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COLLECTION:
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Speechwriting
Josh Gottheimer
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FOLDER TITLE:
Assessing the Condition of American Democracy [binder] [2]
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13
Divider Title:
tham. 11/20/95 7:15 PM Page 34
THE STRANGE
DISAPPEARANCE OF
CIVIC AMERICA
BY ROBERT D. PUTNAM
F
or the last year or so, I have been wrestling with a difficult mystery. It is
a classic brainteaser, with a corpus delicti, a crime scene strewn with clues,
and many potential suspects. As in all good detective stories, however,
some plausible miscreants turn out to have impeccable alibis, and some important
clues hint at portentous developments that occurred before the curtain rose.
The mystery concerns the strange disappearance of social capital and civic engage-
ment in America. By "social capital," I mean features of social life-networks, norms,
and trust-that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared
objectives. (Whether or not their shared goals are praiseworthy is, of course, entirely
another matter.) I use the term "civic engagement" to refer to people's connections
with the life of their communities, not only with politics.
Although I am not yet sure that I have solved the mystery, I have assembled evi-
dence that clarifies what happened. An important clue, as we shall see, involves differ-
ences among generations. Americans who came of age during the Depression and
World War II have been far more deeply engaged in the life of their communities than
the generations that have followed them. The passing of this "long civic generation"
appears to be an important proximate cause of the decline of our civic life. This dis-
covery does not in itself crack the case, but when combined with other data it points
strongly to one suspect against whom I shall presently bring an indictment.
Evidence for the decline of social capital and civic engagement comes from a num-
ber of independent sources. Surveys of average Americans in 1965, 1975, and 1985, in
which they recorded every single activity during a day-so-called "time-budget" stud-
A more extended version of this article, complete with references, appears in the Winter 1995 issue of PS, a publica-
tion of the American Political Science Association. This work, originally delivered as the inaugural Ithiel de Sola
Pool Lecture, builds on Putnam's earlier articles, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of
Democracy (January 1995) and "The Prosperous Community," TAP (Spring 1993).
For American Prospect subscriptions and bulk reprints, call 1-800-872-0162.
34 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
nam. 11/20/95 7:16 PM Page 35
ies-indicate that since 1965 time spent on informal socializing and visiting is down
(perhaps by one-quarter) and time devoted to clubs and organizations is down even
more sharply (by roughly half). Membership records of such diverse organizations as
the PTA, the Elks club, the League of Women Voters, the Red Cross, labor unions,
and even bowling leagues show that participation in many conventional voluntary
associations has declined by roughly 25 percent to 50 percent over the last two to
three decades. Surveys show sharp declines in many measures of collective political
participation, including attending a rally or speech (off 36 percent between 1973 and
1993), attending a meeting on town or school affairs (off 39 percent), or working for a
political party (off 56 percent).
Some of the most reliable evidence about trends comes from the General Social
Survey (GSS), conducted nearly every year for more than two decades. The GSS
demonstrates, at all levels of education and among both men and women, a drop of
roughly one-quarter in group membership since 1974 and a
drop of roughly one-third in social trust since 1972. (Trust in
political authorities, indeed in many social institutions, has also
T hose born
declined sharply over the last three decades, but that is concep-
tually a distinct trend.) Slumping membership has afflicted all
between 1910
sorts of groups, from sports clubs and professional associations
and 1940 are
to literary discussion groups and labor unions. Only nationality
substantially
groups, hobby and garden clubs, and the catch-all category of
more engaged
"other" seem to have resisted the ebbing tide. Gallup polls
in community
report that church attendance fell by roughly 15 percent during
affairs than
the 1960s and has remained at that lower level ever since, while
data from the National Opinion Research Center suggest that
people born
the decline continued during the 1970s and 1980s and by now
later.
amounts to roughly 30 percent. A more complete audit of
American social capital would need to account for apparent countertrends. Some
observers believe, for example, that support groups and neighborhood watch groups
are proliferating, and few deny that the last several decades have witnessed explosive
growth in interest groups represented in Washington. The growth of such "mailing
list" organizations as the American Association of Retired People and the Sierra Club,
although highly significant in political (and commercial) terms, is not really a coun-
terexample to the supposed decline in social connectedness, however, since these are
not really associations in which members meet one another. Their members' ties are to
common symbols and ideologies, but not to each other. Similarly, although most sec-
ondary associations are not-for-profit, most prominent nonprofits (from Harvard
University to the Ford Foundation to the Metropolitan Opera) are bureaucracies, not
secondary associations, so the growth of the "third sector" is not tantamount to a
growth in social connectedness. With due regard to various kinds of counterevidence,
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 35
nam. 11/20/95 7:17 PM Page 36
I believe that the weight of available evidence con-
partial one, to our mystery must pass analogous
firms that Americans today are significantly less
tests.
engaged with their communities than was true a
Is the proposed explanatory factor correlated with
generation ago.
trust and civic engagement? If not, that factor prob-
Of course, American civil society is not mori-
ably does not belong in the lineup. For example, if
bund. Many good people across the land work
working women turn out to be more engaged in
hard every day to keep their communities vital.
community life than housewives, it would be hard-
Indeed, evidence suggests that America still out-
er to attribute the downturn in community organi-
ranks many other countries in the degree of our
zations to the rise of two-career families.
community involvement and social trust. But if we
Is the correlation spurious? If parents, for exam-
examine our lives, not our aspirations, and if we
ple, were more likely than childless people to be
compare ourselves not with other countries but
joiners, that might be an important clue. However,
with our parents, the best available evidence sug-
if the correlation between parental status and civic
gests that we are less connected with one another.
engagement turned out to be entirely spurious, due
Reversing this trend depends, at least in part, on
to the effects of (say) age, we would have to remove
understanding the causes of the strange malady
the declining birth rate from our list of suspects.
afflicting American civic life. This is the mystery I
Is the proposed explanatory factor changing in the
seek to unravel here: Why, beginning in the 1960s
relevant way? Suppose, for instance, that people
and accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s, did the
who often move have shallower community roots.
fabric of American community life begin to fray?
That could be an important part of the answer to
Why are more Americans bowling alone?
our mystery only if residential mobility itself had
risen during this period.
THE USUAL SUSPECTS
Is the proposed explanatory factor vulnerable to
Many possible answers have been suggested for
the claim that it might be the result of civic disen-
this puzzle:
gagement, not the cause? For example, even if
newspaper readership were closely correlated with
busy-ness and time pressure;
civic engagement across individuals and across
economic hard times (or, according to alterna-
time, we would need to weigh the degree to which
tive theories, material affluence);
reduced newspaper circulation is the result (not the
residential mobility;
cause) of disengagement.
suburbanization;
Against those benchmarks, let us weigh the evi-
the movement of women into the paid
dence. But first we must acknowledge a trend that
labor force and the stresses of two-career
only complicates our task.
families;
EDUCATION DEEPENS THE MYSTERY
disruption of marriage and family ties;
changes in the structure of the American econo-
Education is by far the strongest correlate that I
my, such as the rise of chain stores, branch firms,
have discovered of civic engagement in all its
and the service sector;
forms, including social trust and membership in
the sixties (most of which actually happened in
many different types of groups. In fact, the effects
the seventies); including
of education become greater and greater as we
Vietnam, Watergate, and disillusion with
move up the educational ladder. The four years of
public life; and
education between 14 and 18 total years have ten
the cultural revolt against authority (sex,
times more impact on trust and membership than
drugs, and so on);
the first four years of formal education. This curvi-
growth of the welfare state;
linear pattern applies to both men and women, and
the civil rights revolution;
to all races and generations.
television, the electronic revolution, and other
Sorting out just why education has such a mas-
technological changes.
sive effect on social connectedness would require a
book in itself. Education is in part a proxy for
The classic questions posed by a detective are
social class and economic differences, but when in-
means, motive, and opportunity: A solution, even a
come, social status, and education are used togeth-
36 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
.am.
11/20/95
7:19
PM
Page
37
er to predict trust and group membership, educa-
roughly 30 percent in social trust since the early
tion continues to be the primary influence. So,
1970s, and probably even more since the early
well-educated people are much more likely to be
1960s.
joiners and trusters, partly because they are better
While this first investigative foray leaves us more
off economically, but mostly because of the skills,
mystified than before, we may nevertheless draw
resources, and inclinations that were imparted to
two useful conclusions. First, we need to take
them at home and in school.
account of educational differences in our explo-
The expansion of high schools and colleges ear-
ration of other factors to be sure that we do not
lier this century has had an enormous impact on
confuse their effects with the consequences of edu-
the educational composition of the adult popula-
cation. And, second, the mysterious disengagement
tion during just the last two decades. Since 1972
of the last quarter century seems to have afflicted
the proportion of adults with fewer than 12 years
all educational strata in our society, whether they
of education has been cut in half, falling from 40
have had graduate education or did not finish high
percent to 18 percent, while the proportion with
school.
more than 12 years has nearly doubled, rising from
MOBILITY AND SUBURBANIZATION
28 percent to 50 percent, as the generation of
Americans educated around the turn of this centu-
Many studies have found that residential stabili-
ry (most of whom did not finish high school) died
ty and such related phenomena as homeownership
off and were replaced by the baby boomers and
are associated with greater civic engagement. At an
their successors (most of whom attended college).
earlier stage in this investigation I observed that
So here we have two facts-education boosts
"mobility, like frequent re-potting of plants, tends
civic engagement sharply, and educational levels
to disrupt root systems, and it takes time for an
have risen massively-that only deepen our central
uprooted individual to put down new roots." I
mystery. By itself, the rise in educational levels
must now report, however, that further inquiry
should have increased
social capital during the
last 20 years by 15-20 per-
EDUCATION AND CIVIC LIFE
cent, even assuming that
the effects of education
Social trust and group membership by years of education
were merely linear.
