
115
65
1. Tom Kelley's initial investigation
Minority views of Hon. Cardiss Collins, Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom
66
2. Howard Shapiro takes over the investigation
Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus
67
B. FBI report
Towns, Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Hon.
67
C. Attorney General Janet Reno refers the matter to Independent
Paul E. Kanjorski, Hon. Gary A. Condit, Hon. Collin C. Peterson, Hon.
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr
Karen L. Thurman, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett,
70
D. FBI contacts the White House after Reno's referral
Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. James P.
71
1. Freeh requests that Chairman Clinger review background in-
Moran, Hon. Gene Green, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, Hon.
Bill K. Brewster, Hon. Tim Holden, and Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
116
vestigations rather than question agents
71
2. Shapiro notifies White House Counsel's Office, whom he re-
ferred to as "affected parties," of potential incrimination Nuss-
baum's statement
72
a. Sherburne's telephone tree
75
2. Shapiro dispatches agents to interrogate Sculimbrene
77
3. Shapiro made his own assessment that the matter was not
within Independent Counsel Starr's jurisdiction
79
4. Nussbaum's criminal referral
81
5. Shapiro edits letter for White House Counsel that is critical
of Chairman Clinger
82
VII. Politicization of the FBI
84
A. General Counsel of the FBI hand delivers Gary Aldrich book to
White House Counsel
87
1. Justifications
87
2. Hearing testimony
88
B. Distribution of book within the White House
89
1. Cheryl Mills' review
89
2. Christopher Cerf's review
90
C. Summary of 4 years of politicization of the FBI
91
1. Past procedures for White House utilized the Department of
Justice
91
2. First Counsel's Office not staffed with agents
92
3. Travel Office, FBI files, and Aldrich book
92
VIII. Secret Service explanation
92
A. Introduction
92
B. The Secret Service's role in obtaining White House access
95
C. The lists used by the White House Office of Personnel Security
96
D. The only list they could be talking about
96
E. Deactivation
98
IX. White House passes and security issues
100
A. Lax White House security procedures were a precursor to FBI
files issue
100
1. Problems with White House passes
100
2. Unsuitable personnel in charge of overseeing the Office of
Personnel Security
103
B. The process by which background investigations are conducted
105
Union Calendar No. 469
104TH CONGRESS
}
REPORT
2nd Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
104-862
INVESTIGATION INTO THE WHITE HOUSE AND DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE ON SECURITY OF FBI BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION FILES
SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. CLINGER, from the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, submitted the following
NINETEENTH REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
On September 24, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled "Investiga-
tion into the White House and Department of Justice on Security
of FBI Background Files." The chairman was directed to transmit
a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The committee's investigation into the unauthorized possession
of hundreds of FBI background files by the White House remains
in progress. There are many questions that are unanswered; co-
operation from the White House and other witnesses has not been
full and complete; more witnesses must be interviewed; and, many
more documents from earlier committee requests are outstanding.
Accordingly, this is an interim report to inform the public as to the
status of the investigation in the closing days of the 104th Con-
gress.
(1)
2
3
1. The conduct of White House officials
2. The conduct of the FBI
The FBI files matter, or "Filegate," is as serious an issue as the
Clinton administration has encountered. The discovery of the unau-
The committee also is troubled by another serious issue that re-
thorized access to so many FBI background files on so many former
emerged during the FBI files investigation: the politicization of the
White House employees is bad enough. These files contain the most
FBI. Questions about a cozy relationship between the FBI and the
private and personal information on an individual, his spouse and
White House surfaced during the committee's investigation into the
family. The fact that two individuals, Craig Livingstone and An-
White House Travel Office firings. At the time, in a statement by
thony Marceca, with extensive political involvement and checkered
FBI Director Louis Freeh said, "I told the President that the FBI
pasts were in charge of handling the files is cause for alarm and
must maintain its independence and have no role in politics."
investigation.
These questions raised great concern because the politicization of
That present and former White House officials have not been
law enforcement in a democracy is a swift and sure way to trample
forthcoming in revealing who hired the two central characters in
over the civil liberties of private citizens. Consequently, the FBI Di-
this matter is of great concern to the committee. The committee in-
rector took steps to reverse these perceptions of coziness. But it did
tends to aggressively pursue the answers. Whoever was responsible
not prevent the hundreds of files from being sent to the White
for bringing them into the White House is ultimately responsible
House without question.
for these actions, Placing the public trust of such sensitive, private
In the course of the committee's inquiry into the files matter, this
files in the hands of two political operatives was a disaster waiting
perception resurfaced. The committee uncovered several question-
to happen. And, it did.
able actions by FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro that we find
In general, the FBI files issue shows a lack of respect by the
inexplicable and inexcusable. His "heads up" to the White House
Clinton administration for proper security procedures to protect
Counsel had the effect of an early warning to the subjects of the
both the President of the United States and the national security.
committee's and the Independent Counsel's investigations of poten-
This is all the more so since the White House ignored recommenda-
tially damaging information. Shapiro's delivery of a politically con-
tions from a Democratic committee chairman of the U.S. Senate to
troversial manuscript, joint editing of a White House letter to Di-
take security precautions in response to reported security irregular-
rector Freeh, and possession of his own personal White House pass
ities in the first years of the Clinton administration.
had a similar effect.
The Clinton White House displayed a lack of respect for the pri-
This committee witnessed blatant interference in its investiga-
vacy and confidentiality of private citizens. The mere fact that indi-
tory proceedings. Mr. Shapiro's justifications for his actions are im-
viduals lacking in professional skills and discretion were put in
plausible. The committee is seriously troubled by the interference
charge demonstrates the cavalier approach of the Clinton adminis-
of Mr. Shapiro in the investigations of this committee, as well as
tration toward sensitive security matters.
those of the Independent Counsel. Mr. Shapiro himself acknowl-
During the early revelations of the FBI files investigation, White
edged that his "heads up" to the White House was inappropriate.
House officials were quick to blame others rather than take respon-
However, his coziness with the White House continues. Even the
sibility. This happened even when all the facts were not known.
perception of such a relationship threatens the independence of the
FBI. The committee calls upon Mr. Shapiro to tender his resigna-
First, it was touted as a routine mistake; then it was blamed on
a low-level clerk; then the General Accounting Office; and then, the
tion from the office of the FBI general counsel.
Secret Service. Each of these explanations was thoroughly discred-
The act of resignation is necessary, if the Director wishes to re-
ited.
store the arms-length relationship between the FBI and the White
Some White House officials, through surrogates and unattributed
House, as well as the public's confidence. Failure by the Director
to do so will allow the continued erosion of confidence in law en-
background quotes in the press, continue to blame the Secret Serv-
forcement and in the Director's own independent leadership.
ice, even after that theory was soundly debunked. The fact that the
White House seeks to avoid responsibility for this matter, and in-
The committee has yet to determine whether colossal incom-
stead passes the buck, ensures that White House accountability for
petence or a sinister motive precipitated these events. We have yet
its own actions will be elusive.
to learn exactly who is Craig Livingstone, who hired him and why.
Furthermore, the FBI files issue made it more difficult for the
Answers to these questions are necessary to explain the true story
FBI and the Secret Service, the two agencies responsible for pro-
of "Filegate."
The committee's investigation has sufficient information to real-
tecting the President and performing security for the White House,
to trust actions of the White House. Prior to the files matter com-
ize the great danger in the White House's unauthorized acquisition
of these sensitive FBI files. We know the files were in the hands
ing to light, these agencies cooperated with the White House under
the presumption of a "good faith" relationship. Now, however, both
of political operatives, non-professionals, volunteers, teen-agers in
have taken steps to implement more skeptical, arms-length proc-
proximity to a photocopier, and individuals without security clear-
ances. We know there was virtually no supervision over this sen-
esses for future interaction with White House officials. This unfor-
sitive process. We know that some data was taken from the White
tunate departure from tradition is yet another result of the growing
House compound to the home of a witness who has now claimed
mistrust of our political leaders in Washington. Undoubtedly, it is
a black eye on this White House.
1 Report of Fiscal Year 1994; Federal Bureau of Investigations; Louis Freeh, Director.
1,
4
5
fifth amendment protection against testifying before Congress. No
It is important to note that the Billy Dale file only was produced
one yet knows where these files have been or who looked at them.
after a vote of contempt was taken in the full committee on May
The potential for the abuse of the rights and privacy of hundreds
9, 1996. In a meeting with Chairman Clinger shortly before the
of private citizens remains clear and present.
contempt vote, Quinn informed the chairman that he had not even
The committee continues to investigate this case and discover the
attempted to collect certain categories of subpoenaed documents
true story. In the meantime, the committee cannot yet assure the
and he had not yet undertaken a review of the documents for privi-
public that a lax attitude toward and disrespect for the privacy and
lege issues. Quinn issued a blanket "protective" executive privilege
rights of ordinary Americans has not gripped this White House.
claim over the documents on May 9, 1996 at the behest of the
B. THE MATTER OF THE FBI FILES
President. Personnel records are not normally subject to executive
privilege.
1. The discovery of the files: Travelgate to Filegate
"Personnel records" are distinctly different from FBI background
Since May 30, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and
reports and are kept in separate and distinct offices at the White
Oversight has conducted an intensive investigation into the actions
House. Certainly the Counsel's Office, which handles the FBI back-
of the White House and the Department of Justice concerning the
ground reports, is aware of this distinction. After all, the Counsel's
White House's improper acquisition of hundreds of FBI background
Office reviews FBI background reports and it does not ordinarily
investigation files of former Republican officials. The genesis of this
review "personnel" records. The White House Counsel's Office was
revelation of massive invasion of privacy was with the committee's
misleading in how it represented Billy Dale's file to the committee.
While the White House Counsel now tries to revise the history of
document requests for all previously withheld files on Billy Dale.
how they characterized this file, the actions by Counsel staff are
On May 30, 1996, the committee discovered that the White
representative of the type of gaming that was typical in negotiating
House had improperly ordered Billy Dale's FBI background file 7
document productions.
months after he was fired, when the White House finally produced
On May 30, 1996, when Billy Dale's file was produced to the
1,000 pages of the 3,000 pages of documents that were being with-
committee, Chairman Clinger also was notified by letter² that
held under a May 9, 1996 invocation of executive privilege.
President Clinton was formally asserting executive privilege over
The committee issued a January 11, 1996 subpoena which in-
the then remaining 2,000 pages of outstanding documents. Quinn
cluded a request for all records relating to Billy Dale. The docu-
claimed that Attorney General Reno reviewed the documents and
ments were due to the committee on January 22, 1996. Prior to the
agreed with the propriety of assertion of executive privilege. Al-
subpoena, the committee had submitted several document requests
though Quinn represented that this assertion of executive privilege
to the White House which included document requests relating to
was being made by President Clinton, the committee never was
Mr. Dale.
provided any documentation of a personal assertion by President
Prior to May 30, 1996, the White House Counsel had represented
Clinton.
in February 1996 that the only categories of documents withheld
were: "personnel" records, attorney notes, and "deliberative mate-
2. The discovery of the Billy Dale file
rial" concerning investigations of Congress and the Independent
The privileged resolution was withdrawn from floor consideration
Counsel.
at Chairman Clinger's request in order to review the new docu-
Throughout the spring of 1996, White House Counsel withheld
ments and determine the propriety of President Clinton's executive
this group of documents. At no time did the White House Counsel
privilege claims over the remaining 2,000 pages of identified re-
make any representations that he was in possession of an FBI
sponsive documents.
background file of Mr. Dale. In fact when Mr. Dale's file was for-
The committee began an immediate review of the 1,000 pages al-
warded on May 30, 1996, on the morning a contempt vote was
ready produced. That day, committee investigative staff discovered
scheduled, it was not even distinctly identified in a production log
a White House memo, dated December 20, 1993, requesting a copy
and was just grouped among documents emanating from "The
of Billy Dale's FBI background investigation previous report. The
Counsel's Office." Since the document had been obtained from the
request for Dale's file was sent to the FBI a full 7 months after Mr.
Office of Records Management who received it from the Office of
Dale and the White House Travel Office employees had been sum-
Personnel Security, the characterization of the source of the docu-
marily fired and an FBI investigation announced by the White
ment was misleading.
House.
Yet if the document did come from the "Counsel's Office" as iden-
The request form found among the White House's document pro-
tified by the White House, why does the White House Counsel Jack
duction was in memorandum format addressed "TO: FBI, LIAI-
Quinn claim that he told the committee about the document in
SON" and "FROM: BERNARD W. NUSSBAUM."³ The form stated
February 1996 while Special Counsel Jane Sherburne, who was at
that Mr. Dale's previous report was being requested because he
the same February 1996 meeting, claims she didn't know about the
was currently being considered for "ACCESS (S)" to the White
Billy Dale file until June 4, 1996? The Counsel's Office has pro-
vided mutually inconsistent accounts of who knew about the Billy
Letter from Jack Quinn to Chairman William F. Clinger, Jr., Committee on Government Re-
Dale file and when.
form and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives, May 30, 1996.
White House document CGE 43641.
6
7
House.⁴ An attached memo indicated that the FBI complied with
time. Ms. Sherburne testified that Livingstone was "as confused
the request and forwarded the Dale file to the White House on Jan-
uary 6, 1994.5
and puzzled by it"8 as she was.
Although the committee had previously issued, on February 7,
5. The General Accounting Office caused the problem-June 6, 1996
1996, a subpoena to the Department of Justice for all records per-
taining to Billy Dale, DOJ never produced its copy of the document.
By June 6, the White House issued another explanation for the
The committee asked Attorney General Reno to provide informa-
improper possession of the FBI files. The White House stated that
a "low-level file clerk" was not in fact at fault; rather, that the Gen-
tion on the Justice Department's knowledge of its failure to
produce its copy of the Dale file and the White House memo re-
eral Accounting Office ("GAO") might have "triggered" a request for
these files in the course of its investigation of the White House
questing it in December 1993, particularly in light of the fact it
Travel Office matter. The GAO immediately denied any involve-
was responsive to other Justice Department requests and subpoe-
nas. The Department of Justice responded, stating that the com-
ment or request of FBI files.¹⁰
mittee had not requested the Dale file. The memo request from
6. "An innocent bureaucratic mistake"-June 7, 1996
Nussbaum's office was not located in its search.
The committee soon learned that, in addition to Mr. Dale's im-
When FBI Unit Chief James Bourke was asked in a committee
deposition about DOJ's failure to produce this document, he testi-
properly sought FBI file, the White House had obtained at least
338 other FBI files of prior Republican administration officials. 11
fied that he had "no idea" why, and that it wasn't his responsibil-
ity.6 Mr. Bourke later explained that it was the FBI general coun-
One of Livingstone's lawyers, David Cohen, who had been conduct-
sel's responsibility to request document searches in response to
ing his own investigation, telephoned Sherburne, and gave her the
"bad news" that the White House had ordered a lot of other files
congressional subpoenas and he was not aware of any request.⁷
It is clear that White House officials attempted to hide its req-
beyond Dale's. Ms. Sherburne learned that files on former Repub-
lican administration officials were also ordered. 12 White House
uisition and possession of the Dale file: first, by erroneously de-
scribing it as a personnel file instead of an FBI background file:
Counsel and "Travelgate" spokesman Mark Fabiani, immediately
second, by withholding it under a blanket executive privilege; and
labeled this matter "an innocent bureaucratic mistake."13
Fabiani told the Associated Press on June 7, that Livingstone's
third, for failing to list this and other specific documents in its final
privilege log.
attorney's discovery provides "a completely innocent expla-
nation. 14 Fabiani also told the New York Times that the "detailee"
The committee has yet to find the reason why the White House
requested the Dale file from the FBI 7 months after he was fired.
whom he still refused to identify "was mistakenly given an out-
dated list of White House employees dating back to the Reagan Ad-
3. White House's changing explanations for "Filegate"
ministration," and that "no one in the White House ever reviewed
In the first few days following the discovery, the White House of-
the files." 15 Further, Fabiani informed the Associated Press that
fered several conflicting explanations about how it obtained hun-
the ordering of numerous other files was proof positive "that Mr.
dreds of FBI background files. The White House initially released
Dale's file was not singled out." 16 Chairman Clinger sent a letter
to the White House on June 7 requesting all official information on
statements from Craig Livingstone's attorney claiming that the ac-
tivities of Livingstone and Marceca were all an "innocent mistake."
this matter, including the name of the "mystery" detailee.
Why did the White House SO quickly endorse the explanations of
7. The Secret Service caused the problem-June 10
Livingstone and Marceca before getting all the facts?
In a June 10, 1996 letter, Sherburne stated that the FBI back-
4. A "file clerk" caused the problem-June 5, 1996
ground files were assembled in the White House Office of Person-
White House Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne
nel Security "as a result of a mistaken understanding" that these
issued a statement on June 5, 1996, claiming that "file clerks" per-
prior Republican administration officials "continued to have access
forming a routine recordkeeping effort "may have mistakenly"
to the White House compound after the start of the Clinton Admin-
sought Mr. Dale's FBI background file.⁸ Ms. Sherburne refused to
provide the committee with the name of the "file clerk" that sought
10 The GAO spokesperson stated that it "never asked presidential aides for the FBI back-
Sherburne deposition, p. 73.
Dale's file. Unknown to the committee, at the time, Ms. Sherburne
ground file of fired Travel Office director Billy Dale" and generally disclaimed that the GAO
met with Livingstone that evening at the White House. Mr. Living-
ever asked for or was allowed to review any FBI background files. Pete Yost, White House Strug.
stone claimed to know nothing about this growing "problem" at the
gles to Explain Why it Obtained Dale's FBI File, Associated Press, June 6, 1996.
11 Jane Sherburne later testified that the White House learned of this information on June
law firm of Miller Cassidy, aRocca & Lewin. Sherburne deposition, July 23, 1996, pp. 74-75.
6, 1996, through Mr. Livingstone's lawyers, Randy Turk and David Cohen of the Washington
"According to Anthony Marceca's documents produced under subpoena to the committee, (un-
numbered) the "(S)" notation referred to the type of access being sought for the individual. An
13 Pete Yost, Dale FBI File Part of Larger Effort to Recreate White House Files, Associated
12 Sherburne deposition, p. 85.
"S" meant that the White House was seeking access for Mr. Dale as White House Staff rather
Press, June 7, 1996.
than for an "I" for intern or volunteer position.
14/d.
5 White House document CGE 43642.
15 Neil E. Lewis, White House Says Requests for FBI Files Was Wider, New York Times, June
Committee deposition of James Bourke, June 17, 1996, pp. 62-63.
8, 1996.
'Id., pp. 65-66.
16 Pete Yost, Baker, Fitzwater, Brady Among 330 FBI Files White House Got, Associated P
Statement by Jane Sherburne, June 5, 1996.
June 7, 1996.
9
8
istration. 17 Ms. Sherburne attached to her letter a sworn state-
Culvahouse and Tony Blankley, without any recognition of the
ment of Anthony Marceca, the detailee who ordered the files.
names, or that they were not "holdover interns." The committee is
Marceca stated that he based his requests to the FBI on Secret
especially skeptical of this conclusion given Marceca's vast political
Service lists of White House passholders. Contrary to Fabiani's
experience.
statements to the New York Times that "no one in the White
8. Procedural safeguards against "innocent snafus"
House ever reviewed the files," 18 Mr. Marceca revealed in his
statement that he, in fact, did examine the contents for inconsist-
In an attempt to get to the bottom of the cause of the FBI files
encies. Marceca told Livingstone's lawyer that he, in fact, read all
issue, the committee held its first hearing on June 19, 1996. In
of the files in order to pass on any "derogatory information" to Liv-
that hearing, we learned how the very sensitive matters of con-
ingstone. 19 Sherburne later explained that Livingstone's lawyer
fidential background checks and security clearances were handled
met with Mr. Marceca on Sunday, June 9 at his law firm's offices.
by prior White Houses, both Democrat and Republican. 22 In the
Mr. Marceca dictated a statement to Livingstone's attorney in the
past, the President has appointed only professional, circumspect
presence of Livingstone.2
and highly responsible people to be put in charge of these most
The frequently changing explanations in the early days show
sensitive matters.
that the White House was quick to avoid accountability by passing
In this hearing, former Counsels to the President and Living-
the blame. It engaged in a public strategy of excuse-making. How-
stone's predecessor in the White House Office of Personnel Security
ever, each time the blame was shifted elsewhere, the explanation
testified to the careful, and painstaking process that was followed
was discredited. The White House continued to cling desperately to
in order to ensure the confidentiality of these sensitive files. We
the explanation of blaming the Secret Service, even though it, too,
learned that this function was never handed over to political
was debunked in the committee hearing with the Secret Service. In
operatives, or detailees from outside agencies, and certainly not to
the final analysis, the White House must take full responsibility for
teen and college age interns lacking security clearances, such as oc-
this fiasco and stop trying to lay blame elsewhere.
curred in the Clinton White House. 23
It is unconscionable that the White House shifted the blame from
We further learned that for the past 30 years, the White House
its own incompetent appointees to those of the U.S. Secret Service.
has engaged in a careful process of performing background checks
The White House mounted a stealth campaign consisting mainly of
and granting or rejecting security clearances on individuals to de-
background statements attributed to unidentified sources, to blame
termine their suitability and stability for working at the White
the Secret Service. The Secret Service initially refrained from de-
House and throughout the executive branch. The clearance and
fending itself, following its tradition of not making public state-
background processes exist to protect the President as well as the
ments about White House matters. Eventually, Secret Service wit-
national security. The case of convicted spy Aldrich Ames is a pain-
nesses were summoned before the committee to explain the charges
ful reminder of the kind of problem that can arise when vigilance
leveled against them. Their testimony, and their extensive audit of
in national security matters is lacking. Given the necessity of
the White House's systems, showed that no single "faulty" Secret
sound procedures to guard against breaches of security, those who
Service list could provide justification for how Anthony Marceca ob-
oversee security procedures themselves must be carefully selected
tained hundreds of FBI background files of former Reagan and
and always above reproach.
Bush officials.
Nancy Gemmell, former staff assistant in the Security Office
The only list from which Marceca could have obtained all of the
since 1981, testified that at the beginning of the Clinton adminis-
names released by the White House to date, is a master E-Pass
tration Livingstone had numerous teenage interns working inside
list, which lists all "A," active and "I," inactive passholders for ap-
the security office and even in the vault. The interns did not have
proximately the past 8 years. Mr. Marceca testified that he thought
background investigations, security clearances, or proper super-
the "I" next to the name on the list indicated an individual was an
vision. They had access to all confidential FBI background files and
intern. 21 Mr. Marceca would have had to deliberately order the
a photocopier machine stood nearby.
files of people identified as "inactive" in order to have utilized this
It is clear that supervision and accountability are imperative to
list. Mr. Marceca would have us believe that he ordered the FBI
such a sensitive process. As Washington Post editorial chief Meg
background files of such notable figures as Ken Duberstein, A.B.
Greenfield pointed out, "[E]ven if the accident rationale holds up,
it was a plenty serious and inexcusable accident. Neither that ma-
"See June 10, 1996 Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne, letter to Chairman
terial nor that responsibility should ever have been placed in those
Clinger, p. 1.
hands.
24
Neil E. Lewis, White House Says Request for F.B.I. Files Was Wider, New York Times, June
It is troubling, both to the Congress and the public, to think the
8, 1996.
"John F. Harris, White House Admits Having Background Files, Washington Post, June 8,
President could allow such inappropriate staff to oversee security
1996. 20 Mr. Marceca stated in his sworn deposition that he met Craig Livingstone earlier that day
matters in such a careless fashion A brief review of the Clinton ad-
at a local flea market and they went to Craig Livingstone's house nearby. After Mr. Livingstone
telephoned his lawyer, they both went to his lawyer's offices where Mr. Marceca was questioned
22 Security of the FBI Files: Hearing before House Committee on Government Reform and Over-
and delivered a sworn statement. Marceca deposition, 114.3
sight, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 19, 1996.
We do not know why Mr. Marceca's attorney was not present or when his attorney received
23/d.
the copy of the sworn statement that was handed to the White House the following day
24 Meg Greenfield, The White House Wants, Washington Post, June 24, 1996.
21 Marceca deposition, p. 152.
11
10
ministration's history of handling security issues shows other evi-
"team player" while keeping bankers' hours. Numerous ques-
tions still remain about who brought Craig Livingstone into the
dence of irresponsibility.
Clinton inner circle as security chief. The committee has yet to
In March 1994 the problems and delays in obtaining White
piece together a clear picture of who is responsible for Livingstone
House passes and security clearances came to light, when congres-
working in the White House after the inauguration. Given the in-
sional inquiries delved into why hundreds of White House staffers
formation available, did former White House Counsels Bernard
did not yet have background investigations completed. Associate
Nussbaum, Lloyd Cutler, Abner Mikva and present Counsel to the
Counsel William Kennedy was assigned responsibility for oversee-
President Jack Quinn really believe that the political advance man
ing security matters, including the issuance of passes and security
and ex-bouncer was the best individual for this sensitive position?
clearances. Kennedy was subsequently relieved of his responsibil-
Mr. Nussbaum testified before this committee that he does not
ities in this area; yet Livingstone, who was directly in charge of
know who hired Livingstone. Instead, he suggested that the Chief
managing security, was not.
of Staff's office may have been involved. 29 Mr. Livingstone's super-
Later, in August 1994, Senator Dennis DeConcini, then Demo-
visor, Rose law firm partner William Kennedy, said in all commit-
cratic chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service,
tee depositions, as well as hearings, that he could shed little light
and General Government of the Committee on Appropriations,
on who brought Livingstone into the White House. Mr. Livingstone
which provides funding for the White House, concluded an inves-
testified to the committee he does not know who recommended
tigation of reported problems in Livingstone's office. Chairman
him. He gave an arguably tortured explanation of his journey into
DeConcini wrote to the President 25 suggesting specific changes
the White House as a permanent employee. Those who previously
that were sorely needed in the Personnel Security office. Those
heaped high praise on Livingstone, such as the President's senior
changes included replacing Livingstone with a career professional
advisor George Stephanopoulos, virtually denied knowing him to
who had a security background. Chairman DeConcini's rec-
the press. President and Mrs. Clinton's denials of hiring, or partici-
ommendations were considered but not implemented by the White
pating in the hiring of Craig Livingstone is in direct conflict with
House, and for some reason, Livingstone remained in charge. 26
statements from their own senior staff to career FBI agents.
It is clear that security procedures are only as effective as the
Both Livingstone and Marceca had extensive histories as cam-
professionals who manage them. Following the committee's first
paign advance men and political operatives. Marceca was hand-
hearing, two points became evident. First, there were serious secu-
picked by Livingstone for his White House detail through his per-
rity problems at the Clinton White House; second, those respon-
sonal request for Marceca to then-Associate Counsel Kennedy.
sible for White House security under the Clinton administration
Sworn testimony by Dennis Casey, a former Gary Hart campaign
were hardly professional and were a stark departure from past ad-
consultant who worked with Livingstone and Marceca on the cam-
ministrations.
paign in 1984, shed some light on their possible motives for gather-
9. Livingstone and Marceca
ing information on Republican officials and fired Travel Office
workers. Casey testified that both Livingstone and Marceca in the
Among the foremost questions the committee sought to inves-
past had endorsed the utilization of personal information to manip-
tigate regarding how and why the White House obtained these FBI
ulate support for their political candidate.
background files, was, "Who is Craig Livingstone?" "Who rec-
Documents show that Livingstone worked in "counter-events op-
ommended him?" "Who hired him?" and given his background,
erations" during the 1992 Clinton-Gore campaign, and deployed
"Why was he put in charge of such a sensitive job at the White
partisan "tricks" to disrupt Former President Bush's campaign for
House?" These are seemingly simple questions; but complete an-
re-election 30 Livingstone's police record shows a report filed
swers to them are still not forthcoming.
against him during his tenure in the White House where he was
Livingstone did not have the professional background necessary
alleged to have physically threatened a female neighbor. Annoyed
to perform the sensitive functions of the Personnel Security Office.
at her barking dog, Livingstone threatened to "beat her face in."³¹
Yet he was put in charge of that office, and then managed to re-
The Officer who questioned Livingstone reported that he admitted
main in that role despite the frequent turnover of White House
to making the threat. Mr. Marceca has had his own brushes with
Counsels. Conventional wisdom would suggest that management
the law in previous jobs in Texas and Pennsylvania.
turnovers bring staff reorganizations. Instead, over a 3-year period,
In the committee's second hearing, we learned that Marceca left
he enjoyed a 40 percent salary increase by touting his record as a
the White House compound with computer disks, which included
details of the confidential files of National Security Council staffers
25 Letter from Chairman DeConcini to President Clinton, August 11, 1994.
26 Hearing testimony also illuminated other complaints against Livingstone during his tenure
27 See letter from Livingstone to then-Counsel to the President Abner Mikva, "It would be
at the White House. Specifically, Livingstone was reprimanded by Evelyn Lieberman, Assistant
wrong not to approve my request I apologize for my tone, but this is my last try to remain
to the Chief of Staff for the First Lady, for discussing the details of a background investigation
part of the team." August 28, 1995, White House document, CGE 48058.
with a young female staffer. It.is not clear why the First Lady's staff was in the chain of com-
28 White House documents, CGE 47858-47860. Times of Livingstone's entry and exit White
mand to reprimand Craig Livingstone, who reported to the Counsel's Office. Livingstone also
House complex.
had a police report filed against him in November 1993, when he threatened a female neighbor
29 Committee deposition of Bernard Nussbaum, July 11, 1996, p. 21.
because her dog was barking. Livingstone reportedly said he would "beat her face in" if she did
30 Resume of David Craig Livingstone, White House document DGE 46320-46234.
not quiet her dog. Livingstone admitted to the police officer that he did make the threat. Secu-
31 Montgomery County, MD Department of Police, Event Report, Report of Simple Assault,
rity of the FBI Files: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th
November 7, 1993.
Cong., 2d Sess., June 26, 1996.
12
13
and other White House employees.³ Documents produced by
against self incrimination. Livingstone was kept on in his position
Marceca also indicated that his duties in the White House encom-
as director even after the files matter was uncovered, and was not
passed more than just filling out forms. Marceca's memoranda to
placed on administrative leave until he personally made the re-
Livingstone included analyses of the backgrounds of individuals
quest on June 17, 1996.37 Mr. Livingstone resigned at a hearing
who could not pass muster on security issues. 33 Mr. Marceca ap-
before this committee on June 26, 1996.38
peared to be providing legal advice to facilitate the "cleansing" of
background problems. Although Marceca's detail at the White
10. Secret Service hearings
House was not renewed after his background investigation exposed
The Secret Service provided numerous briefings to members of
some problems, he continued frequent entry both as a volunteer
House and Senate committees and testified at two hearings on this
and as a visitor with access until June 1996. Documents produced
matter. At the Government Reform and Oversight hearing, it was
by the White House suggest that Marceca played a larger role in
finally resolved that no possible conglomeration of Secret Service
White House security matters than the Clinton administration has
lists could have documented what is now believed to be more than
admitted to the public.
400 individuals as active passholders.
Further, in late 1993 and 1994, Livingstone was attempting to
Whatever the reason for the White House's assorted and conflict-
obtain a Presidential appointment for Marceca, either as an Inspec-
ing explanations, it became clear that the Secret Service was not
tor General or a U.S. Marshal. Even after Marceca's background
at fault as evidenced by Livingstone's own statement to Special
investigation, completed in December 1993, exposed suitability
Agent Cole on June 7, 1996 when he said, "We just wanted you
problems, attempts to employ Marceca continued. When that en-
guys to know that we weren't blaming the Secret Service. Using an
deavor failed, Livingstone again tried to detail Marceca to the Per-
old list was our fault, and we had the current stuff you guys gave
sonnel Security office, contrary to Associate Counsel Kennedy's tes-
us. I don't know what happened." 39
timony that he thought Marceca should just "go back to where he
The Secret Service spent an extraordinary amount of time and
was." 34 Strangely, on March 17, 1994, it appears Livingstone with-
resources carefully reviewing the quality of the information it pro-
drew his request to Secretary of Defense Perry for Marceca's de-
vided to the White House. Countless hours were dedicated to exam-
tail. 35
ining if any material it provided to the White House could have
However, that was not the end of Marceca's work for the White
been responsible for the hundreds of improperly requested FBI
House. Phone messages Marceca left for Livingstone and other doc-
uments show that Marceca was employed by the White House on
background files. In the end, the Secret Service could not identify
any systemic problems which would explain how this happened.
a number of advance trips for President Clinton and other officials.
One message from Marceca stated that he had just returned from
11. FBI internal investigation and report
a trip with Secretary Perry, and wanted to talk to Livingstone
Director Freeh issued a June 5, 1996 press release denying that
about what he had observed. Another message asked if Livingstone
he had any prior knowledge of the White House's request for Billy
wanted to "be an agent working for Tony." 36 Why were individuals
with questionable backgrounds travelling with the President? Was
Dale's file and announcing that he had tasked the FBI general
counsel, Howard Shapiro to conduct an investigation into the mat-
Marceca asked to make observations of his trip with Secretary
ter and report his findings to Independent Counsel Kenneth W.
Perry? What information was he sharing with Livingstone? Such
Starr, who had become involved on June 6, 1996, because of links
documents raise serious questions about the White House's discre-
to his Travel Office investigation.40
tion in employing individuals with highly questionable backgrounds
Director Freeh explained that any contacts between the White
for important security positions.
House and the FBI were governed by the Justice Department's
In addition to the dubious backgrounds of Livingstone and
July 3, 1993, post-Travel Office firing policies 41 and the Attorney
Marceca, their various sworn statements about the requisitioning
General's November 15, 1994 policy regarding White House con-
of the files appear inconsistent both within and between their own
tacts. Director Freeh assured the public that these policies "are ad-
statements. Additionally, their statements conflict with sworn testi-
hered to scrupulously." 42
mony provided by the FBI, the Secret Service and a former veteran
An official at FBI headquarters informed the press that Director
employee of the Security Office, Nancy Gemmell. Furthermore,
Freeh intended "to make sure that the public's perception is that
since Marceca's appearance at the committee hearing on June 26,
there's not some cozy relationship between the White House and
1996, he has refused to provide further testimony to the House of
Representatives or the Senate, pleading his fifth amendment right
37 See June 20, 1996 letter from Jack Quinn to Chairman Clinger, p. 2.
38 Security of FBI Background Files hearings, June 26, 1996.
32 Security of the FBI Files: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform and Over-
39 Cole deposition, p. 37.
sight. 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 26, 1996.
40 Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary
23 Memorandum from Marceca to Livingstone, undated, Marceca document Bates Stamp No.
investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §593 (c)(1) for the expansion
117.
of the jurisdiction of an Independent Counsel.
34 Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41.
41 Memorandum to John Collingwood, Inspector in Charge, Office of Public and Congressional
35 Letter from Livingstone to Secretary Perry, March 17, 1994, White House document CGE
Affairs, FBI, from Carl Stern, Director of Public Affairs; subject: contact with the White House
55749.
and other executive branch agencies; June 13, 1993.
36 White House document DBI 54256.
42 June 5, 1996 Justice Department FBI immediate re
14
15
13. Improper contacts with the FBI
bureau executives." Another FBI agent added that Director Freeh
"certainly doesn't want the bureau mixed up in this stuff." 43
The committee's investigation continued. Among the many ques-
On June 13, 1996, the FBI revealed that an additional 71 files
tions, which the committee sought to answer, was the hiring of
of prior Republican administration officials had been requested by
Craig Livingstone. Thus, at the request of FBI Director Freeh,
and delivered to the White House by the FBI.
Chairman Clinger, on July 18, 1996, went to Bureau Headquarters
On June 14, 1996, the FBI issued its "Report on the Dissemina-
to review Livingstone's FBI background file. Contained in the file
tion of FBI File Information to the White House," revealing that
was a 1993 agent interview of Bernard Nussbaum wherein Nuss-
408 files were sought by and delivered to the White House "without
baum is recorded as telling Agent Sculimbrene that Craig Living-
justification." Director Freeh noted that "the prior system of provid-
stone had come "highly recommended by Hillary Clinton." The
ing files to the White House relied on good faith and honor" of
statement is in direct conflict with sworn statements made by
White House employees and that "unfortunately, the FBI and I
Nussbaum in a June 26, 1996 committee hearing. In the hearing,
were victimized." Director Freeh noted, "Among the unquestionably
Nussbaum stated that he did not know who brought Livingstone
unjustified acquisitions were reports relating to discharged Travel
into the White House for the position in the security office. He also
Office employees Billy Ray Dale and Barnaby Brasseux." Director
stated that he never spoke to the First Lady about Livingstone.
Freeh also acknowledged that these were "egregious violations of
Prior to the chairman's review of Livingstone's FBI background
privacy." Director Freeh promised the American people that "it will
file, FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro provided the White
House with a "heads up" about the highly pertinent information re-
not happen again on my watch."
lated to Mrs. Clinton's involvement in recommending Livingstone.
As FBI Director Freeh stated in his report, the process has al-
The committee is greatly troubled by the fact that Shapiro provided
ways relied on the "good faith and honor" of those involved.
advance notice of this information to the White House. The FBI
There are inherent risks involved when, instead of "good faith and
has yet to identify any legitimate purpose in Shapiro's actions. The
honor," political operatives, and inexperienced teenagers are put in
FBI failed to contact the Independent Counsel, which had clear ju-
charge of this highly sensitive process.
risdiction over this matter. Mr. Shapiro's specious argument is that
12. Attorney General Reno refers FBI files investigation to Judge
"the Bureau had a responsibility to advise affected parties." 49 Mr.
Starr
Shapiro ignored the Attorney General's admonition that any FBI
involvement would create a "political conflict of interest." Mr. Sha-
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr announced on June 18,
piro's actions potentially damaged both the committee's and the
1996, that he did not believe his office had authority to pursue the
Independent Counsel's investigations, while exacerbating the al-
investigation of the files matter without a request from the Attor-
ready growing perception of politicization of the FBI.
ney General to expand the scope of his authority. In response, At-
Subsequent to the revelation of the Nussbaum interview, Shapiro
torney General Reno announced that day that FBI Director Freeh
dispatched two senior FBI supervisory agents to now-retired Agent
would be asked to conduct a thorough investigation into the mat-
Dennis Sculimbrene's home to formally interview him about the
ter. Following this announcement, the White House wrote to Chair-
Nussbaum statement. Agent Sculimbrene got the impression that
man Clinger promising to provide full cooperation with the FBI's
the White House was unhappy about his interview report on Ber-
investigation and announcing changes being instituted in the
nie Nussbaum. The sending of agents to Sculimbrene's home in-
White House concerning its procedures to obtain and review FBI
volved Shapiro in an operational matter, which is inappropriate for
background investigation files.⁴ Subsequently, on June 20, 1996,
the general counsel.
Attorney General Reno filed a motion with the District of Columbia
Further conflicts uncovered in Shapiro's testimony before this
Federal Circuit Court requesting an expansion of Judge Starr's in-
committee include his hand delivery of former FBI agent Gary
vestigative authority so that he could pursue this improper use of
Aldrich's book, "Unlimited Access," to White House Counsel Jack
FBI background files. The order was signed on June 21, 1996.47
Quinn in February 1996.50 The book was in pre-publication form
and in the possession of the FBI solely for its review. Shapiro testi-
fied that in giving a copy to the White House he was notifying
43 Wesley Pruden, The Limited Hangout at the White House, Washington Times, June 7, 1996,
them of possible security risks posed by information revealed in the
p. A4.
book. However, the White House has yet to produce a complete re-
Report of the FBI general counsel on the dissemination of FBI file information to the White
sponse to the committee on this matter.
House, June 14, 1996.
Id.
Shapiro's frequent contacts with the White House is evidenced by
"FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro stated that he did meet with Independent Counsel
the fact that he is the first FBI general counsel in over a decade
Starr's "office-during this short period where he had authority to investigate this matter. Al-
to have a permanent White House pass, as well as his assistance
though Mr. Shapiro did not provide the details of this briefing, the Independent Counsel pro-
vided highly confidential background information to Mr. Shapiro on the status of its investiga-
to White House Counsel Quinn in drafting a letter to Director
tion at that time. It is unclear whether Mr. Shapiro in turn relayed this information to the
White House as an "interested party" or to the Justice Department.
