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June 21, 1996 Clinger-Ickes-Privileged-Non-Responsive [1]
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June 21, 1996 Clinger-Ickes-Privileged-Non-Responsive [1]
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Case Number: 2006-1066-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
June 21, 1996 Clinger - Ickes - Privileged / Non-Responsive [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Counsel's Office
Original OA/ID Number:
CF 670
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
18
2
1
2
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001a. resume
Mari Anderson. (1 page)
00/00/0000
b(6)
001b. form
Presidential Transition Resume Routing Form. (1 page)
00/00/0000
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
OA/Box Number: CF 670
FOLDER TITLE:
June 21, 1996 Clinger-Ickes - Privileged - Non-Responsive [1]
2006-1066-F
vz3536
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy ((b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
June 14, 1996
Criminal Liability for Unwarranted Disclosure of Security Files
1. Under the Privacy Act, 5 USC 552a (1996)
"Any officer or employee of an agency, who by
virtue of his employment or official
position, has possession of, or access to,
agency records which contain individually
identifiable information the disclosure of
which is prohibited by this section
and
who knowing that disclosure of the specific
material is so prohibited, willfully
discloses the material in any manner to any
person or agency not entitled to receive it,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined
not more than $5,000. 5 U.S.C. 552a (i) (1)
2. The White House is not, however, an "agency" subject to
the Privacy Act. See Kissinger V. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 455 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). See also Meyer V. Bush, 981
F.2d 1288, 1291 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
3. The Privacy Act has a separate provision that applies to
any "person" and this section would appear to cover the White
House. This provision states:
"Any person who knowingly and willfully
requests or obtains any record concerning an
individual from an agency under false
pretenses shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and fined no more than $5,000. 5 U.S.C.
552a (i) (3).
"Person" is defined broadly in the Act to include any individual
and any business, public or private organization other than an
agency. 5 U.S.C. 551.
4. Executive Order 10450, 5 C.F.R., 1989 Compilation at 47,
provides that in the interest of national security investigations
shall be conducted as a condition of government employment. The
Order further provides that background information obtain shall
be "maintained in confidence." Id. at 9 (c). It does not provide
sanctions, however, for improper disclosure.
5. 18 U.S.C. 1001 (1996) provides that any person who
"knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up
or makes or uses any false writing of document knowing the same
to contain any false
statement or entry, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
2
6. 18 U.S.C. 1924 imposes criminal liability for knowingly
removing "materials containing classified information" without
authority and "with the intent to retain such documents or
materials at an unauthorized location " This provision does
not appear, however, to apply.
WHO EMPLOYEE
DATE OF BRIEFING
Torkelson, Jodie
02-08-95
McCurry, Michael
01-18-95
William, Margaret
12-19-94
Moore, Lori
12-14-94 (OVP)
Tarmey, Marjorie
12-12-94
Currie, Betty
12-09-94
Enright, Janice
12-06-94
Ickes, Harold
12-06-94
Bowles, Erskine
11-22-94
Borrstin, Robert
11-22-94
Sperling, Eugene
11-22-94
Deich, Michael
10-13-94
Hughes, Edward
10-13-94
Altman, Roger
10-12-94
Mikva, Abner
09-16-94
Richard, Robert Paul
08-26-94
Walker, Anne Sherle
08-26-94
Marshall, Capricia
08-26-94
Wetzl, Lisa
08-26-94
Angell, John
07-15-94
Panetta, Leon
07-15-94
Cicconi, James
06-30-94
Baer, Donald
07-01-94
Waldman, Michael
07-01-94
Boorstin, Robert
07-01-94
Wilkie, Curtis Carter
07-01-94
Neuwirth, Stephen
06-22-94
Bradley, Jane
06-22-94
Simon, Gregory Charles
05-20-94
Myers, Margaret
05-04-94
Klein, Joel
05-02-94
Toback, Paul
04-18-94
Tyson, Laura
04-08-94
Hernreich, Nancy
04-08-94
Gearan, Mark
04-07-94
Stephanopoulos, George
04-06-94
Lake, Tony
03-29-94
Nolin, Alice
03-28-94
Brown, Lee
07-26-93 (ONDCP)
Should be
reducted 60
elimingc into
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
security secsion
TO:
Mr. Christopher D. Cerf
May 27, 1994
White House Counsel's Office
Executive Office of the President
FROM: Christopher M.B. Disney CD.
John R. Hancock dRK
non
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
responsive
US Department of State
?
SUBJ: Review of EOP Security Issues
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State was
informally requested to assist the Executive Office of the President in
conducting a review of procedures involving the handling and storage of
national security information. The review was conducted during the
period May 16-27, 1994, by the reporting officers who were detailed to
the EOP for the duration of the review.
The review was necessarily limited in scope due to time restrictions but,
in all, 62 interviews were conducted as shown on the attached listing of
personnel. In addition to interviewing EOP personnel, including detailees,
an after hours review of USSS-UD security check procedures was
conducted. Documentation reviewed included items such as the White
House Staff Manual, OPM instructions and a variety of EOP security-
related memoranda.
It is the opinion of reporting officers that, in general, procedures
governing the handling of national security information ranged from highly
effective to those requiring improvement. Certain EOP elements such as
the NSC, WHMO, ONDCP, PFIAB and others which handle large quantities of
11084/4324
classified information appeared to have viable, pro-active and aggressive
security programs. Procedures reviewed within these elements adhere to
USG regulations and commonly accepted practice. Officers charged with
3188
security responsibilities are well versed in procedure and provided
ssad
- 2 -
evidence of well-structured, detailed and thorough programs. All
personnel interviewed displayed extremely positive attitudes towards the
conduct of the review and voiced the expected commitment towards the
protection of classified and sensitive information.
Areas requiring improvement and modification of procedure are addressed
in the attached outline. We found that only certain security practices and
procedures generally involving offices not handling large quantities of
classified information needed attention. Corrective action, in most cases,
could be achieved by an aggressive security awareness training program
and revision of some procedures. In addition, the recommended
consolidation of security functions would provide a comprehensive,
uniform and centrally-managed approach with clear lines of authority and
responsibility.
The issues addressed and recommendations which resulted are divided
into four general areas: (1) Procedural Security, (2) Personnel Security,
(3) Security Awareness and (4) Security Organization.
1.
Procedural Security
a.
Protection of national security information was the major purpose
of this review. Most EOP elements indicated their handling of classified
information was minimal. Examination disclosed procedures which ranged
from highly effective to those requiring improvement.
A common set of procedures addressing the accessing, handling and
disposal of classified information does not exist. Procedures have been
issued by the EOP Security Officer within the Office of Administration for
certain EOP offices but they are dated (June 1988) and have not been
established for or applied to all elements of the EOP. Several
organizations within the EOP appear to lack formal procedures for
governing the access and handling of national security information.
Recommendation No. 1
Uniform procedures based upon existing USG regulations should be drafted
and promulgated to all entities which comprise the Executive Office of the
President.
b.
Classified information enters EOP elements either electronically
(classified communications circuits or secure fax) or hand-carried by
courier. In each of the entities of the EOP structure, material is
ordinarily distributed from a central distribution point or is received
through a terminal in a SCIF. Highly sensitive material, for example the
NID, appears for the most part to receive the requisite handling and
protection with the exception that in some cases the NID is not returned
in a timely manner causing extensive administrative problems in
conducting the necessary tracking procedure. In one case, the NID had not
been returned for almost six months. In another case, the NID was
routinely included in a comprehensive daily briefing book and given to a
secretary for further distribution. This person is not, as of the date of
this report, cleared for access to SCI.