80%
400
(Taking account of the
curvilinear effect in the
70%
350
figure, "Education and
Social Two
D
Civic Life," the rise in
Group Memberships
60%
3.00
Social Twet
trusting and joining
Group Membershipe
should have been even
moved up the accelerating
"Most people can be trusted"
you.
250
greater, as Americans
40%
2.00
curve.) By contrast, how-
ever, the actual GSS fig-
ures show a net decline
30%
150
Group Membership
since the early 1970s of
roughly the same magni-
20%
1.00
tude (trust by about 20-25
percent, memberships by
109.
050
about 15-20 percent). The
relative declines in social
0%
0.00
0
2
4
6
$
10
12
14
16
18
20
capital are similar within
Education (years)
each educational catego-
ry-roughly 25 percent in
Source: General Social Survey, 1972-1994
group memberships and
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 37
nam 11/20/95 7:20 PM Page 38
fully exonerates residential mobility from any re-
last generation. The central point, however, is that
sponsibility for our fading civic engagement.
the downtrends in trusting and joining are virtually
Data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995
identical everywhere-in cities, big and small, in
(and earlier years) show that rates of residential
suburbs, in small towns, and in the countryside.
mobility have been remarkably constant over the
Of course, Evanston is not Levittown is not Sun
last half century. In fact, to the extent that there
City. The evidence available does not allow us to
has been any change at all, both long-distance and
determine whether different types of suburban liv-
short-distance mobility have declined over the last
ing have different effects on civic connections and
five decades. During the 1950s, 20 percent of
social trust. However, these data do rule out the
Americans changed residence each year and 6.9
thesis that suburbanization per se has caused the
percent annually moved across county borders;
erosion of America's social capital. Both where we
during the 1990s, the comparable figures are 17
live and how long we've lived there matter for
percent and 6.6 percent. Americans, in short, are
social capital, but neither explains why it is eroding
today slightly more rooted residentially than a gen-
everywhere.
eration ago. The verdict on mobility is unequivocal:
PRESSURES OF TIME AND MONEY
This theory is simply wrong.
But if moving itself has not eroded our social
Americans certainly feel busier now than a gen-
capital, what about the possibility that we have
eration ago: The proportion of us who report feel-
moved to places, especially suburbs, that are less
ing "always rushed" jumped by half between the
congenial to social connectedness? In fact, social
mid-1960s and the mid-1990s. Probably the most
connectedness does differ by community type, but
obvious suspect behind our tendency to drop out
the differences turn out to be modest and in direc-
of community affairs is pervasive busy-ness. And
tions that are inconsistent with the theory.
lurking nearby in the shadows are economic pres-
Controlling for such characteristics as educa-
sures so much discussed nowadays, from job inse-
tion, age, income, work status, and race, citizens of
curity to declining real wages.
the nation's 12 largest metropolitan areas (particu-
Yet, however culpable busy-ness and economic
larly their central cities, but also their suburbs) are
insecurity may appear at first glance, it is hard to
roughly 10 percent less trusting and report 10-20
find incriminating evidence. In the first place, time-
percent fewer group memberships than residents
budget studies do not confirm the thesis that
of other cities and towns (and their suburbs).
Americans are, on average, working longer than a
Meanwhile, residents of very small towns and rural
generation ago. On the contrary, a new study by
areas are (in accord with some hoary stereotypes)
John Robinson and Geoffrey Godbey of the
slightly more trusting and civicly engaged than
University of Maryland reports a five hour per
other Americans. Unsurprisingly, the prominence
week gain in free time for the average American
of different types of groups does vary significantly
between 1965 and 1985, due partly to reduced
by location: Major cities have more political and
time spent on housework and partly to earlier
nationality clubs; smaller cities more fraternal, ser-
retirement. Their claim that Americans have more
vice, hobby, veterans', and church groups: and
leisure time now than several decades ago is, to be
rural areas more agricultural organizations. But
sure, contested by other observers, notably Juliet
overall rates of associational membership are not
Schor, who in her 1991 book The Overworked
very different.
American reports evidence that work hours are
Moreover, this pattern cannot account for our
lengthening, especially for women.
central puzzle. In the first place, there is virtually no
But whatever the resolution of that controversy,
correlation between gains in population and losses
other data call into question whether longer hours
in social capital, either across states or across locali-
at work lead to lessened involvement in civic life or
ties of different sizes. Even taking into account the
reduced social trust. Results from the GSS show
educational and social backgrounds of those who
that employed people belong to somewhat more
have moved there, the suburbs have faintly higher
groups than those outside the paid labor force.
levels of trust and civic engagement than their
Even more striking is the fact that among workers,
respective central cities, which should have pro-
longer hours are linked to more civic engagement.
duced growth, not decay, in social capital over the
The patterns among men and women on this score
38 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
nam. 11/20/95 7:23 PM Page 39
are not identical: Women who work part-
time appear to be somewhat more civicly
engaged and socially trusting than either
those who work full-time or those who
do not work outside the home at all-an
intriguing anomaly, though not relevant
to our basic puzzle, since female part-
time workers constitute a relatively small
fraction of the American population, and
the fraction is growing, up from about 8
percent to about 10 percent between the
early 1970s and early 1990s.
But what do workaholics do less?
Robinson reports that, unsurprisingly,
people who spend more time at work do
feel more rushed, and these harried souls
do spend less time eating, sleeping, read-
ing books, engaging in hobbies, and just
doing nothing. Compared to the rest of
FPO
the population, they also spend a lot less
time watching television, almost 30 per-
cent less. However, they do not spend
less time on organizational activity. In
short, those who work longer forego
Nightline, but not the Kiwanis club; ER,
but not the Red Cross.
So hard work does not prevent civic
engagement. Moreover, the nationwide
falloff in joining and trusting is perfectly
mirrored among full-time workers, among part-
social trust. In short, neither objective nor subjec-
time workers, and among those outside the paid
tive economic well-being has inoculated Americans
labor force. So if people are dropping out of com-
against the virus of civic disengagement; if any-
munity life, long hours do not seem to be the rea-
thing, affluence has slightly exacerbated the prob-
son.
lem. Poverty and economic inequality are dreadful,
If time pressure is not the culprit, how about
growing problems for America, but they are not
financial pressures? It is true that people with
the villains of this piece.
lower incomes and those who feel financially
strapped are somewhat less engaged in community
THE CHANGING ROLE OF WOMEN
life and somewhat less trusting than those who are
Most of our mothers were housewives, and most
better off, even holding education constant. On the
of them invested heavily in social capital forma-
other hand, the downtrends in social trust and civic
tion-a jargony way of referring to untold unpaid
engagement are visible among people of all
hours in church suppers, PTA meetings, neighbor-
incomes, with no sign whatever that they are con-
hood coffee klatches, and visits to friends and rela-
centrated among those who have borne the brunt
tives. The movement of women out of the home
of the economic distress of the last two decades.
and into the paid labor force is probably the most
Quite the contrary, the declines in engagement and
portentous social change of the last half century.
trust are actually somewhat greater among the
However welcome and overdue the feminist revo-
more affluent segments of the American public
lution may be, it is hard to believe that it has had
than among the poor and middle-income wage-
no impact on social connectedness. Could this be
earners. Moreover, personal financial satisfaction is
the primary reason for the decline of social capital
wholly uncorrelated with civic engagement and
over the last generation?
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 39
qxd
11/20/95
7:26
PM
Page
40
Some patterns in the survey evidence seem to
women who have chosen to enter the workforce
support this claim. All things considered, women
doubtless differ in many respects from women who
belong to somewhat fewer voluntary associations
have chosen to stay home. Perhaps one reason that
than men do. On the other hand, time-budget
community involvement appears to be rising
studies suggest that women spend more time on
among working women and declining among
those groups and more time in informal social con-
housewives is that precisely the sort of women
necting than men. Although the absolute declines
who, in an earlier era, were most involved with
in joining and trusting are approximately equiva-
their communities have been disproportionately
lent among men and women, the relative declines
likely to enter the workforce, thus lowering the
are somewhat greater among women. Controlling
average level of civic engagement among the
for education, memberships among men have
remaining homemakers and raising the average
declined at a rate of about 10-15 percent a decade,
among women in the workplace.
compared to about 20-25 percent a decade for
No doubt the movement of women into the
women. The time-budget data, too, strongly sug-
workplace over the last generation has changed the
gest that the decline in organizational involvement
types of organizations to which they belong.
in recent years is concentrated among women.
Contrary to my own earlier speculations, however,
These sorts of facts, coupled with the obvious
I can find little evidence to support the hypothesis
transformation in the professional role of women
that this movement has played a major role in the
over this same period, led me in previous work to
net reduction of social connectedness and civic
suppose that the emergence of two-career families
engagement. On the other hand, I have no clear
might be the most important single factor in the
alternative explanation for the fact that the relative
erosion of social capital.
declines are greater among women, both those who
As we saw earlier, however, work status itself
work outside the home and those who don't, than
seems to have little net impact on group mem-
among men. Since this evidence is at best circum-
bership or on trust. Housewives belong to different
stantial, perhaps the best interim judgment here is
types of groups than do working women (more
the famous Scots verdict: not proven.
