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Presidential Library Staff.
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Clinton Presidential Records
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Maria Echaveste
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Fast Track [2]
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1
VLVJL LIULU
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE: 9/15/97
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9/15/97
3:00pm
SUBJECT:
FAST TRACK DRAFT LEGISLATION
ACTION FYI
ACTION
FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
McCURRY
BOWLES
McGINTY
McLARTY
NASH
PODESTA
RADD
MATHEWS
REED
RAINES
RUFF
BLUMENTHAL
SMITH
BERGER
SOSNIK
ECHAVESTE
SPERLING
EMANUEL
STREETT
GIBBONS
TARULLO
HILLEY
VERVEER
IBARRA
WALDMAN
KLAIN
YELLEN
BEGALA
LEWIS
LINDSEY
Jay Berman
MARSHALL
Susan Brophy
Tony Blinker
REMARKS:
Connents TO KEN FREIBERG AT USTR
RESPONSE:
395-9631
CLOSE HOLD
Staff Secretary
Ext. 6-2702
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
I am pleased to transmit a legislative proposal entitled the
"Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997."
Also transmitted is a section-by-section analysis.
This proposal would renew over 60 years of cooperation
between the Congress and the Executive Branch in the negotiation
and implementation of market-opening trade agreements for the
benefit of American workers and companies.
The sustained, robust performance of our economy over the
past five years is powerful proof that Congressional-Executive
cooperation works. We have máde great strides together. We have
invested in education and in health care for the American people.
We have achieved an historic balanced budget agreement. At the
same time, we have put in place trade agreements that have
lowered barriers to American products and services around the
world.
Our companies, farms, and working people have responded.
Our economy has produced more jobs, more growth, and greater
economic stability than at any time in decades. It has also
generated more exports than ever before. Indeed, America's
remarkable economic performance over the past five years has been
fueled in significant part by the strength of our dynamic export
sector. Fully 96 percent of the world's consumers live outside
the United States. Many of our greatest sales opportunities
today lie outside our borders. The future promises still greater
opportunities.
Many foreign markets, especially in the developing world,
are growing at tremendous rates. Latin American and Asian
economies, for example, are expected to expand at three times the
rate of the U.S. economy over the coming years. Consumers and
industries in these countries prize American goods, farm
products, and services, and the many expressions of American
ingenuity and culture. While America is the world's greatest
exporting nation, we need to do more if we want to continue to
expand our own economy and produce good, high-wage jobs for our
children.
We have made real progress in breaking down barriers to
American products around the world, particularly in developed
countries like those in Europe. But many of the nations with the
highest growth rates are in the developing world, and they almost
invariably impose far higher trade barriers than we do. We need
to level the trade playing field with those countries. They are
the nations whose markets hold the greatest potential for
American workers and firms.
2
Today, the United States is the world's strongest
competitor. The strength of the U.S. economy over the past
several years is testimony to the creativity, productivity, and
ingenuity of American firms and workers. We cannot afford to
squander our great advantages by retreating to the sidelines and
watching other countries conclude preferential trade deals that
shut out our goods and services. Over twenty such agreements
have been concluded in Latin America and Asia since 1992. The
United States must continue to shape and direct world trade to
our advantage, and to foster democracy and stability around the
world.
I have pledged my Administration to this task, but I cannot
fully succeed without the Congress at my side. We must work in
partnership, together with the American people, in securing our
country's future. The United States must be united when we sit
down at the negotiating table. Our trading partners will only
negotiate with one America -- not first with an American
President and next with an American Congress.
The proposal I am sending you today ensures that the
Congress will be a full partner in setting negotiating
objectives, establishing trade priorities, and in gaining the
greatest possible benefits through our trade agreements. The
3
proposal goes well beyond any previous fast-track legislation in
ensuring that the Congress is fully apprised and actively
consulted throughout the negotiating process. I am convinced
that this collaboration will strengthen both America's
effectiveness and leverage at the bargaining table.
Widening the scope of consultations will also help ensure
that we will take all of America's vital interests into account.
That is particularly important because today our trade agreements
address a wider range of activities than they one did. As we
move forward with our trade agenda, we must continue to honor and
reinforce the other values that make America an example for the
world. I count chief among these values America's long-standing
concern for the rights of workers and for the environment. The
proposal I am transmitting to you recognizes the importance of
those concerns. It makes clear that the trade agreements we
conclude will complement and reinforce those values.
Ever since President Roosevelt proposed and the Congress
enacted America's first reciprocal trade act in the heart of the
Great Depression, the Congress and the President have been
united, on a bipartisan basis, in supporting a fair and open
trading system. Our predecessors learned from direct experience
the path to America's prosperity. We owe much of our own
4
prosperity to their wisdom. I urge the Congress to renew our
long-standing partnership by approving the proposal I have
transmitted today.
5
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short Title.
Section 2. Negotiating Objectives.
Section 2 of the proposal sets out the "overall" and "principal"
objectives that will guide the President in negotiating future
trade agreements covered by the proposal. This format parallels
that of section 1101 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, which in turn was based on a similar structure in the
Trade Act of 1974.
In order for a trade agreement to qualify for fast-track
treatment, it must make progress toward one or more of the
principal objectives set out in section 2 (b). These objectives
address, among other subjects, agricultural exports, intellectual
property, the protection of worker rights and the environment
under the World Trade Organization, trade in services, U.S.
foreign investment, and specific barriers to trade, including
foreign government policies and practices directly related to
trade.
Section 2 (c) calls on U.S. negotiators to take important domestic
policy objectives, such as the protection of human health and the
environment and national security, into account when negotiating
fast track trade agreements. Negotiators are also instructed to
ensure that the United States will retain the ability to
vigorously enforce U.S. trade laws and that official
Congressional advisors are kept fully informed during the course
of trade negotiations.
Section 3. Proclamation Authority and Fast-Track Implementing
Proposals.
Section 3 (a) provides the President with authority to reduce U.S.
tariff rates -- without seeking further approval from the
Congress -- in return for concessions from U.S. trading partners.
Much of the language on this subject is derived from earlier
versions of tariff proclamation authority, with antecedents
dating back to the mid-1930s. The proposal adds a provision that
will allow the President to implement new sectoral tariff
harmonization or elimination agreements under the World Trade
Organization, subject to a Congressional notice and layover
requirement. The proposal also permits the President to carry
out tariff elimination and harmonization agreements, subject to
notice and layover, concluded as an interim step towards a
regional free-trade arrangement.
Section 3 (b) provides that the President may negotiate and bring
back to the Congress for approval and implementation under the
fast track procedures set out in section 151 of the Trade Act of
1974 certain trade agreements addressing non-tariff barriers or
both non-tariff and tariff barriers. Those procedures call for
the Congress to vote on agreements and their implementing
legislation without amendment and within a fixed period. Changes
in U.S. law required to carry out a trade agreement may be
included in fast track implementing legislation only if the
changes are both necessary or appropriate to implement the
agreement and are trade-related. For an implementing bill to be
subject to fast-track Congressional review, the President must
adhere to numerous notice and consultation requirements included
in the proposal.
Under the proposal, the President's tariff proclamation
authority, as well as fast track procedures for implementing
legislation, will be in effect until October 1, 2001. On request
from the President, proclamation authority and fast track
procedures may be extended until October 1, 2005, subject to
disapproval by either House of Congress.
Sections 4 and 5. Notice, Consultations, and Implementation.
Sections 4 and 5 contain a number of provisions requiring the
President to notify and consult with the Congress before and
during trade negotiations. These provisions ensure that the
Congress is fully integrated into the formulation of U.S. goals,
strategies, and decision-making for each trade negotiation.
Section 5 establishes an expedited procedure for Congress to
withdraw fast track if it finds that the Administration is not
adequately consulting the Congress on trade negotiations.
A number of the notice and consultation requirements included in
sections 4 and 5 are drawn from equivalent provisions in the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. For example, the
President must provide advance notice to the Congress before
initiating a negotiation and must consult with the Congress
2
before an agreement is concluded. The President must also
describe in detail at the time he submits implementing
legislation to the Congress how he intends to use existing
regulatory and administrative authority to carry out the
agreement.
The proposal also provides for Congress and the President to
receive advice from the relevant private sector advisory
committees concerning any agreement that the President has
negotiated - - before it is signed. The advisory committees
cover a broad range of sectors and policy matters, including
manufactured goods, agricultural commodities, services,
intellectual property, labor, and the environment. Under
existing law, the President must also consult with these
committees regarding his objectives and bargaining positions in
the negotiations. In addition, in advance of the negotiations,
the President must solicit advice from the United States
International Trade Commission, as well as views from the public,
concerning any U.S. tariff reductions contemplated in the
negotiations.
The proposal adds new consultation requirements to further
enhance Congressional oversight of the negotiation process. For
example, the President must spell out for the Congress before
negotiations begin his principal negotiating objectives and is
required to consult with the Congress over the course of the
negotiations. In addition, the President must inform the
Congress of any other agreements he intends to conclude and must
state whether the trade agreement will require implementing
legislation in addition to that subject to fast-track procedures.
Section 6. On-going Negotiations.
The proposal waives the requirement for the President to provide
advance notification to the Congress of certain negotiations
initiated prior to enactment of the proposal. These include
negotiations commenced in 1995 with the Government of Chile on a
comprehensive trade agreement and certain negotiations currently
in progress under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.
3
Section 7. Conforming Amendments.
The proposal makes changes to other statutes necessary to ensure
that provisions of law applicable to fast track trade agreements
continue to apply. For example, these amendments ensure that
the public and private sector views are solicited regarding any
trade negotiations initiated under the proposal.
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
The Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997
Today, President Clinton transmitted to the Congress the "Export
Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997." This
proposal is designed to renew "fast track" procedures for trade
agreements requiring Congressional approval and implementation as
well as to renew the President's authority to proclaim tariff
reductions pursuant to reciprocal commitments by U.S. trading
partners.
The proposal reactivates a partnership between the President and
the Congress that dates back over six decades. Recognizing that
the high protective U.S. tariff walls it established in 1930 had
only served to deepen the Depression, Congress four years later
enacted the first reciprocal trade agreements act. In that act,
Congress gave the President authority to negotiate mutual tariff
reductions with our trading partners. Congress renewed that
authority repeatedly over the years, and successive Presidents
used the authority to dramatically reduce tariff barriers around
the world.
"Fast track," first put in place under the Ford Administration,
is further expression of partnership between the President and
the Congress in bringing down barriers to U.S. exports. Fast
track is a procedure under which the Congress and the President
work together to ensure that the United States can effectively
negotiate away non-tariff barriers -- such as quotas,
protectionist product standards, and subsidies -- that foreign
governments have increasingly substituted for tariffs to exclude
U.S. products.
Fast track has been used to negotiate five major trade
agreements, beginning with the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations,
signed in 1979. Fast track lapsed along with most of the
President's tariff reduction authority three years ago.
The President's proposed legislation serves to reunite the
Congress and the President in trade negotiations. The
President's proposal, ensures that the Congress is fully
integrated into the formulation of U.S. goals, strategies, and
decision-making for each trade negotiation subject to fast track
procedures. Because the Congress and the President are united
under the proposal, it tells U.S. trading partners that they can
trust the United States not to reopen trade deals after they are
struck.
The proposal also renews the President's long-standing tariff
authority. The proposal adds provisions specifically directed at
eliminating tariffs in sectors of greatest economic interest to
U.S. exporters. It also provides the President authority to
carry out reciprocal tariff elimination agreements on a regional
basis as a first step towards a regional free-trade arrangement.
The proposal calls for the President's renewed tariff authority
and for the new fast track procedures to remain in effect until
October 1, 2001. The President may request an extension of the
proclamation authority and "fast track" procedures through
September 30, 2005. The extension will take effect unless
disapproved by either House of the Congress.
Key provisions of the proposal are as follows:
The proposal sets out "overall" and "principal" trade
negotiating objectives for the President. The objectives
call on U.S. negotiators to seek, for example:
--
to reduce foreign government barriers that discriminate
or impose unreasonable regulatory barriers on services
providers.
to obtain adequate and effective protection for U.S.
intellectual property rights and increased access to
foreign markets for U.S. businesses that rely on
intellectual property.
To secure fairer and more open conditions of trade for
U.S. food products.
2
To make the proceedings of international trade bodies
more open to public view.
To promote through the World Trade Organization
internationally recognized worker rights and
sustainable development so that trade reinforces and
complements labor rights and environmental protection.
To reduce specific foreign trade barriers that reduce
market opportunities for U.S. exports or that distort
U.S. trade.
The President may negotiate and bring back to the Congress
for fast track Congressional approval and implementation
trade agreements addressing non-tariff barriers or both
tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Thus, fast track could be used to carry out agreements
concluded as part of the trade negotiating agenda set
out in the Congressionally-approved agreements
administered by the World Trade Organization for
example, further reductions in tariff and non-tariff
barriers to agricultural trade.
The President could use the renewed "proclamation
authority" to carry out an agreement like the recent
"Information Technology Agreement," which is reducing
tariffs that foreign governments impose on billions of
dollars of U.S. computer, electronic, and semiconductor
products sold around the world.
Finally, fast track could be used for bilateral or
regional free-trade arrangements.
In order for an implementing bill to qualify for fast-track
procedures, the President must comply with numerous notice
and consultation provisions designed to. ensure that the
Congress is a full partner with the President in critical
trade negotiations. These provisions enable the Congress to
set priorities, provide advice, and exercise oversight at
all stages of the negotiations, and after the agreement is
concluded. That means Congressional views will be fully
reflected both in the final agreement and in the manner in
3
which the agreement is to be carried out. Moreover, if the
Congress concludes that the President has not adequately
consulted the Congress regarding a proposed agreement, the
proposal creates an expedited procedure for the Congress to
refuse to apply fast-track procedures.
The proposal adds to existing law in ensuring that the
public is fully informed of the negotiations and that the
President receives advice from both the private sector and
the public concerning the negotiations.
Among the requirements that the President must carry out in
connection with fast-track negotiations are the following:
The President must provide written notice to the
Congress before initiating negotiations and must spell
out in writing his principal objectives for the
negotiations.
The President must solicit views from the public, and
the United States International Trade Commission,
before making an offer in a trade negotiation to reduce
U.S. tariffs. Under the proposal, the President must
in addition issue a public notice of any agreement in
advance of signing it.
The President must consult with the Congress as
negotiations progress and again before an agreement is
concluded. The proposal calls on U.S. negotiators to
keep official Congressional advisors fully informed
regarding the negotiations.
Before signing an agreement, the President must inform
the Congress of any other agreements he intends to
conclude with the countries concerned. He must also
state his plans for implementing the trade agreement
and whether the agreement will require additional
legislation beyond that subject to fast-track
procedures.
Any fast-track agreement that the President concludes
must make progress towards one or more of the principal
trade negotiating objectives set out in the proposal.
4
The proposal adds to the existing requirement that the
President must seek the views of Congressionally-
authorized private sector advisory committees during
the course of the negotiations. These groups include
advisory committees on goods, services, agriculture,
intellectual property, labor, intergovernmental
affairs, and the environment, among others. The
proposal ensures that these committees also examine and
provide their views to the Congress and the President
on any proposed agreement -- before it is signed.
The proposal requires the President to describe at the
time he submits implementing legislation to the
Congress how he intends to use existing regulatory and
administrative authority to carry out the agreement.
He must also explain in writing how the agreement meets
Congressionally-mandated negotiating objectives and
serves U.S. economic interests.
Under well-established practice, the President
collaborates with the Congress in drafting the
implementing legislation and the legislation is subject
to informal public hearings and "mark-ups" by all
Congressional committees of jurisdiction before its
introduction.
Agreements for which the President has observed each of the
proposal's notice, consultation, and other procedures are
subject to fast-track consideration in the Congress. Fast
track rules call for the Congress to vote on qualifying
trade agreements and implementing legislation without
amendment within 60 "legislative days" -- typically a period
in excess of several months.
Under the President's proposal, new statutory provisions or
other changes in U.S. law required to carry out a trade
agreement may be included in fast-track implementing
legislation only if the changes are both: (1) necessary or
appropriate to implement the agreement; and (2) related to
trade. This requirement prevents fast-track bills from being
used to enact non-trade provisions.
5
Under the renewed "proclamation authority" the President
would be authorized to carry out agreements that reduce by
up to 50 percent U.S. tariffs that currently exceed 5
percent ad valorem. The President could eliminate duties of
5 percent or less. The proposal also allows the President
to eliminate tariffs in connection with new multilateral
reciprocal tariff agreements in particular sectors, as well
as to carry out reciprocal tariff elimination agreements as
a step towards regional free-trade areas.
# # #
6
Staff Draft 9/15 12:15 a.m
A BILL
To establish procedures for notice, consultations, and
implementation with regard to certain trade agreements, and
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
1
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.
2
ThisActmay be cited as the "Export Expansion and
3 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997".
4 SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.
5
(a) OVERALL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES. - The
6 overall trade negotiating objectives of the United States for
7
agreements subject to the provisions of section 3 are -
8
(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal
9
market access;
10
(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers
11
and distortions that are directly related to trade;
12
(3) to further strengthen the system of international
1
trading disciplines and procedures;
2
(4) to foster economic growth, raise living
3
standards, and promote full employment in the United
4
States and to enhance the global economy; and
5
(5) to address those aspects of foreign government
6
policies and practices regarding labor, the environment,
7
and other matters that are directly related to trade and
8
decrease market opportunities for United States exports or
9
distort United States trade.
10
(b) PRINCIPAL TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.-
11
(1) SPECIFIC BARRIERS. - The principal negotiating
12
objectives of the United States regarding specific trade
13
barrier and other trade distortions are to expand
14
competitive market opportunities for United States
15
exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of
16
trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff
17
barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments
18
directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities
19
for United States exports or distort United States trade.
20
(2) TRADE IN SERVICES. - The principal negotiating
21
objective of the United States regarding trade in services
2
I
is to reduce or eliminate barriers to international trade in
2
services, including regulatory and other barriers that deny
3
national treatment and unreasonably restrict the
4
establishment and operations of service suppliers.
5
(3) FOREIGN INVESTMENT. - The principal
6 negotiating objective of the United States regarding foreign
7
investment is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
8
barriers to United States foreign investment by -
9
(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the
10
principle of nondiscriminatory treatment;
11
(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to
12
investments;
13
(C) reducing or eliminating performance
14
requirements and other unreasonable barriers to the
15
establishment and operation of investments;
16
(D) establishing standards for expropriation
17
and compensation for expropriation consistent with
18
United States legal principles and practice; and
19
(E) providing meaningful procedures for
20
resolving investment disputes.
21
(4) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. - The principal
3
1
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
2
trade-related intellectual property are -
3
(A) to further promote adequate and effective
4
protection of intellectual property rights, including
5
through -
6
(i) ensuring full implementation of the
7
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
8
Intellectual Property Rights referred to in
9
section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round
10
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), and
11
achieving improvements in the standards of
12
that Agreement;
13
(ii) providing strong protection for new
14
and emerging technologies and new methods
15
of transmitting and distributing products
16
embodying intellectual property;
17
(iii) preventing or eliminating
18
discrimination with respect to matters
19
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
20
maintenance, use, and enforcement of
21
intellectual property rights; and
4
1
(iv) providing strong enforcement of
2
intellectual property rights, including through
3
accessible, expeditious, and effective civil,
4
administrative, and criminal enforcement
5
mechanisms; and
6
(B) to secure fair, equitable, and
7
nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for
8
United States persons that rely upon intellectual
9
property protection.
10
(5) TRANSPARENCY. - The principal negotiating
11
objective of the United States with respect to transparency
12
is to obtain broader application of the principle of
13
transparency through -
14
(A) increased and more timely public access
15
to information regarding trade issues and the
16
activities of international trade institutions; and
17
(B) increasing the openness of dispute
18
settlement proceedings, including under the World
19
Trade Organization.
20
(6) AGRICULTURE. - The principal negotiating
21
objective of the United States with respect to agriculture
5
1
is to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in
2
agricultural commodities by -
3
(A) reducing or eliminating tariffs or other
4
charges that decrease market opportunities for
5
United States exports;
6
(B) reducing or eliminating subsidies that
7
decrease market opportunities for United States
8
exports or distort agricultural markets to the
9
detriment of the United States;
10
(C) developing, strengthening, and clarifying
11
rules that address practices that unfairly decrease
12
United States market access opportunities or distort
13
agricultural markets to the detriment of the United
14
States, including -
15
(i) unfair or trade-distorting activities of
16
state trading enterprises and other
17
administrative mechanisms;
18
(ii) unjustified restrictions or
19
commercial requirements affecting new
20
technologies, including genetically modified
21
organisms;
6
I
(iii) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary
2
restrictions;
3
(iv) other unjustified technical barriers to
4
trade; and
5
(v) restrictive rules in the administration
6
of tariff rate quotas.
7
(7) WORKER RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
8
PROTECTION. - The principal negotiating objectives of the
9
United States regarding worker rights and protection of
10
the environment are, through the World Trade
11
Organization, -
12
(A) to promote respect for internationally
13
recognized worker rights, including with regard to
14
child labor;
15
(B) to secure a review of the relationship of
16
worker rights to the provisions, objectives, and
17
instruments of the World Trade Organization with
18
a view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading
19
system are available to all workers;
20
(C) to adopt, as a principle of the World Trade
21
Organization, that the denial of internationally
7
1
recognized worker rights should not be a means for
2
a country or its industries to gain competitive
3
advantage in international trade;
4
(D) to promote sustainable development; and
5
(E) to seek to ensure that trade and
6
environmental protection are mutually supportive,
7
including through further clarification of the
8
relationship between them.
9
The United States will also seek to establish in the
10
International Labor Organization a mechanism for the
11
systematic examination of, and reporting on, the extent to
12
which member governments protect internationally
13
recognized worker rights and enforce core labor
14
standards.
15
(c) GUIDANCE FOR NEGOTIATORS. -
16
(1) In pursuing the negotiating objectives described
17
in subsection (b), United States negotiators shall take into
18
account United States domestic objectives including, but
19
not limited to, the protection of health or safety, essential
20
security, environmental, consumer or employment
21
opportunity interests and the law and regulations related
8
1
thereto.
2
(2) In the course of negotiations conducted under
3
this act, the United States Trade Representative shall -
4
(A) consult closely and on a timely basis with,
5
and make every effort to keep fully apprised of the
6
negotiations, the congressional advisers on trade
7
policy and negotiations appointed under section 161
8
of the Trade Act of 1974; and
9
(B) take into account the need for the United
10
States to retain the ability to enforce rigorously its
11
trade laws in order to ensure that United States
12
workers, farmers, and firms can compete on fair
13
terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade
14
concessions.
15
(d) ADHERENCE TO OBLIGATIONS UNDER URUGUAY
16 ROUND AGREEMENTS. - In determining whether to enter into
17 negotiations with a particular country, the President shall take
18 into account the extent to which that country has implemented,
19 or has accelerated the implementation of, its obligations under
20 the Uruguay Round Agreements (as defined in section 2 of the
21
Uruguay Round Agreements Act).
9
1
SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS PROCEDURES.
2
(a) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF BARRIERS. -
3
(1) IN GENERAL. - Whenever the President
4
determines that one or more existing duties or other
5
import restrictions of any foreign country or the United
6
States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign
7
trade of the United States and that the purposes and
8
policies of this Actwill be promoted thereby, the President
9
-
10
(A) before October 1, 2001 (or October 1,
11
2005, if fast track procedures are extended under
12
subsection (c)), may enter into trade agreements
13
with foreign countries; and
14
(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3),
15
proclaim -
16
(i) such modification or continuance of
17
any existing duty,
18
(ii) such continuance of existing duty-
19
free or excise treatment, or
20
(iii) such additional duties,
21
as the President determines to be required or
10
1
appropriate to carry out any such trade agreement.
2
(2) LIMITATIONS. - No proclamation may be made
3
under paragraph (1) that -
4
(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate
5
of duty that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem
6
on the date of the enactment of this Act) to a rate of
7
duty which is less than 50 percent of the rate of such
8
duty that applies on such date of enactment;
9
(B) provides for a reduction in duty on an
10
article to take effect on a date that is more than 10
11
years after the first reduction that is proclaimed to
12
carry out a trade agreement with respect to such
13
article; or
14
(C) increases any rate of duty above the rate
15
that applied on January 1, 1995.
16
(3) AGGREGATE REDUCTION; EXEMPTION FROM
17
STAGING. -
18
(A) AGGREGATE REDUCTION. - Except as
19
provided in subparagraph (B), the aggregate
20
reduction in the rate of duty on any article which is
21
in effect on any day pursuant to a trade agreement
11
1
entered into under paragraph (1) shall not exceed
2
the aggregate reduction which would have been in
3
effect on such day if -
4
(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem
5
or a reduction of one-tenth of the total
6
reduction, whichever is greater, had taken
7
effect on the effective date of the first
8
reduction proclaimed under paragraph (1) to
9
carry out such agreement with respect to such
10
article, and
11
(ii) a reduction equal to the amount
12
applicable under clause (i) had taken effect at
13
1-year intervals after the effective date of such
14
first reduction.
15
(B) EXEMPTION FROM STAGING. - No
16
staging is required under subparagraph (A) with
17
respect to a duty reduction that is proclaimed under
18
paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that is not
19
produced in the United States. The United States
20
International Trade Commission shall advise the
21
President of the identity of articles that may be
12
1
exempted from staging under this subparagraph.
2
(4) ROUNDING. - If the President determines that
3
such action will simplify the computation of reductions
4
under paragraph (3), the President may round an annual
5
reduction by an amount equal to the lesser of -
6
(A) the difference between the reduction
7
without regard to this paragraph and the next lower
8
whole number; or
9
(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
10
(5) OTHER LIMITATIONS. - A rate of duty reduction
11
or increase that may not be proclaimed by reason of
12
paragraph (2) may take effect only if a provision
13
authorizing such reduction or increase is included within
14
an implementing bill provided for under section 5 and that
15
bill is enacted into law.
16
(6) OTHER TARIFF MODIFICATIONS. -
17
(A) Subject to the consultation and layover
18
requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round
19
Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the
20
modification of any duty or staged rate reduction of
21
any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined in
13
1
section 2(5) of that Act, if the United States agrees
2
to such modification or staged rate reduction in a
3
negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or
4
harmonization of duties under the auspices of the
5
World Trade Organization or as part of an interim
6
agreement leading to the formation of a regional
7
free-trade area.
8
(B) Paragraphs 1-5 of this subsection shall not
9
limit the authority provided to the President in
10
subparagraph (A) or in section 111(b) of the
11
Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
12
(b) AGREEMENTS REGARDING TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF
13 BARRIERS. -
14
(1) IN GENERAL. - Whenever the President
15
determines that -
16
(A) one or more existing duties or other
17
import restrictions of any foreign country or the
18
United States, or any other barrier to, or other
19
distortion of, international trade unduly burdens or
20
restricts the foreign trade of the United States or
21
adversely affects the United States economy; or
14
1
(B) the imposition of any such import
2
restriction, barrier, or distortion is likely to result in
3
such a burden, restriction, or effect;
4
and that the purposes and policies of this Act will be
5
promoted thereby, the President may, before October 1,
6
2001 (or October 1, 2005, if fast track procedures are
7
extended under subsection (c)), enter into trade
8
agreements with foreign countries providing for -
9
(i) the reduction or elimination of such
10
duty, restriction, barrier, or other distortion, or
11
(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on
12
the imposition of, such barrier or other
13
distortion.
14
(2) CONDITIONS. - A trade agreement may be
15
entered into under this subsection only if such agreement
16
makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives
17
described in section 2(b)
18
(3) BILLS QUALIFYING FOR "FAST TRACK"
19
PROCEDURES. -
20
(A) The provisions of section 151 of the Trade
21
Act of 1974, as amended by subparagraph (B) of
15
1
this paragraph, (in thisActreferred to as "fast track
2
procedures") apply to implementing bills (as
3
defined in subsection (b)(1) of such section)
4
submitted with respect to trade agreements entered
5
into under section (3)(b) of this act.
X
6
(B) Section 151(b)(1) of the Trade Act of
7
1974 is amended by striking subparagraph (C) and
8
inserting -
9
"(C)(i) if changes in existing laws or
10
new statutory authority is required to
11
implement such trade agreement or
12
agreements or such extension,
13
provisions which are necessary or
14
appropriate to implement such trade
15
agreement or agreements or extension
16
and which are trade-related, either
17
repealing or amending existing laws or
18
providing new statutory authority; and
19
(ii) provisions necessary for purposes of
20
complying with section 252 of the
21
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
16
1
Control Act of 1985 in implementing
2
the applicable trade agreement."