2.
Recommendation No. 2
All recipients of the NID and other numerically controlled documents
should be reminded by memorandum from as high a level as appropriate of
their obligation to restrict access to this material and return these
"NSC
documents to the issuing office within the prescribed time period. In
addition, strict adherence must be maintained to the limitations placed
upon distribution of the NID by the CIA. Access by personnel not on the
distribution list must be approved by the originating office within CIA.
C.
Within the EOP, outside the NSC, WHMO, PFIAB, ONDCP and a few
other exceptions, there appears to be remarkably little national security
information processed and stored. There is, however, a significant amount
of information which is extremely sensitive in nature -- the President's
Daily Schedule is one example. Anecdotally, during reporting officers'
assignment to the OEOB, part of the time was spent in Room 502. Each
morning a copy of the President's Schedule for that day and, on one
occasion, a 3-month advance schedule was found in an envelope in front of
Room 502 marked for "Jeff Watson" who presumably formerly occupied the
office. The Schedule was unclassified and uncontrolled in an unsealed
envelope.
Recommendation No. 3
Procedures for limiting distribution and enhancing protection of sensitive
information, especially the President's Daily Schedule, should be
reviewed and improvements made as appropriate. This process should also
extend to information transmitted by unclas fax between the White House
Complex and Presidential trip site locations.
d.
Personnel interviewed were aware and acknowledged that the
EOP/OA computer system in use (OASIS), was restricted to unclassified
information. However, if secure systems did not exist in their office
space, not all personnel were aware how classified information could be
processed. It is noted that the IST Division of OA has recently completed
3.
a draft directive on InfoSec concerns. It appears thorough, detailed and
broad in scope and should be promulgated as soon as possible.
Recommendation No. 4
Procedures should be issued reinforcing the requirement not to process
classified information on non-secure systems. Personnel should also be
made aware of available automated systems which can be utilized for
processing classified information and the highest level of information
permitted.
e.
Procedures for disposition of classifed material in many office
areas seemed unclear. Cursory reviews of many office spaces detected
unusually few security containers.
Recommendation No. 5
A thorough survey should be conducted by each agency/office security
officer to determine the exact requirement for security containers with
an emphasis on reducing any classified holdings to the greatest extent
possible but insuring that the remainder receive appropriate storage in
approved containers. In addition, combinations on all security
containers should be changed upon the departure of the office incumbent
and/or at least once a year. Records should be maintained. it may be
beneficial to have one or more common security containers located in the
West Wing first and second floor areas where classified can be stored as
required. It is also noted that SCIFs are not established on these two
floors. All SCI material must, therefore, be secured in the Sit Room on the
ground floor.
f.
Few offices are equipped with shredders; most rely on burn bags.
Discussions with a variety of employees revealed an inconsistent
approach to the burn bag process. Some were collected by USSS-UD and
others were delivered to a central shredding facility. Some employees
seemed unsure of the process and used burn bags for disposal of
unclassified material. Anecdotally, reporting officers discovered an
unsecured burn bag in an unoccupied office in the OEOB at OOB on a Monday
4.
morning. It was not checked for classified material. It had been
unprotected for an unknown period over a week-end.
Recommendation No. 6
Clear, consistent procedures should be established for the collection/
disposal of classified waste material. Ensure "open storage" is not
permitted in unauthorized spaces. Each office which processes/handles
classified information should utilize a standardized COB check list. After
hours checks by USSS-UD should include checking for unsecured burn bags,
classified information left unprotected and open containers.
Recommendation No. 7
Instructions issued on May 16, 1994 by Ms. Patsy Thomasson should be
enforced. The shredder operator at the NEOB complained that burn bags
continue to be piled in front of his door at OOB each morning. Each would
have been unprotected on an unsecure loading dock area for varying periods
and therefore subject to compromise.
g.
Hard copy material is hand-carried throughout the EOP complex
which includes the NEOB, the OEOB, the Winder Building, ONDCP and the
White House. Procedures lack uniformity and vary in the degree of
protection afforded. The EOP Mail Room process (Red Tag) appears
effective but personnel from many offices also individually hand deliver
material.
Recommendation No. 8
Instructions should be issued clarifying courier procedures and lockable
courier pouches should be issued to central offices within each building
for the transport of SCI material. Personnel transporting classified/
sensitive information outside the OEOB/WH complex should be reminded of
requirements and procedures.
Recommendation No. 9
Storage/access procedures for SCI and other codeword material should be
thoroughly examined especially in West Wing offices. A walk-through by
reporting officers at 2300 hours on 5/25 disclosed the fact that (a) few,
5.
if any, safes are available in West Wing working spaces, and (b) at COB,
within certain West Wing first floor offices, material was simply left on
the desk - a TS document was discovered unprotected on one desk. It is
noted, however, that a UD officer is present in front of the Oval Office 24
hours a day making the possibility of compromise remote. Due to the
quantity of documents seen unprotected in various offices, the presence of
other collateral or code word material cannot, be discounted.
Recommendation No. 10
New COB procedures should be established for certain first floor West
Wing offices. After departure of the principal, staff members should be
required to collect all classified/sensitive material and secure it. Safes
should be procured for this purpose. While access to the West Wing is
controlled by UD personnel and chars are escorted (ratio unknown),
material left exposed could be subjected to scrutiny by char force or other
uncleared personnel perhaps being escorted on tours.
Recommendation No. 11
Certain offices have evening secretarial shifts. If the secretary leaves
prior to collection of the burn bag by the UD officer, she simply leaves the
unsecured bag in full view. This procedure is also employed by day shift
personnel. Burn bags should receive more positive control. One option
would be for staff members to hand carry the closed burn bag to a central
holding room for later collection by UD. This will insure positive control
from the time a document enters the office to its destruction.
Recommendation No. 12
Within the EOP, burn bag destruction procedures fall into two general
categories: (1) NSC (both Sit Room and OEOB) material is held in a secure
area for weekly collection and destruction by CIA courier, and (2)
Collection by UD personnel and office staff and carriage to one of two
destruction facilities in the OEOB (Basement Area) or NEOB (Loading Dock).
In the latter category, material is taken out of the burn bag and placed on
the conveyor belt which carries it to the shredder. At that point the
material is in full view of the operator. SCI material may be present and
operators have not been authorized SCI access. Either operators should be
6.
SCI accessed or instructions should be promulgated to staff to segregate
SCI from collateral waste.
2.
Personnel Security
a.
Within the White House Personnel Security Office (WHPS), a 17-step
process has been established which results in the issuance of a building
pass. In addition, under the signature of the Chief of Staff, an instruction
was issued on March 14, 1994 concerning completion of security related
paperwork for new employees. Procedures seem clear, are endorsed by
senior management and provide for punitive measures for non-compliance.
The areas which may warrant additional attention, however, are the
adjudication process and the timeliness of the entire procedure. The FBI
conducts a SSBI and returns the ROI to the WHPS where it is reviewed for
issues of suitability and potential embarrassment to the Administration.
The report is then forwarded to the USSS for review from a protective
intelligence perspective and a permanent pass issued as appropriate.
The pass that is issued appears to be adjudicated primarily on the basis of
suitability and potential threat to the President. While not dissimilar,
adjudicative criteria for access to national security information which
would include potential CI concerns does not appear to be specifically
addressed in this process. Issuance of the pass, however, is in fact
viewed as the potential for authority to access classified information up
to and including Top Secret. There is some confusion as to exactly what
issuance of a permanent pass means.
