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1996 U.S. LEXIS 2165, *33; 64 U.S.L.W. 4167
LEXSEE
the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional
Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inappli-
principle that state sovereign immunity limited the fed-
cable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the
eral courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption
the Amendment itself is clear enough on this point:
of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance
construed to extend to any suit
And our
between state and federal power achieved by Article III
decisions since Hans had been equally clear that the
and the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 454. As the dis-
Eleventh Amendment reflects "the fundamental princi-
sent in Union Gas made [*36] clear, Fitzpatrick cannot
ple of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of ju-
be read to justify "limitation of the principle embodied in
dicial authority in Article III," Pennhurst State School
the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent
and Hospital V. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-98, 79
provisions of the Constitution." Union Gas, 491 U.S. at
L. Ed. 2d 67, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); see Union Gas,
42 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
supra, at 38, (" 'The entire judicial power granted by
In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas
the Constitution does not embrace authority to [*34] en-
has proven to be a solitary departure from established
tertain a suit brought by private parties against a State
law. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority V.
without consent given
") (SCALIA, J., dissent-
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 121 L. Ed. 605,
ing) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497,
113 S. Ct. 684 (1993). Reconsidering the decision in
65 L. Ed. 1057, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921)); see also cases
Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies under-
cited at n. 7, supra. As the dissent in Union Gas rec-
lying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to
ognized, the plurality's conclusion--that Congress could
its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of
under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts'
questionable precedential value, largely because a ma-
jurisdiction under Article [--"contradicted our unvary-
jority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale
ing approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive
of the plurality. See Nichols V. United States, 511 U.S.
catalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction." Union
(1994) (slip op., at 8) (the "degree of confusion
Gas, 491 U.S. at 39.
following a splintered decision
is itself a reason
Never before the decision in Union Gas had we
for reexamining that decision"). The case involved the
suggested that the bounds of Article III could be ex-
interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be
panded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitu-
altered only by constitutional amendment or revision by
tional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment.
this Court. Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the
Indeed, it had seemed fundamental that Congress could
plurality's [*37] rationale depart from our established
not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and under-
the bounds of Article III. Marbury V. Madison, 5 U.S.
mine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound
137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). The plural-
to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and
ity's citation of prior decisions for support was based
that it should be, and now is, overruled.
upon what we believe to be a misreading of precedent.
The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision
See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 40-41 (SCALIA, J., dissent-
in Union Gas, see post at 2, but nonetheless would
ing). The plurality claimed support for its decision [*35]
find congressional power to abrogate in this case. n11
from a case holding the unremarkable, and completely
Contending that our decision is a novel extension of the
unrelated, proposition that the States may waive their
Eleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for "attend-
sovereign immunity, see id., at 14-15 (citing Parden V.
ing" to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to
Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184,
mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established ra-
12 L. Ed. 2d 233, 84 S. Ct. 1207 (1964)), and cited
tionale upon which the Court based the results of its
as precedent propositions that had been merely assumed
earlier decisions. When an opinion issues for the Court,
for the sake of argument in earlier cases, see 491 U.S. at
it is not only the result but also those portions of the
15 (citing Welch V. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public
opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.
Transp., 483 U.S. at 475-476, and n. 5, and County of
Cf. Burnham V. Superior Court of Cal., County of
Oneida V. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U.S. at
Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 613, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631, 110
252).
Ct. 2105 (1990) (exclusive basis of a judgment is not
The plurality's extended reliance upon our decision
dicta) (plurality); Allegheny County V. American Civil
in Fitzpatrick V. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 49 L. Ed. 2d
Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
614, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), that Congress could
573, 668, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989)
under the Fourteenth Amendment abrogate the States'
("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs
sovereign immunity was also, we believe, misplaced.