3
(c) APPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF "FAST TRACK"
4 PROCEDURES -
5
(1) IN GENERAL. - Except as provided in section
6
5(b)-
7
(A) fast track procedures apply to
8
implementing bills submitted with respect to trade
9
agreements entered into under subsection (b) before
10
October 1, 2001; and
11
(B) fast track procedures shall be extended to
12
implementing bills submitted with respect to trade
13
agreements entered into under subsection (b) after
14
September 30, 2001, and before October 1, 2005, if
15
(and only if)-
16
(i) the President requests such extension
17
under paragraph (2); and
18
(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts
19
an extension disapproval resolution under
20
paragraph (5) before October 1, 2001.
21
(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT. -
17
1
If the President is of the opinion that fast track procedures
2
should be extended to implementing bills described in
3
paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the
4
Congress, not later than July 1, 2001, a written report that
5
contains a request for such extension, together with -
6
(A) a description of all trade agreements that
7
have been negotiated under subsection (b) and the
8
anticipated schedule for submitting such agreements
9
to the Congress for approval;
10
(B) a description of the progress that has been
11
made in negotiations to achieve the purposes and
12
policies of this act, and a statement that such
13
progress justifies the continuation of negotiations;
14
and
15
(C) a statement of the reasons why the
16
extension is needed to complete the negotiations.
17
(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE ADVISORY
18
COMMITTEE. - The President shall promptly inform the
19
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
20
established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974
21
(19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's decision to submit a
18
1
report to the Congress under paragraph (2). The Advisory
2
Committee shall submit to the Congress as soon as
3
practicable, but not later than August 1, 2001, a written
4
report that contains -
5
(A) its views regarding the progress that has
6
been made in negotiations to achieve the purposes
7
and policies of this act; and
8
(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons
9
therefor, regarding whether the extension requested
10
under paragraph (2) should be approved or
11
disapproved.
12
(4) REPORTS MAY BE CLASSIFIED. - The reports
13
submitted to the Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3),
14
or any portion of the reports, may be classified to the
15
extent the President determines appropriate.
16
(5) EXTENSION DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS. -
17
(A) For purposes of this subsection, the term
18
"extension disapproval resolution" means a
19
resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole
20
matter after the resolving clause of which is as
21
follows: "That the
disapproves the request of
19
1
the President for the extension, under section
2
3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Export Expansion and
3
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997, of the
4
provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974
5
to any implementing bill submitted with respect to
6
any trade agreement entered into under section 3(b)
7
of the Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade
8
Agreements Act of 1997 after September 30,
9
2001.", with the blank space being filled with the
10
name of the resolving House of the Congress.
11
(B) Extension disapproval resolutions -
12
(i) may be introduced in either House of
13
the Congress by any member of such House;
14
and
15
(ii) shall be jointly referred, in the House
16
of Representatives, to the Committee on Ways
17
and Means and the Committee on Rules.
18
(C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e)
19
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and
20
(e)) (relating to the floor consideration of certain
21
resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to
20
I
extension disapproval resolutions.
2
(D) It is not in order for -
3
(i) the Senate to consider any extension
4
disapproval resolution not reported by the
5
Committee on Finance;
6
(ii) the House of Representatives to
7
consider any extension disapproval resolution
8
not reported by the Committee on Ways and
9
Means and the Committee on Rules; or
10
(iii) either House of the Congress to
11
consider an extension disapproval resolution
12
after September 30, 2001.
13 SEC. 4. NOTICE AND CONSULTATIONS.
14
(a) NOTICE AND CONSULTATION BEFORE
15 NEGOTIATION. - The President, at least 90 calendar days before
16 initiating negotiations on any agreement that is subject to the
17 provisions of section 3(b), shall -
18
(1) provide written notice to the Congress of the
19
President's intent to enter into the negotiations and set
20
forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such
21
negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the
21
1
negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an
2
agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and
3
(2) before and after submission of the notice, consult
4
regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance
5
of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of
6
the House of Representatives and such other committees
7
of the House and Senate as the President deems
8
appropriate.
9
(b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS BEFORE
10
AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO. -
11
(1) CONSULTATION. - Before entering into any
12
trade agreement under section 3(b), the President shall
13
consult with -
14
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
15
House of Representatives and the Committee on
16
Finance of the Senate; and
17
(B) each other committee of the House and the
18
Senate, and each joint committee of the Congress,
19
which has jurisdiction over legislation involving
20
subject matters which would be affected by the
21
trade agreement.
22
1
(2) SCOPE. - The consultation described in
2
paragraph (1) shall include consultation with respect to -
3
(A) the nature of the agreement;
4
(B) how and to what extent the agreement will
5
achieve the applicable purposes and policies of this
6
act; and
7
(C) plans regarding the implementation of the
8
agreement under section 5, including whether the
9
agreement includes subject matter for which
10
supplemental implementing legislation may be
11
required which is not subject to fast track
12
procedures; and
13
(D) any other agreement or agrements the
14
President has entered into or intends to enter into
15
with the country or countries in question.
16
(c) ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORTS. - The report
17 required under section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974
18 regarding any trade agreement entered into under section 3(b)
19 of this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, and
20 the United States Trade Representative not later than 30
21 calendar days after the date on which the President notifies the
23
1
Congress under section 5(a)(1)(A) of the President's intention
2 to enter into the agreement.
3 SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.
4
(a) IN GENERAL. -
5
(1) NOTIFICATION AND SUBMISSION. - Any
6
agreement entered into under section 3(b) shall enter into
7
force with respect to the United States if (and only if) -
8
(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days
9
before the day on which the President enters into the
10
trade agreement, notifies the House of
11
Representatives and the Senate of the President's
12
intention to enter into the agreement, and promptly
13
thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the
14
Federal Register;
15
(B) within 60 calendar days after entering into
16
the agreement, the President submits to the
17
Congress a description of those changes to existing
18
laws that the President considers would be required
19
in order to bring the United States into compliance
20
with the agreement;
21
(C) after entering into the agreement, the
24
1
President submits a copy of the final legal text of
2
the agreement, together with -
3
(i) a draft of an implementing bill;
4
(ii) a statement of any administrative
5
action proposed to implement the trade
6
agreement; and
7
(iii) the supporting information
8
described in paragraph (2); and
9
(D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
10
(2) SUPPORTING INFORMATION. - The
11
supporting information required under paragraph
12
(1)(C)(iii) consists of -
13
(A) an explanation as to how the
14
implementing bill and proposed administrative
15
action will change or affect existing law; and
16
(B) a statement -
17
(i) asserting that the agreement makes
18
progress in achieving the applicable purposes
19
and policies of this act; and
20
(ii) setting forth the reasons of the
21
President regarding -
25
1
(I) how and to what extent the
2
agreement makes progress in achieving
3
the applicable purposes and policies
4
referred to in clause (i), and why and to
5
what extent the agreement does not
6
achieve other applicable purposes and
7
policies;
8
(II) whether and how the agreement
9
changes provisions of an agreement
10
previously negotiated;
11
(III) how the agreement serves the
12
interests of United States commerce;
13
and
14
(IV) why the implementing bill
15
and proposed administrative action are
16
required or appropriate to carry out the
17
agreement.
18
(3) RECIPROCAL BENEFITS. - To ensure that a
19
foreign country which receives benefits under a trade
20
agreement entered into under section 3(b) is subject to the
21
obligations imposed by such agreement, the President
26
I
shall recommend to Congress in the implementing bill
2
and statement of administrative action submitted with
3
respect to such agreement that the benefits and obligations
4
of such agreement apply solely to the parties to such
5
agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms
6
of such agreement. The President may also recommend
7
with respect to any such agreement that the benefits and
8
obligations of such agreement not apply uniformly to all
9
parties to such agreement, if such application is consistent
10
with the terms of such agreement.
11
(b) LIMITATIONS ON FAST TRACK PROCEDURES. -
12
(1) FOR LACK OF CONSULTATIONS. -
13
(A) Fast track procedures shall not apply to
14
any implementing bill submitted with respect to a
15
trade agreement entered into under section 3(b) if
16
both Houses of Congress separately agree to a
17
procedural disapproval resolution within any 60
18
calendar-day period.
19
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term
20
"procedural disapproval resolution" means a
21
resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole
27
I
matter after the resolving clause of which is as
2
follows: "That the President has failed or refused to
3
consult with the Congress on trade negotiations and
4
trade agreements in accordance with section 4(b) of
5
the Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade
6
Agreements Act of 1997 and, therefore, the
7
provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974
8
shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted
9
with respect to any trade agreement entered into
10
under section 3(b) of the Export Expansion and
11
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 1997.".
12
(2) PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS. -
13
(A) PROCEDURAL DISAPPROVAL
14
RESOLUTIONS -
15
(i) in the House of Representatives -
16
(I) shall be introduced by the
17
chairman or ranking minority member
18
of the Committee on Ways and Means
19
or the chairman or ranking minority
20
member of the Committee on Rules;
21
(II) shall be jointly referred to the
28
1
Committee on Ways and Means and the
2
Committee on Rules; and
3
(III) may not be amended by either
4
Committee; and
5
(ii) in the Senate shall be original
6
resolutions of the Committee on Finance.
7
(B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of
8
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e))
9
(relating to the floor consideration of certain
10
resolutions in the House and Senate) apply to
11
procedural disapproval resolutions.
12
(C) It is not in order for the House of
13
Representatives to consider any procedural
14
disapproval resolution not reported by the
15
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
16
on Rules.
17
(c) RULES OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE. -
18 Subsection (b) of this section and section 3(c) are enacted by
19 the Congress -
20
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
21
House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively,
29
1
and such are deemed a part of the rules of each House,
2
respectively, and such procedures supersede other rules
3
only to the extent that they are inconsistent with such
4
other rules; and
5
(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional
6
right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating
7
to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same
8
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that
9
House.
10 SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.
11
(a) NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE WORLD TRADE
12 ORGANIZATION. - The provisions of section 4(a) shall not
13 apply to [add ITA II] an agreement which results from a
14 negotiation under the auspices of the World Organization
15 initiated under a Uruguay Round Agreement, as defined in
16 section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, that were
17 commenced before the date of the enactment of this Act, and
18 the applicability of fast track procedures to such agreement
19 shall be determined without regard to the requirements of
20 section 4(a).
21
(b) AGREEMENT WITH CHILE. - If an agreement to which
30
I
section 3(b) applies is entered into with Chile after the date of
2 the enactment of this Act and results from negotiations that
3 were commenced before such date of enactment the provisions
4 of section 4(a) shall not apply to such agreement and the
5 applicability of fast track procedures to such agreement shall
6 be determined without regard to the requirements of section
7 4(a).
8 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
9
(a) DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this act:
10
(1) The term "core labor standards" means -
11
(A) the freedom to associate;
12
(B) the right to organize and bargain
13
collectively;
14
(C) a prohibition on forced labor;
15
(D) a prohibition on exploitative child labor;
16
and
17
(E) a prohibition on discrimination in
18
employment.
19
(2) The term "distortion" includes, but is not limited
20
to, a subsidy.
21
(3) The term "foreign country" includes any foreign
31
I
instrumentality. Any territory or possession of a foreign
2
country that is administered separately for customs
3
purposes, shall be treated as a separate foreign country.
4
(4) The term "internationally recognized worker
5
rights" has the meaning ascribed to that term in section
6
507(4) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.
7
(5) The term "trade" includes, but is not limited to -
8
(A) trade in both goods and services, and
9
(B) foreign investment by United States
10
persons, especially if such investment has
11
implications for trade in goods and services.
12
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. - Title I of the Trade
13 Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 and following) is amended as
14 follows -
15
(1) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is
16
amended by striking "section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus
17
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" " and inserting
18
"section 5(a)(1) of the Export Expansion and Reciprocal
19
Trade Agreements Act of 1997".
20
(2) Section 131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended -
21
(A) in subsection (a) -
32
1
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking "section
2
123 of this Act or section 1102 (a) or (c) of
3
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
4
of 1988," and inserting "section 123 of this
5
Act, section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus
6
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, or
7
section 3(a) or (b) of the Export Expansion
8
and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
9
1997,"; and
10
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking "section
11
1102(b) of the Omnibus Trade and
12
Competitiveness Act of 1988" and inserting"
13
section 3 (b) of the Export Expansion and
14
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997"
15
after "under"; and
16
(B) in subsection (b), by replacing "section
17
1102(a)(3)(A) of the Omnibus Trade and
18
Competitiveness Act of 1988" with "section
19
3(a)(3)(A) of the Export Expansion and Reciprocal
20
Trade Agreements Act of 1997"; and
21
(C) in subsection (c), by replacing "section
33
1
1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
2
Act of 1988," with "section 3 of the Export
3
Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
4
1997,".
5
(3) Sections 132, 133(a), 134(a), and 162(a) (19
6
U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), 2154(a), and 2212(a)) are each
7
amended by striking "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade
8
and Competitiveness Act of 1988," each place it appears
9
and inserting "section 3 of the Export Expansion and
10
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1997,".
11
(4) Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 2154(b)) is amended
12
by replacing "section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and
13
Competitiveness Act of 1988" with "section 3 of the
14
Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
15
of 1997".
16
(5) Section 135(a)(1)(A) (19 U.S.C. 2155(a)(1)(A))
17
is amended by replacing "section 1102 of the Omnibus
18
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988" with"section 3
19
of the Export Expansion and Reciprocal Trade
20
Agreements Act of 1997".
21
(6) Section 135(e) (19 U.S.C. 2155(e)) is
34
1
amended -
2
(A) in paragraph (1), by replacing "section
3
1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
4
Act of 1988" with "section 3 of the Export
5
Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
6
1997" each time it appears, and by replacing
7
"section 1103(a)(1)(A) of the Omnibus Trade and
8
Competitiveness Act of 1988" with "section
9
5(a)(1)(A) of the Export Expansion and Reciprocal
10
Trade Agreements Act of 1997"; and
11
(B) in paragraph (2), by replacing "section
12
1101 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
13
Act of 1988" with "section 2 of the Export
14
Expansion and Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
15
1997" after "1988".
16
(7) APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 125, 126, AND
17
127 OF THE TRADE Act OF 1974. - For purposes of
18
applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of
19
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137) -
20
(1) any trade agreement entered into under section
21
3 shall be treated as an agreement entered into under
35
1
section 101 or 102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of
2
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 or 2112); and
3
(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued
4
pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under section
5
3 shall be treated as a proclamation or Executive order
6
issued pursuant to a trade agreement entered into under
7
section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974.
36
CARMEN VOTAW
IRS Problem Solving Day: On November 15, Treasury will host the first National IRS
Problem Solving Day. On November 4, Treasury officials went to Baltimore to prepare
for Problem Solving Day, and will communicate the lessons learned in Baltimore to the
other districts during a November 7 video conference. IRS is also working to develop a
comprehensive set of performance measures that include customer service.
North American Development Bank (NADBank): On-November 5, a number of
improvements to the Community Adjustment and Investment Program were announced
(CAIP) in preparation for the House and Senate votes on Fast Track. These
improvements include seeking appropriations for an additional $37 million over four
years to permit greater lending, grant making and micro lending capabilities. On
gast
November 20, Treasury officials will visit Weslaco, TX, with Rep. Hinojosa to announce
the designation of the community as eligible for loans or loan guarantees through the
NADBank. On November 21, Treasury officials will attend a meeting of the Presidential
Advisory Committee of the NADBank in El Paso.
DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE
Community Policing Grant: On November 6, the COPS Office announced the award of
$34.6 million to 117 jurisdictions in 30 states and D.C. The Advancing Community
Policing Program includes grants for Community Policing Demonstration Centers and
grants for Organizational Change.
Don't Ask, Don't Tell: DOJ has successfully defended the 1993 statute governing
homosexuals in the military in the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. The
"statements" provision of the act requires the discharge of service members who state that
they are homosexual. Service members will not be discharged if they rebut the statement
that they engage in homosexual acts or are likely to do so. In 1996, the Second Circuit
held that the "statements" provision is constitutional if the "acts" provision that requires
the discharge of those who engage in homosexual acts is constitutional. The Second
Circuit remanded for a determination of that issue. The district court then held that the
"acts" provision violates Equal Protection because it is based upon the prejudice of
heterosexual service members against homosexuals. DOJ appealed that decision and its
opening brief will be filed on November 10.
Harbor Maintenance Tax: On October 31, the Supreme Court agreed to review a case
involving the constitutionality of the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT). On June 3, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the HMT, as applied to exporters, was
an unconstitutional tax on exports in violation of the Export Clause. The HMT is assessed
upon port use and all commercial shippers must pay. Potential refunds approach $1-2
billion. If collection of the fee is enjoined as to exports, the U.S. will probably cease
collecting the fee as to imports to avoid violating international obligations.
Cabinet Weekly Report, October 31 - November 7, page 2
X
Inter-American Dialogue
November 1997
Dear Colleague:
We are pleased to enclose several recent articles by Dialogue members and staff. We
welcome your reactions to any and all of these.
Sincerely,
City Cahin
Peter Hakim
Check one:
Please continue sending these mailings.
Please stop sending these mailings.
Fax: 202/822-9553
E-mail: [email protected]
Name:
1211 Connecticut Avenue NW. Suite 510 . Washington. DC 20036 202/822-9002 FAX: 202/822-9553
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
BOSTON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1097
address. www.csmonitor.com
75%
Latin Trip: a Fast Track Lap
By Peter Hakim
firsthand impressions of the size, energy, and
economic potential of all three nations.
T
O no one's great surprise, President
Clinton's trip last week to South
A fresh sense of South America
America - the first since he took office
They have now seen the endless sky-
- was largely uneventful. Unlike his visit car-
scrapers and great industrial power of Sao
lier this year to Mexico, Central America,
Paulo, and experienced the vibrancy and so-
and the Caribbean, this time there were no
phistication of Buenos Aircs. They've had
conflictive issues to be resolved, nor urgent
hours of discussion with the national leader-
requests to be considered. No major policy
ship of each county - and acquired a grasp
pronouncements were made, and no grand
of the problems they face, and of the ambi-
projects were launched. The president sim-
tions and fears they have for their nations.
ply visited and consulted with his counter-
The White House team knows better than
parts in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela to
ever how much the US has to gain by build-
build closer economic and political ties.
ing strong links with Latin America. A fresh
The importance of this effort, however,
sense of the people and the places should en-
should not be underestimated. Three results
ergize Clinton and his Cabinet for the battle
of the trip are worth mention. Whether they
over fast track.
turn out to be significant or enduring de-
pends on the willingness of the US and other
Nudging reform
governments to invest energy in strengthen-
While appropriately celebrating Latin
ing bilateral and multilateral relationships.
America's democratic advances, the presi-
dent also conveyed US concerns about the
Commitment to free trade
region's political failures - human rights
First, Clinton had the opportunity per-
abuses, violations of press freedoms, neglect
sonally to affirm that the US is firmly cont
of social and economic inequalities, perva-
mitted to regional free trade and hemi-
sive corruption, and others.
spheric economic integration. Throughout
Critics may be right, though, that had
Latin America and the Caribbean, confi-
Clinton spoken more forcefully on these
dence in the US commitment to these goals
matters, he'd have made a stronger contri
has dropped sharply since the Miami Sum-
bution to badly needed reforms. On this
mit of the Americas in December 1994.
score, it was the first lady who proved par-
The reason is plain. Only last month, the
ticularly adept in raising the issues and
Clinton administration formally presented
demonstrating support for change. In
legislation requesting congressional ap-
Buenos Aires, she addressed sensitive ques-
proval for the fast-track authority needed to
tions concerning the status and rights of
negotiate trade agreements, the essential
women. Her message, enthusiastically re-
basis for regional cooperation. Without fast
ceived by the largely female audience, will
track for three years, the US was unable to
surely have an impact on politics and policy.
make good on its pledge to bring Chile into
Energized and informed, Clinton must
the North American Free Trade Agreement.
now fully engage to win the congressional
In addition, the US has failed to put in
battle for fast track. Whatever goodwill Clin-
place new trade arrangements to protect
ton generated in Latin America will be rein-
small Caribbean and Central American states
forced by sustained White House interest in
from NAFTA-induced diversion of trade and
the region - and by success in securing the
investment toward Mexico. In South Amer-
authority to negotiate new hemisphere-wide
ica, the president left no doubts about his
trade arrangements. It will also set the stage
personal commitment to the free flow of
for a productive second meeting of the hemi-
commerce and invéstment.
sphere's leaders in April in Chile. Nothing
He also made it clear the US considers
the US could do would be more welcome in
Brazil and Argentina solid partners, not ri-
Latin America and the Caribbean.
vals or adversaries.
Just as important, the president and his
Peter Hakim is president of the Inter-
most senior foreign policy advisers gained
American Dialogue in Washington.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
211
COPYRIGHT R 1997 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE PUBLISHING SOCIETY An rights included
BOSTON - THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1997
Internet address: www.csmonitor.com
75c
Fast Track Would Bolster US Credibility as Global Leader
By Peter Hakim
discussions. Fast track is essential for the
the President's proposal.
more poverty. This will not help Latin
successful launch of negotiations for the
There is no chance that Congress will
America's workers or its environment.
T
HE White House took an important
Free Trade Area of the Americas, sched-
approve a fast-track bill that allows the
The defeat of fast track will also be
step toward reenergizing US policy
uled for next April at the second Summit
US to use trade agreements to enforce
toward Latin America and the
costly to the US. Latin America already
of the Americas in Santiago, Chile.
labor or environmental standards.
Caribbean when it submitted fast-track
absorbs 15 percent of US exports, and
Recognizing that most of the votes for
Derailing the current fast-track initia-
legislation to Congress last week.
the region is the fastest growing market
fast track will have to come from Repub-
tive will not produce a better initiative; it
If passed, the legislation will give Pres-
for North American products - with 40 to
licans, the President and his advisors tai-
will lead to none at all. There will be no
50 cents of every dollar Latin America
ident Clinton - like his predecessors over
lored their legislation to satisfy GOP de-
new US trade pacts in the hemisphere -
the past several decades - the authority to
spends on imports going to US compa-
mands that trade agreements largely
and no new agreements on workers'
nies.
negotiate international trade pacts that
exclude labor and environmental provi-
rights or ecological protection. It is only
Congress must consider in an expedited
sions. The administra-
with the approval of
fashion, and can approve or reject, but
tion's proposal has at-
fast track that the US
can credibly exercise
I
F current trends continue, Latin
not amend. The no-amendment proce-
America will soon be a larger con-
tracted
some
dure is essential for serious trade deals
criticism
Derailing the current
sumer of US imports than Europe and
Republican
leadership in seeking
because it assures our partners that the
Japan combined. Further, Latin American
even though it limits
fast-track initiative will
regional agreements on
US Congress will not be allowed to
and Caribbean cooperation on many
fast-track treatment to
not produce a better
these issues.
rewrite concluded agreements in order to
other fronts - the defense of democracy
issues that have a direct
Everyone loses if
satisfy multitudinous special interests.
bearing on trade mat-
initiative; it will lead
and human rights, anti-drug initiatives,
fast track is defeated
The administration's proposal for fast
environmental protection, collaboration
ters. True, the bill does
to none at all.
and the US is unable to
track is well-crafted and Congress should
in international forums - depends on
make protection of
negotiate hemispheric
quickly approve it.
stronger trade ties, the region's first pri-
workers' rights and the
free-trade agreements.
ority in its relations with the US.
For most governments of Latin Amer-
environment a goal and
The nations of Latin
ica and the Caribbean, fast-track approval
The White House has sent the right
suggests the US will promote increased
America and the Caribbean will be denied
is the acid test of the US commitment to
fast-track proposal to Congress. An in-
attention to these matters in international
the opportunity to gain secure, long-term
hemispheric free trade and stronger eco-
tense campaign, led by the president, is
organizations. But this language does not
access to the US market - which is the
nomic cooperation with the region. With
now required to gain prompt legislative
give the White House any additional ne-
first or second most important market for
fast track, the US will be able to proceed
approval. Nothing would do more to but-
gotiating authority. This is a bill designed
nearly every country of the region. The
tress US-Latin American ties and ensure a
with a free-trade pact with Chile, fulfilling
to appeal to the Republican majority.
region will also attract less foreign in-
successful visit by President Clinton to
a commitment made more than three
That is why most Democrats will op-
vestment - from the US and elsewhere -
years ago at the first Summit of the Amer-
South America next month and a produc-
pose the legislation, arguing that it fails
than it would with a hemispheric free-
icas in Miami. The US will also gain the
tive inter-American Summit in April 1998.
to protect workers or the environment.
trade pact in place. Less trade and less
credibility it needs to engage the other
But anyone who cares about these is-
foreign investment will mean slower
nations of the hemisphere in free trade
Peter Hakim is president of the Inter-
sues should think twice before rejecting
growth and fewer jobs in the region, and
American Dialogue in Washington.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
BOSTON - THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1997
Internet address: www.csmonitor.com
75c
By Peter Hakim
ARLIER this month, the
The opponents of renewed US
E
Clinton administration an-
sales have exaggerated the danger
nounced plans for two secu-
that they would spark a new re-
Two US security-related
rity-related initiatives in Latin
gional arms race - generating new
initiatives have rekindled
America, both apparently meant to
frictions and squandering resources
underscore growing US confidence
that would be better used for social
historic anxieties
in the region's governments.
purposes. After all, the countries
between Argentina,
The US lifted its 20-year blanket
have long had access to similar
Brazil, and Chile.
ban on the transfer of high-tech
weapons from European suppliers.
weapons to Latin America and pro-
But the US decision ending the
posed to designate Argentina a non-
bar on arms transfers was not uni-
NATO ally (a category heretofore
versally welcomed in Latin Amer-
the US action may alleviate the con-
reserved for a handful of countries
ica. The Argentine government,
cerns of Argentina's military forces
like Israel, Jordan, and Korea that
which for most of this decade has
about Chilean arms purchases from
are close US partners in actively
been Washington's staunchest sup-
the US.
hostile situations).
porter in the region, was strongly
Still, singling out Argentina was
The reaction in Latin America -
opposed. Argentina does not, at this
bound to rankle Chile and Brazil
particularly among the countries
time, want to spend money on so-
and create some apprehension
most affected - has been almost the
phisticated weapons; nor, however,
about US motives. Both countries
opposite of what was intended. In-
does it want its military officers en-
see themselves as strong allies of
stead of good will, the announce-
vious of their neighbors and alien-
the US, and want to be on equal
ments provoked suspicions about
ated from their government. Brazil
footing with other Latin American
US aims and rekindled some of the
was ambivalent. It may soon be in
nations in their security relations
historic anxieties between Ar-
the market for jet aircraft and other
with Washington.
gentina, Brazil, and Chile. All this
advanced weapons, but does not
There was no need for the US to
has occurred less than two months
appreciate the prospect of in-
make these decisions now: Neither
after the US constructively pro-
creased pressure - from its military
decision serves any particularly ur-
moted a resolution in the Organiza-
or from US manufacturers - to buy
gent purpose. Neither advances any
tion of American States calling for a
now. Even the Chileans, who have
strong US interest in Latin America.
legal framework to ensure ad-
announced plans for major pur-
Backtracking or recanting is not the
vanced notification and greater
chases of military hardware and
answer. It would add to the confu-
transparency in arms acquisitions.
thus stand to benefit first from the
sion and rancor among Latin Amer-
In itself, the decision to allow US
new US policy, resent the implica-
ican governments.
companies once again to sell ad-
tion that the US has bestowed a spe-
What the US should do, instead,
vanced weapons to Latin America
cial favor on them.
is to shape a coherent policy frame-
was hardly unreasonable. The
The US decision to make Ar-
work that will guide and anchor fu-
grounds for imposing the prohibi-
gentina a special military ally also
ture decisions, and help to explain
tion in the first place, back in 1977,
has some justification. Argentina
them to others. The US should be
have largely disappeared.
was the only Latin American coun-
working with every country in the
Repressive military regimes
try to volunteer troops for the Gulf
hemisphere to develop arms control
have been replaced by elected civil-
war. It has regularly sent troops to
and restraint arrangements that will
ian governments. Aside from the
international peacekeeping mis-
build confidence among nations and
festering frontier dispute between
sions, including to such US priority
strengthen civilian control of armed
Ecuador and Peru, the countries of
spots as Haiti and Bosnia. In almost
forces.
the region are at peace with one an-
every instance, Argentina has ener-
That will contribute more to
other. The prospect of armed con-
getically supported US security and
peace and genuine security in Latin
flict across borders has never been
arms control initiatives. Further.
America than a unilateral US em-
lower. Military expenditures, not
bargo on advanced military sales.
very high by international stan-
dards to begin with, have been
Peter Hakim is president of the
dropping steadily and sharply al-
Inter-American
Dialogue
in
most everywhere.