48 Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, P. 57.
Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary
49 Letter from FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 19, 1996.
investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $593 (c)(1) for the expansion
50 Security of FBI Files hearing, August 1, 1996, P. 33.
of the jurisdiction of an Independent Counsel.
17
16
White House Office of Personnel Security staff failed to prop-
Freeh. Incredibly, Shapiro offered his advice on the letter, which
erly secure confidential FBI law enforcement files. The commit-
attacked both the FBI and Chairman Clinger.
tee was provided with testimony and evidence that staff and
In light of Attorney General Reno's determination that the FBI
interns without the necessary clearances had unfettered access
and the Justice Department refrain from investigating anything re-
to the highly sensitive material in the FBI background files in-
lated to the White House's acquisition of FBI background files, the
cluding that of more than 400 former Bush and Reagan admin-
committee finds Shapiro's interference in the matter clearly and to-
istration officials.
tally inappropriate. Mr. Shapiro's contacts with the White House
The FBI continued to involve itself in the investigation of the
appear to be in direct conflict with his position as general counsel
FBI files matter after receiving notice from the Attorney Gen-
of the FBI and suggest a far too cozy relationship between the
eral that a conflict of interest existed between the FBI and the
White House and the FBI.
White House concerning this matter. Mr. Shapiro notified the
C. FINDINGS
White House about the incriminating contents of Livingstone's
background file before the committee was allowed to review it.
The committee, while investigating the matter of the security of
Shapiro assisted with correspondence between the White
FBI background files has made the following findings:
House and the FBI regarding the FBI files matter and the in-
FBI Background files often include the most sensitive and
vestigation by the Committee on Government Reform and
confidential personal and financial information about the indi-
Oversight.
vidual being reviewed.
Army Detailee Anthony Marceca was given unfettered access
The White House improperly requested hundreds of con-
to confidential FBI law enforcement files and allowed to re-
fidential FBI background files seemingly without any justifica-
move confidential information from the White House, despite
tion. This was a violation of the constitutional rights and pri-
his own inability to receive White House clearance. Marceca's
vate lives of many upstanding citizens, whose files were
removal of information in those files from the White House
requisitioned and reviewed by White House employees. Many
was inappropriate.
of the individuals were political appointees of the Reagan and
FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro provided the White
Bush administrations. This leads to the possibility that the
House Counsel a pre-publication copy of Gary Aldrich's book,
Clinton administration was attempting to prepare a political
thus allowing distribution of the book to the President's politi-
"hit list" or "enemies list" with the most sensitive and private
cal damage control operation. Mr. Shapiro improperly allowed
information possible.
the White House access to a manuscript provided to the FBI
The White House Office of Personnel Security and the FBI
under an employment agreement with a former agent without
maintained a system of mutual convenience which allowed low
any valid basis for doing so.
level staff to access any file without question by the FBI. The
The White House withheld from Congress responsive subpoe-
Clinton administration has, on a number of occasions, failed to
naed documents that further implicated individuals under
implement safeguards that would have prevented this lapse in
criminal investigation. The White House began the release of
security. Further, the longstanding policy of the FBI, which re-
disputed documents only under threat of contempt.
lied on the honor of White house employees, was exploited by
The White House asserted executive privilege over docu-
Clinton administration employees.
ments that had no nexus to the President or his need to com-
FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro provided confidential
municate with his staff concerning issues involving the Presi-
FBI law enforcement information about Mrs. Clinton's role in
dency or national security. Many of the documents received by
bringing Livingstone to the White House. When Shapiro real-
the committee, over which the President made an executive
ized that the information contained in Livingstone's FBI back-
privilege claim, contained routine administrative information
ground file could damage Nussbaum and Mrs. Clinton, he im-
or communications on issues having no bearing on issues of na-
mediately contacted the Office of White House Counsel and
tional security.
read verbatim the incriminating contents of Livingstone's file.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Once White House Counsel Jane Sherburne learned that the
information contained in Livingstone's file could damage Nuss-
The committee has undertaken a preliminary investigation into
baum and Mrs. Clinton, Sherburne contacted Mrs. Clinton re-
the improper release of FBI background files to the White House.
garding the incriminating information.
This interim report is the result of that investigation. Hearings,
Sherburne possibly violated ethical standards by informing
depositions, and document review have produced additional ques-
private attorneys for Bernard Nussbaum and Craig Living-
tions still under review. The committee is not satisfied that the
stone about confidential FBI law enforcement information. On
public has the answers to many of these concerns. It would there-
the day before reports of his testimony before a grand jury,
fore be imprudent to make recommendations on a set of incomplete
lawyers for Nussbaum were told about evidence uncovered in
facts. The only exception concerns Mr. Shapiro's activities. Even
a search of Livingstone's file that contradicted Nussbaum's tes-
though a complete review of Shapiro's activities has not been com-
timony before the Committee on Government Reform and
pleted, it is clear from the evidence available to the committee that
Oversight. Mr. Livingstone received the same information.
18
19
Shapiro's actions were grossly inappropriate and that he should,
House Counsel or his deputy. 53 This position was described by a
therefore, resign.
former White House Counsel as "a largely thankless job, requiring
This committee owes it to the individuals whose files were im-
long hours, superb organizational skills, attention to detail, and
properly obtained by the White House to continue a thorough in-
total discretion.
vestigation of these circumstances to find out what happened to
Beginning in 1972, during the Nixon administration, Jane
their most private information.
Dannenhauer was appointed as the Assistant to the Counsel to the
The committee suggests a broad scope for the subsequent stages
President with the responsibility of directing the White House Se-
of this important investigation. It, therefore, puts forward a set of
curity Office. 55 Ms. Dannenhauer served in her capacity as Assist-
questions for the further consideration of the committee.
ant to the Counsel during the Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush ad-
1. Who hired Craig Livingstone?
ministrations, as well as the first 2½ months of the Carter admin-
2. What list was used to make up the White House requests for
istration. 56 Ms. Dannenhauer reported directly to either the White
FBI background files?
3. Who reviewed the contents of FBI background files for Reagan
House Counsel or Deputy White House Counsel, and was the only
person in the Security Office authorized to review the FBI back-
and Bush administration officials?
ground files. 57
4. Were the contents of the FBI background files ever transmit-
ted electronically to any computer database in or outside the White
Previous White House Counsels testified to this committee that
House complex?
in each administration in which they served, the background inves-
5. What effect do new procedures have on the White House pass
tigation process was limited to a very small number of high level
process and FBI background checks?
individuals. Those individuals included the White House Counsel to
7. What standard procedures are in place to ensure that those
the President, the Deputy White House Counsel and the Assistant
without the proper clearances do not have access to material pro-
to the Counsel for Security. In a small number of instances, aspects
tected by the Privacy Act, which are stored in the White House?
of a particular FBI background report would have been discussed
8. What policies should be implemented to ensure that FBI offi-
with a senior-level staff member on a need to know basis, without
cials do not interfere with ongoing investigations outside the Bu-
sharing the file. 58 "Background files were never shown to others in
reau's jurisdiction?
the White House, including the President, the Vice President, the
chief of staff or the director of presidential personnel," according to
II. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY
Richard A. Hauser, Deputy Counsel to President Reagan. 59
A. HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY
1. White House Security Office practice and procedures
The White House conducts some level of background check on
When a new administration takes office it must complete back-
every individual requesting access to the complex and on every in-
ground investigations on all new appointees and employees with
dividual who is being considered for a Presidential appointment.
White House access. In the past, a new administration began the
There are several ways in which this background check can be con-
process during the transition. It is important to complete this proc-
ducted, ranging from a name check to a full field background inves-
ess in a timely manner to insure the security of both the President
tigation. Historically, the White House Counsel has been respon-
and vast amount of sensitive national security information con-
sible for reviewing the FBI background reports of individuals for
tained within the White House. This process began with what is
suitability purposes. To assist the Counsel in processing the back-
called a "name check.' 60 To complete a name check an individual's
ground reviews, the Johnson administration created the White
name and Social Security number are sent to the FBI where it is
House Security Office. 51 The head of the office, holding the title of
Assistant to the White House Counsel for Security, reported di-
checked against various databases to see if there was any recent
rectly to the White House Counsel or Deputy White House Coun-
potentially illegal activity in the public record.6¹
sel.⁵²
When the FBI receives the name check request, it disseminates
From its origination up to the Clinton administration, the White
the request to several internal units. These units check four dif-
ferent computer databases and the FBI central indices. The
House Security Office was responsible for coordinating paperwork
to ensure that all of the forms that appointees were required to
databases provide information on criminal histories, arrest records,
complete before an FBI background investigation could be initiated
outstanding warrants, as well as information on organized crime,
were in order. In addition, the office organized and maintained the
background files and reports which were sent to the White House
53 Id.
54 Id.
from the FBI. The Director of the Security Office was responsible
56 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 38.
for the initial review of the FBI background reports for any infor-
56 Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 38.
mation which should be brought to the attention of the White
67 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to President George Bush, pp. 11-
12.
58 Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, PP. 23-26.
51 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, Counsel to President George Bush, p. 2, in
50 Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 26.
60 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 3.
committee files.
61 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, P. 20.
52 Id.
20
21
terrorism, and foreign counterintelligence. 62 In addition, a name
already been cleared for access by a previous administration. 70 And
check request requires the FBI to look to see whether a "copy of
second, by the time the paperwork had been processed on the new
a previous report" is on file for the individual. An FBI research an-
alyst then reviews the summary memoranda contained in an indi-
employees, the list of White House employees would be more cur-
vidual's file to determine which reports to forward to the White
rent. It was necessary to obtain the FBI reports in order to update
House. 63 All of the information is then sent to the White House.
the background investigations of the holdover employees, who,
In previous administrations, once an individual was cleared
along with all other White House pass holders, needed an update
through the name check process, he was eligible for temporary ac-
of their background investigation every 4 years. 71 Every new ad-
cess to the White House pending a full field FBI background inves-
ministration begins with the same information and every new ad-
tigation.
64
ministration has had to recreate the files of the permanent White
Any individual seeking repeated or permanent access to the
House employees.
White House and all Presidential appointees were required to go
The procedure which each previous administration 72 followed to
through a full field background investigation.6 The FBI full field
update its background files essentially consisted of four steps:
background investigations were necessary in order to review the
(1) the Security Office would obtain from the Secret Service
background of individuals at the White House for security reasons
and verify a current list of pass holders with access to the
and also for the President to make a suitability determination.
White House complex;
To begin this process, the individual is required to fill out a
(2) the office would request from the FBI copies of the pre-
"Standard Form 86," (SF-86) which provides personal data on the
vious background reports concerning those on the list;
individual and authorizes the FBI to conduct the background inves-
(3) the head of the office would review the prior reports to
tigation. As with the FBI background investigations, previous ad-
ascertain the date of the last background check, and to bring
ministrations only permitted the Director of the Security Office, the
any derogatory information to the attention of the White House
White House Counsel and Deputy White House Counsel to review
counsel; and
the SF-86's.66 In previous administrations, the bulk of the back-
(4) the Security Office would send a new SF-86 to be com-
ground investigations should normally be processed and reviewed
pleted by employees as they came due for an update investiga-
during the first 6 months of the administration.
tion.73
2. Updating the background files
Although the Security Office would rely on the Secret Service lists
for current and accurate information in its lists of individuals that
When an administration leaves the White House it is required to
still had access to the White House, it was normal practice to cross
archive all of its papers pursuant to the Presidential Records Act. 68
reference and double check the lists. 74 It is solely the responsibility
Among the records required by this act to be archived are the FBI
of the White House Security Office to inform the Secret Service
background files of all of the administration's appointees and em-
that an individual should be taken off the access lists and listed
ployees. These FBI files are archived and placed under seal in the
as "inactive" to ensure that only present employees remain on the
Presidential Library for 20 years. When the incoming administra-
"active" Secret Service lists. 75
tion arrives, it must recreate the files for those "holdover" employ-
In the first year of a new administration, the Security Office
ees who would be continuing their employment at the White
House. The task of recreating the files fell to the White House Se-
would proceed with its updates on an office by office basis to deter-
curity Office.
mine who the holdover employees were that needed to have their
In prior administrations, the Security Office only began the proc-
files recreated. 76 The Security Office would fill out a standard re-
ess of recreating the holdover employees' files after all of the paper-
quest form ordering a copy of the previous FBI report of the hold-
work on the new appointments had been completed. 69 The ration-
over employee. When the previous report was received in the Secu-
ale for requesting these files after all the new employee paperwork
rity Office, the Director of the office would personally review the
had been completed was twofold. First, the holdover employees had
file to determine and make a notation of the date when that the
individual was due for a background investigation update. 77 That
62 Report of the FBI general counsel on the dissemination of FBI file information to the White
individual's name would then be added to the list, organized on a
House, June 14, 1996, p. 19.
monthly basis, of individuals coming due for an update of their FBI
Id., p. 20.
64 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 3.
background report. 78 The Director of the office would also review
65 Id.
66 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 46. (A.B. Culvahouse, Counsel to President
Reagan, testified that out of 12 lawyers in the White House Counsel's Office, only 2 others were
70 Id, p. 6.
authorized to review the forms. The Deputy White House Counsel and a designated Counsel's
71 Prepared written statement of Jane Dannenhauer, p. 1 (in committee files).
Office attorney was authorized to look at judicial forms.)
72 Each administration since the Nixon administration has followed this procedure.
67 Former Counsel to President Bush, C. Boyden Gray stated, "The inevitable backlog that re-
73 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, P. 7.
sults from 80 many investigations being requested at once requires the Security Office staff to
74 Id, p. 8; Security of FBI Background Files June 19, 1996, p. 50.
spend 12-14 hour days just to manage the paper flow." Prepared written statement of C. Boyden
76 Security of FBI Background Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 59.
Gray, p. 4.
76 Prepared written testimony of C. Boyden Gray, p. 8.
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207.
77 Id., P. 9.
68 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 7.
78 Id
22
23
the file for derogatory information, ultimately sending the report
at the time she left, Gemmell assisted in training the new employ-
on to the Deputy White House Counsel for adjudication.79
ees in the procedures of the office.91 She testified that she ex-
Because the Security Office maintained all of the confidential
plained the Secret Service lists to the people working in the office
files on every individual with current access to the White House
and informed them that the initial list received from the Secret
complex, the office was equipped with a separate vault room that
Service had to be updated. Ms. Gemmell testified. that an up-
was attached to the Security Office. All of the files were kept in the
dated list needed to be ordered from the Secret Service once per-
vault which was equipped with cabinets containing 70 rotating
sonnel decisions were made, especially in offices where there would
bins.⁸⁰ The files were stored in the bins alphabetically. The Secu-
be a high turn-over. 93 The Clinton administration kept Gemmell on
rity Office vault could be accessed only by entering and going
until she retired on August 13, 1993.
through the Security Office. The door to the vault had a lock with
B. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION PERSONNEL AND OPERATION OF THE
a combination which only a few authorized individuals were given.
OFFICE
The only other persons with access to the vault were members of
the Office of Records Management.⁸ This Office uses two of the
1. Who hired Craig Livingstone?
four file cabinets in the Security Office vault to store its records.
Craig Livingstone, the new Director of the White House Security
Terry Good, the Director of the Office of Records Management tes-
Office quickly came to the forefront of the investigation of the un-
tified that his office stores materials from the White House office
authorized requests of FBI background files. Although the office
that "ranges from items that are considered confidential through
was supposed to maintain primarily the same functions as in pre-
security classified materials.' 82 During the Clinton administration,
vious administrations, the Clinton administration changed the
Records Management also stored White House Counsel's Office files
name from the White House Security Office to the Office of Person-
on all individuals being considered for appointments throughout
nel Security (OPS) after Livingstone took over in early February
the government. Although the Office of Records Management file
1993. Livingstone remained in this position until he resigned, an-
cabinets have separate locks, Good testified that they are often left
nounced at the committee's June 26, 1996 hearing.
unlocked during the day.8
Mr. Livingstone enjoyed a particularly long tenure, outlasting
3. The transition from the Bush administration to the Clinton ad-
three White House Counsels and numerous supervisors. 94 How-
ever, nobody in the Clinton administration has taken responsibility
ministration
for bringing Craig Livingstone into the White House. Livingstone
Since the end of the Nixon administration, Jane Dannenhauer
himself cannot remember who hired him for the position of Director
briefed the attorneys in each new administration on what the Secu-
of OPS. He explained that he had been around during the cam-
rity office was and what it did. As she had done with past adminis-
paign as an advance man, as well as. assisting at the 1992 Demo-
trations, Dannenhauer met with several of the attorneys from the
cratic National Convention, "coordinating security" for the Demo-
Clinton White House Counsel's Office before she left her position
cratic Finance Committee's VIP operations.95
at the White House in March 1993.⁸ She initially met with four
David Craig Livingstone began his political career in 1984 work-
or five of the attorneys, none of whom would be supervising the Se-
ing as an advance man on the Gary Hart for President and the
curity Office. 86 Dannenhauer then met with Craig Livingstone, who
Mondale/Ferraro campaigns. Mr. Livingstone was responsible for
would ultimately become the new Director of the Security Office.
"organizing large crowd events' according to his resume. 96 Mr. Liv-
Ms. Dannenhauer testified that Livingstone appeared only to work
ingstone testified that he then spent the next few years "work[ing]
there "part-time" while she was there. Mr. Livingstone "would
in a bar and restaurant, work[ing] on small campaigns, Democratic
come in and maybe be there a half a day.' 88 Several weeks after
initiatives." However, his resume states that during this period
the administration took office, Bill Kennedy, the Assistant White
he was an advance man for the Reagan/Gorbachev Summit Meet-
Hou'se Counsel who would be supervising the office, finally met
ing in Geneva, Switzerland where he was responsible for arranging
with Ms. Dannenhauer.89
international press appearances for Presidents Reagan and Gorba-
Ms. Dannenhauer's assistant since 1981, Nancy Gemmell, stayed
chev. He also claims to have secured a 55 minute meeting between
on in the White House Security Office for 7 months into the new
U.S. citizens and the General Secretary.
administration. 90 Although the office still was not entirely staffed
Id, p. 48.
92 Id, p. 50.
Id., p. 10.
Livingstone, June 14, 1996, p. 38.
93 Id., pp. 50-51.
81 Good, June 25, 1996, p. 16.
94 Livingstone remained in the position of Director throughout the tenures of Counsels Bernie
Nussbaum, Lloyd Cutler and Abner Mikva. He also outlasted his supervisors and associate
Id.
counsels William Kennedy, Beth Nolan, and Christopher Cerf.
Id.
96 Livingstone, 3/22/96 dep. p. 14. (See also, the Washington Post, September 9, 1996, PP. A1,
Id, p. 17.
85
Security of FBI Background Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 70.
A12. The Washington Post reported that a friend of Livingstone's stated that Livingstone's job
consisted of posting himself at an escalator in the convention hall and saying "good evening"
Id.
to VIPs who walked by. "Craig said his job was to meet and greet.")
Id.
96 White House document CGE 46232.
68 Id., p. 82.
97 Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996.
Id.
90 Id., p. 48.
24
25
Mr. Livingstone also worked for Senator Timothy E. Wirth. In
the event in the manner that the Clintons would want it done. 106
his resume, he states that he coordinated Senator Wirth's transi-
On his resume, he wrote that the "Mission statement" of his job,
tion from the House of Representatives to the U.S. Senate. Al-
was to "[p]rotect the integrity of the Office of the President." 107 He
though it is absent from his resume, Mr. Livingstone worked for
also stated that he was responsible for securing the PIC computer
the Hollywood Women's Political Committee "doing their Washing-
network against fraud and theft 108 According to theft reports by
ton work. 98
the Federal Protective Service, more than $174,000 worth of the In-
Craig Livingstone's first encounter with Al Gore was in 1988,
augural Committee's computers, VCR's, radios, cellular phones,
when he served as his trip director traveling "daily" with Mr. Gore
pagers and other electronic gear disappeared from the committee
and claims to have produced Mr. Gore's 1988 Presidential an-
headquarters.
nouncement. Mr. Livingstone also failed to mention in his deposi-
After the Inauguration, Livingstone sought to obtain a position
tion or on his resume that he worked on the 1988 Dukakis for
at the Clinton White House. Mr. Livingstone testified that he was
President campaign. 99 Livingstone also worked as the operations
asked to assist with the advance for President Clinton's first Cabi-
director for the Democratic National Committee Convention staff in
net meeting at Camp David. 109 Mr. Livingstone worked on advance
1988 in Atlanta, GA where he coordinated operations for DNC
for the Cabinet meeting from January 25 through 30, 1993. 110
Chairman Paul Kirk. He returned to working at bars and res-
While organizing advance for the Cabinet meeting, Livingstone
taurants during the interim and "coordinated screenings" for the
worked with Christine Varney, President Clinton's new Cabinet
highly controversial movie "The Last Temptation of Christ" in
Secretary. Ms. Varney testified that she knew Livingstone prior to
1988. He also worked at a public relations company where he
the Clinton campaign, "he was generally known as one of the guys
claims that he "prepared clients for legislative appearances." 100
around town who did advance for Democratic party stuff. 111 Ms.
Mr. Livingstone worked for Washington, DC Councilwoman
Varney could not recall whether Livingstone mentioned the job in
the Security Office to her or whether she mentioned it to him. 112
Charlene Drew Jarvis for approximately 1 year before he began his
Ms. Varney did state that although she was unclear on whether
first employment with the Clinton campaign doing advance
she told Livingstone about the position, she believes it unlikely
work. 101 From October 1991 to November 1992, Mr. Livingstone,
that she approached Livingstone about the position because she
according to his resume, was the "Senior Consultant to Counter-
would not have known about it at that time. 113
Event Operations" for Clinton/Gore '92. Mr. Livingstone claims to
According to Associate White House Counsel Cheryl Mills, at the
have "successfully deployed several of the infamous "Pinocchio" and
end of January or beginning of February, Deputy Counsel Vince
"Chicken George" media events. 102 Mr. Livingstone also claims
Foster told Mills that he was planning on speaking with Living-
credit for "Special Operations and Advance" for then-Governor
stone about one of the lower-level administrative positions in the
Clinton's successful primary and general election as well as assist-
Security Office. 114 Mr. Foster also spoke with Varney about the po-
ing in the "creation and execution of mission objectives of the Clin-
sition for Livingstone. He described the work to Varney as, "an ad-
ton for President, Washington, D.C. local headquarters." 103
ministrative paper-pushing kind of job, [for] someone who knew
In between Bill Clinton winning the primary but before the gen-
most of the new Clinton employees, to sit on them to make sure
eral election, Craig Livingstone went to "Africa to work training
they got their paperwork done. 115 Based on Foster's description,
some soldiers, Democratic campaign techniques." 104 After return-
Varney told Foster that Craig Livingstone would be appropriate for
ing from the Angola training grounds, Livingstone worked with the
a position with that level of responsibility. 116
"VIP financial staff" on fundraising projects for President-elect
Mr. Foster and Cheryl Mills eventually interviewed Livingstone
Clinton and Vice-President-elect Gore. By November 1992, Living-
for what Mills described as the "most junior position" in the Secu-
stone was the lead and site lead advance person for the Clinton/
rity Office. 117 She explained the position to Livingstone as adminis-
Gore '92 campaign.
trative, primarily collecting and sending out forms. She also indi-
After the election, Livingstone was the director of security for the
cated to him that whoever was hired to fill Jane Dannenhauer's po-
sition as Assistant to the Counsel, would make the ultimate deci-
Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC). He states that he had "re-
sponsibility for security at inaugural headquarters and all
106 Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, p. 18. (See also, Varney deposition, July 23, 1996
events.' 105 In his deposition, Livingstone explained that his duties
dep., p. 14. Christine Varney, the general counsel of PIC, described Livingstone's position as
as director of security at PIC were to ensure that events were han-
handling the logistics of transportation to and from the Navy Yard, where PIC was located, as
well as handling passes or credentials for PIC employees and volunteers.)
dled with the safety of the attendees in mind as well as producing
108
109 Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, p. 21.
Id
110 White House document CGE 048536.
Livingstone SF-86 form completed 2/16/93 to begin his FBI background investigation.
111 Varney deposition, March 23, 1996, p. 15.
100 White House document CGE 46231.
112 Varney deposition, March 23, 1996, p. 18.
101 Livingstone deposition, p. 12.
113 pp. 18-20. (See Livingstone deposition. Livingstone, however, stated that it was Varney
102 During President Bush's speeches figures dressed up as Pinocchio and as a chicken began
who told him about the position in the Security office.)
to appear in the crowd and heckle President Bush.
114 Deposition of Cheryl Mills, August 2, 1996, p. 15.
103 White House document CGE 46230.
115 Varney deposition, p. 19.
104 Livingstone deposition, p. 13.
116/d.
105/White House document CGE 46230.
117 Mills deposition, p. 16.
26
27
sion on whether to hire Livingstone. 118 According to Ms. Mills, Liv-
ingstone indicated to both Foster and Mills that he viewed the job
someone would soon be appointed. Shortly thereafter, William Ken-
nedy was appointed as Assistant Counsel to the President and took
as a temporary position, as he was interested in a position as Di-
control of oversight of the Security Office. 130
rector of the Military Office. 119 Although many have suggested a
role for Vince Foster in hiring Craig Livingstone, Mr. Livingstone
Former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum recalled yet
failed to recall any contact whatsoever with Mr. Foster when he
another version of the hiring of Craig Livingstone. He stated, "at
testified under oath in his deposition. 120 The Security Office posi-
the time I arrived in the White House on January 20, 1993, or
tion for which Livingstone interviewed with Foster and Mills was
shortly thereafter, Craig Livingstone was acting already in the Of-
relatively low-paying and not as challenging a position as Living-
fice of Personnel Security. That's when Mr. Foster and I
arrived
stone wanted. 121
[h]e was in the White House, I believe, when I got
According to White House records, Livingstone began working in
there." 131 Former Assistant Counsel to the President Kennedy tes-
the Security Office on February 8, 1993. 122 On that date, he wrote
tified that Livingstone was already working in the Security Office.
a memo to Cheryl Mills reviewing the duties and personnel in the
I arrived the first week in February and went on the
Security Office. 123 Mr. Livingstone states in the memo that he "re-
payroll on February the 10th, I believe. When I arrived,
viewed the White House Security Office as requested. 124 He stat-
Craig was acting as Acting Director of the Office of White
ed that Jane Dannenhauer and Nancy Gemmell would be staying
House Personnel Security. I was informed by Mr. Foster
on for a short period of time and reporting to Livingstone. He also
that was the position he was under consideration for. I
explained that he would be meeting with the IRS and FBI for brief-
don't know who told Mr. Foster that or on what basis. 132
ings on their respective roles in the background process. Mr. Liv-
ingstone attached a proposed memo to Jane Dannenhauer to go out
Mr. Livingstone himself stated that he was working in the office
under the name of the Deputy Assistant to the President and Dep-
when Kennedy arrived at the White House. Mr. Livingstone was
uty Counsel directing Dannenhauer to notify her staff that effective
not on payroll at the time, and stated that he still considered him-
February 8, 1993 Craig Livingstone would serve as the Director of
self an "advance person. 133 Mr. Livingstone did not go on the pay-
the White House Security Office with Dannenhauer serving as his
roll for several weeks. According to Kennedy's testimony, Living-
"advisor" until March 1, 1993, "whereupon, it is expected she will
stone had a probationary period while waiting for his FBI back-
submit her resignation. 125
ground investigation to be completed. 134 His FBI background inves-
According to Cheryl Mills' testimony, Livingstone was to be an
tigation was initiated on February 18, 1993 and completed on
assistant in the office and a more senior person was to be hired to
March 13, 1993. 135
replace Jane Dannenhauer. When asked whether she recalls learn-
In the course of Livingstone's background investigation FBI
ing that Livingstone had become the Director of the office, she tes-
Agent Dennis Sculimbrene conducted interviews on March 1-3,
tified: "I actually don't ever recall learning that fact, but I am sure
1993, of Livingstone's supervisors at the White House, including
there became a point in time later on in the year when it must just
Bernard Nussbaum and Bill Kennedy. Agent Sculimbrene took con-
have been self-evident. But I don't recall learning that fact.' 126 In
temporaneous notes of the meeting where Nussbaum mentioned
contrast, the February 8, 1993 memo, with her handwritten notes
that although he had only known Livingstone for the period of time
in the margin, clearly and explicitly shows that Livingstone himself
since he had been employed in the new Clinton administration, he
informed her that he was the Director of the Security Office. Asso-
understood that Craig Livingstone "had come highly recommended
ciate Counsel William Kennedy, who eventually was assigned the
to him by HILLARY CLINTON." 136 Mr. Nussbaum added that
responsibility of oversight of the Security office, was not hired until
Mrs. Clinton "has known his mother for a longer period of time."
February 10, 1993, 2 days after the memo was written. 127
Mr. Kennedy told Agent Sculimbrene that "he did not hire" Craig
Livingstone testified in his first committee deposition that Chris-
Livingstone and was aware that Livingstone "may not stay in his
tine Varney introduced him to people in the Counsel's Office, one
current position." 137
of whom was Cheryl Mills. 128 Mr. Livingstone stated that he had
Another FBI agent who was assigned to the White House, Gary
a brief discussion with Mills about the position in the Security Of-
Aldrich, recalled a conversation with Assistant Counsel and Rose
fice, which she described as largely administrative. 129 Ms. Mills ex-
Law Firm partner Bill Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy asked the agent
plained to him that she would not be overseeing the office, however
what type of person should be in the position of Director of the Se-
curity Office. Agent Aldrich answered that it should be "somebody
118/d.
119/d.
130
120 Livingstone, 3/22/95 dep., pp. 22-23.
131 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, P. 56.
121 Mills deposition, p. 16.
132/d., pp. 58-59.
122 White House documents CGE 053841, 046220.
p. 170.
123 White House document, CGE 48606.
134 Id., p. 172.
124 White House document CGE 048606-608.
135 Secret Service Documents (unnumbered) (in committee files).
1281d., p. 048608.
136 Nussbaum has denied that he ever made the statement. The interviewing agent, Dennis
Mills deposition, p. 16.
Sculimbrene, does not remember the interview of Mr. Nussbaum, however he stated that his
127 White House document CGE 053841.
usual practice was to transcribe his notes immediately following any interview.
128 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 215.
March 1-3, 1993 interviews with White House supervisors in the course of the FBI back.
12e/d.
ground check on Craig Livingstone.
28
29
squeaky clean, meticulous, careful, discreet, mature, someone with
Livingstone's March 1993 FBI background information was finally
a depth of understanding of security issues." 138 Mr. Kennedy later
given to the Secret Service in the fall of 1993, the Service raised
told Agent Aldrich: "it doesn't matter anyway; it's a done deal. Hil-
concerns with Kennedy about derogatory information in Living-
lary wants him [Livingstone] for that slot." 139 Both Agent
stone's background. 145
Sculimbrene and Aldrich testified that Kennedy told them that he
Secret Service Agent Arnie Cole recalled that he was not aware
had to hire Craig Livingstone.
that Livingstone would be taking over the position until the end of
Mrs. Clinton publicly denied hiring or even knowing who Craig
February 1993. 146 The Secret Service had stressed to the Clinton
Livingstone was until this year. In response to questions by report-
transition team how important the position of Director of the Secu-
ers during her trip in Helsinki on July 10, 1996, Mrs. Clinton said,
"I did not know him. I did not have anything to do with his being
rity Office was in getting all the new people in and making sure
hired, and I do not remember even meeting him until sometime in
everyone had a pass. Mr. Livingstone himself did not have his per-
the last year." In contrast, an intern working in the White House
manent White House pass until November 23, 1993. The FBI for-
Office of Personnel Security informed this committee of an encoun-
warded all of the results of Livingstone's background investigation
ter with Mrs. Clinton that puts her denials of knowing Craig Liv-
to Nussbaum on March 16, 1993 and the file was not forwarded to
ingstone in question.
the Secret Service for adjudication until September 20, 1993. Agent
White House intern, Gina Gibson, said that she was being shown
Cole testified that he raised questions about "derogatory informa-
around the White House when she saw Mrs. Clinton approaching
tion" in Livingstone's background with Kennedy. 147 Agent Cole fur-
from down the hall. Ms. Gibson said that as Mrs. Clinton passed
ther testified that he raised concerns about Livingstone with his
she said "Hello Craig" and kept on walking. 140 Ms. Gibson interned
superior at the Secret Service and "asked Mr. Kennedy if he con-
at the White House from May 1994 through July 1994, well before
curred with my concerns one way or the other, and he did not, and
the time period Mrs. Clinton said she first knew who Craig Living-
ultimately Mr. Livingstone received his White House pass." 148 An-
stone was.
other 2 months passed before Livingstone's permanent pass was fi-
Craig Livingstone participated in numerous other activities with-
nally approved on November 23, 1993.
in the White House where contact with President Clinton and Mrs.
Questions still remain as to how Livingstone was actually hired
Clinton would have been likely. Craig Livingstone was sent to Lit-
as the Director of the White House Security Office. Cheryl Mills
tle Rock, AR, January 1-6, 1994, to handle arrangements for Presi-
states that he was to be an assistant in the office, yet she receives
dent Clinton's mother's funeral. 141 Included in the numerous other
a February 8, 1993 memo where he clearly assumes the role of the
advance trips that Livingstone participated in was the October 22,
Director. Messrs. Kennedy and Nussbaum both state that Living-
1993, Boston trip on which he was on advance for President Clin-
stone was already in the office when they arrived, but neither of
ton, 142 the April 21-25, 1994 advance trip to Boston for President
them questioned his background or qualifications for the position.
Clinton, or when he was the site lead for President Clinton's May-
Mr. Kennedy himself stated in a memo to Counsel to the President
June 1994 European trip. 143 These are just a few of the advance
Bernard Nussbaum that Livingstone probably would not be in the
trips which Livingstone likely would have had contact with the
President or Mrs. Clinton.
position for long, as he was hoping to get the position as Director
In May 1994, Livingstone wrote a memo to David Watkins re-
of the Military Office. 149
questing that he be provided with a cellular telephone since his
Finally, neither Kennedy nor Nussbaum mentioned that Mrs.
"duties now require that [he] be on call during the weekends to as-
Clinton had either recommended Livingstone or directed that he be
sist the President in whatever manner necessary." If President
placed in the "slot" of Director of the Security Office. In fact, both
Clinton did not know Livingstone personally, why did Livingstone
denied that Mrs. Clinton had anything to do with the hiring of
need to be on call for him on weekends? What did Livingstone be-
Craig Livingstone. It remains a mystery how he came to the atten-
lieve his duties entailed in order to "assist" the President?
tion of former Rose Law Firm partner, then Deputy White House
Three days before the White House received Livingstone's back-
Counsel Vince Foster. What we do know is that both the FBI and
ground investigation, Kennedy sent a March 10, 1993 memo to
the Secret Service voiced their concerns about hiring Craig Living-
David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Management and
stone to head the White House Security Office. Despite these con-
Administration, requesting that the effective employment date for
cerns and the fact that Kennedy knew that he did not even want
Livingstone be established as February 8, 1993. 144 When Craig
the position, Livingstone was given absolute control.
138 Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, P. 31.
139 Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 32.
140 Telephonic staff interview of Gina Gibson.
145 Cole, 7/10/96 dep., PP 22-23.
141 White House document, CGE 54412.
14°Id., p. 13. Secret Service Agent Arnie Cole is the supervisor of the White House Access
142 White House document, CGE 54410.
Control Branch and as such, primary point of contact for Livingstone in his capacity as Director
143 White House document, CGE 54387. Mr. Livingstone authored a memo to Tricia Northcutt
of the White House Office of Personnel Security. Mr. Livingstone did not receive his temporary
in preparation for this trip requesting numerous sets of Presidential cufflinks, Presidential hats,
pass until February 26, 1993.
Presidential pins, Presidential key chains, a ladies stick pin, Presidential pens and Presidential
Cole deposition, PP. 21-22.
tie bars before he departed on May 23, 1994 for England.
148 Security of FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, PP. 99-104.
144 White House document CGE 046220.
149 White House document CGE 048543.
30
31
2. Craig Livingstone's quest for the Military Office
He told me that his goal in the White House was to be-
It was no secret that Livingstone wanted the position of Director
come head of the [M]ilitary Office and that he felt that the
of the Military Office. In a February 22, 1993 memo from Bill Ken-
Chief of Staff, Mack McLarty, was not supporting him
nedy to Bernard Nussbaum and Vince Foster, Kennedy addressed
enough in his quest to do that. And he often spoke of argu-
hiring Livingstone as the Director of the Office of Personnel Secu-
ments he said he had with the Chief of Staff and others
rity. Mr. Kennedy wrote:
relative to his seeking this promotion. 164
[Craig Livingstone] is willing to accept the job at a sal-
On May 27, 1994, Livingstone wrote a note to George
ary of $45,000, although reserving the right to look for
Stephanopoulos thanking him for offering to be of assistance in his
something better, such as becoming the Director of White
efforts "to further serve the President as Director of the White
House Military Affairs for which he is apparently being
House Military Office." 165 Mr. Livingstone listed four points which
considered. That position apparently would not open until
he believed should be considered in his quest for the office. The last
sometime in June, 1993, if at all. There is probably a good
of the four points, that "the job, by nature, should have someone
chance this office will lose Mr. Livingstone. 150
with sound political skills-particularly as we approach N.H. [New
After Foster interviewed him for the "junior position" in the Secu-
Hampshire]," is most revealing of Livingstone's lack of understand-
rity Office, Mills told the committee that she asked Foster why Liv-
ing that all jobs in the White House are not political. 166
ingstone would not be appropriate as the Director of the Military
The Military Office is responsible for all of the military oper-
Office. According to Mills, Foster explained why it would be unrea-
ations as they relate to the White House. White House communica-
sonable for Livingstone to be in that position. He told her that it
tions, military aides, and the President's doctor all come under the
was usually a person with a long term history in the military and
supervision of the Military Office. The use of Air Force One, the
a relatively senior retired officer. 151
helicopter as well as any other transportations of the President are
Mr. Livingstone approached numerous people about his desire to
under the control of this office. In essence, every military asset in
become Director of the Military Office. He spoke to Bruce
the White House is run by the White House Military Office, an of-
Lindsey, 152 George Stephanopoulos, 153 Bill Kennedy, 154 Gary Al-
fice for which a man of Craig Livingstone's background was not
drich, Chuck Easley, 155 Harry Thomason, 156 George Saunders, 157
suited.
Arnie Cole, 158 Dennis Sculimbrene, 159 Vince Foster 160 and Cheryl
Mills 161 among others.
3. Livingstone's duties as Director of the White House Office of Per-
Mr. Thomason testified that "for some reason, all the employees
sonnel Security
of the White House thought if they needed to unload things or tell
After Livingstone became the Director of the Security Office, he
things, that they could see me." 162 Although Thomason testified
requested that the name be changed to the Office of Personnel Se-
that he remembered Craig Livingstone met with him, he was un-
curity (OPS). 167 Although the Clinton administration changed the
able to recall the context of his notes of that meeting where he
name of the office, it was supposed to perform essentially the same
wrote: "Control of military office and SS [Secret Service] could very
duties as it had in prior administrations. In a 1994 memo to Jodie
well derail future efforts. 163 FBI Agent Gary Aldrich testified that
Torkelson, Assistant to the President for Management and Admin-
he too had a conversation with Livingstone about the Military Of-
fice position:
istration, Livingstone described his duties as Director of OPS:
process security papers for Presidential appointees and
180 White House document CGE 048543.
White House staff; handle daily contact with the FBI;
151 Mills deposition, August 2, 1996, p. 18.
maintain frequent contact with attorneys on an individ-
162 Deposition of Bruce Lindsey, July 29, 1996, PP. 20-21. (Lindsey was asked whether Living-
B1
ever approached him about the job in the Military Office. Lindsey stated, "Yes. We did
ual case basis;
an event at the Library of Congress during the Inaugural and he, I think, was doing an advance
work with the Secret Service in processing applicants for
on the event, and I was standing outside and he told me that he wanted to be head of the White
House Military Office. I asked whether or not it had to be a service person. He indicated
access and White House passes; sit on numerous commit-
it did not. I don't know if I said anything else.")
tees with the Secret Service;
153 White House document CGE 046222.
154 White House document CGE 048543.
act as a liaison between Secret Service and staff;
155 Deposition of Chuck Easley, July 26, 1996, p. 42. (Easley stated that the first time he met
maintain clearance processes for White House Intern/
him, Livingstone told him that he wanted to be the Director of the Military Office. That occurred
sometime in early February 1994.)