Recommendation No. 1
The system employed by the various elements of the EOP to issue building
passes and to grant clearances lacks uniformity. While unique
requirements exist, for example, within the WHO and WHMO, procedures
should be as common as possible. A Task Force composed of EOP Security
and Personnel Officers should address this issue and arrive at consensus.
7.
Redundant areas should be identified and avoided. N.B. During the course
of the review, several comments were made regarding the excessive
length of the clearance process which caused administrative problems. It
is noted, however, that a great deal of attention has been given to this
issue and as of May 11th, 76% of the staff had been issued passes. The
balance were either in the adjudication process, pending a BI or awaiting
paperwork (2%).
Recommendation No. 2
If, in the adjudication process, a conscious application of criteria
governing access to national security information is not applied, then this
should occur forthwith. Personnel involved in the adjudication process
should refamiliarize themselves with these instructions which are
included in Chapters 731, 732, 735 and 736 of the Federal Personnel
Manual as amended by the FPM Sunset Document.
Note: The Diplomatic Security Service is prepared to detail a senior
Personnel Security Adjudicator to work within the WHPS for a short
period to assist in the establishment of this process and provide informal
OJT of personnel as necessary.
Recommendation No. 3
To assist in the timely retrieval of information concerning the level of
clearance granted/held by each employee who is a member of any element
of the EOP or who holds any type of pass allowing unescorted access to
any EOP facility, a data base should be created. Information should be
available in this system to any of the security officers within the EOP
structure. This will also aid considerably in the passing of clearances in
a timely fashion to other USG agencies.
Recommendation No. 4
Signing of the SF 312 and the resulting acknowledgement of one's
responsibilities in the protection of classified information is
inconsistent. Throughout the EOP, common procedures should be
established in the clearance issuance and briefing process to insure the SF
312 is signed by each person granted access to classified material.
8.
Recommendation No. 5
The building pass system seemed unnecessarily complicated with a
somewhat bewildering array of variously colored and lettered passes. The
brevity of this survey did not permit a detailed analysis of the system but
it is recommended that this issue be another agenda item for the EOP
Security Coordinator group to address.
Recommendation No. 6
Employment of Volunteers and Interns in areas in which classified
material is handled should be severely limited. If unavoidable, those so
employed should be cleared up to the Secret level with access limited to
that level. This can be accomplished through conduct of a NACI.
Recommendation No. 7
The wording of the memorandum from WHPS regarding the completion of a
favorable BI and the authorization for a permanent building pass and
security clearance should be revised. It is imprecise and is not
understood by at least one EOP unit security officer.
Recommendation No. 8
WHPS personnel are under pressure to insure that personnel are cleared in
as short a time frame as possible. Given the functions expected of this
office, it appears extremely understaffed and in unusually cramped
physical space. Efforts to alleviate both problems should be undertaken as
soon as possible.
Recommendation No 9
The WHPS staff is required to adjudicate a wide variety and a vast number
of background investigations. The process ultimately allows access to
national security information. All EOP personnel, especially those in the
WHPS, who are charged with adjudicative responsibility should receive
formalized training. It is recommended that this occur to insure proper
criteria is applied and to maintain the credibility of the process.
9.
Recommendation No. 10
It is recommended that a program be initiated as soon as possible to
subject each file on the pending clearance/building pass list to a thorough
review to ascertain precise disposition. It is suggested that the process
begin with the WHO, the most highly visible office within the EOP.
Recommendation No. 11
It is recommended that a survey be conducted beginning with WHO staff to
determine who, in fact, has access to collateral and SCI material.
Commensurate levels of clearance and access should be effected and a
central record maintained.
Recommendation No. 12
The "White House Office Supplemental Information Sheet for Personnel
Action" should be slightly revised as discussed. Inclusion of this
information should help speed the process of accessing classified
information since Secret/Confidential access can be granted by
satisfactory completion of a NACI pending completion of the full field BI.
3.
Security Awareness
a.
Some procedures are in effect for certain security related issues.
For example, page B-6 of the White House Staff Manual outlines how
unsecured classified material is to be handled. However, it appears that
procedures are neither widely known nor strictly followed. The Security
Awareness program should be so designed as to (1) Initially brief
incoming personnel, (2) periodically remind employees of their security
related responsibilities and (3) brief employees on unique security and CI
concerns prior to travel abroad. During the course of this review, several
persons commented that "security problems" were most evident in areas
populated by "political appointees" as opposed to career civil
service/detailed personnel. Most agreed that security awareness training
was sorely needed. It was noted, for example, that WHCA offered two
10.
separate briefings on overseas security issues with one person showing up
for the first and only a handful for the second. It is also noted that the
Security Office, OA, is engaged in a periodic training effort.
Recommendation No. 1
A system-wide program of security training should be initiated. It is
suggested that this include briefings to junior and mid-level staff and a
comprehensive series of periodic memoranda to senior staff. Emphasis
should be placed on the handling and disposal of classified material,
classification management and the unique nature of employment within
the EOP which may make personnel particularly attractive to Hostile
Intelligence Services (HOIS).
Recommendation No. 2
To assist the EOP Security Staff in the conduct of a security awareness
program, the Diplomatic Security Service is prepared to present a 45-
minute briefing program with Q&As addressing two primary areas: (a)
Handling of national security information and (b) Technical security
concerns. The latter is designed to demonstrate vulnerabilities of such
areas as telephone usage, particularly the ease in interception of
conversations on cellular phones.
Recommendation No. 3
The existing 37 minute security awareness instructional tape should be
re-done. It is too long, attempts to cover too many unrelated issues and
tends to lose the attention of those viewing. It needs to be shortened to a
maximum of 15 minutes and considerably tightened in scope and
presentation. It should be accompanied by a presentation by each agency
security officer addressing agency-specific security issues. It is noted
that this effort has been initiated by the OA Security Officer.
Recommendation No. 4
An EOP Security Handbook should be developed and distributed to all
current and new personnel. It should include information presented in the
tape, contact numbers for security personnel, emergency numbers,
11.
description of procedures and other related information. It is noted that
the Security Office, OVP, has developed and issued a detailed and
extremely useful document which could provide the basis for an EOP
Handbook.
4.
Security Organization
a.
Virtually every agency within the EOP has its own security
coordinator but the entire system is fragmented and lacks cohesion and
uniformity. Security procedures vary extensively with minimal cross
polination despite periodic meeting of the Security Coordinators group.
There is little back-up and when individuals are on travel status
procedures slow down and often stop. Uniformity is achieved only on an
informal, ad hoc basis. Under a centralized, properly staffed security
directorate, policy would be uniform and procedures appropriately
enforced.
Recommendation No. 1
To facilitate a comprehensive, EOP-wide security program, it is suggested
that the existing fragmented operation be overhauled. For the
recommendations made herein to be effective, a change must be made in
the way the security program is managed. Therefore, a position should be
created to coordinate the wide array of EOP security programs. The
primary function would be to establish uniform policy and procedures for
all elements within the EOP structure. The incumbent should be a security
professional (career or detailed) and the senior security officer within
the EOP. The position could be possibly entitled Director of Security,
Executive Office of the President, with all existing Security Coordinators
reporting to him/her for security programming purposes only. He/She
should report to as high a level as possible within the General Counsel,
WHO, which will add authority to the function.
12.
Note: To assist EOP Staff in implementing this recommendation, the
Diplomatic Security Service is prepared to detail a senior officer to
provide guidance and direction as required in establishing such a position.