PTAs, for example, and fewer professional associa-
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
tions), but in the aggregate working women are
actually members of slightly more voluntary associ-
Another widely discussed social trend that more
ations (though housewives, according to Robinson
or less coincides with the downturn in civic
and Godbey, spend more time on them). Moreover,
engagement is the breakdown of the traditional
the overall declines in civic engagement are some-
family unit-mom, dad, and the kids. Since the
what greater among housewives than among em-
family itself is, by some accounts, a key form of
ployed women. Comparison of time-budget data
social capital, perhaps its eclipse is part of the
between 1965 and 1985 seems to show that
explanation for the reduction in joining and trust-
employed women as a group are actually spending
ing in the wider community. What does the evi-
more time on organizations than before, while
dence show?
housewives are spending less. This same study sug-
First of all, evidence of the loosening of family
gests that the major decline in informal socializing
bonds is unequivocal. In addition to the century-
since 1965 has also been concentrated among
long increase in divorce rates (which accelerated
housewives. The central fact, of course, is that the
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and then lev-
overall trends are down for all categories of women
eled off), and the more recent increase in single-par-
(and for men, too, even bachelors), but the figures
ent families, the incidence of one-person households
suggest that women who work full-time actually
has more than doubled since 1950, in part because
may have been more resistant to the slump than
of the rising number of widows living alone. The net
those who do not.
effect of all these changes, as reflected in the
Thus, although women appear to have borne a
General Social Survey, is that the proportion of all
disproportionate share of the decline in civic
American adults currently unmarried climbed from
engagement over the last two decades, it is not easy
28 percent in 1974 to 48 percent in 1994.
to find any micro-level data that tie that fact direct-
Second, married men and women do rank some-
ly to their entry into the labor force. Of course,
what higher on both our measures of social capital.
40 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
11/20/95 7:28 PM Page 41
That is, controlling for education, age, race, and so
1950s and 1960s replaced physical capital, but
on, single people-both men and women,
destroyed social capital, by disrupting existing com-
divorced, separated, and never married-are signif-
munity ties. It is also conceivable that certain social
icantly less trusting and less engaged civicly than
expenditures and tax policies may have created dis-
married people. (Multivariate analysis
incentives for civic-minded philanthropy.
hints that one major reason why
On the other hand, it is much harder to
divorce lowers connectedness is that it
see which government policies might be
lowers family income, which in turn
T
responsible for the decline in bowling
reduces civic engagement.) Roughly
he decline
leagues and literary clubs. Some commu-
speaking, married men and women are
of marriage is
nity institutions sponsored, organized, or
about a third more trusting and belong
subsidized by government, such as
to about 15-25 percent more groups
probably an
National Service, agricultural extension
than comparable single men and
accessory to
programs, and Head Start, may enhance
women. (Widows and widowers are
trust and social capital. Which effect pre-
more like married people than single
the crime, not
vails needs to be resolved with evidence,
people in this comparison.)
the main
not ideology.
In short, successful marriage, espe-
villain.
One empirical approach to this issue
cially if the family includes children, is
is to examine differences in civic engage-
statistically associated with greater
ment and public policy across different
social trust and civic engagement. Thus,
political jurisdictions to see whether
some part of the decline in both trust and member-
enlarged government leads to shriveled social capi-
ship is tied to the decline in marriage. To be sure,
tal. Among the U.S. states, however, differences in
the direction of causality behind this correlation
social capital appear essentially uncorrelated with
may be complicated, since it is conceivable that lon-
various measures of welfare spending or govern-
ers and paranoids are harder to live with. If so,
ment size. Citizens in free-spending states are no
divorce may in some degree be the consequence,
less trusting or engaged than citizens in frugal ones.
not the cause, of lower social capital. Probably the
Cross-national comparison can also shed light
most reasonable summary of these arrays of data,
on this question. Among nineteen member coun-
however, is that the decline in successful marriage is
tries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation
a significant, though modest part of the reason for
and Development (OECD) for which data on
declining trust and lower group membership. On
social trust and group membership are available
the other hand, changes in family structure cannot
from the 1990-1991 World Values Survey, these
be a major part of our story, since the overall
indicators of social capital are, if anything, positive-
declines in joining and trusting are substantial even
ly correlated with the size of the state. This simple
among the happily married. My own verdict (based
bivariate analysis, of course, cannot tell us whether
in part on additional evidence to be introduced
social connectedness encourages welfare spending,
later) is that the disintegration of marriage is proba-
whether the welfare state fosters civic engagement,
bly an accessory to the crime, but not the major vil-
or whether both are the result of some other
lain of the piece.
unmeasured factor(s). Even this simple finding,
however, is not easily reconciled with the notion
THE RISE OF THE WELFARE STATE
that big government undermines social capital.
Circumstantial evidence, particularly the timing
of the downturn in social connectedness, has sug-
RACE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
gested to some observers that an important
REVOLUTION
cause-perhaps even the cause-is big government
Some observers have noted that the decline in
and the growth of the welfare state. By "crowding
social connectedness began just after the successes
out" private initiative, it is argued, state interven-
of the civil rights revolution of the 1960s. That
tion has subverted civil society.
coincidence has suggested the possibility of a kind
Some government policies have almost certainly
of sociological "white flight," as legal desegregation
had the effect of destroying social capital. For exam-
of civic life led whites to withdraw from communi-
ple, the so-called "slum clearance" policies of the
ty associations.
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 41
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The erosion of social capital, however, has
boomers, born in 1947, as they aged from 25 in
affected all races. In fact, during the 1980s the
1972 (the first year of the GSS) to 47 in 1994 (the
downturns in both joining and trusting were even
latest year available). Startlingly, however, such an
greater among African Americans (and other racial
analysis, repeated for successive birth cohorts, pro-
minorities) than among the white majority. This
duces virtually no evidence of such life cycle
fact is inconsistent with the thesis that "white
changes in civic engagement. In fact, as various
flight" is a significant cause of civic disengagement,
generations moved through the period between
since black Americans have been dropping out of
1972 and 1994, their levels of trust and member-
religious and civic organizations at least as rapidly
ship more often fell than rose, reflecting a more or
as white Americans. Even more important, the
less simultaneous decline in civic engagement
pace of disengagement among whites has been
among young and old alike, particularly during the
uncorrelated with racial intolerance or support for
second half of the 1980s. But that downtrend obvi-
segregation. Avowedly racist or segregationist
ously cannot explain why, throughout the period,
whites have been no quicker to drop out of com-
older Americans were always more trusting and
munity organizations during this period than more
engaged. In fact, the only reliable life cycle effect
tolerant whites.
visible in these data is a withdrawal from civic
This evidence is far from conclusive, of course,
engagement very late in life, as we move through
but it does shift the burden of proof onto those
our eighties.
who believe that racism is a primary explanation for
The central paradox posed by these patterns is
growing civic disengagement over the last quarter
this: Older people are consistently more engaged
century. This evidence also suggests that reversing
and trusting than younger people, yet we do not
the civil rights gains of the last thirty years would do
become more engaged and trusting as we age.
nothing to reverse the social capital losses.
What's going on here?
Time and age are notoriously ambiguous in their
GENERATIONAL EFFECTS
effects on social behavior. Social scientists have
Our efforts thus far to identify the major sources
learned to distinguish three contrasting phenomena:
of civic disengagement have been singularly
unfruitful. In all our statistical analyses, however,
Life cycle effects represent differences attribut-
one factor, second only to education, stands out as
able to stage of life. In this case individuals change
a predictor of all forms of civic engagement and
as they age, but since the effects of aging are, in the
trust. That factor is age. Older people belong to
aggregate, neatly balanced by the "demographic
more organizations than young people, and they
metabolism" of births and deaths, life cycle effects
are less misanthropic. Older Americans also vote
produce no aggregate change. Everyone's close-
more often and read newspapers more frequently,
focus eyesight worsens as we age, but the aggregate
two other forms of civic engagement closely corre-
demand for reading glasses changes little.
lated with joining and trusting.
Period effects affect all people who live through
"Civic Engagement by Age" shows the basic
a given era, regardless of their age. Period effects
pattern. Civic involvement appears to rise more or
can produce both individual and aggregate change,
less steadily from early adulthood toward a plateau
often quickly and enduringly, without any age-
in middle age, from which it declines only late in
related differences. The sharp drop in trust in gov-
life. This humpback pattern seems naturally to rep-
ernment between 1965 and 1975, for example, was
resent the arc of life's engagements. That, at least,
almost entirely this sort of period effect, as Amer-
was how I first interpreted the data. But that would
icans of all ages changed their minds about their
be a fundamental misreading of the most important
leaders' trustworthiness. Similarly, as just noted, a
clue in our whole whodunit.
modest portion of the decline in social capital dur-
Evidence from the General Social Survey
ing the 1980s appears to be a period effect.
enables us to follow individual cohorts as they age.
Generational effects affect all people born at
If the rising lines in the figure indeed represent
the same time. Like life cycle effects (and unlike
deepening civic engagement with age, we should
typical period effects), generational effects show up
be able to track this same deepening engagement
as disparities among age groups at a single point in
as we follow, for example, the first of the baby
time, but like period effects (and unlike life cycle
42 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
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Two INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CIVIC GENERATION GAP
Crvic ENGAGEMENT BY AGE (EDUCATION CONTROLLED)
90%
2.5
10%
2
70%
Voted in last presidential election/
"Most people can be trusted"/
60%
Read newspaper daily
1.5
30%
40%
1
Veting TV movt
Group Memberships
30%
Social Tive
20%
G soup Membership
0.5
10%
0%
0
20
30
40
30
60
70
$0
90
Age
Source: General Social Survey, 1972-1994. Respondants aged 21-89. Three-year moving averages. Equal weighting of three
educational categories.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BY GENERATION (EDUCATION CONTROLLED)
80%
899
00000
2
70%
Yoo
°00
Voted in last presidential election/
"Most people can be trusted"/
1.5
60%
Read newspaper daily
50%
Turned 18
I
Group Memberships
in 1920
Turned 18
in 1930s
Turned 18
40%
in 1940s
Turned 18
in 1930s
Voting Turnout (NES)
05
Read Newspaper Daily (GSS)
Turned 18
30%
in 1960h
Social Trust (NES)
Social Trust (GSS)
Turned IN
Group Memberships (GSS)
in 1970s
20%
0
1870-
1910
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1965.