Volunteer programs; initiate memoranda to the attorneys;
Thomason deposition, P. 71.
initiate and maintain Security Interview process for both
157 Saunders, 7/13/96, p. 30. (Livingstone told Saunders that the job he really would like to
staff applicants and intern/volunteers;
have is head of the Military Office.)
158 Cole, 7/10/96, pp. 10-11.
159 Sculimbrene, 7/15/96, P. 53. ("[H]e told me, and as I understood from others, he was look.
164 Aldrich deposition, p. 34.
ing for another job. He told me he wanted to run the Military Office.")
165 White House document CGE 46222.
Ieo See, Mills, supra.
161 Supra note.
The thank-you note produced to this committee had a cover page attached stating "What
should we do with this request?" Below this question is written the word "Nothing" and it is
162 Thomason, 5/17/96, PP. 71-72.
circled. White House document CGE 46221.
163 Bobbie Faye Ferguson document, BFF 1067.
167 White House document CGE 048607.
32
33
act as principal liaison with all government-wide depart-
dent needed from him on weekends. Livingstone was also attempt-
ment/agency security officers in assisting in their clearance
ing to expand his role in White House security and was planning
processes, and;
a "security committee." 178
process compartmentalized clearances for staff. 168
Former White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray made clear that
But in contrast to Jane Dannenhauer, his predecessor, Living-
substantive judgments on the background investigations were re-
stone was involved in more than simply running the Security Of-
served exclusively to the White House Counsel and Deputy Coun-
fice. Although Livingstone described one of his primary duties in
sel. 179 The responsibility for the adjudication was kept at the high-
1993 as reviewing FBI background files, 169 he continued to do ad-
est levels of the Counsel's Office not only to ensure immediate ac-
vance work for President Clinton even after taking over the posi-
cess to the President with any problems, but also to ensure the con-
tion as Director of the Security Office.
fidentiality of the files.
Mr. Livingstone would often participate in Presidential and First
In the Clinton administration, the responsibility was given to an
Lady advance trips, traveling ahead of the President or First Lady
associate counsel, William Kennedy, who in turn passed along the
to set up. and handle logistics. 170 In fact, Livingstone stated, "we
responsibility to Craig Livingstone, who in turn passed it along to
[White House appointees] are asked to do advance from time to
his staff which consisted of interns and young individuals in their
time, and it's something that I have done. I would consider that
first job. 180 The confidentiality of all of the FBI background files
part of my job." 171
was jeopardized once the Counsel to the President, Bernard Nuss-
Mr. Livingstone also told FBI Agent Gary Aldrich that he was
baum, denounced any responsibility for this unpleasant yet nec-
the Clinton administration's liaison to the FBI and spoke often
essary work. The FBI background investigations are conducted for
with the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh. 172 The committee re-
the White House in order to protect the country in connection with
ceived a copy of a letter from FBI Director Louis Freeh to Living-
potential security breaches, as well as to protect the President po-
stone that appears to confirm this fact. In the letter, Director Freeh
litically and physically. Not only did Livingstone shift his respon-
said that "the President and the American people are indeed fortu-
sibility to review background investigations to lower level staff but
nate to have your dedication and service." After thanking Living-
he also was looking for creative ways for Clinton appointees to get
stone and "Stephanie" for their help with Director Freeh's sons, he
around problems in their backgrounds, ignoring the purpose of the
said that "we look forward to seeing both of you soon. Don't forget
to visit us at the FBI." It was signed "Very truly yours, Louie. 173
investigation. Mr. Livingstone's explanations of his duties in the White House
Mr. Livingstone altered the historical duties of the office in other
raise questions as to whether he was authorized to undertake these
ways as well. In a memo to Counsel to the President Abner Mikva
tasks, and if so, by whom. It is clear on more than one occasion
requesting a raise, Livingstone wrote, "I strongly believe that my
that his superiors were aware of what he was doing, as he outlined
level of work reviewing IRS records, adjudicating FBI backgrounds,
these additional duties in his memos to them. Mr. Livingstone's
conducting intake security interviews and developing corrective
predecessor worked long hours in her position as Director of the Se-
plans of action for individuals with problems that can be made
curity Office. She did not have time to do political advance work
right." 174 The memo did not describe what kind of plans of action
or to expand the mandate of her office.
or problems would be involved in this newly developed duty. In ad-
What is important to note is that there was never a backlog of
dition, as individuals left the White House for other positions, they
passes, never any security concerns raised by the Secret Service,
would be "debriefed" by Livingstone as part of his duties. 175
and certainly never any unauthorized requests sent to the FBI dur-
In a September 22, 1993 memo Livingstone requested a perma-
ing the tenures Livingstone's predecessors. There seemed to be lit-
nent radio and cell phone stating, "this request is necessary due to
tle or no supervision of Livingstone and the activities he was pur-
the nature of my duties as Director of White House Security.' 176
suing. The Clinton administration put someone in this sensitive of-
He did not enumerate what those duties were which required him
fice with no experience and who clearly was unsuitable as recog-
to have a' radio and cell phone. As discussed above, the next year,
nized by both the FBI and the Secret Service. Not only did the
in May 1994, he again requested a White House issued cell phone
White House ignore the importance of the suitability issue but
to be "on call" during the weekend "to assist the President in what-
after placing an unsuitable person in this position, the responsible
ever manner necessary. 177 As in the previous memorandum, he
did not describe what his duties were or what assistance the Presi-
White House document CGE 054002 (Letter from Paul Connelly, Chief of Security and
Safety Division of the White House Communications Agency to Craig Livingstone dated May
8, 1994. "I was very happy to hear of your mandate and desire to widen your role in White House
168 White House document CGE 048827-829.
security and am interested in participating on the White House security committee you men-
169 Livingstone, June 14, 1996, p. 4.
tioned.) (Emphasis added.).
170 Livingstone deposition, March 22, 1996, PP. 24-25.
179 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 23.
1711d., p. 26.
180 Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 49. (Livingstone stated: "1 think in the first year
Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 34.
I looked at a lot of the reports, but as we all got trained in our functions and our mission be-
173 White House document CGE 054403.
came clear, we-1 trained my staff to look for certain types of information, and if there wasn't
174 White House document CGE 048059. (Emphasis added) (May 30, 1995 memo from Craig
any of that type information, that I felt confident that they could make a decision if the informa-
Livingstone to Abner J. Mikva, re: Follow-up to pay adjustment request.)
tion was derogatory or not." He then noted that he did not even train the staff, Lisa Wetzl, a
175 Livingstone, March 22, 1996 dep. p. 31.
staff assistant did, "I believe it was 1994 when Ms. Wetzl trained our staff." Ms. Wetzl was only
176 White House document CGE 054067.
22 years old when she began in the office and in a thank you note to Livingstone, she said it
177 White House document CGE 048523.
was the first job she ever held.)
34
35
parties, the White House Counsels, abdicated supervisory respon-
Mikva. The first memorandum, dated May 30, 1995, states, "I have
sibility. It is not surprising then that problems would arise.
done my best to be a good soldier," and requests a salary increase
4. Livingstone's salary requests
to $65,000. 191 The second memorandum, dated August 28, 1995,
takes on a much stronger and almost threatening tone.
Mr. Livingstone was hired as the Director of the Personnel Secu-
rity Office at a salary of $45,000 in February 1993. In a May 10,
It would be wrong not to approve my request. Not just
1993 memo to Associate Counsel to the President Bill Kennedy,
because I was promised but because I have demonstrated
Livingstone requested a salary increase of $5,000.18 On October
that I deserve it. I apologize for my tone but this is my last
20, 1993, Livingstone did receive an increase to $51,000 which was
try to remain part of the team. 192
approved by Bernard Nussbaum. 182
In this second request, his salary demand increased to $70,000.193
Between May and August 1994, three Counsel's Office attorneys
Mr. Livingstone's final request for a raise came on May 14, 1996,
wrote letters on behalf of Livingstone requesting an increase in his
just 5 days after the committee held the White House in contempt
salary. The Assistant to the President for Management and Admin-
for the failure to turn over subpoenaed documents. Among the doc-
istration, David Watkins, wrote a memo to Associate Counsel Beth
uments that had been withheld was the White House request for
Nolan in May 1994 noting that it had come to his attention that
Billy Dale's FBI background file. The Assistant to the President for
she had requested a salary increase for Livingstone. 183 Mr. Wat-
Management and Administration, Jodie Torkelson, wrote a memo
kins explained that a salary freeze was in effect for all salary ad-
requesting information on Livingstone's salary history and any
justment actions. 184 Nevertheless, Nolan's colleague, Associate
notes or paperwork on what he may have been promised. Ms.
Counsel Chris Cerf, wrote a memo to Deputy Chief of Staff Phil
Torkelson states in the memo, "Livingstone's at it again. He's sub-
Lader on July 1, 1994 requesting a raise for Craig Livingstone. 185
mitted paperwork for signature giving himself a raise and saying
Mr. Cerf wrote, "[i]t would be an overwhelming setback if Craig's
that he was promised the money by Abner [Mikva].
I'd like
frustration over his salary contributed to a decision to seek employ-
to kill this before I leave. 194
ment elsewhere. I consider this to be a significant risk that we
Craig Livingstone claimed that two White House Counsels, Ber-
should be doing everything in our power to minimize." 186
nard Nussbaum and Abner Mikva, promised him that he would get
In a third attempt to get Livingstone a raise, both Beth Nolan
a raise to $70,000. He wrote memos directly to Counsel to the
and Deputy Counsel to the President Joel Klein joined in a memo
President Mikva stating that he deserves a raise because he had
to Deputy Chief of Staff Phil Lader. 187 In the memo they acknowl-
been a "good soldier" and "weathered the office through a few
edged that there was a general freeze on salaries but argued that
storms." How was Livingstone able to secure a 40 percent salary
an exception should be made for Livingstone, asking that he be
increase in only 3 years? His salary rose rapidly from $45,000 to
given an immediate raise to $60,000.¹⁸⁸ They cited his extraor-
$63,750. Although Livingstone complained that his predecessor
dinary effort to clear up a backlog of White House passes, one of
made over $60,000, he did not acknowledge that she had over 20
Livingstone's duties as Director of Personnel Security.
years of experience as Director of the Security Office. Mr. Living-
Mr. Livingstone did receive a salary increase on January 8, 1995
stone had no background, education or experience in the area, yet
to $57,500, which was approved by White House Counsel Abner
he was given significant salary increases. His office was responsible
Mikva. 189 Nine months later Livingstone received yet another sal-
for the backlog in passes yet he claimed credit and demanded re-
ary increase to $63,750.190 Before receiving that final increase Liv-
wards for clearing up that same backlog.
ingstone had written two memos to Counsel to the President Abner
His persistent demands for salary increases and ability to rally
the Counsel's Office behind him raise even more questions about
White House document CGE 047884. (Memo from Craig Livingstone to William Kennedy,
dated May 10, 1993. In the same memo, Livingstone requested that Nancy Gemmell remain on
who Craig Livingstone really is. Although most people in the White
paid status through August 1, 1993. He also asked to bring on a receptionist at a reduced salary
House would now deny knowing him or at best admit that they
of $17,000. "On August 1, 1993 my salary would increase TO $50,000 from $45,000. Based on
may have seen him around, Livingstone was able to garner support
the reduction of salary for the receptionist.")
White House document CGE 046144.
for his cause when necessary.
183 White House document CGE 048509. (Memo from David Watkins to Beth Nolan dated May
25, 1994, re: salary adjustment. The memo was copied to Patsy Thomasson and Kelli McClure
5. Livingstone brings on new staff
and read, "EYES ONLY")
184/d.
The White House Security Office began using interns for the first
White House document CGE 048622. (Memo from Christopher D. Cerf to Phil Lader, Dep-
uty Chief of Staff, re: raise for Craig Livingstone. The memo was copied to Beth Nolan.)
time in its history after Livingstone came on as Director. Mr. Liv-
1se1d.
187 White House document CGE 048627. (Memo from Joel Klein, Deputy Counsel to the Presi-
White House document CGE 048059. (Livingatone states that at a salary of $57,500 he was
dent and Beth Nolan, Associate Counsel to the President dated August 19, 1994, re: raise for
living paycheck to paycheck and complains that his predecessor, who had been in the position
Craig, Livingstone. The memorandum was marked "Personal and Confidential." The memo was
since the Nixon administration, made over $60,000.)
forwarded to Livingstone with a handwritten note from Beth Nolan, "our 3rd effort, it has gone
192 White House document CGE 048058. (Livingstone also notes that his "situation" had gone
to Phil. Joel will also talk to him.")
on for over 2½ years, pointing out that he had "seen [the] office through a few storms.")
188Nolan and Klein stated that Livingstone had worked 18 months at "an inadequate salary"
193 Attached to the authorization form for the salary increase was a note from Kelli McClure
of $51,000.
to Deputy Counsel to the President James Castellito, "[t]he increase was approved by Judge
189 White House document CGE 046217.
Mikva. It is my understanding that it was based on a promise made when Bernie Nussbaum
190 White House document CGE 046215. (The document is a "Change in Employee Status"
was here." White House document CGE 046216.
form, change in salary requested by Abner Mikva, dated September 28, 1995.)
194 White House document CGE 053840. (The increase in salary requested was to $70,000.)
36
37
ingstone's Executive Assistant, Lisa Wetzl, began as an intern in
eral positions at several different agencies. 201 His plans came to a
OPS in June 1993 after graduating from college in May of the same
halt when the White House received his FBI background file and
year. 195 Other assistants in the office started as interns before
informed him that there were problems in his background which
moving up to staff positions. Ed Hughes began as an intern in Feb-
would prevent his detail from being renewed and prevent him from
ruary 1994 after graduating from college in June 1993. 196 Jona-
receiving:a Presidential appointment.202
than Denbo, an assistant in the office, was an intern in the office
Mr. Marceca continued working in the Office of Personnel Secu-
in the summer of 1994 and was hired in September after he grad-
rity until his original 6-month detail ended in February 1994. Al-
uated from college in May 1995.¹⁹ The staff in the office was gen-
though he received a hard pass and had full access to the White
erally very young and inexperienced: Nevertheless, all of the staff
House, his background investigation was not completed until De-
were granted top secret clearance by the White House and com-
cember 1993 and he was never cleared by the Secret Service for a
partmentalized clearances from, the CIA.
permanent pass. Along the way, his daughter also joined the White
During 1993 and early 1994 the Office of Personnel Security had
House, apparently assisting in the Office of Presidential Person-
an extensive backlog in paperwork. White House appointees were
nel.203 His son, Nathan, obtained a White House job as a "gift ana-
not completing their paperwork and those that were completed
lyst" in the winter of 1995.20⁴
were not being sent to the FBI. By April 1993, Livingstone was at-
After leaving the White House, Marceca remained in contact
tempting to get his friend and political ally, Anthony Marceca, de-
with both Livingstone and the White House. He volunteered to an-
tailed to the office to assist with the backlog.
swer phone calls from the "comments line" following the President's
addresses to the Nation. Mr. Marceca retained a White House vol-
III. DETAIL OF ANTHONY MARCECA TO THE WHITE HOUSE
unteer pass until May 1995 and remained on a volunteer access list
until June 21, 1996, several weeks after the discovery of the FBI
A. INTRODUCTION
files and Marceca's role became known. 205 According to phones
Anthony Marceca is one of the central figures in the investiga-
message he left for Livingstone, Marceca also appears to have
tion of the FBI files matter. The White House claims that he was
worked on several Presidential and Cabinet level advance trips be-
the individual responsible for ordering hundreds of files on former
tween 1994 and 1996. 206
Reagan and Bush administration officials. First described as a
Anthony Marceca is far from the low-level clerk the White House
"low-level clerk," the White House refused to release Marceca's
has claimed. He and Craig Livingstone worked together as a politi-
name to the committee for several days. However, the committee
cal "team" since 1984 and continued their partnership up to the
soon learned through press accounts that the so-called low-level
present. Given the backgrounds of both Livingstone and Marceca,
clerk was a White House detailee employed as a civilian investiga-
it is astonishing that the Clinton administration would put these
tor in the Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID). President
two individuals in the sensitive office of Personnel Security with
Clinton's deputy campaign manager, Ann Lewis, claimed Marceca
access to the FBI file of any person who has ever had a background
was a "non-political staffer.' 198 Anthony Marceca is a longtime po-
investigation.
litical colleague of Craig Livingstone. The two worked on advance
B. MARCECA PARLAYS HIS POLITICAL BACKGROUND WITH CRAIG
for numerous campaigns since the Hart campaign in 1984.
LIVINGSTONE INTO A WHITE HOUSE POSITION
Mr. Marceca was detailed to the White House Office of Personnel
Security in August 1993 at the request of Associate White House
Anthony Marceca testified that he met Craig Livingstone while
Counsel William H. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy wrote two letters di-
they were both doing advance work for the Gary Hart campaign in
rectly to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin regarding Marceca's de-
1984.207 The two had become friends and discovered that they
tail. 199 Kennedy, in one letter, stated that he had "learned of Agent
Marceca's unique investigative abilities and background and would
Marceca document (unnumbered) calendar of Anthony Marceca dated December 27, 1993;
greatly appreciate his full-time assistance here.' 200
January 7, 1994; January 14, 1994; February 2, 1994; February 3, 1994; February 7, 1994; Feb-
ruary 8, 1994; February 25, 1994; and, March 2, 1994.
Once ensconced in the office, Marceca attempted to use the posi-
202 Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41; Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 60.
tion as a springboard to a Presidential appointment. He was inter-
203 Marceca documents (unnumbered). Calendar of Anthony Marceca dated January 20, 1994:
"Andrea's first day in Presidential Personnel." It is not clear what his daughter was doing for
viewing for positions as a U.S. Marshal as well as Inspector Gen-
the office. There was an FBI name check run on her, however, she did not have a White House
pass.
204 Committee interview of Jonathan Denbo, September 4, 1996, p. 17. Mr. Denbo explained
196 Wetzl deposition, June 17, 1996, p. 7. Ms. Wetzl began as an OPS intern in June 1993,
that he met Nathan Marceca when he came in to OPS to fill out his new employee paperwork.
she was hired as a staff assistant in August 1993 and promoted to Executive Assistant in the
Mr. Livingstone told Denbo that Nathan was Tony Marceca's son.
fall of 1994. Ms. Wetzl left the office in September 1995 to work as a confidential assistant to
205 Easley deposition, p. 57. Mr. Easley, who replaced Craig Livingstone, stated, "I learned
Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
that Mr. Marceca had a temporary volunteer pass that was deactivated May 1995, and since
196 Deposition of Edward Hughes, August 13, 1996, p. 6. (Hughes became Livingstone's Execu-
then he has been on the volunteer access list." Mr. Easley removed Marceca's name from the
tive Assistant in September 1995.)
access list on June 21, 1996, after the Secret Service notified him of the name.
197 Deposition of Jonathan Denbo; September 4, 1996, p. 3.
206 White House documents CGE 054248-54275. (The committee did not receive any notice of
196 Ann Lewis, This was a simple mistake, USA Today, June 10, 1996, p. A12.
the contact between the White House and Marceca until a document production on the evening
199 White House documents CGE 043814.
of September 5, 1996. The White House documents had been subpoenaed by the committee and
200 White House documents CGE 043816, letter from Kennedy to Aspin, dated April 13, 1993,
were over 2 weeks late in being produced.)
re: request for detailee.
207 Marceca deposition, p. 24.
38
39
worked well together. Messrs. Livingstone and Marceca formed
Security Coordinator. 222 Mr. Marceca accepted the offer and took
an "advance team" where Livingstone would handle the public rela-
tions end of the advance work and Marceca would handle the logis-
the position on a volunteer basis, taking time off from his Army
tics end. 209 Dennis Casey, a political consultant from Pennsylvania,
CID position. According to Marceca, he worked directly under Liv-
who worked for the Hart campaign in 1984, remembered Living-
ingstone planning the security aspect of access to Inaugural
stone and Marceca. 210 Casey testified that, during a campaign
events. 223 Mr. Marceca spent the day of the Inaugural in the "com-
meeting, Livingstone was present and reported on "peccadilloes and
mand post," the Navy building, "coordinating movements.' 224 After
vulnerabilities of labor leaders and prominent public officials in
the Inauguration was over, Marceca went back to his job at Army
CID.
hopes of neutralizing them or getting their support switched from
Mondale to Hart. Mr. Casey testified that he informed Living-
Craig Livingstone did not have such a clear recall of his work
stone that he felt the gathering of such information could hurt the
with Anthony Marceca. Although Livingstone stated that he did
campaign and directed him to stop that type of work. 212 Mr. Liv-
meet Marceca in 1984 while working advance on the Hart cam-
ingstone disagreed with Casey and angrily left the room. 213
paign, his recollection was that he worked with Marceca only "on
Mr. Casey recalled that he met Marceca at that time as well. Mr.
occasion." 225 When asked in a deposition whether he knew of any
Marceca spoke with Casey about the information Livingstone gath-
other campaigns Marceca worked on, Livingstone stated that he
ered and told Casey that it was time to "play hardball with the dirt
knew that Marceca had worked on the Hill and he had a "vague
Mr. Livingstone had gathered.' 214 After an incident in which
recollection" that Marceca may have assisted at the Inaugural. 226
Marceca took $200 from the campaign petty cash, Casey called the
There is a direct conflict between Livingstone and Marceca's testi-
Washington campaign office of Gary Hart and notified the office
mony. Clearly, Marceca testified that Livingstone asked Marceca to
that Marceca should not be allowed back. 215
work with him on PIC, yet he has no recollection of it. The two
The team of Livingstone and Marceca worked on several other
worked closely together. Marceca explained that he worked at PIC
campaigns. After the Hart campaign in 1984, they both moved on
for at least 40 days up to and including the day of the Inau-
to the Mondale campaign. Mr. Marceca stated that the manage-
gural.
227
ment of the Mondale campaign knew both him and Livingstone and
kept them together as a team. 216 In 1986 the two were asked to
1. Marceca's quest for a detail to the White House
work advance for the Hart for President announcement in Colo-
Livingstone took a position with the White House Office of Per-
rado.²¹⁷ Both Marceca and Livingstone accepted the invitation and
sonnel Security on February 8, 1993. Sometime after Livingstone
worked on advance with the campaign until Hart dropped out of
began working at the White House, Marceca contacted Livingstone
the race. 218 In 1987, Livingstone asked Marceca to work with him
to inquire about the possibility of a detail to the National Security
on Al Gore's announcement. 219 Mr. Marceca agreed and worked
Council at the White House. 228 Mr. Livingstone checked on the Na-
several advance trips with Livingstone for the Gore Campaign. 220
tional Security Council detail and reported back to Marceca that he
Mr. Livingstone contacted Marceca on election night in 1992.
did not think it was possible. 229 According to Marceca, Livingstone
Now that Clinton had won the election, Livingstone was attempt-
explained that there was a possibility of an opening for a clerical
ing to get the position of Director of Security for the Presidential
type position in his office, OPS.230 In March 1993, Livingstone con-
Inaugural Committee (PIC).221 Mr. Livingstone contacted Marceca
tacted Marceca and told Marceca that he had gotten permission to
approximately 1 week later and asked him to stop by the Old Navy
bring in someone to assist in the office. He described the position
Yard, which was PIC Headquarters. When Marceca arrived at the
as a clerical-type position, "going over people's background reports
Navy Yard, Livingstone told him that he had gotten the job as Di-
and making files and collating information, and it
did not in-
rector of Security for PIC and asked Marceca to work at PIC as the
volve investigations. "231 Livingstone asked Marceca to send him a
resume at that time. In a deposition before the committee, Living-
208ld.
stone recalled that Marceca had told Livingstone that he wanted
no See, committee deposition of Dennis Casey, June 20, 1996.
to work at the White House. Messrs. Livingstone and Marceca dis-
p. 6.
"Id
cussed general ways that Marceca might be available to assist the
"Id.
Office of Personnel Security. 232
141d.
"Id., pp. 7-8. Mr. Casey explained that Marceca had entered his office and taken the $200.
When Casey approached him the next day, Marceca explained that he needed the cash to get
m2/d, p. 35.
handbills printed and distributed. Mr. Marceca also explained that he needed the money to "pay
community children or urchins to distribute the fliers door-to-door." After Casey called the
224 Id., p. 39.
Washington office to inform them of Marceca's actions, Marceca contacted Casey and said, "you
"Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 22.
guys got me good, right between the eyes."
need.
216 Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, pp. 25-26.
Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 36.
"Id., P. 27.
228/d., p. 41.
"Id, p. 29.
"Id, P. 30.
230/d., p. 42.
wild, p. 43.
p. 34.
Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, pp. 24-26.
40
41
2. The White House requests Marceca
3. Marceca has access to the White House before his detail
Mr. Livingstone presented the idea of Marceca's detail to Associ-
ate White House Counsel William Kennedy. 233 Mr. Marceca had
According to White House records, Marceca was placed on "ac-
interviews scheduled with Kennedy on March 18 and 24, 1993. 234
cess lists" by Livingstone beginning as early as March 24, 1993.247
After interviewing Marceca, Kennedy wrote to Secretary of Defense
White House Access lists allow an individual to enter the White
Les Aspin on April 5, 1993 to request the detailing of Anthony
House without appointment for the period of time that they are on
Marceca. The detail was to be on a non-reimbursable basis, to OPS,
the list. 248 Individuals who enter via an access list, simply check
beginning on April 12, 1993. Mr. Kennedy stated in the letter,
in at any entry post, produce positive identification and are grant-
"I have learned of Agent Marceca's unique investigative abilities
ed a pass to enter the complex. 249 Mr. Marceca was placed on ac-
and background and would greatly appreciate his full-time assist-
cess lists by Craig Livingstone and granted continuous access to
ance here." 236 The following day Kennedy received a reply from
the White House complex from March 24 through July 31, 1993. 250
David C. Allen, the Director of Marceca's unit at the Army CID. 237
The Secret Service places individuals on an access list based on
Mr. Allen recommended Marceca for the detail, stating, "Mr.
a request from the Office of Personnel Security. 251 Because
Marceca is always the master of every situation," and "[he] is a
Marceca was on an access list, he could have entered and exited
sound and logical thinker, capable of handling any number of criti-
the White House at any time throughout the 4 month period before
cal and sensitive missions at one time. 238 In his letter to Ken-
his detail began and there would be no record of it. 252
nedy, Allen warned Kennedy not to be dissuaded if the military
The White House's attempts to get Marceca detailed to the Office
leadership of CID objected to the detail of Anthony Marceca. He
of Personnel Security lasted 5 months and involved several at-
further stated his readiness "to discuss, in great detail, the high re-
tempts. Mr. Kennedy testified that he was told by Livingstone that
gard I have for Mr. Marceca both professionally and personally." 239
the office could use Marceca's expertise in dealing with the numer-
On the same day, April 6, 1993, Kennedy called Marceca. 240
ous members of the military that have access to the White
The letter which was sent to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on
House. 253 Despite all of Kennedy's efforts, he has a vague recollec-
April 5, 1993 requesting the detail of Marceca was then re-sent on
tion of the complications of obtaining Marceca or even the out-
April 13, 1993. The text of the letter is the same, however the date
standing qualifications that Marceca ostensibly possessed. 254 Mr.
had been changed. 241 The next correspondence in the attempt to
Marceca, however, spent the majority of his time sifting through
get Marceca detailed was on June 22, 1993. In that letter Kennedy
SF-86's for errors and working on the Update Project. It appears
wrote to Colonel Michael Sheffield, Executive Secretary to the Sec-
that a great amount of time was spent in getting a friend of Living-
retary of Defense. 242 In this letter he states that Craig Livingstone
stone's detailed at the Army's expense. Why was it so important to
had requested that Special Agent Marceca be detailed to the Office
detail Tony Marceca to the White House?
of Personnel Security (OPS).243 Mr. Kennedy also notes that
Marceca's experience in reviewing and screening potential can-
C. MARCECA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF
didates would be invaluable to OPS in completing its ongoing re-
PERSONNEL SECURITY
view of military personnel assigned to the White House, as well as
1. Introduction
providing personnel services related to security for the staff of the
Executive Office of the President. 244
The Clinton administration had problems getting through the pa-
Mr. Marceca's detail was ultimately approved on August 5, 1993,
perwork necessary to obtain permanent White House passes for its
by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General Rob-
staffers during the first year and a half of the administration. 255
ert M. Alexander in a memorandum to William Kennedy 245 On
One of the problems was a backlog in the processing of the SF-86
August 9, 1993 Marceca went to the White House and received his
forms, which had been filled out by new White House staff mem-
hard pass giving him access to the White House, although he did
bers. The SF-86 is a questionnaire which calls for sensitive and
not begin his detail at the White House until August 18, 1993. 246
personal information from the appointee. Former White House
Counsel A.B. Culvahouse described the form as "designed to affirm-
p. 25.
atively encourage the furnishing of adverse or derogatory informa-
234 Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered). Calendar of Anthony Marceca, dated March 18,
tion." 256 Each SF-86 was reviewed for errors and completeness. In
1993; March 24, 1993.
235 White House document CGE 043823.
previous administrations, only the Counsel to the President, his
236
Id.
237 White House document CGE 043821.
247 White House document CGE 047382-3. White House access list.
238 Id.
239
248 Security of FBI Files hearings, July 17, 1996, p. 148.
249 Id., p. 147.
240 Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered) Calendar of Anthony Marceca, dated April 6,
250 White House document CGE 047382-047631.
1993.
261 Cerf deposition, August 12, 1996, p. 41.
$41 White House document CGE 043816.
262
Security of FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 149.
242 White House document CGE 043819.
243 Id.
263 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 129.
254
244 Id.
Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, pp. 38-44.
245 White House document CGE 043822.
265 See generally GAO report on "Personnel Security: Pass & Security Clearance Data for the
Executive Office of the President," October 1995.
246 White House document CGE 043818. Detail authorization form for Anthony Marceca.
256 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 32.
42
43
deputy and the director of the Security Office would review the SF-
WHOMA [White House Office of Management and Admin-
86's.257
istration] to begin this process. 268
Once checked, the SF-86 would be sent to the FBI to begin the
In his deposition, Marceca testified that he did not know what
process of a background investigation. Anthony Marceca, a tem-
a Secret Service WAVES list was, nor did he know what a tem-
porary detailee, took responsibility for this project when he began
porary pass holder or permanent pass holder list was. 269 The Se-
working at OPS. Mr. Marceca testified that the first day he began
cret Service would provide the Office of Personnel Security with an
to work in OPS, the backlog of SF-86 forms was piled up on his
updated passholders list on a monthly basis or upon request. 270
desk in a stack 2½ feet high.2⁵⁸
When asked whether he had ever seen Secret Service lists which
Although Marceca began working in the White House on August
were separated by office, Marceca testified that he did not think
18, 1993, prior to that, on August 9th, he went to the White House
that he had gotten any lists which were broken down by office until
to get his pass and to discuss what his duties would be. 259 Accord-
January 1994.2⁷¹ Nancy Gemmell stated that when she left the of-
ing to Marceca, he met with Nancy Gemmell, Lisa Wetzl and Craig
fice in August 1993 she went to the Secret Service, and requested
Livingstone. 260 Mr. Marceca stated that at that meeting Nancy
a current master Secret Service list separated by office. 272 This is
Gemmell explained to him the procedures to follow for the duties
the list which Gemmell left in the office with the understanding
he would be performing while working with OPS. 261 Ms. Gemmell
that an additional list should be requested:
was a holdover employee who had worked in OPS since 1981, the
Ms. GEMMELL I was very much understood that the ini-
beginning of the Reagan administration. 262
tial list the office had was just that, an initial list to be
During that meeting Marceca took notes of what he was told. 263
used to start the first steps of the Update Project. It was
Mr. Marceca stated that Nancy Gemmell showed him the proce-
very well-known that many personnel decisions had yet to
dures he should follow in completing the "Update Project" as well
be made and therefore that follow-up would have to be
as other duties he was expected to perform. 264 However when
done.
asked whether she personally gave Marceca the Secret Service list
to continue the Update Project, Gemmell stated, "[N]o sir; I had no
idea who would be assuming that responsibility. 265 Ms. Gemmell
Mrs. COLLINS OF ILLINOIS. So then during the regular
did leave behind a written sheet of instructions which he would be
update projects in which you were involved, how often
able to refer to after she left. 266
would you request a list of names from the Secret Service?
Ms. GEMMELL Basically, only twice, ma'am. At the be-
2. Discrepancies in Marceca's testimony
ginning to initiate the process, and then the second time
In stark contrast to his testimony before the committee that he
to be used as the file copy.
thought everyone on the "update list" was in need of access to the
Mrs. COLLINS OF ILLINOIS. Did you leave behind any Se-
White House complex, his handwritten notes make it clear that he
cret Service lists of names that you had requested for the
was aware that OPS was responsible for taking former White
Update Project when you left in August of 1993?
House employees off of the lists. He wrote: "De-activate (sic) former
Ms. GEMMELL The list that was received from the Se-
staff
267 Mr. Livingstone, Marceca's supervisor, also was
cret Service was left behind. It was still in process; far
aware that it was the White House's responsibility to inform the
from being completed; correct. 273
Secret Service who to take off of their lists of active pass holders.
Mr. Marceca testified that the only regular Secret Service lists
In a March 1993 memorandum to Associate Counsel Bill Kennedy,
which he knew of were weekly pass lists which he received from
Livingstone wrote:
the Secret Service and used to complete his project. He stated that
Please note that there are many Bush Administration
these lists contained only a small number of people who were on
the access lists and needed to be contacted to fill out an SF-86.²⁷⁴
employees that still have active badges. USSS [U.S. Secret
Service] informs me that it is WHS [White House Staff] re-
The Secret Service did not provide the office with "access lists"
in the manner that Marceca used the term. The Secret Service lists
sponsibility to deactivate badges. I am working with
are quite distinctive, as the paper is oversize, on green and white
computer printout paper with perforated edges. The access lists to
2571d., p. 46.
258 Marceca deposition, p. 83.
which Marceca refers are created by the Office of Personnel Secu-
269 Id., p. 60.
rity based on names provided by the Office of Management and Ad-
260 Id., P. 153.
261
262 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, PP. 38-39. Mrs. Gemmell stayed on in the
268 White House document CGE 053677. Although the memorandum is undated, the informa-
Clinton administration until August 13, 1993 to assist in training the new staff.
tion contained within clearly indicates that it was created in March 1993.
283 Anthony Marceca document (unnumbered). Handwritten notes of Anthony Marceca dated
200 Id., pp. 94-95.
August 9, 1993.
270 Wetzl deposition, p. 33.
264 Marceca deposition, p. 61.
271 Marceca deposition, p. 98.
265 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 90.
272 Telephonic interview of Nancy Gemmell.
206
273 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 50-51.
267 Marceca document production (unnumbered). Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.
274 94.
44
45
ministration. In hearing testimony however, Marceca, stated
Those records would include the background investigations and pa-
specifically that he recalled working with the large, green and
perwork which are stored in the Security Office. Therefore the
white computer printout lists 276 Contrary to his statement, in his
own notes Marceca writes, "Mr. David Watkins, head of manage-
records for all holdover employees must be recreated by ordering
the background investigations from the FBI.
ment and administration
monthly report submitted on
passes. 277
Marceca's task was to recreate these files, and he would spend
Lisa Wetzl, a staff assistant in OPS, testified that when Marceca
some time each week working on the Update Project. The process
arrived he took over her duties of helping to correct and submit to
to determine which files to order is simple. The Secret Service has
the FBI the SF-86 for new employees. 278 Ms. Wetzl explained that
lists of all current passholders which it provides to OPS. The Secret
both she and Nancy Gemmell went through the process with him
Service lists can be printed out in different formats, one of which
to make sure that he understood it. 279
is current passholders by office. Previous administrations would go
The duties which Marceca was to perform in OPS were rather
down the lists office-by-office to determine who the holdovers were
amorphous. Mr. Marceca testified that, "I would work in the Office
in each office. The staff would start with those offices which rou-
of Personnel Security doing updates of White House staff and visi-
tinely would have the largest amount of holdovers, such as the
tors, people that had access. 280 Mr. Marceca testified that Living-
General Services Administration and White House contractors. The
stone was his supervisor; 281 however, Livingstone testified that he
White House Office would normally be saved for last as it would
did not supervise Marceca. With regard to the Update Project, Liv-
have the greatest turnover with the least amount of holdovers.
ingstone testified, "I didn't supervise this project." 282 Mr. Living-
(The White House Office includes those offices with mostly political
stone stated, "I don't believe that there was anything specific that
appointees such as the Chief of Staff and Communications.) 288
Tony would have been required to talk to me specifically about.
After determining who the holdovers were, the office would order
Certainly not in the form of projects.' 283 According to Livingstone,
those FBI background investigations.
nobody in the office was reporting to him on the activities of
Before leaving the White House, Nancy Gemmell had begun the
Marceca. 284 It appears from Livingstone's statements that Marceca
very first stages of the Update Project:
had free reign to do whatever he wanted without consultation with
Mr. SCHIFF. Can you describe what the Update Project
actual staff.
that you were working on until August 13th was?
Mr. Marceca, however, testified that he was assigned the Update
Ms. GEMMELL Basically, again, sir, it was just simply
Project by Livingstone. 285 Livingstone, the Director of the office,
setting up the very first stages of it, and basically, that
has no clear recall as to who was assigned the project, who was
means that you were making dummy files; in other words,
working on the project at any given time, or who was supervising
file jackets that would be used down the road. So therefore
the project. 286 Ultimately, Livingstone was in charge of all activi-
you were typing file labels, you were typing subject files.
ties in that office, and Marceca was the individual assigned to work
As an example, if you were processing the General Serv-
on the Update Project.
ices Administration employees, you would type a subject
D. MARCECA BEGINS THE UPDATE PROJECT
file for that group also.
Mr. SCHIFF. Did you have a way of dividing up the Se-
1. Introduction
cret Service files-that is, GSA group or White House
As discussed previously, when a new administration arrives at
group there or something like that?
the White House, nearly all of the previous administration's
Ms. GEMMELL. As I recall the list, sir, the list of employ-
records are removed for storage in the Presidential archives. 287
ees was by category; in other words, was by office. 289
At the time Marceca started in OPS Nancy Gemmell had already
275 Denbo interview, September 4, 1996, p. 9.
retired. Ms. Gemmell testified that she did not know whether
276 Marceca deposition, p. 40.
277 Marceca document production (unnumbered). Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.
Marceca used the list she had left behind, nor did she know who
278 Wetzl deposition, pp. 20-21. (A.B. Culvahouse, Counsel to President Reagan, testified be-
would be assuming the responsibility for the Update Project. 290
fore the committee that during his tenure only the White House Counsel, his Deputy and the
Director of the Security Office were authorized to review the SF-86 forms. Security of FBI Files
2. Marceca's understanding of the Secret Service lists
hearing, June 19, 1996 P. 46.)
Id., p. 21.
Mr. Marceca stated that as part of the Update Project he was to
280 Marceca deposition, p. 59.
261 Id.
refer to a list and open files on individuals who had access to the
282 Livingstone deposition, p. 33.
White House. 291 He explained that his mission was to open a file
283 Id., P. 37.
284 Id., p. 39.
on each individual on the list and then request a previous back-
285 Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 59.
ground investigation from the FBI. 292 When asked whether Nancy
286 Livingstone deposition, June 17, 1996, p. 33. (When asked who supervised the project Liv-
ingstone stated; "I believe Ms. Gemmell, Ms. Anderson, Ms. Wetzl and Mr. Marceca." Ms.