Attachment: Personnel Interviewed
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
White House Office
Mari Anderson, Executive Asst. to WH Per. Sec. Dir.
Larry W. Croce, Military Office Security Director
Craig Livingstone, Personnel Security Director
Beth Nolan, Associate Council to the President
John D. Podesta, Asst. to the President/Staff Secretary
Claude A. Taylor, Director of Volunteers
Paul A. Toback, Special Asst. to Chief of Staff
Rod Von Lipsey, WH Fellow/Special Asst. to Chief of Staff
Sharon E. Wagner, Admin. Asst. to the Staff Secretary
Francis R. Wessel, Admin. Asst. to the Staff Secretary
National Security Council
James E. Baker, Deputy Legal Advisor
John W. Ficklin, Deputy Director Records Management
Christopher L. George, Staff Information Assistant
David E. Herrington, Adm. Office Systems Director
Andrew S. Kerr, Staff Information Assistant
Robert J. Manzanares, Adminstrative Office Director
Patricia C. Nelson, Security Officer
John W. Peggins, Systems Manager
Ralph H. Sigler, Deputy Director WH Situation Room
David S. Vantassel, Asst. Director Information Disclosure
National Economic Council
Robert D. Kyle, Special Asst. to the President
Elaine M. Mitsler, Executive Asst.-International Group
Office of the Vice President
Todd J. Campbell, Counsel and Dir. of Adm. for the VP
Joanne M. Hilty, Security Officer for the OVP
Council of Economic Advisors
Elizabeth A. Kaminski, Admin. Officer and Security Coord.
Office of Administration
Mary Coutts Beck, Director of Personnel Management
Christopher D. Cerf, General Council
Alejandro L. De Leyos, Mailroom Supervisor
Charles C. Easley, Security Officer
Mark E. Frownfelder, Security Specialist
Lawrence R. Jurcich, Telecommunications and Security
James L. MacDonald, Director Info. Systems and Technology
Gwendolyn N. Weaver, Dep.Asst. Director for Info. Management
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Office of Management and Budget
Roberta L. Foster, Secretary-National Security CCCI
Darrell A. Johnson, Deputy Asst. Director of Administration
Marilyn E. Jones, Secretary-Dep. Assoc. Dir. National Sec.
Anthony B. Wu, Budget Examiner/Acting Branch Chief CCCI
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Tilman Dean, Support Services Spec./Security Coordinator
Henry H. Marsden, Director Supply Reduction
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Barbara A. Ferguson, Administrative Office/Security Coord.
Deborah J. McGovern, Administrative Assistant
Joann Ward, Administrative Operations Assistant
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Gwendolyn S. Watson, Administrative Officer/Security Coord.
Sandra E. Van Namee, Administrative Assistant
United States Trade Representative
Michael Arbogast, Systems Analyst
Lorraine Green, Human Resources Manager
Catherine A. Hofgren, Sup. Servs. Supervisor/Security Coord.
David Spetrino, Special Asst. to the USTR
Joan C. Steyaert, Director Computer Operations
White House Communications Agency
Francis Bartol, Communications Center
Paul Connelly, Security Officer
Robert Gutjahr, Deputy Security Officer
Lawrence Ledbetter, Communications Center
United States Secret Service
Arnie Cole, WH Sec. Branch-Investigations/Access Controls
Lt. Ron Elie, WH Uniformed Division
Tom Farrell, WH Security Branch Chief
Capt. Flanagen, WH Uniformed Division
Capt. J.J. Hampton, WH Uniformed Division
Officer Richard Tozier, WH Uniformed Division
Don Flynn, WH Security Branch
John J. Robey, Technical Services Branch Chief
General Services Administration
Lawrence Downes, Shredder Room NEOB
responsion?
March 29, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR PHIL LADER
FROM:
J. VERONICA BIGGINS JMB
BETH NOLAN Bm
RE:
CLEARANCE PROCESS
The Office of Presidential Personnel and the Office of the Counsel to the
President recommend that the clearance process be guided by the following stipulations:
Candidates for P.A.S. positions will continue to be handled by the White House
Counsel's office. Clearance for P.A.S. candidates will be issued only after the Counsel's
Office has completed a public record vet, an FBI background investigation, an IRS tax
check, financial disclosure and conflict of interest review, and a Counsel interview.
Candidates for P.A. Boards or Commissions with fiduciary, or otherwise sensitive,
responsibilities, and the chairs of certain other Boards or Commissions, will continue to
be cleared by the White House Counsel's office, using the procedures outlined above.
Counsel clearance for all other members of Boards or Commissions will be
limited to a public record vet, an FBI name check and an IRS tax check. These
candidates will no longer be required to submit a Personal Data Statement or to be
interviewed by the Counsel's Office. They will normally be required to file financial
disclosure forms with their Designated Agency Ethics Officials (DAEOs.)
Candidates for S.E.S. positions will no longer be cleared by the White House
Counsel, but instead by personnel from the agency in which the candidates are to serve.
Crucial steps must be taken to ensure that the agency attorneys conducting the public
record vet and interview of these S.E.S. candidates be impartial and their work
confidential.
The White House will work with each agency, on a case-by-case basis, to identify
who will handle candidate clearance for the agency. Those specified individuals will
work with the White House Liaisons and Chiefs of Staff to formulate a process that
ensures candidates are cleared in the best interest of both the White House and the
agency. The White House Counsel retains the final right to issue or deny clearance to
any S.E.S. candidate.
An exception applies for all regional S.E.S. positions, which will continue to be
handled by the White House Counsel.
TOTAL
STAFF W/
STAFF W/
STAFF W/
STAFF W/
NUMBER
PERMANENT
ADJUDICATED PENDING
NO PAPER
NAME OF OFFICE
OF STAFF
PASSES
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND WORK
WHITE HOUSE STAFF
395
241
67
77
10
OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT
89
63
9
8
9
DOMESTIC POLICY
35
15
10
10
0
NEC
29
11
13
5
0
EOP
11
9
15
1
0
TOTAL
559
339
101
100
19
is this
responsive?
Does it relate
-
to OPS vetting or ?
d couldn't tall la Can sem jaw?
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who 13 Alize
Smith ?
-
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
Privileged and Confidential
2006. 2006-1066-F
INITIALS: r
DATE: 6/23/15
February 5, 1994
MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM H. KENNEDY, III
FROM:
ALICE J. SMITH
RE:
FILES IN VETTING OFFICE
In Room 142 next to Dennis' desk, I have left three boxes of labeled,
confidential files from the old Counsel's Office of OPP. I have listed the names of
the specific files in each box on the three attached sheets. The small file box contains
miscellaneous items bequeathed to those of us who remained by our former attorney
colleagues. I did what I could to organize it, but in some cases I was not quite
certain what was important to keep. I erred on the side of keeping more rather than
less, although I did pitch a lot of duplicates and scraps of paper that made no sense at
all. The large white box contains the chronological ("chron") files from January-
August, 1993. (The chron files after August are in the cabinets in Rm. 142 and are
still in use). The brown box contains mostly my legal research files on various
subjects and a group of files related to selection work I did last summer for PPO on
creating a pool of Inspector General candidates.
John Carey's vetting procedures memoranda are all in the chron files. My two
large procedures memos are there and in a procedures notebook on the shelf in Rm.
142.
Some method of protecting these very sensitive files should be discussed with
Records Management soon. The chron files, as well as many of the others, contain
legal research memoranda, documents regarding specific candidates, personnel and
salary matters, PPO's senior staff meeting materials, and other confidential materials.