1905
1969
Date of Birth
Source: General Social Survey, 1972-1994, and National Election Studies, 1952-1992. Respondents aged 25-80. Five-year
moving averages. Equal weighting of three educational categories.
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 43
qxd 11/20/95 7:34 PM Page 44
effects) generational effects produce real social
ta, compared to roughly 1.1 memberships per capi-
change, as successive generations, enduringly
ta). The grandparents are more than twice as likely
"imprinted" with divergent outlooks, enter and
to trust other people (50-60 percent compared
leave the population. In pure generational effects,
with 25 percent for the grandchildren). They vote
no individual ever changes, but society does.
at nearly double the rate of the most recent cohorts
(roughly 75 percent compared with 40-45 percent),
Returning to our conundrum, how could older
and they read newspapers almost three times as
people today be more engaged and trusting, if they
often (70-80 percent read a paper daily compared
did not become more engaged and trusting as they
with 25-30 percent). And bear in mind that we
aged? The key to this paradox, as David Butler and
have found no evidence that the youngest genera-
Donald Stokes observed in another context, is to
tion will come to match their grandparents' higher
ask, not how old people are, but when they were
levels of civic engagement as they grow older.
young. The figure on page 43, "Social Capital and
Thus, read not as life cycle effects, but rather as
Civic Engagement by Generation," addresses this
generational effects, the age-related patterns in our
reformulated question, displaying various measures
data suggest a radically different interpretation of
of civic engagement according to the respondents'
our basic puzzle. Deciphered with this key, the fig-
year of birth.
ure on page 43 depicts a long "civic" generation,
born roughly between 1910 and 1940, a broad
THE LONG CIVIC GENERATION
group of people substantially more engaged in
In effect, the figure on page 42 lines up
community affairs and substantially more trusting
Americans from left to right according to their date
than those younger than they. (Members of the
of birth, beginning with those born in the last third
1910-1940 generation also seem more civic than
of the nineteenth century and continuing across to
their elders, at least to judge by the outlooks of rel-
the generation of their great-grandchildren, born in
atively few men and women born in the late nine-
the last third of the twentieth century. As we begin
teenth century who appeared in our samples.) The
moving along this queue from left to right-from
culminating point of this civic generation is the
those raised around the turn of the century to those
cohort born in 1925-1930, who attended grade
raised during the Roaring Twenties, and so on-we
school during the Great Depression, spent World
find relatively high and unevenly rising levels of civic
War II in high school (or on the battlefield), first
engagement and social trust. Then rather abruptly,
voted in 1948 or 1952, set up housekeeping in the
however, we encounter signs of reduced community
1950s, and watched their first television when they
involvement, starting with men and women born in
were in their late twenties. Since national surveying
the early 1930s. Remarkably, this downward trend in
began, this cohort has been exceptionally civic:
joining, trusting, voting, and newspaper reading
voting more, joining more, reading newspapers
continues almost uninterruptedly for nearly 40
more, trusting more. As the distinguished sociolo-
years. The trajectories for the various different indi-
gist Charles Tilly (born in 1928) said in comment-
cators of civic engagement are strikingly parallel:
ing on an early version of this essay, "We are the
Each shows a high, sometimes rising plateau for
last suckers."
people born and raised during the first third of the
To help in interpreting the historical contexts
century; each shows a turning point in the cohorts
within which these successive generations of
around 1930; and each then shows a more or less
Americans matured, the figure also indicates the
constant decline down to the cohorts born during
decade within which each cohort came of age.
the 1960s.
Thus, we can see that each generation that reached
By any standard, these intergenerational differ-
adulthood since the 1940s has been less engaged in
ences are extraordinary. Compare, for example, the
community affairs than its immediate predecessor.
generation born in the early 1920s with the genera-
Further confirmation of this generational inter-
tion of their grandchildren born in the late 1960s.
pretation comes from a comparison of the two
Controlling for educational disparities, members of
parallel lines that chart responses to an identical
the generation born in the 1920s belong to almost
question about social trust, posed first in the
twice as many civic associations as those born in
National Election Studies (mainly between 1964
the late 1960s (roughly 1.9 memberships per capi-
and 1976) and then in the General Social Survey
44 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
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7:35
PM
Page
45
between 1972 and 1994. If the greater
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF A CIVIC GENERATION
trust expressed by Americans born earlier
in the century represented a life cycle
effect, then the graph from the GSS sur-
veys (conducted when these cohorts were,
on average, 10 years older) should have
been some distance above the NES line. In
fact, the GSS line lies about 5-10 percent
below the NES line. That downward shift
almost surely represents a period effect
that depressed social trust among all co-
horts during the 1980s. That downward
period effect, however, is substantially
more modest than the large generational
Members of given birth-cohorts as a
percentage of total adult population
you
differences already noted.
(aged 20 and up)
20%
In short, the most parsimonious interpre-
tation of the age-related differences in civic
engagement is that they represent a power-
ful reduction in civic engagement among
1930
auge
1900
1000
2000
Americans who came of age in the decades
Year
after World War II, as well as some modest
Source: Calculated from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports.
additional disengagement that affected all
cohorts during the 1980s. These patterns hint that
stalled a cataclysmic drop" in voting turnout, and it
being raised after World War II was a quite different
had a similar delaying effect on civic disengage-
experience from being raised before that watershed.
ment more generally.
It is as though the postwar generations were
Second, the full effects of generational develop-
exposed to some mysterious X-ray that permanently
ments generally appear several decades after their
and increasingly rendered them less likely to connect
onset, because it takes that long for a given genera-
with the community. Whatever that force might
tion to become numerically dominant in the adult
have been, it-rather than anything that happened
population. Only after the mid-1960s did significant
during the 1970s and 1980s-accounts for most of
numbers of the "post-civic generation" reach adult-
the civic disengagement that lies at the core of our
hood, supplanting older, more civic cohorts. The fig-
mystery.
ure above ("The Rise and Decline of a Civic
But if this reinterpretation of our puzzle is cor-
Generation") illustrates this generational account-
rect, why did it take so long for the effects of that
ing. The long civic generation born between 1910
mysterious X-ray to become manifest? If the
and 1940 reached its zenith in 1960, when it com-
underlying causes of civic disengagement can be
prised 62 percent of those who chose between John
traced to the 1940s and 1950s, why did the effects
Kennedy and Richard Nixon. By the time that Bill
become conspicuous in PTA meetings and
Clinton was elected president in 1992, that cohort's
Masonic lodges, in the volunteer lists of the Red
share in the electorate had been cut precisely in half.
Cross and the Boy Scouts, and in polling stations
Conversely, over the last two decades (from 1974 to
and church pews and bowling alleys across the
1994) boomers and X-ers (that is, Americans born
land only during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s?
after 1946) have grown as a fraction of the adult
The visible effects of this generational disen-
population from 24 percent to 60 percent.
gagement were delayed by two important factors.
In short, the very decades that have seen a
First, the postwar boom in college enrollments
national deterioration in social capital are the same
raised levels of civic engagement, offsetting the
decades during which the numerical dominance of
generational trends. As Warren E. Miller and J.
a trusting and civic generation has been replaced
Merrill Shanks observe in their as yet unpublished
by the dominion of "post-civic" cohorts. Moreover,
book, The American Voter Reconsidered, the post-
although the long civic generation has enjoyed
war expansion of educational opportunities "fore-
unprecedented life expectancy, allowing its mem-
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 45
qxd 11/20/95 7:37 PM Page 46
bers to contribute more than their share to
10 percent of American homes had television sets,
American social capital in recent decades, they are
but by 1959, 90 percent did, probably the fastest
now passing from the scene. Even the youngest
diffusion of a major technological innovation ever
members of that generation will reach retirement
recorded. The reverberations from this lightning
age within the next few years. Thus, a generational
bolt continued for decades, as viewing hours grew
analysis leads almost inevitably to the conclusion
by 17-20 percent during the 1960s and by an addi-
that the national slump in trust and engagement is
tional 7-8 percent during the 1970s. In the early
likely to continue, regardless of whether the more
years, TV watching was concentrated among the
modest "period effect" depression of the 1980s
less educated sectors of the population, but during
continues.
the 1970s the viewing time of the more educated
sectors of the population began to converge
OUR PRIME SUSPECT
upward. Television viewing increases with age, par-
To say that civic disengagement in contemporary
ticularly upon retirement, but each generation
America is in large measure generational merely
since the introduction of television has begun its
reformulates our central puzzle. We now know that
life cycle at a higher starting point. By 1995 view-
much of the cause of our lonely bowling probably
ing per TV household was more than 50 percent
dates to the 1940s and 1950s, rather than to the
higher than it had been in the 1950s.