Gemmell had started the very first stages of the project before she retired. Ms. Wetzl began
288 Id.
working on the project after she was promoted to Executive Assistant in late 1994, when she
289 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, PP. 90-91.
felt that she had enough authority to do 80. See Wetzl deposition, p. 66. Ms. Anderson appar-
290 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, P. 90.
ently never worked on the project at all.)
291 Marceca deposition, p. 61.
287 Prepared written statement of C. Boyden Gray, p. 6.
292 Id., p. 62.
46
47
Gemmell had ever instructed him to determine the accuracy of the
peared. 301 For each name on the list he would prepare a file folder
status of the names on the list, Marceca answered:
and type the request on a preprinted form addressed to the FBI Li-
My project was to establish-was establish a file that
aison requesting a "copy of previous report." 302 On those forms is
would perform a check to find out if these folks were still
a space for the purpose of the request. In that space, Marceca
on staff or not on staff
The list that I was provided
typed "ACCESS (S). 303 That denoted that the individual named
was a list to my understanding that everybody on that list
on the form was requesting access to the White House. The "S" was
had access. 293
an internal OPS designation for White House staff. 304
After receiving the previous report from the FBI, Marceca stated
Mr. Marceca's answer is puzzling. In the first sentence, he states
that he would review it to determine the suitability of the person
that he was to determine who remained on the White House staff;
for a position in the Clinton administration, and to check the date
he then states that everyone on the list had access. Mr. Marceca
for the standard 5 year reinvestigation. 305 In the process of deter-
claims to have worked from the same list throughout the Update
mining the date of reinvestigation, Marceca claimed he would dis-
Project 294 and had discovered that certain individuals on that list
cover that many individuals were no longer employed by the White
were no longer granted access to the White House complex. 295 Mr.
House. 306 Once Marceca began receiving a number of files for indi-
Marceca's statements appear contradictory. It is unclear what
viduals no longer working at the White House and not seeking ac-
Marceca actually knew about the Secret Service lists. We do know
cess to the White House, he created a "dead bin" where he would
from his own handwritten notes that, in the course of processing
put all of those files. 307
the individual files, he would place all files of White House Office
Mr. Marceca also testified at the hearing about the "set" of lists
staff in orange folders, all Vice-Presidential Office staff in pink
which he worked from while he performed the Update Project. He
folders, all volunteer and intern files in red folders and all support
staff (GSA) in blue folders. 296
described the list as being on green and white computer paper, ap-
proximately 8 inches wide which was folded over and had connect-
The master Secret Service list includes a combination of active
ing pages. 308 The list he worked off of was approximately an inch
and inactive passholders. The passholder names on the list, how-
thick with the names of the individuals in the left hand column. 309
ever, are clearly differentiated by "A" or "I," meaning active or in-
During the hearing, Marceca recalled that the list was divided into
active. According to the Secret Service, the only list which Marceca
subgroups according to office, which is contrary to his deposition
could have used to request all 476 of the names would be the mas-
testimony. 310
ter list. 297 Mr. Marceca testified that he was under the impression
Mr. Marceca told the committee that he was told by Livingstone,
that the "A" and I" designation on the Secret Service lists stood
and possibly others in the office, to work off of the list he had been
for "access" and "intern." 298 The list Marceca used also contains
using. 311 Mr. Livingstone and Lisa Wetzl have both stated that
the date of birth on each passholder. 299 If one were to accept
they do not know which list Marceca was using for the Update
Marceca's testimony regarding his belief that the letters stood for
Project. Nancy Gemmell has testified that she did not even know
"access" and "intern," then it follows that Marceca also believed
who would be working on the Update Project, therefore she did not
that he was ordering background files on holdover interns who
give anyone a Secret Service list to use for the Update Project. In
were 30 to 70 years old, and who had interned during Reagan and
Bush administrations.
fact, she testified that she instructed the individuals working in the
office that they would have to request an updated Secret Service
Contrary to his already incredible testimony, the request forms
list to complete the project. 312
Marceca sent to the FBI on these "interns," as in the case of Billy
Although Marceca stated in his deposition that he never knew
Dale, identified them not as interns, but as staff members.
that there might be any problems with the list he was using, he
3. Marceca's explanation of the Update Project
later stated in the committee hearing that he realized there were
problems, causing him to change his method of updating the files:
In a hearing before the committee, Marceca again clarified the
procedures he employed in doing the Update Project. He stated in
301/d.
the hearing that he worked from a "set of computer lists" which
were kept in the vault of OPS. 300 He added that he attempted to
go through the. names on the list in the order in which they ap-
304/d., p. 41.
308/d., P. 39. This is the same task which, in previous administrations, only the counsel, dep-
uty counsel and the director of the Security Office were authorized to conduct.
203/d., p. 66. (Later in the deposition Marceca is asked whether there came a time when he
300/d., p. 40.
discovered that there were people who were not properly on those lists. Marceca answered, "Not
The "dead bin" was a bin located in the vault which was empty at the time Marceca
to my knowledge, (to) the time I left, no." Marceca deposition, p. 73.)
began his detail.
294 Id., p. 98.
308 Id., p. 40.
Id., p. 100.
296 Marceca document production. (Unnumbered.) Handwritten notes dated August 9, 1993.
310/d., p. 41. In his deposition testimony Marceca stated that he did not see any lists which
297 See infra Section VII, for further clarification of the Secret Service lists.
were divided by office until January.
296 Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996 p. 67.
311/d., p. 106.
299 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 41.
Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 50. Ms. Gemmell testified, "It was very
300 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 39. Mr. Marceca's hearing testimony is
much understood that the initial list the office had was just that, an initial list to be used to
contrary to his deposition testimony in which he stated that he used only one list for the Update
start the first steps of the Update Project. It was very well-known that many personnel decisions
Project. Marceca deposition, p. 61.
had yet to be made and therefore that follow-up would have to be done."
48
49
He then stated that he worked off of the list, not the SF-86
Mr. FLANAGAN. You understood [the list] was current,
form. 317 Mr. Marceca then clarified this apparent contradiction by
and it turns out it wasn't. Was it fair to say it was an up-
dated list?
explaining that after the project was not advancing as planned, he
Mr. MARCECA. No, sir. It is fair to say that I believed the
began to make lists of names from the "Update list" and systemati-
list was current when I had that list. Later on it developed
cally circulate those to offices in the White House. 318 Attached to
that there were people that had left the White House,
Marceca's lists of names would be a request from Marceca asking
when I started that project they had no reason to believe
whether any of the individuals listed were holdovers. 319
that list was outdated or that those people did not have ac-
4. The "Dead Bin"
cess to the White House.
In the process of making these requests, Marceca would be in-
formed by the various offices that certain individuals on Marceca's
Mr. MARCECA. I believe I worked on that list until I dis-
list had left the White House some time ago. Marceca explained:
covered, and it was not a sudden discovery, but somewhere
In some cases those folks, the GSA [General Services
after a couple of months-well, it is being pointed out it
Administration] would tell me this person is still here, but
was always the same list. When I discovered that there
were problems with that list, I then changed my approach
these people with GSA, two or three people with GSA left
in '87 and they are no longer here. So I would go back to
to updating. 313
the file then and I would check off on the list and I would
There is no evidence to suggest that Marceca changed his approach
not call for an SBI because I knew they were not there. 320
to the Update Project. In fact, when asked why he stopped at "G-
If Marceca had actually gone through the list in this manner, he
o" on the list, Marceca testified that was as far as he had gotten
would not have received any files of individuals who were not cur-
on the list. 314
Mr. Marceca explained his two goals as he proceeded down the
rently working in the White House. Instead, he had accumulated
list. First, he wished to determine that the individual was still at
somewhere in the range of 500 files which he stashed in the "dead
the White House, and second was to ensure that he "didn't prevent
bin."
Marceca defined what he considered his "dead bin:"
them from coming into the White House in case of an emer-
gency. 315 His actions, however, contradict his stated goals. Mr.
That file that the update list sat in was where files were
Marceca did not check whether an individual on the list was cur-
stored that were what I recall dead files, files of people
rently employed by the White House before ordering his file, other-
who no longer worked at the White House. They went in
wise he would not have received the files of over 400 individuals
that file. They went in that bin. If there was-if the name
not currently employed by the White House. It is not clear what
was not-if the person's name was not on file in that bin,
emergency he referred to when explaining his second goal. He did
that meant that I had to open a file. But before I opened
not have the ability to prevent a current passholder from entering
a file, I checked into file drawers to find out if a file had
the White House compound by conducting the Update Project. The
already been opened. And if there was no file in the file
only way to accomplish that would be to notify the Secret Service
drawer, I got a new file folder, and I opened a new
to deactivate the individual's pass.
file
321
In his deposition before the committee, Marceca described two
The so-called "dead bin" which Marceca created raises some very
different procedures which he used for recreating the FBI back-
troubling questions. It is implausible that, after he received even
ground files of holdover employees. He first explained that he
one file for an individual who was not presently working at the
would work from the SF-86 form and then check the "update list"
White House, he did not raise any questions about the list which
to determine if the name on the SF-86 were also on the list.
he was using. Apparently he did not question the list after receiv-
Answer. The very first thing I had to do was [take the
ing over 400 files of individuals who were not working at the White
SF-86] go into the vault, pull out this list that was in the
House.
vault, and check to see if the name was on the list. Which
Mr. Marceca was a career investigator, trained to ask questions
means, that if it was on the list, then they were former
and find answers. It is not plausible that Marceca would not be
White House staffers. If their name was on the list, I
able to determine the reason so many names, with "I's" next to
would put a check beside their name
If they were not
them, no longer worked in the White House. Nor is it plausible
on the list, I would just continue on
This is the up-
that he was unaware of whose files he was requesting. When ques-
date list in the safe. 316
Marceca deposition, p. 65. In his testimony during a committee hearing, Marceca testified
113/d., PP. 284-286. (In his deposition testimony Marceca directly contradicts this statement,
that he worked from the list, not from SF-86 forms. Security of FBI Files, June 26, 1996, pp.
when asked whether there came a time when he discovered that there were people who were
40-42.
not properly on those lists. Marceca answered, "Not to my knowledge, [Lo] the time I left, no."
Marceca deposition, p. 99.
Marceca deposition, p. 73.)
219/d.
314/d., p. 194.
nold, p. 100.
3¹⁵ Id., pp. 193-94.
nild, p. 64.
Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, pp. 83-84.
50
51
tioned why he requisitioned files on known prior Republican offi-
cials, Marceca responded that he had seen a high level Republican
5. Marceca's other duties
in the White House on one occasion. He therefore, did not question
Committee documents show that Marceca's testimony of his re-
whether any other well known Republicans should be on the list
sponsibilities in the Office of Personnel Security was not com-
as well. 322
prehensive. Although he apparently did handle the processing of
Mr. Livingstone was aware that Marceca was working on the Up-
forms for background investigations, he provided additional serv-
date Project, but claims that they did not have any conversations
ices as well. 332 Marceca's memoranda to Livingstone show that he
about the project: "I don't have a specific recollection of talking to
was assisting White House employees whose background investiga-
anyone about when Tony started or if Tony was trained properly
tions threatened their jobs. One Marceca memo entitled "Analysis
on it. '323 Likewise, Ms. Wetzl, a staff assistant at the time, did not
of Personnel Background" contained the following:
know what process Marceca was using to complete the Update
1. Subject should first fire the attorney who wrote the
Project.³²⁴
letter, for the following reasons:
Mr. Marceca wrote memos to Livingstone to keep him up-to-date
(a) The letter is combative and argumentative
on the status of his projects, 325 and he kept detailed lists of each
(b) The letter does not offer explanations, but excuses
previous report received from the FBI. 326 Everyone who worked in
2. I suggest the following be included in a new letter:
the Office of Personnel Security, a one room office, 327 testified that
(a) Subject has paid his/her dues to society, for past mis-
they knew Marceca was working on the Update Project, but never
takes.
asked him about it. 328
All prior employees of the one room Office of Personnel Security
are unable to recall what Secret Service list Marceca used for the
(c) The shoplifting incident occurred because the subject
project, including Marceca. 329 Ms. Wetzl, however, destroyed Ms.
needed money to buy food
Gemmell's list, and testified she does not believe Marceca used it
for the Update Project. 330 Wetzl further stated, "Nancy had left all
her stuff in one corner and I didn't believe that Tony had used any
(e) [I] am very sorry for the mistakes of my
past
of that, that he had gotten a new list from the Secret Service and
and I believe being fired is unfair and unreason-
able. 333
was working on that. 331 Ms. Wetzl, Livingstone's 24-year old Ex-
ecutive Assistant, made the decision to destroy the only possible
Why, as these documents suggest, did the Clinton administration
clue as to why the files were improperly obtained.
employ Marceca to cleanse background problems for employees
with criminal histories? How extensive was the problem of employ-
Marceca stated that one day he saw Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press
ees with background blemishes? Was Marceca hired specifically for
Secretary for President Bush, in the White House complex.
that purpose? These questions raise further concerns about the ap-
Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 54.
proach taken by the Clinton administration toward security issues.
324 Wetzl deposition, p. 26. When asked to describe what she observed Marceca doing on the
Update project, Wetzl answered, "I knew he was working on it, you know, and we were all in
E. MARCECA'S DETAIL ENDS
the same office 80, you know, I would see him at his work station but I really didn't get in-
volved in the details of what he was doing." (Emphasis added).
1. White House attempts to extend Marceca's detail
326 Marceca document production, Bates Stamp Nos. 000096, 000155. In the first memo from
Marceca to Livingstone, Marceca writes, "White House Staff; 50 Requests for Backgrounds were
Marceca's detail ended in February 1994. Livingstone and Ken-
sent this week and the previous 3 weeks to FBI. 50 Requests for Backgrounds are awaiting to
be sent next Monday to FBI. (We are at the 'D' with this project.) Next week; 1 Jan. 94, re
nedy had attempted to extend his detail; 334 however, there were
investigation begins on GSA; AT&T; NSC; Credit Union; and "White House Staff, for BI's which
"unresolved issues" in his background which made Kennedy decide
expire in 1989." In the second memo, under Re-investigations of White House Staff, Marceca
not to renew the detail. 335 Livingstone testified he thought Marceca
writes, "White House Staff Update: 43 Request for Previous backgrounds were this week. 50
each for the previous 5 weeks to FBI. 50 Request for backgrounds are awaiting to be sent next
would have liked to continue his detail; however, he discussed
Monday to FBI. 250 Request for Previous Reports sent during this reporting period. (We are
these "unresolved issues" with Kennedy who made the final deci-
at the F with the Staff Update Project.").
sion not to renew the detail. 336 Mr. Kennedy explained:
"Marceca document production, Bates Stamp Nos. 000004-000081. Lists created by Anthony
Marceca dated from September 24, 1993 through February 10, 1994.
Question. [W]e have been informed by the White House
Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, p. 12. Mr. Livingstone was asked about the layout
of OPS, he answered, "In 1993, it was one large room." All of the staff members of the office
that [Marceca] did leave sometime in February of '94. Do
worked in the same room. Id.
you know why he was not retained at the White House?
228See, Livingstone deposition, Wetzl deposition and Marceca deposition.
129See, Security of FBI Files hearing, June 24, 1996, PP. 40-41. Mr. Marceca explains that
he does not have a vivid recollection of the list which he used; Livingstone explained that he
332 Among his other duties, Marceca's calendars show that on at least two occasions he was
was not, clear on the details of the Update Project; however, it appeared that whatever list
summoned by Counsel to the President Bernard Nussbaum's secretary to crack open Nuss-
Marceca was using caused the problem. Id., PP. 30-33; Ms. Wetzl testified, "I saw that it was
baum's safe.
a Secret Service list I didn't look at in detail, 80 I couldn't tell you what-which format
Marceca document production.
this list was in." Wetzl deposition, p. 34.
334 See, Wetzl deposition, p. 36. Ms. Wetzl was asked whether there were any attempts to re-
330 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 24, 1996, p. 113. Wetzl stated, "I did not work with
detail Marceca to OPS. She answered, "I don't know. There was talk of it, but I'm not-1 wasn't
her list. I threw it out."
involved in it."
Wetzl deposition, P. 45.
335 Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996 P. 60.
336/d., pp. 60-61.
52
53
Answer. Well, I don't remember the timing involved.
working for the Texas Attorney General's Office, Medicaid Fraud
Okay? I simply do not know when things took place. But
Division. During the FBI interview of Judge Stephenson, she stat-
if I remember correctly, there were two things that sort of
ed, "I would not hire him [Marceca] to serve civil papers from my
impacted this. One of which is that the White House, I
Justice of the Peace Office
he is nothing but a blow hard and
don't believe, wanted to pick up paying for him. That's
[I] could not recommend him for a position of trust and confidence
number one. Number two, Tony's background had come in
with the United States Government.' 347
and there were some problems revealed with it that made
me think it might be better if he kind of went back to
2. Marceca does advance for the Clinton administration
where he was. 337
After Marceca's detail ended he remained in close contact with
A White House document shows that Livingstone and Kennedy re-
Livingstone and volunteered at the White House. Before Marceca
quested an extension of Marceca's detail on February 28, 1994 338
left the White House he had a meeting with Livingstone, Lisa
The request is on a non-reimbursable basis starting on February
Wetzl and Mari Anderson. In that meeting Marceca agreed to come
28, 1994 and ending on June 27, 1994, with Marceca's duties out-
in on successive Saturdays and work with the others to finish the
lined as assisting the Security Office with military adjudication.
Update Project. 348 Mr. Marceca claimed that he never completed
The form notes that reimbursement would start on April 11, 1994.
the project because he was sent on a detail to Canada by CID. 349
This document was signed by Kennedy after Marceca's original
Upon his return, he was named acting Special Agent in Charge of
detail ended and after the problems in his background were discov-
his Washington Fraud Team, and stated he "didn't have the time
ered on December 17, 1993. On March 8, 1994, the White House
to do anything like that."
Personnel Liaison contacted Livingstone asking, "Do you know the
Although Marceca did not have time to complete the Update
start date for Tony Marceca?" 339 Mr. Marceca testified that he was
Project, apparently he did have time to do advance work for the
unaware of any attempts to have him re-detailed to the White
House 340 Messrs. Livingstone and Marceca did discuss the prob-
Clinton administration. On May 18, 1994, Marceca left a message
lems which were developed in Marceca's background investiga-
for Livingstone about an advance trip: "He [Marceca] just got off
tion. 341 Even after Kennedy and Livingstone had received
a trip w/ Perry (Sec.) [Secretary of Defense William Perry]. He
Marceca's background and knew there were suitability issues, they
would [like] to talk to Craig about what he observed. 351 He had
requested that he be redetailed. A March 17, 1994 letter, only re-
left a message for Livingstone earlier in the month stating that he,
cently produced to the committee, shows that Livingstone had re-
"cannot go on [the] trip to Normandy." '352 At the end of June 1994
quested, as late as March 3, 1994, a subsequent detail for Marceca.
Marceca left a message that, "[he] wants to go to lunch/ also wants
The March 17 letter respectfully withdrew the request. No expla-
to go orf trip w/ you. 353 Mr. Marceca appears to have continued
nation was given for the change of heart on Marceca working at
to work on advance trips through 1995 and 1996, according to
the White House. 342
phone messages he left for Livingstone.
Mr. Kennedy stated that the problems in Marceca's background
In January 1995, Marceca left Livingstone a cryptic message: "If
were "not problems that would have led to a termination sort of on
you're going on 'that' trip, he'll see you are taken care of. Other-
the spot. 343 Although Kennedy refused to discuss the specific
wise, he'll talk to you later.' 354 "That" trip was never identified in
problems, Marceca did tell the committee that a woman had filed
documents produced to the committee. Mr. Marceca called Living-
a private claim against him in Texas. 344 Marceca testified during
stone in September 1995 to request assistance getting on the ad-
a deposition for a civil case he filed, that he was charged with offi-
vance detail of a local trip. 355 Likewise, in December Marceca
cial oppression for misuse of his office. 345 In that case, Marceca had
asked Livingstone to schedule him for a trip in February or March
brought suit for slander against Justice of the Peace Lilly A. Ste-
1996. Marceca stated that he would be willing to take 2 weeks
phenson, whom the FBI interviewed during Marceca's background
leave to do a trip. 356 These messages suggest that Marceca stayed
investigation. 346 Judge Stephenson met Marceca while he was
347 Marceca V. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition ex-
337 Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 41.
hibit, FBI 302 dated October 29, 1993.
338 White House production CGE 043810. The document is a form entitled "White House Office
348 Marceca deposition, p. 153.
PERSONNEL FROM OTHER AGENCIES. It is signed by William H. Kennedy, III and dated
Id.
February 28, 1994.
360 Id.
White House production CGE 054258. Message from Kelli McClure, White House Person-
White House production CGE 054252. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone,
nel Liaison for Management and Administration, to Craig Livingstone, dated March 8, 1994 at
dated May 18, 1994 at 10:25 a.m.
3:40.
262 White House production CGE 054255. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone,
340 Marceca deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 150.
dated May 12, 1994 at 9 a.m.
241/d, pp. 151-52.
363 White House production CGE 054254. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone,
342 Letter from Livingstone to Secretary of Defense Perry, dated 3/17/94; White House produc-
dated June 28, 1994 at 9:05 a.m.
tion 55749.
254 White House production CGE 054249. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingatone,
343 Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 43.
dated January 11, 1995 at 1:41 p.m.
344 Marceca deposition, p. 152.
365 White House production CGE 054265. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone,
345 Marceca V. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, p. 10 (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994).
dated September 13, 1995 at 10:43 a.m.
See, Marceca V. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition
366 White House production CGE 054248. Message from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingatone,
p. 10.
dated December 19, 1995 at 11:43.
54
55
in contact with Livingstone and participated in numerous advance
"Marvin:" Will send over file on Marceca. 359 No last name is indi-
trips for the administration.
cated on the message; however, Marvin Krislov was an Associate
Mr. Marceca also contacted Livingstone regarding issues with his
Counsel to the President in December 1994. It is odd that Living-
FBI background investigation. Mr. Marceca visited Livingstone at
stone would have Marceca's file sitting out on a table in the vault
the Office of Personnel Security on September 11, 1994. During
8 months after his detail ended
that visit, Marceca reviewed his own FBI background file. He ex-
Mr. Marceca admitted under oath that he had read his own back-
plained that Livingstone did not allow him to read it, rather he ac-
ground investigation after he no longer worked in the Office of Per-
cidentally saw it:
sonnel Security. The information which he read in his background
Question. How did you happen to see the report?
file was the basis for the lawsuit he filed on November 14, 1994
Answer. I was visiting the White House and I was in
against Judge Stephenson. 360 Marceca's actions exemplify why it is
Mr. Livingstone's office, and I pulled out a-We were in a
imperative that the Office of Personnel Security employ only indi-
conversation. He took a telephone call and turned his back,
viduals who are professional, circumspect and have demonstrated
turned around to his desk. There was newspaper there. He
a sense of responsibility and discretion.
was on the phone four or five minutes. And I reached up
After learning more about the backgrounds of the individuals in
and pulled the newspaper out and background investiga-
control of the function of requesting FBI background files, it is all
tion spilled on the floor. I picked up the background inves-
the more difficult to believe that the unauthorized ordering of hun-
tigations, and the last background investigation to pick up,
dreds of FBI files of prior Republican officials was an innocent mis-
put back in the stack, which happened to have been all
take. Mr. Marceca's explanations and excuses are not credible, and
rolled up, was my background investigation. I opened that
his actions merit more investigation. 361
up, and when I saw my name-and I saw-I briefly read
what the FBI said. I turned a couple pages back, and I
IV. INITIAL DISCOVERY OF "TONY'S FILES"
saw [Mrs. Stephenson], what she said
I looked at what Mrs. Stephenson said briefly. I read
Although the public did not learn of the White House's unauthor-
that, and I flipped it back and I saw what Ms. Montag
ized request of over 400 FBI background files until June 1996,
said.
White House employees knew about it since the fall of 1994. Lisa
Question. Okay. Now
Wetzl, Livingstone's 22 year old Executive Assistant, discovered
Answer. I then put the file back underneath the rest of
"an awful lot of" extra files which Marceca had ordered while pre-
the BI's and continued to read the newspaper until Mr.
paring to complete the Update Project. 362 There was a general un-
Livingstone rejoined the conversation.
derstanding in the office that the bottom row of files in the vault,
*
was "Tony's row." 363 Ed Hughes, assistant in the Office of White
Question. And so what you did when you picked up that
House Security, explained that he questioned Wetzl about the files,
report, opened it up and read it, you committed a criminal
"I think Lisa had explained that they were simply Tony's files.
act, did you not?
They were files that she was not sure what they were doing there,
but they were just kind of there, taking up space." 364
*
When Ms. Wetzl began looking through "Tony's files," she recog-
Answer. No sir, I was cleared to look at background in-
nized that some of the files had been mistakenly ordered after
vestigations.
identifying Marlin Fitzwater's name. 365 She knew that he did not
Question. But not yours?
work at the White House anymore. 366 Ms. Wetzl told Livingstone
Answer. Sir, that was the fickle finger of fate that [re-
about her discovery: "I said, Craig, Tony ordered all these files of
port] would fall on the floor.
previous administration peòple that we don't need.' 367 Ms. Wetzl
Question. Is that not a violation of your code of ethics?
White House production CGE 054271. Message from "Marvin" to Craig Livingstone, dated
Answer. I don't believe so, sir. It was an accidental dis-
December 16, 1994 at 11:42.
357
360 Marceca V. Stephenson, Na A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994)
covery.
361 Mr. Marceca's own handwritten notes show that he was aware that he was responsible for
After Marceca's "accidental discovery" of his FBI file during his
instructing the Secret Service to deactivate prior administration staff. Marceca document pro-
duction (unnumbered) Handwritten notes of Anthony Marceca, dated August 9, 1993.
visit to the Office of Personnel Security in September, he contacted
362 Wetzl deposition, pp. 41-43. Ms. Wetzl knew about the row of files which the office referred
Livingstone about the FBI again. On October 6, 1994 Marceca left
to as "Tony's row" or "Tony's files." She was not aware that the files were of prior Republican
a message for Livingstone stating, "Got a visit from the FBI." 358
administration officials until she began to review the files in the fall. Id., p. 67.
Wetzl deposition, P. 65. Ms. Wetzl stated, "The row after row 15 was separate. That was
On December 16, 1994, Livingstone received a message from
Tony's stuff, Tony's project. We called it Tony's row."
364 Edward Hughes interview, August 13, 1996, p. 17.
365 Marlin Fitzwater was President Bush's Press Secretary and Deputy Press Secretary to
Marceca V. Stephenson, No. A 94-CA-775-JN, (W.D. Tx. filed Nov. 1994), deposition of An-
President Reagan.
thony Marceca, February 20, 1995, pp. 114-17.
366 Wetzl deposition, p. 43.
358 White House production CGE 054268. M
ge from Tony Marceca to Craig Livingstone,
367 Id., p. 63.
dated October 6, 1996 at 12:35.
56
57
testified that Livingstone had no reaction to her statement, nor did
sponsibility of checking the Standard Form 86 (SF-86) for accuracy
he instruct her to do anything with the files. 368
and notifying White House staff of any errors. 377 Only 2 months
Mr. Livingstone testified that he knew that his office had re-
later, Wetzl was hired as a full-time staff assistant in the office.
quested Billy Dale's file within "the last year or possibly two." He
Ms. Wetzl testified that her responsibilities "didn't significantly
also believed that he produced Dale's file to Associate White House
change except that I was now there for the long-term so I could,
Counsel Neil Eggleston in response to the GAO investigation of the
you know, really get to work on things that needed to get accom-
Travel Office, which was completed on May 2, 1994. Mr. Living-
plished.' 378 She continued to "help to correct and to submit to the
stone admitted that he had read the contents of Billy Dale's file,
FBI the Standard Form 86 for new employees. 379 Before Ms.
but stated that it was in the course of responding to the GAO in-
quiry. Mr. Livingstone testified that he saw the request dated De-
Wetzl came to the White House, she had never even seen an SF-
cember 20, 1993 for Billy Dale's FBI report, at that time. 369 Mr.
86, however, once Livingstone hired her, she was correcting them
for the FBI.³⁸⁰
Livingstone was therefore aware that Dale's file was requested 7
months after he was fired from the White House Travel Office. 370
Ms. Wetzl testified that Nancy Gemmell, a holdover employee in
Ms. Wetzl set about her task of completing the Update Project,
the Office of Personnel Security, trained her to read SF-86
leaving the files in the vault SO that she could refer to them if she
forms. 381 Ms. Gemmell, however, had never read an SF-86 before
discovered a name she might need. 371 She never consulted with
the Clinton administration took office. 382 Ms. Gemmell only re-
anyone else nor did she ever contact the FBI regarding the files on
cently learned the procedures to follow in checking an SF-86 for
former Reagan and Bush officials. According to Ms. Wetzl, the en-
completeness. In prior administrations, only the Director of the of-
tire row of approximately 430 Republican FBI background inves-
fice was permitted to review the FBI background files and SF-86
tigation files in "Tony's row" simply remained in the office vault.
forms. 383 Ms. Dannenhauer, however, was not retained on staff for
Sometime between December 1994 and February 1995, Wetzl
a sufficient amount of time to train the new Director and employ-
boxed up the files and archived them with the Office of Records
ees, as she was during the transition from the Ford to Carter ad-
Management (ORM). 372 These boxes remained in ORM until ORM
ministration. 384 Ms. Dannenhauer explained, "[Mr. Livingstone]
analyst Tom Taggart reviewed the documents in response to the
was not there really long while I was there. I only worked with him
committee's December 1995 request. Mr. Taggart notified Associate
probably part-time. He would come in and maybe be there a half
White House Counsel Natalie Williams that Billy Dale's FBI back-
a day
385
ground file was among the documents archived by the Office of Per-
Mr. Livingstone did not have the proper training necessary to
sonnel Security. Ms. Williams testified that she never reviewed the
run the Office of Personnel Security. He was certainly not capable
file or notified the committee that Billy Dale's FBI background in-
of training his staff in procedures that he himself did not know.
vestigation had been archived by Livingstone's office in December
Without practical work experience or training, Ms. Wetzl should
1995. 373 The document was not produced until May 30, 1996,
not have been placed in a position of decisionmaking in an office
under threat of a contempt vote against White House Counsel to
which handled sensitive information. The fact that nobody in the
the President, Jack Quinn.
office even thought to return the improperly obtained files to the
A. LISA WETZL'S BACKGROUND
FBI shows the lack of knowledge required to work in the Office of
Personnel Security. Mr. Livingstone testified that the reason he did
1. Ms. Wetzl, who had no experience, should not have assumed the
not contact the FBI about the binful of files on prior Republican ad-
amount of responsibility she undertook
ministration officials was, "We were never instructed to return ma-
Prior to the Clinton administration, Jane Dannenhauer, the
terials back to the FBI." 386 Neither Livingstone nor Wetzl had the
former Director of the Office of Personnel Security, never allowed
ability to think on their own and make the determination that a
detailees from outside the White House or interns to work in the
Democratic administration should not have hundreds of Republican
Security Office because of the sensitive nature of the files and pa-
administration files.
perwork. 374 As with the majority of Livingstone's assistants, Lisa
Wetzl came to the Office of Personnel Security as one of the first
interns in June 1993 after graduating from college in May of the
same year. 375 Initially, Wetzl provided general office support, an-
p. 14.
swering phones and typing forms. 376 She quickly assumed the re-
360 Id., p. 15. After Lisa Wetzl left the Office of Personnel Security, Jonathan Denbo, a recent
college graduate, took over the responsibility of reviewing the SF-86 forms. Jonathan Denbo
interview, September 4, 1996, p. 5.
Livingstone deposition, June 14, 1996, pp. 81-83.
369 Id., P. 81.
Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 46.
PP- 81-83.
371 Wetzl deposition, p. 66.
Wetzl deposition, PP. 67-68.
384 Id., p. 38. During the Ford/Carter transition, Ms. Dannenhauer and one of her assistants
373 Williams deposition, July 31, 1996, p. 24.
remained for 2½ months to train the new staff members and await a new Director, thereby
Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996 p. 81.
ensuring a smooth transition.
3751d., p. 7.
Id., P. 82.
37⁶ld., p. 10.
366 Security of FBI Files, hearing, June 26, 1996 p. 138.
58
59
2. Limited inquiry
the most sensitive information, apparently without concern by the
Ms. Wetzl's FBI background investigation was completed and the
White House Counsel's Office. Then, 4 months before her departure
results were provided to the White House on September 3, 1993.
to take on a position requiring the utmost confidentiality, Mr. Liv-
For reasons unknown, the Counsel's Office did not submit her re-
ingstone undertakes the review of her background to clear up the
port to the Secret Service for adjudication until 7 months later, on
"drug usage discrepancy." 392
April 11, 1994. She received her White House permanent pass
shortly thereafter, on April 25, 1994. Mr. Livingstone requested
B. LISA WETZL DISCOVERS "TONY'S FILES"
CIA "compartmented clearance" for Ms. Wetzl and she received
three clearances above the level of top secret in August 1994. The
1. Wetzl to complete "Update Project"
committee never received any explanation for these delays. Ms.
Originally, Marceca planned to return to the White House and
Wetzl continued to work in the Office of Personnel Security
complete the Update Project with the assistance of others in the of-
throughout the year processing and correcting incoming SF-86
fice. 393 Mr. Marceca however, never completed the project and it
forms, processing pass requests and maintaining the weekly access
fell by the wayside for close to 10 months until Lisa Wetzl took it
and pass extension lists. 387
upon herself to finish it. 394 Ms. Wetzl did not feel comfortable un-
On April 10, 1995, Livingstone notified the FBI of an "apparent
dertaking the Update Project while she was only a staff assist-
discrepancy between information on Ms. Wetzl's Standard Form
ant. 395 She stated, "I started-when I was promoted to executive
(SF) 86 and the information provided during her initial interview
assistant is when I, you know, felt I could start this project on my
with the FBI Special Agent." 388 Special Agent Gary Aldrich testi-
own and get it over with, because I knew it had to be done. That
fied that he was the "lead agent on the Wetzl investigation." A
was in the fall of '94." 396
"limited inquiry" was initiated by the FBI and the results provided
to Craig Livingstone on May 26, 1995. 389 FBI general counsel ad-
2. Marlin Fitzwater, or too many files
vised the committee that the reason for the "limited inquiry" was
Once Wetzl looked into what Marceca had been working on, she
a discrepancy regarding drug usage. 390 Mr. Livingstone then
realized that there were problems. 397 She described what she dis-
asked the CTA to review Ms. Wetzl's new limited inquiry results,
covered when she began looking through the bin in the vault which
and her three CIA compartmented access clearances continued
Marceca used:
without further inquiry. Ms. Wetzl left the Office of Personnel Se-
curity in September 1995, to take the position as the Confidential
Tony had separated his files from the rest of the files,
I assume for easier access for him. I looked at those stacks
Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Togo D.
West, Jr. 391
of files and I-first thing I realized was that there were an
The committee has not been able to determine, due to Living-
awful lot of them, considering they were only A through G.
stone's refusal to appear at a deposition, why Mr. Livingstone sud-
And just working for the office-it had been a couple of
denly ordered a limited inquiry on Ms. Wetzl's "discrepancy" that
years at least-I didn't think that there were that many
holdovers.
398
had apparently been in her background for 18 months. During
these 18 months, she had top secret and CIA clearances to review
When Wetzl began looking through the names on the files, she re-
alized that some of them were "mistakenly" requested. 399 Ms.
387 White House document production, CGE 54939.
Wetzl recognized Marlin Fitzwater's name on a file and knew that
388 Letter from FBI general counsel, Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 24, 1996.
he did not work at the White House anymore. 400
389 White House document production, CGE 54392.
390 Deposition of Gary Aldrich, 7/18/96, p. 53. In response to committee questioning, Agent Al-
Ms. Wetzl described her first reaction as that of exasperation
drich described an instance in which:
when she realized that she would have to remedy the problem. 401
There was a staff member who contended that the information on the FBI summary was in-
Ms. Wetzl never stated that she was alarmed or concerned that
correct. It was on a case that I completed, and communication was made to me first about this,
I think. This individual worked in the Security Office.
files had been ordered on individuals who were not seeking access
Well, there was a contention, about information that I had submitted, that the information
to the White House.
contained in the report was incorrect. I was asked to-essentially, I was asked to go back and
review this in the context that if I could-if I could see that it could be possible that it was
Similarly, when Wetzl approached Livingstone about the unau-
incorrect, could I change it? This was spoken to me by Craig Livingstone.
thorized files, he had no marked reaction. 402 Ms. Wetzl testified
I never had a request like this before, and so I went back to my-to the case file and I pulled
the report. 1 reviewed whatever material was in the file that could help me make a determina-
that she told Livingstone that, "Tony ordered all these extra files,
tion. After I reviewed the material, I could not determine that I had made an error, and 80 I
reported back to Mr. Livingstone that I had reviewed the material; I didn't think I made an
error.
392 July 24, 1996 letter from Howard Shapiro to Chairman Clinger.
He then spoke to-either spoke to Jim Bourke or to Tom Renaghan or both about this, con-
Marceca deposition, p. 153.
tending that the matter, in his opinion was not settled.
Wetzl deposition, p. 66.
I was. then contacted by my supervisor, Tom Renaghan, who asked me once again to review
396 Wetzl deposition, p. 66.
it. 1 reviewed it. I suggested to him that there was no change that I could make, and that is
206
Id.
the-that was the end as far as I knew. I have since learned that an agent was directed to come
Id., P. 41.
to the White House to reinterview the person.
398
Agent Greg Schwarz. And I can't tell you
Id.
what happened after that, but I do know that this person had since moved shortly thereafter
399 p. 43.
to another agency. Aldrich deposition, pp. 68-69.
400 Wetzl deposition, p. 43.
Wetzl deposition, p. 8.
402 Id., p. 58.
60
61
what a pain." 403 The only thing she can remember Livingstone
Ms. WETZL. Yes.
saying was, "Oh, Tony," or a statement to that effect. 404 Mr. Liv-
ingstone and Ms. Wetzl were the two most senior staff members in
the office and neither of them found it notable that hundreds of
Senator THOMPSON. I guess I am just asking the ques-
files were ordered on prior administration officials, alleging that
tion-you had these files, you saw them, you saw that
they had no idea that they ought to return the files. 405 Mr. Living-
there were many, many more than what was appropriate,
stone described one situation where the office would return files to
and simultaneously you had a list that apparently had the
the FBI:
same characteristics. It just occurs to me that you might
Sir, if I could be specific, often-not very often but often,
have wanted to compare that list of the files to see wheth-
we would get-for John D. Smith, we would get John S.
er or not you were holding a list of the files that you were
Smith's report sent to us by mistake by the FBI. Now, that
going to have to be going through and working from, and
we would send back to the FBI if we knew that we were
that might have helped you determine what Tony had
requesting John D. Smith versus John S. Smith, assuming
used to get those files.
they had no business ever at the White House. 406
Ms. WETZL. Well, at that point, I didn't really-the mis-
take had already been made. I didn't care what
Tony
Livingstone's attempts to make a distinction between the FBI send-
had done
ing the wrong file and the White House requesting files improperly
are in conflict. It is disingenuous for Livingstone to maintain that
he believed that the two situations called for a different response.
Senator THOMPSON. The decision as to what to put in
the burn bag and what to archive-is that something that
C. THE "UPDATE PROJECT" IS REDONE BY LISA WETZL
you were instructed on or something you made a decision
1. Wetzl destroys the Secret Service list
on yourself?
Ms. WETZL. It was something I made a decision on my-
Ms. Wetzl testified that upon discovering the unauthorized files
self.
ordered by Marceca she began to look around the vault for the ma-
terials which both Marceca and Nancy Gemmell used in the course
Although Wetzl testified that her understanding was that "all pa-
of the Update Project. 407 Ms. Wetzl found a list which she believed
perwork that we didn't need anymore that we wanted to put in
had been left by Nancy Gemmell, she explained, "I knew imme-
storage, it all had to go to Records Management." 410 The materials
diately that it was out of date. It was extremely long and appeared
Marceca was using never went to Records Management. It was de-
to contain hundreds of names from past administrations.' 408 Ms.
stroyed. With that act, Ms. Wetzl eliminated the only real evidence
Wetzl proceeded to destroy that list, the only evidence which might
of exactly what Marceca had in his possession when he ordered the
have provided some explanation as to why all of these files were
hundreds of files on prior Republican administration officials.
ordered.