There are at least seven to eight containers of miscellaneous computer disks in
the office. Some of these contain backups of public record vets (or drafts of same,
which I would argue we should not keep); but others seem to contain the kitchen sink.
I have not had time to go through each of those disks to determine what is important,
but will come and assist another weekend or late evening, if needed. In addition, the
computers in Rm. 142 also contain many files that I am unsure how to handle. For
example, the computer nearest the door has the majority of the final public record vet
files. The shelf against the back wall also has the hard copy vets and many vet
binders from Transition. They, too, ultimately will need to be stored under some
confidential classification.
As you know, I am only a phone call away and will be glad to help out as
much as I can when, and if, you ever need to close up the vetting shop. Office:
(202) 514-1900. Home: (703) 998-0154.
cc: Bernard Nussbaum
Dennis Quinn
Consider
r
-
The issue is whether
sinice stut Haur Staff
is underded
The document
itself doesn't 7
seem so --
are they ? ]
DETERMINED TO BE AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
WASHINGTON
2000-196-F
INITIALS: vz
Privileged and Confidential
DATE: 6/23/19
January 17, 1994
MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM H. KENNEDY AND DENNIS J. QUINN
WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL'S OFFICE
FROM:
ALICE J. SMITH
RE:
REVISED VETTING PROCEDURES
This memorandum describes the current vetting procedures performed by the Vetting
Section of the White House Counsel's Office. I have used the comprehensive September 16,
1993 Vetting Procedures memorandum as the base, but have incorporated a substantial
number of administrative and other changes/additions that we have made in this process since
the end of September. These changes have been necessitated by staff downsizing as well as
better coordination of our paralegals' administrative duties.
VETTING PROCEDURES
The Vetting Section of the White House Counsel's Office (formerly the Counsel's
Office of Presidential Personnel (PPO))¹ is responsible for conducting public record research
on potential candidates for federal appointments, preparing confidential memoranda ("vets")
based on that research, and interviewing PAS, PA and SES candidates before they may
receive counsel clearance. Following is a short overview of the process. This memorandum
describes, in detail, the administrative, research, writing, and interviewing procedures
currently in use by the Vetting Section.
A. OVERVIEW
Candidate names for public record vetting come into the Vetting Section from
PPO's Systems office, although we have often received requests to prepare
public record vets directly from other PPO Directors and their Search
Managers. The Vetting Section's Paralegal/Administrative Assistant (AA)
receives the names and logs them into a Paradox data base and other records
described in the next section, provides the names to the researchers with the
1
From January, 1993 until October, 1993, vetting processes were shared by both
the Counsel's Office of PPO and the White House Counsel's Office. As of October, all
vetting is supervised by the White House Counsel's Office.
level of the positions, and provides the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney
with the names. The AA also sends Personal Data Statement (PDS) forms to
non-career SES candidates for whom a PPO "start memo" has been provided,
keeps track of those forms when they have been returned, maintains the SES
tracking data base, and performs other tasks described below regarding
requests for the FBI name checks and IRS tax checks.
The researchers/writers perform the public record research on all levels of
candidates. The extent of the search varies according to level of position, or
in some cases, on special instructions from the attorneys. Researchers
determine whether the public record materials reveal issues that should be
summarized in a vetting memorandum. If an initial researcher determines that
no issues are presented, then he or she obtains a second opinion from another
researcher or attorney. If both agree that there are no issues, the candidate's
research folder is placed in the "No Issues" pile and his/her name is included
in the next cumulative memorandum listing all candidates on whom no issues
were discovered that is sent to Bill Kennedy and other PPO administrators. If
the two research reviewers cannot agree or are unsure whether issues are
presented, the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney decides. If issues are
discovered, the research folder is placed in the stack of "Issues" vets to be
prepared and reviewed by the interviewing attorneys.
The researcher/writers attempt, as often as possible, to prepare the written
issue vet on a candidate before the candidate is interviewed by an attorney.
However, when this is not possible, due to staffing limitations and a large
number of research requests on candidates, the interviewing attorney reads the
raw public record research material from the file before doing the interview
and reporting on the candidate to Bill Kennedy.
The vet drafter reviews the research file, discusses any additional research
needed with the researcher (assuming the writer is not the same as the
researcher), and prepares the issue vet. After the initial drafting of a vet, a
second researcher/writer/attorney reviews the file and edits the vet, discussing
additional research required, organization of the vet, etc. with the writer.
When both the drafter and the second reviewer are satisfied with the vet, the
final version is read by the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney, put in final
format with the appropriate cover memorandum and distributed to Bill
Kennedy and PPO administrators described in the details section below.
Attorneys interview PAS, PA and high level SES candidates after completed
PDS forms arrive and discuss the results of these interviews and the public
record research, if there are issues, with Bill Kennedy who determines whether
to clear candidates. Lower level SES candidates, except those at State,
Justice, Defense, AID, and USIA, receive only a public record vet check and
2
an FBI name check, but do not complete a PDS or an interview. If there is a
particular known reason for concern, the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney
or Bill Kennedy may choose to put a lower level SES candidate through the
entire process.
PAS and PA folders are returned to Bill for any further procedures, such as
the ethics and Form 278 review conducted by attorneys in other sections of the
Counsel's Office. Tracking of PAS and PA candidate clearance processes is
handled by Edgar Bueno. Bill and Edgar also prepare and distribute the
counsel clearance memoranda on PAS/PA candidates.
The counsel clearance memorandum on SES candidates is prepared daily by
the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney and must be signed by Bill. No SES
candidate is placed on this memorandum until he/she has been interviewed, the
FBI name check is in, the tax check is in, and the candidate has been
discussed with and cleared by Bill. Attachments to FBI name checks must be
reviewed only by Bill. Any IRS tax check on which he has placed a red dot
(meaning issues) must be reviewed, the candidate must be questioned on any
issues presented, and Bill must be apprised of the tax issues raised before the
candidate may be cleared. The clearance memorandum is distributed to certain
PPO personnel (described in detail section below). PPO handles telling the
SES candidates when they have been finally approved for the job because there
may, on occasion, be a reason unknown to Counsel's Office that PPO wishes
to hold release of a name. PPO must also communicate with the Office of
Personnel Management before a candidate's name is finally released.
B.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
The following procedures are performed by the AA in conjunction with the
Supervising Attorney, researchers or others as indicated.
Receipt of Names for Public Record Vetting
Receive SES names with "start memorandum" from PPO
Administration (generally from Doug Sheorn who provides resume). If
SES names arrive from other sources without start memoranda, check
with Antonella Pianalto (or her designated staff member) on proceeding
with vetting. On occasion, individuals have obtained PDS forms and
submitted them to this office for vetting before we have received word
that the President has preliminarily approved them for the job.
3
Receive PA/PAS names from Julie Anderson, PPO. If no resume is
available, request from Resumix (or researchers can do this).²
-
Log names in two places: Clipboard Public Record Tracking Log (all
names); AA's Non-career SES Candidate Paradox data base.³
-
Notify Supervising Attorney when names arrive and determine with
attorney's assistance which SES candidates should receive PDS packets.
-
Check for whether a prior public record vet has been prepared and
indicate date on start memo.
-
Give copies of start memoranda and resumes to researchers to log into
their public record tracking system. Give supervising attorney copy of
start memo and indicate on it whether PDS forms were sent or not and
whether memo has been given to researchers.