Washington.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
BOSTON - THURSDAY, JULY 31, 1997
Internet address: www.csmonitor.com
75c
VOI NO 1/7
COPYRIGHT . 1997 THE CHRISTIAN SCHNCE PUBLISHING SOCIETY All rights reserved
Gaps in Latin America's Boom
By Peter Hakim
President Aristide, current President René Préval has
posing further violations of democratic process and the
barely been able to govern in the past few months. While
rule of law in Peru - and seeking to mobilize other coun-
OR most of Latin America, 1997 has been a good
international donors and foreign investors are frustrated
tries to this position.
F
year. Recent midterm elections represented a de-
by the absence of coherent policy initiatives, the econ-
Colombia's situation may be the most serious. De-
cisive step toward democracy in Mexico. The Mex-
omy remains stagnant, the situation of most Haitians is
spite its history of democratic politics and sound eco-
ican and Argentine economies have largely recovered
worsening, and popular alienation grows. Despite the
nomic management, Colombia is besieged by violence
from reversals two years ago and are growing rapidly.
presence of United Nations troops, criminal violence is
and corruption. Drug money pervades its politics and
Brazil is showing remarkable political and economic sta-
increasing and security is precarious.
has perverted much of its police and judicial systems. It
bility - and, with several other countries, is attracting
The problems are mainly for the Haitians to resolve,
fuels the region's most dangerous guerrilla movement,
large flows of foreign investment. Chile's economy and
but the US could help by ending its partisan squabbling
which occupies huge expanses of Colombian territory,
democratic institutions remain vigorous. In Guatemala,
over whether, as the administration claims, Haiti is a
dominates the military in many places, and threatens oil
a peace agreement ended 36 years of civil war.
great success of US policy or whether, as congressional
production, the country's main legal export. Paramili-
But the news isn't all good. Several nations have
Republicans insist, it is a dismal failure. It is neither. In-
tary forces add to the violence and human rights abuses.
fallen into crisis - and some may end up as failed states.
stead of trading charges, the two sides should come up
Colombia's deterioration began years ago with the
Not since the debt-ridden 1980s have so many countries
with a bipartisan policy that might pro-
massive expansion of drug trafficking,
of the region found themselves in such dire straits. Two
vide some useful answers.
but its acceleration coincides with the
of these problem-ridden nations - Nicaragua and Haiti -
The US has played a far smaller role
US decision to "decertify" the country
have, within the past decade, been sites of US military
in two other crisis-ridden Latin Amer-
Several nations in the
as an unreliable ally in the drug war, and
interventions, either directly or by proxy. Both had ap-
ican countries - Peru and Colombia.
region have fallen into
many Colombians blame the US for the
peared to be emerging from long histories of repression,
President Fujimori and his security
current crisis. While it won't help
advisers are largely responsible for
crisis - and some may
violence, and economic failure.
Colombia, which has to solve its own
Although it has held democratic elections twice since
Peru's crisis. Until recently, Fujimori
end up as failed states.
problems, the US should end its unilat-
1990 and has enjoyed two peaceful transfers of power,
had an extraordinary record of suc-
eral certification process, which is
Nicaragua has never overcome the polarization that has
cess. He brought inflation under con-
largely self-defeating.
split the country in two. Through strikes and street
trol, restarted economic growth, and
It may be just coincidental that four
demonstrations, the Sandinista opposition has paralyzed
ended a terrorist threat. He easily won a second term
countries have fallen into crisis in Latin America and
government operations and has upset a feeble economic
after gaining approval for a constitutional amendment
that several others - including Ecuador, El Salvador, and
recovery. Intransigence on both sides blocks the com-
allowing him to run. Most Peruvians were prepared to
Honduras - are increasingly troubled. But it is worri-
promises needed to end the impasse. The US can't con-
overlook his autocratic methods when the nation faced
some. Applause for Latin America's democratic progress
tribute much to a solution, but it should remove itself
hyperinflation and guerrilla war, but now have begun to
and economic advance has to be tempered by a concern
from Nicaragua's conflict over property claims - a highly
reject his authoritarian rule and manipulation of national
about the nations that are being left behind.
charged issue that US involvement only complicates.
institutions. Questions about whether he was born in
Haiti's brief, three-year experiment with democracy
Peru and therefore is a legal candidate for president have
Peter Hakim is president of the Inter-American
is in trouble. Facing strident opposition from former
made the situation more volatile. The US can help by op-
Dialogue in Washington.
THE GLEANER
Wednesday, August 27, 1997
COMMENTS/LETTERS
A8
Internationally acclaimed journalist facing expulsion from Panama
Blatant violation of press freedom
so when it was clear that his
By Michael Shifter
Freedom of the press is a crucial
military relations are problematic
openly. more so than under
Panamanjan government. calling
probing into an assortment of
lest of such a commitment. It is a
in a number of countries. The
Noriega. That's a big change,
for the suspension of Gorriti's
political, financial, drug-related
fundamental defence of democ-
vigorous exercise of press free-
hard to overstate. But the Gorriti
planned deportation. Peruvians
USTAVO GOR-
scandals would be unrelenting.
racy.
dom was viewed as a relatively
case shows that such a stride
of various political stripes even
G
RITI is a strong
Gorriti and his muckrakers-in-
The Gorriti case is instructive
bright spot in an otherwise trou-
may be at scrious risk - and that
those at sharp odds with Gorriti
believer in the "right
training team at La Prensa are. if
for what may be a wider pattern
bled political landscape.
the Panamanian government
on national political questions
to irritate." This was
nothing else. unrelenting - and
spreading throughout Latin
Panama illustrates the point.
appears not to fully fathom the
have rallied to his defense.
the title of an article
uncompromising. They have
America. Government efforts to
Nearly eight years ago the
real meaning of freedom of the
President Perez Balladares still
the Peruvian journalist published
merely been practicing their pro-
restrain press freedom have also
United States invaded Panama
press.
has a chance to heed these calls.
three years ago in his country's
fession, and exercising their
recently taken place in Peru,
and arrested strongman Manuel
The case has, predictably, pro-
and avert the setback. It would
best known weekly.
"right to irritate". And irritate
Colombia, Argentina and else-
Noriega, who now serves in a
duced an international outcry.
be a mistake to underestimate
Today. Gorriti is faced with
they have. That is why the gov-
where. It is, of course, a measure
Miami prison on corruption and
Journalists and human rights
how crucial the "right to irritate"
expulsion from Panama, where
ernment of Ernesto Perez
of the success of democracy that
drug trafficking charges. Have
groups have joined in solidarity
is to any claim to fully democrat-
for the last eighteen months he
Balladares wants Gorriti out (he
investigations of wrongdoing are
things generally gotten worse or
and support. as have such well-
ic rule.
has been Associate Director of
has refused to budge). That some
now taking place with greater
better since the invasion? Was
known literary figures as Mario
La Prensa. the country's leading
officials have questioned
frequency, and greater profes-
the military intervention, in other
Vargas Llosa and John Le Carre.
Michael Shifter is programme
newspaper. He must leave by
Gorriti's judgement in treating
sionalism, than ever. But it is
words, worth it? Though the
On August 18. the Inter-
director of Democratic Gov.
Friday. Exercising the "right to
certain subjects only confirms
also troubling that some govern-
question has provoked endless
American Commission on
ernance at the Inter-American
irritate" to the fullest can. he has
the point. But no one has ques-
ments in the region that claim
debate, it is fairly indisputable
Human Rights of the
Dialogue and an adjunct professor
found out once again. be haz-
tioned that what he has pursued,
allegiance to the highest stan-
that today Panamanians can
Organisation of American States
of Latin American studies at
ardous.
exposed. and reported is the
dards of press freedom have
speak their minds freely and
issued an injunction to the
Georgetown University.
Gorriti has exposed a lot in
truth. His exposes - in Panama,
been unable and unwilling to tol-
Panama as he has in Peru - but
Peru and elsewhere - have
erate the serious pursuit of truth.
it doesn't take a particularly dis-
earned him international acclaim
It often hits too close to home.
cerning investigative reporter to
and awards galore.
In a region marked by some
expose the flimsiness of
The deportation order is a bla-
economic growth but persistent
Panama's rationale for the threat-
tant violation of the freedom of
and stubborn poverty, one of the
ened deportation: that other
the press. It is an attack on
few unambiguous virtues of the
Panamanian journalists are quali-
democracy. Lofty rhetoric about
democratic trend has been
fied to fill Gorriti's current post.
commitment to democratic prin-
greater respect for freedom of
This didn't seem to be a problem
ciples abounds in this hemi-
the press. Even with the routine
when Gorriti started his job. It
sphere. a measure of the wel-
of elected governments, judicial
doesn't appear to be a problem in
come move from authoritarian to
systems are often weak and
other professions. It only became
constitutional, civilian govern-
politically controlled, Congress
ments in the past fifteen years.
tends to be ineffectual, and civil-
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY, AUGUST 1, 1997
A15
Political Savvy Proves Vital to Latin Reforms
Democracy is fostering market-ori-
more persuasive. Miguel Rodriguez, eco-
ated the largest-ever team for liaison with
most. Compare Bolivia and Ecuador. Both
ented reforms in Latin America. Such a
nomic czar of market-oriented reforms un-
the political parties and Congress. Mr. Cav-
have suffered from high rates of inflation.
sentence could not have been written in
der Venezuelan President Carlos Andres
allo understood that Argentina's hyperin-
Both have had weak and undisciplined po-
the 1960s or the 1970s but it is an apt sum-
Perez from 1989-92, is very talented-but
flation resulted from political causes even
litical parties. Both have talented tech-
mary of increasingly common political
talent alone did not suffice for Mr. Ro-
though it took economic forms: Argentines
nocrats. Both have had presidents who
practices in Latin America in the 1990s.
driquez or for Venezuela, whose economy
did not believe in their currency because
have given populism a bad name. But Bo,
And yet not all democratically elected gov-
was in shambles when Mr. Perez finally
they could not believe their government.
livia's democratic practices and proce-
ernments are equally successful at eco-
left office. Former Argentine Finance Min-
Mr. Menem's decrees could not kill infla-
dures require its politicians to coalesce in
nomic reform.
ister Domingo Cavallo rightly deserves
tion because Argentines were too skeptical
Congress to choose the president;
As the region struggles to overcome
much credit for Argentina's stunning turn-
of one-man anti-inflation plans. Mr. Cav-
Ecuador's political coalitions are merely
decades of instability and underdevelop-
around since 1991. And yet, the same man,
allo, by contrast, made democracy work for
tactical. Bolivia's politicians hammer out a
ment, identifying the differences between
with the same ideas, had failed as an eco-
economic reform. He worked with Con-
program of government; Ecuador's politi-
democratic governments that have been
nomic manager under a military govern-
gress to enact a law to bind his president,
cians just hammer each other. Bolivia has
able to initiate and sustain economic reform
ment. Mr. Cavallo became president of the
the Congress, the governing party and him-
manifold problems but it has been better
programs, and those that have gotten stuck
Central Bank of Argentina in 1982; he
self not to finance public expenditures by
governed-as evidenced by its superior
in a revolving door of "reform" and col-
lasted 53 days in office and had little good
printing money. An act of Congress was
growth rate and an inflation rate that Is
lapse, becomes more and more important.
to show for it.
one-fifth that of Ecudaor-in this decade.
First, contrary to popular opinion, it's
What, then, increases the likelihood
the sustained
A democratic, not a merely technical,
pretty clear that constitutionally elected
that economic reforms will succeed? First,
it is teamwork. In Argentina, Brazil and
engagement politi
approach to economic reforms increases
their efficacy. The procedures of democra-
The Americas
Chile, the most sustained efforts at eco-
cal parties and
tic law making, consultation, and compro-
nomic reform under constitutional govern-
ment began with technically skillful lead-
Congre nottalented
mise, slow and cumbersome as they are,
By Jorge I. Dominguez
enhance the credibility of economic, re-
ers acting not alone but through teams.
forms. In democracies, a savvy business
Secondly, it is the sustained engagement
that solidify
executive might dine with the president
of political parties and Congress, not tal-
and schmooze with the finance minister,
presidents who rule by decree are not nec-
ented decree-wielding technocrats, that
reform.
but the future course of a market economy
essarily capable of reforming their
solidify reform. Successful technocrats
can be guaranteed only if their programs
economies. Brazil's former President Jose
combine their technical know-how with an
more credible than a decree to create con-
elicit broad support.
I
Sarney repeatedly tried this method in the
understanding of the political process,
fidence in the market turnaround.
Only the democratic opposition can
1980s by issuing decrees to subdue roaring
consensus building, and the making and
Today a similar story is unfolding in
guarantee the future course of a market
inflation and right macroeconomic
enforcement of law.
Brazil. President Fernando Henrique Car-
economy. When the opposition is commit-
wrongs, but Brazil's economy stagnated
In 1990 in Chile, the economic program
doso is working laboriously to persuade
ted to the market economy, its victory
from 1987 onward and ended the decade
of the winning center-left coalition had
members of Congress to adopt constitu-
brings policy changes in its wake but no
with annual inflation above 1,000%.
been hammered out in extensive and de-
tional amendments, to enact legislation to
rewriting of the fundamental rules that
Similarly, Carlos Menem was inaugu-
tailed intra- and interparty negotiations.
unleash market forces in Brazil, and to for-
govern the economy. This has been the
rated as Argentina's constitutional presi-
While in office, Finance Minister Alejandro
mulate sound rules for markets' operation.
longstanding practice in the industrial
dent in mid-1989 amid runaway hyperin-
Foxley understood that the framework of
The program's long-term effectiveness de-
economies and it is the key to the contri-
flation. By early 1991, Mr. Menem had is-
new policies would endure only if the oppo-
pends, above all, on persuading Brazilian
bution of democracy for markets in Latin
sued 100 decrees with the force of law
sition accepted its broad outlines. A major
politicians to sign on to these changes. Re-
America in the 1990s.
(since national consolidation in 1858, only
tax increase in 1991 was negotiated with the
forms enacted by the president alone have
130 such decrees had been issued), but was
largest conservative opposition party and
only temporary value. The slow constitu-
Mr. Dominguez is the director of the Cen
only able to bring inflation down to 10% per
approved in Congress. Chileans used de-
tional and congressional procedures make
ter for International Affairs at Harvard Uni-
month. The economic program was in dis-
mocratic procedures to bind democracy to
It more likely that Brazil's emerging mar-
versity and the author of "Technopols: Free-
array, the economy in recession.
the market and bind each other to sustain-
ket reforms will endure.
ing Politics and Markets in Latin America in
Nor is the argument that singularly tal-
able social and fiscal policies.
Thus, parties and constitutional proce-
the 1990s" (Penn State University Press;
ented finance ministers can do it all any
As economy minister, Mr. Cavallo cre-
dures, not technocrats and decrees, matter
1997).
SUNDAY. OCTOBER 19. 1997
THE WASHINGTON POST
Brent Scowcroft
Say Yes to Fast Track
Washington is preoccupied with an intense
authority is essential to being able to lead on
indirectly, to the world. And the world is
debate over whether Congress should grant the
trade. We must recognize that there will be a
listening.
president fast-track authority to negotiate trade
price if we decide to seek à la carte leadership.
When the House and the Senate vote on fast
agreements with other countries. Fast-track
I am convinced it is a price we neither will
track, our friends and allies-and our adversar-
authority commits Congress to vote on pro-
want, nor can afford, to pay.
ies-will be watching closely. A positive vote,
posed trade agreements without permitting
If America does not lead on international
embracing a strong majority of Democrats and
amendments. Congress has provided every
trade, either others will try to replace us, or
Republicans in both houses, will send an unmis-
president since Gerald Ford such authority,
there will be a vacuum. Neither is attractive for
takable signal about American resolve to contin-
recognizing that other countries are unlikely to
American workers or American policymakers.
ue to lead on international economic issues. It
negotiate without the assurance that agree-
It would be naive to expect others to keep our
will also be seen as a vote of confidence in the
ments will not be changed during the ratification
interests paramount. Indeed, in this hemi-
ability of the American worker to compete
process.
sphere, other countries already seek to sup-
Largely because of differences within his own
globally. A weak vote or, worse, a rejection, will
plant us. The European Union wishes to
party, the president has delayed until now
be read for what it is: a lack of confidence in the
conclude a free-trade agreement with the
seeking to renew the authority that expired with
American worker and an unwillingness to lead
leading economies of Latin America by 1999.
the approval of the Uruguay Round agreement
on trade. This is not a vote for or against a
European leaders tell attentive audiences in
in 1994. The trade and economic arguments for
Latin America that their future is with Europe,
particular president and his trade policy. It is
and against fast track are being debated vigor-
not America. Fast-track authority is necessary
fundamentally a vote on our capacity to continue
ously. But let us not kid ourselves. The debate is
to fulfill economic and foreign policy commit-
to shape a rapidly changing global environment,
essentially between those in favor of expanding
ments made to Latin America leaders by both
not just in the economic domain but also in
trade oppor tunities for America and those desir-
Presidents Bush and Clinton. Without fast-
broader areas of politics, security, the environ-
ous of protecting America from international
track authority, the United States will be
ment, narcotics, terrorism and weapons of mass
competition.
crippled in its ability to pursue its critical
destruction.
For me, and for most Americans, the econom-
agenda with our Latin neighbors.
If we fail to set the terms of debate on
ic choice is clear and easy, as it was for our
As members of Congress debate the presi-
international trade, we cannot expect to lead on
Founding Fathers. If the arguments of the
dent's request, they need to be aware that what
the full range of our other national interests. The
protectionists were valid, Bangladesh and the
they say and do is watched closely overseas.
financial markets may well judge Congress
Congo would be economic powerhouses, for
Americans may tune out congressional proceed-
harshly if it rejects fast track. America's real
they have low wages and few environmental or
ings; the opposite is true for opinion leaders
penalty, however, will be a muted voice on
labor standards. Furthermore, if the protection-
watching from abroad. They listen to what is
everything else that matters.
ists were correct, we ourselves might not have
said, and they know how to count votes. Thanks
drawn up a constitution, a primary impetus for
to modern communications, which bring CNN
The writer, a former White House national
which was to ban the tariff barriers that were
to the remotest corner of the globe, a member
security adviser, runs an international
springing up between the states under the
Articles of Confederation. And we would be
of Congress can no longer make a constituency
consultancy advising, among others,
looking back to the golden age of the Smoot-
speech. The member is speaking, directly or
Pennzoil Co.
Hawley tariff, which was instrumental in turn-
ing the 1929 stock market crash into the worst
depression in history.
Important foreign policy considerations in
the fast-track debate need to be acknowledged.
In my time in public service, there has never
been a sharp line between America's security,
foreign policy and economic interests. One or
the other may have been more visible at any
particular time, but all interacted and comple-
mented each other. If America does not lead on
international trade, it will be harder to lead on
security and political issues.
America has a privileged place among na-
STATE
tions. It is a place we have earned through the
power and appeal of our vision for a safer, better,
more prosperous world. We have been willing to
commit precious resources, on the battlefield
and at the negotiating table, to achieve this
vision. And, perhaps unique in history, we have
led through the clarity of vision rather than
acquisition of foreign domains. This gives us
unique credibility and opportunity. We should
not take this lightly, nor assume we can maintain
it without investment and leadership.
We cannot say we will lead on NATO and
regional security but not on trade. We cannot
say we will lead on democracy and human
rights but not on trade. And we cannot say we
will lead on the environment but not on trade.
These and other issues are all interrelated,
often in complex, invisible ways. Fast-track
BY MARGARET SCOTT
U.S.-Cuban Relations:
From the Cold War to the Colder War
Jorge I. Domínguez
39:30(Fa201993)
H
undreds of thousands of Cuban troops deployed to nearly every
corner of the globe-that seemed to be the nightmare of every
US administration from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s. From
its own perspective, President Fidel Castro's government attempted
to use its activist foreign policy first to protect itself from hostile US
policies, and second to leverage support from the Soviet Union and
other communist countries for Cuba's own domestic development.
The first proposition had been articulated by Ernesto "Che"
Guevara in the 1960s when he called on revolutionaries to create
"two, three Vietnams" in order to confront and weaken the United
States and its allies. Even as the Cuban government gradually edged
away from ample support for many revolutionary insurgencies, the
strategy of global engagement as the best defense against US offense
persisted. The second proposition developed in the 1970s. Although
Cuba's decisions to deploy troops or to undertake other internation-
alist missions were characteristically its own, it also furthered a long-
term tendency to coordinate such policies with those of the Soviet
Union, demonstrating thereby that Cuba was the Soviet Union's most
reliable foreign policy ally in the Cold War, and providing a basis for
a substantial claim on Soviet resources (Domínguez, 1989).
Jorge I. Domínguez is C. Douglas Dillon Professor of International Affairs
and director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. His most
recent edited and co-authored books are TECHNOPOLIS: FREEING POLITICS
AND MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990S (Penn State Press, 1997) and
(with Marc Lindenberg) DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
(University Press of Florida, 1997).
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the "Seminario
Internacional: Seguridad, Transiciones Post-Autoritarias, y Cambio Social en el
Caribe en la Post Guerra Fría: Los Casos de Cuba, Haití, y República Dominicana,"
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Santo Domingo, March
13-15, 1997. I am grateful to the seminar participants for their valuable com-
ments. This article is published under authorization from the Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, which retains the copyright.
49
50
JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
DOMÍNGUEZ: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
51
Indeed, Cuba was the only communist country able to deploy its
explanation for both the dramatic redesign and curtailment of Cuban
armed forces thousands of miles from its borders to participate in wars
foreign policy and the repositioning of US policy toward Cuba. It fails
that were, at best, only remotely related to the defense of the
to explain, however, the intense US preoccupation with prescribing
homeland. Those troops fighting on the savannahs of Angola or the
the details of Cuba's future domestic politics.
steppes of Ethiopia were not Czechs, Poles, Mongols, or Bulgarians;
Therefore, a second explanation comes from exploring ideo-
they were Cubans. And unlike the US armed forces in Vietnam and the
logical themes of long standing in both US and Cuban policies. There
Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan, Cubans won the three wars they
is a close correspondence between current and historical ideological
fought on African soil: Angola 1975-76, Ethiopia 1977-78, and Angola
themes in US policy toward Cuba, and these have been exacerbated
1987-88. Cuba's military effort was impressive even when compared
both by the shift in the international distribution of power and by the
to the US military effort during the Vietnam war. From 1975 through
decay of the revolutionary belief system in Cuba. US policy toward its
1989, Cuba kept more troops deployed to African countries each year
near-neighbors has long sought to prescribe the nature of domestic
than the United States had stationed in Vietnam during the peak year
politics and economics. This second argument, however, still fails to
of the war (1968), relative to the respective populations of Cuba and
explain sufficiently how these large structural and ideological causes
the United States.
have yielded specific militant and ideological US policies in the 1990s.
The Soviet Union, in turn, provided massive economic, military,
Consequently, a third explanation considers the role of domes-
and political support for Cuba, especially from the mid-1970s to the
tic politics in both countries, arguing that hardliners in each have,
mid-1980s. Such assistance enabled the Cuban economy to recover
perhaps unwittingly, helped each other in sustaining or fostering
from its collapse at the end of the 1960s and funded the growth of a
confrontational policies. In particular, members of Congress and
social welfare state that substantially increased Cuba's quality of life,
certain Cuban American organizations have succeeded in reshaping
notably its standards of education and health.
US policy toward Cuba in the 1990s by making effective strategic use
Today the Soviet Union no longer exists, and no Soviet successor
of "mobilizing incidents"; namely, public events that have served as
state provides assistance to President Castro's government. Cuba's
opportunities to encourage the hardline Congressional minority to
economy shrank dramatically in the early years of the 1990s; it
push through new legislation.
stabilized at a low level only in 1996. And Che's old slogan sounds
The ultimate question, given the preceding three arguments, is
ironic in the 1990s, because Vietnam itself has rushed headlong
why the United States has not invaded Cuba. This essay aims to suggest
toward a market economy.
that the United States has been deterred from such actions both by
Given Cuba's diminishing power, how can we make sense of the
Cuba's military capabilities and by the "balancing" provided by other
overall pattern of US-Cuban relations since the end of the Cold War?
international actors. Western European and Latin American govern-
Why is it that the US government has established workable relations
ments and Canada have deterred the United States from adopting even
with every remaining communist government but Cuba? Even some
more aggressive policies. Accidental war has also been prevented
of the most problematic of those governments have received greater
because both the United States and Cuba have developed low-key
deference from the US than has Cuba's. The United States engaged
confidence-building measures. This combination of explanations
Serbia's government respectfully, for example, in order to reach the
accounts for both high confrontation and impasse in US-Cuban
1996 Dayton, Ohio, accords that ended the civil war in Bosnia. And
relations in the late 1990s.
the United States is prepared to provide various forms of assistance to
North Korea in exchange for that country's commitment to forgo the
WAS THUCYDIDES RIGHT?
development of nuclear weapons.
This article explores four scholarly explanations for the US
position. First, the distribution of power in the international system,
In classic proposition of the realist school of international affairs:
his study of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides formulated the
as it changed with the end of the Cold War in Europe, is a major
"The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"
(Thucydides, 1951: 331). For many years, Cuban foreign policy
rebuked this master analyst of ancient Greek international relations,
Once a peace agreement had been signed in El Salvador, Presi-
for small, relatively weak Cuba behaved as if it were a major power.
dent Castro chose a symbolic event to announce that Cuba would
With the end of the Cold War, Cuba's exceptionalism ended as well.
henceforth not support revolutionary movements militarily. He did so
in January 1992 while hosting several former high officials of the
Thucydides' hypothesis embodies a strong prediction about
Kennedy administration (along with Cuban and former Soviet offi-
Cuba's international behavior once it was deprived of Soviet support
cials) to reflect on the 1962 missile crisis.¹
and was left with just the resources of a small country. The evidence
for the hypothesis is compelling. In September 1989, Cuba completed
In any one of these instances, the history is, of course, more
the repatriation of its troops from Ethiopia (Pérez Ruiz, 1990). In
complex than what has been reported here, but the pattern is
March 1990, all Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua were brought
unambiguously clear. When civil war broke out again in Angola in the
back to Cuba (Granma Weekly Review, 1991: 13). In May 1991,
early 1990s, for example, Cuban troops did not return. The Angolan
Cuba's last troops were repatriated from Angola (Bohemia, 1991:
government hired South African mercenaries and mobilized support
Also in 1990 and 1991, Cuba brought home its troops and military
from other governments to prevail on the battlefield.
advisers from various other countries; the longest-lived of these
Cuba's adjustment to the changed international system, of
smaller military missions took place in the Congo (Brazzaville), where
course, went beyond strictly military issues. In May 1990, President
it lasted for fourteen years. Thus, as the Cold War ended in Europe and
Castro inaugurated two new hotels on Varadero Beach, including one
Cuba lost the military and economic backing of the Soviet Union,
built by "foreign capitalists." He announced that Cuba would hence-
Cuba's overseas military presence came to a near-instantaneous end.
forth seek foreign investment to develop its economy. The Commu-
Cuban support for revolutionary movements had been another
nist Party's Political Bureau endorsed this policy shift soon thereafter
pillar of its far-reaching internationalist behavior. In some cases, those
(Granma Weekly Review, 1990a: 3; 1990b, 1). For a communist
whom Cuba had supported finally won: guerrillas of SWAPO (South
system founded on the expropriation of foreign property, this was a
West African People's Organization) laid down their arms to become
major turnabout.
the government of newly independent Namibia, and the African
On October 30, 1994, before the 12th Havana International Fair,
National Congress won South Africa's national elections and remade
Vice President Carlos Lage, Cuba's de facto prime minister, articulated
the political system.
the new policy of luring foreign direct investment.
More telling is the evolution of Cuba's relations with El Salvador's
We are offering you an orderly country, a coherent and irrevers-
guerrillas, the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN).
ible policy of openness to capital investment, a sufficient and
In June 1991, Cuba's Foreign Ministry explained that "Cuba does not
extended economic infrastructure, a productive sector aimed at
achieving efficiency, a hard-working, devoted, highly educated
renounce, nor will it ever renounce, nor has it any reason to hide or
and trained people, a society without terrorism or drugs. (Lage,
camouflage its strong bonds of brotherhood and solidarity" with the
1995: 89).
FMLN, even though the latter had yet to lay down its weapons.