2. Process by which the project is completed
Wetzl was questioned about why she would have destroyed the
list in a hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Ms. Wetzl testified that after she discovered Marceca's "extra
files," she proceeded with Project Update. She began working off of
Senator THOMPSON. All right, so it could have possibly
a list from the Secret Service "of pass-holders" and went through
been the same list that Mr. Marceca used to obtain all
the list to identify names that no longer should have access to the
those improper files? Is it possible?
White House complex. 411 When Wetzl discovered a name of an in-
Ms. WETZL. Anything is possible, yes.
dividual that was no longer an active passholder, she notified the
Senator THOMPSON. So you had the files there and you
Secret Service to remove the name from the list. Ms. Wetzl also
had the list there, the Gemmell list?
cross referenced her list with updated lists from supervisors of the
Ms. WETZL. Yes.
departments within the White House complex, 412 Because she
Senator THOMPSON. And you decided to destroy the
thought all of the other lists were "hopelessly outdated," she simply
Gemmell list, or put it in the burn bag. Is that correct?
started over creating her own list.
Unlike her predecessor Mr. Marceca, Wetzl testified that she did
not read the new Project Update files that she received for con-
408 Wetzl deposition, p. 59. Ms. Wetzl testified, "Nancy, like 1 said before, had briefly tried
tent. 413 She merely looked at the top of the first page to determine
to explain to me before her impending departure how to do everything, and it was my under-
when the individual would need a 5-year reinvestigation and then
standing that we wanted to put in storage, it all had to go to Records Management; Security
of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, PP. 137-138. Mr. Livingatone testified, "Sir, I am glad you
"filed them."
asked that question. The only information that I ever got-and I can't speak for the rest of the
péople'here, of course-the only information I ever got about what we were to do with FBI files
409 White House Access to FBI Summaries: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judi.
was to safeguard them, ensure that they were remanded to Records Management at the end
of the administration
We were never instructed to return materials back to the FBI."
ciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 28, 1996 pp. 167-171.
406 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, p. 138.
410 Deposition of Lisa Wetzl, p. 59.
407 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996 p. 46.
411 Deposition of Lisa Wetzl, P. 53.
408 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 26, 1996, pp. 46-47.
Id., p. 55.
62
63
3. Extra files are boxed up and archived
of Dale's background investigation file, neither had any intention
The group of files ordered by Marceca were gathered together by
of including it in the production of materials to the committee.
Wetzl sometime between December 1994 and February 1995. Ms.
Wetzl testified that she "mentioned it" to Livingstone that files
2. White House Counsel determines that FBI file is a personnel file
from the previous administration had been ordered and that she
may have told him that "Marlin Fitzwater's file is there.' 414
In a June 10, 1996 letter to Chairman Clinger, Jack Quinn al-
These files remained in the White House Security Office vault,
leged that he recalled telling the chairman during the meeting that
separated from the other files for "a long period of time." Ms. Wetzl
"Billy Dale's personnel file" was among the group of personnel/vet-
explained that she left them in the office until she figured out
ting records being withheld by the White House at that time. 419
"whose we needed and whose we didn't.' 415 At some point, Wetzl
Mr. Quinn's statement is not true. The discussion revolved around
placed all of "Tony's files" in boxes to be taken to the archives. She
David Watkins personnel file, a central figure in the Travel Office
typed up a list of the names of each individual whose file was
affair. The committee was never told that Billy Dale's file was
placed in the box and took the boxes to the Office of Records Man-
among the files being withheld and certainly was not informed that
agement located next door to the Office of Personnel Security. The
the White House was withholding a December 1993 request for his
files remained at the Office of Records Management until they
FBI background investigation file. Moreover, Quinn never distin-
were retrieved by White House Counsel Sally Paxton at the behest
guished between a "personnel" file and an FBI background inves-
of Jane Sherburne on June 6, 1996.
tigation file. These are very different files that seem to blend to-
gether in the White House's explanation.
V. WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE DISCOVERY OF FBI FILES
Mr. Quinn's letter, however, evidences another contradiction. Al-
A. BILLY DALE'S FILE
though the letter states that he informed Chairman Clinger about
the Billy Dale file at a February 15, 1996 meeting, Special Counsel
1. Office of Records Management responds to subpoena
Jane Sherburne deposition testimony conflicts with Quinn's state-
On December 19, 1995, White House Special Counsel to the
ment. Ms. Sherburne testified that she did not even know about
President, Jane Sherburne, Associate Counsel Natalie Williams
Billy Dale's FBI file until June 4, 1996. 420 Ms. Sherburne attended
and Special Associate Counsel Jonathan Yarowsky distributed a
the February 15 meeting with Quinn.
memorandum to selected White House staff regarding the commit-
tee's request for certain documents relating to the White House
3. Natalie Williams passes on information to Wendy White
Travel Office firings. 416 Shortly thereafter, Williams was notified
In an effort to keep documents from the committee, the White
by Tom Taggart, of the Office of Records Management, that in pre-
House conducted an extensive operation of reviewing documents in
paring documents for release to the committee, he had discovered
order to ensure that damaging information was not released. The
the FBI background file of Billy Ray Dale. 417 In a hand-written
White House Counsel's Office hired additional staff just to review,
note to his file dated December 27, 1995, and signed by Taggart,
scrutinize, redact, and finally, produce documents the committee
he memorialized his conversation with Williams regarding Billy
requested. 421
Ray Dale's FBI background investigation file:
Wendy White was one of those hired to assist in the document
Today, on 12/27/95, I notified Natalie Williams about
review. Ms. White was hired as Special Associate Counsel in mid-
Billy Dales FBI (retired) report (background check & vet-
February 1996 to assist with the production of materials to the
ting) that we received with other files from Craig Living-
committee. According to White, she learned of the Dale file as soon
stone. She said that this file involved personal and person-
as she began work at the White House.
nel privacy issues-would not be sent to the Committee,
Shortly after I started, Natalie Williams, who had been
file. nor would it be released. She is not interested in seeing
working on the subpoena response, returned to private
practice. Before she left, she provided me with certain in-
/s/ (Tom Taggart, Jr.)
formation I needed in order to complete the production.
12/27/1995 418
During this transition period, she advised me that the Of-
As the note makes clear, while both the White House Counsel's Of-
fice of Records Management maintained a Billy Dale file
fice and the Office of Records Management knew of the existence
responsive to the subpoena that should be retrieved from
ORM if the committee and White House reached agree-
414Id., p. 63.
ment that the file should be produced for in camera review
p. 58.
White House document production, CGE 42825-42827. The memorandum only asks for
or otherwise. 422
documents "created as of May 31, 1995" to be provided to the committee and provides a limited
definition of the "White House Travel Office matter" for purposes of determining which docu-
ments are responsive.
419 Letter from Jack Quinn, Chief White House Counsel, to William F. Clinger, Jr., June 10,
417 Natalie Williams deposition, p. 19.
1996.
418 Handwritten memorandum of Tom Taggart, Jr., December 27, 1995, produced to the com-
420 Deposition of Jane Sherburne, July 23, 1996 p. 71.
mittee in a July 18, 1996 letter from Jane Sherburne to Chairman Clinger.
421 White House document DF 780643-654, task list created by Jane Sherburne.
422 Statement of Wendy S. White concerning production of Billy Dale FBI file, July 18, 1996.
64
65
In several instances where the White House produced documents
in partial compliance with the committee's subpoena, the Billy Dale
House 7 months before the request, and had no need for White
file was not included.
House access.
4. Wendy White's handling of Billy Dale file
2. Chairman Clinger's statement on the Billy Dale file
a. May 21, 1996-orders the Dale file from OPS
Chairman Clinger first learned that the White House had ob-
In early May 1996, after the committee was forced to hold Quinn
tained the FBI background file of Dale from the White House May
in contempt, the White House decided to comply with the commit-
30, 1996 document production. He made no public statement on the
matter until June 5, 1996.
tee's subpoena of January 11, 1996. Responding to this action, the
White House began to prepare documents for release to the com-
At a press conference to express his outrage on this matter,
Chairman Clinger released the memorandum from Nussbaum re-
mittee. Ms. White wrote of this preparation of documents, "On May
21, 1996, I had the Office of Personnel Security retrieve the Billy
questing the FBI background file of Billy Ray Dale. Chairman
Ray Dale file from the Office of Records Management. At my direc-
Clinger asked, "Can there be any legitimate reason why President
tion, the file was then copied and prepared for production. 423 Ms.
Clinton's White House Counsel requested the confidential FBI
Sherburne wrote a July 18, 1996 letter to the chairman explaining
background checks a full 7 months after, I repeat after, Billy Dale
that she and Ms. White had no discussions about a Billy Dale FBI
was fired and unjustly accused and smeared with allegations of
background file; rather they discussed a personnel file. 424 Ms.
wrongdoing? And yet, for a reason that has not yet been deter-
Sherburne's own letter makes clear that she understood there to be
mined, the FBI complied with the request.' 428
a difference between personnel files and FBI background files, and
Out of concern for the individuals whose privacy had been vio-
that she did not know of the Billy Dale FBI background file. 425 The
lated, Chairman Clinger took steps to commence a full investiga-
White House steadfastly maintains, however, that at the Febuary
tion of the White House's improper actions in obtaining this and
15, 1996 meeting they were discussing FBI background files, before
possibly other FBI background files.
Sherburne claims to have known of the Billy Dale file. White
VI. FBI INVOLVEMENT IN THE FILES MATTER
House Associate Counsel Natalie Williams also believes she likely
told Sherburne about the Billy Dale file. 426
On June 5, 1996, Chairman Clinger telephoned FBI Director
White told the staff of the committee, "I gave the original file
Louis Freeh upon discovery of the White House document request-
back to the Office of Personnel Security on May 23, 1996 to be re-
ing the background file of Billy Ray Dale. Chairman Clinger, in a
turned to ORM. The White House produced the Billy Dale file to
press conference, notified the public of this event and released the
the committee, together with the other documents, on the morning
request form, the document used by the White House to obtain FBI
of May 30, 1996. 427
background investigations, from the White House. 429 Director
B. CHAIRMAN CLINGER'S JUNE 5, 1996 STATEMENT
Freeh immediately sought a meeting with FBI General Counsel
Howard M. Shapiro and Deputy General Counsel Tom Kelley. 430
1. The committee receives 1,000 pages
When he could not locate Shapiro, Freeh sought answers from
On May 30, 1996, the White House produced 1,000 documents to
Kelley on how background files of former White House employees
the committee in order to avoid a vote by the House of Representa-
could land in the White House. 431
tives on the contempt citation against Quinn. That production in-
A. DIRECTOR FREEH INITIATES INVESTIGATION
cluded Dale's FBI background file and the memorandum from Ber-
nard Nussbaum, then Counsel to the President, to the FBI liaison
According to Kelley, Freeh showed him the document that Chair-
requesting the file. That was the first time the committee learned
man Clinger released and asked Kelley to undertake an initial in-
of the White House improperly requesting, maintaining, and with-
vestigation of the White House request for Billy Ray Dale's file. 432
holding the FBI background file of Billy Ray Dale.
Kelley told the committee that "[the Director] asked me to come
Investigators for the committee were reviewing the White House
over and he explained to me that this release that Congressman
documents when they came upon memoranda of an extremely per-
Clinger had made, he showed me a copy of the document and he
sonal nature about Dale and his family. Affixed to these documents
said he would like to determine how that could have happened, and
was a December 20, 1993 memorandum from Nussbaum to the FBI
dispatched me to find out. 433
requesting a copy of a "previously requested report" for the back-
ground file of Billy Dale. Mr. Dale was dismissed from the White
Statement of William F. Clinger, Jr., June 5, 1996.
The FBI file, itself, was never made public by the committee. However, before the White
House finally released documents to the committee in compliance with the subpoena, it made
"Statement of Wendy S. White concerning production of Billy Dale FBI file, July 18, 1996.
many of the 1,000 pages of documents available to the press. The committee has been unable
"*"July 18, 1996 letter from Special Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne to Chairman
to ascertain whether sensitive, background information on Billy Dale was included in the mate-
Clinger.
rials made available to the press.
Id.
430 Kelley deposition, PP. 22-23
426 Williams deposition, p. 18.
431/d.
427 Jane Sherburne letter, July 18, 1996.
432 Id.
433
66
67
1. Tom Kelley's initial investigation
should undertake the investigation. Director Freeh assured Shapiro
Kelley recognized the source of the document as the memoran-
that he should conduct the investigation.440
dum used by the White House to request an FBI background inves-
Generally, the Office of Professional Responsibility would inves-
tigation and went to discuss the document with the Executive
tigate allegations of wrongdoing within the FBI. The FBI Office of
Agencies Sub-unit of the Information Resources Division at the
Professional Responsibility investigates allegations of criminal or
FBI. Kelley spoke with SPIN Unit Chief Jim Bourke, as well as
ethical misconduct by employees of the FBI. The FBI also has an
Jan George, and Formy Duvall, of the Executive Agencies Sub-unit
Inspection Division. The Inspection Division is charged with ensur-
of the Information Resources Division. 434
ing that the FBI conducts its business according to the law and
David Kitchen, recently appointed Chief of the Executive Agen-
regulation. 441
cies Sub-unit, soon became involved in Kelley's inquiry. Mr. Kelley
In addition, the Department of Justice Inspector General would
received the background file of Billy Dale from Bourke. Mr. Bourke
be available to investigate the circumstances surrounding the im-
had already retrieved the file, aware of the controversy surround-
proper release of Billy Dale's file. The Inspector General enforces
ing it. Kelley soon learned that the file had been disseminated to
criminal and civil laws, regulations and ethical standards within
the White House on January 6, 1994, in response to a December
the Department of Justice by investigating individuals and organi-
20, 1993 request form. 435 This was more than 2 years before the
zations who allegedly are involved in financial, contractual or
White House mentioned the file to the committee.
criminal misconduct in Department of Justice programs and oper-
When background material is released to a Federal agency, it is
ations. Director Freeh did not believe that the Office of Professional
reviewed by the FBI for information that should not be released.
Responsibility or the Department of Justice Inspector General were
On the back of each page that is released, a stamp is marked indi-
capable of conducting an investigation "properly" or "swiftly." He
cating that information in the file, or the file, itself, has been re-
chose his friend, Howard Shapiro, to conduct the investigation.
leased. In addition to the stamp, the date of the release and the
2. Howard Shapiro takes over the investigation
initials of the analyst who reviewed the file for release among oth-
ers, are added. Mr. Kelley noticed that "there were quite a series
On the afternoon that Shapiro was instructed to undertake an
of [pages] that were transmitted.' 436
investigation of the events surrounding the specious request by the
Mr. Kelley learned from Jan George that, instead of putting the
White House of an already dismissed employee's FBI background
White House request for the file in the file, itself, the FBI retained
file. Shapiro watched a video tape of Chairman Clinger's June 5
the form in separate files.437 The file of White House requests had
press conference on the discovery of the White House request for
been retained only for 1 to 2 years, in response to the growing
Billy Dale's FBI background file as a way to acquaint himself with
number of files requested. 438 No copies of the White House request
the issues. 443
forms had heretofore been retained.
According to Shapiro, Paul Cignoli, chief of the FBI's Civil Dis-
Mr. Kelley reported to Director Freeh and General Counsel Sha-
covery Review Unit, took the initiative to determine whether or not
piro that the file had been sent to the White House. Director Freeh
the background files of other fired Travel Office employees had
instructed Shapiro to undertake a more extensive investigation into
been disseminated to the White House. 444 Shapiro learned that the
background file of Brasseux had also been obtained by the White
the matter and prepare to release the facts to the public. The Di-
House. Shapiro advised Director Freeh of this fact and the Director
rector asked that the report be made to the Director and to the
advised Chairman Clinger.
Deputy Attorney General. The Director told Shapiro that the gen-
eral counsel's office was the best place to conduct the investigation,
B. FBI REPORT
because only then could the Director ensure that the investigation
On June 14, 1996, the FBI released the Report of the FBI Gen-
was done "properly and
swiftly." 439
eral Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File Information to the
When he was first given the task of investigating the dissemina-
White House. The report found that the White House had sought
tion of FBI files, Shapiro asked Director Freeh if he thought that
and received hundreds of FBI background investigations, "without
the Office of Professional Responsibility or Investigations Division
justification." Director of the FBI Louis Freeh stated that the
White House's actions constituted, "egregious violations of pri-
4341d.; PP. 23-25.
"Id., PP. 23-25.
vacy.'
446
4361d., p. 27.
"Id
4°Id., p. 29.
Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File
441 Deposition of Thomas A. Kelley, pp. 43-44.
Information to the White House, June 14, 1996, at charts tab 16. According to a report written
Shapiro deposition, p. 28.
by Shapiro, in the first year of the Clinton administration, the actual number of files requested
Shapiro deposition, p. 25.
by the White House was 10,197, more than 3 times the number requested the previous year
by the Bush administration. The average number of files requested by the Clinton administra-
48/d, p. 24.
tion each month was 850, more than 3 times the monthly average of Bush administration re-
Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File
quests.
Information to the White House, June 14, 1996. Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal
Deposition of Howard M. Shapiro, July 30, 1996, p. 29.
Bureau of Investigation.
68
69
The report also summarized the previous practices that led to
these violations. There was an unusuably large number of requests
According to the FBI report, several offices in the White House
for FBI background investigations from the White House. The FBI
can request a name check or a background investigation: the Exec-
report recounts the dramatic increase in requests from the White
utive Office of the President, the National Security Council, the
House during the years 1993 through 1996.447 The rise in number
Counsel to the President, or the Office of Personnel Security. The
of requests is attributed to several factors. 448 At the end of each
requests from the Office of Personnel Security, the office headed by
administration, all files are removed from the White House for
D. Craig Livingstone, were sent under the name of the White
placement in the Presidential library of the retiring President.
House Counsel. No signature was affixed to the forms sent by the
Office of Personnel Security. 452
Therefore, in order to reconstruct the files necessary to accommo-
date access for career civil servants in the White House, new ad-
The report explains that the forms are picked up by an FBI cou-
ministrations must obtain previous reports filed on those civil serv-
rier and delivered to the Special Inquiry and General Background
Investigations Unit of the FBI's Personnel Division. The forms that
ants.
According to the FBI report, when an administration has a
are the subject of this controversy sought "copies of previous re-
ports." A request for a copy of a previous report is submitted to the
change in party, the number of files it must order is greater than
Executive Agencies Sub-Unit of the Executive Agencies, Personnel
when the preceding and succeding parties are of the same political
and Administrative Support Unit of the Information Resources Di-
party. The FBI could provide no evidence that the change in politi-
vision. That office has a staff of 36: 18 research analysts; 11 file
cal party of the administration produced a greater demand for
assistants; and 7 clerks or typists. 453 Two members of this staff are
background files than a change in administration within the same
assigned to the "White House Desk."
political party. Particularly since the request for files at issue were
When the White House Desk receives requests for previous re-
mostly of people in the political offices where there were very few
ports, it obtains the FBI file number of the subject of the request.
holdovers, there should have been few requests for files of White
Once the file number is found, all background investigation files
House Office staff.
are obtained by the White House Desk. According to Shapiro's re-
Director Freeh criticized the Clinton administration's abuse of
port, these files contain all raw data used to compile summaries
the FBI in the accumulation of FBI background files. On the occa-
and reports. To comply with a request for previous reports, the an-
sion of the release of the report, Freeh, promising to prevent future
alyst first confirms that the files received are for the person for
abuse, said:
whom the White House has requested information. Then, the ana-
The prior system of providing files to the White House
lyst determines what information to send to the White House.
relied on good faith and honor. Unfortunately, the FBI and
Memoranda, interviews, and other documents previously prepared
I were victimized. I should have known before last week
in conjunction with the file are copied, as are any letters prepared
about a decades old system that failed. The FBI and I fell
for the previous transmittal of this information. The original docu-
victim to my lack of vigilance, and this failure to exercise
ments that are copied are listed on a "pull card," and stamped on
proper management controls also affected the privacy
the back with the initials of the analyst on the back of the file.
rights of many persons. I deeply regret those problems and
Then, the copies of the documents are sent to the White House
pledge that they will not occur again on my watch. Like
with the original request. 454
the report on which I based my comments, I have not
Those in the office managing the White House requests for back-
reached any conclusions regarding the motivation of any
ground files saw a significant rise in the number of requests. Con-
White House employee. 449
gresswoman Morella questioned Peggy Jean Larson, Supervisor of
the Executive Agencies Dissemination Unit, Sub-unit, at the FBI.
In response to Freeh's statement that the FBI was "victimized,"
White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said, "I do not under-
Mrs. MORELLA. Did there come a time in late '93 and
stand those statements. There has been no abuse of the informa-
early '94 when you began to receive a large amount of re-
tion in the files.' 450 This statement came soon after the White
quests for copies of previous reports?
House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, apologized on national tele-
Ms. LARSON. Yes, Ma'am.
vision to the "hundreds of people
whose classified FBI person-
Mrs. MORELLA. In your 32 years of experience with your
nel files were obtained by the Clinton administration and reviewed
unit, can you recall another instance when you received
by an Army security officer.' 451
more than 400 requests for copies of reports within a 2- to
3-month period?
Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File
Ms. LARSON. Probably not within a 2- to 3-months pe-
Information to the White House, June 14, 1996. For statistical details of increase in file request
riod. It is not unusual that we would have received that
from the Clinton administration, see supra at note 13.
many requests over a longer period of time, but I can't re-
is important to note that the Clinton administration underwent a much hailed 25 per-
cent cut in White House staff. Therefore, the number of requests for current reports should have
call in that short period of time.
lessened the demand placed on the FBI's White House desk.
449 Statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, June 14, 1996.
450 Tim Weiner, Request for Files "Victimized" FBI, It's Director Says; New York Times, June
452 Howard M. Shapiro, Report of the FBI General Counsel on the Dissemination of FBI File
Information to the White House, June 14, 1996.
15, 1996.
⁵³Id., p. 16.
McGrory, Boston Globe, June 10, 1996.
Id., p. 18.
70
71
Mrs. MORELLA. Did you report the unusual number of
inquiry on the first day the Dale file became public. Mr. Starr had
requests to your supervisor?
heretofore conducted the investigation into the White House firing
Ms. LARSON. I made Mr. Thornton aware of the fact that
of seven employees of the White House Travel Office. Mr. Starr
we did have an increase in the number of request for prior
sought evidence regarding the White House retrieval of Dale's file,
backgrounds only. I only brought it to his attention be-
because it was evidence that the White House sought damaging in-
cause I was going to have to get some overtime. I believe
formation with which to tarnish Dale's image.
it is in the record that one of my employees, her husband
On the same day that Starr wrote of his concerns to Reno, Sha-
was ill and the other analyst was rather backed up.
piro was notified that he would be tasked with conducting a com-
Mrs. MORELLA. Did he indicate that he would follow up
plete investigation of both FBI and White House involvement in
on this? I wondered what his response was.
this affair. 459 At 9 a.m. on June 20, 1996, Attorney General Reno
Ms. LARSON. His response was, did I have enough help,
made a request to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
and how much overtime did I need, and were there any
bia that the issue of the White House retrieval of FBI background
problems. I said no, that just because of one of them being
investigations on former Bush and Reagan administration officials
out, that the other analyst was in need of overtime. He
be added to the jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel. 460
said that was fine. But as far as the nature of the request,
In her public statement, Reno said, "I have concluded that it
there was no problem with that. 455
would constitute a conflict of interest for the Department of Justice
In his deposition, Bourke stated that those opening the requests
itself to investigate a matter involving an interaction between the
would not recognize the names of people for whom background in-
White House and the FBI, a component of the Department of Jus-
vestigations had been requested.
tice. Therefore, I have decided today to seek an expansion of Mr.
Starr's jurisdiction from the court, SO that he may conduct that fur-
Ms. OLSON. But anything that comes in with the first
ther investigation. 461
two boxes, previous report or name check, would go on to
the Name Check Unit?
Once a matter is put within the jurisdiction of an Independent
Counsel, it is then specifically outside the jurisdiction of the FBI.
Mr. BOURKE. Correct.
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, in §597, states that "[w]henever a matter
Ms. OLSON. Regardless of who the individual is?
is in the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an independent counsel or has
Mr. BOURKE. Correct. I mean, the people who open those
been accepted by an independent counsel under § 594(e), the De-
packages wouldn't know James Baker from you, or me.
partment of Justice, the Attorney General, and all other officers
Well, they would know him from me. They know me from
him. 456
and employees of the Department of Justice shall suspend all in-
vestigations and proceedings regarding such matter
The FBI,
Baker. People in that office, however, did recognize the name of James
as a bureau within the Department of Justice, is governed by this
provision of the U.S. Code. The FBI should have suspended its in-
Ms. REMINGTON. In late 1993, early 1994, would you
vestigation or any involvement in the FBI files investigation. Mr.
know who James A. Baker was?
Shapiro was clearly without any authority to investigate this mat-
ter.
Ms. GEORGE. I remember when we got the name check
in, Sherry Canter did it.
D. FBI CONTACTS THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER RENO'S REFERRAL
Ms. REMINGTON. Did she know who James Baker was?
Ms. GEORGE. Yes. 457
As of June 20, 1996, the investigation of the release of FBI files
to the White House was referred by Attorney General Reno to Inde-
It is clear that there were FBI officials who recognized the high
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr. At that time, the only entities
number and unusual nature of the requests for background inves-
rightfully investigating the matter were the Independent Counsel
tigations coming in to the FBI, but they apparently relied upon the
and the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.
"good faith and honor" of the White House.
1. Freeh requests that Chairman Clinger review background inves-
C. ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO REFERS THE MATTER TO
tigations rather than question agents
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR
As part of its investigation, the committee sought to learn why
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr wrote to the Attorney Gen-
personnel with largely political backgrounds were placed in sen-
eral Janet Reno on June 18, 1996, stating his reservations about
sitive positions in the White House Office of Personnel Security.
the Independent Counsel conducting the investigation of the dis-
Additional concerns were voiced regarding allegations of impropri-
semination of FBI files to the White House, because he felt his
mandate lacked the scope. 458 Mr. Starr had begun a preliminary
"Shapiro deposition, p. 120. Mr. Shapiro also testified that he met with the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel and received a briefing on the Independent Counsel's investigation.
455 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, pp. 71-72.
Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 592 (a)(1) of the initiation of a preliminary
456 Bourke deposition, PP. 24-25.
investigation and application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C $(c)(1) for the expansion of the
457 George deposition, p. 34.
jurisdiction of an Indepenent Counsel; June 21, 1996.
458 Associated Press, Reno Orders FBI File Probe, June 19, 1996.
461 Statement of Attorney General Janet Reno, June 20, 1996.
72
73
ety on the part of Livingstone and Marceca. The committee heard
a circumspect life and was not aware of any illegal drug
testimony regarding Livingstone's and Marceca's suitability for the
or alcohol problems. He said that the appointee will work
positions they held. 462 The committee initially sought to interview
at the White House on security matters. He said that in
those agents who conducted the background investigations of Liv-
the short period of time that the appointee has worked for
ingstone and Marceca.
him he has been completely satisfied with his performance,
In a July 10, 1996 letter, Director Freeh wrote that he had
conduct and productivity. He recommended the appointee
"grave concerns about having line Agents subjected to congres-
for continued access in his current capacity. 468
sional inquiry about specific investigations and I respectfully ask
that your committee use other means to obtain the information
During hearings before the committee on June 26, 1996, wit-
needed for your inquiry. 463 Freeh was concerned that such inter-
nesses, including Nussbaum, testified under oath that they did not
views conducted by a congressional committee could have a
know who was responsible for the hiring of Livingstone. Several
"chilling effect on the vigor with which our Agents conduct inves-
members of the committee questioned the veracity of the witnesses.
tigations." 464 In the same letter, Freeh wrote, "I respectfully ask
The exasperation of the committee is evidenced in the remarks of
that you allow the FBI to provide [the background files] to you
Congressman Christopher Shays of Connecticut. When the wit-
through knowledgeable managers or that the Committee pursue
nesses could not answer the question of who hired Livingstone,
the underlying documentation. 465
Shays declared, "You know what, anybody can tell you-there's not
Chairman Clinger acceded to Director Freeh's request regarding
a person in this room who doesn't know who hired them for what-
the review of Livingstone's and Marceca's background files. Bar-
ever job. It's disingenuous for you guys to take so long [to answer
bara Olson, chief investigative counsel, arranged to view the files
the question]. 469 Those reviewing the Livingstone file apparently
at FBI headquarters. On July 15, 1996, FBI Congressional Affairs
were aware of the controversy surrounding the question of who
Director Margaret Owens spoke with Steve Colloton of the Inde-
hired Livingstone, because Cignoli informed Kelley immediately of
pendent Counsel's Office to ensure that the Independent Counsel
tified Shapiro. 470
the contents of the memorandum, and then Kelley immediately no-
had no objections to making the files available to the chairman and
approved staff of the Committee on Government Reform and Over-
On July 15, 1996, Mr. Shapiro obtained a copy of the page from
Livingstone's file once he learned that its contents would be dam-
sight. Mr. Colloton said the office of the Independent Counsel had
aging to the White House 471 He showed the copy to FBI Counsel
no objections to the release of the files to the committee. 466
Larry Parkinson. 472 He discussed the contents of the memorandum
2. Shapiro notifies White House Counsel's Office, whom he referred
with Margaret Owens and John Collingwood, both of the Office of
to as "affected parties," of potential incrimination Nussbaum's
Public and Congressional Affairs. On that same day, he also spoke
statement
with Director Freeh about the controversial document. Mr. Shapiro
read the incriminating sentence, that Livingstone "had come highly
In preparation for that visit, Owens had the files retrieved. Para-
recommended to him by Hillary Clinton," to Dennis Corrigan, Chief
legals in the Civil Discovery Review Unit analyzed the files, osten-
of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General at the Department of Jus-
sibly to redact names of those in the files who had provided infor-
tice, and informed Corrigan that he would call the White House
mation on the condition of confidentiality. On July 15, 1996, Paul
with this information. 473
Cignoli, Chief of the Civil Discovery Review Unit, brought a docu-
Immediately after speaking with Corrigan, Shapiro telephoned
ment in Livingstone's file to the attention of Tom Kelley. 467 Mr.
the White House. 474 Mr. Shapiro called for Quinn and learned that
Kelley realized its importance.
he was away from his office. Mr. Shapiro spoke with Quinn's dep-
The document was a portion of a memorandum of an interview
uty, Kathleen Wallman. 475 Ms. Wallman notified Special Counsel
with Bernard Nussbaum. Nussbaum, the former Counsel to the
Jane Sherburne. In other words, almost 1 month after the Attorney
President, was interviewed by Special Agent Sculimbrene in con-
General referred the matter to the Independent Counsel, Shapiro
junction with the background investigation of Livingstone. In the
relayed information uncovered in an investigation of the FBI files
memorandum of that interview, Sculimbrene wrote in March 1993:
Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, advised
468 Special Agent Dennis Sculimbrene, memorandum of interviews conducted between March
1, 1993 and March 3, 1993. The memorandum includes descriptions of interviews of Lori Stal-
that he has known [Livingstone] for the period of time that
lings, Supervisory Personnel Assistant in the White House; Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the
he has been employed in the new administration. [Living-
President; and William Holden Kennedy, III, Associate Counsel to the President Mr. Kennedy
stone] had come highly recommended to him by HILLARY
sought assurances from Sculimbrene that any recommendation Kennedy made regarding Living-
stone was made "on the short period of time that he has known [Livingstone].' Kennedy also
CLINTON, who has known his mother for a longer period
tary Office.
mentioned to Sculimbrene that Livingstone sought the position of head of the White House Mili-
of time. [Nussbaum] was confident that the appointee lives
409 Security of FBI Background Files hearings, June 26, 1996, P. 170.
11. 470 Interview of Howard Shapiro; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary; July 29, 1996, p.
462 Reneghan deposition, PP. 62-65.
471 Shapiro deposition, PP. 63-64.
463 July 10, 1996 letter from Director Freeh to Chairman Clinger.
Id.
17. 473 Interview of Howard Shapiro; U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary; July 29, 1996, p.
465
Id.
July 29, 1996 interview of Howard M. Shapiro by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
p. 12.
Kelley deposition, PP. 85-86.
p. 12.
74
75
matter to the White House, the subject of that investigation. Sha-
interview prior to my having reviewed the file.' 477 Clinger listed
piro recounted his conversation with the White House in a deposi-
numerous people in the White House who were notified imme-
tion before the committee:
diately of the contents of Livingstone's file.
Answer. [I]n preparing the documents for [Chairman
a. Sherburne's telephone tree
Clinger's committee to review], my staff had identified a
page that I thought would be of interest to them because
Several witnesses have testified before the committee as to the
it related to a matter that had already been the subject of
number of people involved in discussions about the Nussbaum
interview as relayed by Shapiro. After Shapiro notified the White
substantial controversy. And I read to her that single sen-
House on July 15, communications within the White House and
tence of the paragraph summarizing the interview of Ber-
outside the White House ensued immediately.
nard Nussbaum. And she asked me in what form it ap-
Once Jane Sherburne was notified of the controversial and dam-
peared. And I described that it was a page that had three
aging contents of Livingstone's file, realizing the importance of the
paragraphs relating to interviews about three different
damaging information, she made it a point to spread the word
people conducted over a couple-day period. Again, I read to
about the file to a large number of people on that day. Ms.
her that sentence.
Sherburne recounted the exact manner in which she contacted peo-
Question. Did you tell her that it appeared that it had
ple in a deposition before the committee.
been-the interviews had occurred from March 1 to 3,
Question. Did you discuss [the information relayed by
1993?
the FBI] with anyone else in the White House?
Answer. I believe I did. I am not entirely certain but I
Answer. Yes.
think I did. I lost my train of thought for a second.
Question. Who did you discuss it with?
I told her-well, she asked me what limitations, if any,
Answer. Well, I would have discussed it with my team,
would there be on the committee's use of that information
with Kathy Wallman, with Evelyn Lieberman, and
or further dissemination of it. And I said, you know, I
Harold Ickes; perhaps others, but that would have been
didn't purport to be an expert or a scholar on matters like
the core group.
that; that the Privacy Act did not apply to the Committee
Question. Who on your team—
as such and that I did not think there would be legal re-
Answer. And Jack Quinn as well.
strictions, or I was aware of no legal restrictions and that
Question. Who on your team did you discuss it with?
it would be used at the discretion of the committee chair-
Answer. Certainly Mark Fabiani, Sally Paxton, and
man.
John Yarowsky. Possibly others, but those would have
Question. And just so the record is clear, the sentence
been the primary ones.
that you read to her verbatim was the sentence that [Liv-
Question. And did these discussions occur on Tuesday
ingstone]. had come highly recommended by Hillary Clin-
after you had received your call from the FBI?
ton?
Answer. They would have been Tuesday or Wednes-
day. 478
Answer. Yes.
Question. Who has known [Livingstone's] mother for a
The members of the White House staff that were informed by
longer period of time?
Sherburne of the incriminating information allowed them to pre-
Answer. Yes.
pare answers to questions that were sure to come at the release of
Question. So you contacted the White House before any-
this information. More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that
one on this committee ever saw that document; is that cor-
Sherburne sought out Mrs. Clinton to relay this information.
rect?
Question. Do you know if anyone has discussed it with
Answer. Well, as it turns out. The intent was for it to
Mrs. Clinton?
be essentially contemporaneous, but yes. 476
Answer. Yes.
Chairman Clinger was alarmed to learn that the White House,
Question. And who is that that discussed it with her?
the target of the ongoing investigations, had reviewed the docu-
Answer. I did.
ments before he had. In a statement to the public on August 1,
Question. And when did you discuss it with her?
1996, Clinger said, "No one from the FBI called me to read me a
Answer. It would have been Tuesday or Wednesday.
verbatim account of the Nussbaum notes. Apparently no one at the
[July 16 or 17, 1996] 479
FBI read a verbatim account of these notes to anyone at the Inde-
Sherburne continued to list the people she notified of the informa-
pendent Counsel's Office. I did not review the file personally until
tion contained in Livingstone's file.
July 18, 1996. I would note the White House and over a dozen
present and former staff obtained the information in Nussbaum's
Statement of William F. Clinger, Jr., chairman, Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, August 1, 1996.
478 Sherburne deposition, pp. 222-223.
Shapiro deposition, pp. 104-106.
Id.
76
77
Question. Have you had any discussions of this with any-
the FBI is trying to curry favor with the White House. I
one outside of the White House other than your attorney?
don't think the FBI should curry favor with anybody. I
Answer. Yes.
think they should be independent, call them as they see
Question. And who was that?
them, but they shouldn't be playing one side where they
Answer. David Cohen, Jim Fitzpatrick, Larry
are giving them all the cues as to what is in the file, and
Pedowitz.
it bothers me that that has occurred on several occa-
Question. Jim Fitzpatrick who is representing Bernie
sions. 482
Nussbaum?
Answer. That's right. And I'm trying to remember if I
2. Shapiro dispatches agents to interrogate Sculimbrene
spoke to Randy Turk about it. I may have.
In addition to notifying the White House about details of the
Question. Were you aware that Bernie Nussbaum was
committee's investigation, Shapiro sent two agents to interrogate
going to go into a grand jury appearance shortly after you
Agent Sculimbrene at his home early on July 16.48³ Agent
had your conversations with his attorney?
Sculimbrene interviewed Bernard Nussbaum in the course of pre-
Answer. No. 480
paring Livingstone's background investigation, and recorded Mrs.
Ms. Sherburne contacted people in and outside the White House.
Clinton's involvement with Mr. Livingstone. Because some at the
Those in the White House contacted by Sherburne included officials
White House had questioned Agent Sculimbrene's information,
in the White House Counsel's Office and the Chief of Staff's Office.
Shapiro claims that he wanted to confront Sculimbrene with the
Kathleen Wallman is the Deputy Counsel to the President. Evelyn
discrepancies. 484 FBI Agents searched Sculimbrene's work station
Lieberman is the Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of
and papers that day.
Staff for White House Operations. Harold Ickes is the Assistant to
Shapiro and Kelley made the decision to send Duncan Wain-
the President and Deputy Chief of Staff. Mark Fabiani, Sally
wright, an Assistant Inspector, and Special Agent Jennifer Esposito
Paxton, and John Yarowsky are Special Associate Counsels to the
to interview Sculimbrene. Inspector Wainwright had been assigned
President.
to work with Shapiro on the FBI files investigation. Special Agent
Once she had notified officials within the White House,
Esposito, the wife of William J. Esposito, Deputy Assistant Director
Sherburne began to contact lawyers for different individuals who
of Financial Crimes, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, and Oper-
were the subjects of a variety of investigations into the White
ational Support, was sent because, according to Shapiro, she was
House Travel Office and the FBI files controversy. Sherburne con-
"from [Wainwright's] squad." 485
tacted David Cohen, a lawyer with Miller, Cassidy, LaRocca &
Inspector Wainwright telephoned Agent Sculimbrene to inform
Lewin, who represents Craig Livingstone. She contacted Jim
him of Shapiro's intent to send agents to Sculimbrene's home on
Fitzpatrick, a lawyer with the firm of Arnold and Porter, and Larry
that day to interview him. Agents Wainwright and Esposito arrived
Pedowitz, a lawyer with Watchell, Lipton and Associates, both of
at Sculimbrene's home at approximately 11 a.m. on July 16, 1996.
whom represent Bernard Nussbaum. The subjects of the investiga-
Sculimbrene reviewed the memorandum in question and said
tion into the FBI files matter were privy to the machinations of the
that it appeared to be written by him. Although Sculimbrene could
investigation, itself.
not remember the precise interview with Nussbaum, he described
In a hearing before the committee, members expressed dismay at
the process by which he recorded his interviews. Sculimbrene per-
the level of closeness between the White House and the FBI. In his
formed thousands of interviews in the normal course of his work
questioning of Shapiro, Congressman Stephen Horn made clear the
at the White House. The memorandum written by Esposito and
nature of his concerns:
Wainwright describes their interview with Sculimbrene:
Mr. Shapiro, I will tell you what makes me very curious.