1960s and 1970s. What could have been the myste-
Most studies estimate that the average American
rious anticivic "X-ray" that affected Americans who
now watches roughly four hours per day (exclud-
came of age after World War II and whose effects
ing periods in which television is merely playing in
progressively deepened at least into the 1970s?
the background). Even a more conservative esti-
Our new formulation of the puzzle opens the
mate of three hours means that television absorbs
possibility that the zeitgeist of national unity, patri-
40 percent of the average American's free time, an
otism, and shared sacrifice that culminated in 1945
increase of about one-third since 1965. Moreover,
might have reinforced civic-mindedness. On the
multiple sets have proliferated: By the late 1980s
other hand, it is hard to assign any consistent role
three-quarters of all U.S. homes had more than one
to the Cold War and the Bomb, since the anticivic
set, and these numbers too are rising steadily,
trend appears to have deepened steadily from the
allowing ever more private viewing. Robinson and
1940s to the 1970s, in no obvious harmony with
Godbey are surely right to conclude that "televi-
the rhythms of world affairs. Nor is it easy to con-
sion is the 800-pound gorilla of leisure time." This
struct an interpretation of the data on generational
massive change in the way Americans spend their
differences in which the cultural vicissitudes of the
days and nights occurred precisely during the years
sixties could play a significant role. Neither can
of generational civic disengagement.
economic adversity or affluence easily be tied to
Evidence of a link between the arrival of televi-
the generational decline in civic engagement, since
sion and the erosion of social connections is, how-
the slump seems to have affected in equal measure
ever, not merely circumstantial. The links between
those who came of age in the placid fifties, the
civic engagement and television viewing can be
booming sixties, and the busted seventies.
instructively compared with the links between civic
I have discovered only one prominent suspect
engagement and newspaper reading. The basic
against whom circumstantial evidence can be
contrast is straightforward: Newspaper reading is
mounted, and in this case, it turns out, some direct-
associated with high social capital, TV viewing with
ly incriminating evidence has also turned up. This
low social capital.
is not the occasion to lay out the full case for the
Controlling for education, income, age, race,
prosecution, nor to review rebuttal evidence for
place of residence, work status, and gender, TV
the defense, but I want to present evidence that
viewing is strongly and negatively related to social
justifies indictment.
trust and group membership, whereas the same
The culprit is television.
correlations with newspaper reading are positive.
First, the timing fits. The long civic generation
Within every educational category, heavy readers
was the last cohort of Americans to grow up with-
are avid joiners, whereas heavy viewers are more
out television, for television flashed into American
likely to be loners. In fact, more detailed analysis
society like lightning in the 1950s. In 1950 barely
suggests that heavy TV watching is one important
46 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
tham. 11/20/95 7:39 PM Page 47
reason why less educated people are less engaged
ship or the cumulative effects of lifetime viewing
in the life of their communities. Controlling for
hours. Newspaper circulation (per household) has
differential TV exposure significantly reduces the
dropped by more than half since its peak in 1947.
correlation between education and engagement.
To be sure, it is not clear which way the tie
Viewing and reading are themselves uncorrelat-
between newspaper reading and civic involvement
ed-some people do lots of both, some do little of
works, since disengagement might itself dampen
either-but "pure readers" (that is, people who
one's interest in community news. But the two
watch less TV than average and read more newspa-
trends are clearly linked.
pers than average) belong to 76 percent more civic
How MIGHT TV DESTROY
organizations than "pure viewers" (controlling for
SOCIAL CAPITAL?
education, as always). Precisely the same pattern
applies to other indicators of civic engagement,
Time displacement. Even though there are only
including social trust and voting turnout. "Pure
24 hours in everyone's day, most forms of social
readers," for example, are 55 percent more trusting
and media participation are positively correlated.
than "pure viewers."
People who listen to lots of classical music are
In other words, each hour spent viewing televi-
more likely, not less likely, than others to attend
sion is associated with less social trust and less
Cubs games. Television is the principal exception
group membership, while each hour reading a
to this generalization-the only leisure activity that
newspaper is associated with more. An increase in
seems to inhibit participation outside the home.
television viewing of the magnitude that the U.S.
TV watching comes at the expense of nearly every
has experienced in the last four decades might
social activity outside the home, especially social
directly account for as much as one-quarter to one-
gatherings and informal conversations. TV viewers
half of the total drop in social capital, even without
are homebodies.
taking into account, for example, the indirect
Most studies that report a negative correlation
effects of television viewing on newspaper reader-
between television watching and community
THE TV CONNECTION
Group membership by television viewing and education
2.7
2.5
2.3
1.9
2.5
1.8
1.8
Group Memberships
2
1.4
Mote then years
1.2
1.5
12 yes
1
11
1.2
1.1
Education
as
0.9
Two
0
0.1 have
2 hours
you hour
5.14 hours
Daily Television Viewing
Source: General Social Survey, 1974-1994
NUMBER 24
THE STRANGE DISAPPEARANCE OF CIVIC AMERICA 47
14putnam.qxd 11/20/95 7:40 PM Page 48
involvement (see "The TV Connection"), previous
ore than two decades ago, just as the
page) are ambiguous with respect to causality,
M
first signs of disengagement were
because they merely compare different individuals
beginning to appear in American pol-
at a single time. However, one important quasi-
itics, the political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool
experimental study of the introduction of television
observed that the central issue would be-it was
in three Canadian towns found the same pattern at
then too soon to judge, as he rightly noted—
the aggregate level across time. A major effect of
whether the development represented a temporary
television's arrival was the reduction in participa-
change in the weather or a more enduring change
tion in social, recreational, and community activi-
in the climate. It now appears that much of the
ties among people of all ages. In short, television
change whose initial signs he spotted did in fact
privatizes our leisure time.
reflect a climatic shift.
Effects on the outlooks of viewers. An impres-
Moreover, just as the erosion of the ozone layer
sive body of literature suggests that heavy watchers
was detected only many years after the proliferation
of TV are unusually skeptical about the benevo-
of the chlorofluorocarbons that caused it, so too the
lence of other people-overestimating crime rates,
erosion of America's social capital became visible
for example. This body of literature has generated
only several decades after the underlying process
much debate about the underlying causal patterns,
had begun. Like Minerva's owl that flies at dusk, we
with skeptics suggesting that misanthropy may fos-
come to appreciate how important the long civic
ter couch-potato behavior rather than the reverse.
generation has been to American community life
While awaiting better experimental evidence, how-
just as its members are retiring. Unless America
ever, a reasonable interim judgment is that heavy
experiences a dramatic upward boost in civic
television watching may well increase pessimism
engagement (a favorable "period effect") in the
about human nature. Perhaps too, as social critics
next few years, Americans in 2010 will join, trust,
have long argued, both the medium and the mes-
and vote even less than we do today.
sage have more basic effects on our ways of inter-
In an astonishingly prescient book, Technologies
acting with the world and with one another.
without Borders, published in 1991 after his death,
Television may induce passivity, as Neil Postman
Pool concluded that the electronic revolution in
has claimed.
communications technology was the first major
Effects on children. TV consumes an extraordi-
technological advance in centuries that would have
nary part of children's lives, about 40 hours per
a profoundly decentralizing and fragmenting effect
week on average. Viewing is especially high among
on society and culture. He hoped that the result
pre-adolescents, but it remains high among
might be "community without contiguity." As a
younger adolescents: Time-budget studies suggest
classic liberal, he welcomed the benefits of techno-
that among youngsters aged 9 to 14 television con-
logical change for individual freedom, and in part,
sumes as much time as all other discretionary
I share that enthusiasm. Those of us who bemoan
activities combined, including playing, hobbies,
the decline of community in contemporary
clubs, outdoor activities, informal visiting, and just
America need to be sensitive to the liberating gains
hanging out. The effects of television on childhood
achieved during the same decades. We need to
socialization have, of course, been hotly debated
avoid an uncritical nostalgia for the fifties. On the
for more than three decades. The most reasonable
other hand, some of the same freedom-friendly
conclusion from a welter of sometimes conflicting
technologies whose rise Pool predicted may indeed
results appears to be that heavy television watch-
be undermining our connections with one another
ing probably increases aggressiveness (although
and with our communities. Pool defended what he
perhaps not actual violence), that it probably
called "soft technological determinism" because he
reduces school achievement, and that it is statisti-
recognized that social values can condition the
cally associated with "psychosocial malfunction-
effects of technology. This perspective invites us
ing." although how much of this effect is self-
not merely to consider how technology is privatiz-
selection and how much causal remains much
ing our lives-if, as it seems to me, it is-but to ask
debated. The evidence is, as I have said, not yet
whether we like the result, and if not, what we
enough to convict, but the defense has a lot of
might do about it. Those are questions we should,
explaining to do.
of course, be asking together, not alone.
48 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
WINTER 1996
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
14
Divider Title:
Note:
Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain (Divinity School,
The University of Chicago) was unable to accept
our invitation for January 7 because of a long-
scheduled commitment to participate in a
conference in South Africa.
Jean Bethke Elshtain,
a political philosopher whose task has been to show the connections between our political and
our ethical convictions, is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political
Ethics at The University of Chicago.
Professor Elshtain was born in the irrigated farm country of northem Colorado and grew up in
the small village of Timnath, Colorado (population 185). She attended public schools in
Timnath, Colorado, and the Cache la Poudre Consolidated High School. A graduate of
Colorado State University (A.B., 1963), Professor Elshtain went on to earn a Master's degree
in history as a Woodrow Wilson Fellow before turning to the study of politics. She received
her Ph.D. from Brandeis University in Politics in 1973 and immediately joined the faculty of
the University of Massachusetts/Amherst She served as an assistant professor from 1973 to
1976 when she was promoted to an associate professorship. She became a full professor in
1981. She joined the faculty of Vanderbilt University in 1988 and was appointed to her
current position at the University of Chicago in 1995. As well, she has done guest stints as a
visiting professor at Oberlin College, Yale University, and Harvard University.