-
File start memoranda in "Nominations Approved" folders
chronologically.
Sending/Receiving of SES Personal Data Statement Packets/FBI and IRS
Check Reports
-
No PDS forms are sent by the Vetting Section until we receive the start
memo with instructions from Antonella. Edgar will send the PDS
2
Names may occasionally come from other sources, such as the PPO directors.
Limited vetting staff currently prevents any substantial amount of public record vetting before
PPO and the President preliminarily approve a candidate and send a "start memo" to
Counsel's Office. The researchers/writers will attempt to do everything possible to produce
a public record vet on individuals being considered for the most high profile positions to
assist PPO in making its preliminary selection decisions. The Vetting Section, however, is
presently limited in its ability to analyze in detail the writings of any candidates who are
extremely prolific. We can generally perform a "scandal search" (see description below)
within a reasonable time and report at least orally on the results.
3
Before this data base became operational in mid-November 1993, SES names were
tracked on a handwritten log that begins in March, 1993. Information from that log has been
incorporated into the data base. Another handwritten back-up log, the "desk log,' that was
in use until September, 1993 has been discontinued.
4
forms to all PAS/PA candidates. (He receives a copy of the PAS/PA
start memos, too).
-
Record on SES data base when forms were sent.
-
Check that all signed required documents (e.g. releases and waivers)
are present. If not, call the candidate and request the missing
documents.
-
When completed forms and all waivers are returned, log in date
received on data base.
Place PDS form and all waivers except IRS waiver in the SES
Interview Queue in SES file cabinet in order of receipt. (Supervising
Attorney or Bill Kennedy on occasion may give instructions for certain
candidates to be interviewed in advance of others in the queue). Make
sure attorneys are aware when files are ready for interviews.
Prepare requests for IRS tax checks on SES candidates after waivers
have been received. Deliver by courier to IRS. Log date of request
into data base. Keep copies of all requests.
-
Prepare FBI name check requests on day start memo is received. Keep
copies of requests. Place requests in box in Edgar's office for FBI
pick-up. Check to be sure pick-up occurs as scheduled.
-
Check daily with Edgar for IRS reports and FBI name checks. Sort out
any SES candidate reports from PAS/PA and White House staff
reports. Log into data base the date that each of these reports are
received in Vetting Section.
-
Alert Supervising Attorney to any tax reports on which Bill has placed
a red dot. The Supervising Attorney then consults with the respective
interviewing attorney about follow-up with the candidate. All tax
reports are filed in the SES interview folders. Place an asterisk by the
date that the report is received in the data base until AA is informed by
Supervising Attorney that the candidate is ready for final clearance,
then remove the asterisk.
Alert Supervising Attorney to any FBI name checks that have
attachments. Place asterisk by date FBI report is received in the data
base if there are any attachments. Remove this only after Supervising
Attorney tells AA that the candidate has received final clearance. DO
NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES LOOK AT THE
5
ATTACHMENTS. THESE ARE HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AND
ARE NOT TO BE REVIEWED EVEN BY SUPERVISING
ATTORNEY WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM BILL. Supervising
Attorney will bring any FBI name check report to Bill's attention for
review before the SES candidate may be cleared.
AA follows up with any candidates who have not returned PDS forms
within about two weeks. Sometimes the information on the start
memorandum on where to send the forms has been in error and
candidates have not received forms. Thus, follow-up is important to
prevent this.
AA works with Supervising Attorney, White House Security staff
(Craig Livingstone's office) and Edgar Bueno to track down any FBI
and IRS reports that may have been misdelivered to wrong office. This
has been a decreasing problem for the last six weeks or so, but it still
happens on occasion. When FBI name checks and IRS reports are
substantially late (i.e. three to four weeks), AA alerts Supervising
Attorney, if he/she has not already seen the delay. Supervising
Attorney works with Bill on best method (e.g. another fax to IRS and
FBI people or call from Bill) for speeding delivery of these reports.
ONLY BILL COMMUNICATES WITH FBI OR IRS, UNLESS HE
INSTRUCTS OTHERWISE.
SES Candidate Clearances
After Supervising Attorney reports that Bill Kennedy has preliminarily
cleared any high level SES candidates after the interview, the
candidate's folder is placed in the white bin beside Supervising
Attorney's desk until it is determined that tax and FBI reports have
been received and are either "clean" or have been approved by Bill.
AA and Supervising Attorney review data base and files in the white
bin daily to determine which SES candidates may be placed on the final
Counsel's Office clearance memorandum after all parts of the process
have been completed. When lower level SES candidates (i.e. those
who will not be undergoing the interview process) have received a
"clean" FBI name check and the public record search turns up no
issues, they may be placed on the clearance memorandum. If either the
public record search has generated issues or the name check has
attachments, Supervising Attorney must review the candidate with Bill
during the daily vetting meeting with him.
6
AA prepares the daily SES clearance memorandum listing the names
and positions of the cleared candidates. This is generally done at the
end of each day because FBI and IRS reports do not arrive until later in
the afternoon. NO NAME MAY BE PLACED ON THE
CLEARANCE MEMORANDUM WITHOUT APPROVAL BY
SUPERVISING ATTORNEY. Supervising Attorney (or AA if
instructed) takes memorandum to Bill for his signature.
SES clearance memoranda is delivered to Antonella Pianalto in PPO
immediately. Copies also go to Doug Sheorn and Peg Clark in PPO
Systems and to Bill.
-
Log clearance date for each candidate into the data base. Keep one
copy of the clearance memorandum in the cumulative "SES Clearance
Memoranda" hard copy file and another copy in the general "Chron"
file.
Preparation/Distribution of Final Public Record Vets
-
When an issue vet is ready to be distributed, AA obtains final version
from main writer and puts the computer file into the main vet collection
directory.
-
AA spell checks vet and conforms it for style (e.g. margins, etc., if not
previously done).
-
AA prepares the cover memoranda for the issue vets. Vets are grouped
by agency.
-
AA (or another researcher) prepares the memorandum containing the
mass list of candidates on whom no issues have been discovered in a
public record search.
-
Vets generally are delivered by approximately 6 p.m. each day., or as
frequently as they can be prepared.
Distribution: All issue vets and the listing of "no issue" candidates are
now distributed directly to Bill Kennedy, Jan Piercy, Antonella
Pianalto, and to the new PPO Director, Veronica Biggins. Copies of
7
vets and the "no issues" list are filed in the Vet Chron file and the
alphabetical Vet notebooks.⁴
AA records dates that vets are delivered on the clipboard public record
tracking log. 5
-
All final vets should be on the hard drive of the AA's desk computer
and backed up daily. At the end of each week, they are transferred
onto the hard drive of another computer where all the vets are stored.
Staff members should be reminded to delete their rough draft versions
of vets on their computers once the AA has processed the final
documents.
The Index for the Vet Notebooks is updated once a week by the AA.
Antonella Pianalto receives a new copy each time one is run.
Public record raw research files used in preparation of vets are placed
in the filing bin near the AA for labeling and filing in the Public
Record alphabetical cabinets in Rm. 140. (Cabinet containing M-O and
O-P is in Rm. 142.) Big Project to Do Soon: Work with Records
Management and Bill to determine method of appropriately labeling and
permanently storing the very large quantity of these public record
research files. Files should be labeled as confidential attorney materials
in some manner, but should remain accessible so that documents can be
retrieved rapidly as needed.
Other AA Tasks
The AA also answers phones, maintains files of blank SES and PA/PAS
interview forms, maintains record of inquiries about candidates for Supervising
Attorney, handles most facilities/operations matters. The AA also performs
public record research and drafts public record vets, time permitting.