SA [Special Agent] Sculimbrene stated that his inter-
You are a very bright young man, you are obviously very
view report should accurately summarize Nussbaum's com-
sophisticated, you have conducted a major prosecution, and
ments concerning Livingstone. He noted that he took pride
suddenly you get some information, and you pick up the
in his work and sought to make his reports accurate and
phone and call the White House. Did you want to curry
complete. SA Sculimbrene noted that is was his general
favor with them
practice to prepare his interview reports on the same day
Shapiro once again denied the impropriety of informing the White
that an interview took place. He followed this practice be-
House of information uncovered in an investigation of the White
cause it caused him to prepare his reports while the infor-
House. Horn continued:
mation was fresh in his memory.⁴⁸⁶
What bothers me is that with Mr. Freeh coming in, we
Id.
were assured that the FBI would be independent. Then we
483 Shapiro deposition, pp. 70-71.
484 Id.
have the Vincent Foster press release bit, and it looks like
485 Id., p. 72.
486 Supervisory Special Agent Duncan J. Wainwright and Special Agent Jennifer Esposito,
480 Id.
Federal Bureau of Investigation 302 Interview of Special Agent M. Dennis Sculimbrene, Wash-
481 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, PP. 93-94.
ington, DC, July 16, 1996.
78
79
In addition to recounting the procedures he used to record inter-
after me, wouldn't you? Don't you think that is intimida-
views, Sculimbrene stated that he did recall a significant fact re-
tion? 489
garding Livingstone. Agents Wainwright and Esposito wrote that,
"SA Sculimbrene does recall being told by Livingstone that Living-
Members of the committee were concerned with the mere fact that
stone's mother was a friend of Hillary Clinton.' 487 Clearly, the in-
the interview took place, and that it was done after the entire in-
formation from this interview buttresses the informaton found in
vestigation had been turned over to the Independent Counsel. The
Sculimbrene's original memorandum of the interview of Nussbaum.
committee was equally concerned about the way the interview was
In his statement regarding Shapiro's actions surrounding the im-
conducted. Agents telephoned Sculimbrene, told him they were on
proper contacts with the White House, Chairman Clinger said:
their way, and soon arrived at his home to conduct the interview.
On July 16 there was another unusual occurrence. Two
3. Shapiro made his own assessment that the matter was not within
senior headquarter FBI agents appeared at the home of
Independent Counsel Starr's jurisdiction
FBI agent Dennis Sculimbrene to talk with him about this
The initial discovery of the information in the Nussbaum inter-
interview of Bernard Nussbaum and ask for his notes of
view resulted from Shapiro's staff reviewing files for release to this
the interview. According to Mr. Shapiro, this action was
committee. The files that were reviewed were those of the two fig-
taken at his direction and without any consultation with
ures central to the FBI files investigation being conducted by the
the Independent Counsel. Why after the Attorney General
committee and the Independent Counsel. The committee's review
had clearly stated that these matters would be handled by
came at the suggestion of Director Freeh, who was well aware of
the Independent Counsel because they presented a conflict
both the committee's investigation of the FBI files matter and that
of interest for the Justice Department and the FBI, did
these files were requested in that matter. Nonetheless, despite
Mr. Shapiro take this disturbing action? 488
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Shapiro claimed not to
know the purpose of the committee's request for these files.
This action perpetuated the feeling among members of the commit-
In an appearance before the committee, Shapiro testified that he
tee that the FBI was wrongly involved in protecting the White
did not believe that the contents of the Nussbaum interview were
House. The FBI wasted resources to hide the embarrassing facts
related to the FBI files investigation. Chairman Clinger asked Sha-
contained in Sculimbrene's memorandum. Some saw the FBI's tac-
tics as heavy handed. Regarding the choice of agents to conduct the
piro if he knew the Attorney General had referred the "filegate"
matter to the Independent Counsel in response to concerns that
interview, Congressman Horn engaged in the following colloquy:
any such investigation might provide a conflict of interest for the
Mr. HORN. Who picked the particular agents that inter-
FBI. Shapiro responded that he was aware of the referral. How-
viewed Mr. Sculimbrene?
ever, Shapiro testified that he "did not think that this information
Mr. KELLEY. I did.
specifically was at the time part of the Independent Counsel's in-
Mr. HORN. How did you happen to pick them?
vestigation. 490 Steven Schiff, vice chairman of the committee, at-
Mr. KELLEY. Actually, the one I picked was Duncan
tempted to clarify the matter. Responding to Schiff's question
Wainwright. I picked Duncan Wainwright for several rea-
about whether he thought "that Mr. Livingstone's hiring was relat-
sons. First, he used to work for me, and he is very steady
ed to the matters to be investigated by the Independent Counsel,"
Shapiro replied,
and reliable and intelligent.
Mr. HORN. How about the second agent?
My misunderstanding, if I had one, was whether the
Mr. KELLEY. May I finish? The second agent was picked
question of how Craig Livingstone came to be hired was a
by Duncan Wainwright.
matter within the scope of the criminal investigation of the
Mr. HORN. Did one of the agents have a spouse who
Independent Counsel's Office looking into what I under-
worked for the FBI?
stood to be the criminal investigation, was the request for
Mr. KELLEY. Yes.
and acquisition of the FBI files. 491
Mr. HORN. And what did that spouse do?
The qualifications of Livingstone for a position in the White House
Mr. KELLEY. The spouse is the assistant director of the
Office of Personnel Security and whether he was placed there for
Criminal Investigative Division.
political purposes is central to any investigation of the White
Mr. HORN. A fairly high position in the FBI.
House's improper retrieval of FBI files. According to Shapiro, he
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, it is.
did not see the relevance of how Livingstone got his job to that in-
Mr. HORN. Now, if somebody with that relationship
vestigation. Members of the committee did not believe that Shapiro
showed up on my doorstep, and I am an FBI special agent,
could see the need to relay this information to the White House,
as Mr. Sculimbrene was, I would worry that somebody is
yet not see the bearing it had on the investigations being con-
489 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1,1996, pp. 91-92.
488 Statment of William F. Clinger, Jr., chairman, Committee on Government Reform and
490 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 46.
Oversight, U.S. H of Representatives, August 1, 1996.
Id., p. 82.
81
80
ducted. In a hearing before the committee, Congressman Burton
that may have interfered with an ongoing investigation is simply
unacceptable for the FBI's top lawyer.
said:
Let me get this straight here. The people you did not ad-
4. Nussbaum's criminal referral
vise about this were the Independent Counsel, the Senate
Shapiro knew the clear significance of the information in the FBI
Judiciary Committee, or the members of this committee
background file, which contained contemporaneous notes of an
before you advised the White House Counsel, the Deputy
interview of Nussbaum. Nussbaum relayed information about Liv-
Attorney General's office, who has a lot of liaison and con-
ingstone to FBI Agent Sculimbrene in March 1993, at a time when
nection with the White House. It's widely known that since
Nussbaum had no reason to be dishonest. In addition, Agent
Mr. Hubbell left the Justice Department, Ms. Gorelick, the
Sculimbrene had no reason to attribute any significance to Nuss-
Deputy AG, has the most intimate relationship with the
baum's comments.
White House, both political and otherwise. If you step back
Shapiro knew of the controversy surrounding the hiring of Craig
and look at the results of your decisions to notify the
Livingstone, which developed in June 1996. In his deposition before
White House and the Justice Department, the Democrats
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Shapiro first
who needed to perform damage control were made aware
hypothesized about why his staff would have alerted him to the
but the Republicans and the Independent Counsel inves-
contents of the memorandum in question. Shapiro said:
tigating the matter knew much later. So we gave the peo-
[I]t was brought to my attention because it referred to
ple who were trying to defend themselves a heads up
a matter which had already been the subject of much pub-
first. 492
lic controversy and many articles in the newspapers and
on-stories on television about the allegation that there
Many members of the committee were angered over Shapiro's
was a connection between Hillary Clinton and the hiring
statements that the hiring of Livingstone was not related to the
of Craig Livingstone; more specifically, that Hillary Clin-
White House retrieval of FBI background files.
ton was a friend of Craig Livingstone's mother and had
Soon after Shapiro notified the White House about the contents
recommended for the job. 497
in the memorandum of Mr. Nussbaum's interview, private lawyers
were notified about that information. It was reported that Mr.
In the same interview, Shapiro gave his reason for alerting the
Nussbaum was to testify before the Independent Counsel shortly
White House to this information. He said, "Knowing that was a
after learning of this information. Showing concern for this series
matter which had already been a matter of considerable public
of events, Congressman Gilman posed the following question to
controversy
I decided that it was appropriate to advise the
White House.' 498
Shapiro at the committee's hearing.
At the June 26, 1996 hearing before the Committee on Govern-
In your opinion, how should the Department of Justice
ment Reform and Oversight, "Security of FBI Background Files,"
react if a representative of the FBI, on his own, shares FBI
none of the witnesses, including Craig Livingstone, could remember
information with an outside party that bears on the party's
who hired Craig Livingstone. In that hearing, Chairman Clinger
possible testimony or other derogatory information or leads
asked Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, "Do you know
that would assist that party in thwarting the government's
who hired Craig Livingstone?" 499 Nussbaum replied, "I don't know
inquiry? How do you think the Justice Department should
who brought Mr. Livingstone into the White House." Later, follow-
react to that kind of statement? 493
ing Kennedy's statement that he "never discussed Mr. Livingstone
with Mrs. Clinton in any way, shape or form," Nussbaum said,
Shapiro responded that "if the Department thinks that someone at
"Nor did 500 Several other witnesses denied knowing who hired
the FBI is interfering with an investigation, it is a matter they
should take very seriously." Later in that hearing, Congressman
Livingstone. At that hearing, Nussbaum was under oath. He swore to tell the
Gilman. asked Shapiro, "[W]asn't there an ongoing grand jury in-
truth. He was the White House Counsel while Livingstone was Di-
quiry on the files and on Livingstone at the time you made your
rector of White House Security. Livingstone worked for Nussbaum.
telephone calls?" 495 Shapiro replied, "There-well, I'm obviously
When he professed not to know who hired Craig Livingstone, com-
not fully aware of what inquiries there are. I understand that the
mittee members were perplexed. When Chairman Clinger discov-
Independent Counsel's office was conducting and is conducting a
ered a contemporaneous memorandum written by an FBI agent
grand jury investigation into what-into the request for and acqui-
that shed some light on who hired Livingstone, he was alarmed.
sition of FBI files by the White House. 496 The fact that Shapiro,
Chairman Clinger was disappointed to learn that the document
a former prosecutor with the U.S. attorney's office, took actions
quoted Nussbaum as saying that Livingstone "had come highly rec-
492 Id., PP. 157-158.
497 Shapiro deposition, p. 59.
493 Id., P. 113.
498 Id.
494 Id.
489 Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 57.
495 Security of FBI Files hearings, p. 114.
500 Id.
Id., p. 115.
82
83
ommended to him by Hillary Clinton." 501 Accordingly, this infor-
Mr. SHAPIRO. The letter. They weren't asking me for my
mation "calls into question Mr. Nussbaum's June 26, 1996 state-
opinion on Mr. Clinger's speech. And also whether I had
ments made under oath before the Government Reform and Over-
an opinion on who that letter should come from, from the
sight Committee."
White House.
Upon discovering this information, Chairman Clinger believed
Ms. OLSON. And so they faxed you a copy of the letter?
that it warranted the attention of every Member of the House of
Mr. SHAPIRO. No. They read me some language. I told
Representatives and the American people. He stood on the floor of
them that as to most of it, I had no opinion and didn't
the House chamber and described the events surrounding the
think it was appropriate for me to comment, which is not
Sculimbrene memorandum. Calling this "a very serious issue,"
to say I had no opinion, but didn't think it appropriate for
Chairman Clinger concluded his statement, saying, "This is a mat-
me to comment.
ter I will refer to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
They highlighted one sentence that was in one draft one
Because Attorney General Reno has designated Independent Coun-
way and one in the other, and I concurred with their ap-
sel Kenneth Starr to investigate potential criminal wrongdoing in
parent decision that they already were telling me that in
the White House Travel Office and FBI Files matters, I am simul-
the second statement would be taken as less of an accusa-
taneously forwarding this matter to Judge Starr's attention." 502
tion against the FBI, and I said-and as to the question
On July 30, 1996, the matter of Nussbaum's statements to the
about who was appropriate to come from, I asked Jack
FBI and before the Committee on Government Reform and Over-
Quinn, was he suggesting-I believe he asked me, did I
sight was referred to the Office of the Independent Counsel and the
think it more appropriate that it come from Leon Panetta?
U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia. Chairman Clinger and
and I said, "If your question is, are you a sufficiently high
other members of the Committee on Government Reform and Over-
level Government official to write to the director of the
sight wrote to Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and U.S. Attor-
FBI? I think you shouldn't worry about that."
ney Eric H. Holder, Jr., to refer the matter to their offices. 503
Ms. OLSON. And what was the one sentence?
5. Shapiro edits letter for White House Counsel that is critical of
Mr. SHAPIRO. Let me look at the letter as it was sent,
Chairman Clinger
and I might be able to tell you.
In the letter as sent, which we received some time later
Upon the announcement that Chairman Clinger was making a
that evening-first time I had actually seen it-it says-
criminal referral of Bernard Nussbaum, Quinn called Shapiro to re-
after the first three paragraphs, it says: That is why we
quest his assistance in writing a letter to Director Freeh. Shapiro
are troubled, as we know you must be, by the implication
testified about this matter in his deposition:
that an FBI background investigation might include a
Ms. OLSON. The day of Chairman Clinger's referral or
false report. 504
the day of Chairman Clinger's Floor statement about the
In the letter that finally went to Freeh, and was released. to the
statements by Mr. Nussbaum and the statement that he
public, Quinn wrote:
had read in the file, did you have any conversations with
It is equally troubling that a Member of Congress can
the White House?
publicly reveal confidential information, whether for par-
Mr. SHAPIRO. Yes, I was called that day by Jack Quinn
tisan purposes or otherwise. It should not escape notice
and Kathleen Wallman-this is prior to the chairman's
that this is done at a time when Members of Congress
Floor speech-advised by them that they had learned from
have expressed worry that employees of the executive
press, who I think they told me had a copy of his speech,
branch might have sought out confidential FBI informa-
that he was going to be making a Floor speech, and they
tion about certain individuals and planned to somehow use
told me that they were writing a letter.
it publicly. While that charge has never been established
I think what they said is, "The White House is writing
against anyone in the executive branch, we now witness
a letter to the FBI director," and they wanted to ask me
the same objectionable behavior by the very people who
a couple questions about it, primarily was there anything
professed to be the guardians of privacy. 505
in the tone of it that we would find offensive that would-
that they would sort of be unaware, would hit somebody
The general counsel of the FBI edited a letter for the White House
the wrong way at the FBI, that they would unintentionally
that was harshly critical of the chairman of the Committee on Gov-
offend somebody about.
ernment Reform and Oversight, who was performing his oversight
Ms. OLSON. You mean by the tone of-the tone of the
duties. Shapiro's actions raise questions about the independence of
the FBI.
letter?
Members of the committee were particularly angered by the par-
ticipation of the FBI in editing a letter critical of the chairman of
801 Sculimbrene memo contained in the FBI background file of Craig Livingstone.
502 Congressional Record, July 25, 1996, PP. H8520-H8521
803 Letter to the Honorable Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel, from Chairman Clinger
604 Shapiro deposition, p. 150.
and members of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; July 30, 1996.
505 Letter from White House Counsel Jack Quinn to FBI Director Louis Freeh, July 25, 1996.
84
85
a congressional committee. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen con-
fronted Shapiro about his participation in the drafting of the letter
by a President and he will not be considered a politically
oriented member of the President's 'team.''
from Quinn to Director Freeh. When Shapiro was trying to belittle
his cooperation with the White House regarding the letter, Ros-
After Watergate, the Congress was wary of the President's political
Lehtinen said:
influence over the Nation's police force. It sought a way to remove
Based on your testimony, you said that you conversed
the Director of the FBI and the FBI, itself, from political involve-
ment.
with this gentleman, talked about who the letter should go
to, talked about the tone, and I would say that you had a
When Louis Freeh was appointed by President Clinton in 1993,
very direct hand in the drafting of this document. 506
he immediately took steps to change the internal structure of the
FBI. He eliminated two associate deputy directors, and four dozen
Congressman Souder told Shapiro he was wrong in editing the let-
management positions. Perhaps his most controversial move in-
ter. He said:
volved the appointment of his closest aides. An article in the Los
You said you helped edit a letter for the White House
Angeles Times reported about some dissension in the FBI ranks
Counsel which attacked both our Chairman and your own
about Freeh's appointments: 509
FBI agents. Now you say it wasn't editing, you were con-
Some of the controversy emanates from Freeh's appoint-
sulted. Almost any definition of "editing," you had the op-
ment of a triumvirate of federal prosecutors he knew when
portunity to edit. You say you made changes. By most defi-
he served in the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan. He
nitions, that is editing, and it was a political letter which
named Robert B. Buckham, 43, chief of staff; Howard M.
you should have withdrawn from. 507
Shapiro, 34, is the FBI's first general counsel, and
VII. POLITICIZATION OF THE FBI
Buckham's brother, James R., 32, heads up the new office
for ending interagency turf fights. "He may be relying too
The FBI serves as the principal investigative arm of the Depart-
heavily on the views of a certain group of friends, includ-
ment of Justice and as such, is charged with gathering and report-
ing their estimates of other people in the organization, cre-
ing facts, locating witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases in-
ating a clique," worries a former senior Justice Depart-
volving Federal jurisdiction. The FBI investigates all violations of
ment official. 510
Federal law except those that have been assigned by legislative en-
actment or otherwise to another Federal agency.
Howard Shapiro met Director Freeh right out of Yale Law School
In response to the politicization of the FBI during the Nixon ad-
when he first began his clerkship for Judge Leval and Director
ministration, the Congress passed a law giving the Director of the
Freeh was appearing before the Judge as an assistant U.S. attor-
FBI a fixed term. Public Law 90-351, provided that:
ney in a major case in his career known as the "pizza connection"
case. 511 Mr. Shapiro testified that the "unusually close relation-
(b) Effective with respect to any individual appointment
ship" they developed during the course of this case led to Freeh re-
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
questing he come to work at the U.S. attorney's office in New York.
the Senate, after June 1, 1973, the term of service of the
Mr. Shapiro testified that he believed that Director Freeh "assisted
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be
him in being selected for the job. 512
ten years. A Director may not serve more than one ten-
Director Freeh again tapped Mr. Shapiro to join him on a "spe-
year term. 508
cial assignment by the Attorney General" to investigate and pros-
On the Floor of the Senate, Senator Robert C. Byrd spoke in sup-
ecute the December 1989 tragic mail bombing case that killed
port of limiting the term of the Director of the FBI and about the
Judge Robert Vance. They worked closely throughout the course of
importance of FBI independence. Senator Byrd said, "This amend-
this case until Direct Freeh was sworn in as a Federal district
ment would aid in insulating the FBI Director against politically
court judge. Mr. Shapiro left the U.S. attorney's office and accepted
motivated manipulation from the executive branch by giving the of-
a teaching position at Cornell Law School but managed to stay in
fice a tenure of 10 years." Senator Byrd reasoned that:
contact with then-Judge Freeh.
When Director Freeh was first asked by President Clinton if he
A 10-year term is desirable because it would generally
overlap the tenure of a two-term President and would
would accept the position of Director of the FBI in the summer of
eliminate many of the pressures that could be brought to
1993, he sought the advice of Howard Shapiro. 513 Mr. Shapiro tes-
bear on the Director if he were to be reappointed every 4
tified that he "urged him to take the job and encouraged him to do
years. In this way, the Director can be more effectively in-
sulated from political pressures liable to be placed on him
509 Ronald J. Ostrow, Freeh Reign He's Eliminated Red Tape and Senior Posts, Given Agents
More Power and Fewer Desk Jobs, Promoted International Cooperation and His Friends-In Just
17 Months, Louis Freeh has Made a Mark on the FBI as Indelible as J. Edgar Hoover's, the
506 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 137.
Los Angeles Times Magazine, Sunday, February 5, 1995.
507 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, pp. 176-177.
511 Deposition of Howard Shapiro, 7/30/96, p. 10.
508 Pub.L. 90-351, Title VI, $1101, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat 236, as amended by Pub. L. 94-
503, Title II, § 203, October 15, 1976, 90 Stat 2427.
512/d., P. 11.
513/d., p. 12.
86
87
In return, Director Freeh told Shapiro that he "expected"
White House, an inherently political entity. The years that Shapiro
him to "come down and work for him" at the FBI to which Shapiro
spent in law enforcement deny him such flimsy excuses.
agreed and took leave from his teaching position at Cornell. Be-
A. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE FBI HAND DELIVERS GARY ALDRICH
cause Director Freeh had not yet formally created the office of the
BOOK TO WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL
general counsel and first had to move out the current FBI career
legal counsel, Shapiro began working for Director Freeh as his
As a condition of employment at the FBI, agents must sign a con-
"special counsel" for 2 to 3 months. 515
tract by which they agree to obtain clearance before publishing in-
After the retirement of the previous legal counsel, Shapiro began
formation which they gain during their duties at the FBI. When an
to "recreate" the Office of the General Counsel and immediately
agent or former agent seeks to publish information gained while in
brought two deputies that work with his at the U.S. attorney's of-
the employ of the FBI, he must first submit the information he
fice. Mr. Shapiro testified that he and Director Freeh believed
seeks to publish to the FBI for its review. Offices within the FBI
these outside attorneys "could improve the overall quality of the of-
who are affected by the written materials are asked to review the
fice" since only career FBI agents had been allowed in these posi-
contents and decide whether its publication would jeopardize the
tions before. Mr. Shapiro, deriding their experience, stated that in
functions of the FBI. While the review is to be completed in 30
the past the Bureau tended to promote individuals "based on their
days, 521 records supplied to the committee by the Department of
prediction of who would be the best agent. "516 Mr. Shapiro imme-
Justice show that the process of review by the FBI took almost 6
diately stopped this practice however, and filled the office with
months. 522
Former FBI agent Gary Aldrich had written a book about his
former colleagues of his and the Director's.
service in the FBI and in the White House. He submitted a draft
As revelations of numerous contacts between FBI General Coun-
of his book to the FBI for its review. Once Shapiro had a copy of
sel Shapiro and the White House materialized, concerns about the
Aldrich's manuscript, he waited less than a month to hand deliver
politicization of the FBI have resurfaced. We learned that Shapiro
a copy to White House Counsel to the President, Jack Quinn. 523 To
had his own White House pass allowing him to come and go as he
date, the White House has refused to reveal what it did with the
pleased in the White House complex. 517 Director Freeh's appoint-
book prior to its publication.
ment of close friends rather than "the best agent" is at the center
of this problem. No longer does the top lawyer for the FBI have an
1. Justifications
allegiance to the law enforcement agency whose laws he has taken
Shapiro's justification for his "heads up" to the White House re-
an oath to uphold. Instead the relationships created within the Of-
garding Bernard Nussbaum" 1993 interview that linked the First
fice of the General Counsel created allegiances to the Director and
Lady to Craig Livingstone's hiring, was that the White House was
his allegiances to the White House that gave him his appointment.
an "affected party. 524 He did not, either in deposition or hearing
Shapiro has protested any political savvy, testifying that he has
testimony, ever indicate the Federal Bureau of Investigation rule
had only non-political, career, Department of Justice appoint-
or policy he was adhering to by his conduct. Thus, the true purpose
ments, 518 and that he would therefore not have any political issues
of his action has not fully been explained. Similarly, while inquir-
in mind when in contact with the White House. 519 Given the great
ing into the reason for his White House delivery of the Aldrich
attention paid by the public, the media and the Congress to past
book, Shapiro was asked in committee deposition if he "commu-
indiscretions by the FBI in its contacts with the White House, Sha-
nicated the substance of [the Aldrich] book [to the White House]
piro should have been ever aware of the political consequences of
because they were an interested party?" 525 Shapiro replied, "Yep."
his actions. Instead of protestations that he was not "competent" to
But, in hearings before the committee 2 days later, he gave a more
commit a political act, Shapiro owed his agency and the public
rehearsed response for the media.
to be especially vigilant in his conduct, in matters involving the
In his opening statement before the committee hearings, Shapiro
gave a more lengthy explanation for his distribution of the Aldrich
manuscript.
5¹⁵/d., p. 13. Mr. Shapiro described this as a "somewhat delicate personnel matter" that Direc-
tor Freeh had to move out the current Assistant Director who served as the Director of the or-
The first draft of the book was replete with sensitive in-
fice of Legal Counsel Division before Shapiro could "replace" him. Then Assistant Director Joe
ternal White House information that went to their internal
Davis thereafter retired from the FBI after a long and distinguished career with the Bureau.
procedures and went to White House security matters, as
"Director Freeh sent a letter on May 25, 1994 to Craig Livingstone requesting that Shapiro
p. 15.
well as to the-directly to the result of his conduct of his
receive a permanent OGA White House pass. Director Freeh cited the numerous meetings Sha-
piro attends at the White House complex: "no fewer than 14 meetings within the White House
gates, including a meeting with the President" over the past month. We believe that no other
Letter to Mr. Jay Stephens, attorney for Agent Gary Aldrich; January 4, 1996. OPCA
FBI legal advisor or general counsel has required such access to the White House complex in
maintains liaison with the authors of the submitted manuscripts-and formally advises them,
within 30 working days, whether, or under what conditions, approval for publication is granted
the past.
This is not a credible statement, given that Shapiro was a professor at Cornell University
(as per responses from the substantive agencies).
before taking a leave of absence to work for his mentor and good friend, Louis Frech. Shapiro
Letter to Howard Shapiro, general counsel of the FBI, from Lisa Kate Osofsky, deputy gen-
is an SES employee appointed by Director Freeh as a result of his appointment by the Clinton
eral counsel of the FBI, July 31, 1996.
White House.
523 Shapiro deposition, July 30, 1996, P. 82.
Shapiro deposition, p. 125.
524 Letter from Shapiro to Chairman Clinger, July 19, 1996.
520 Security of the FBI Files, hearing, August 1, 1996, p. 33.
826 Shapiro deposition, p. 88.
88
89
official business. I delivered a copy of that to the White
House Counsel's Office because, as I in fact somewhat pre-
Shapiro to define "interested party." In response, Shapiro gave an-
other, detailed reason for sending the book to the White House:
sciently advised them, I could not ensure, the FBI could
not ensure that Mr. Aldrich would not go forward and pub-
[T]he first draft of his book contained numerous lengthy
lish that book prior to receiving clearance, and in fact that
passages about internal White House procedures, White
is what he did. 526
House security matters and the text of interviews of White
House people. Those-I told them that I could not ensure
Congressman Burton attempted to obtain a more detailed expla-
and ultimately was unable to ensure that Mr. Aldrich
nation from Shapiro about why he delivered the book to the White
would comply with our requirements as to what material
House. Congressman Burton asked:
could be published and what material could not, that it
Question. What were they doing [with the book]?"
could be published any day without prior notice to us, as
Answer. I knew that Mr. Aldrich could publish that doc-
it was, and that I thought given how much it divulged
ument, as he did, without waiting for our approval, with-
about White House processes, they needed to see it. 529
out-without concurring with our objections, and that they
What Shapiro fails to acknowledge is that he delivered the book in
should know and have it in their hands before internal
February, well before any fears could have developed that Aldrich
White House procedures were disseminated to the
would publish without complete FBI approval.
world. 527
Shays then attempted to pinpoint the reason for taking the book
First, it is implausible that, in February of this year, Shapiro an-
to the White House, rather than other agencies.
ticipated that Aldrich would consider publishing his book without
Mr. SHAYS. Wasn't it replete with other information that
FBI concurrence, when Aldrich had adhered to FBI policies in sub-
would affect other people? Why did you decide it should
mitting the book for review. Furthermore, it strains credulity to be-
only go to the White House?"
lieve that Shapiro delivered the book to Quinn out of concern about
Mr. SHAPIRO. Who else do you have in mind, sir?
White House security. Why would Shapiro go directly to the White
Mr. SHAYS. Any other interested party?
House Counsel's Office, which has become a public relations/politi-
Mr. SHAPIRO. I'm not sure-Mr. Aldrich wrote a book
cal entity for the President, rather than the U.S. Secret Service,
about his time at the White House, sir, and it was about
whose central mission is to protect the security of the President
the White House and the White House and the White
and the White House complex?
House procedures.
In addition to the "security review" being conducted by the White
Mr. SHAYS. What about all the people that were men-
House, the FBI was also conducting a review in accordance with
tioned, weren't they interested parties?
the employment agreement signed by Aldrich upon his employ-
ment. Records obtained by the committee show that the FBI had
extensive consultation with Jay Stephens, former U.S. attorney,
Mr. SHAYS. How about the Secret Service, did you notify
and counsel for Aldrich, regarding the prepublication review of the
the Secret Service? I would like an answer. 530
manuscript by the FBI.⁵²⁸ Indeed, many of the concerns that the
FBI had were allayed in this process. Stephens, on three separate
Shapiro did not answer the question regarding other agencies men-
tioned in the Aldrich book, but not made aware of the contents of
occasions, sent to the FBI revisions in the manuscript that were
made at their request.
the book before it was published. Moreover, the Secret Service is
responsible for the security of the White House. Yet the Secret
Shapiro's explanation regarding the White House's security con-
cerns simply does not survive scrutiny. We know that the book was
Service received no notifications or information regarding the Al-
drich book from either the FBI or the White House Counsel's Of-
delivered in February, less than 30 days after the FBI's receipt of
fice.
the manuscript, and the initial meetings between the Bureau and
Stephens on the editing process. Why did Shapiro see the urgent
B. DISTRIBUTION OF BOOK WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE
need to provide the pre-publication manuscript to the White House,
without the permission of the author or publisher, months before
The first people in the White House to see the copy of the Aldrich
its release?
book were Jack Quinn and Kathleen Wallman. Apparently, the
book was divided up among several staff members for their review.
2. Hearing testimony
1. Cheryl Mills' review
To obtain a better understanding of Shapiro's motive for taking
the Aldrich book to the White House, Congressman Shays asked
Cheryl Mills, Associate Counsel to the President, was given a
copy of the Aldrich book to review. She was asked about her knowl-
edge of the book in a deposition before this committee.
826 Security of FBI Files hearings, August 1, 1996, p. 33.
527 Id., PP. 58-59
528 Letter to Howard Shapiro, general counsel of the FBI, from Lisa Kate Osofsky, deputy gen-
529 Security of FBI Files hearings, p. 125.
eral counsel of the FBI, July 31, 1996.
630 Security of FBI Files hearings, pp. 125-126.
90
91
Question. Were you aware that Howard Shapiro had
Question. And did she explain the reason why she was
given Mr. Quinn a copy of Gary Aldrich's book?
asking you to review the book?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Did you review a copy of that book?
Answer. Portions of it.
Answer. While I am not inclined to talk about the proc-
Question. Were you tasked to review that by Mr. Quinn?
ess that led to the deliberations on this issue, here is what
I feel very comfortable telling you, and that is that I and
others were asked to review portions of the book and with
Answer. I think "tasking" is a bit strong, but maybe that
an eye towards whether or not there was information that
is always strong, whenever you are referring to me.
would compromise security in the White House. That was
With regard to the portions of the book that I reviewed,
my particular mission. We reported back up the line on
the question that I was looking at was whether or not
this and, to the best of my knowledge, the outcome was
there were disclosures of nonpublic or confidential infor-
that the White House did not take a position one way or
mation within it, and also whether or not-what the im-
the other on what the FBI should do with this matter. 532
pact of these types of disclosures would be on the security
personnel process with respect to people's willingness to be
The committee has yet to determine the purpose of the White
candid and open and forthright with regard to the FBI
House Counsels' review of Aldrich's book, though not for lack of at-
tempts. The committee subpoenaed all notes and memoranda from
background process; and to the extent that it did have any
the White House related to the matter. However, Special Counsel
implications for that process, whether or not these implica-
Jane Sherburne reported that those documents were not "main-
tions were sufficient to be debilitative to people's desire to
tained.' 533 Why is the White House Counsel's Office "not maintain-
enter government and serve as a public servant.
ing" notes? Why were no memoranda created on a project that os-
*
tensibly affected White House security? Were there memoranda
Question. Do you know if anyone else in the Counsel's of-
that were destroyed?
fice was given portions of the book to read or given the
Additionally, why did the review of pre-publication manuscripts
book to read?
fall within the purview of White House counsel "duties"? Was this
Answer. I was only given a portion; so I am sure that
not more suitably a matter for a security related agency? The
others were also probably reviewing with regard to disclo-
White House's lack of response to committee requests continue to
sures of nonpublic or confidential information as. well as
be of great concern.
whether or not such disclosures have an impact on the in-
The committee learned on September 18 from the FBI that they
tegrity of and the ability of people to provide candid and
refused to accept back from White House Counsel Jack Quinn a
open and honest information to the FBI in the process of
copy of Gary Aldrich's book Unlimited Access, given to Mr. Quinn
securing or being reviewed for government positions. 531
by FBI General Counsel Shapiro. The FBI refused to accept the
book saying, "Because this is a document in the possession of the
Mills could give no additional information about who reviewed the
White House which you have described as 'responsive' to a congres-
book and why. But Mills is not the only White House lawyer ques-
sional subpoena, we believe it would be inappropriate for the FBI
tioned by the committee who was assigned to review the book.
to become involved in this matter." 534 The FBI and the Justice De-
2. Christopher Cerf's review
partment are under subpoena for these documents. Why is the
White House playing hot potato with Gary Aldrich's book? It is
Cerf was asked about his knowledge of the Aldrich book at a dep-
amazing, but not surprising, that the White House continues to
osition before the committee. He told the committee that he had re-
withold documents relevant to this committee's investigation. Ac-
sponsibilities for reviewing the manuscript similar to those of Mills.
tions such as these increase the skepticism toward this administra-
Question. Do you recall the circumstances of your learn-
tion. Mr. Quinn should explain his actions in trying to avoid re-
ing about [the Aldrich book], whether it was in a meeting,
sponding to the committee's subpoena.
a counsel office meeting, or outside of that?
C. SUMMARY OF 4 YEARS OF POLITICIZATION OF THE FBI
Answer. It was in the context of my duties in the Coun-
sel's office.
1. Past procedures for White House utilized the Department of Jus-
Question. Were you asked to review portions of the book
tice
or a portion of the book?
In the past, as a result of concerns about the political use of the
Answer. Yes.
FBI, White House contacts have been managed primarily through
Question. And who asked you to do that?
the Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General is the
Answer. It was either Kathi Whalen or-it probably was
Kathi Whalen.
532 Cerf deposition, PP. 89-95.
633 Letter from Sherburne to committee Chief Investigative Counsel Barbara Olson, September
10, 1996.
531 Mills deposition, pp. 70-80.
634 Letter from John Collingwood to Jack Quinn, dated September 18, 1996.
92
93
primary liaison for contacts between the White House and the FBI.
The current FBI has abandoned that formality. Why has the FBI
White House. 536
came from Craig Livingstone's attorney and was adopted by the
general counsel now taken on the role of White House contact? At
Director Freeh's request, Shapiro has held a permanent White
Mr. Livingstone's attorney, Randall Turk, who interviewed a
House pass since 1993. To the committee's knowledge no other FBI
number of other former White House employees about the matter
general counsel has had such unfettered access to the White House.
when Billy Dale's FBI file was discovered, claimed the matter had
a "completely innocent explanation" and blamed the problem on a
2. First Counsel's Office not staffed with agents
"Secret Service list that still contained Dale's name as a current
In the past, FBI Directors have staffed all offices with career
White House passholder. 537 White House spokesman, Mark
agents within the FBI, agents whose loyalty was to law enforce-
Fabiani, immediately adopted Turk's explanations. 538 Livingstone's
ment, and not to the political winds of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
stone's explanations of problems with the FBI files.
attorney also briefed the White House Counsel's Office on Living-
When Freeh was appointed, he appointed three associates from
outside the FBI, and created the first Office of the General Coun-
On June 7, Mr. Turk refused to reveal the name of the "Army
sel. As the person to fill the fist general counsel position at the
detailee," but his identity was revealed to be Anthony Marceca, an
FBI, Freeh chose his long time friend and confidante, Howard Sha-
old political friend of Livingstone's, not a low level clerk, as had ini-
tially been portrayed. Mr. Marceca did not begin working at the
piro.
White House until August 1993, long after Mr. Dale's name was re-
In his deposition before the committee, Shapiro defended Direc-
moved as a current White House passholder and his Secret Service
tor Freeh's decision to staff the FBI with nonagent attorneys. He
pass summarily revoked.
said:
Another attorney for Livingstone, David Cohen, claimed that
And we had-although we had some absolutely, and we
"neither Marceca nor Livingstone noticed at first that the lists in-
still do, some absolutely fabulous agent attorneys who had
cluded so many names that should have been purged from
decided to make a career of it, for the most part I thought
them. 539 Yet an undated memo, which appears to be from March
we could improve the quality and the experience and the
1993, demonstrates that Livingstone clearly understood that there
expertise of the office by transitioning from agent attor-
were some names on Secret Service lists that needed to be removed
neys to nonagent attorneys. 535
and Livingstone knew that it was his job to remove them. 540
There was no list after May 19, 1993 which would have con-
Although Shapiro and Director Freeh may have intended to "im-
prove the quality" of the attorneys at the FBI, they have politicized
tained Mr. Dale's name as a "current White House passholder,"
since Mr. Livingstone himself sent a memo to the Secret Service to
the FBI, through the actions of Shapiro which indicate the astute
place Mr. Dale and his colleagues on "do not admit" status at the
political skills and the intent to protect the President and Mrs.
White House, as of May 19, 1993. 541
Clinton. Shapiro, whether at the behest of Director Freeh or not,
has been the most prolific contact with the Clinton administration
Of the hundreds of FBI files that were gathered by Livingstone
and Marceca, most of them were never "current White House
and the White House-it's ally at the FBI. His permanent White
House pass and frequent White House visits allowed and encour-
passholders" at any time in 1993. As the Secret Service concluded
aged the spreading of information to the White House as an "af-
in the committee's July 17, 1996 hearings on The Security of the
FBI Files, on any list created in 1993, most of the 476 names of
fected party."
individuals whose files were improperly obtained would have been
3. Travel Office, FBI files, and Aldrich book
listed as inactive. 542 The explanations offered by the White House
Evidence of the White House's political use of the FBI can be
and Livingstone were implausible from the start but, since the Se-
found in the Travel Office scandal, the improper retrieval of FBI
cret Service is not in a position to publicly respond to such attacks,
the assault on the Secret Service served its purpose as a useful tac-
files and the improper dissemination of a manuscript to the White
tic to shift blame.
House. In the Travel Office matter, the White House improperly re-
But even Livingstone had a hard time sticking with the "blame
quested that the FBI conduct an investigation into the fired Travel
the Secret Service" strategy. On June 7, 1996, the very day his at-
Office employees. The Clinton administration has made liberal use
torney was blaming the Secret Service, Livingstone went to Secret
of the FBI and tarnished its reputation in the process.
Service Agent Arnold Cole to discuss the matter. In his deposition,
Agent Cole revealed:
VIII. SECRET SERVICE EXPLANATION
A. INTRODUCTION
White House Admits Having Background Files, the Washington Post, June 8, 1996, p. A1.
at 1:41 p.m.
When it was revealed that the White House had inappropriately
538 "White House Admits Having Background Files," the Washington Post, June 8, 1996.
sought and obtained hundreds of FBI files of former Reagan and
539 "Panetta Offers Apology Over Files Mistake", the Washington Post, June 10, 1996.
540 Confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone to William Kennedy, undated. Living-
Bush officials, the first line of defense adopted by the White House
stone refers to the date on which the green/tan access badges will expire as March 15, 1993.