Except for the last phrase, any Latin American finance minister
Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry added, "in order to foster the
might have made the same speech.2 On September 5, 1995, further-
climate of trust required for negotiations and as a clear signal of its
more, the Cuban National Assembly adopted a new foreign invest-
political will to contribute to that process, Cuba has been limiting
ment law. Its preamble alluded to the triggering reason: "In today's
since [April 1991] its solidarity with the FMLN to the political level"
world, without the existence of the socialist bloc, with a globalizing
(Granma, 1991: 8). Noteworthy though it was to confirm, in effect,
world economy and strong hegemonistic tendencies in the eco-
that Cuba had been providing military assistance to the insurgency
nomic, political, and military fields" (Republic of Cuba, 1995: 1). Cuba
well into 1991, the decision to stop such military engagement at this
had little choice but to suffer what it must.
time is nonetheless consistent with a realist hypothesis. Cuba could
no longer afford such a risky foreign policy.
Cuban foreign trade was also drastically affected. Cuban exports
dropped from approximately 5.4 billion pesos in 1989 to 1.1 billion
pesos in 1993, while imports plunged from 8.1 billion pesos in 1989
at a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the
to 2.0 billion pesos in 1993.3 Foreign trade recovered somewhat
new Russian government approved a motion to condemn the Cuban
thereafter, with 1996 exports and imports standing at $2.0 and $3.7
government's violation of human rights (Pérez, 1993). A three-
billion, respectively. Trade also underwent a reorientation. In 1989,
decades-old political, economic, and military alliance had been shat-
European countries (especially communist countries) accounted for
tered.
88 percent of Cuban trade turnover; in 1994, that proportion was
In the same spirit of coercive diplomacy, the Cuban Liberty and
down to 45 percent. The trade share of Asian countries increased, but
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (better known as the
the value of that trade actually dropped between 1989 and 1994. Only
Helms-Burton Act) mandates that the United States will reduce its
in the Americas did both trade share and value increase from 6 percent
assistance to any successor state of the Soviet Union by the exact
and 766 million pesos in 1989 to 35 percent and 1.1 billion pesos in
amount that such a country provides to assist Cuba in maintaining its
1994. All of this Cuban trade, moreover, came to be conducted on
military and intelligence facilities. Although a loophole-riddled waiver
market prices (Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1995: 11-13; Cuba: Eco-
provision cancels, in practice, the effect of this section, the general
nomic Report, 1996; US Central Intelligence Agency, 1995).
perspective it articulates reflects actual US policy (US House of
Thus, from 1989 to 1991, the international system was trans-
Representatives, 1996: sec. 106).
formed, and Cuban foreign policy changed accordingly. Cuba repatri-
On the other hand, Thucydides' hypothesis is open to the
ated its troops, stopped its military assistance to insurgencies, and
interpretation that a major power has a range of choices about how
began to conform to a world market economy. Desovietized forever,
and where to wield its clout. This is even more evident in the
Cuba became again just an island archipelago under the hot Caribbean
contemporary formulation of the neorealist school of international
sun.
relations. For such scholars, states seek power, and calculate their
As for the United States, Thucydides' hypothesis also forecasts
interests in terms of power, relative to the nature of the international
that the stronger powers will flex their muscles to achieve fundamen-
system they face (Keohane, 1983: 507). One consequence of such
tal objectives. The United States has certainly done so with regard to
reasoning is to discount fully what might occur at the "unit level"; that
Cuba. The US government, for example, made it clear to various
is, largely to disregard the domestic arrangements and circumstances
African and Latin American governments seeking its assistance that
of states in the international system.
they could not remain Cuba's military allies.
US policy toward Cuba in the 1990s has most decidedly not
The Bush administration also communicated to Soviet president
conformed to this expectation. The centerpiece of that policy has
Mikhail Gorbachev that the quality of US-Soviet relations, in what
been the endeavor to oust the Castro government. The collapse of
turned out to be the closing days of the Soviet Union, required that the
what was once Cuban foreign policy during the Cold War was, from
USSR terminate its military alliance with Cuba. In August 1991, various
Washington's perspective, an insufficient achievement. Instead of
Soviet civilian and military leaders staged an unsuccessful coup to
celebrating that Cuba was no longer able to project its power
overthrow Gorbachev. The US government backed Gorbachev openly;
overseas, the US government was angry that Cuba's political regime
the Cuban government remained silent as the coup unfolded. Days
did not crumble. The US hostility toward the Cuban government
later, during US secretary of state James Baker's celebratory visit to
heightened as the Cold War came to an end and precisely when Cuba
Moscow, the Soviet government announced its unilateral decision to
ceased to pose a security threat to most US interests. Neither realism
withdraw all Soviet troops from Cuba. (Soviet troops had been in
nor neorealism can explain this temper tantrum in US policy toward
Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis.) Cuba was not consulted-in fact,
Cuba, or why US-Cuban relations went from the Cold War to a colder
its government was not even informed before the public announce-
war.
ment. The Soviet Union also terminated subsidized arms sales to the
Cuban military (Cuba Interests Section in the United States, 1991;
Smith, 1993: 136-137; Blank, 1994: 104-110). And in February 1992,
56
JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
DOMÍNGUEZ: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
57
IDEOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
From the 1930s to the 1980s, the U.S. propensity to intervene in
T
he Monroe Doctrine is often presented as a statement in the
atin American countries for these reasons was tempered by the
tradition of Realpolitik, whereby the United States sought to
tructure of the international system and, in particular, by competi-
deter European reconquest in the Americas beyond the colonies the
ion with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Cold War interven-
European powers still held. That reading is, literally, a half-truth. The
ions, for example, characteristically featured a strong "anti-Soviet"
operative sentence of President James Monroe's Message to Congress
omponent; the United States rarely intervened in the internal affairs
(December 2, 1823) features an ideological policy:
if its near-neighbors unless it perceived a superpower threat.1 With
he collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations
existing between the United States and those powers to declare
nternational system, the United States was liberated to pursue once
that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their
gain ideological interests in the Monrovian tradition. US interven-
system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
ons in Panama in December 1989 and Haiti in September 1994
peace and safety. (Perkins, 1963: 56-57)
xemplify the renewed willingness of the United States to deploy
It was not just their power but also their system, which was
orce to reshape the domestic politics of its near-neighbors in the
"essentially different," that Monroe sought to keep away from the
bsence of a threat from another superpower. The collapse of the
Americas. Monroe's ideological intent was instantly understood by
SSR was, of course, especially pertinent to US-Cuban relations: the
Austrian chancellor Klemens von Metternich. The United States, he
oviet Union no longer sought to stop the United States from attempt-
wrote to his Russian counterpart, had "distinctly and clearly an-
ig to remake Cuban domestic politics. Free at last to rediscover its
nounced their intention to set not only power against power, but, to
istory, the US Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
express it more exactly, altar against altar." If the United States were
olidarity Act of 1996.
to prevail, Metternich continued, "what would become of our reli-
The Helms-Burton Act captures well this ideological tradition in
gious and political institutions, of the moral force of our govern-
S foreign policy. Section 201, "Assistance to a Free and Independent
ments (Perkins, 1963: 392). Ideological goals have been integral
uba," affirms that "the self-determination of the Cuban people is a
to US policy toward Latin America ever since.
overeign and national right of the citizens of Cuba which must be
President Theodore Roosevelt amended the Monroe Doctrine in
tercised free of interference by the government of any other
his Message to Congress of 1905. "There are, of course, limits to the
ountry." Subsequent sections, however, indicate that the United
wrongs which any self-respecting nation can endure," he wrote. Such
ates still claims the right to determine in intrusive detail which
wrongs include "some State unable to keep order among its own
ystem" of governance is permissible in the Americas (US House of
people and unwilling to do justice to those outsiders who treat it
epresentatives, 1996: sec. 201).
well." Those circumstances "may result in our having to take action
Section 205 stipulates the definition for determining when Cuba
to protect our rights," though "such action will not be taken with a
ill have a transitional government. It requires that Cuba free all
view to territorial aggression" (Perkins, 1963: 223). The US govern-
olitical prisoners, legalize all political activity, and make a public
ment thus claimed the right to intervene in the affairs of its near-
mmitment to organize free and fair elections. But the definition of
neighbors to stop internal disorder, as it defined it, or to redress
e transitional government also includes ceasing interference with
perceived injustices done to foreigners. From the outset of the
dio Martí or Television Martí, permitting the reinstatement of
formulation of what came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary,
tizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba, and "taking
economic "injustices" committed against foreigners-that is, nonpay-
propriate steps" to return expropriated property to US citizens or
ment of debts-would warrant US intervention. Under these and
mpensate them accordingly. It also requires the exclusion of Fidel
related policies, the United States occupied Cuba militarily from 1906
d Raúl Castro from Cuba's government, a provision closed to the
to 1909.
pothesis that Cuba's people might choose them as their governors
a free and competitive election.
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Even if a transitional government were to carry out all these
of belief in Marxism-Leninism and in the revolutionary ethos that
procedures, Section 202 still seeks to limit US assistance to such a
narked the Cuban experience in the 1960s. In their place, the Cuban
government principally to humanitarian aid (food, medicine, emer-
eadership has proposed nothing. Its one remaining ideological com-
gency energy needs) and to "preparing the Cuban military forces to
nitment is, to be sure, a fierce adherence to the claim that it, and only
adjust to an appropriate role in a democracy" (US House of Represen-
t, is capable of defending the Cuban nation from foreign aggression.
tatives, 1996: sec. 202).
Two important texts illustrate this shift: one preceding and one
The definition of a democratic government, under Section 206,
following the marked deterioration of US-Cuban relations that OC-
stipulates some widely accepted criteria, such as free and fair elec-
curred in early 1996.
tions, respect for civil liberties, an independent judiciary, and so forth.
On July 26, 1995, Fidel Castro marked one more anniversary of
But part of the definition also stipulates that Cuba must be "substan-
the attack he led against the Moncada barracks of the Cuban army in
tially moving toward a market-oriented economic system" and show
1953. As always, he sought to legitimate his claim to rule with
"demonstrable progress in returning to United States citizens" once
reference to his historical "merits," even though the "glorious past" of
expropriated property or "providing full compensation for such
the anti-Batista struggle was rapidly receding. He also touted the
property" (US House of Representatives, 1996: sec. 206).
evidence that the economic decline had stopped and that some
Even if one were to agree that TV Martí should be seen and heard
improvement in the standard of living was under way. He expressed,
in Cuba, that those who lost their citizenship should regain it, that
however, no vision for the future. He simply reiterated that somehow
market economics works best, that Fidel and Raúl Castro's services
Cuba was still Marxist-Leninist, even if economic policy had changed
are not needed in a future Cuban government, and that property
direction "substantially and rather radically."
should be returned or compensated, all of these desiderata go well
In addition, he warned, the "elements of capitalism introduced
beyond any internationally recognized criteria for the determination
in our country bring along the noxious and alienating features of that
of democratic or transitional democratizing governments under the
system, such as corruption and bribery." He did not explain, however,
charters of the United Nations or the Organization of American States.
how anyone but he could distinguish between the good and the bad
Mandating them in US legislation as defining characteristics of a
capitalists. Castro also attacked those US policies that sought to
democratic or transitional Cuban government makes a mockery of the
promote academic and cultural exchanges, expressing fear that they
pledge to respect Cuban sovereignty.
would subvert the Cuban political system. But he did not distinguish
The Helms-Burton Act is, however, quite faithful to the themes
this US opening he did not like from his other demands that the United
of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. It claims for the
States should adopt more open policies toward Cuba (Radio Rebelde,
United States the unilateral right to decide a wide array of domestic
1995).
policies and arrangements in a nominally sovereign post-Castro Cuba.
On March 23, 1996, the Communist Party's Political Bureau met
In the Monroe Doctrine, the United States asserted its right to specify
to discuss the country's situation and approved a statement eventually
which system of government was acceptable in the Americas. In the
read publicly by General Raúl Castro. The statement is riddled with
Roosevelt Corollary, the US government claimed the additional right
contradictions on nearly every subject it discusses. For example, it
to stipulate specific economic and other policies and specifically to
defends the economic policies launched in the early 1990s: self-
redress the nonpayment of debts. The Helms-Burton Act rediscovers
employment, freer agricultural markets, wider scope for peasant
the ideological brio of imperialism. At the end of the twentieth
production and marketing, rural cooperatives, foreign direct invest-
century, as in centuries past, the United States is demanding the right
ment-these are all engines of economic recovery for a country that
to set the framework for the political and economic system it would
suffered so drastically in the first half of the decade. In each case,
tolerate inside Cuba.
however, the Political Bureau statement also records the objections
There are several important ideological changes in Cuba as well.
of the ideological hardliners, who nevertheless provide no alternative
A central feature of Cuban politics in the 1990s has been the erosion
solutions for filling the basic needs of the population.
DOMINGUEZ: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
61
Only on one subject is the statement consistent: its harsh,
Early in the decade, the Bush administration appeared to believe
generally unfair, and dogmatic criticism of scholars and scholarship in
that the Cuban political regime would fall from its own weight. That
think tanks, which the party itself had formally sponsored and from
seemed to be the lesson of communism in Europe. Without Soviet
which Cuban government and party officials had systematically and
subsidies, many observers reasoned, Cuba was ripe for change. There
regularly drawn information and analysis (Granma, 1996).
was no need to spend significantly greater US resources to overthrow
In the mid-1990s, therefore, Cuban leaders had lost their ideo-
the Castro government.
logical compass.5 They had authorized economic measures of which
In 1989, US Senator Connie Mack (Republican, Florida) intro-
they mostly disapproved but had no choice but to adopt. They could
duced legislation to prohibit trade between Cuba and the subsidiaries
no longer claim to represent revolutionary ideals. They demonstrated
of US firms operating in third countries. Senator Mack was, in part,
a greater intolerance for the intellectual work of scholars closely
responding to an important segment of his Cuban American constitu-
affiliated with government and party institutions-work that was
ents, who were well organized through the Cuban American National
critical in some respects but also remarkably loyal politically. Indeed,
Foundation. In 1989, 1990, and 1991, the US Department of State
the Cuban political regime increasingly came to resemble a dictator-
went on record opposing Mack's proposals because they extended
ship committed to protecting international capitalists in exchange for
US legal jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the United States. The
economic growth-a far cry from what was once called a socialist
proposals did not get far in Congress.
revolution.
In early 1992, however, US Representative Robert Torricelli
One consequence of the loss of belief in Cuba-the decay of the
(Democrat, New Jersey) formulated a bill, which he called the Cuban
regime's ideological foundations-was to make the population more
Democracy Act, featuring the same provisions. Torricelli was con-
vulnerable to the spread of alternative belief systems. The same Cuban
vinced that the Bush administration was too passive in its approach to
government that was compelled to open to the international economy
Cuba and that a combination of stiffer sanctions, but also some
sought to shut out the contamination from international society, just
calibrated subtle openings, would throw the Castro government off
as the United States was reenergizing the ideological strains in its
balance. Torricelli's bill, for example, would eventually facilitate
foreign policy and rediscovering the virtues of end-of-the-century
telephone communication between Cuba and the United States.
imperialism. And all this happened while Cuba's network of interna-
tional alliances was crumbling.
Torricelli also saw a partisan opportunity in an election year. In
April 1992, Robert Gelbard, principal deputy assistant secretary of
An ideological explanation rooted in the rediscovery of histori-
state for inter-American affairs, testified for the Bush administration
cal themes in US policy toward its near-neighbors helps to explain the
against Torricelli's bill, just as the administration had opposed earlier
shift from the Cold War to the colder war. As the weaker country
versions of it. The rising Democratic contender for the presidency,
adjusted, the stronger one expanded its intrusive ambitions beyond
Bill Clinton, endorsed Torricelli's bill, however. By May 1992, the
shaping international behavior toward determining the structure of
Bush administration had dropped its opposition. In September 1992,
domestic politics.
in the heat of the campaign, Congress passed the Cuban Democracy
Act by large majorities, and President Bush signed it into law (Kaplowitz
THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF US-CUBAN RELATIONS
and Kaplowitz, 1993: 234-236). The enactment of the Cuban Democ-
racy Act, therefore, is best explained as an outcome of US domestic
S
tructural and ideological arguments set the contours of US-Cuban
politics.
relations, but actions in each country provide the necessary
The clout of hardliners is an insufficient explanation for the bill's
connections between macro-causes and micro-outcomes. How did
enactment, however. Hardliners succeeded because they maneu-
political processes generate the specific events and policies of the
vered strategically during what might be called a "mobilizing inci-
1990s?
dent"; that is, an event that lifts some political constraints blocking
action, affects some swing votes, and, in this case, made effective use
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of ideological legacies from the Monroe-Roosevelt tradition. The
incident, Helms-Burton moved from the Congressional back burner to
"mobilizing incident" here was the presidential election and the
approval by overwhelming majorities in both chambers. The domes-
partisan bidding for Cuban American votes in Florida, a pivotal state.
tic policy debate took it for granted that the policies of Monroe and
That was the key to this political outcome.
Theodore Roosevelt did, indeed, provide the proper ideological
The story of the Helms-Burton Act is similar. The Republican
context for US policy toward Cuba.
electoral victory in the Congressional elections of 1994 installed
During the spring and summer of 1994, Cubans in increasing
Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) as chairman of the
numbers emigrated across the Straits of Florida in unseaworthy boats,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Representative Dan Burton
rafts, and other improvised craft in a desperate attempt to reach the
(Republican, Indiana) as chairman of the House Subcommittee on
United States. A group of Cuban Americans called Brothers to the
Western Hemisphere Affairs. Torricelli had chaired the subcommittee
Rescue, founded in 1991, had been flying over the straits to spot the
in the previous Congress; the three Cuban American members of
migrants and report them to the US Coast Guard, which would rescue
Congress served on it. The one real change was Helms's new role.
them and bring them safely to US shores.
Cuban American lobbies mobilized to tighten economic sanc-
In subsequent months, however, Brothers to Rescue shifted
tions on Cuba. The goal was to stop foreign investment in Cuba and,
from a humanitarian to a political mission, entering Cuban airspace to
if possible, to impair Cuban trade. The means was to empower legally
drop flyers criticizing the Cuban government. This had not happened
those whose property had been expropriated by the Cuban govern-
since the 1960s; it alarmed the government's supporters and espe-
ment to bring litigation in US courts against firms that "trafficked" in
cially the military services. On January 9 and 13, 1996, Brothers to the
such property. Certainly a foreign investor who had come to operate
Rescue dropped thousands of such flyers over the city of Havana. At
a once-expropriated firm was a prime target, but in theory, even
that point, a crisis broke out within the Cuban government; hardliners
trading with a Cuban state enterprise created from such expropria-
demanded authorization to shoot down such aerial intrusions. As
tion would make an international firm vulnerable to litigation. The
Cuba's official account notes, "the Cuban government gave instruc-
bill's framers hoped that, faced with potentially high legal costs in US
tions to the Air Force that what happened on January 9 and 13 could
courts, international firms would stay away from Cuba.
by no means be tolerated" (Robaina González, 1996). On February 24,
The Clinton administration opposed the Helms-Burton bill when
1996, three planes piloted by Brothers to the Rescue approached
it was first submitted. Though the bill had important support in the
Cuban international waters; at least one penetrated Cuban air space.
House of Representatives, enough Republicans and most Democrats
The Cuban Air Force chased the unarmed civilian airplanes and shot
agreed with the administration that this bill's extraterritorial provi-
down two of them over international waters.
sions would cause serious harm to the United States' relations with its
The United Nations Security Council noted-alas, on July 26-
main trading partners. In October 1995, Senator Helms was outma-
that the "unlawful shooting down by the Cuban Air Force of two civil
neuvered and had to agree to delete the property litigation proce-
aircraft on 24 February 1996 violated the principle that States must
dures (Title III). The Senate approved only a much weaker bill that
refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight," and
would have had, at most, modest effects on US policy toward Cuba
condemned such Cuban behavior (UN, Security Council, 1996).
(Congressional Record, 1995: S15584-S15589; CubaINFO, 1995a: 1-
The aircraft shootdown coincided with increased political re-
2). In late 1995 and early 1996, the federal budget battle between the
pression in Cuba. On October 10, 1995 (the anniversary of the
President and Congress took center stage, and the Helms-Burton bill
beginning of Cuba's first war of independence), 140 small, unofficial
languished and seemed mortally weakened.
Cuban opposition groups coalesced around a plan to found the
Once again, the clout of hardliners was insufficient to get the bill
Concilio Cubano (Cuban Council). The Concilio's aims were to
enacted; instead, it would be the skill of hardliners in capitalizing
persuade the Cuban government to grant a general amnesty for all
strategically on yet another "mobilizing incident" that would prove to
political prisoners, show full respect for the present Constitution and
be the key to this second political outcome. Thanks to the mobilizing
fundamental laws, fulfill its obligations to respect human rights under
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the United Nations Charter, grant freedom of economic organization,
and hold free and direct elections, on the basis of the pluralistic nature
Second, hardliners in the United States and Cuba have become
of society. The Concilio's subsequent behavior confirmed its commit-
each other's best allies. Hard-charging Cuban American lobbies pressed
ment to use only peaceful means to achieve its goals. On February 15,
effectively and successfully for Helms-Burton. Hardliners in Cuba
1997, however, the Cuban government banned all gatherings by
persuaded Fidel Castro to give the air force standing orders to shoot,
Concilio and arrested its leading members (Hidalgo and Machado,
and to crack down on Concilio Cubano. Cuba's shootdown and
1995, 1996a, b, c; Amnesty International, 1996).
crackdown strengthened the hand of hardliners in the United States,
The Cuban Air Force's actions and the hardline domestic crack-
reviving and enacting Helms-Burton. And Helms-Burton, in turn,
down forced President Clinton to make a decision. For the first time
inflamed the Cuban government and deepened its propensity for
since the 1962 missile crisis, a president of the United States contem-
political repression and intolerance of even slightly different ideas, as
plated ordering the US armed forces to take military action against
evident in the Political Bureau statement of March 23, 1996.
Cuba.6 He could have chosen among several military options of
In short, domestic politics in both countries activated the
varying degrees of severity; instead, he rejected all of them and agreed
potential evident in the structural and ideological explanations and
to accept the Helms-Burton Act. Congress swiftly resurrected the bill
helped bring the United States and Cuba closer to intensified conflict,
and decisively approved it. The President signed itinto law on the date
to the detriment of the goals each government claimed to seek-for
of the 1996 Florida presidential election primary.
Cuba, a more effective insertion in the international system; and for
One salient feature of the Helms-Burton Act was the property
the United States, a "peaceful democratic transition in Cuba."
litigation provisions in Title III. The act authorized the President to
waive this legislation, however; a determination had to be made every
PREVENTING WAR
six months. As the crisis over Cuba subsided and his prospects for
reelection improved-no new mobilizing incidents-and as the costs
T
he burden of the preceding analysis suggests that the United
to US relations with its allies of implementing Title III became clearer,
States and Cuba are on the edge of a major confrontation. Indeed,
Clinton waived Title III first on July 16, 1996, despite warnings of
this analysis makes it difficult to understand why a major military clash
electoral retribution from Cuban American voters, and again in early
has not occurred already. The structural, ideological, and domestic
January 1997. On this date, he stated that he would waive it indefi-
political explanations all point toward armed conflict. Since the end
nitely. Other aspects of the act, such as penalties to be imposed on
of the Cold War, moreover, the United States has twice demonstrated
Russia if it were to continue or intensify its relations with Cuba, are
its willingness to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of its near-
also waivable.⁷ As a practical matter, most-though not all-of the
neighbors. It did so first in Panama in 1989 and then in Haiti in 1994.
provisions that affect third countries are inoperative. It is "dead" law.
President Clinton's formulation of a key foreign policy principle
Nevertheless, these events and the law create two policy lega-
regarding his decision to intervene in Haiti suggests a highly expan-
cies. First, the United States has very few instruments or policy
sive view of the US "right" to intervene. For example, a few months
alternatives left with which to punish the Cuban government should
before the US intervention in Haiti, President Clinton visited Moscow
another worrisome episode occur, be it another shootdown, an
and was asked his views concerning Russian military intervention in
emigration crisis, an incident around the US naval base at Guantánamo
some newly independent successor states of the Soviet Union. He
Bay, or even more intense domestic repression. The Helms-Burton Act
replied,
also codifies all US sanctions on Cuba, thereby removing presidential
I think there will be times when you will be involved, and you will
discretion in the management of US policy toward Cuba. The odds
be more likely to be involved in some of these areas near you, just
have increased that the President of the United States would order an
like the United States has been involved in the last several years
armed attack against Cuba the next time there is a serious incident.
in Panama and Grenada near our area. (White House, 1994)
Why, then, has the United States not invaded Cuba yet? The
principal explanation is probably its assessment that the costs of such
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67
66
intervention remain too high. Cuba's successful deterrence of the
seeking or gaining preponderant power is to try to balance against it.
United States remains the strongest explanation for the absence of
Hegemony leads to balance, which is easy to see historically and to
war and for the commitment of the US government to foster a
understand theoretically." In the post-Cold War world, Waltz avers,
"democratic transition" in Cuba that remains "peaceful," to quote the
that is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still
official slogans. This deterrence has two important aspects.
has benefits to offer and many other countries have become accus-
The first is strictly military. The Cuban armed forces are a sad,
omed to their easy lives with the United States bearing many of their
pale shadow of the powerful institution that strutted the world stage
ourdens" (Waltz, 1994: 169). This characterization fits well with how
in the 1970s and 1980s (Walker, 1996). But they retain sufficient
he European Union, Canada, and most Latin American and Caribbean
strength and fighting élan to make a US invasion of Cuba much costlier
ountries have sought to "balance" against US policy toward Cuba,
than the US interventions in Panama and Haiti. The size and cost of the
specially in the aftermath of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts.8
US deployment to ensure victory in Cuba, and the casualties that US
To prevent an accidental turn toward a military confrontation,
forces would likely suffer, help to deter a US invasion. Cuba thus has
1 addition, the Cuban and US governments have engaged in a number
a "bee sting" capability.
f low-key confidence-building measures in the 1990s.⁹ Many of the
The second dimension of deterrence is political. Consider
pecific measures had been discussed within the Bush administration
President Clinton's statement in Moscow. He did not endorse an all-
ut had been put on hold as the 1992 presidential election ap-
purpose justification for either Russian or US military intervention in
roached. Their implementation, for the most part, began in 1993.
the affairs of near-neighbors. Instead, he argued, getting involved is
The two coast guards began to collaborate more closely, sharing
ome information on search and rescue missions in the Straits of
justified
when there is an involvement beyond the borders of the nation,
orida. This collaboration would become especially important dur-
that it is consistent with international law and, whenever pos-
g the 1994 migration crisis and its aftermath; it has also led to various
sible, actually supported through other nations either through
stances of joint action against drug traffickers. At times, for ex-
the United Nations or through some other instrument of interna-
nple, the US Coast Guard has provided the information, while its
tional law." (White House, 1994)
aban counterpart (Guardafronteras) has arrested the criminals
The US intervention in Haiti in 1994 was endorsed by the United
nd, in some cases, has returned them to the United States). On
Nations Security Council, for example. And, although President
ctober 8, 1996, for instance, the US and Cuban Coast Guards
Clinton's statement clearly does not preclude the possibility of the
illaborated on the seizure of 1.7 tons of cocaine (CubaINFO, 1996b:
United States intervening militarily in the absence of a UN endorse-
On the US side, the Justice Department and the FBI have recipro-
ment, the policies of other governments and international institutions
ted, warning against terrorist actions departing from Florida, and
weigh heavily on Clinton's own calculus of costs and benefits.
ve brought terrorists to court (CubaINFO, 1995b: 1).
Because US policy toward Cuba (especially the Helms-Burton Act) is
Some confidence-building measures also began in 1993 in and
opposed by most US allies, the likelihood of US military intervention
bund the US naval base at Guantánamo. For example, when US
in Cuba is lessened.
:ces were scheduled to engage in a military exercise, the US base
Therefore, the "balancing" of US power by the power of others
mmander would give advance notification to his counterpart on
is also an important explanation for the absence of war between the
= Cuban side, communicating some aspect of the exercise that the
United States and Cuba-an explanation consistent with what are
bans typically would have observed anyway. The information was
sometimes called neorealist perspectives on international relations.
erationally useless to the Cuban forces, but the procedure opened
The premier neorealist scholar, Kenneth Waltz, has written accord-
ommunication channel that would expand and become useful in
ingly about the international system after the end of the Cold War.
ie. Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces have responded in kind,
Waltz argues (as he did consistently about the international system
oviding the US command at the Guantánamo base advance notifica-
before 1989) that "the response of other countries to one among them
n of their live-ammunition exercises.
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The most important reason for US-Cuban contact and collabora-
tion has been to cope with the effects of the migration flow. In
As part of the 1994 migration crisis, nearly thirty thousand
December 1984, the two governments signed a migration agreement.