Her books include
Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton University
Press, 1981; second edition, 1992)
The Family in Political Thought, editor (University of Massachusetts Press, 1982)
Meditations on Modem Political Thought (Praeger, 1986; reissued by Penn State Press, 1992)
Women and War (Basic Books, 1987; Italian translation published by Il Mulino, Bologna,
1991; Japanese translation published by Hosei University Press, 1994; second paperback
edition with new Epilogue, University of Chicago Press, 1995)
Women, Militarism, and War, co-editor (Roman and Allenheld, 1990)
Rebuilding the Nest. A New Commitment to the American Family, co-editor (Family Services
Publication, Milwaukee, 1990)
Power Trips and Other Journeys (University of Wisconsin Press, 1990)
Just War Theory, editor (Basil Blackwell, 1990)
But Was It Just. Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War, co-author, with Michael
Walzer, George Weigel, Stanley Hauerwas, and Sari Nusseibeh (Doubleday, 1992)
Democracy on Trial, her 1993 Massey Lectures for the Canadian Broadcasting corporation
(Basic Books, 1995)
Politics and the Human Body, co-editor (Vanderbilt University Press, 1995)
forthcoming is Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1996)
Works in progress include
Jane Addams and America, an intellectual biography of Jane Addams
and
The King is Dead. Sovereignty at Century's End
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702 0048
Divinity School
002/010
Page Two of Two from Jean Bethke Elshtain (office fax 312 702-6048)
Jean Bethke Elshtain is the author of well over one hundred essays in scholarly journals, over
one hundred essays in journals of civic opinion, and some one hundred-fifteen book reviews.
She has delivered many guest lectureships. Of special note are:
The Annual Tom Seely Lecture on Law and the Free Society, University of Texas,
Austin, Law School
The Annual Peace Lecture, University of Groningen, Holland
The Sproul Lectures, McGill University
The Distinguished Humanities Lectures, University of Georgia
The Lynd and Harry Bradley Lecturer, Kenyon College
The Bertha May Belle Andrews Memorial Lecture, Bates College
Plenary Speaker, International Conference on Christianity and Democracy, Emory
University
The Edward Douglass White Lecture, Louisiana State University
The Charles Phelps Taft Lecture, University of Cincinnati
The Massey Lectures, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
The Ryan Lecture, Georgetown University Law Center
The Andrew Cecil Lecture on Citizenship in a Free Society, Univ. Texas/Dallas
The Donald R Brown Memorial Lecture, University of Vermont
The Joy Gilbert Jameson Lecture, The University of the Redlands
The Bernard J. Flanagan Lecture on Religion and Public Affairs, Holy Cross College
The Covey Lectures, Loyola University of Chicago
The Willard O. Eddy Lecture, Colorado State University
The Lois Miller Memorial Lecture, St. Norbert's College
The Gordon Sandison Lecture, Western Washington University
The James A. Gray Lectures, The Divinity School, Duke University
The McMartin Lecture, The University of Ottawa
Professor Elshtain has been a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow at the Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton. She currently serves as a member of the Board of Trustees of
Members of the Institute for Advanced Study. She has been a Scholar in Residence,
Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Conference and Study Center. Como, Italy, a Guggenheim
Fellow (1991-92) working on an intellectual biography of Jane Addams. and a Writer in
Residence, MacDowell Colony, Peterborough, New Hampshire. She is the recipient of the
Ellen Gregg Ingalls Award for excellence in classroom teaching--the highest award for
undergraduate teaching at Vanderbilt University.
Jean Bethke Elshtain is married and the mother of four children. Sheri, Heidi, Jenny, and
Eric; and the grandmother of JoAnn Paulette Welch.
ADD'L Soc Sec
(b)(6)
[001]
Office address/telephones: Univ of Chicago Divinity School, Swift Hall, 1025 E. 58th St.,
Chicago, IL 60637; (312) 702-7252; fax (312) 702-6048.
DEMOCRACY
CE/T7/ET
ON TRIAL
770.0. 00:77
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
102 0043
:
TOOUS SITUTAIN
BasicBooks
A Division of Harper' alins Publishers
03/010
3
The Politics of
Difference
770.0. -0:77
0700 701
THE question of unity and diversity has been posed from
the beginning of political thought In the West. The American
Founders were well aware of the vexations attendant upon the
creation of a new political body. They worked with, and
against, metaphors that had once served as the symbolic vehl-
cles of political incorporation. As men of the Enlightenment,
they rejected Images of the body politic that had dominated
scanor SITUTAIG
medieval and early-modern political thinking. For Jefferson,
Madison, and others, political theories of "the King's two bod-
les"-John of Salisbury's twelfth-century vision in Politicralicus
of a body politic with the prince as the head and animating
force-were too strongly corporatist, predemocratic, and explic-
itly Christian to serve the novus ordo seclorum.¹ But they were
haunted nonetheless by Hebrew and Christian metaphors of a
covenanted polity: The body is one but has many members.
Indeed, one might argue that it is only incorporation
within a single body that makes meaningful diversity possible.
00/010 S
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
67
Our differences must be recognized If they are to exist sub-
pecullar at best, anathema at worst. Democrats today are trou-
stantively. As political philosopher Charles Taylor noted, "my
bled by such developments. We recognize in the rush for
discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out in
recognition of difference a powerful, and legitimate, modern
isolation, but that I negotiate It through dialogue, partly overt,
concern. Some forms of equal recognition surely not only are
partly internal, with others My own Identity crucially
possible In a democracy but form its very lifeblood. The ques-
depends on my dialogical relations with others."2 In other
tion is, What sort of recognition? Recognition of what? For
words, we cannot be different all by ourselves. The great chal-
what? To claim "I am different, you must recognize me and
lenge for the Founders was to form a political body that
honor my difference" tells me nothing that is civically Interest-
brought people together and created a "we," but also enabled
ing. Should I honor or recognize someone simply because she
people to remain separate and to recognize and respect one
is female or proclaims a particular version of her sexual iden-
6048 702
another's differences. Modern democrats face the same chal-
tity? This would make little sense. 1 may disagree profoundly
lenge.
with her about everything I find Important-from what Ameri-
I indicated in chapter 2 that one version of our current
can policy ought to be in the war in the Balkans, to what
discontents-the politics of displacement-tries to solve this
needs to be done to stem the tide of deterioration and despair
problem by smashing It to bits. Rather than negotiating the
in America's Inner cities, to whether violence on television is a
complexity of public and private Identities, those who adopt
serious concern or just an easy target for riled and worrled
this view disdain and displace any distinction between the citi-
parents and educators.
zen and whatever else a person may be-male or female, het-
My recognition of her difference, by which 1 mean my
erosexual or homosexual, black or white. One seeks full pub-
preparedness to engage her as an Interlocutor given our differ-
SCOOOL VITUTATO
lic recognition as a person with a handicap or a particular
ences on the things that count politically-including equality,
sexual orientation, or membership In an ethnic or racial group,
justice, freedom, fairness, authority, and power-turns on the
and that exhausts one's public concerns. Marks of difference,
fact that I share something with her: She is in the world with
once they gain public recognition in this form, translate all too
me; she, loo, is a citizen. We both, It Is hoped, operate from a
easily into group triumphalism as the story grows that the pub-
stance of goodwill and an acceptance of the backdrop of
lic world is a world of many I's who form a we only with oth-
democratic constitutional guarantees, as well as democratic
ers exactly like themselves. No recognition of commonality is
habits and dispositions. We are both committed to rough-and-
forthcoming. We are stuck In what the philosopher calls a
ready parity, an energetic desire to forge at least provisional
world of "incommensurability," a world in which we literally
agreements on highly controversial Issues or to remain com-
cannot understand one another.
mitted to the centrality of dialogue and debate to our shared
Democrats historically would have found this notion
way of life if we cannot resolve our differences. If I am her
07/010
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
69
enemy because I am white or heterosexual or a mother or an
different from one another, indeed, unequal by nature. Such
academic, or she Is mine because she is none of these things,
persons equated equality with sameness and Inequality with
our only option is to "go to war"-to silence, reproach, even
difference. Because it is clear that human beings differ, they
wipe out each other. One makes war with enemies; one does
insisted, society must reflect those differences. Furthermore,
politics-democratic politics-with opponents.
they contended, we will invariably wind up with widespread
social Inequality because people are not the same; Inequality is
lodged in nature. It follows that attempts to alter Institutions to
DIFFERENCE AND INEQUALITY
ellminate or reduce Inequality will require nasty social surgery,
because we must then eliminate human differences them-
selves. It seems best, according to this conservative argument,
otno 701 ETC.O.
I will turn later to how we come to know something "in com-
to allow natural differences-seen as inequalities-to work
mon," to accept that we share a heritage, although we share it
themselves out, even if the result Is a stratified, Inegalitarian
imperfectly and unevenly. But, first, let me say a bit more
society in the social and economic sense even as we remain
about the current politics of difference. At one point not so
equal only before the law.
long ago, it was the liberal position that an emphasis on the
Those who opposed this vlew, usually persons from the
ways people differed sanctioned inequality and that our
political Left or centrist liberals, insisted that it strained
"sameness" alone secured an egalitarian, democratic regime: If
credulity to believe that all those who were well placed had
you prick me, do I not bleed? After all, was It not hierarchical,
fully earned it and that their power and privilege simply
inegalitarian, conservative thinkers who insisted that natural
flowed from their being different-unequal-from the rest of
differences must translate Into social and political inequalities?