From this information, the committee believes the date of this memorandum to be between
March 4, 1993 and March 15, 1993.
Shapiro deposition, p. 18.
May 19, 1993 memo from Craig Livingstone to Arnold Cole, CGE 33034.
542 Security of FBI Files
ing, July 17, 1
PP. 46-47.
94
95
On June 7, 1996 I received a phone message that Craig
Cole asked him if he thought his office was bugged and Livingstone
Livingstone wanted to see me about a case. On the same
"indicated to [Cole] that he just didn't think it was safe to talk in
day, at approximately 3:45 p.m., I met with Mr. Living-
his office." 548
stone outside his office in the Old Executive Office Build-
While the White House continued to place blame on the Secret
ing. We briefly discussed a temporary passholder case
Service, no one from the White House ever contacted the Secret
under review.
Service to make any complaints about any problems with Secret
Unsolicited, Mr. Livingstone asked whether or not I had
Service lists. 549 When Secret Service Agents Libonati, Undercoffer
seen the press release made by his attorney concerning the
and Cole testified before the committee on July 17, 1996, it became
Billy Dale files. I responded in the affirmative, at which
clear that the Secret Service was not culpable for the "egregious
point Mr. Livingstone stated, "We just wanted you guys to
violations of privacy" that took place in the Office of Personnel Se-
know that we weren't blaming the Secret Service. Using
curity. The Secret Service spent an extraordinary amount of time
an old list was our fault, and we had the current stuff you
and resources carefully reviewing the quality of information they
guys gave us. I don't know what happened."
provided to the White House. There were no systemic problems for
I told Mr. Livingstone that I did not think he could
which the Secret Service is responsible that would account for
blame us. Basically the conversation was terminated and
these actions. 550
I reported to my supervisor. 543
B. THE SECRET SERVICE'S ROLE IN OBTAINING WHITE HOUSE ACCESS
Cole testified before the committee that he had clearly briefed Liv-
ingstone on the use of Secret Service lists. 544 At any rate, no com-
The Secret Service maintains the E-Pass system. It is a comput-
bination of errors attributed by the White House to the Secret
erized access and pass holder system that produces hard passes for
Service can explain how and why the Office of Personnel Security
the White House and computer printouts of pass holders. The lists
inappropriately obtained hundreds of FBI files of former Reagan
produced by the E-Pass system are used to show who has and who
and Bush officials. 545
does not have access to the White House. John Libonati, Super-
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 28,
visory Special Agent with the Secret Service, testified before the
1996, Livingstone appears to deny talking to anyone in the Secret
committee that "[t]he printouts are not designed, and should not be
Service about the matter:
used for other purposes. The printouts are produced for uses relat-
Senator ABRAHAM. Once this was reported, I mean, a
ed to access issues." 551
few weeks ago, when it became clear that obviously there
As Agent Libonati testified, "the request for FBI files by any
were some files that were in this category we are discuss-
White House administration is made solely for active employ-
ing, did you talk to the FBI, the Secret Service, or anybody
ees. 552 The Secret Service provides lists of active employees, inac-
about how this could have happened?
tive employees or a master list which contains the names of ap-
LIVINGSTONE. I remember talking to a lot of people be-
proximately 24,000 active and inactive White House passholders
cause I was mortified once it became apparent what we
for the previous 8 years. 553 Letter from William H. Pickle, Execu-
had, and I informed counsel. As I recall it specifically, I in-
tive Assistant to the Director of the Secret Service, to Chairman
formed my counsel, and my counsel informed White House
Clinger, August 23, 1996. 554
counsel later that night, separate from me. The FBI came
The master List, kept by the Secret Service, includes 8 categories
in immediately and removed the files.
of a File Number; First, Middle, and Last Names; Pass Type;
Senator ABRAHAM. You had talked to the FBI then and
Month, Date and Year, Date of Birth; Status; Month, Date, and
the Secret Service about it?
Year; and Office Name. The pass type indicates the areas to which
Mr. LIVINGSTONE. No.
the passholder has access. The first listing of month, date, and year
Senator ABRAHAM. You never did at that point?
is listed only for those whose pass is scheduled to expire, and the
Mr. LIVINGSTONE. No. 546
date listed is the date of expiration. The office name is the office
in which the passholder works. The status is the place where a no-
Livingstone did speak with the Secret Service about this matter.
Agent Cole, a decorated Secret Service employee, testified that Liv-
P. 184.
ingstone left a copy of his attorney's press release for him in his
Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 44.
office and that Livingstone was making efforts to contact him
pp. 24-41.
throughout the week. 547 When Agent Cole spoke with Livingstone,
"I/d Opening statement of Agent Libonati.
552/d., p. 25.
Cole testified that Livingstone did not want to speak in his office.
553/d., PP. 27-28; On August 23, 1996, William H. Pickle, Executive Assistant to the Director
of the Secret Service, wrote to Chairman Clinger to explain why the Secret Service retains 8
years worth of inactive passholder records. He wrote, "In April of 1982, a study was conducted
843 Cole deposition, pp. 41-42.
by the Secret Service Office of Management and Organization. The study concluded that due
544 Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 17, 1996, p. 47.
to a recurring need for information in these files, an 8-year retention period would be rec-
6451d, pp.:24-41.
ommended to the National Archives for review. The request was reviewed and approved by Ar-
546 White House Access to FBI Summaries; hearing before the Senate Committee on Judiciary,
chives appraisers in January of 1983."
104th Cong., 2d. Sess., June 28, 1996 p. 111.
Thus, Secret Service Records would include the names and status of those who held White
Cole deposition, p. 38.
House passes for 8 years.
96
97
tation is made of whether the passholder's access is "active" or "in-
[whose FBI background files the White House obtained improperly]
active." That status is indicated by an "A" or an "I."
the Secret Service set out to determine if, in fact, we had provided
C. THE LISTS USED BY THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
ANY LIST which would have inaccurately reflected any or all of
these 476 names as ACTIVE passholders in 1993 or 1994. 559 And
SECURITY
because, according to Libonati, [t]he Secret Service has for many
One of the excuses offered by the White House as to why the Of-
years provided printouts containing passholder information to the
fice of Personnel Security improperly obtained FBI background files
White House Office of Personnel Security," Libonati characterized
was that they were updating their files because the previous ad-
the issue before the Secret Service in the following manner: "Did
ministration had removed all personnel files from the White House.
the Secret Service produce and/or provide any list or lists which
According to the Clinton administration, the list provided to them
would have inaccurately reflected these 476 individuals as ACTIVE
from the Secret Service, which they used to find out who should
passholders?" Libonati presented to the committee evidence uncov-
have access to the White House, incorrectly included names of peo-
ered by the Secret Service search and audit of their files, which
ple from previous administrations who should not have had access
clearly demonstrated that the Secret Service could not have pro-
to the White House. White House officials insistently refer to the
vided such a list. 560
Secret Service's list as defective.
The Secret Service conducted an exhaustive audit of its records.
Craig Livingstone testified before the committee, "[T]his mistake
Libonati told the committee, "The audit confirms that from 1984 to
occurred simply because the passholder list provided to my office
July of 1993, 379 of the 476 names on the subject list were made
by the Secret Service contained some names of former staffers who
Inactive. We can account for 8 errors
561 Names were made
no longer had access to the White House complex, interspersed
inactive only at the request of the White House. However, many of
among the names of actual, current passholders and others who
continued to have access. 555 Liza Wetzl, now Confidential Assist-
the names mentioned above were entered into the E-Pass system
when it was installed, and they were entered as Inactive. Thus, at
ant to the Secretary of the Army, testified before the committee
that, "I
concluded that Tony must have ordered previous re-
no time were many of the names on the list of 476 in the E-Pass
ports for every person on whatever out-of-date Secret Service list
system as active passholders.
Libonati recounted before the committee the evidence uncovered
he had been working from. 556 This was an attempt to shift the
blame for improperly ordering hundreds of FBI background files
by the Secret Service in their search for lists produced by the E-
from the White House to the Secret Service. However, we learned
Pass system at certain times. According to Libonati, the evidence
that any list that was produced in 1993, would have identified the
showed:
vast majority of the people whose files were wrongfully obtained as
Ninety-four of the names of the 476 on the list were inac-
"Inactive."
tivated between 1984 and 1989, before we installed our current
At the time Livingstone and Marceca testified, the committee did
E-Pass system. 562
not have the benefit of documents withheld by the White House.
In a printout of inactive passholders, the evidence shows
When the White House finally produced subpoenaed documents,
that "182 of the 476 names in question appear as they should
they revealed that the White House knew that it was required to
on this inactive printout.' 563
keep the Secret Service apprised of changes of those with access. 557
In a printout of active passholders from May 2, 1994, "368
These memoranda demonstrate that the White House clearly knew
of the 476 names in question do not appear on this list, and
that to remove names from access lists was their job.
they should not appear on this list. This is an active
passholder list. 564
D. THE ONLY LIST THEY COULD BE TALKING ABOUT
In a printout of active passholders as of July 31, 1993, "379
Because it had been accused by the White House of providing in-
of the 476 names in question do not appear on this list." 565
accurate lists for use by the White House Security Office, the Se-
In a printout of inactive passholders as of August 19, 1994,
cret Service undertook an exhaustive audit of their E-Pass system
429 of the 476 names in question do and should appear on this
and any lists that may have been provided to the White House. At
inactive list.' 566
hearings before this committee, the Secret Service spoke in detail
In a March 31, 1993 active passholder list provided to the
about the lists available to the White House. 558
committee by the White House, 408 of the 476 names are not
Agent Libonati described the information which led to the search
on the list. In addition, the name of Elizabeth Belfore was not
for mistakes in Secret Service lists. Agent Libonati told the com-
on the March 31, 1993 list, but is among the 476 people whose
mittee, "Upon receipt of two lists which total 476 individuals
"Id., p. 25. (Emphasis in original.)
656 Security of FBI Files hearings, June 26, 1996, p. 30.
Id., pp. 24-41.
"/d., p. 47.
send., p. 25.
657 Memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Director of White House Security to Arnold Cole;
"Id, pp. 33-34.
"Please place the following people on restricted access. They are restricted from gaining access
"Id, P. 34.
to the White House Gomplex without written authorization of Mr. David Watkins." Document
Id., p. 34.
CGE 33034; May 19, 1993.
p. 35.
668 Security of the FBI File hearing, July 17, 1996, pp. 24-41.
98
99
background files were requested by the White House. Belfore
did not receive a pass until after July 8, 1993. 567
tration to identify those pass holders whom they wish to
The data compiled by the Secret Service clearly demonstrated
remove from the active passholder list. Regardless of how
that the only way Marceca could have obtained all of the names he
obvious it may seem to anyone in the Secret Service, we
sought files on would have been by utilizing a master list with both
cannot, should not, and do not inactivate a pass without
"Active" and "Inactive" employees, with the notations "A" and "I"
clear instruction from the administration. 570
clearly indicated on the printout. In using the master list, Marceca
would have had to deliberately order the files of hundreds of indi-
After Libonati's explanation, Congresswoman Collins, the ranking
minority member of the committee, was still confused about the
viduals identified as "Inactive." Agent Cole testified that he briefed
process used to deactivate a pass.
Marceca's supervisor, Livingstone, on the "Active" and "Inactive"
list notations:
Mrs. COLLINS OF ILLINOIS. Could you explain to me why
Question. You would have meetings where you in-
Senator Tower, who had died 2 years earlier in a plane
crash, still had an active White House pass in '93?
structed-I believe you testified you, instructed Craig Liv-
ingstone on procedures and how to get material from your
Mr. COLE. Because [the May 27, 1993 memorandum]
office and get updated lists, that type of thing?
was the first notice we got from the White House to deacti-
Answer. Yes, we have had conversations about that.
vate his pass.
Question. In terms of reading the lists, what "A" and "I"
Mrs. COLLINS. Did you know he had died?
meant, active and inactive; that kind of thing had been ex-
Mr. COLE. I wasn't aware of the fact that he had a White
plained to Mr. Livingstone?
House Pass, Ma'am.
Answer. Yes: 568
Mrs. COLLINS. Did you know he had died?
Mr. COLE. Yes.
Marceca has testified that he believed the designations, "A" and
Mrs. COLLINS. Does anybody ever cull the lists to take
"I" on the Secret Service lists meant "Access" and "Intern." "569 To
out people who are deceased?
believe this story, one would have to accept that Marceca, whose
involvement in political campaigns is extensive, believed that such
Mr. COLE. The requirement for deactivation of passes
well known former White House officials as James Baker, A.B.
that is the same requirement that took place for Vincent
Culvahouse, Ken Duberstein and many others were "holdover in-
Foster, that we would have to have someone from the
terns," a category of passholders which does not exist.
White House to tell us to deactivate it. It is obvious that
Another fact uncovered by the Secret Service discredits Marceca's
person would not pose a threat to the complex, because
explanation that he was working with an old, or outdated list. One
they are deceased.
of the names on the list of files he obtained, Elizabeth Belfore, did
Mrs. COLLINS. Why would you have to have somebody
not begin working at the White House until July 1993. Thus, any
tell you to deactivate a file of somebody that the Service
list Marceca worked from which included her name was created
knows is not going to use it?
after this date. Since Marceca did not begin working at the White
Mr. COLE. Because that documentation belongs to the
House until August 1993, it is apparent that he must have used
White House.
a list created during that time period. A list made at that time
Although White House staff feigned ignorance of it, the process
would not have included most of the names of individuals whose
of deactivation of passes for deceased or retiring personnel was well
files were eventually requisitioned by the White House.
known to the White House Security Office. The fact that Living-
E. DEACTIVATION
stone made the request that the Secret Service deactivate Senator
Tower's pass establishes his knowledge of the process of updating
At, hearings before the committee, committee members ques-
the Secret Service access list as a White House responsibility 571
tioned why some former administration employees remained as ac-
Other evidence points to the fact that Livingstone was well ac-
tive passholders in the Secret Service E-Pass System. Libonati and
quainted with the process of removing Bush administration offi-
Cole explained that it is the responsibility of the White House to
cials from Secret Service access lists.
inform the Secret Service when an employee's status should change
In a confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone to Wil-
from active to inactive.
liam Kennedy, Livingstone notes, "Please note that there are many
Libonati made the process of deactivation of passes clear in his
Bush administration employees that still have active badges. USSS
opening statement:
informs me that it is WHS responsibility to deactivate badges. I am
A pass is also made inactive solely at the request of
working with WHOMA to begin this process." Because of informa-
the White House. It is the responsibility of each adminis-
66⁷ Id., pp. 35-36.
570 Id., p. 27. (Emphasis added.)
568 Cole deposition, pp. 47-48.
Memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Director of White House Security; Re: deactivation
569 Security of the FBI Files hearing, July 26, 1996.
of Senator Tower, May 27, 1993. "Please deactivate the pass issued to Senator Tower." CGE
047989.
101
100
tion contained in the memorandum, it's date appears to be between
inquiry examining the delays in obtaining the passes was met with
March 4, 1993 and March 15, 1993.⁵⁷²
numerous obstacles for over a year. 575
Documents dated August 9, 1993 include notes made by Marceca
When the GAO inquiry finally concluded, it reported the follow-
from a meeting with Nancy Gemmell that included Lisa Wetzl and
ing findings:
Craig Livingstone. In those notes, Marceca writes, "De-Activate
A mere two permanent passes received final approval prior
former staff FBI contact to remove STOP on [illegible]. 573 The
to September 20, 1993-9 months into the new administra-
tion. 576 (In the past, permanent White House passes were ob-
White House staff was clearly familiar with the process of updating
tained for all staff by approximately 6 to 9 months into a new
Secret Service lists and the language associated with it.
administration. )
In addition to the notes and memoranda of Livingstone and
In 1993, new Clinton White House staffers held temporary
Marceca, testimony before the committee also points to the fact
passes for an average of 341 days, thus requiring numerous re-
that the staff of the White House Security Office was aware of the
newals. (A temporary pass is usually issued for 90 days.) 578
process for deactivating White House passholders. In his deposition
In 1993, the Secret Service stated that it routinely granted
to the committee, Agent Cole stated that he briefed Livingstone on
eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as
such matters.
requested by the Executive Office of the President. 579
Livingstone and Marceca knew the process of deactivating White
There were 190 new Clinton White House staffers who took
House access passes was a primary function of their jobs, and they
more than 100 days to complete the SF-86-the basic paper-
were fully briefed on the process required to do that. Nonetheless,
work needed for the FBI to initiate a background investiga-
they tried to blame the Secret Service for their malfeasance. Be-
tion. 580
cause of their attempts to shift the blame, the Secret Service was
There were 36 new Clinton White House staffers who took
forced to spend countless hours and resources responding to inquir-
over 300 days-almost a year-to complete their SF-86s.5
ies and allegations. The only logical conclusion to the audits con-
Of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took over
ducted, was that no active Secret Service list could have produced
300 days to be approved for permanent passes. 582
the list of names of those whose FBI files were wrongfully re-
In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be
quested by the White House.
approved for a permanent pass. 583
Only about two dozen staffers had "interim clearances" ac-
IX. WHITE HOUSE PASSES AND SECURITY ISSUES
cording to the White House in the first 8 months of the admin-
istration. 584
A. LAX WHITE HOUSE SECURITY PROCEDURES WERE A PRECURSOR TO
Individuals entering on duty during 1993 received final ap-
FBI FILES ISSUE
proval for permanent White House passes "an average of 346
1. Problems with White House passes
days from their start date." 585
"The longer time needed to process 1993 entrants was pri-
The gathering of hundreds of FBI files was a consequence of the
marily attributable to the time individuals took to complete the
White House placing highly unsuitable personnel and supervisors
SF-86 and to subsequent actions taken by the Executive Office
in charge of the Security processes at the White House. The fact
of the President.' 586
that the Clinton White House followed lax security procedures and
When White House advisor George Stephanopoulos was ques-
was negligent in obtaining White House passes became apparent
tioned about the problems with obtaining passes during "This
over 2 years ago, in March 1994, after lengthy congressional inquir-
Week with David Brinkley," on June 30, 1996, he erroneously
ies.
claimed:
A GAO inquiry into the delays in obtaining White House passes
STEPHANOPOULOS. Well most people did go get their
was requested by Chairman Clinger, and Representatives Frank
Wolf and Porter Goss in March 1994, and released in October 1995.
interviews. Most people got their passes. If there was slip-
The GAO report outlined the unprecedented delays of the Clinton
page, that was a mistake. It was wrong.
White House in obtaining passes. 574 In keeping with the Clinton
administration's pattern of resistance to investigations, the GAO
The GAO inquiry which was requested in March 1994 was still stalled in October 1994
when Chairman Clinger, Representative Wolf and Representative Goss wrote to White House
Chief of Staff Leon Panetta on October 7, 1994 concerned about the delay in the investigation.
STeGAO report, p. 21.
577 Staff interview with Jane Dannenhauer.
672 Confidential memorandum from Craig Livingstone, Chief of White House Security, to Wil-
GAO report, p. 28.
liam Kennedy, Associate White House Counsel, undated. Within the memorandum, Livingstone
579 GAO report, p. 29.
refers to a crash of the WAVE computer system occurring on March 4, 1993. Livingstone refers
580 GAO report, P. 22.
to the date on which "green/tan access badge(s)" will expire as March 15, 1993. From this infor-
681 GAO report, p. 22.
mation, the committee believes the date of this memorandum to be between March 4, 1993 and
582 GAO report, P. 21.
March 15, 1993.
683 GAO report, p. 29.
573 Anthony Marceca, notes from meeting with Nancy Gemmell, August 9, 1993.
584 GAO report, p. 34.
GAO report to Cong "Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the
685 GAO report, p. 3.
Executive Office of the President," October 19, 1995.
102
103
SAM DONALDSON. Aldrich [FBI agent Gary Aldrich] says
Ms. Jane Dannenhauer, Assistant to the Counsel to the Presi-
hundreds.
dent in charge of the Security Office during the Nixon, Ford,
STEPHANOPOULOS. Well, I'm not sure that's true
I
Reagan and Bush administrations, reported that a new administra-
don't have the exact number.
tion normally completed its pass issuance within approximately 6
According to a White House memo from Craig Livingstone,
months, or at most 9 months. 596 In comparison, the GAO reported
Stephanopoulos' temporary pass was renewed for an additional 90
that only two Clinton staffers had permanent passes 9 months into
days on December 13, 1993. 587 Stephanopoulos, like most of the
the administration. 597 Messrs. Kennedy and Livingstone, who were
White House staff at that time, had numerous renewals of his tem-
responsible for White House pass issuance, did not obtain their
porary pass.
own passes until November 23, 1993. 598
The GAO inquiry was preceded by months of congressional in-
2. Unsuitable personnel in charge of overseeing the Office of Person-
quiries into the inordinate delay in obtaining White House
nel Security
passes. 588 Senior officials, including the then-Chief of Staff Mack
McLarty, did not obtain permanent passes until March 1994. Once
While the committee and the public have yet to learn who hired
this serious security breach of the Clinton administration was
Craig Livingstone, the committee discovered information on the
brought to light in March 1994, the White House was forced to re-
hiring of his supervisor, William Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy testified
spond.
that Mrs. Clinton participated in his selection as Associate White
The press began reporting on the delays in the issuance of per-
House Counsel. 599 At the time of his background investigation,
manent White House passes in early 1994. On March 10, 1994, the
Kennedy informed the FBI's SPIN Unit Chief Bourke that he was
Wall Street Journal first pointed out that the White House had not
a "close personal friend of the President and Mrs. Clinton for twen-
approved passes for senior White House officials such as the Direc-
ty years and was a managing partner in the same Arkansas law.
tor of the Office of Administration, Patsy Thomasson. 589 This arti-
firm in which Mrs. Clinton was employed. 600
cle appears to have generated a memo from Associate Counsel Wil-
Mr. Kennedy, in his position as an Associate Counsel, reviewed
liam Kennedy to Mack McLarty explaining the procedures to re-
the sensitive background investigations of Presidential appointees
ceive a permanent pass. 590 The next day the Washington Post re-
and White House staff, including Director of Personnel Security
ported that, "15 White House aides, including press secretary Dee
Craig Livingstone. Although Kennedy supervised Livingstone's of-
Dee Myers and another unidentified senior official, have yet to re-
fice and was aware of problems in Livingstone's background, he fa-
ceive security clearances because they failed to complete necessary
vorably adjudicated his file. 601
paperwork
591
Mr. Kennedy had background problems of his own. Mr. Kennedy
By March 12, 1994, the White House conceded that the situation
did not properly disclose his failure to pay Social Security taxes for
was actually much worse than it originally admitted and that hun-
a servant in his home. He paid the taxes belatedly under his wife's
dreds of staff did not have permanent passes: "White House Press
former married name. 602 Just as Kennedy had ignored the prob-
Secretary Dee Dee Myers
confirmed that about a third of the
lems in Livingstone's background, Livingstone adjudicated Ken-
1044 employees designated as White House staff, including herself,
nedy's background favorably, ignoring the derogatory informa-
have not received their permanent passes. 592 Of the 125 senior
tion. 603 Although each had completed the adjudication of the oth-
staff, approximately one-third still did not have their permanent
er's file, Kennedy did not forward either his or Livingstone's file to
passes. 593 By March 14, 1994, the White House raised the number
the Secret Service for months. 604
of officials who did not have security clearances to 100 rather than
Four Counsels to the President and two Chiefs of Staff kept Mr.
the 15 individuals originally reported. 594 Clearly, the responses
Livingstone in his position despite serious concerns about his back-
provided to Congress by McLarty were misleading, incomplete and
ground. Livingstone was retained despite his penchant for short
inaccurate. 595
working hours and routine demands for large salary increases.
Keeping Craig Livingstone employed seemed more important to
587 White House production CGE 047029. Memorandum for U.S. Secret Service Pass Section
from White House Security, Re: extension of passes, December 13, 1993.
596 Staff interview of Jane Dannenhauer.
566 Representative Frank Wolf began inquiring about the delays in White House passes and
597 GAO report, P. 21.
the lack of procedures being followed with passes in July 1993. Throughout the fall of 1993 and
598 GAO documents prepared for GAO report, January 5, 1995. (In committee files).
into 1994, then-Chief of Staff Mack McLarty assured Wolf that clearances were being handled
see
Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 4:
"in a timely manner."
Question: Did the First Lady have any involvement in your hiring?
569 "Who is Patsy Thomasson!" Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994.
cbo Memorandum to Thomas F. McLarty from William H. Kennedy III, re: procedures to re-
ceive a permanent pass, March 10, 1994, CGE 054752.
Kennedy, Associate Counsel, the White House, February 18, 1993. (FBI document production,
600 KENNEDY. February She 26, did. 1993 memo to Mr. Brekke from Mr. Bourke regarding "Meeting with William
"After Year, 15 White House Aides Have Yet to Receive Security Clearances," the Washing-
July 10, 1996, unnumbered.)
ton Post, March 11, 1994.
601 Kennedy deposition, June 18, 1996, p. 9.
592 "White House lags badly on background checks," the Washington Times, March 12, 1994.
602 Takes the Fishe," Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1994.
503
"Patsy CCE 054658, undated document titled "Deconcini" with questions and answers, CGE
594 "100 on White House Staff Lack Clearance," the Washington Post, March 14, 1994.
596 See letters to Rep. Frank Wolf from Mack McLarty dated August 19, 1993, October 27,
54654-662. 604 Ann Devroy, 100 on White House Staff Lack Clearance, the Washington Post, March 14,
1993 and February 24, 1994.
1994.
104
105
Clinton administration officials than maintaining the security of
some of the Nation's most sensitive files. 605
House, as well as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
Former White House Counsels have testified that the process of
recommended that Livingstone be replaced in 1994 with a profes-
reviewing FBI files "is. a solemn, legal and ethical obligation.' 606
sional careerist. Senator DeConcini's recommendations were ig-
After the committee discovered that the Office of Personnel Secu-
nored by then-White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler. 613
rity ordered the files of hundreds of former Reagan and Bush ad-
B. THE PROCESS BY WHICH BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS ARE
ministration officials, the Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, called
CONDUCTED
the actions "egregious violations of privacy.' 607 Director Freeh con-
tinued to state that the files were ordered "without justifica-
The process for obtaining a permanent access pass to the White
tion.' 608 As Director Freeh pointed out, the system utilized relied
House generally requires the following steps:
on the "good faith and honor" of those involved in the process. 609
As the Washington Post opined on June 17, 1996:
1. Pre-employment steps
damage was done from Day 1 when Craig Living-
a. Security interview
stone was put in this job. The last people in government
Prior to each person's appointment, applicants must undergo a
to have access to, let alone be custodians of, sensitive back-
security interview conducted by the relevant security office. 614 In
ground investigation reports and material should be politi-
the case of the political staff, generally the "White House staff," the
cal operatives. That, unfortunately, is what the Clinton ad-
ministration seems to have done. And that's for start-
interview would be conducted by the Office of Personnel Security,
ers.
610
supervised by Livingstone. For the career staff, the Office of Ad-
ministration Security Officer would conduct the interviews. 615 Dur-
FBI Special Agent Tom Renaghan, who supervised the FBI
ing the first year-and-a-half of the Clinton administration, hun-
agents who conducted background investigations at the White
dreds of employees did not submit to this interview prior to em-
House, remembered issues in Livingstone's background:
ployment, or for many months after being hired. 616
that were not totally favorable
they [FBI agents
b. Submit to a drug test
Aldrich and Sculimbrene who conducted background inves-
tigations at the White House] both felt that he wasn't the
All applicants must submit to a drug test. If the test is positive,
right guy to be the Security Director. They didn't think he
the person is supposed to be disqualified from appointment. 617
had the background or demeanor, didn't appear to be the
Many of the new employees in the Clinton administration did not
kind of guy that would be the type of person that would
take drug tests prior to employment at the White House, and they
be-you would expect in that position
He
was
unpro-
were often conducted months later.
fessional in many ways, as unprofessional as they would
perceive a guy to be who had that type of a job.
They
C. An initial name check
voiced their opinion to me about that periodically asking
Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their
me to take some kind of action to get something done with
name, date of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are
respect to him. 611
checked through the Secret Service's Workers, Appointment, and
Mr. Kennedy allowed Livingstone to retain his sensitive position
Visitors Entrance System (WAVES). This consists of checks
after reviewing Livingstone's background file. Although both FBI
through four computer databases: the FBI's National Crime Infor-
and Secret Service agents raised suitability and security concerns
mation Center database; a criminal history database; a Secret
about Livingstone, Kennedy ignored them.612 Senator Dennis
Service database; and a Washington-area law enforcement
DeConcini, the then-Democratic chairman of the Treasury Postal
database. 618 This is the type of name check that is conducted for
Service and General Government Subcommittee of the Appropria-
visitors at the White House. For many Clinton White House staff
tions Committee, which approved appropriations for the White
in the first year-and-a-half, this was the only background check
conducted on them.
605 Three attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office wrote letters requesting a raise for
Craig Livingstone, even though there was a salary freeze. CGE 048622, 048627; Mr. Livingstone
d. An extensive FBI name check
wrote several letters to Abner Mikva requesting a raise, stating, TT]his is my last try to remain
part of the team." CGE 048058; See, supra section III.
In this process, the White House forwards a request form to the
606 Security of FBI Files hearing, June 19, 1996, p. 32. (Testimony of A.B. Culvahouse.)
FBI to check the name through the FBI Central Records, computer
607 Howard M. Shapiro, general counsel, FBI; Report of the General Counsel on the Dissemina-
tion of FBI File Information to the White House; June 14, 1996. (Statement of FBI Director
databases and the Criminal Justice Information Services database
Louis Freeh).
609 Howard M. Shapiro, general counsel, FBI; Report of the General Counsel on the Dissemina-
613 August 11, 1994 letter to the President from Senator DeConcini.
tion of FBI File Information to the White House; June 14, 1996.
614 GAO report, P. 15.
610 The FBI Files Flap: Take 2," the Washington Post, June 17, 1996.
615 Easley deposition, July 26, 1996.
611 Renaghan deposition, July 19, 1996, pp. 62-65.
61GAO report.
612 Cole deposition, July 10, 1996, pp. 21-22.
617 GAO report, p. 15.
GAO report, p. 15.
106
107
to identify any derogatory information and prior arrest records. 619
very limited checks on their backgrounds and no permanent
Any previous report is also provided if the individual already has
passes. The importance of following procedures and determining
an FBI background investigation on file.
the suitability of staff members is to protect both the President,
e. Obtaining a temporary pass
personally, and the vast amount of sensitive information at the
White House.
Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has
At no place is it more important that individuals of the highest
30 days from the date of employment in which to complete the SF-
caliber serve in positions of responsibility than at the White House.
86, an FBI investigation consent form, and a tax check waiver. 620
The White House handles matters of life and death on a daily basis
This 30 day standard was the regular practice in past administra-
and the American people must be able to rely upon stable and suit-
tions; however, there was no such legal requirement.
able people being involved in this process. Because the White
Mr. Charles Easley, who headed up the Security Office for career
House had failed in this process, Presidential Assistant Patsy
employees at the White House, stated that if someone did not turn
Thomasson made this alarming admission in her March 22, 1994
in their SF-86s and other background information within 30 days,
testimony before the House Treasury Postal Appropriations sub-
"they had a lot of time to sit at home and do their forms" because
committee: "We don't think we have any Aldrich Ameses at the
he would not allow someone to work at the White House. 621 Mr.
White House
But we certainly could." 628
Easley said that this was not the case for the staff handled by Liv-
This admission prompted then-Congressman Dan Glickman,
ingstone. Easley acknowledged that he was aware that Livingstone
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee to write to the Di-
allowed staff to work at the White House and obtain a temporary
rector of the CIA asking what steps he had taken to ensure that
pass without turning in paperwork, a change in normal proce-
White House staffers without clearances did not have access to
dure. 622
classified material. 629 Representative Glickman noted at the time,
Previously, the practice had been that an individual had to stay
"The urgency of this matter has been highlighted by the arrest of
on an "access list" prior to completing the SF-86 and related paper-
Aldrich Ames." 630 Early in the administration, there was cause for
work, which meant the person would have to present positive iden-
concern about White House personnel.
tification each time he or she entered the White House complex. 623
Once the FBI name check is returned, the individual would be is-
C. BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF CLINTON WHITE HOUSE STAFF
sued a temporary pass for a period not to exceed 90 days. After one
1. White House staff provided minimal cooperation to the FBI
extension, the Secret Service is supposed to contact the requesting
office to provide a rationale for an additional extension. 624 Each
The FBI agents who worked on a day-to-day basis in conducting
new employee also is required to attend a security briefing at
FBI background investigations on the new Clinton White House
which his or her attendance should be documented. 625
staffers were very familiar with the delays in obtaining White
House passes. From the start, the process was slower than with
f. Obtaining a permanent pass
previous administrations and staff cooperation was liminted.
Before a permanent pass is obtained, the FBI or some other
FBI Agent Dennis Sculimbrene testified that the incoming ad-
agency must conduct a full-field background investigation. If the
ministration usually starts sending cases on Cabinet-level person-
investigation reveals information that warrants attention, the FBI
nel and appointees in December, before the Presidential Inaugura-
notifies the White House Counsel's Office, the White House Office
tion. But that did not occur with the Clinton administration. 631
of Personnel Security, or the Security Office of the EOP (adminis-
Agent Sculimbrene said there was a marked contrast with this ad-
tered by Charles Easley) and might provide an interim report. 626
ministration: "the forms were poorly filled out and they didn't even
Once the reviewing office receives the FBI background investiga-
start getting them until July." 632 When they received the forms,
tion summary, it determines suitability and decides whether to for-
they were often backdated. 633
ward the file to the Secret Service. A written request is sent to the
Agent Sculimbrene's supervisor, Tom Renaghan, also reported
Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee and,
that backgrounds were received late and were backdated. 634 FBI
if the Secret Service agrees there is no danger to the President or
Agent Cecelia Woods, another agent assigned to the White House,
other protectees, a permanent pass is issued. 627
reported that she saw the dates on SF-86s visibly changed and re-
ceived SF-86s sometimes 8 months after they had been completed
During the first year-and-a-half of the Clinton administration,
this process was neglected and hundreds of new White House staff
by the appointee. 635
worked in positions, including the most senior positions, with only
FBI Agent Greg Schwarz testified that he had trouble setting up
interviews or getting people to appear for interviews and was
619 GAO report, p. 15.
620 GAO report, P. 16.
as Patsy Takes the Fishe, the Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1994.
621 Easley deposition; p. 48.
are
Id.
622 Easley deposition, pp. 48-50.
Id.
623 GAO report, p. 16.
631 Sculimbrene deposition, July 15, 1996, p. 28.
624 GAO report, p. 16.
632 Id., P. 29.
626 GAO report, p. 16.
Id.
GAO report, p. 17.
634 Renaghan deposition, PP. 13-15.
GAO report, p. 18.
635 Woods deposition, July 10, 1996, pp. 20-22.
108
109
aware of this happening to other agents at the White House. 636
Agent Sculimbrene noted that the drug use was by "older people
Agent Woods testified that Renaghan, her supervisor, advised Unit
who had used illegal drugs much more recently, as recently as the
Chief Bourke of these irregularities and that Bourke should have
Inaugural. 644 According to Sculimbrene, these drugs included:
discussed the problems with Associate White House Counsel Bill
Kennedy 637 Woods, however, never saw any corrective actions
designer drugs
I think the first time I heard the
taken on issues she or her colleagues raised with her super-
word "designer drugs' was off an appointee.
visors. 638
Cocaine possibly crack cocaine hallucinogenic
FBI Agent Gary Aldrich explained that he had problems conduct-
mushrooms. I think some people used LSD. It was much
ing background interviews, including: problems in locating individ-
more than the one or two times when they were 18 or 19
years old
uals, an inability to contact them directly and appointments being
this was not just junior staffers, either. 645
made and broken. 639 As a result of these problems, Deputy White
Agent Sculimbrene noted that he did not believe that "a single per-
House Counsel Vincent Foster sent out a memo to all staff on Feb-
son" was terminated because of any information of this nature that
ruary 17, 1993 instructing them to cooperate with FBI Agents Al-
became apparent from an FBI background investigation. 646
drich and Sculimbrene. Mr. Foster wrote:
FBI Agent Cecilia Woods also found recent drug use in the back-
grounds of some appointees and noted one instance where drug
There are a large number of staff members yet to be
usage stopped as recently as the day before an individual filled out
interviewed and only a few weeks left to complete them be-
the SF-86.647
fore your temporary clearance expires. Please be respon-
It was in a White House having its own problems completing
sive to the Agent's request for an interview and accommo-
background investigations that Livingstone and Marceca were busy
date his schedule. 640
at work on the "Update Project," which resulted in the procurement
There was such laxity in submitting the names of new White
of hundreds of background investigation files of former Reagan and
Bush officials.
House staff for background investigations that Bourke resorted to
clipping newspaper articles which identified new staffers and send-
D. SECRET SERVICE CONCERNS
ing them to Bill Kennedy with notes that the FBI had not received
the backgrounds of the individuals named. 641
1. Delays in submitting background investigations to the Secret
Service
Agent Bourke's letters to Kennedy highlight the fact that the FBI
had not been provided information on many top White House offi-
The Secret Service also became concerned about the delays in the
cials as late as October 1993. In an April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Ken-
Clinton White House obtaining permanent passes. 648 Secret Serv-
nedy, Bourke wrote: "I read an article in the April 6, 1993, edition
ice Agent Arnold Cole was the supervisor of the White House Ac-
of USA Today on Jocelyn Elders. It reminded me that we still do
cess Control Branch and was the individual tasked with interfacing
not have the paperwork to do her background investigation
with Livingstone's office.⁶⁴⁹
(BI).' 642 At the same time that the White House was negligent in
During the transition, Cole and other security personnel met
obtaining background investigations on new White House staff
with Clinton officials regarding security matters. At that time,
members, Livingstone and Marceca were ordering the background
David Watkins was the point of contact and Cole met with him on
investigations on former Reagan and Bush officials.
several occasions. 650 At some point later in February, Livingstone
was identified to Cole as the person who would be heading up the
2. Problems in the background investigations of Clinton administra-
office. 651
tion staff
During the spring of 1993, Cole convened a meeting of security
Almost immediately FBI agents reviewing the background files of
officers for March 31, 1993 to meet "new members of the adminis-
the new Clinton White House officials noticed significant problems.
tration and discuss any security issues pertaining to the White
According to Sculimbrene, the problems in the backgrounds in-
House complex. 652 These meetings were convened monthly
cluded, "using illegal drugs repetitively, lying to law enforcement
through November 1993.653 Agent Cole testified that the Secret
officers, lying about school records, being fired." 643
Service received very few background files before the end of
1993.654
Schwarz deposition, July 11, 1996, pp. 27-30.
Woods deposition, July 10, 1996, PP. 22-23.
"Id., p. 43.
e³⁸/d., P. 61.
p. 44.
*Aldrich deposition, July 18, 1996, p. 20.
Woods deposition, p. 29.
"Memorandum to all White House Office Staff from Vincent Foster and William Kennedy,
Cole deposition, p. 18
CGE 048210.
"Id., P. 6.
FBI document production, July 10, 1996 (unnumbered) March 1, 1993 letter to Bill Ken-
p. 8.
nedy from Jim Bourke; April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke; October 20, 1993
Id., P. 10.
letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke.
Id., p. 15.
642 April 7, 1993 letter to Bill Kennedy from Jim Bourke.
Id., p. 17.
643 Sculimbrene deposition, July 15, 1996, p. 42.
Deposition of Arnold Cole, July 10, 1996, p. 25.