Cubans were held temporarily in camps at the US Guantánamo naval
Cuba agreed to take back a specified number of Cubans whom the
base. US and Cuban military authorities developed a constructive
United States had found excludable under its own laws (most had
relationship in 1994-95 to deal with the complexities of this situation.
come through Mariel harbor by sea in 1980), and the United States
Meetings were held every four to six weeks between the high-ranking
agreed to accept lawful Cuban migrants on a routine basis. This
Cuban and US military authorities at the base to deal with practical
agreement was suspended in May 1985 and reinstated in November
matters, making it less likely that one side would misunderstand the
1987. 10 The number of Cuban immigrants accepted by the United
other's behavior. These meetings continued even after the migration
States each year thereafter, however, always remained below five
crisis subsided; one of them (in December 1995) became public, at
thousand. During Cuba's economic crisis of the early 1990s, the
least partly because it was attended by General John Sheehan, chief of
the US Atlantic Command.¹²
pressures to emigrate built up. The worst year of the economic crisis
turned out to be 1993; the frequency of rafters increased that year and
Equally noteworthy has been the collaboration between the two
continued into early 1994.
governments after the February 24, 1996, shootdown, so as to prevent
On August 5, 1994, the largest riot since the early 1960s broke
militant Cuban Americans from drawing the two governments into
out in the city of Havana. On August 12, the Cuban government
renewed confrontation or accidental combat. Brothers to the Rescue
stopped preventing emigration by boat or raft; some 35,000 people
and other Cuban American organizations have staged events on the
fled Cuba over the next few weeks. On September 9, 1994, the two
high seas at the site of the shootdown to honor those killed in the
governments reached a new agreement to stop the flow. Another
incident and others whose boats or rafts have capsized as a conse-
more comprehensive agreement would be signed on May 2, 1995.
quence of Cuban air force or coast guard action. For each of these
Through these agreements, the Clinton administration reversed sev-
events, both governments have set down clear markers for the Cuban
eral decades of US migration policy toward Cuba. Henceforth, Cubans
American flotillas that headed toward the US-Cuban maritime border
on the high seas would no longer be treated presumptively as
(Rohter, 1997: A12). At such times, the respective coast guards,
refugees; when picked up by the US Coast Guard, they would be
supported by their air forces, have established close communications;
interrogated to discern their motives, but with the expectation that
US Coast Guard officers travel to Havana in advance of each flotilla
they would be sent back to Cuba. The new agreement also provided
episode to discuss what each side will do to prevent a violent
incident."
for the lawful, orderly migration of no fewer than 20,000 Cubans to
the United States every year; an annual emigration lottery was created
Other factors contribute to this relative stability in US-Cuban
to give opportunities to those who had no relatives in the United
relations, notwithstanding the conflict. Whereas in 1962, the Joint
States. In 1996, 500,000 people applied for such visas."
Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Kennedy a massive military
Thus in 1995 as in decades past, the governments of Cuba and
attack on Cuba, in 1996, the Joint Chiefs did not back a military
the United States, each for its own reasons, adopted the migration
response to the shootdown crisis.¹⁴ President Clinton, moreover,
policies most favored by the other government. The United States
chose to retain the various migration agreements, widened aspects of
wanted to stop the illegal waves of Cubans washing up on Florida
cooperation over technical issues, and imposed tighter controls to
shores. Cuba wanted to stop the thefts and hijackings that had been
prevent unauthorized flights over Cuban territory.
part of those emigration attempts. The sharp reduction of the illegal
In short, despite the high level of bilateral confrontation, US-Cuban
flow of Cuban migrants across the Straits of Florida would also reduce
relations have stopped short of war. Cuba has successfully deterred US
the likelihood of military confrontation, albeit accidental, between US
military actions. Governments that are in most other respects US allies
and Cuban forces patrolling the straits.
have counterbalanced US policies toward Cuba. And the United States
and Cuba have constructed confidence-building procedures and adopted
other policies to make accidental war less likely.
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CONCLUSIONS
Until those relations distend somewhat, the likelihood of a peaceful
democratic transition in Cuba recedes.
T
he Cold War has turned colder in the Caribbean. Cuba is the only
country once governed by a communist party whose domestic
The ultimate puzzle, then, is why "real" war has not broken out
political regime the United States is still committed by law and policy
already between the United States and Cuba. The answer offered in
to replace, albeit "by peaceful means."
this essay is that Cuba has successfully deterred the United States from
invading, and that other powers have effectively "balanced" against
The end of the Cold War international system, and specifically
US policies toward Cuba, as neorealist scholars would expect. But the
the collapse of the Soviet Union, forced Cuba to adjust along the lines
US and Cuban governments also deserve credit for building a modest
that realist and neorealist explanations would predict. Cuba had to
network of confidence-building procedures to prevent accidental
downsize its foreign policy and "suffer what it must." International
war. It would be hyperbole to claim that these procedures have
systemic explanations also predict that the victorious power would
prevented war, but their extension and deepening might.
flex its muscle; the extent and intensity of US interest in shaping
Cuba's domestic political regime, however, has been unexpected
For now, these confidence-building steps remain woefully insuf-
from these explanations.
ficient to stop a major conflagration. The shootdown of February 24,
1996, exemplifies the great danger of accidental conflict triggered by
The longstanding ideological themes in US hemispheric policies
provocative and illegal actions by certain Cuban American groups. If
that preceded the anticommunism of the Cold War are a second
such an event were to recur, the likelihood that the President of the
necessary factor. The United States has long insisted on its right to
United States would feel compelled to authorize military retaliation
shape the domestic politics and economics of neighboring countries.
against Cuba would be greater, partly because so few other options
The Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts are lineal descendants of the
are available.
Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. The United States can
be pragmatic in the design of many policies throughout the world, but
The Cold War in the Caribbean may become the even Colder
it has always been much more ideological, not just more imposing, in
War, as both the United States and Cuba march toward the centenary
its own backyard. Cuba's own ideological disarray in the 1990s made
commemoration of the first US military occupation of Cuba in 1898.
it vulnerable to renewed US pressures. Cuba's compounded struc-
Neither peace nor democracy is at hand.
tural and ideological weaknesses heightened the intrusive ambitions
of the United States to reshape Cuba's future. The US government
rediscovered its imperialist history and liked what it saw.
Domestic politics provides the necessary connection between
these large-scale structural and ideological causes, on the one hand,
and the specific policy outcomes, on the other. The process of
enactment of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts is the child of
domestic politics in the United States, crystallized through mobilizing
incidents when a Congressional faction could maneuver strategically
to prevail. The 1996 mobilizing incident, in turn, was facilitated and
accelerated by the consequences of hardliner ascendancy in Cuban
domestic politics, especially since early that year. Cuba's hardliners
bear major responsibility for the approval of the Helms-Burton Act.
The hardliners in each country have been each other's best allies, each
remaining an obstacle to changing the quality of US-Cuban relations.
72
JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
DOMÍNGUEZ: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
73
NOTES
REFERENCES
1. For Castro's remarks, see Blight, Allyn, and Welch, 1993: 303. I was
Amnesty International (1996) Cuba: Government Crackdown on Dissent.
present at this meeting and heard the statement.
London: International Secretariat.
2. For an assessment of Cuba's recent record with foreign investment,
see Pérez-López, 1995; and Naciones Unidas, 1995.
Banco Nacional de Cuba (1995) Economic Report, 1994. Havana.
3. Official Cuban trade accounts still value one Cuban peso as equal to
BLANK, S. (1994) "The End of the Affair: Moscow and Havana, 1989-1992,"
one US dollar.
pp. 97-115 in Donald E. Schulz (ed.) Cuba and the Future. Westport:
Greenwood.
4. For a classic demonstration of this point, see Blasier, 1985.
BLASIER, C. (1985) The Hovering Giant: US Responses to Revolutionary
5. The Cuban government had long promulgated a mix of pragmatic
Change in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
and ideological policies. At issue here is not the discovery of pragmatic
revised edition.
behavior but the loss of an intellectual and value-laden framework to support,
justify, and explain the twists and turns of routine policymaking.
BLIGHT, J. G., B.J. Allyn, and D. A. Welch (1993) Cuba on the Brink: Castro,
6. This information comes from several confidential author interviews
the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse. New York: Pantheon.
in Washington, DC, 1996.
Bohemia (1991) (n.t.) (Havana) 83, 15 (12 April): 33.
7. The President has no authority to waive the provisions that deny visas
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for visiting the United States to executives (and their spouses and children)
S15584-S15589.
of firms that "traffic" in goods or services derived from property once
expropriated in Cuba.
Cuba: Economic Report (1996) 1996 Summary. Fax courtesy of the Cuba
Interests Section in the United States.
8. For a subtle analysis of the common position of the European Union
countries with regard to Cuba, see IRELA, 1996.
CubaINFO (1996a) (Washington, DC) 8, 9 (11 July): 2-3.
9. These paragraphs rely partly on confidential author interviews in
(1996b) 8, 13 (10 October): 1.
Washington, DC, 1993, 1996, 1997; and Havana, 1996.
(1995a) 7, 14 (2 November): 1-2.
10. For an analysis and history of U.S.-Cuban migration relations, see
Domínguez, 1992.
(1995b) 7, 16 (20 December): 1.
11. Confidential author interviews, Washington, DC, 1997. For discus-
Cuba Interests Section in the United States (1991) General fax. 11
sion of wider implications, see González, 1996: 23-24.
September.
12. Confidential author interviews, Washington, DC, 1993, 1996, 1997.
DOMÍNGUEZ, J. I. (1992) "Cooperating with the Enemy? US Immigration
Some Cuban American members of Congress have criticized these meetings.
Policies toward Cuba," pp. 31-88 in Christopher Mitchell (ed.) Western
See CubaINFO, 1996a: 2-3.
Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy. University
13. Confidential author interviews, Havana, 1996; Miami, 1997; Wash-
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
ington, 1997. On July 13, 1996, I witnessed one example of such U.S.-Cuban
. (1989) To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy.
collaboration. On Cuban television, I watched the Cuban American flotilla
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
just outside Cuban territorial waters surrounded by U.S. and Cuban coast
guard vessels.
GONZÁLEZ, E. (1996) Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters? Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation.
14. Confidential author interviews, Washington, DC, 1996.
Granma (1996) 27 March.
(1991) 18 June: 8.
74
JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS
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Granma Weekly Review (1991) 9 June: 13.
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(1990b) 1 July: 1.
ROBAINA GONZÁLEZ, R. (1996) "Statement by H. E. Roberto Robaina
HIDALGO, A. and T. MACHADO (1996a) "Acuse de recibo del gobierno a
González, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, to the
Concilio Cubano." Miami: Buró de Información de Derechos Humanos
Resumed 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.' 6 March.
(1 February).
ROHTER, L. (1997) "Ceremonies Honor Fliers Shot Down by Cuban Jets."
(1996b) "Elige Concilio Cubano secretariado y delegado nacional."
New York Times (25 February): A12.
Miami: Buró de Información de Derechos Humanos (12 February).
SMITH, W. (1993) "Cuba and the Soviet Union, Cuba and Russia," pp. 127-
(1996c) "Redada policiaca contra dirigentes de Concilio Cubano."
142 in Donna Rich Kaplowitz (ed.) Cuba's Ties to a Changing World.
Miami: Buró de Información de Derechos Humanos (15 February).
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
(1995) "Concilio Cubano define objetivos comunes." Miami: Buró
THUCYDIDES (1951) The Peloponnesian War. Trans. Richard Crawley. New
de Información de Derechos Humanos (29 October).
York: Modern Library.
Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-América Latina (IRELA) (1996) "La
United Nations, Security Council (1996) Resolution 1067 (1996), S/RES/1067
posición común de la UE sobre Cuba: debate interno, reacciones y
(1996). 26 July.
repercusiones." INF-96/6-CUBA. Madrid, 13 December.
United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence (1995)
KAPLOWITZ, M. D., with D. R. KAPLOWITZ (1993) "Cuba and the United
Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics, ALA 95-10001. Washington, DC.
States: Opportunities Lost and Future Potential," pp. 223-243 in
Donna Rich Kaplowitz (ed.) Cuba's Ties to a Changing World. Boulder:
United States, House of Representatives (1996) "Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Lynne Rienner.
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996." Report 104-168 (1 March).
KEOHANE, R. (1983) "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and
WALKER, P. G. (1996) "Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces: Adapting in the
Beyond" in Ada W. Finifter (ed.) Political Science: The State of the
New Environment." Cuban Studies 26: 61-74.
Discipline. Washington: American Political Science Association.
WALTZ, K. (1994) "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" in
LAGE, C. (1995) "Discurso pronunciado por el Dr. Carlos Lage Dávila,
Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.) The
vicepresidente del Consejo de Estado y secretario del Comité Ejecutivo
International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order.
del Consejo de Ministros, en la inauguración de la XII Feria Internacional
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
de La Habana." Dossier (Havana: Centro de Estudios sobre América).
White House, Office of the Press Secretary (1994) "Remarks by the President
February. 87-89.
in Live Telecast to Russian People." Moscow, 14 January.
Naciones Unidas (1995) Comisión Económica para América Latina y el
Caribe. "La inversión extranjera en Cuba.' "LC/MEX/L.286. 22 November
PÉREZ, S. (1993) "El fin de la URSS y Cuba." Cuadernos de Nuestra América
10, 20 (July-December): 83-98.
PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, J. F. (1995) "A Critical Look at Cuba's Foreign Investment
Program." Paper presented at the 19th Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association, Washington, DC, 28-30 September.
PÉREZ RUIZ, A. (1990) "Saludos en la hora cero." Verde Olivo (Havana) 9:
8-11.
PERKINS, D. (1963) A History of the Monroe Doctrine. Boston: Little, Brown.
THE WASHINGTON POST
R
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1997 C9
Bernard Aronson
The Morning After' in Latin America
Less then three years ago, at the Miami
Summit in December 1994, the elected heads
of state of the hemisphere's 34 democracies,
led by the United States. unanimously com-
mitted themselves to a bold agenda of eco-
nomic reform culminating in free trade
BRAZIL
throughout the Americas by the year 2005.
But when President Clinton travels to Argen-
tina, Brazil and Venezuela this week, he will
visit a hemisphere suffering from "reform
fatigue" while Congress debates whether
ARGENTING
even to give the president authority to negoti-
ate a free trade agreement with Chile.
In both Latin America and the United
States, it is "the morning after" nearly a
decade of dramatic market openings and
trade expansion throughout the hemisphere.
In Latin America, resurgent economic popu-
lists argue that persistent unemployment and
poverty prove that the "neo-liberal" econom-
ic model of lower tariffs, reduced spending.
and subsidies and privatizations exacerbates
gaps between rich and poor and only benefits
the economic clite. In the United States,
opponents of presidential fast-track authority
argue that trade agreements like NAFTA
force American workers to compete unfairly
against low-paid workers in emerging mar-
BY MARGARET SCOTT
kets and against imports that do not meet
U.S. health and environmental standards.
That is because the traditional closed,
food, fuel and utilities, regulating labor mar-
Today a debate is underway across the
protected economies of Latin America were
kets and operating telephone and electric
Americas about how to balance the demands
the breeding ground for a nexus of cozy and
companies, they have to get into the business
of a global marketplace against the needs of
often corrupt relations between powerful
of providing all their citizens, particularly the
social equity.
economic groups who depended on state
marginalized poor, safe drinking water and
President Clinton should'join this debate
favors and their friends in government.
sanitation, world-class public education, ba-
when he visits Latin America. The stakes are
Breaking down that nexus of economic and
sic health services, modern highways and
political power creates for the first time in
high. and U.S. leadership is crucial to its
airports, security against crime and violence,
Latin America the possibility not only of real
outcome. And as a "New Democrat" presi-
safeguards against fraud in the marketplace,
upward mobility for ordinary citizens but
dent-who has tried to stecr a third course
protection of their right to organize trade
also real democratic accountability for gov-
between traditional big-government solu-
unions and bargain collectively and an inde-
ernment leaders.
tions to social problems and the abdication of
pendent judiciary where the law, not corrup-
It is not an accident that the most demo-
any legitimate government role-he has
tion, rules.
cratic elections held in Mexico's history and
something relevant to say. The message
In many Latin nations, for example, the
the first congressional majorities won by
might go like this:
system of licensing and regulation for new
opposition parties followed the opening of its
In the 1970s the Democratic Party mis-
small businesses is so complex and time-
markets./Nor is it coincidental that today
judged how inflation ravaged poor and work-
consuming that it permanently shuts the
Latin civic groups, newspapers, television,
ing families and was shut out of national
radio and ordinary citizens are challenging
poor out of the formal economy, denying
power for more then a decade. Those who
them access to credit, property rights and
official corruption with an energy and deter-
seck to speak for those constituencies in
mination rarely seen before or that heads of
the chance to grow their businesses enough
Latin America should not repeat that mis-
state in/Brazil and Ecuador accused of official
to enjoy economies of scale. It must be pared
take. The hyperinflation that consumed Latin
corruption have been forced from office by
back drastically. But the inefficient and anti-
economics in the previous "lost decade"
popular discontent.
quated system of collecting taxes that allows
destroyed the wages and savings of working
Still, the critics of reform have a point.
many of the hemisphere's wealthiest citizens
and poor families. And they have benefited
Chile's social progress remains the excep-
and corporations to escape any civic obliga-
the most from the economic stabilization
tion not the rule. The World Bank estimates
tion must be strengthened significantly.
policies that now protect the value of Latin
that 50 million Latin Americans have joined
How to balance the demands of the mar-
currencies. Chile, the Latin nation that in
the ranks of the poor since 1950. The process
ketplace in Latin America against the respon-
recent years has gone furthest in opening up
of economic reform in Latin America will not
sibilities of the state cannot be dictated by an
its economy, also has made the most prog-
be sustained politically unless its advocates
American president. It must emerge, as it has
ress in reducing poverty, lowering unemploy-
can demonstrate ,concretely that it offers a
in our own history, through the tug and pull
nient, raising retirement benefits and ex-
better life for the hemisphere's impoverished
and often messy politics of a democratic
panding educational opportunity.
citizens.
society. But the president's voice will make a
What is at stake in the battle for reform in
Here neither the ideologues of the market
difference, as will the decision by Congress
Latin America is not only the fale of the poor
nor the ideologues of the state offer all the
on reauthorizing the president's authority to
but the future of democracy.
answers. For Latin America faces a paradox.
negotiate expanded trade in the Americas. A
What guerrilla forces fighting in the moun-
As it reduces the power of the state to control
no vote would dramatically tilt the debate in
tains could not accomplish after decades,
and intervene in the economic marketplace,
Latin America against the reformers who are
global trade, capital flows, communications
Latin America must strengthen the capacity
transforming the hemisphere.
and technology are doing daily: undermining
of the state to deliver human services and
and sweeping away the traditional authoritar-
safeguard basic rights. As Latin American
The writer served as assistant sccretary of
ian structures that long governed and sup-
governments get out of the business of
state for inter-A merican affairs from June
pressed Latin American societies.
producing steel and aluminum, subsidizing
1989 to July 1993.
The Globe and Mail, Friday, August 1. 1997
Commentary
How interest groups are shaping foreign policy
S
EVERAL years ago, a turgid article enti-
new governments only because an interna-
tled The Death of Foreign Policy was
Barbara McDougall
most economically vital activities: fish, furs
tional coalition started by veterans put it
and forests.
published in an undistinguished learned
on foreign relations
there. Even the United States, the last re-
Even the new leadership of the United Na-
journal. It followed, and was in the same vein
maining holdout with any clout, may reverse
as, The End of History, an essay that had
tions, an organization not inaccurately de-
its position, or at least find ways to accommo-
scribed in the past as being "all top and no
launched a rash of pronouncements about the
as in Cambodia. They are almost never appro-
date an international agreement.
bottom," is attempting to connect with its
deaths of various trends in the aftermath of
priately mapped, and if they are, the maps are
It is too early for the original coalition to
grassroots as part of a massive reorganization
the Cold War.
lost or deliberately destroyed; therefore the
declare victory and go home, even though it
effort.
It is always wise to be skeptical about such
mines cannot be cleared with any assurance.
has found a committed champion in Mr. Ax-
matters, largely because things declared well
They continue to wreak havoc long after hos-
worthy. As always, the devil is in the details,
and truly dead have an unhappy way of pop-
tilities cease, at the cost of untold numbers of
and the wording of an accord, to be tabled at
IN this environment, Ma. Matthews em-
ping up again unexpectedly, like dandelions
civilian lives.
an international conference to be hosted by
phasizes, power concentrates faster than be
or bell-bottom trousers.
Efforts to ban or limit land mines have
Canada in December, is still at the early
fore, but it is fair to say that It shifts faster,
Foreign policy is, of course, not dead, but
been sporadic and ineffective; military estab-
stages of discussion.
too. Interesting problems arise that have yet
changes were inevitable and have been rapid.
lishments, after all, like them. Recently, how-
to be resolved. Who, for example, defines the
What has emerged is a shift in the "outputs"
ever, a nucleus of veterans wounded in the
of foreign policy. National security, for exam-
Vietnam War joined together to build support
Who defines the public
public interest? In the global context, is there
even such a thing as the public interest, as op-
ple, the central theme of diplomacy since the
internationally to eliminate the use of land
interest? In the global
posed to "special" interests? What happens to
emergence of nation-states several hundred
mines altogether.
years ago, has receded as a preoccupation,
context, is there even such a
a group that has achieved its purpose, as the
Working largely through the Internet, the
and concerns that are often seemingly in con-
group extended itself, initially through con-
thing as the public interest, as
veterans group seems likely to do? Does it at
tempt to find another cause? Does it even re-
flict with each other, such as the environment
tacts with other veterans groups in the
opposed to 'special' interests?
main a "group"?
and terms of trade, are in the ascendant.
United States and Canada, and then through-
Most important for governments, who is ao
However, the "inputs" to foreign policy are
out Europe and beyond. Support spread like
also changing. The influence of pin-striped
countable - and to whom? Foreign policy de
wildfire, well beyond the original interest
It is extraordinary, however, that a sub-
fined as defending the national interest is not
diplomats, from time immemorial the nation's
group, but governments particularly those
stantive international agreement is within
high on the agenda of most members of the
eyes and ears in far-flung lands, is being dis-
with extensive armed forces and large milita-
reach as a direct result of individual, non-gov-
public today in virtually any country. The
placed by high-profile pressure from a variety
ry-industrial establishments - remained
ernment effort; and that, from a standing
components of national interest, on the other
of disconnected interests. With the latest tech-
aloof, having failed to read the entrails.
start, the objective may have been achieved
hand - trade, the environment, labour-force
nology, groups can coalesce around a partic-
in less than two years - a remarkably short
standards - are of vital concern to separate
ular issue very quickly.
However, the group was successful in
gestation period by international standards.
and increasingly narrow but highly vocal sec-
In a recent speech in Washington, Jessica
The rise of ad hoc non-governmental organ-
tors of the public. How governments will re-
Matthews, the recently appointed president of
bringing the matter to the agenda of what ap-
izations as influences on foreign policy is
spond to this fragmentation of interests has
the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and Secu-
peared to be a minor international confer-
gaining momentum as technology revolution-
yet to be determined, but foreign policy will
rity, referred to these groups as "coalitions of
ence, where it caught the imagination of Ca-
izes the ability of individuals to attach them-
never be the same.
the willing." The example she used is the ini-
nadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.
selves to others for very specific purposes.
tiative under way to eliminate the use of land
Military heavyweights such as the United
While a ban on land mines would be ap-
mines as instruments of war.
States, France and Britain at first refused to
plauded by virtually all the world's civilian
Land mines are brutally effective weapons;
Barbara McDougall, a director of several
budge. But now, several months later, all the
populations, sometimes the worthiness of the
they destroy, among other targets, enemy ve-
Canadian corporations, is a former Cana-
major European players have turned around.
causes espoused is in the eye of the beholder.
hicles and, not coincidentally, they kill and
dian minister of external affairs. She is a reg.
The shift is due in part to changeovers in
Canada's terms of trade, for example, have
maim viclously. More often than not they are
ular contributor to this weekly foreign-affairs
government in France and Britain; but a ban
been negatively affected at various times by
laid randomly, and sometimes by the million,
column, alternating with several other writ.
on land mines was on the agenda of those
special interests in three of our historic and
ers.
THEJOURNAL OF COMMERCE
TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 16, 1997
Panama Canal
Heading for capacity crunch
BY AMBLER MOSS
world that Panama was ready to
ent canal efficient while the
A little over 20 years ago
operate the canal as efficiently
new work goes forward. Other
(Sept. 7, 1977), the Panama Ca-
as they could desire. The United
additional projects may be add-
nai Treaties were signed in
States was represented by Secre-
ed. such as a "land-bridge" rail-
Washington, transferring the im-
tary of Transportation Rodney
road to handle containers and
portant waterway to Panama by
Slater and President Clinton's
a high-volume highway. They
the end of 1999. A firestorm of
special envoy to the Americas
will not obviate the need for a
political controversy over the
Thomas "Mack" McLarty. Gov-
new set of locks, however.
"giveaway" made Senate approv-
emment and business partici-
Where will the funding come
al of the treaties hard to achieve,
pants came from around the
from for such a project? Obvi-
costing the Carter administration
world and left satisfied with the
ously, it will not be from the
a huge amount of political capi-
congress' message.
U.S. Congress, no longer re-
tal.
sponsible for the canal, nor
The treaties solved a major
from Panama, still working its
problem in U.S.-Latin American
World shipping bas so
way out of the "debt crisis"
relations, but a large segment of
increased that by the year
years. Nor can such an amount
U.S. public opinion remained
be funded by raising canal
2010 the Panama Canal's
tolls; such a raise would soon
unconvinced.
carrying capacity will be
drive shippers to find other
Only a short time remains be-
exceeded by demand. Such
transportation solutions.
fore Panama takes over, but a
Panama - and the United
well-conceived gradual process
will be the case even after a
States, as long as it is still in
of transition is nearly complete.
With the United States still in
billion-dollar modernization
the canal should begin now
charge, the chief executives of
program, now under way, is
to develop a plan. The canal
administrator, Alberto Aleman,
the canal have been Panamanian
completed.
has established a working
since 1990, two successive indi-
viduals with high qualifications.
group to study this project that
The work force is now 92% Pan-
will, in any event, take years to
amanian, including high man-
Nevertheless, one big surprise
complete.
agement positions. The canal
was revealed at the Congress
How could it work? There is
puts through more ships per
which made the participants
a way. An international finan-
take note. World shipping has
year than ever (nearly 14,000)
cial institution the Intera-
and actually makes a profit.
so increased that by the year
merican Development Bank
2010 the Panama Canal's carry-
comes to mind - could organ-
Headed by U.S. Undersecre-
ing capacity will be exceeded
ize a consortium of shipping
tary of the Army Joe R. Reeder,
by demand. Such will be the
nations which use the canal to
a mixed board of U.S. and Pana-
case even after a billion-dollar
finance a project with a
manian members has been su-
modernization program, now
long-term payout from canal
pervising the canal's operations.
under way, increases the num-
revenue. With proper financial
Panama has recently passed a
ber of ships sailing through the
structuring, toll increases, if
law setting up a new Panama
canal from 35 per day to 42.
any, could be postponed until
Canal Authority to manage the
To meet demand, all experts
the new set of locks was
canal as a semi-independent en-
agree that a third set of canal
opened. Panamanian sovereign-
tity beginning in the year 2000.
locks must be constructed to
ty over the canal, a burning po-
Surprisingly, the law passed
increase capacity. In fact, this
litical issue from the beginning
Panama's Legislature without op-
recommendation was made in
of this century, would not be
position. U.S. officials have
1993 by a tripartite commission
affected.
praised it as a good instrument
of the United States, Panama
Nevertheless, the world ship-
of governance. The world ship-
and Japan as the best of many
ping community would become
ping community will have access
alternatives to increase trans-
stakeholders with Panama and
to the new authority through an
portation capacity across Pana-
assure the canal's success in
advisory board it plans to estab-
ma.
meeting the rapidly growing
lish.
The price tag will be high,
demands for its service.
All this good news was show-
perhaps more than $8 billion,
cased last week in Panama at a
but less than the cost of build-
three-day conference grandly
ing an entirely new canal. A
Ambler Moss is director of the North-
called the Universal Congress of
number of problems must be
South Center at the University of Mi-
overcome, including developing
ami. He was on the negotiating team
the Panama Canal. Organized by
for the Panama Canal Treaties, was
Panama's former deputy canal
additional fresh water sources
U.S. Ambassador to Panama from
administrator, Fernando Manfre-
to run the canal, assessing and
1978-1982 and is a U.S. representative
do, its purpose was to reassure
overcoming environmental
on the Panama Canal consultative
the shipping interests of the
problems and keeping the pres-
committee.