us to adhere not only [*38] to the holdings of our prior
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"ocrText": "Page 12\n1996 U.S. LEXIS 2165, *33; 64 U.S.L.W. 4167\nLEXSEE\nthe Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional\nFitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inappli-\nprinciple that state sovereign immunity limited the fed-\ncable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the\neral courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of\nFourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption\nthe Amendment itself is clear enough on this point:\nof the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the\n\"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be\nConstitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance\nconstrued to extend to any suit\nAnd our\nbetween state and federal power achieved by Article III\ndecisions since Hans had been equally clear that the\nand the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 454. As the dis-\nEleventh Amendment reflects \"the fundamental princi-\nsent in Union Gas made [*36] clear, Fitzpatrick cannot\nple of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of ju-\nbe read to justify \"limitation of the principle embodied in\ndicial authority in Article III,\" Pennhurst State School\nthe Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent\nand Hospital V. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-98, 79\nprovisions of the Constitution.\" Union Gas, 491 U.S. at\nL. Ed. 2d 67, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); see Union Gas,\n42 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).\nsupra, at 38, (\" 'The entire judicial power granted by\nIn the five years since it was decided, Union Gas\nthe Constitution does not embrace authority to [*34] en-\nhas proven to be a solitary departure from established\ntertain a suit brought by private parties against a State\nlaw. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority V.\nwithout consent given\n\") (SCALIA, J., dissent-\nMetcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 121 L. Ed. 605,\ning) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497,\n113 S. Ct. 684 (1993). Reconsidering the decision in\n65 L. Ed. 1057, 41 S. Ct. 588 (1921)); see also cases\nUnion Gas, we conclude that none of the policies under-\ncited at n. 7, supra. As the dissent in Union Gas rec-\nlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to\nognized, the plurality's conclusion--that Congress could\nits holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of\nunder Article I expand the scope of the federal courts'\nquestionable precedential value, largely because a ma-\njurisdiction under Article [--\"contradicted our unvary-\njority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale\ning approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive\nof the plurality. See Nichols V. United States, 511 U.S.\ncatalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction.\" Union\n(1994) (slip op., at 8) (the \"degree of confusion\nGas, 491 U.S. at 39.\nfollowing a splintered decision\nis itself a reason\nNever before the decision in Union Gas had we\nfor reexamining that decision\"). The case involved the\nsuggested that the bounds of Article III could be ex-\ninterpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be\npanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitu-\naltered only by constitutional amendment or revision by\ntional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment.\nthis Court. Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the\nIndeed, it had seemed fundamental that Congress could\nplurality's [*37] rationale depart from our established\nnot expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond\nunderstanding of the Eleventh Amendment and under-\nthe bounds of Article III. Marbury V. Madison, 5 U.S.\nmine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound\n137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). The plural-\nto conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and\nity's citation of prior decisions for support was based\nthat it should be, and now is, overruled.\nupon what we believe to be a misreading of precedent.\nThe dissent makes no effort to defend the decision\nSee Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 40-41 (SCALIA, J., dissent-\nin Union Gas, see post at 2, but nonetheless would\ning). The plurality claimed support for its decision [*35]\nfind congressional power to abrogate in this case. n11\nfrom a case holding the unremarkable, and completely\nContending that our decision is a novel extension of the\nunrelated, proposition that the States may waive their\nEleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for \"attend-\nsovereign immunity, see id., at 14-15 (citing Parden V.\ning\" to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to\nTerminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184,\nmere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established ra-\n12 L. Ed. 2d 233, 84 S. Ct. 1207 (1964)), and cited\ntionale upon which the Court based the results of its\nas precedent propositions that had been merely assumed\nearlier decisions. When an opinion issues for the Court,\nfor the sake of argument in earlier cases, see 491 U.S. at\nit is not only the result but also those portions of the\n15 (citing Welch V. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public\nopinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.\nTransp., 483 U.S. at 475-476, and n. 5, and County of\nCf. Burnham V. Superior Court of Cal., County of\nOneida V. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U.S. at\nMarin, 495 U.S. 604, 613, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631, 110\n252).\nCt. 2105 (1990) (exclusive basis of a judgment is not\nThe plurality's extended reliance upon our decision\ndicta) (plurality); Allegheny County V. American Civil\nin Fitzpatrick V. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 49 L. Ed. 2d\nLiberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.\n614, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976), that Congress could\n573, 668, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989)\nunder the Fourteenth Amendment abrogate the States'\n(\"As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs\nsovereign immunity was also, we believe, misplaced.\nus to adhere not only [*38] to the holdings of our prior"
}