110
111
As the meetings proceeded through the year, it became apparent
Agent Cole said there was also information in Kennedy's back-
that there were problems with staff obtaining permanent passes.
ground file which was brought to his attention that he reviewed
Agent Cole testified:
from a security standpoint and ultimately resolved in favor of Mr.
the obvious concern that we had from a security
Kennedy. 663
standpoint was that anyone with a temporary pass exceed-
As background investigations of other individuals started coming
ing 90 days and they have close proximity to the Presi-
into the Secret Service in late 1993 and early 1994, it became ap-
dent, we would want to know whether or not this person
parent that there were issues of recent drug use in many files.
would pose a possible immediate or projected threat later
Agent Jeff Undercoffer, who reviewed files in early 1994, testified:
on. So those were our concerns. 655
"I would say more than 30, more than 40, perhaps, had drug usage
[beyond college age]"
and "a few dozens who were recent. 664
Agent Cole testified that he raised these concerns with Bill Ken-
Agent Undercoffer testified to what the files he reviewed included:
nedy and explained to him the importance of having the back-
ground investigations completed. 656 Yet neither Kennedy's own
I have seen cocaine usage. I have seen hallucinogenic us-
-
background file nor Livingstone's were forwarded to the Secret
ages, crack usages
I would say those are the big
three.⁶⁶⁵
Service until September 20, 1993.657 Following the submission to
the Secret Service of both of their backgrounds, it took another 2
In late 1993, the Secret Service raised concerns over an individ-
months before the Secret Service issued permanent passes to Ken-
ual's pass request "based on our review of the background inves-
nedy or Livingstone on November 23, 1993. 658 Earlier that month,
tigation" in which they "felt that the derogatory information was
on November 7, 1993, Livingstone's neighbor filed a complaint with
such that it may compromise the security of the White House with-
the Montgomery County Police Department, charging Livingstone
out some other mechanism in place to ensure that our concerns
with a simple assault for threatening her. Mr. Livingstone report-
were just merely concerns. 666
edly said, "If you don't keep that (expletive deleted) dog quiet, I'm
The Secret Service initially denied pass requests for a number of
individuals because of very recent drug use. 667 Out of this situa-
going to beat your face in.' 659 The neighbor informed police that
tion, a program was developed whereby the offending individual
Livingstone made previous threats to her in the past, which Living-
stone admitted. 660
was required to participate in a special drug testing program for
White House employees with recent drug use. 668
Background files with no problems take only several days for the
Secret Service to issue a permanent pass. No one at the White
E. WHITE HOUSE DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
House was alarmed when the people whom they put in charge of
In order to obtain the approval of the Secret Service in issuing
reviewing backgrounds had problems significant enough to cause a
permanent passes to individuals with recent drug use, the White
2 month delay in issuing their permanent passes. A man who made
House instituted a random drug testing program. Agent Cole ex-
assault threats against a woman was put in charge of security at
plained the program: "I think it was a compromise between both
the White House. This should never have occurred.
the White House and the Secret Service as a suggestion as to what
2. The Secret Service raised concerns about the content of the back-
would be amenable to both parties. 669 According to the White
ground files
House, the program included as many as 21 people over the past
several years according to the White House. These were individuals
The Secret Service raised concerns about whether Livingstone
who had drug use in the year before they began work at the White
should be granted a White House pass, 661 when it obtained his
House. Nine such individuals still are employed at the White
background file in September 1993. Agent Cole said that he became
House. 670 As White House Counsel Jack Quinn explained the pro-
aware of "derogatory information" in Livingstone's file and raised
gram:
it with Kennedy:
In a small number of instances, the Office of White
What I recall discussing with Mr. Kennedy was my con-
House Counsel in consultation with the Secret Service, de-
cerns on the derogatory information and whether or not he
termined that an individual should be issued a pass only
concurred or not
he wanted to understand specifi-
if he or she agrees to be subject to the more frequent, non-
cally what my concern was as it related to our
random special drug testing protocol described above. This
mission
662
means being tested unannounced twice a year under the
same conditions as the standard random testing program
Deposition of Arnold Cole, July 10, 1996, p. 18.
Id, p. 19.
GAO draft of data for GAO report, 1/5/95.
Id., pp. 24-25.
p. 41.
Id.
666 Undercoffer deposition, p. 42.
November 7, 1993 event report to Montgomery County Police of threat to Barbara Ann
Cole deposition, p. 31.
Sable by Craig Livingstone, #B93-240485.
660
Id.
Id., p. 32.
Cole and Undercoffer depositions.
Cole deposition, pp. 21-22.
Cole deposition, p. 32.
Id., pp. 22-23.
July 31, 1996 letter to Chairman Clinger from Jack Quinn.
112
113
in the EOP's Drug-Free Workplace Plan. These individuals
The committee was troubled by the ease with which unsuitable
are so designated because information developed in the
candidates were given the highest levels of security clearances. The
course of the security clearance process or supplied by the
CIA explained to the committee that it authorized the clearances,
individual suggested that it would be prudent to do so. 671
including that of Livingstone, because the White House made the
It is important to recognize that this program is handled entirely
requests.
by the White House Counsel's Office and the drug testing is admin-
Finally, even when the White House decided to upgrade the secu-
istered by the EOP random testing program. When an individual
rity clearance process, Livingstone was given special treatment
is placed in this program, a "drug letter" is placed in his or her file
again. Current White House Security Chief Charles Easley testified
with the Secret Service. The Secret Service is then informed if
that he did not review Livingstone's file when he was updating the
there is any positive drug testing.
clearances of everyone at the White House 677 Mr. Easley testified
The individual must sign this "drug letter" indicating that they
that even though he reviewed the file of everyone else he worked
acknowledge the drug use set forth in his or her FBI background
with at the White House, he declined to review Livingstone's file
investigation and the individual is informed that any positive drug
and approved him for a security clearance in December 1995. 678
test would be grounds for immediate termination. 672
This is the individual the White House put in charge of the secu-
The Secret Service has no role in the procedures for the drug
rity office when Craig Livingstone resigned.
testing program and relies entirely upon the information provided
The lax and cavalier attitude the Clinton White House has re-
by the White House. There is no independent verification of the in-
garding security was evident from the day Kennedy and Living-
formation by the Secret Service, which is entirely dependent upon
stone were placed in positions of responsibility at the White House.
the good faith efforts of the Counsel's Office to comply with the re-
Mrs. Clinton had a role in Kennedy's hiring. Mr. Kennedy took full
quirements in the "drug letter." The White House Counsel's Office
advantage of his connections to the President and Mrs. Clinton, in-
staff who have been involved since 1993 in overseeing or super-
forming FBI liaison Bourke of the relationship. Both Kennedy and
vising the special drug testing are Bill Kennedy, Beth Nolan and
Livingstone were unsuited to this sensitive work given problems
Chris Cerf. 673
with their own backgrounds and evidence of questionable conduct.
While the White House went to extraordinary lengths to have re-
Despite complaints from the FBI and Secret Service about inordi-
cent drug users on staff-it even created a special program to keep
nate delays and abuse of past processes, the White House contin-
them employed at the White House-a June 10, 1993 memo sug-
ued to allow unsuitable individuals to preside over the office. The
gests that Bill Kennedy and Craig Livingstone seemed to think
White House ignored FBI and Secret Service concerns, and the of-
drug users might have some kind of "right" to a job at the White
fice was eventually found to have inappropriately gathered FBI
House! 674
background files on hundreds of former Reagan and Bush officials.
In regard to staff who admit present or prior drug use, the June
The White House is at the center of policies and debates that
10, 1993 memo asks: "Does the President have the authority to (1)
may determine matters of life or death, war or peace. For the past
refuse employment; (2) hire on conditions: send the individual to a
30 years, the White House has engaged in a careful process of secu-
health care professional to assess the individual's suitability/risk as
rity clearances and background checks on individuals to determine
a pre-condition of employment; and, (3) hire without any condi-
their suitability for positions in the White House and throughout
tions?" 675 Mr. Kennedy, who oversaw the frivolous firings of the
the executive branch.
Travel Office, had to ask whether or not the President could deny
The clearance and background process is designed to protect the
present drug users a job at the White House.
security of the President as well as the national security of the
F. CIA COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES
country. One need only recall the case of Aldrich Ames to realize
what kind of problems can spring from a lack of vigilance in secu-
The Clinton White House issued the highest of national security
rity matters. As important as it is to have solid procedures in place
clearances, CIA compartmented clearances, to Livingstone, Wetzl
to guard against breaches of security, the people who operate such
and other young staffers in the Office of Personnel Security. Al-
procedures must be carefully selected and remain above reproach.
though CIA officials reviewed Livingstone's drug history and FBI
Clearly, that did not happen in the Clinton White House where cro-
background file, it does not appear that the CIA made any objec-
nies and political operatives were put in charge of these sensitive
tions to issuing Livingstone at least three separate compartmented
matters.
clearances. 676 Records the committee has now reviewed make it
Whether or not these events are shown to be a blunder, the re-
clear that the Clinton White House gave Craig Livingstone access
sult of colossal incompetence, or whether they are established to be
to the most classified sensitive information.
more serious or even criminal, the casualness with which this
White House has approached many areas of security and access
673 July 31, 1996 letter to Chairman Clinger from Jack Quinn.
provided a climate for either of these troubling alternatives. The
"June 10, 1993, "Assignment from Bill Kennedy & Craig Livingstone," CGE 047888.
677 Easley deposition, p. 72.
CIA documents, located in committee files.
"Id.
114
able backgrounds to remain in the White House.
modus operandi of this White House allowed persons of question-
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR.,
HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, HON. CONSTANCE A.
MORELLA, HON. JOHN L. MICA, AND HON. DICK CHRYS-
LER
Nothing in the hearing record or the entire course of our inquiry
into this matter has established any improper contacts, dealings, or
relationship whatsoever, between FBI Director Louis Freeh and
former White House Security Director Craig Livingstone.
Neither, is there any evidence of anything in the record of our
inquiry (particularly as relates to the subject matter of the inappro-
priate disclosure by FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro to the
White House), which indicates any intent whatsoever by Director
Freeh to protect the President or Mrs. Clinton in this matter.
FBI General Counsel Shapiro's lack of judgement in an ill ad-
vised disclosure to the White House, should not be viewed as re-
flecting adversely on the professionalism or independence of Direc-
tor Louis Freeh, nor the many dedicated men and women of the
FBI, who proudly serve our Nation so well, each and every day.
In addition, we recommend that in the future, all supervisory,
operational, and line positions, including that of general counsel at
the FBI, shall be filled solely by FBI agent personnel.
HON. WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR.
HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN.
HON. CONSTANCE A. MORELLA.
HON. JOHN L. MICA.
HON. DICK CHRYSLER.
(115)
117
Further, the majority's shameless attack on FBI General Counsel
Howard Shapiro, a career, non-partisan law enforcement profes-
sional with unimpeachable credentials, for actions which were
clearly appropriate, is outrageous and an embarrassment to the
committee. If the majority believes that Mr. Shapiro should resign
MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. CARDISS COLLINS, HON. HENRY
for disclosing what it claims was "confidential law enforcement in-
A. WAXMAN, HON. ToM LANTOS, HON. ROBERT E. WISE,
formation," then Chairman Clinger should also resign for disclosing
JR., HON. MAJOR R. OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS,
that very information in a public statement on the House Floor. It
HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., HON. LOUISE MCINTOSH
is transparently obvious that the majority is angry at Mr. Shapiro
SLAUGHTER, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. GARY A.
only because his efforts to act in a fair and non-partisan manner
CONDIT, HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON, HON. KAREN L.
thwarted its attempt to score points in the press.
THURMAN, HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, HON. THOMAS
For these reasons, we strongly dissent.
M. BARRETT, HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, HON. ELEA-
We in the minority have addressed the problems identified in the
NOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. JAMES P. MORAN, HON.
FBI's report, "The Dissemination of FBI File Information to the
GENE GREEN, HON. CARRIE P. MEEK, HON. CHAKA
White House" in order to guarantee that this sort of potential inva-
FATTAH, HON. BILL K. BREWSTER, HON. TIM HOLDEN,
sion of privacy could not happen again. We support the bill intro-
AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS
duced by Ranking Minority Member Cardiss Collins, H.R. 3785, the
Background Security Records Act of 1996, to ensure that FBI
We agree that the requests by White House staff for files on
records containing sensitive background security information pro-
former employees were wrong, and we have supported the commit-
vided to the White House are properly protected for privacy and se-
tee's efforts to investigate the reasons for and circumstances sur-
curity.
rounding the obtaining of these records from the FBI. The issue for
The bill would amend both the Privacy Act and the Presidential
this committee is whether the files were requested for political pur-
Records Act to enact procedural safeguards so that individuals
poses with the intent of getting damaging information on these
could be certain their confidential background files would not be
former employees, or instead were requested as the result of errors.
disseminated without their permission. If the majority were truly
After taking sworn depositions from dozens of present and
interested in conducting responsible oversight and addressing these
former White House employees, the committee has uncovered no
types of problems, they would support these types of meaningful
evidence that the individual who requested the files had been or-
legislative reforms. Instead, they are intent on turning this serious
dered to purposely obtain them by higher-ups in the Clinton ad-
issue into partisan politics. The Republicans have also refused to
ministration. Nor has it uncovered any evidence that anyone high-
hold even a single hearing on the bill.
er than Craig Livingstone was aware that the files had been im-
WHAT THE COMMITTEE HEARINGS REVEALED
properly requested. Even more importantly, the committee has no
evidence that the files were improperly disclosed to anyone outside
The committee's hearings revealed a number of relevant facts
the White House Personnel Security Office.
about the FBI files. We learned that it was standard practice for
If the majority had issued an honest report by pointing out the
each administration to engage in what is now known as the Update
deficiencies of the Office of Personnel Security while acknowledging
Project-that is, the recreation of personnel security files for hold-
over employees from the previous administration. This was re-
the lack of evidence that it was anything more than a bureaucratic
quired, because each administration removes all of its files when
mistake, we would have supported it. But when the majority makes
it leaves office. The procedure for requesting files was to use a
such reckless findings as that this somehow "leads to the possibil-
preprinted Xeroxed form with the name of the White House Coun-
ity that the Clinton Administration was attempting to prepare a
sel typed at the top, but requiring no signature. These forms date
political 'hit list'," without even a shred of evidence or testimony
back 30 years to the Johnson administration. This procedure was,
supporting that charge, we can only conclude that honesty is not
as the FBI found, ripe for abuse, and it now appears that these
in the majority's vocabulary. This report is yet another blow to this
forms were inadvertently used to obtain the FBI files on former
committee's long tradition of oversight which is honest, fair, non-
employees. The White House has taken unprecedented steps to
partisan, and credible.
change these procedures and bring accountability to the process,
In addition, the majority's claim that the FBI files would not
but the files were already requested.
have. been revealed without the committee's threat of contempt is
disingenuous and inaccurate. The White House never exerted a
claim of privilege over the Dale FBI file, and the majority report's
allegation of White House stonewalling is no more credible here
than it was in the Travel Office report.
(116)
118
119
Witnesses interviewed by the committee could only speculate on
Passholders by Name", and includes among other names, George
the reasons for what happened. A common theme expressed by
Bush, James Baker, and Marlin Fitzwater.
Bush administration White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray and
In addition, the committee received a list generated in February
Nancy Gemmell, a longtime-aide in the Personnel Security Office,
1994 as part of an effort to develop a list of White House staff for
was that the use of detailees and interns with insufficient back-
such things as invitations to the White House Easter Egg Roll.
ground in security or name recognition was a key problem.¹ We
That list has names such as Spencer Abraham and James Baker
agree. Security work is extremely sensitive, but there appears to
as working in the White House. The source of the names is listed
have been an extremely lax attitude in the treatment of FBI files.
as the Secret Service. A follow-up agenda from a July 7, 1994,
One important witness was Lisa Wetzl, who was the first to dis-
meeting between White House personnel and Secret Service shows
cover that Anthony Marceca had requested "too many files", mean-
a complaint that former employees, such as James Baker, contin-
ing those no longer employed by the White House. Ms. Wetzl noti-
ued to show up on Secret Service lists.
fied her supervisor, Craig Livingstone, of that fact, and proceeded
The other interesting fact about the FBI files requests is that the
to determine which of the files involved employees no longer work-
requests were made for all other offices, such as GSA, before any
ing in the White House. Although the files should have been re-
requests were made for White House staff. If there were an under-
turned to the FBI, they were boxed and apparently indexed and
handed effort to get the files on former White House employees,
placed in the White House archives, where there is no evidence
presumably those files would have been requested first and not
they were seen again, with the apparent exception of files for active
last.
employees mistakenly placed there.
CHAIRMAN CLINGER'S DISCLOSURES
Ms. Wetzl's testimony is extremely relevant, because she has
stated that when she worked on the Update Project after Mr.
Ironically, the only public disclosure of an FBI background file to
Marceca, she requested a Secret Service list of employees holding
date has been Chairman Clinger's disclosure on the House Floor of
active passes. In her view, the list was out-of-date, and required
the contents of the FBI file on Craig Livingstone, which he was
cross-checking with offices. She also recalls seeing an out-of-date
permitted to review by the FBI. Contained within this file was the
Secret Service list, which she believes was requested by Ms.
summary report by Special Agent Dennis Sculimbrene that White
Gemmell, and used by Ms. Gemmell to prepare requests to the
House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum told him that Craig Livingstone
FBI, and that the list may have had the names of Marlin Fitzwater
had the backing of the First Lady, who was a friend of Living-
and James Baker.
stone's mother.
On June 20, 1996, Secret Service witnesses testified before the
This tidbit was the first item of news from our investigations and
Senate Judiciary Committee that they did not believe the list was
hearings on the FBI files that the chairman deemed important
generated by them, but the actual evidence suggests a less clear
enough to take to the House Floor. The chairman's special order in-
picture. For example, during the committee's depositions of Secret
sinuated that Bernard Nussbaum, Craig Livingstone, William Ken-
Service witnesses, it was noted that in one case, the White House
nedy and the First Lady must have lied, because they had denied
requested the previous report on a person named Agin-"A" "G" "I"
this allegation.
"N". It now appears that there was no such person. The correct in-
Perhaps the chairman was just raising an issue for investigation;
dividual was named Hagin-"H" "A" "G" "I" "N". It just so happens
but that could have been done in a letter to the Independent Coun-
that a Secret Service list from 1993 also listed the individual as
sel. We can only conclude that the clear purpose of the Floor state-
Agin, with a space rather than an "H" at the beginning of the
ment was to plant in the minds of the American people the unsub-
name.
stantiated thought that the First Family and all of their lawyers
The significance of this fact is that it suggests that the White
were lying about this matter. Indeed, who after watching this spe-
House Office of Personnel Security was in fact working off of some
cial order wouldn't think they were lying and raise the question of
Secret Service list, and not a list it generated. This was further
why an FBI agent would write this note if it weren't true?
confirmed by Ms. Wetzl, who recalled both Ms. Gemmell and Mr.
Yet, just like every other time that there has been a wild, unsub-
Marceca working off a list with the distinctive green and white
stantiated accusation hurled at the occupants of the White House,
computer paper used by the Secret Service.
only half the facts were released. In this case, neither House Mem-
The Senate hearing also showed other problems with the Secret
bers on the Floor nor the public who was watching were given in-
Service lists. For example, in what was described as a "computer
formation on the credibility of the agent who had written the note.
glitch", names that were being deactivated from one Secret Service
The allegation that Mrs. Clinton was behind the hiring of Craig
passholder list were not automatically being deactivated from an-
Livingstone and knew his mother was hardly news. Agent Gary Al-
other list. The committee also received a list from the White House
drich, a friend and colleague of Mr. Sculimbrene, had made the
dated March 31, 1993, which may have been generated by the Se-
charge in the Wall Street Journal and in his widely discredited
cret Service. That list is entitled "E-Pass Possible Admin Holdover
book, Unlimited Access. The allegation had also appeared in the
Wall Street Journal on June 25, but in this case, Mr. Sculimbrene
It should be noted that neither Ms. Gemmell nor Jane Dannenhauer, Mr. Livingstone's pred-
was reported to have attributed the remark not to Mr. Nussbaum,
ecessor, had any background in security issues.
but to William Kennedy and Craig Livingstone.
121
120
Third, the statement that Mr. Shapiro notified the White House
Then on July 15, in what the chairman described in his letter to
about the information before the committee was allowed to review
Ranking Minority Member Collins not as a deposition under Rule
19 of the committee rules, which requires 3 days written notice, but
it is simply not true. As Mr. Shapiro testified at the August 1,
1996, hearing, he had offered to make it available to the majority,
something called a "sworn interview," Mr. Sculimbrene told the
but they had rescheduled:
majority staff that it was Mr. Livingstone who actually told him
this fact. He also said he did not put the statement in Mr. Living-
My intent was to notify roughly simultaneously both the
stone's background file.
committee and the White House, for whom this informa-
Mr. Sculimbrene in fact has told numerous stories about how he
tion had originally been gathered. Knowing that committee
came to know this so-called fact. We might have never known
majority staff was due to examine the materials that same
A
about the discrepancies in Mr. Sculimbrene's statements to the ma-
afternoon, I placed a call to the Justice Department, where
jority staff in his interview, if the minority had not insisted on get-
I advised the Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney Gen-
ting the transcript, which the majority had initially refused to pro-
eral of the information and of my intent to advise the
vide. In assessing Agent Sculimbrene's credibility, we must also
White House Counsel's office. I then called the Counsel's
look at an FBI memo in the committee's possession, in which Spe-
office, and spoke with Deputy Counsel to the President,
cial Agent David Bowie stated that Mr. Sculimbrene's behavior was
Kathleen Wallman. Because of a last minute rescheduling
"abnormal and indeed irrational" in a conversation with him. Agent
by the committee staff of which I had been unaware, the
Sculimbrene, who is described in the memo as a close personal
majority staff did not in fact see the information until the
friend of fired Travel Office head Billy Dale, is recalled as "voicing
following day
very bitter political feelings against the Clinton White House.
In no way did Mr. Shapiro withhold the information, as claimed
Agent Bowie expressed his concern that Sculimbrene, who ap-
by the majority.
peared as a defense witness at the Dale trial, might "provide erro-
Fourth, before the FBI took any action with this information, it
neous testimony."
asked the one law enforcement entity which might have an inter-
We cannot help but wonder why, if this allegation was truly trou-
est, the Independent Counsel. As Mr. Shapiro testified, the Inde-
blesome, the committee's investigators did not go to Craig Living-
pendent Counsel had no problems with Congress reviewing the
stone's mother, Gloria, to ask her directly whether she knew the
files, nor did they ask that any conditions be placed upon its re-
First Lady. She has subsequently denied that she does. Perhaps a
lease, which could have included release to the White House. They
cursory review of her background could have revealed if there were
did not even want to review the file. To the extent Mr. Nussbaum
any truth to the allegation. We suspect the reason was obvious-
would have been testifying to a Grand Jury, the issue would not
they knew she would deny it, and they knew that the more they
have been who hired Craig Livingstone.
investigated this matter, the more implausible the allegation would
Finally, Chairman Clinger's Floor statement criticized two FBI
become.
agents for going to Agent Sculimbrene's home and telling him that
We must also address the issues of whether the FBI should have
the White House was unhappy with what he had written about Mr.
told the White House about the existence of this summary in the
Nussbaum's interview. Once again, the question is what type of in-
file, the majority's finding that FBI General Counsel Howard Sha-
vestigation did the committee do to determine the veracity of this
piro provided confidential FBI law enforcement information to the
charge against the two agents before making these public charges.
White House, and the majority's shameless demand that he resign.
Mr. Shapiro testified that the agents in question denied the allega-
First, it is obvious that the reason the majority was upset about
tion:
the notification is simply that the White House had an opportunity
At no time did the agents tell agent Sculimbrene that
to present its side of the story at the same time the chairman went
the White House was unhappy and concerned about this
to the Floor, as opposed to a day later. There is little doubt that
particular interview. No such thing occurred.
the other side of the story would not have been released by the
chairman and become available to the White House.
Therefore, it appears that this may be one more case in which
Second, the notion that the information was confidential law en-
Agent Sculimbrene's account of a conversation is disputed.
forcement information which should not have been shared with the
The concern of the FBI that in light of the denials, Agent
White House is absurd. The information, as is standard practice,
Sculimbrene's report may have been inaccurate, was a real one.
Just recently, FBI Agent Halbert Harlow was convicted of falsify-
was gathered at the specific request of the White House in order
to determine whether Mr. Livingstone was suitable for employ-
ing over 50 White House interviews.
When this committee began its hearings into the FBI files, we in
ment. It was not part of some sort of criminal investigation. A sum-
the minority fully concurred. We too wanted to get to the bottom
mary of that information, including any derogatory information,
of how and why the files were requested, and what was done with
had already been provided to the White House. The information
them. However, as the committee's investigation increasingly dem-
which Mr. Shapiro communicated to the White House was not de-
onstrated that the requests were in fact a bureaucratic error and
rogatory, nor was it confidential as far as the White House was
not a sinister plot, the committee hearings kept shifting their focus.
concerned.
127
126
stone's resume, and is listed as "Chief Financial Officer, Clinton-
ployment of two individuals employed in the White House Security
Gore Presidential Transition Team."
Office be established as of the following dates: David Craig Living-
On February 8, 1993, Mr. Livingstone signs a "Declaration of Ap-
stone; Title: Assistant to the Counsel to the President (Security);
Effective Employment Date: 2/8/93; Annual Salary $45,000." The
pointee", which is a form used in determining fitness for employ-
other individual is Mari Anderson, who is listed as Security Assist-
ment.
ant with an effective employment Date of 2/15/93. The memo
The job of Director of the Office of Personnel Security is super-
vised by the Office of White House Counsel. In a memorandum
states, "Mr. Livingstone and Ms. Anderson have been on the job
from David Watkins, Assistant to the President for Management,
and working since the start dates indicated above while the budget
to Bernard Nussbaum, Assistant to the President and Counsel, and
parameters were being resolved."
Vincent Foster, Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy
A document entitled, "The White House Office, Request for Per-
Counsel, dated February 16, 1993, Watkins lays out the budget and
sonnel Action" dated 3/11/93, bears the initials "DW/CL" (presum-
full-time employees, which are to be proposed for the Counsel's Of-
ably David Watkins; the CL may also be CC). It requests Living-
stone be put on the payroll retroactively to 2/8/93.
fice budget.
It appears from the memo that Watkins had authorized 28 slots
A document entitled, "Notification of Personnel Action" with an
at $1,100,000. The Counsel's Office had responded with a budget
approval date of March 11, 1993, shows that Mr. Livingstone has
of 25 slots at $1,100,000 along with a proposal to shift the three
been placed on the payroll retroactively to February 8, 1993, as As-
sistant to the Counsel to the President (Security). The document
employees of the Security Office, other than its head, to the Person-
nel account. Watkins responds that if the slots are shifted, the Of-
bears the typed name of Mary Coutts Beck, Acting Director of
PMO, along with some form of an initial.
fice of White House Counsel must reduce its budget by $85,000.
On February 17, 1993, Craig Livingstone sends a memo to Wil-
It would appear that Mr. Livingstone's recollection of the events
leading up to his hiring, described when he appeared as a witness,
liam Kennedy, Associate Counsel to the President, describing the
are generally accurate. He apparently moved into the White House
functions of the Security Office.
by way of the campaign and the Inauguration, where he served as
On February 18, 1993, Kennedy sends a memo to Vincent Foster
Director of Security for the Inaugural Committee. His resume
attaching Livingstone's memo. He writes, "The result of all of these
shows he was sponsored by Eli Segal, a campaign official and in-
functions is that the Office moves much paper. I need to discuss
volved in the transition.
this subject with you when you have time."
Mr. Livingstone apparently came to the White House on Feb-
On February 23, 1993 Kennedy sends a memo to Nussbaum de-
ruary 8, 1993 on an unpaid basis, and appears to have spent his
scribing the major functions of the White House Security Office, ap-
first week reviewing the operations of the Security Office. The work
parently based upon Livingstone's memo.
would appear to have been done on behalf of William Kennedy,
On February 24, 1993, Nussbaum and Foster (now also joined by
since the memo of February 17, 1993 was sent from Livingstone to
William Kennedy, Associate Counsel to the President) respond to
Kennedy.
the Watkins memo taking issue with their allocation. They note
It appears that during the week from February 16, 1993 to Feb-
that they propose to spend just $91,000 on the three assistants
ruary 24, 1993, the Counsel's Office was primarily interested in
(compared with $121,000 under the Bush administration) and just
achieving a larger budget by moving the personnel from the Secu-
$45,000 on the head of the office (compared with $67,000 for the
rity Office (except for its head) onto the payroll of the Personnel Of-
incumbent), apparently implying that they should not have their
fice.
budget reduced by $85,000 in light of their savings.
Eventually, in memos to David Watkins dated March 9, 1993,
On March 1, 1993; David Watkins sent a memo to Bernard Nuss-
and March 10, 1993, Nussbaum, Foster, and Kennedy all take re-
baum stating, "I understand from your budget that you believe the
sponsibility for the hiring of Livingstone. Watkins on the subse-
position currently held by Jane Dannenhauer, Assistant to the
quent day takes the final action resulting in Livingstone's hiring
Counsel to the President for Security, should be part of your budg-
retroactive to the date of his declaration on February 8, 1993.
et and should be compensated at a rate of $42,000 per year. Please
HON. CARDISS COLLINS.
let me know when you have identified the new staffer to fill Ms.
HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN.
Dannenhauer's position. At the moment, her salary of $70,255 is
HON. TOM LANTOS.
counting against your budget. But this amount will be reduced
HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR.
when you replace Ms. Dannenhauer." Watkins also consents to giv-
HON. MAJOR R. OWENS.
ing the Counsel the full $1,100,000 for 25 slots.
HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS.
On March 9, 1993, in a memo to David Watkins from Bernard
HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.
Nussbaum and Vincent Foster, they state that "Craig Livingstone
HON. LOUISE MCINTOSH
was hired in February as Assistant Counsel to the President for
SLAUGHTER.
Security with a salary of $45,000, not $42,000 as originally budg-
HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI.
eted."
HON. GARY A. CONDIT.
On March 10, 1993, William Kennedy sends a memo to David
HON. COLLIN C. PETERSON.
Watkins. It states "This is a request that the start date of the em-
122
123
REVEALING CONFIDENTIAL FBI INFORMATION
Specifically, SA SCULIMBRENE erroneously stated that
he had provided a memo to the writer in the White House
The majority has repeatedly disclosed sensitive, internal FBI
Travel Office matter allegedly containing the information
files, despite the majority's criticism of the White House for its
relevant to the inquiry.
The writer never received a
handling of FBI records. As previously discussed, when Chairman
memo from SA SCULIMBRENE dealing with the above
Clinger went to the House Floor on July 25, 1996, he divulged cer-
subject matter.
tain contents in the FBI file of Craig Livingstone. The divulging of
confidential derogatory information found in that file is exactly the
concern that the committee had expressed concerning the White
In fact, the information provided by SA SCULIMBRENE
House request of FBI files of former administration employees.
during conversations with the writer merely implies that
Ironically, the committee has uncovered no evidence that the White
he has very strong political views involving the CLINTON
House ever disseminated the information contained in those FBI
Administration and a close personal relationship with the
files. On the other hand, the chairman did.
subject of this matter, BILLY R. DALE.
The disclosure stands in stark contrast to his comments to Rank-
The writer is very concerned about the overall tempera-
ing Minority Member Collins in a letter dated July 15, 1996, in
ment and demeanor of SCULIMBRENE reflected on 8/4/
which he wrote: "I have been extremely reluctant to directly review
95. While the writer is not in a position to render Psycho-
FBI files. It is the abuse of such files by the Clinton White House
logical judgements/conclusions about others, it is the opin-
which initiated this congressional investigation." He then stated
ion of this writer that SA SCULIMBRENE's conduct/be-
that he "would determine what, if any, information may be shared
havior, on 8/4/95, is clearly outside the norm. The writer
with the Members of this Committee." Instead of consulting with
notes that SA SCULIMBRENE was involved, approxi-
any member of the committee, the speech was made on the House
mately a year ago, in a serious accident which almost cost
Floor before the C-Span public.
him his life. It is noteworthy to point out that during the
Even before the chairman went to the House Floor, the contents
course of the 8/4/95, discussions with the writer,
of Mr. Livingstone's files were in the press. An AP story of 4:39
SCULIMBRENE commented, while pointing towards his
p.m. on July 25, 1996, describes an FBI agent's notes alleging that
head, that he could get away with anything because "I am
he was told by Bernard Nussbaum that Mr. Livingstone had been
handicapped".
recommended by the First Lady and that Mrs. Clinton knew his
mother. Before rushing to the Floor to raise questions about the in-
tegrity of the First Lady, Mr. Nussbaum, and Mr. Livingstone, the
SSA BOWIE is very concerned that SA SCULIMBRENE
committee might have done at least a minimal amount of investiga-
has allowed his personal and political feelings toward the
CLINTON White House to destroy his objectivity in deal-
tion.
Minimum fairness to the individuals would have required full
ing with this issue. It is equally perplexing to understand
disclosure of the trustworthiness of Special Agent Sculimbrene.
why any FBI Agent would allow his personal relationships
with a subject of a criminal probe to become this involved
Among the documents requested by subpoena was a memo by SSA
as such behavior constitutes, as a minimum, the appear-
David Bowie, dated August 7, 1995, who recounted a discussion he
ance of a conflict of interest. The writer is persuaded that
had with Agent Sculimbrene concerning the prosecution of Billy
SA SCULIMBRENE is contemplating either testimony be-
Dale (Document FBI-00005437-00005442):
fore a Congressional Committee and/or plans to serve as a
It became immediately apparent that SA
defense witness for subject BILLY DALE. Should he decide
SCULIMBRENE held extremely intense feelings about the
to do this, his credibility as a witness and as a FBI Agent
indictment of subject BILLY DALE whom he described as
will be destroyed in the aftermath. The situation detailed
a personal and professional friend. It became equally ap-
above is potentially embarrassing for the FBI and is poten-
parent that SA SCULIMBRENE blames the CLINTON
tially a disaster for SA SCULIMBRENE.
WHITE HOUSE and the FBI for the predicament in which
subject DALE finds himself. During the course of a some-
times heated conversation between the writer and SA
It is highly suggested that WMFO management look at
SCULIMBRENE, it became equally apparent that SA
the possibility that SA SCULIMBRENE may be in need of
SCULIMBRENE has allowed both his personal and politi-
EAP and/or some form of emotional support. The writer is
cal feelings to obscure his judgement relative to this entire
persuaded that SCULIMBRENE's behavior is abnormal
and indeed irrational. In addition, SA SCULIMBRENE
matter.
should be made aware of the consequences should he de-
cide to provide erroneous testimony in an effort to help his
friend, and C-7 subject, BILLY R. DALE.
128
HON. KAREN L. THURMAN.
HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY.
HON. THOMAS M. BARRETT.
HON. BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS.
HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON.
HON. JAMES P. MORAN.
HON. GENE GREEN.
HON. CARRIE P. MEEK.
HON. CHAKA FATTAH.
HON. BILL K. BREWSTER.
HON. TIM HOLDEN.
HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS.
o
125
124
FBI files had been requested, and that he certainly did not order
Instead of alerting House Members and the public that the FBI
copies of FBI files.
agent whose notes conflict with the testimony of Mr. Nussbaum
The chairman responded by saying that the "documents speak
and Mr. Livingstone was a close personal friend of Billy R. Dale,
for themselves," and dismissed Mr. Nussbaum's demand for an
and whose credibility was challenged by another FBI agent, Chair-
apology by suggesting that he was attempting to "demonize" him.
man Clinger was silent, leading an average listener to assume that
We believe this is a wholly inadequate response. The chairman
Mr. Sculimbrene was an ordinary FBI agent. Chairman Clinger
very publicly-and wrongly-accused Mr. Nussbaum of possible
might have disclosed that Mr. Sculimbrene was an associate of Mr.
criminal behavior, without conducting even a minimal amount of
Gary Aldrich, whose credibility on White House matters has been,
to put it mildly, called into question.² He also never stated that
{
investigation. Whether those accusations were innocent or inten-
tional, the record clearly demonstrates that they were false.
Agent Sculimbrene was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as stat-
When we in the minority requested, in a letter dated June 28,
ing that he knew of the purported relationship between Mr. Living-
1996, that the chairman take the fair and decent course by admit-
stone's mother and the First Lady from Mr. Livingstone and Mr.
ting that he overreached and apologizing to Mr. Nussbaum, he once
Kennedy (June 25, 1996), and that he had told Senate investigators
again refused. Instead, he replied:
that Mr. Kennedy was the source of his information.
(A)s you will see, I never made reference to Mr.
The majority does not merely raise questions when making
Nussbaum as a "felon," as he has alleged. In fact when I
charges such as those made in Chairman Clinger's special order. If
was specifically asked, "How much trouble is Mr. Nuss-
the sole intent was to bring this to the attention of the Independ-
baum in?" I stated, "Well, I think it's premature to say
ent Counsel, a private letter to Mr. Starr would have sufficed.
whether, you know, whether he's in any trouble."
But this was not the only example of the majority's rushing to
a partisan judgment without conducting even a minimal amount of
However, the transcript of that press conference, provided by the
investigation. On June 5, 1996, Chairman Clinger held a press con-
chairman himself in his reply, confirms that the chairman did
ference detailing a request for Billy Ray Dale's FBI background file
make those statements about Mr. Nussbaum to the press:
that bore Mr. Nussbaum's typed name. The chairman alleged that
At the very least, there is a strong implication President
"At the very least, there is a strong implication President Clinton's
Clinton's counsel acted unethically in requesting confiden-
counsel acted unethically in requesting confidential background
tial background checks of a former employee. At the very
checks of a former employee." According to an article distributed by
worst, the request may have violated the Privacy Act
the Associated Press, "U.S. Rep. William Clinger, R-Pa., suggested
the written request might be a false statement that could be pros-
The chairman has yet to admit his error or to apologize to Mr.
ecuted as a felony." Subsequent investigation quickly established
Nussbaum. Nor has he apologized to Presidential Advisor George
that Mr. Nussbaum, like his predecessors, never reviewed such re-
Stephanopoulos for partisan leaks suggesting that Mr.
Stephanopoulos was somehow responsible for Mr. Livingstone's po-
quests. As Mr. Nussbaum testified at the committee's June 26, 1996,
sition as Director of the Personnel Security Office without releasing
other information in the committee's possession demonstrating that
hearing:
that was not the case.
So, on the basis of a printed form, Mr. Chairman, you
told the country, Mr. Chairman, that, at best, I was uneth-
WHO HIRED CRAIG LIVINGSTONE?
ical as White House Counsel; at worst, I was a
The majority is obsessed with determining who hired Craig Liv-
felon. to ask me a simple question-did I ever request Billy
But you had no member of your staff call me,
ingstone, as if that startling mystery was the key to unraveling
their entire conspiracy theory. However, the records provided to the
Dale's FBI files six months after he was fired? Was I really
committee, if the majority would take the time to read them, reveal
trying to dig up dirt on Billy Dale when he was being in-
exactly how Mr. Livingstone was hired. The answer is much less
vestigated by the Justice Department? Those notions are
exciting than the majority would have us believe.
absurd on their face. They are false. But no one called to
The resume of David Craig Livingstone lists his current job as
ask. (Emphasis added).
"Presidential Inaugural Committee, Director of Security" from No-
Mr. Nussbaum then testified under oath that he had no knowl-
vember 1992 to present. Prior to that he lists his occupation as
edge that Mr. Dale's or any other former White House employee's
"President-Elect Clinton and Vice-President-Elect Gore, Lead and
Site Lead Advance" in November 1992. Prior to that his job is list-
21t is ironic that in light of the majority's repeated claims of stonewalling by the administra-
ed as "Senior Consultant to Counter-Event Operations, Clinton/
sel tion, regarding statements he made in his book. Rather than assisting in this committee's efforts
Mr. Aldrich refused to answer under oath more than 30 questions asked by minority coun-
Gore '92" from October, 1991 to November 1992.
to obtain relevant information regarding the credibility of a witness, majority staff also ob-
At the top of the resume is a handwritten notation stating "Spon-
structed the minority's efforts to have these questions answered by Mr. Aldrich.
sored by Eli Segal." Mr. Segal, who was a campaign manager in
In letter dated August 2, 1996, Ranking Minority Member Collins subsequently requested
the Clinton Campaign is also the first reference in Mr. Living-
Chairman a Clinger to instruct Mr. Aldrich to respond to these 36 questions. To date, he has not
responded.