4
Previously, all vets were also filed in the Regular Chron file, but this became too
space consuming and was discontinued in November, 1993.
5
NOTE: Unfortunately, the SES data base does not have space for recording when
the public record raw research on SES candidates is completed and when the final vet is
prepared. Attorneys are nonetheless responsible for reviewing the public record materials
before reporting on candidates to Bill. (The clipboard would still remain necessary for
tracking public record vets on PAS/PA candidates).
8
C.
PUBLIC RECORD RESEARCH PROCEDURES
Although some aspects of the research conducted on candidates remain
constant, the extent of the research depends on the level of the candidate's
appointment, and on any additional information that we have received
warranting greater research than would normally be performed. For example,
articles written by a PAS candidate will generally be reviewed, or at least
those relevant to the appointment if the candidate is a very prolific author.
However, an SES candidate's writings will not be reviewed unless there is a
particular reason for concern known to us. Details of the research procedures
for each level of candidate follow in this memorandum.
AA gives researchers start memos or other requests for public record
vetting. Researchers maintain their own logs on candidates and the
status of their research. They coordinate research duties among
themselves (i.e. who goes to the Library of Congress, who will
perform computer research on a given day).
Researchers complete a LEXIS/NEXIS research checksheet on all
candidates and also a Library of Congress checksheet for PAS
candidates. NOTE: These checksheets have been revised and
improved since September. The sheets in the attachments to the
September 16 memorandum are no longer in use. These research
sheets indicate what research was conducted, including the scope and
search terms for the computer research.
If a prior vet has been written on a candidate more than six weeks
earlier (or if there is reason to think that the candidate's name has
recently been in the press), the researchers will conduct an updated
LEXIS/NEXIS search only from the date of the prior vet and will
indicate on the research sheet that it is an update only.
When the research is complete, researchers determine whether the
public record materials reveal issues that should be summarized in a
vetting memorandum. If an initial researcher determines that no issues
are presented, then he or she obtains a second opinion from another
researcher or attorney. If both agree that there are no issues, the
candidate's research folder is placed in the "No Issues" pile and his/her
name is included in the next cumulative memorandum listing all
candidates on whom no issues were discovered. (See above in
Administrative Procedures).
If the two research reviewers cannot agree or are unsure whether issues
are presented, the Vetting Section Supervising Attorney decides.
9
If issues are discovered, the research folder is placed alphabetically in
the stack of "Issue Vets" to be prepared and reviewed by the
interviewing attorneys.
1.
Research for All Candidates
Researchers search every name that comes into the office in the LEXIS/NEXIS
computerized databases, using the NEXIS/OMNI and the GENFED/MEGA
files. In NEXIS/OMNI, the researcher will first perform a full search on the
candidate - in other words, type in the candidate's name, with no qualifiers. If
there are too many cites for a researcher to review, the researcher will try a
"scandal" search on the candidate.
What classifies as "too many cites" depends on the level of the appointment,
as will be explained in the following sections. A scandal search involves using
the candidate's name and adding
w/30 scandal! or controvers! or illegal! or illicit! or
drug! or blam! or critic! or investigat! or indict! or
embarrass! or improper! or complain! or disput! or
arrest! or convict! or discriminat! or republican! or
clinton!
If there are still too many cites to review, the researcher then searches using
the hlead(candidate's name) segment, or field, format. This pulls all articles
with the candidate's name in the title or lead paragraph.
In GENFED/MEGA, the researcher types name(candidate's name) to pull up
all cases in which a candidate is either a defendant or a plaintiff. The
researcher prints all cites that appear in cite list format for an attorney's
review. If a case is thought to involve the candidate, the researcher prints the
case in variable kwik 60 (.vk60), or copies the case in the law library, if
available. The attorney may ask the researcher to Auto-Cite particular cases to
determine prior and/or subsequent history. In some instances, the attorney
will Auto-Cite as he or she reviews the cases on line. Researchers should
obtain copies of cases that have been highlighted in press reports, whether the
candidate has been a party or has represented clients. When researchers are
also drafting initial vets, they should be certain to bring to a reviewing
attorney's attention exactly what they have done with respect to case law
research and their analysis of the cases. Researchers should also indicate
clearly on the research checksheets and cite lists what has been done
concerning cases and any law review articles.
10
2.
PAS Appointments
For PAS appointments, the researchers generally collect information on names
both at the Library of Congress (LOC)6 and by using LEXIS/NEXIS.
Library of Congress
At the LOC, researchers look for articles written by or about a
candidate. They conduct searches on names in all three LOC
buildings, using the following databases:
In Madison Building:
Periodical Room: General Periodicals Online (GPO), Business
Periodicals Online (BPO), Infotrac
Law Library: Legaltrac
In Adams Building:
5th floor reading room: Business CD Rom, Science CD Rom (when
applicable)
In Jefferson Building:
2nd floor reading room: ERIC, PAIS, Humanities, Biography, Social
Sciences
In Any Building: LOCI, BIBL, MAGS
Occasionally, researchers review other resources, such as
Congressional directories, art profiles and specialty directories, where
those resources may generate more information.
LEXIS/NEXIS
6
Recently, limited staff and resources, combined with a very large number of candidate
names to research, has necessitated limiting some of the LOC data base searches on a case-
by-case basis. Where the researchers determine that a given data base is most likely to
generate redundant information or no additional information, they will not perform such
searches.
11
Researchers conduct the most thorough LEXIS/NEXIS searches on PAS
appointments. They look not only for controversies surrounding the
personal and professional life of a candidate, but also for any
controversial aspects of the candidate's philosophy that would relate to
his or her new position.
For PAS appointments, researchers should be more hesitant to go to a
scandal search. If there are more than 160 cites on a candidate, the
researchers try a scandal search. If there are still too many cites to
review, an ad(candidate's name) segment search should be done.
It is often useful to couple a general name search with the names of all
the businesses and schools with which the candidate has been involved.
This technique is especially helpful if a candidate has a common name
which is generating cites on many different individuals.⁷
If a candidate is a lawyer, the researchers do two additional searches:
In GENFED/MEGA, they enter the candidate's name to determine
whether he/she represented any controversial parties. (This broad
search also encompasses all cases where the candidate is a named party
in published cases.) In addition, the researchers do a name search in
the files LAWREV/ALLREV and MARHUB/ALLDIR for law review
articles and Martindale Hubbell citations on the candidate.
Congressional Testimony
Researchers collect congressional testimony cites for each PAS
appointment by calling the law library at the OEOB. Once the cites
have been printed at the library, a researcher shows the list to the
supervising attorney. If the attorney is interested in obtaining the
testimony, a researcher locates and photocopies it in the microfiche
room of the NEOB library.
Checks with State Bar Associations/Foreign Agent Registration
(F.A.R.A.)/Federal Election Commission (FEC)
For all U.S. Attorney candidates, researchers check with the
candidate's state bar associations to determine whether the individuals
are in good standing and whether they have received any reprimands,
complaints or disciplinary action. When requested by the supervising
7
For example, the researcher would type Jane Doe and Cornell and Georgetown and
Wilmer Cutler and litigation and
This should help isolate relevant cites on the
candidate.
12
attorney, researchers have also made this inquiry on other attorney
candidates.
When requested by the supervising attorney, researchers check with the
F.A.R.A. office at the Department of Justice for possible registration of
candidates for positions where such a registration likely would present a
conflict of interest (e.g. National Security Council, State Department).