Wo
e
y
O
ra'se
po
file ce
But electoral
quotas divide
panel members
By Toni Marshall
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Recent international summit
meetings in Cairo, Copenhagen,
Vienna, Beijing and Miami have
given priority to improving the sta-
tus of women.
But women in Latin America
and the Caribbean remain caught
in a vicious cycle that frustrates
their advancement to leadership
roles: They are poorly represented
in key leadership positions, so they
have little influence on the politics
and policies that could improve the
status of women.
Every Latin American and Ca-
ribbean nation signed onto the fi-
nal declaration of each summit, ac-
cording to female leaders from the
Americas who met in Washington
this month at a two-day Women's
Leadership Conference of the
Americas.
Participants said these coun-
tries should now be held to their
commitments.
The network of 60 women was
organized by two local think tanks,
the Inter-American Dialogue and
the International Center for Re-
search on Women.
"Immigration, migration, rac-
ism and poverty heavily affect
Exchanging views at the women's forum are (from left) Marta Suplicy, a
official, and Canadians Dale Godsoe, Dalhousie University
women in the Americas. There is a
member of Brazil's congress, American Paula Stem, an ex-ITC
vice president, and Helga Stephenson of Viacom Canada Ltd.
gross inbalance of power in our
countries," said Maria Antonietta
Berriozabal, founder and chair-
Those opposed to quota systems said they
strategy to increase and enhance
partners.
man of the National Hispana Lead-
ership Institute and U.S. repre-
become ceilings for women and may promote
women's political participation,
On Nov. 25 the conference will
with particular energy focused
laúnch an international day oppos-
sentative to the Inter-American
Commission of Women of the
the wrong women to power - - those who are
also on their leadership formation
ing domestic violence against
and training," he said.
women.
Organization of American States.
actually puppets of powerful men.
Those opposed to quota systems
Agencies such as the Pan Amer-
"We need to see if this group will
said they become ceilings for
ican Health Organization, the
boldly and courageously point is-
women and may promote the
World Bank and the Inter-Ameri-
sues out to our presidents," she
wrong women to power - those
can Development Bank, plus non-
said.
now in place in a few Latin Amer-
be placed in ornamental positions.
who are actually puppets of pow-
governmental organizations, are
The goal of the conference was
ican countries.
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
erful men.
creating service networks to treat
to enhance the influence of female
In 1991, Argentina passed the
Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and
"I question the act of imposing
abused women, programs to edu-
leaders in different sectors, en-
hemisphere's first sex-quota law
Venezuela are considering similar
quotas. Because once quotas are
cate health officials, as well as
courage them to invest time and
for election of national legislators.
sex-quota legislation.
dictated you face a block-
projects to educate judges about
energy needed to recruit more
"If the goal is to increase the
opposition from male colleagues.
women's issues and problems of
women into leadership roles and
Argentina, Bolivia and, more re-
percentage of women legislators in
Goals tend to work better than quo-
domestic violence.
motivate them and give informa-
cently, Brazil, have enacted laws
the short to medium term, the use
tas," said Judy McLennan, former
"There needs to be a permanent
tion to help eliminate legal bar-
requiring that as many as 30 per-
of gender quotas represents the
U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Com-
adoption of laws against domestic
riers to women's opportunities.
cent of elected offices be held by
only available option," said Mark
mission on the Status of Women.
violence," said Sylvia Ostry, chair-
Participants agreed that women
women.
Jones of Michigan State Univer-
Domestic violence was the hot
man of the Center for International
need to ascend to the highest level
Under Argentine law, a mini-
sity, who presented a paper on sex
topic on the second day of the con-
Studies and chancellor of the Uni-
of office but disagreed on how they
mum 30 përcent of all candidates
quotas and the election of female
ference.
versity of Waterloo in Canada.
are to get there.
on the closed party lists in all of the
lawmakers in the Americas.
Between 25 and 50 percent of
"Domestic violence doesn't af-
The major point of contention
country's 24 electoral districts
"Quotas should be implement-
women in Latin America report
fect just the poorest women," she
was the electoral quota system
must be women, and they can't just
ed, however, as part of a broad
they have been abused by male
said.
THE SIGLO NEWS
The week beginning 8 October 1997
Optimistic Evaluation of the
Guatemalan Peace Process
KATI SUOMINEN
[email protected]
Cautious optimism characterized a con-
ticipation of civil society are necessary ingredi-
ahead in the construction of a new society."
ference evaluating the first ten months of Guate-
ents for genuine peace. The accords have brought
According to Davidow, the Clinton Ad-
malan peace accords in Washington DC on Sep-
about "a totally new way of government to in-
ministration now wants to sec Guatemala make
tember 24. Participants to the event, sponsored
volve and relate to civil society and indigenous
progress toward the "establishment of public se-
by Georgetown University and Inter-American
peoples", stated Ricardo Stein of Secretaría para
curity for all citizens; fiscal reform to provide
Dialogue (a local policy analysis center on hemi-
la Paz (SEPAZ). "The main thrust of our efforts
the resources needed for critical social invest-
spheric affairs) included distinguished Guatema-
has to be achieved within this Administration,
ment; and finally, strengthening of key state in-
lan officials, and private sector and other non-
and ensure that the process is made irreversible."
stitutions, particularly the justice system."
governmental leaders.
Stein also declared that "participation is the un-
Davidow emphasized that "ultimately, the
Most participants viewed the peace pro-
derlying thread of the accords; it is the key."
challenge of building a peaceful Guatemala falls
cess as heading in the right.direction. The Wash-
The main economic and social challenges
to Guatemalans themselves and no one else."
ington audience was also reminded that the peace
of reconstruction relate to land issues, tax reform,
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Eduardo
building exercise constitutes a highly complex
domestic savings, privatization process, fiscal
Stein acknowledged the fundamental role played
program involving all the sectors of the Guate-
discipline with investment in health, public
by the international community in the process
malan society and encompassing over 400 com-
safety, and education, and a secure investment
leading to the signing of the accords, and stated
mitments related to the country's political, so-
climate with clear rules of the game. Pablo Rodas
that it is understandable that donor nations now
cial, cultural, and economic development. Speak-
Martini of ASIES urged Guatemalans to estab-
want to show their taxpayers that Guatemalans
ers agreed that achieving the multiple ambitious
lish realistic goals amidst the high expectations
are also paying their fair share.
goals stipulated in the accords is an enormous
unleashed by the signing of the accords.
The international community pledged
challenge requiring sufficient resources and daily
Addressing the US role in the Guatema-
some US$ 2 billion to assist the peace process,
efforts by all Guatemalans. "We must be con-
lan peace process, Assistant Secretary of State
but the remaining portion of reconstruction costs
vinced by the peace process," said Helen Mack
Jeffrey Davidow expressed confidence in
are to be raised internally. To that end, Stein as-
of the human rights group Myma Mack Founda-
Guatemala's seriousness of effort in building
sured that his government is reforming the Gua-
tion.
peace, but also stated that "it is a political fact of
temalan tax system-known for its regressive
Government leadership was seen as vital
life that Congressional support for additional US
nature and dismal collection record-to gener-
for the implementation of the accords, but par-
foreign assistance to Guatemala has been predi-
ate necessary funds for complying with the com-
ticipants reiterated that democratization, decen-
cated upon success in bringing peace to the coun-
mitments in the accords.
tralization, greater transparency, and active par-
try, and in implementing the peace and moving
Weekly Focus on Guatemala
THE SIGLO NEWS
Volume 1. Number 50. The week beginning 6 August 1997
EWIS
TAIN
Guest Columnist
NAFTA Parity Extension
Bites the Dust-For Now
he final version of the US budget-tax
port from the budget deal if the CBI measure
package for FY 1998 approved by the
was included. They argued the provision vio-
Congress last week deleted a provision
lates a prohibition on attaching to budget leg-
extending NAFTA benefits to Carib-
islation matters only indirectly related to the
bean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries.
budget.
The CBI entered into force in 1984 as a brain-
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott also
child of the Reagan Administration to shore up
disapproved of the CBI provision; reportedly
the Central American and Caribbean economies
due to opposition from Fruit of the Loom, a
during the Cold War. Embracing 17 Caribbean
company with operations in Lott's home state
island states, Central America, and Panama, the
Mississippi.
CBI is second only to NAFTA in granting prefer-
Textile and apparel union backers Repre-
ential access to the US market. Excluded from its
sentatives John Spratt and F. Allen Boyd stated
eligibility criteria are canned tuna, petroleum,
By Kati
to the House-Senate budget conference com-
footwear, certain leather goods and watches, and
Suominen-
mittee that, while Congress would be unlikely
textiles and apparel, the single largest export to
[email protected]
to terminate the parity benefits granted by the
the US from the CBI region.
House CBI provision after only a year, the an-
President Clinton has reiterated his commit-
nual costs of parity extension would signifi-
ment to giving the CBI region NAFTA parity to
cantly rise from the first year's $217 million.
curb trade diversion to Mexico, which CBI members say has
The Congressional Budget Office estimates a five-year
caused a 10% drop in their exports and cost thousands of jobs
NAFTA parity extension would cost $1.25 billion.
since NAFTA was enacted in 1993.
When President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine
The initial House budget bill contained the Caribbean
Albright, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger in-
Trade Partnership Act introduced by Congressman Philip
tervened in the last minute to rescue the CBI provision, Sena-
Crane, providing an immediate one-year NAFTA parity for
tor Roth conditioned its inclusion in the budget deal to Ad-
all CBI exports. The Administration's counterproposal, Car-
ministration support for reforming AMTRAK, the national
ibbean Trade Enhancement Act, established a 50% reduction
passenger rail line. Facing labor union objections, Clinton
in current duties on CBI products for three years, after which
balked.
each beneficiary meeting a dozen requirements ranging from
A compromise CBI bill has already been drafted by
anti-narcotics cooperation to intellectual property rights pro-
the US Trade Representative, working with the staffs of
tection would be granted duty-free access to the US market.
Crane, Lott, Roth, and Mack McLarty, Clinton's Special
The Senate budget bill did not include a CBI provision.
Envoy for Latin America. CBI-watchers consider it will
Senate Finance Committee Chairman William Roth, along with
muster broad-based support, particularly in the wake of top
twelve of his colleagues, threatened to withdraw their sup-
Administration officials' intervention.
¿EL FIN DE LA POLÍTICA SOCIAL?
Dr. José María Dagnino Pastore
Como el sol y la lluvia, la "globalización" nos ocurre: es un dato. Huelga discutir si
conviene o no. Sí vale plantear: ¿Cómo mejor adaptamos a ella?
La globalización. Su base material es el salto informático y telecomunicativo de los
'80, que permitió decidir y operar on line en todo el mundo. Institucionalmente la
sustentan las desregulaciones, privatizaciones y la apertura al exterior. Su expansión
geográfica se acentúa con la caída del comunismo en 1990. Luego se retroalimenta,
empujando tecnologías, instituciones y espacios.
La teoría as que acelera el crecimiento de la producción por mejor uso de recursos
(traslado de capitales y tecnologías), ampliación de mercados (economías de escala)
y creatividad (estimula la competencia); lleva a la convergencia de los PBI per capita
y permite mejorar el bienestar.
Efectos no tan secundarios. El capital, en busca de su mayor rendimiento, va a los
países de menores peligros y costos; y tiende a emparejar los precios y costos de
bienes transables y a aproximar los demás, entre ellos los salarios -ajustados por
productividad-.
Así la globalización "disciplina" los gobiernos, premiando con fondos las políticas
económicas austeras y estables y castigando las opuestas: los induce hacia aquéllas.
Además, aparte de influir sobre el empleo total, traslada demanda de mano de obra
de países donde cuesta cara adonde es barata (algunas zonas pobres del mundo).
¿Qué sucede? Aunque la globalización es sólo uno de los factores que afectan la
economía mundial, constituye "lo" distintivo de esta década.
En los '90 el PBI se expandió mas rápido que en el pasado: crecimiento. China-
Sudeste asiático y Sudamérica (emergentes con reformas) han crecido mas que los
países desarrollados, particulamente si no ajustaron (CEE): convergencia. Los flujos
financieros se volcaron bruscamente hacia naciones emergentes: búsqueda de
rentabilidad. La inflación cedió: disciplina fiscal. La desocupación aumentó en
muchos países (tecnología, competencia) y alcanzó récords en Europa (traslado de
empleos). Los salarios reales bajaron en algunos países en reestructuración. La
pobreza aumentó en zonas de Europa y América Latina.
Argentina creció rápido. La huida de capitales se transformó en fuerte influjo de
fondos. Pasó de hiperinflación a precios estables. Los salarios reales descienden
después del repunte inicial. La desocupación se duplicó y la pobreza, que bajó al
principio, vuelve a niveles de 1990.
La macroeconomía, el crecimiento, la modernización, bien; en muchos países de
Occidente, "lo social", no.
Del dicho al hecho... Las actitudes ante la situación van desde negar la realidad -
cuestionar estadísticas, inventar justificativos- hasta revivir el fracaso: Estado y
protección. Sin escapismos ni reincidencias poco promisorios ¿cómo afrontarla?
Según una ideología el proceso resolverá los problemas y cualquier interferencia lo
demorará; en todo caso hay que profundizarlo: los alivios presentes se pagarían
caros con posteriores sufrimientos. Como esto seguirá siendo válido, el desempleo
bajará por crecimiento y menores salarios.
Otra apreciación exige, con variados argumentos, que se "haga algo". Pero aún
queriendo ¿Cuál es el camino? Inglaterra y Francia emitieron un fuerte mandato de
cambio, pero ¿Pueden Blair y Jospin hacer mucho mas que poner una "cara humana"
a su perplejidad? ¿Puede un país tener "política social" bajo la globalización?
La "lógica" del proceso. Para atraer capitales los gobiernos deben reducir costos y
riesgos.
El Diano Clavin
Los costos disminuyen si los factores de producción (recursos naturales, capital,
trabajo, tecnología) son abundantes, calificados y bien administrados; las
instituciones inducen eficiencia; y el gobierno presta servicios valiosos con impuestos
bajos.
Dentro de este esquema, correspondería a los gobiernos asegurar la estabilidad
política, facilitar la operatoria (reducir trámites, arancelamientos, reglamentaciones
innecesarias) y gastar eficazmente lo indispensable. Su acción sólo se justificaría si el
desembolso capta mas capitales que los ahuyentados por el impuesto
correspondiente.
Los riesgos son menores cuanto mas estable se presume una política económica
afín a la globalización.
La única razón para subsidiar a desocupados o míseros sería que al menguar el
riesgo de inestabilidad, atrajera mas fondos que los repelidos por los consecuentes
impuestos. Regulaciones con costos económicos sólo serían aceptables si redujeran
los riesgos en mayor medida (en rigor, deberían eliminarse las que no cumplen este
criterio).
Los efectos sociales serían los que resultaran de la política de captación de fondos.
Lo social en tiempos globales. Aun bajo estas restricciones, hay lugar para una
política social más efectiva. p.e., evidente en Argentina.
En materia fiscal es posible: a) con el mismo gasto social: atacando la corrupción
(ANSES), eliminando erogaciones innecesarias, reduciendo subsidios (universidades
casi gratuitas), aumentando la productividad (ausentismo de maestros), aplicando
nuevos métodos (vouchers), privatizando funciones (hogares de menores); y b)
aumentándolo, con transferencias de otras áreas (gastos reservados, orden y
seguridad, etc.) que, vía medidas similares, podrían mantener sus servicios con
menores dispendios.
En lo especifico, cabe reemplazar subsidios a desocupados por programas y
vouchers temporarios de empleo.
¿Esto es todo? ¿Es la maximización de la rentabilidad el principio dominante de
todas las políticas públicas? La teoría económica enseña excepciones válidas aún en
puros términos de "eficiencia" -dejando la "equidad" de lado-. La inversión en
educación puede ser una.
En lo social veo dos líneas tentativas:
a) En cuanto a la estabilidad de la política económica, el acto de equilibrio de los
gobiernos consiste, por un lado, en pasar el examen diario de confianza de los
mercados financieros y, por otro lado, en mantener la gobernabilidad de la nación. Tal
vez cierta opinión vemácula sea demasiado celosa -jOh, pasados desenfrenos!- de lo
que afecta a aquélla en detrimento de lo que influye sobre ésta.
Las empresas planean estratégicamente sus inversiones; el mercado financiero
calibra con mas realismo el peligro en países emergentes. Ambos saben que para los
gobiernos es suicida quebrar el balance macroeconómico y valoran una sociedad
integrada; miran lo económico y lo político. La cohesión de una nación: las
instituciones republicanas, el ejemplo de los gobernantes, el sentido de equidad
también reducen los riesgos. Esto da algún margen -de cauto manejo- para la política
social.
b) Las normas (ambientales, sanitarias, laborales, etc.) que, beneficiosas para la
comunidad, aumentan los costos de producción, perjudican a quienes las adoptan, y
viceversa; vgr.: los países que practican dumping social o ecológico. Esto se potencia
con la globalización. El futuro apunta a que tales reglas se consagren y supervisen
internacionalmente. ¡La política social también se globaliza!
EL COMERCIO Sábado 30 de agosto de 1997
Opinión
Educación y segregación social
Osvaldo Hurtado
uito.- desde una perspectiva cuan-
tre establecimientos privados y públicos,
económica y socialmente. Actualmente
titativa han sido notables los avan-
en cuanto a la calidad de la educación que
ello todavía sucede en unos pocos países
ces de la educación latinoamerica-
imparten a sus alumnos.
latinoamericanos, Uruguay, Chile y Costa
na en las últimas décadas. El anal-
En escuelas y colegios privados. parti-
Rica por ejemplo; en los otros, quienes
fabetismo ha dejado de ser el oprobioso
cularmente los que matriculan alum-
acuden a una escuela pública se hallan
problema que mantenía relegada en una
nos provenientes de las clases alta y me-
condenados, fatalmente, a ser pobres co-
situación de extrema marginalidad a más
dia, son bajos los índices de repetición de
mo fueron sus padres y abuelos y los que
de un tercio de la población, para quedar
año y altos los porcentajes de quienes
estudian en colegios estatales a desempe-
reducido a un fenómeno aislado que sólo
concluyen sus estudios. Tales centros im-
ñar trabajos mal remunerados.
afecta a un poco más del 10%, principal-
parten una educación de excelente cali-
Muchos se preguntan sobre el motivo
mente representado por personas de la
dad, equivalente a la que reciben niños y
por e! cual América Latina es una región
tercera edad. El acceso a la educación pri-
adolescentes norteamericanos, europeos
con abismales diferencias entre ricos y
maria se ha tornado casi universal gracias
y de los llamados dragones asiáticos, con-
pobres y con índices de pobreza superio-
a la multiplicación de escuelas y maes-
dición que les permite continuar estudios
res a los existentes en otras regiones con
tros, lo que ha permitido que más del
superiores, algunos en universidades de
un nivel de desarrollo equivalente. La res-
2 90% de los niños en edad escolar obten-
países industrializados, conseguir em-
puesta se encuentra en la dramática caí-
i
gan matrícula y asistan a clases. Los pro-
pleo e integrarse al mercado de trabajo
da que ha sufrido el nivel académico de la
gresos de la educación secundaria, si bien
con atractivas remuneraciones. Incluso
educación pública. No pueden existir so-
menos significativos, también han sido
escuelas privadas a las que acceden niños
ciedades justas y equitativas en países que
importantes, pues cerca de la mitad de los
provenientes de sectores populares im-
practican tan perversa forma de discri-
adolescentes cursan estudios en colegios
parten una educación mejor que la de las
minación educativa, lamentablemente no
de segunda enseñanza.
públicas. En mis recientes vacaciones un
corregida por los gobiernos democráti-
No puede formularse una apreciación
campesino de la Costa ecuatoriana me
cos a pesar de estar obligados, por man-
similar en el orden cualitativo. Sólo el
refirió el caso de su hija que habiendo
dato constitucional, a garantizar iguales
13% de estudiantes que ingresan a la es-
aprobado el primer grado con altas cali-
oportunidades a todos los ciudadanos.
cuela terminan el sexto grado sin haber
ficaciones en una escuela estatal, en la es-
Esta negativa realidad no está recibien-
repetido algún año de estudios y un abul-
cuela católica en la que continuó sus es-
do adecuadas respuestas. En muchos pa-
tado 42% la abandona antes de concluir-
tudios tuvo que repetir el año en razón de
íses, antes que destinar recursos para ele-
la. La enseñanza secundaria prepara es-
sus insuficientes conocimientos.
var la calidad de la educación pública,
tudiantes para que sigan estudios univer-
Esta diferenciación no existió antes en
mejorar la preparación de los maestros y
sitarios, cuando la inmensa mayoría no
América Latina. La educación pública no
subsidiar a padres pobres que envían a
puede hacerlo, y sus contenidos no guar-
sólo que competía académicamente con la
sus hijos a la escuela (programa de largo
dan relación con los requerimientos del
privada sino que, incluso, llegaba a impar-
plazo a ejecutarse en varios gobiernos), lo
mercado de trabajo y del desarrollo de los
tir una enseñanza mejor. Generaciones de
que se hace es construir locales y crear
países de la región.
latinoamericanos educados en escuelas y
puestos de profesores, muchas veces in-
Estas apreciaciones, en razón de consti-
colegios del Estado accedieron a impor-
necesarios. O, lo que es peor, desperdiciar
tuir una generalización y expresar un
tantes responsabilidades en gobiernos y
dinero y energías en programas sociales
promedio estadístico, ocultan la profun-
empresas O fueron brillantes profesiona-
populistas tan del gusto de políticos a la
da brecha.abierta en los últimos años en-
les, gracias a lo cual sus vidas cambiaron
caza de réditos electorales. EFE.
EL COMERCIO Miércoles 30 de julio de 1997
Opinión
Democracia: un buen "negocio"
Osvaldo Hurtado
Quito
dáfrica. Desde cuando Mandela asumió el
los negocios. Al contrario, el importante
O es una simple coincidencia que
poder cambió la negativa actitud de la co-
paso dado por México en su proceso de-
correspondan a la democracia
munidad internacional y se creó una sen-
mocratizador más bien ha sido apreciado
más antigua del mundo los mayo-
sación de confianza, que permitió a su go-
positivamente por nacionales y extranje-
res niveles de desarrollo del plane-
bierno atraer y multiplicar la inversión na-
ros, que hoy ven con mayor seguridad que
ta, alcanzados por los Estados Unidos ha-
cional y extranjera y, con ello, dinamizar el
antes el futuro de la economía, motivos
ce varias décadas en un tiempo relativa-
crecimiento económico y abrir las puertas
por los cuales se ha fortalecido el peso me-
mente corto, medido en términos históri-
para el progreso social de la marginada
xicano, ha mejorado la cotización de los
COS. Las democracias de Europa y Japón,
población negra.
papeles de la deuda externa y ha subido el
bastante más nuevas, algunas constituidas
La democracia chilena, en los siete años
índice de la bolsa de valores.
después de la II Guerra Mundial e incluso
anteriores, ha logrado que la economía
La apertura democrática mexicana con-
años más tarde, han logrado asegurar a sus
crezca a un promedio del 6.8% anual y re-
trasta con la regresión que sufre Perú, cu-
habitantes un grado de bienestar que ja-
ducir el número de pobres al 23%. Vista la
ya democracia no se sustenta en sus insti-
más imaginaron. Nunca antes un número
región en su integridad, los países latinoa-
tuciones sino en el liderazgo de un caudi-
tan grande de personas disfrutaron de ali-
mericanos que en el Informe sobre Desa-
llo de futuro incierto. En ella los militares
rrollo Humano de las Naciones Unidas
mentos, salud, educación, vivienda, segu-
no están subordinados a la autoridad civil,
ridad, años de vida, recreación y libertad,
ocupan los primeros puestos Chile, Cos-
son restringidas las libertades públicas y
en los términos en que actualmente dispo-
ta Rica, Argentina y Uruguay- son los que
particularmente la de prensa, los derechos
han disfrutado de un mayor número de
nen de estos bienes esenciales para la rea-
humanos sufren graves atentados, la
lización humana norteamericanos, euro-
años de vida democrática. A su vez los que
Constitución se interpreta en función de
habitualmente vivieron dominados por
peos y japoneses.
los antojos de Fujimori y el Congreso Na-
dictaduras El Salvador, Bolivia, Hondu-
La constatación de esta realidad y la per-
cional es un sello que imprime los dicta-
ras, Guatemala, Nicaragua y Haití- se ubi-
cepción de que la democracia, además de
dos del presidente de la República. La des-
can en los últimos lugares.
naturalización de las instituciones demo-
ser un sistema político que protegía liber-
Los acontecimientos políticos produci-
cráticas está erosionando la confianza de
tades y derechos, era superior a cualquier
dos recientemente en México y Perú con-
otro para garantizar el desarrollo econó-
los inversionistas y tornando pesimistas
firman la relación estrecha entre progreso
las previsiones sobre el futuro de la econo-
mico y social de los pueblos, fue lo que lle-
económico y honrado ejercicio de la de-
mía peruana.
vó a las naciones integrantes de la Unión
mocracia.
Hay países latinoamericanos, sin embar-
Soviética y a sus satélites europeos a aban-
El triunfo de la oposición, representada
go, que a pesar de su buena conducta de-
donar el totalitarismo comunista y esta-
por el PAN y el PRD, en las elecciones me-
blecer regímenes constitucionales basados
mocrática no han obtenido positivos re-
xicanas y la pérdida de la hegemonía que
sultados económicos. En estos casos las
en el sufragio libre y pluralista de los ciu-
disfrutó el PRI por cerca de setenta años
causas se encuentran en la mala calidad de
dadanos.
en cuerpos legislativos, estados, munici-
los partidos políticos y de sus líderes y en
No fueron diferentes los motivos que lle-
pios y en el estratégico Distrito Federal, no
una inadecuada relación de las institucio-
varon a la minoría blanca a aceptar la de-
han despertado, como muchos temían, in-
nes constitucionales con la realidad de las
mocratización del régimen racista de Su-
cel tidumbre y pesimismo en el mundo de
naciones. EFE.
El océano de la información
Osvaldo Hurtado
Quito
extraer sus frutos. En cambio, los que no lo hacen,
n una reunión en New York, a propósito de los
dejan de ser interlocutores de la sociedad moderna,
documentos que habíamos recibido los
son relegados de sus avances y poco pueden aportar
miembros de la Comisión de Medio Ambien-
al progreso de las actividades en que se desempe-
te y Desarrollo del BID y el PNUD, comenté
ñan, pues, las enseñanzas que un profesional recibió
con el ex-presidente Misael Pastrana sobre las pu-
y aprendió en la universidad se vuelven insuficien-
blicaciones que adquiríamos O llegaban a nuestras
tes u obsoletas unos años después de cuando obtu-
manos, algunas no deseadas, -libros, informes y re-
vo su título. Por ello, para quienes desean mantener
vistas especializadas- tan numerosas que, luego de
al día sus conocimientos, la lectura va dejando de
copar viejos y nuevos estantes, no encontrábamos
ser un pasatiempo -como siempre fue- para conver-
un lugar adecuado donde ubicarlas.
tirse en un diario estudio de textos, trabajo que, a
Con su buen humor bogotano me relató el caso de
veces, suele continuar en noches y fines de semana.
un librero al que un amigo encontró cerrando con
Hasta hace poco el valor de las empresas estuvo
varios candados la puerta de su negocio. Maliciosa-
determinado por el monto de su activo, representa-
mente le preguntó si acaso pensaba que a alguien se
do por la suma de bienes de su propiedad: físicos,
le podía ocurrir realizar un asalto para robar libro's.
monetarios y ciertos intangibles como patentes y
Con similar ironía el librero respondió, "ala" no pon-
buen nombre. Actualmente si una empresa desea
go seguridades para evitar que se los roben sino pa-
mantener su prestigio y permanecer en el competi-
ra impedir que ingresen nuevos ejemplares.
tivo y globalizado mercado, tal patrimonio es insu-
La anécdota describe muy bien una de las caracte-
ficiente si no cuenta con una organización prepara-
rísticas del mundo de fin de siglo. La vasta y com-
da para procesar los progresos del conocimiento, in-
pleja información que diariamente se publica sobre
troducir innovaciones e incorporar el avance tecno-
los más diversos asuntos, referidos al conocimiento
lógico, tareas a cargo de una red de personas inteli-
humano, se ha multiplicado en tal forma que la bi-
gentes, preparadas y bien informadas (creativos, di-
bliografía que la contiene se ha vuelto indominable,
señadores, ingenieros, analistas, planificadores, fi-
aún en temas especializados y hasta baladíes. Un in-
nancistas, publicistas y en general intermediarios
forme del Instituto Real de Asuntos Internacionales
estratégicos) cuyos aportes determinan el futuro de
(Londres, 1996), sobre las perspectivas del próximo
una actividad económica y los dividendos que reci-
ben los accionistas.
milenio, señala que en un año cualquiera de esta dé-
cada se hallan trabajando (y muchos publicando los
Algo parecido puede decirse de quienes son los
resultados de sus investigaciones que luego inunda-
principales actores de una sociedad democrática, en
rán bibliotecas, universidades, centros de estudios,
razón de ejercer el gobierno, trazar el rumbo de los
librerías y ahora el internet) más científicos que to-
países, conducir los asuntos públicos y, con su ac-
dos los que existieron en la historia humana hasta
ción, determinar los beneficios económicos y socia-
mediados de los años 60. Añade, luego, algo igual-
les que reciben los ciudadanos y sus familias. Políti-
mente sorprendente. Si las revistas que anualmente
cos que no mantienen al día sus lecturas y partidos
se editan acerca del cáncer se acumularan en un so-
que permanecen ajenos al conocimiento moderno
lo lugar, alcanzarían una altura mayor que un rasca-
0 carecen de acceso a fuentes actualizadas de infor-
cielos de New York. Con este antecedente me aven-
mación, particularmente en el campo de la econo-
turo a suponer que las publicaciones que se hacen
mía que tan determinante es para el éxito de la ges-
sobre economía seguramente cubrirían una parte de
tión pública, detienen el progreso de las naciones,
Manhattan.
ocasionan perjuicios a los pueblos y sumen en el
Esta asombrosa dinámica del conocimiento plan-
atraso a sus países.
tea a individuos, sociedades y países la necesidad de
seguir su vertiginoso curso con la asiduidad de
(EFE)
quien vela por la salud de un enfermo y de discrimi-
nar sus contenidos temáticos para no perderse en
Este artículo fue publicado la semana anterior pero,
sus intrincados laberintos. Los que así proceden
por un error involuntario en el levantamiento del tex-
consiguen dialogar con la ciencia contemporánea y
to, se lo reedita hoy.