TOOUS SITUTATO
us. Alas, the radical egalitarian response often got as tenden-
American society is, perhaps, unique among nations in that,
tious as that of its ideological opposite. Rather than challenge
from the first, equality ("all men are created equal") has been
the equation of equality with sameness, many critics implicitly
one of the touchstones of Its national Identity and political cul-
embraced the idea: The more we were the same, the better. So
ture. Need I acknowledge that slaves and women were omlt-
they extolled a fuzzy or utoplan notion of a world in which
ted from the formal definition and struggled mightily for Inclu-
people were as indistingulshable from one another as happy
sion? But the general principle named both a partial and
peas in the egalitarian pod. Arguments defending the necessity
imperfect reality and a continuing aspiration.
to assess the disparate value or merit of diverse human capaci-
For many conservatives, an extension of equality beyond
ties, abilities, and achievements vanished like the early morn-
legal recognition-and even that might be going too far-was
Ing dew in the sunlight's steady glare. I clearly remember the
balderdash because It was obvious to them that people were
heated denunciations of "elitism" from my college compatriots
03/01010
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
71
in the 1960s whenever evaluations of merit and accomplish-
In education and the academy, the equation of equality
ment were defended. Some argued that standards themselves
with sameness led to a muddleheaded assault on any notion of
are somehow inherently antidemocratic. The same argument is
distinctiveness or value. A "core curriculum," for example, was
even more vehemently pressed today.
jettisoned at many institutions on the presumption that the
This vision of a bland equality of sameness was pro-
core was sulted only for elitists and hampered Individual lib-
moted by many calling themselves egalitarians, some of whom
erty. Some colleges and universitles gave up grading students
were indebted to Marxism. The American writer Kurt Vonnegut
altogether or adopted a "pass/fail" system, which often
satirized it in his short story "Harrison Bergeron," which
amounted to the same thing. Textbook publishers knowingly
appears in a collection called Welcome to the Monkey House:
began to "dumb down" texts In history, science, and literature.
stno TTC.O.
In an understandable and justifiable urge to Improve the lot of
The year was 2081 and everybody was finally equal. They
the many, the distinctiveness of the one was forgotten, even
weren't only equal before God and the law. They were
disdained.
equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than any-
body else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else.
In his polgnant autoblography about growing up as the
Nobody was stronger or quickes than anybody else. All
son of Mexican immigrant parents in California and becoming
this equality was due to the 211th, 212th, and 213th
a "scholarship kid," Richard Rodriguez wrote about the conde-
Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing vig-
scending paternalism he encountered all too often at the hands
llance of agents of the United States Handicapper General.3
of Interventionist egalitarians. His target is affirmative action
and his legal categorization as a "minority" as part of educa-
In this delightfully Ironic yet worrisome tale, Vonnegut
tional efforts made in his behalf. Although he received an
TOOUS STATUTES
portrays a future society In which all differences, all particular
excellent parochial and public education, he was treated as a
and unique human talents and gifts, have been compensated
victim of cultural deprivation; the working assumption, of
for downward to achieve the "equal society," in the belief that
course, was that he was both ignorant and Incapable of
differences in themselves constitute inequalities. Thus ballet
defending himself. All sorts of "allowances" were made for
dancers, naturally gifted and trained to be lithe and limber,
poorly educated Mexican American students and they were
must dance with huge weights and Irons on their legs so that
pushed through the system under the assumption that stan-
they cannot leap any higher or move any more gracefully than
dards of merit and achievement were Impositions by the Anglo
anyone else. The world of perfect equality, one in which
majority on all minorities.
nobody is better at anything than anybody else, Is at last
In the name of equality, of promoting "Integration" and
attained! Of course, none of us would care to Inhabil Von-
leveling, political radicals and school administrators often
negut's fictional world. That is his point.
acted in deeply paternalistic ways. As Rodriguez explained:
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
73
The conspiracy of kindness became 2 conspiracy of
better to promote homogenizing ends. I recall my perplexity at
uncaring. Cruelly, callously, admissions committees
a conference on women and feminism in the late 1980s, when
agreed to overlook serlous academic deficiency. I knew
I listened to two and a half days of assaults on the very Idea of
students in college then barely able to read, students
equality. Equality meant "the same." Equality was the mark of
unable to grasp the function of a sentence. I knew non-
while graduate students who were bewildered by the
masculinism. Equality was the stigma of heterosexism. Equality
requirement to compose a term paper and who each day
was pretty much every nasty thing you could come up with
were humiliated when they couldn't compete with other
and name. Somehow even the Nazis got to be perverse egali-
students in seminars. Not surprisingly, among those
tarlans in their rush to exterminate the different.
students with very poor academic preparation, few com-
Equality, I learned, meant "homologization with the
pleted their courses of study. Many dropped out, blaming
themselves for their fallure. One fall, six nonwhite shu-
male subject." As that was news to me, I decided I needed to
otno TTC.O.
dents I knew suffered severe mental collapse. None of
ponder this matter further. The rush to eliminate equality
the professors who had welcomed them to graduate
from our political Idiom and our political aspiration struck
school were around when it came time to take them to
me as daft. Recognizing that democracy without equality is
the Inflrmary or the airport. And the university officials
an impossible proposition, I got the uneasy feeling-one that
who so diligently took note of those students In their self-
serving totals of entering minority students finally took no
remains with me and has only been strengthened by recent
note of them when they left.'
celebrations of difference as a uniform and fixed group Iden-
tity-that perhaps many of those who are immersed In what
Unsurprisingly, at the time his book was published, In the
they call the "discourse of difference" are not so keen on
early 1980s, there were concerted attempts to discredit
constitutional democracy Itself. One participant in the confer-
security SITUTATO
Rodriguez as a stalking-horse for right-wing reaction; in this
ence was candid about this point. Women, she claimed,
way, his arguments could be ignored, and the general inability
should be celebrating their "will-to-power." Democratic
of the Left to tolerate diversity in the ranks of minority
equality was both "puny and phony." She evidently neither
groups-presumably they should all think alike and have Iden-
knew nor cared about the ways that slogan had been disas-
tical needs that can be ministered to-was made evident. This
trously deployed in the not-loo-distant past. I refer, of course,
situation has grown even more pronounced since then.
to the perverse use of this idea by mid-century haters of
Remember, these assumptions were made with a grim
democracy, especially in fascist rhetoric and theory. We are
determination to promote sameness in the name of educa-
not so far removed from these events that we can be blithe
tional and civic equality. Consider how quickly things have
about deploying certain slogans uncritically. Perhaps one
changed or, more to the point, how quickly the rhetoric of dif-
should not be too concerned, however. Perhaps this is pri-
ference has supplanted the rhetoric of equality-perhaps the
marily an academic exercise, radical playacting by a few Indl-
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
75
001/009
viduals who would be appalled to see the implication of their
embrace their own version of sameness-an exclusionist
own ideas fully worked out.
sameness along lines of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual
But there is room for worry. As the political theorist
preference. There is no apparent end 10 this process, as identi-
George Kateb noted: "To want to believe that there is elther a
ties get shaved off Into more and more minute slivers, for
fixed majority Interest or a homogeneous group identity is not
example, lesbian women of color; "Act-Up" milliants who
compatible with the premises of rights-based Individualism."5
favor outing; white, heterosexual men who were abused by
Although I prefer to speak of democratic "Individuality," rather
their fathers-the possibilities are endless. Ironically, according
than "individualism," Kateb's point is well taken. To the extent
to Wolin, il has traditionally been the "nondemocratic rulers,
that citizens begin to retribalize into ethnic or other "fixed-
the men who justify their rule by appealing to differences—
Identity" groups, democracy falters. Any possibility for human
heredity, divinity, merit, knowledge-who reduce populations
dialogue, for democratic communication and commonality,
to a common condition."7 We now Impose 2 common condi-
Divinity School
vanishes as so much froth on the polluted sea of phony equal-
lion on ourselves in the name of diversity.
Ity. Difference becomes more and more exclusivist. If you are
If one sees In democratic principles, including the Insis-
black and I am white, by definition I do not and cannot, in
tence that we are obliged to reach out to one another rather
principle, "get it." There is no way that we can negotiate the
than to entrench in our isolated groups, only a cover for hid-
space between our given differences. We are just stuck with
den privileges, one stalls out as a citizen. This leads to a terri-
them, stuck in what political thinkers used to call "ascriptive
ble impasse, Wolln concludes, one to which "the politics of
characteristics"-things we cannot change about ourselves.
difference and the Ideology of multiculturalism have con-
Mired in the cement of our own Identities, we need never deal
tributed by rendering suspect the language and possibilities of
with one another. Not really. One of us will win and one of us
collectivity, common action, and shared purposes."8 Yet, those
will lose the cultural war or the political struggle. That's what
who push such politics must, In practice, appeal to "some cul-
it's all about: power of the most reductive, Impositional sort.
ture of commonality" in launching their demands that their dif-
12/21/95 12:58 T312 702 6048
The political theorist Sheldon Wolin fears that the most
ferences be respected and their grievances responded to.
important democratic category, the citizen, will dissolve In the
There is, in fact, a way It can be done that recognizes both the
acids of this new Ideology of difference, an Ideology that
"difference" and the commonality of an aggrieved group.
despairs of, or huffily rejects, equality. In this respect, Wolln
Let us consider the discourse on equality and difference
defines equality as "some broad measure of similarity If only to
as it pertains to persons with developmental disabilities. I can
support a notion of membership that entails equality of rights,
track four stages In the story of equality and difference as it
responsibilities, and treatment."6 Repudiating the "sameness" of
pertains to people with such disabilities. First, the "retarded"
equality for its homogenizing urge, ideologues of difference
are construed as being outside the world of equality, having
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
77
002/009
been identified by others as persons who lack the qualities
political discourse and an Instrument for social change and jus-
necessary to play a part in the world of equality and inequal-
tice, one of the strongest weapons the relatively powerless
ity, the world of juridical and civic relations, the world of pub-
have at their disposal to make their case and define their alms
lic freedom. Their difference disqualifies them by definition.
before their fellow citizens.