This inquiry is made by phone (514-1145) whenever the candidate's
resume indicates that he or she might have had such a registration (e.g.
certain lawyers who clearly represented foreign governments in their
practice).
Also when requested by the supervising attorney, researchers gather
FEC information on candidates' political donations or, if the candidate
has held political office, who has donated money to the candidate's
campaign. This information can be retrieved at the FEC's public
information office, located at 999 F Street.
3.
PA and High Level SES Appointments (Includes all SES candidates at
Justice, State, Defense and high-level positions (DAS and above) at
other agencies)
Researchers do not gather information at the LOC or congressional testimony
cites for these types of SES appointments or for PA candidates, unless there is
reason to do so on a particular case. For these SES positions and all PAs,
researchers again should be somewhat hesitant to resort to a scandal search.
They usually will review as many as 100 cites before qualifying a search. The
supervising attorney may ask a researcher to obtain copies of articles written
by these candidates where such articles appear from their titles to relate to the
position at issue or look potentially controversial.
4.
All Other SES Candidates
For all other SES candidates, the researchers perform only a "scandal search"
(see above) if there are more than 50 cites on a candidate using the general
name search. Both the NEXIS/OMNI files and GENFED/MEGA files are
searched. If no issues are discovered, the researchers inform the supervising
attorney orally.
D.
WRITING OF VETS
Writers pick up "issue vet" folders from the alphabetical stacks on the
vetting shelf and prepare drafts of vets. While using a folder, the
13
writer should place a colored sheet with the candidate's and the writer's
name in the alphabetical place in the stack so that an interviewing
attorney will know where the public record research can be located.
Initial vet drafters review the research file with the researcher involved
(if they are not the same person) and request additional information
where necessary. Drafters prepare what are termed "Defensive (or
Issue) Vets," which highlight any issues or potential controversies
found in the public record search. Currently, we attempt to give each
issue a separate subheading so that a reader who is scanning can focus
his or her reading on the points of most interest to him or her.
The vet includes a short initial summary of the candidate's background.
The writer also will discuss relevant articles written by PAS and PA
candidates, whenever possible. We include a footnote indicating when
resources have precluded a comprehensive review of writings. When it
is deemed useful, a resume listing of a particular candidate's written
works may be attached to a vet in order to give the reader at least a
sense of the subject areas in which he or she has written.
If a prior vet has been written and additional "update" research (see
research section above) reveals issues, the drafter prepares an update
vet that discusses the new issues, with the old vet attached. On the
cover memorandum to the final vet, it is indicated that this is an
"update" vet. If the new research revealed no issues, then the mass
listing "no issues" memo includes a parenthetical stating that it is an
update only.
The first writer provides the research file and draft vet to another
researcher/attorney for a thorough review and editing. The reviewer
may request additional research. In all cases, the second reader should
review the research sheets to determine whether research was thorough.
Once a satisfactory vet is produced, it is provided to the Supervising
Attorney for final review and distribution (see procedures above).
E.
CANDIDATE INTERVIEWING
Attorneys interview PAS/PA/SES candidates after their PDS forms
have been received. The attorneys pick up SES candidates files in
order from the Interview Queue in the SES cabinet. They inform the
AA each time they take an SES file. The AA records the interviewing
attorney's name in the data base.
14
The Supervising Attorney picks up PAS and PA files from Edgar
Bueno approximately every other day for distribution to the
interviewing attorneys. Supervising Attorney keeps track of which
attorney has each PAS/PA file.
-
Attorneys locate and review the public record vet if completed or, if
not, the raw research file.
-
Attorneys review PDS and contact candidate for phone interview.
They use the interview questionnaire prepared for this purpose and
record responses. When necessary, memoranda are prepared for Bill
summarizing various issues.
-
Attorneys meet daily with Bill to discuss all candidates on whom they
have completed the interview process and follow up on particular issues
with candidates as he instructs.
-
Final clearance procedures for SES candidates are discussed above in
Section B. Bill handles all further clearance work on PAS and PA
candidates.
15
LEXIS/NEXIS RESEARCH
WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL
CANDIDATE:
POSITION:
RESEARCHER:
DATE:
NEXIS
CITES
fu
.vk90
.vk50
.vk
Name:
and not:
+ Jobs:
+ Scandal:
+ Byline:
+ Hlead:
+ Rnt Date:
Additional Searches:
Search:
Search:
GENFED/MEGA
Name:
Search:
ADDITIONAL DATABASES
DATABASE:
Search:
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS RESEARCH FORM
CANDIDATES
LOCI
BIBL
MAG1
MAG2
MAG3
GP01
GPO2
GP03
GP04
BPO
INFO
LEGAL
PAIS
ERIC
HUM
BIO
SOCSCI
F
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Craig Livingstone
FROM:
Harold Ickes
DATE:
21 June 1994
RE:
Security video
Craig, on Saturday 18 June I watched the White House
security briefing video provided to me by your office.
Please notify me of the status of my security clearance.
Non-vesponsine Non
June 21, 1996
Clinger FB1
Request. \
Harold lakes
NSC
WAVES
1001/001
SBugn non aman
investion, craig
-
working
For
From
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 20, 1994
Excellency:
I wish to confirm to you that I will use the full powers of my
office to facilitate arrangements for the financing and
construction of a light-water nuclear power reactor project
within the DPRK, and the funding and implementation of interim
energy alternatives for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
pending completion of the first reactor unit of the light-water
reactor project. In addition, in the event that this reactor
project is not completed for reasons beyond the control of the
DPRK, I will use the full powers of my office to provide, to the
extent necessary, such a project from the United States, subject
to approval of the U.S. Congress. Similarly, in the event that
the interim energy alternatives are not provided for reasons
beyond the control of the DPRK, I will use the full powers of my
office to provide, to the extent necessary, such interim energy
alternatives from the United States, subject to the approval of
the U.S. Congress.
I will follow this course of action SO long as the DPRK continues
to implement the policies described in the Agreed Framework
Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
Sincerely,
Riu Ciuntry.
10/27/99
8:05pm
His Excellency Kim Jong Il
Supreme Leader of the
Craug Levings true
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Pyongyang
brought this
over to point out
percuity breach
&danger thereto.
T.
FAX REPAIRS
RESUMIX
070253
C
P
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
V
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
ROOM ONE, OEOB
from ORM
Date:
Contact:
Phone Number:
5/12
Mari Anderson
202-456-2345
Location:
Rm 84 + GEOB
Model:
P.O. Number:
xerox 7020
W2B014
Problem:
Fox says Clean Lens. & won't fax
after Cleaning Lens.
Date:
Phone Number:
5/16/94
PPO Coptacts Dong Sheon
202-456 2966
Location:
Pm 131
Model:
7020
P.O. Number:
W2B014
Problem:
not working Properly.
Date:
Contact:
Phone Number:
202-456 -
Location:
Model:
P.O. Number:
W2B014
Problem:
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
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AND TYPE
001a. resume
Mari Anderson. (1 page)
00/00/0000
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
OA/Box Number: CF 670
FOLDER TITLE:
June 21, 1996 Clinger-Ickes Privileged - Non-Responsive [1]
2006-1066-F
vz3536
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001b. form
Presidential Transition Resume Routing Form. (1 page)
00/00/0000
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
OA/Box Number: CF 670
FOLDER TITLE:
June 21, 1996 Clinger-Ickes - Privileged - Non-Responsive [1]
2006-1066-F
vz3536
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.