SOMEREIO
- 2 JUL 1997
análisis
Inmigración, política 4 educación
¿Qué pasará con los hispanos en Estados Unidos en el futuro? Es la pregunta del millón. La embestida
antiinmigrante lleva a reflexionar a tres intelectuales: Carlos A. Rosales, Abigail Horn y Róger Lindo.
Los primeros analizan el estado de las leyes de inmigración y la participación política de los latinos; el
tercero presenta un panorama sobre la creciente penetración de inmigrantes asiáticos en sectores de poder
frente a la inercia latina. Rosales dirige el proyecto Centroamérica del Diálogo Interamericano en
Washington; Horn, coordina proyectos del programa de gobernabilidad democrática; y Lindo es editor de
La Opinión de Los Angeles.
Las nuevas leyes al desnudo Carlos A. Rosales y Abigail Horn
«La composición demográfica es el destino en la politi-
madamente un millón de inmigrantes dejarían de recibir
ca americana.»
cupones de alimentos a fines de agosto.
Kevin Phillips
El contenido antiinmigrante de la ley de asistencia so-
The Emerging Republican Majority, 1968.
cial no se dio en un vacio. Según testimonio de un promi-
nente analista político en el Washington Post (25.4.97), la
rushington.- La decisión del presidente
eliminación de asistencia social para inmigrantes legales
W
Clinton y del Congreso de restaurar algu-
fue parte de un acuerdo al interior del Partido Republica-
nos de los beneficios sociales que casi
no para apaciguar a su facción más conservadora del par-
medio millón de inmigrantes legales inca-
tido que aboga por un paro total a la inmigración. Estos
pacitados y de la tercera edad perderían a finales de
apoyarian la inmigración sólo si se establecían mecanis-
agosto en el marco de la ley de reforma de la asistencia
mos que garantizaran que quienes arriban a este país no
social (1996 Welfare Reform Bill), produjo un suspiro
vendrían por recibir asistencia social.
de alivio colectivo en las comunidades hispanas de este
La reacción en contra de la ley ha sido dramática. El
pais. La ley, aprobada por cl Congreso el año pasado y
pánico que el anuncio de la ley creó conllevó a por lo
firmada por Clinton, amenazaba con la descontinuación
menos cinco personas al suicidio. A la hora de asignar
de beneficios federales para aquellos inmigrantes lega-
culpas por estas tragedias, la opinión pública ha fustiga-
les pobres. que por su avanzada edad o por su incapaci-
do duramente a los republicanos. No es de extrañar por
dad fisica o mental, no eran económicamente activos.
ende que las fuerzas políticas que lograron los cambios
No obstante la anulación del aspecto retroactivo de la
en la Icy fueran una alianza de demócratas, Clinton
ley, los inmigrantes legales que arribaron a Estados
quien aunque firmara la ley hizo de los cambios una
Unidos después del 22 de agosto de 1996 (fecha en que
prioridad de su gobierno, activistas pro-inmigración, y
fuera firmada la ley) no serán elegibles para recibir di-
un buen número de republicanos prominentes encabeza-
chos beneficios. Además, según cifras oficiales, aproxi-
dos por, entre otros, los senadores Alfonse D'Amato
32
TENDENCLAS No. 64
(NY) y Mike DeWine (OH), el alcalde de Nueva York,
de la publicación del libro de Phillips. El 90% de los flu-
Rudolph Giuliani, y los representantes de Florida, Heana
jos migratorios a suelo estadounidense desde 1968 pro-
Ros-Lehtinen y Clay Shaw.
viene de grupos propensos -a veces muy marcadamen-
Las malas noticias para los inmigrantes no termina-
te- a votar por el Partido Demócrata. Después de trein-
ron con la ley de reforma a la asistencia social. La nueva
ta años a ese ritmo, las estadísticas están alcanzando ni-
ley migratoria que entró en vigencia el 1 de abril del co-
veles alarmantes para los conservadores antiinmigra-
rriente, incrementa el patrullaje fronterizo, agiliza los
ción. Sus proyecciones del impacto a futuro de la inmi-
procesos de deportación, dificulta el proceso de legaliza-
gración en la política electoral revelan que para el año
ción migratoria y consecuentemente amenaza a partir de
2008 el Partido Republicano se convertiría inexorable-
septiembre, con la deportación masiva a cientos de miles
mente en partido minoritario en elecciones presidencia-
de inmigrantes de México, Centroamérica y el Caribe. Si
les, y que para el mismo año el voto hispano como pro-
bien detrás de la nueva ley están los mismos argumentos
porción del voto total sobrepasará al voto afroamerica-
de siempre en torno a los costos y efectos negativos (so-
no, convirtiéndose así en el voto minoritario más impor-
ciales, económicos, cultura-
tante en el mapa electoral
les) de una política migrato-
americano. Estos cálculos
ria abierta, también es cierto
(ver cuadro) se basan en una
que los voceros de los gru-
complicada fórmula que to-
pos conservadores que se
ma como punto de partida
oponen a la inmigración han
las elecciones de 1988 en las
articulado muy claramente
que George Bush derrotó al
un argumento plenamente
candidato demócrata Mi-
político en contra de la inmi-
chael Dukakis con el 53%
gración.
del voto. Dicho porcentaje
Peter Brimelow y Ed Ru-
representa también el voto
benstein, ambos intelectuales
promedio recibido por los
conservadores, desempolva-
republicanos desde 1968, así
ron en junio en el influyente
como también la proporción
National Review el trabajo
del voto republicano en las
de Kevin Phillips quien pro-
elecciones parlamentarias de
nosticó hace casi treinta años
1994 en las que lograron al-
en The Emerging Republican
canzar el control de ambas
Majority (1968) el adveni-
cámaras del Congreso. Por
miento de una generación de
ende, los autores argumentan
victorias republicanas basa-
que es razonable asumir que
das en un persistente y diná-
dicho porcentaje representa
mico patrón de participación
el ápice de la fortuna electo-
étnica en la política
ral republicana.
norteamericana. Según éstos,
Un estudio reciente de la
los pronósticos de Phillips
prestigiosa Academia Nacio-
resultaron ser acertados. El
nal de Ciencias, así como es-
argumento Phillipsiano esta-
Negra Alvarez. Bodegón. Colección de la artista.
timados de la oficina del
ba anclado firmemente en
censo sobre la composición
que hasta 1965 la médula étnica del país era un 90% eu-
étnica del país revelan que en 1995 la población era 75%
ropea y la mayoria de inmigrantes provenían de paises
anglo sajona, 12% afro-americana, 10% hispana y 3%
que la consolidaban: Alemania, Canadá y el Reino Uni-
asiática. Para el año 2050 y como ha indicado sarcástica-
do. Efectivamente, la historia ha registrado que con la
mente John Hope Franklin, historiador de la Universidad
excepción de Lyndon B. Johnson, ningún candidato de-
de Duke, los Estados Unidos sería «un país que George
mócrata ha recibido la mayoría del voto anglo sajón des-
Washington no reconocería»: 51-54% anglo sajón, 14-
de 1948. No obstante lo anterior, Brimelow y Rubens-
15% afro-americano, 21-26% hispano y 8-10% asiático.
tein argumentan que los triunfos electorales republica-
Además de las altas tasas de crecimiento de las comuni-
nos están rápidamente llegando a su fin.
dades de inmigrantes, y para pesadumbre de Brimelow y
La culpa, según éstos, reside en la implementación
Rubenstein y sus adeptos, su localización geográfica se
de la Ley de Inmigración de 1965 (Immigration and Na-
concentra en cinco Estados -California, Texas, Nueva
tionality Act) que irónicamente entró en vigencia el año
York, Illinois y Florida- que acarréan 166 de los 538
33
votos electorales del pais, 0 sea, el 61% de los 270 votos
las iniciativas republicanas en torno a la asistencia social
necesarios para ganar según el sistema electoral ameri-
e inmigración los empujan a desquitarse apoyando can-
cano.
didaturas demócratas. Según Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, la re-
No obstante lo persuasivo del argumento, un cuerpo
presentante republicana por Florida, nacida en Cuba, el
creciente de evidencia parece refutarlo categóricamente.
malestar propiciado por los duros efectos de la ley de re-
Más aún, existen indicios claros que muchos al interior
forma a la asistencia social parecen haber enviado un
del Partido Republicano no comparten la visión apoca-
"mensaje muy claro a las comunidades inmigrantes:
líptica de Brimelow y Rubenstein. Un análisis más cui-
'Miren, los republicanos nos están dando claros indicios
dadoso de los patrones electorales, particularmente en las
de que no nos quieren en su partido." Ni cortos ni pere-
contiendas locales, revela una propensidad marcada en
zosos, los demócratas han sabido aprovechar esta situa-
las comunidades hispanas de votar por candidatos repu-
ción: en 1996 tanto Clinton como los candidatos demó-
blicanos. "Algunos republicanos han asumido que los
cratas al Congreso obtuvieron 7 de cada 10 votos hispa-
hispanos van a votar por demócratas. Ese supuesto es
nos, un incremento del 10% de dos años atrás, lo que
falso", afirma Chuck Berry, republicano y presidente de
permitió a Clinton ganar California, Arizona y Florida.
la Cámara de Representantes de Colorado quien aspira a
Esos resultados contrastan marcadamente con la ten-
la gobernatura de su Estado. Xavier Becerra, un repre-
dencia de que gracias al voto hispano un buen número
sentante demócrata de Cali-
de republicanos moderados
fornia quien además preside
Proyecciones del vote republicano [A]
han logrado obtener el po-
la bancada hispana en el con-
der local en varias ciuda-
para elecciones presidenciales
greso (Hispanic Caucus)
des y Estados grandes del
comenta, "yo no creo que los
Voto
Voto
Voto
país. Este año en Los An-
Año
republicano
afroamericano
hispano
hispanos estén casados al Par-
total (%)
geles, por ejemplo, adonde
como proporción del voto total (%)
tido Demócrata."
la proporción del voto lati-
1988
53%
10.7%
7.4%
Varios artículos en The
no ya superó a la del voto
Proyecciones
New Republic, el New York
afroamericano. el republi-
2000
50.7
11.3
10.0
Times, el Washington Post, el
2004
50.3
11.4
10.8
cano Richard Riordan ganó
Wall Street Journal y el con-
2008
7,49.9
11.6
11.7
la alcaldía con el 60% del
servador Weekly Standard re-
2012
49.5
11.7
12.6
voto hispano contra su
conocen un importante cam-
2016
49
11.8
13.5
contrincante, el demócrata
bio estructural que está defi-
2020
48.7
12.0
14.4
Tom Hayden, quien reci-
niendo los resultados electo-
2024
48.3
121
15.6
biera el 75% del voto
rales en las ciudades y los Es-
2028
47.8
12.2
16.6
afroamericano. Muchos
2032
47.4
12.3
17.6
tados más grandes de la
analistas y estrategas repu-
2036
47.0
12.4
18.6
Unión Americana. El axioma
blicanos están recetando
2040
46.5
12.5
19.7
de que las preferencias elec-
2044
46.0
12.6
20.7
un nuevo esquema de ac-
torales hispanas se asemejan
2048
45.7
127
cionar político mediante el
al voto afroamericano (mayo-
2052
45.3
12.9
21.6
cual se buscaría atraer el
ritariamente demócrata) está
apoyo y simpatía del. vo-
siendo desafiado por una do-
tante hispano. "Eso no es
sis de realismo político que
algo para lo cual somos
muestra que los hispanos es-
muy buenos," confiesa el
tán resultando ser conservadores en temas económicos.
senador Phil Graham de Texas. Pero es claro que mu-
así como en algunos temas sociales como el crimen y la
chos están tomando conciencia de las posibilidades. y
familia. Más importante aún. los hispanos han mostrado
republicanos desde Giuliani -quien necesita el voto
la voluntad de emitir votos republicanos en proporciones
hispano para lograr su reelección como alcalde de Nue-
importantes. Esto obedece a que en los últimos 20 años
va York en el otoño, hasta Newt Gingrich- quien re-
el número de hogares hispanos con ingresos por encima
cientemente contrató a una vocera hispana para mejorar
de los $35.000 anuales se ha triplicado a 2.4 millones. El
su comunicación con la comunidad latina, están voltean-
perfil socioeconómico del latino ha variado significati-
do la espalda a las advertencias de ideólogos como Bri-
vamente en los últimos años lo que implica que muchos
melow y Rubenstein. cuya postura antiinmigrante y has-
de los elementos de su visión política ahora incluye, en-
ta racista nubla su visión política y optan por estrategias
tre otras posturas tradicionalmente conservadoras, la re-
confrontativas y polarizantes que sólo empujarían al vo-
ducción de los impuestos y de la regulación económica.
tante hispano a los brazos abiertos del Partido Demócra-
Empero, la ansiedad de los inmigrantes causada por
ta.
34
TENDENCIAS No. 64
18
LA PRENSA
10 SEP 1997
OPINION
El futuro de la política comercial de E.U.A.
Carlos A. Rosales y Kati Suominen
Llegó septiembre y con él ha comenzado en Wa-
proco con Chile.
shington la última sesión legislativa del año. Unio de los
El objetivo de este cambio de estrategia es claro:
debates más enconados que protagonizarán los mora-
desligar el "fast-track" de NAFTA ya que ése es un te-
dores del Capitolio en los próximos meses será el rela-
ma que no goza de mucha popularidad en Washington.
cionado con el tema comercial Este día el presidente
Hasta la Casa Blanca admite que los beneficios econó-
Bill Clinton dará a conocer su estrategia legislativa para
micos de NAFTA han sido sólo "modestos" pero el sen-
pedir ante el Congreso la aprobación de un mecanismo
tir para muchos es que su impacto ha sido negativo. La
de "vía rápida" (fast-track) que le facilitaría negociar
bancada de congresistas hispanos (Hispanic Caucus) ha
tratados comerciales. Dicha medida le permitiría cum-
declarado que se pronunciará en contra de la "vía rápi-
plir con el compromiso adquirido en la Cumbre de las
da" si la petición de Clinton no incluye medidas especí-
Américas de 1994 en Miami de negociar la inclusión
ficas de índoles laboral y ambiental que contrasten
de Chile al Tratado de Libre Comercio de Norteamérica
cualquier efecto adverso como los que, ellos argumen-
(NAFTA, por sus siglas en inglés) que conforman Cana-
tan, han sido causados por NAFTA.
dá, E.U.A. y México. Asimismo, el "fast-track". le permi-
Otras realidades políticas del libre comercio dificul-
tiría a Clinton tanto avanzar con liderazgo americano
tan la lucha. Como fue el caso con NAFTA, Clinton ne-
el proyecto hemisférico anunciado también en Miami
cesita el apoyo de los demócratas más que el de los re-
de construir para el año 2005 un Area de Libre. Co-
publicanos en su cruzada por "fast-track" ya que son
mercio de las Américas (ALCA), así como también ne-
los primeros los que representan los intereses sindica-
gociar acuerdos comerciales con cualquier país 0 re-
les y los distritos fronterizos que temen perder-empleos
gión del hemisferio.
por la presunta fuga de inversión que resultaría de
Clinton busca la aprobación del Congreso antes del
acuerdos comerciales por la "vía rápida"
cierre de esta sesión legislativa y evitar así continuar la
batalla en el 98 que es año electoral para los legislado-
¿Y que pasó con la paridad NAFTA?
res. El "fast-track" le daría a Clinton además la autori-
Por cuarta vez en los últimos tres años una iniciativa
dad y libertad que necesita para la próxima Cumbre de
de la administración Clinton que pretendía extender los
las Américas a realizarse en Chile el próximo abril
beneficios de NAFTA a los países de la Cuenca del Ca-
donde se tratará el ALCA. Los estrategas demócratas
ribe fracasó en julio ante el Congreso. Tal esquema, co-
quisieran también conseguir el aval de por lo menos la
nocido comúnmente como. "paridad de NAFTA", permi-
Cámara de Representantes para cuando Clinton viaje a
tiría que los textiles y el vestuario de 23 países de Cen-
Sur América en octubre.
troamérica y el Caribe reciban igual trato tarifario que
Dificil clima político
los fabricados en México. Clinton aseguró hace cuatro
meses en Costa Rica que a diferencia de los intentos
Todo parece indicar que lo único que es seguro a es-
previos, este último plan de la Casa Blanca sería apro-
ta altura es que Clinton enfrentará una dura batalla le-
bado por el Congreso ya que los costos que ocasionaría
gislativa. La coalición nacional de corporaciones esta-
la expansión de los beneficios arancelarios estarían cu-
dounidenses pro "vía rápida" y libre comercio Business
biertos en el marco del acuerdo entre republicanos y
Roundtable reconoce que "el chima político para consi-
demócratas para balancear el presupuesto nacional.
derar nuevos tratados comerciales no es bueno". Según
Por ahora el proyecto de paridad de NAFTA ha
éstos, "los sindicatos, grupos pro-derechos humanos,
muerto. Aunque se habla de que la Casa Blanca va a
proteccionistas, aislacionistas y ambientalistas están
introducir al Congreso otra iniciativa a su favor, se es-
cuestionando los méritos del libre comercio". Aunque
pera que el capital político que el presidente gastará en
se anticipa que Clinton recibirá el "fast-track" con el
su esfuerzo por conseguir el "fast-track" será tal que
apoyo de los conservadores pro-libre comercio del con-
los prospectos para la paridad de NAFTA no son alen-
greso, el proyecto de ampliar NAFTA será particular-
tadores. Como que ni la quinta será la vencida.
mente difícil. No por nada en las últimas semanas la
Casa Blanca ha indicado que en lugar de negociar la
El primer autor dirige el proyecto Centro América del
inclusión de Chile a NAFTA, la administración busca
Diálogo Interamericano en Washington D.C. y la segunda es
suscribir un tratado de libre comercio bilateral y recí-
Asistente del Presidente de la misma organización.
CLARIN Domingo 24 de agosto de 1997
Un alboroto exagerado entre los
amigos de Sudamérica
OPINION
MICHEL SHIFTER
Washington funciona de un modo pe-
to funcionarios estadounidenses como
culiar, especialmente en agosto, cuan-
británicos se apresuraron a restarle im-
do el calor es intenso y la vida política
portancia a tal posibilidad. A esta mix-
se paraliza casi por completo. Sin em-
tura se sumó la reciente declaración del
bargo, dos anuncios recientes sobre te-
presidente Menem, de que el intento
mas militares y estratégicos parecen
brasileño de alcanzar un lugar en un
haber generado cierta preocupación en
expandido Consejo de Seguridad de la
Chile, Argentina y Brasil. La decisión
ONU alteraría el balance regional.
de levantar un embargo de 20 años so-
Las reacciones a estos recientes
bre la venta de armamento estratégico
anuncios en el Cono Sur son compren-
a América latina se tomó el pasado pri-
sibles, pero exageradas. Ellas reflejan
mero de agosto en reconocimiento a
una mala lectura de la política de
los avances democráticos en la región.
Washington. Suponen, además, la exis-
Y la posible decisión de otorgar a Ar-
tencia de algún gran plan maestro de
gentina el status de aliado extra-OTAN,
los EE.UU. en la región. No existen,
se tomaría en reconocimiento a la cola-
por ejemplo, evidencias que sugieran
boración estrecha y generosa de dicho
que los EE.UU: están tratando de al-
país con los Estados Unidos en diver-
canzar algún objetivo estratégico al
sas operaciones de paz. A la luz de tales
otorgar status extra-OTAN a la Argenti-
intenciones, presuntamente benignas,
na. Pero es comprensible que chilenos,
¿por qué tanto alboroto?
brasileños O argentinos formulen pre-
Chile se muestra especialmente irri-
guntas y se preocupen al enterarse de
tado por la posible extensión del status
que otros países que tienen tal status
extra-OTAN a la Argentina, como me-
son Israel, Egipto, Jordania, Corea del
dio de disipar sus preocupaciones so-
Sur y Japón. ¿Cuáles son las intencio-
bre un posible desbalance militar. Chi-
nes de los EE.UU.? Las respuestas son
le no se ve a sí mismo necesariamente
probablemente mucho menos comple-
como beneficiario del cambio de políti-
jas de lo que nuestros amigos chilenos,
ca norteamericana en materia de arma-
argentinos o brasileños presumen.
mentos. Aunque la secretaria de Esta-
Hay indicios de que el presidente
do, Madelaine Albright, aclaró que el
Clinton aprovechará su visita a la Ar-
status que obtendría Argentina sería
gentina en octubre para anunciar for-
fundamentalmente "simbólico", y que
malmente el nuevo status. Sería impor-
otros buenos amigos de los EE.UU., CO-
tante que el viaje le sirva también de
mo Chile, podrían eventualmente cali-
oportunidad para delinear una política
ficar para el status extra-OTAN (¿tal vez
hemisférica más amplia y coherente,
extra-NAFTA?), en Argentina, Brasil y
que enfatice la paz y la estabilidad en la
Chile las declaraciones de Albright fue-
región, y el papel saludable jugado por
ron interpretadas por algunos como
el Mercosur y otros acuerdos económi-
una decisión de sentido estratégico.
COS subregionales.
Algunos analistas creyeron que otor-
gar ese status a la Argentina podría
Es director del Diálogo Interamericano y profesor en
preocupar a Gran Bretaña, aunque tan-
la Universidad de Georgetown en Washington.
14 Sábhido 19 Julio 'de' 1997 E/Diário de Hoy
ARTES Y LETRAS
Piedra de toque
MÉXICO LINDO
MARIO VARGAS LLOSA
La derrota del PRI en las elecciones mexicanas del do-
oposición, el PRD y el PAN, que, sumadas, tendrán ma-
ese formidable 48% de los votos que le ha dado el triun-
mingo 6 de julio, en las que el Partido Revolucionario
yoría Congreso, pero, por separado, representan han-
fo. Enhorabuena y albricias. Con sus suaves maneras, su
Institucional, que desde hacía 68 años gobernaba el
cadas inferiores a las del PRI. Como es sabido, aparte de
parquedad retórica, demostrado una convicción yuna
país como si fucra su feudo, perdió la Alcaldia de la ca-
su coincidencia en la lucha por la democratización de
voluntad que le van a ser muy necesarias para montar el
pital y cl control de la Cámara de Diputados, donde los
México, las diferencias ideológicas entre ambas son con-
potro chúcaro de un Distrito Federal que está técnica-
partidos de oposición -cl PAN y el PRD- tendrán la
siderables y, qué duda cabe, el Gobierno tratará de ex-
mente quebrado, hacer frente a las expectativas de mu-
mayoría absoluta, no significa todavia el fin de la dic-
plotarlas a fondo y de agravarlas, porque nada favorece-
chos millones de mexicanos empobrecidos que votaron
tadura perfecta, pero sí un paso decisivo hacia la de-
ría más el empeño de recuperación del PRI, que una lu-
por él, esperando de su gestión edilicia poco menos que
mocratización de la nación más poblada de lengua cs-
cha enconada entre sus dos rivales.
un milagro.
pañola. Se trata de un hecho de enorme trascendencia,
El PAN es de centro-derecha, y el PRD, de centro-
endrá el ingeniero Cárdenas la lucidez el prag-
y no sólo para México, cuya historia puede experimen-
izquierda, hablando grosso modo, como les gusta a los
matismo suficientes para comprender que éxito, a par-
tar un vuelco que acelere su modernización y desarro-
horribles politólogos. Eso no deberia ser un obstáculo pa-
tir de ahora, va a depender de que tenga cl coraje de no
llo; también para toda América Latina, donde el mal
ra que sus respectivas dirigencias tengan siempre pre-
poner en práctica las anticuadas recetas populistas, an-
ejemplo del astuto sistema de apropiación del poder in-
sente en los meses venideros -cuando se decidirá si es-
timercado antiempresa privada, intervencionistasy di-
geniado por el PRI -el más eficaz y duradero que ha-
te principio de democratización se profundiza másbien
rigistas, que ha venido defendiendo todos estos años pa-
va conocido la humanidad en este siglo- fue una he-
estanca y corrompe cuál debe ser la primera prioridad
ra marcar distancias ideológicas con el supuesto ultrali-
chicera tentación para todas las dictaduras. Varias de
política para México. Ella sólo puede ser la de continuar
beralismo del PRI y de sus rivales del PAN? Si lo tiene, e
éstas, como las de los generales Velasco Alvarado, en
con este proceso al que han dado tan formidable pistole-
inspirado en el ejemplo de un Tony Blair y los laboristas
Perú, y Torrijos, en Panamá, trataron de imitarlo, pe-
tazo de partida los mexicanos que acudieron a las urnas
británicos, 0 de IIII Ricardo Lagos y los socialistas chile-
ro sin éxito, pues ninguna de ellas se resignó al regici-
el domingo 6 de julio. Y si hay un ejemplo que deberian
nos que lo siguen, renuncia al populismo estatista (gram
dio ritual a que el PRI se sometia periódicamente con
tener presente es el de Chile. Alli, la lúcida identificación
causante de la corrupción y el subdesarrollo económico
consultas electorales amañadas para dar una aparien-
de la prioridad democrática llevó a las fuerzas de oposi-
de América Latina), el capital interno y externo (que en
cia de movilidady alternancia democráticas (en verdad,
ción a la dictadura de Pinochet a unirse en una alianza,
estos momentos está dándole un voto de confianza). no
se trataba de cambiar presidentes para que el sistema
que a muchos pareció contra natura, destinada at nom-
huirade México, como prodicen versarios ocu-
continuara incólume).
perse por mpatibilidades ideológicas. En efecto, ¿co-
rrira: por el contrario, acudirá a contribuir al desarrollo
Dicho esto, conviene no ceder a la euforia y evaluar
mo podian durar, aliados, el Partido Socialista, de
de un pais dotado de gigantescos recursos y al que una
lo ocurrido con objetividad. Según el recuento del
Salvador Allende,y la Democracia Cristiana, de Frei. que
estabilidad institucional (que solo garantiza una demo-
Instituto Federal Electoral, el PRI alcanza un 38.86% de
habia contribuido de modo principalisimo al desplome
cracia, nunca una dictadura) hará mucho más atractivo
losvotos: el Partidode Acción Nacional (PAN),
del Gobierno aquél? embargo, fue posible, aque-
de loque 10 hacia la politica del PRI. decidida siempreet
y el Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). el
lla alianza hizo realidad el retorno de la legalidad y la li-
la cúspide del poder politico huerfana de consenso so-
25.59%. Es decir, el PRI no está muerto, sino muy vivoy
bertad, a ella debe en buena parte que Chile sea abo-
cial. El PAN lo ha visto muy claramentey con-
coleteando, yapareee la primera fuerza politica del
ra la sociedad que prospera más rápido que todo el res-
secuencia. leahora del PRD SU lider queese
país. Aunque se halle en minoria en el Congreso, con-
to de América Latina.
consenso que existe en México a favor de la democracia,
serva el Ejecutivo la presidencia, la mayoria de las go-
Quien abora en el centro de todas las miradas, CO-
se amplie, como en Chile, en favor del único modelo ('(')-
bernaciones- ysu influencia en las instituciones laad-
mo el héroe de la jornada electoral del 6 de julio, es in-
nómico que puede asegurar, junto con la modernización
ministración. los tribunales, los sindicatos, los medios de
geniero Cuanhtémoc Cárdenas. flamante Jefe de
politica del pais, su desarrollo económico. Sin este. la de-
comunicación, el mundo financiero y empresarial- es
Gobierno del Distrito Federal. Verdadera Ave Fénix. el
moeracia mexicana será precaria vivira bajo la amena-
todavia inmensa. Seria ingenuo pensar que. luego de es-
lider del PRD. con una reciedumbre admirable, ha sabi-
72 del desplome. La tentación del populismo podria
to reves. el PRI, y, sobre todo, sus llamados dinosaurios,
do sobrevivir a dos derrotas presidenciales (en eleccio-
-como ocurrió gobierno Alan Garcia. en Perú--
que se opusieron a las reformas liberalizadoras impulsa-
nes de dudosa puleritud. claro está), a crisis internas de
provocar en el Distrito Federal una crisis y un caos que
das porel Presidente Zedillo. equedarán de bra-
su partido, a un escepticismo grande sobre su capacidad
harian las delicias de los enemigo: la democratización
ZOS cruzados. esperando con resignación que la oposición
de liderazgo. a una campaña feroz en su contra, y con-
de México. (' inyectarian un soplo de oxigeno al insepul-
democrática el pueblo mexicano les arrebate 0 merme
tagiar a sus partidarios un entusiasmo que ha premiado
to PRI.
las cuotas de poder que conservan. Por el contrario, es
previsible que las defiendan movilizando todas lasarmas
de persuasión, intimidación y corrupción de que dispo-
nen y que son muy poderosas.
Sin embargo, no le será nada facil al PRI retroce-
der a la sociedad mexicana al pasado ominoso de la ma-
nipulación el embauque en el que ha vivido por casi sic-
to décadas. Una barrera mágica se ha roto, como cuan-
do los obreros polacos de Solidaridad. en 1981, paraliza-
ron los astilleros de Gdansk y demostraron que la dicta-
dura comunista no era invulnerable. Decenas de millo-
nes de hombres y mujeres han tenido, por fin, la emul-
sionante sensación de que sus votos depositados en las
anforas, no constituian una pantomima publicitaria ca-
exterior una burla periódica para plebiscitar al pa-
quidermo gobernante sino una decisión libre, con con-
secuencias inmediatas sobre las estructuras de poder,
que, a raiz de estas elecciones, quedaban profundamen-
tc reformadas. Esos votos no sólo han cambiado caras y
nombres en los escaños del Congreso, las alcaldias y go-
bernaciones; han cambiado el sistema político y la psi-
cologia del votante mexicano, dándole conciencia de su
poder de su derecho a modelar su sistema de gobierno,
de acuerdo a su soberana voluntad. Quienes han gusta-
do de use exquisito alimento que as el ejercicio de la li-
bertad, no permitirán sin rebelarse que se les cambie de
dieta, de manera intempestiva, en las futuras consultas
electorales. Y ellos cuentan además, ahora, con una im-
portante baza: una opinión internacional que ha cele-
brado lo ocurrido en México, como una gran conquista
democrática, y que, sin la menor duda, seguirá de cerca
la continuación de este proceso, apoyándolo reservas.
La mejor prueba de ello ha sido la positiva reacción que
estas elecciones han tenido en el mundo de los inversio-
nistas, donde nose ha registrado el menor síntoma de in-
quietud con lo ocurrido.
La mayor responsabilidad de lo que suceda ahora
en la vida política de México, recae en las dos fuerzas de
OESP 13/10/97
ANALISE
Ansiedade explicável
ROBERTO
Ministros de Co-
que tem se discutido nos últimos
TEIXEiRA DA COSTA
mércio Exterior
meses é a questão cronológica:
dos 34 países, rea-
as desgravações tarifárias den-
S visitas
tro do hemisfério deverão ocor-
A
lizada ém Belo
que perio-
Horizonte em
rer antes de 2005 ou tão somen-
dicamente
maio. Até então,
te a partir de então? Há indica-
nos fazem os che-
pouco se ouviu ou
ções prévias de que os america-
fes de Estado
se discutiu a res-
nos gostariam que alguns itens
13 só em 1997
peito.
dessa complexa agenda fossem
cm sua maior par-
As reuniões
discutidos antes e em alguns ca-
te costumam pas-
preparatórias an-
sos até antecipados. A posição
sar desapercebida
teriorel que se se-
do Mercosul tem sido clara: deve
pela mídia pela
guirain à de Mia-
prevaleter 0 single undertaking,
opinião pública.
mi, realizadas em
ou seja, nada estará resolvido
Fora a visita de
Denver (EUA) e
até que tudo esteja resolvido.
Jacques Chirac. e
A presença
Cartagena (Co-
Outro item na pauta da visita
mais recentemen-
de Clinton
18mbia), tiveram
parece a esta altura menos con-
to do papa João
pouca repercus-
troverso a convivência do
Paulo II, dificil-
provoca maior
são represen-
Mercosul com a Alca. Manifesta-
mente essas pre-
repercussão em
tação empresarial
ções recentes dos EUA são no
senças suscitam
brasileira naque-
sentido de que a Alca, entrando
debates e criam
função da relação
les dois momentos
em operação, não implicará no
expectativas.
comercial
foi no mínimo mo-
desaparecimento do Mercosul.
Certamente es-
desta a tema Alca
Não creio que na agenda pre-
se não è 0 caso da
parecia distante e
sidencial o ilustre visitante vá fa-
chegada ao Brasil hoje do presi-
não preocupava nossos empre-
zer pressão sobre o anfitrião a
dente Bill Clinton. Essa ansieda-
'sários ainda digerindo a abertu-
respeito de tema tão delicado, já
de i perfeitamente explicável
ra da economia, num mundo ca-
tratado pelos canais diplomáti-
pela liderança que os Estados
da vez mais globalizado e compe-
cos competentes. Até porque, o
Unidos ocupam na economia
titivo.
acordo de Miami cobria também
mundial. e por um ciclo de gran-
A reunião de Belo Horizonte
temas como meio ambiente,
de prosperidade. Trata-se tam-
nos trouxe a realidade, mostran-
acesso a tecnologia. educação e
béin da primeira viagem que O
do que 2005 não é tão distante e
treinamento c a questão do nar-
presidente Clinton fará a três
um acordo de livre comércio com
cotráfico c fato de Barry Mc-
países da América do Sul. Ante-
os EUA poderia, a curto prazo,
Caffrey, czar da luta contra as
riormente marcada para o mês
exercer uma forte influência no
drogas, estar comitiva é bein in-
de maio. foi adiada. 0 que au-
nosso parque industrial. Se é
dicativo. Esses temas deverão es-
mentou a expectativa. É também
verdade que esse acordo abriria
tar agendados nos encontros en-
a sétima visita que um presiden-
possibilidades de acesso direto
tre nossos presidentes.
te americano faz 30 Brasil. Os
de produtos brasileiros aos EUA,
Apesar de estarmos na época
anteriores foram Roosevelt, Tru-
a observação mais sensata é que
das teleconferências e de a pre-
man. Eisenhower. Carter, Rea-
pelo menos inicialmente, os
sença americana no Brasil (e vi-
gan e George Bush.
americanos teriam grande van-
ce-versa) ser tão marcante pelas
No entanto, sem dúvida, essa
tagem por sua maior produtivi-
questões geográficas, culturais e
presença do presidente america-
dade industrial. Se isso já não
valores que comungamos histo-
no. entre nós. provoca maior re.
bastasse, há a preocupação go-
ricamente - como democracia e
percussão em função da presen-
vernamental sobre nossas con-
liberdade ainda assim a vinda
to relação comercial e de investi-
tas externas. particulamente no
de Clinton é importante. Estou
mento. entre nossos países e a
que se refere à balança comer-
certo de que. malgrado algumas
questão da Área de livre Comér-
cial. Do déficit previsto de US$
diferenças e desencontros. 0 re-
cio das Américas (Alca).
10 bilhões para 1997, estima-se
lacionamento entre nossos pai-
Efetivamente. nos últimos me-
que aproximadamente metade
ses sairá fortalecido.
ses. 0 acordo de livre comércio
será proveniente dos EUA (ex-
hemisférico assinado em Miami
portações do Brasil USS 7 hi-
Roberto Teixeira da Costs. economists. é
em 1994. vem ocupando espaço
lhões e importações de USS 12
vice-presidente do wiwelho de adminis-
crescente na nossa imprensa.
bilhões).
trução do Banco Sul América e presidente
particularmente a partir da pre-
Portanto, não se trata de rejei-
do Capitulu Beasileiro do Couselho de
paracão da terccira reunião dos
ção ao acordo de 1994, mas o
Empresários da America Latina (Gal)
O1 artigos publicades com assinature não addrem opinito do joinal. Sua publi
TENDÊNCIAS/DEBATES
cação abveded so propósho de estimular . debate dos problems braskeiros
RTL
mundials de refleter as diverses tendendes do contemperánes
Mercosul: precisamos.seguir.em frente
ROBERTO TEIXEIRA DA COSTA
o Mercosul vem apresentando resul-
tados bem superiores à expectativa.
Tanto sob o Angulo da ampliação do
FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO 15/10/97
comércio intra-regional e inter-regio-
nal como na maior aproximação de
nossos vizinhos do Cone Sul princi-
palmente a Argentina, onde rivalidades
históricas inibiam lum melhor diálo-
go-, além de um novo status perante a
comunidade "internacional Ater aqui,
portanto, o Mercosul história
de sucesso,
Cercado defgrande ceticismo pelos
empresários não viam sinergia
nem grande benefício em acordo com a
Argentina Tele foi Viabilizado pela
competencia diplomacia dos dois
maiores países, que, com grande deter
minação, tornaram-no uma realidade.
Não é exagero dizer que, se o Mercosul
zos. o Mercosul, obra de visionários,
dada de desgravação tarifária patroci-
tivesse sido submetido a plebiscito jun-
não faria em cinco anos o que demorou
nada pela OMC no final deste milênio
to a empresários ou políticos, teria sido
30 anos para os europeusl
ou no início do próximo.
fragorosamente derrotado.
Na medida em que os prazos foram
Temas do Mercosul, que deveriam
o sucesso do Mercosul pode ser ex-
sendo cumpridos e os resultados apare-
prioritariamente ocupar nossa agenda,
plicado por três fatores.
cendo -e ao passarmos pela crise do
aguardam o melhor momento. A ques-
o primeiro é a prevalência de regimes
México-, as visões se alteraram. Essa
tão das assimetrias é um deles (o pro-
democráticos. o acordo não teria acon-
situação veio a modificar-se ainda mais
blema recente com o açúcar é um
tecido se vigorassem regimes autoritá-
nitidamente depois que o Chile e Bolí-
exemplo, pois reflete o tema dos subsi-
rios, preocupados com segurança no
via, mesmo sem adesão total, celebra-
dios). Precisamos também buscar con-
conceito militar. Apesar de um certo
ram acordos comerciais que os aproxi-
vergência nas nossas políticas tributá-
distanciamento político, o sistema pô-
maram do Mercosul. Assim, o que pa-
ria, trabalhista e alfandegária. o regime
de ser referendado pelo Congresso de
recia distante, principalmente tendo
automotivo reclama solução definitiva
todos os países envolvidos.
em vista as conversações com a Comu-
o mais rápido possível.
o segundo diz respeito aos resultados
nidade Andina -ou seja, a criação de
A questão de uma moeda comum,
dos programas de estabilização imple-
uma zona de livre comércio na Améri-
que nos obrigasse a uma maior ortodo-
mentados por Argentina e Brasil, que
ca do Sul-, poderia acontecer.
xia, nunca foi analisada detidamente.
reativaram suas economias e induzi-
No entanto, esse sucesso do Merco-
Continuamos conduzindo nosso co-
ram, em momen-
sul, conseguido em
mércio intra-regional em dólares, agra-
tos diferentes, 'o
prazo tão curto e
vando nossos problemas na balança
aumento substan-
Se o Mercosul tivesse
com resultados tão
comercial, sem aceitar nossas próprias
moedas.
cial das correntes
expressivos, é a Γa-
de comércio entre
sido submetido a
A formulação de uma política para a
zão dos seus pro-
área de serviços (inclusive financeiros)
os dois países.
plebiscito junto a
blemas. Se eles não
e compras governamentais não está na
o plano de con-
forem equaciona-
ordem do dia. As empresas binacionais
versibilidade da
empresários ou políticos
dos, poderão colo-
não saíram do papel. Uma Bolsa de Va-
Argentina e, mais
teria sido derrotado
car em risco o que
lores única para o Mercosul ainda não
tarde, o Real no
até aqui consegui-
foi ensaiada. enquanto os europeus ca-
Brasil criaram for-
mos.
minham nessa direção.
les estímulos às economias internas c
Na medida cm que os resultados fo-
Os diferentes protocolos de integra-
proporcionaram incrementos nas im-
ram aparecendo, nos descuidamos da
ção educativa assinados caminham va-
portações. A corrente de investimentos
implementa ão de uma agenda pró-ati-
garosamente, assim como os de inte-
recíprocos que se seguiu foi outro fator
VA. As descontianças de parte a parte
gração cultural c para 1 formação de
de grande relevância
podem aumentar significativamente se
recursos hum mos no med de pos gra-
o terceiro diz respeito à nova fase de
continuarmos, com uma politica de
duação. Na área de propriedade inte-
internacionalização que o mundo ex-
bombeiros, apagando o fogo que apa-
lectual também pouco avançamos.
perimenta. Efetivamente, a agenda dos
rece aqui e/acolá. Como poderão existir
Não podemos correr 0 risco de que
acordos entre nossos países coincidiu
interessados em que esse incêndio
problemas menores anulem o que já al-
com o fim do protecionismo, desgrava-
aconteça, preciso tomar cuidado.
cançamos. Para isso, a transparência e
ções tarifárias e economias mais aber-
o fato é que nossos países têm tido
0 diálogo entre as partes devem ser
tas, ou só foi possível graças a esses fa-
uma série de outros assuntos na ordem
constantes e sem reservas.
tores, que agora prevalecem.
econômica, que ocupam prioritaria-
Assim, antes de buscar ampliar o
Assim, não é de estranhar que a co-
mente o tempo das autoridades.
Mercosul, devemos consolidá-lo e
munidade internacional tivesse ficado
Nosso Itamaraty tem hoje diante de si
aperfeiçoá-lo, se efetivamente quiser-
tão ou mais surpreendida com nossos
uma robusta pauta de temas, que vão
mos alcançar um mercado comum.
resultados do que nós mesmos. Nossos
desde a Alca (ultimamente ocupando
Roberto Telxeira da Costs. 62. economista, + presiden
retrospectos não eram confiáveis; não
muito espaço) até a revisão das relações
le do Capitulo Brasilelro do Ceal (Conselho de Empresa
éramos vistos como países que respei-
com o México e a Comunidade Andina,
rios da America Latina) e vice presidente do conselho do
Banco Sul America. foi presidente da Comissão de Valo-
tavam compromissos e cumpriam pra-
sem falar na hipótese de uma nova ro-
191 Mobiliários (CVM).
Nova era
DEPOIS DOS PROCESSOS DE DEMOCRATIZAÇÃO E ESTABILIZAÇÃO, CONFIANÇA MARCA OS DEBATES NA AMÉRICA LATINA
ROBERTO TEIXEIRA DA COSTA
que tem respondido conve-
nientemente aos desafios e
N
os últimos anos meu fo-
por uma classe trabalhadora
co de atenção tem se di-
laboriosa, que busca conti-
vidido entre temas liga-
nuamente se aperfeiçoar all-
dos ao mercado de capitais e a
mentando sua produtividade,
questão da integração hemis-
e também nosso grande ativo:
férica.
um mercado consumidor em
Quanto a esse último aspec-
expansão.
to, visitas periódicas a dife-
Os desafios não mudaram:
rentes capitais e cidades da
temos de aumentar nossa ta-
América Latina e participa-
xa de poupança e tornar mais
ção em diferentes tipos de en-
eficientes os recursos aplica-
contros e seminários enrique-
dos em educação. No foro do
ceram minha visão sobre o
Ceal, ou mesmo no recém rea-
processo de mudanças pelo
lizado World Economic Fo:
qual passa nossa reglão.
rumaficou muito clara a ênfa,
"Agora mesmo, na oltava
se no projeto educacional. E
reunlão plenária do Conselho
fator limitativo que devemos
de Empresários da América
enfrentar prioritariamente.
Latina (Ceal), realizada na
A questão da Alca não fol
bela cidade de Quito, à qual
delxada de lado, mas o senti-
mais de 120 empresários da
mento que se adquire é de cer-
reglão estiveram presentes,
ta perda de prioridade, caso
pude constatar algo que mi-
incompetência por não contar
denada a buscar diminuir os
tenha existido algum dia. Não
nha sensibilidade já vinha in-
com uma moeda estável. Mi-
desníveis sociais.
só o "fast track" parece dificil
dicando: os processos de rede-
nha geração já havia pratica-
Nesse contexto é funda-
de ser concedido pelo con-
mocratização e de estabilida-
mente jogado a toalha e pare-
mental que os políticos este-
gresso norte-americano como
de monetária trouxeram um
cia um sonho irrealizável al-
jam à altura desse desafio.
também aqui a perspectiva
dividendo importante a au-
gum dia voltarmos ao contex-
Reconhecemos nossos pro-
não se alterou. Ao contrário, a
toconfiança. Não se trata de
to dos países do Primeiro
blemas e buscamos, dentro
questão do "déficit comercial"
ufanismo nem de bravatas.
Mundo com uma Inflação civi-
das fórmulas democráticas,
com o exterior nos obriga a
Continuamos
lizada.
corrigi-los. Isso provoca certa
políticas prudentes. De outro
conscientes dos
Mercosul se consolida
Assim, o Bra-
ansiedade e incompreensão.
lado, a posição norte-ameri-
enormes desa-
sil e, regra geral,
Os países desenvolvidos nos
cana mostra-se mais concilia-
fios que temos a
e política
os demais paises
cobram providências e acer-
dora. A Alca poderia coexistir
vencer, porém,
norte-americana
do Mercosul têm
tos que até agora não conse-
com o Mercosul.
estamos nos
para a Alca começa
demonstrado
guiram (previdência social,
Apesar das dificuldades
dando conta do
que são capazes
para citar um exemplo), ou
que periodicamente apare-
a se mostrar mais
que já consegui-
de gerir ortodo-
velocidade de realização de
cem (e são normais), o Merco-
mos evoluir ao
conciliadora
xamente seus
paises autoritários.
sul consolida-se, e, dentro do
longo dessa jor-
países, sem de-
o fato de que numa reunião
processo de mundialização,
nada. Mudou a
magogias ou po-
plenária do Ceal, como a que
essa integração é muito im-
tônica do discurso! Não pas-
pulismo. Esperamos que esses
acabamos de realizar, tenha-
portante para 0 País. È me-
samos o tempo nos lamentan-
padrões de governabilidade
mos podido discutir o tema da
thor estarmos dentro do Mer-
do e falando das nossas maze-
se mantenham.
integração x governabilidade,
cosul do que fora dele. Como
las. Não mostramos estatísti-
Pois bem, estamos vivendo
do desenvolvimento sustentá-
lembrava John Bichl, "pensar
cas para ver quem esteve m.c.
essa nova fase c começando a
vel, do papel dos empresários
que a América Latina tivesse
nos mal ou quem tinha ита
realizar os beneficios da esta-
na educação e cultura é sinal
entrado num processo de glo-
inflação suportável.
bilidade. Em contrapartida,
de um novo tempo.
balização sem o Mercosul, SC.
Esse campeonato nos en-
obrigamo-nos a novos esfor-
No caso específico brasilei-
ria pensar numa América do
vergonhava, quando víamos
ços para consolidar 0 que já
ro. olhamos com maior con-
Sul muito humilhada."
num gráfico de barras 0 obe-
conseguimos C, também, dar
fiança nosso maior patrimô-
lismo da inflação brasileira
um salto à frente: esse passo
nio. representado por uma
Roberto Texcira da Costa consultor di
como um monumento à nossa
implica erescer de forma or
classe empresarial dinâmica
relut da Sulamérica
NOV-12-1997 20:04
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456-2983
TO MARIA ECHAVESTE
FASTTrack
FR
PETER NECHELES
RE EL PASO MTG. ON 11/21/97
CA IP
Maria - please let me know if there are additional folks that should be invited (either as panel
members or to attend the session).
Call me if you have any questions. (622-2139)
Thanks.
NOV-12-1997 20:04
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CAIP Advisory Committee Meeting
Friday, November 21, 1997, 9:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. (Mountain Time)
Camino Real Hotel, Salons C& D
101 El Paso Street
El Paso, Texas 79901
Objective for the meeting
-- how can the CAIP integrate into existing activities on the field and national level.
-- review the first 90 days of the operation of the CAIP
Each panel is scheduled for a thirty minute session - panelist will be asked to make
presentations no longer than 5-7 minutes to the Advisory Committee and Federal Agency
Representatives.
At the dias will be the following:
members of the Advisory Committee,
principals from the Finance Committee,
AS Phil Singerman (Commerce) {invited - not confirmed}, and
Irasema Garza, Secretary, the National Administrative Office (Labor) {confirmed}.
Morning session will focus on discussion of El Paso -- what has occurred, what strategies
are being implemented, and what additional items are needed.
Afternoon session will focus on what efforts are being undertaken by Federal agencies,
and the new proposals that will be developed.
Draft agenda:
Continental Breakfast
8:15 - 9:00 a.m.
Opening Statements
9:00 - 9:20 a.m.
Representative Silvestre Reyes {invited - not confirmed}
Representative Esteban Torres {invited - not confirmed}
Mayor Carlos Ramirez {to be invited}
Victor Miramontes {to be invited}
Mozelle Thompson {confirmed}
William Podlich {conflict}
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Presentations by Trade-affected Communities
9:20 - 11:40 a.m.
Panels:
1.
Community & Labor Groups
2.
Businesses
3.
Academic Groups
4.
State and Local Representatives
Lunch
11:40 - 1:00 p.m.
National Efforts in Trade-affected Communities
1:00 -2:45 p.m.
Panels:
S.
Finance Committee & NADBank Los Angeles Office
6.
Departments of Labor & Commerce
Public Comments
2:45 - 3:45 p.m.
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Panel Lists
1.
Community & Labor Panel
Acción El Paso
Carmen Contreras
{invited - not confirmed}
Executive Director
Acción El Paso
Montwood National Bank
7744 North Loop
El Paso, TX 79915
(915) 779-3727
FAX (915) 779-3966
La Mujer Obrera
Cindy Arnold
{confirmed}
La Mujer Obrera
2120 Texas Avenue
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 533-9710
FAX (915) 544-3730
EP Central Labor Union - represent the apparel workers
Bill Arballo
{confirmed - will send VP}
President
7924 Gateway East, Suite 204
El Paso, TX 79915
(915) 594-8691
FAX (915) 594-8694
Willie Valazquez Intitute
Ricardo Castañon
{invited - not confirmed}
Assistant, New Economic Strategies
1712 West Beverly Blvd., Suite 201
Montebello, CA 90640
(213) 728-5613
FAX (213) 728-1020
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2.
Business Panel
El Paso Chamber of Commerce
Wes Jurey
{confirmed}
President and CEO
El Paso Chamber of Commerce
10 Civic Center Plaza
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 534-0537
FAX (915) 577-9916
Lending Institutions
Gerardo (Jerry) Romero
{confirmed}
Vice President and CRA Officer
Norwest Bank El Paso, NA
221 N. Kansas
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 546-4216
FAX (915) 546-4254
South El Paso Redevelopment & Revitalization Association
Tanney Berg
{confirmed}
Executive Director
South El Paso Redevelopment &
Revitalization Association
507509 South Oregon St.
El Paso, TX 79941
(915) 532-4519
FAX (915) 532-4517
Levi Strauss Foundation
Annette Morales
{confirmed- Thelma Petterson}
Director, Community Planning
Levi Strauss Corporation
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 594-5288
FAX (915) [FAX #]
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3.
Academic Panel
El Paso Community College
Dr. Adriana Barrera
{invited - not confirmed - Pam Payne}
President
El Paso Community College
919 Hunter
El Paso, TX 79915
(915) 594-2112
FAX (915) 594-5024
UTEP
Dr. Tim Roth
{to be invited}
Business School
University of Texas, El Paso
College of Business Administration
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-5245
FAX (915) 747-
Dr. Tom Fullerton
{to be invited}
Business School
University of Texas, El Paso
College of Business Administration
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-5247
FAX (915) 747-
Dr. Dennis Soden
{to be invited}
School of Public Policy
University of Texas, El Paso
College of Business Administration
El Paso, TX 79968
(915) 747-5514
FAX (915) 747-
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4.
Local and State Government Panel
Mayor's office
John Edmonson
{confirmed}
Consultant to Mayor Carlos Ramirez
2 Civic Center Plaza
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 541-4437
FAX (915) 541-4501
State Senate
State Sen. Eliot Shapleigh
{tentatively confirmed - Loretta Burgess}
800 Wyoming, Suite A
El Paso, TX 79902
(915) 544-1990
FAX (915) 544-1998
State House
State Rep. Norma Chavez {may have conflict - Manny Romero}
6070 Gateway East, Suite 508
El Paso, TX 79905
(915) 778-9960
FAX (915) 778-4065
State Officials/local workforce board
[CONTACT]
{contact Edmonson for names}
[OFFICE]
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) [PHONE #] FAX (915) [FAX #]
5.
CAIP Panel
NADBank
Hugh Loftus
Director of the Los Angeles Office
North American Development Bank
13191 Crossroads Parkway North, Suite 275
City of Industry, CA 91746-3435
(562) 908-2100
FAX (562) 908-2110
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Treasury
Peter Necheles
Senior Advisor, Government Financial Policy
U.S. Treasury Department
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Room 2415
Washington, DC 20220
(202) 622-2139
FAX (202) 622-0265
Agriculture
Steve Levy
Supervisory Program Analyst, Rural Development
U.S. Department of Agriculture
14th and Independence, SW
Washington, DC 20250
(202) 720-5044
FAX (202) 720-5114
Small Business Administration
Jeanne Sclater
Deputy Associate Deputy Administrator
U.S. Small Business Administration
409 3rd Street, SW
Washington, DC 20416
(202) 205-6657
FAX (202) 205-0617
Carlos Mendoza
District Director
U.S. Small Business Administration
10737 Gateway West, Suite 320
El Paso, Texas 79935
(915) 540-5676
FAX (915) 915-540-5636
6.
Other Federal Efforts (Commerce & Labor)
NAFTA-TAA
[NAME]
[TITLE]
U.S. Department of Labor
[ADDRESS]
Washington, DC [ZIP CODE]
(202) [PHONE #]
FAX (202) [FAX #]
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Department of Labor
[NAME]
[TITLE]
U.S. Department of Labor
[ADDRESS]
Washington, DC [ZIP CODE]
(202) [PHONE #] FAX (202) [FAX #]
EDA
[NAME]
[TITLE]
U.S. Department of Commerce
[ADDRESS]
Washington, DC [ZIP CODE]
(202) [PHONE #] FAX (202) [FAX #]
Other invitees
LULAC
Belen Robles
{to be invited}
President, LULAC
221 N. Kansas, Suite 1200
El Paso, TX 79901
(915) 577-0726
FAX (915) 577-0914
Hispanic Leadership Institute
Margarita Sanchez
{to be invited}
[TITLE]
Hispanic Leadership Institute
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 593-6387
FAX (915) [FAX #]
Local Representatives
State Sen. Robert Duncan
{to be invited}
[ADDRESS]
[CITY], TX [ZIP CODE]
(512) 463-0128
FAX (915) [FAX #]
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State Rep. Paul Moreno
{to be invited}
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 544-0789
FAX (915) [FAX #]
State Rep. Pat Hagerty
{to be invited}
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 532-1391
FAX (915) [FAX #]
State Rep. Joe Picket
{to be invited}
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 590-4349
FAX (915) [FAX #]
State Rep. Gilbert Serna
{to be invited}
[ADDRESS]
El Paso, TX [ZIP CODE]
(915) 860-9183
FAX (915) [FAX #]
DRAFT -- November 12, 1997
Page 9
TOTAL P.10