Some, of course, even put such persons outside the bound-
But if you have consigned equality to the discursive trash
arles of humanity-recall that the mentally handicapped and
heap as so much phony-baloney, as we used to say as chil-
disabled were the first targets of Nazi extermination policies.
dren, and scream at me that you will have none of it; if,
In the second stage, the retarded, still called and thought of as
instead, you Insist that what politics must consist of is my
such, are drawn within the circle of concern by those who do
acknowledging and recognizing your differences but not being
have 2 civic Identity and are part of the world of democratic
allowed to engage you about these differences directly
equality. The disabled become the reciplents of concern; their
because we have nothing to say to each other, then I can only
welfare must be seen to. But they are not yet participants In
respond that you are not thinking and acting like a democratic
Divinity School
the drama of democratic equality themselves. In a third phase,
citizen. You are thinking and acting like a royal pain in the
the retarded, in and through their "normal" representatives,
neck, and the sooner 1 can get you out of my sight and mind, 1
make claims upon the "equal," arguing that they, too, have the
will-not because I am racist or sexist or any of the other
qualifications to be part of the discourse. They, too, can vote
handy labels we toss around all 100 easily these days, but
and hold Jobs-or the vast majority can. They, too, can love
because I am weary of being accused of bad faith no matter
and be loved. So, over time, they are incorporated on the pre-
what I do, or say, or refrain from doing or saying.
sumption that they are not so "different" as was once assumed.
Finally, the developmentally different find their own voice,
however halting, and instst that their difference does not sever
MULTICULTURALISM AND
them from equality.
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
12/21/95 12:59 T312 702 6048
In vital ways, persons with disabilities are more like than
unlike those without disabilities. But because of the ways they
are unlike the majority, they must struggle to make the case for
How did we get Into this mess? There are many reasons,
equality with respect for difference. They seek recognition.
including the unraveling of democratic civil society 1 discussed
Language shifts: We are not "retards," they Implore us; we are
in chapter 1. Here I want to focus on another dimension of the
your fellow citizens with disabilities. Equality, or entering the
trials of contemporary democracy: education. American public
discourse of equality, does not and need not have lo do with
education is in blg trouble and has been since at least the
homogenelty. Instead, equality remains a powerful term of
1970s. Defenders of public schools are on the defensive. Most
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
79
003/009
often they portray themselves as embattled champions of
awareness of different opinions: We do not all think alike. In
democracy against repressive right-wingers, evangelical hot-
contrast, the claims to difference of many contemporary multi-
heads, and Irrational and unenlightened parents. Now, there
culturalists are couched in ontological terms: This is what we
are no doubt repressive types and hotheads and overwrought
are, According to this vision of exclusive groups, there is such
parents engaged in skirmishes with educational institutions,
a thing as "thinking black" or "thinking white"; you can't help
from preschools to universities. But critics do not neatly fit this
it, if you are one Of the other. To the extent that public schools
demeaning and misleading picture.
put themselves at the service of this latter version of multicul-
Bear in mind that It was taken for granted from the start
turalism, they disastrously abandon the turf they were deeded,
of the American democratic experiment that the survival of the
the space within which they were enjoined to help create a
republic for any length of time would depend heavily on the
commitment to a rough-and-ready social egalitarianism, cou-
cultivation of civic sentiments among the young. The optl-
pled with an equally strong commitment to civility.
mistic hope was that a national character could be formed by
But how can imposed uniformity-whether of same-
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the careful molding of each generation's children. This hope
ness or of difference-prepare citizens of a democracy to
had a long and noble lineage. In his great funeral oration, Perl-
exercise civic and social responsibilities? This is a worry that
cles marked the difference between the Spartan system, which
many now have about the educational wars being waged in
subjected young boys to harsh and laborious training replete
America over so-called multicultural curricula that are
with grim martial restrictions, and the open Athenian system of
designed explicitly to entrench differences. The new muld-
generosity and leniency. Like the Spartans, the Athenians were
culturalism promotes, as I noted earlier, incommensurability:
brave In battle; unlike the Spartans, they promoted goodwill,
If 1 am white and you are black, we cannot, in principle,
what we today might call "well-roundedness." (I discuss Peri-
speak to or understand each other. You just don't and won't
cles' funeral oration in more detail in chapter 4.)
"gel it." As a form of ideological teaching, multicultural abso-
The American Founders debated education, rejecting
lutism Isolates us in our own skins and equates culture with
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explicitly a classic civic republican education modeled on the
racial or ethnic Identity. Some critics have described this as a
Spartan example because It demanded and likely yielded
process of "resegregation" and wonder how long It will take
homogenelty and sameness. In Federalist Number 10, Publius
to move from separate approaches for black children In the
advanced a commitment to civility, one that Implies accep-
name of Afro-centricity, for example, to a quest for separate
tance of difference as well as political equality. The "spirit of
schools. One of the glorles of American public education has
the people," Informed by religious principles and a belief in
been Its mingling of class, gender, ethnicity, and race. That
nature and nature's laws, required no prefixed and dogmatic
was part of the democratic ethos. In Days of Obligation,
creed. This epistemological version of difference involved the
Richard Rodriguez noted:
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American educators have lost the confidence of their pub-
get jobs when they leave school-we may stress watery
lic Institution. There are influential educators today,
adaptation above authentic excellence. If we concentrate
and I have met them, who believe that the purpose of
exclusively on the few, assuming that the many are less vital
American education is to Instill In children a pride in their
in the overall scheme of things, the democratic culture neces-
ancestral pasts. Such a curtailing of education seems to
me condescending; seems to me the worst sort of mis-
sary to sustain constitutional democracy over the long haul
sionary spirit. Did anyone attempt to protect the white
will either wither on the vine or not bear fruit in the first
middle-class student of yore from the Ironies of history?
place. If we say that education must be for the many, and we
Thomas Jefferson-that great democrat-was also a slave-
believe the many are not up to much, we abandon excel-
owner. Need we protect black students from complexity?
lence for the lowest common denominator: There goes Jeffer-
Thomas Jefferson, that slaveowner, was also a democrat.
son's aristocracy of virtue and talent!
American history has become a pageant of exemplary
slaves and black educators. Gay studies, women's studies,
A delicate line separates the overpoliticization of educa-
ethnic studies-the new curriculum ensures that educa-
tion from the awareness that education is never outside a
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tion will be flattering. But I submit that America is not a
world of which politics-how human beings govern and
tale for sentimentalists.
order a way of life In common-is a necessary feature. Edu-
cation is always cast as the means whereby some, or all, citi-
If we are flattered and cajoled Into thinking ours is a
zens of a particular society get their bearings and learn to live
story of purity because it is one of victimization, we become
with and among one another. Education always reflects a
sentimentalists. As Rodriguez went on to Insist, newcomers to
society's views of what is excellent, worthy, and necessary.
this country need to know about seventeenth-century Purl-
These reflections are not cast in cement like so many founda-
tans and about cowboys and Indians; these are constitutive
tion stones; rather, they are refracted and reshaped over time
702 6048
dramas of American society. Teaching exotic, mythic, and
as definitions, meanings, and purposes change through
"foreign" pasts does not prepare one for a culture that is both
democratic contestation. In this sense education is political,
"in common" and forever changing. If I can Indulge in yet
but being political is different from being directly and bla-
another reminder, democracy is not simply a set of proce-
tantly polkicized-being made to serve interests and ends
dures or a constitution, but an ethos, a spirit, 2 way of
Imposed by militant groups, whether in the name of height-
12/21/95 13:00 T312
responding, and a way of conducting oneself. Not being sim-
ened racial awareness, true biblical morality, androgyny, ther-
ple, democracy does not afford us a straightforward answer
apeutic self-esteem, or all the other sorts of enthuslasms in
to the question of what education in, and for, democracy
which we are currently awash.
might be. If, for example, we move too quickly to the notion
Consider the following examples. A class takes up the
of relevance-teach them something practical, so they can
Declaration of Independence, with its grand pronouncement
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that "all men are created equal." But when the Declaration of
archalists, those blatant oppressors hid behind fine-sounding
Independence was written, women (and many men) were dis-
words. All they created is lainted and hypocritical. All is fore-
enfranchised, and slaves were not counted as full persons.
closed. All, presumably, has been exposed. Debate ends or is
How could this be, the students wonder? What meaning of
discouraged. To express a different point of view is to betray =
equality did the Founders embrace? Were any of them uneasy
false consclousness, venality, or white, patriarchal privilege.
about it? How did they square this shared meaning with what
Demonology triumphs.
we perceive lo be manifest inequalities? What was debated,
These two examples of teacherly malfeasance I take to be
and what was not? What political and moral exigencies of that
instances of unreflective, dogmatic politicization. Each evades
historic moment compelled what sorts of compromises? Might
the dilemmas of democratic equality rather than offering us
things have gone differently? This classroom is an Instance of
points of critical reflection on that dilemma. This sort of educa-
reflective political education In and for a particular democ-
tion falls In Its particular and Important task of preparing us for
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racy-the American version-and its perennial dilemma of the
a world of ambiguity and variety. It equips US only for resent-
one and the many.
ment or maliclous naïveté. Let me be clear: I am not Indicting
But let me put forth a second and a third example, exag-
education on any level as the sole author of our growing
gerated In order to mark the differences between these latter
balkanization. But I am suggesting that the schools, whose
two instances and my first example as clearly as I can. In a
mission once was to Instill some measure of commonality
second classroom, the teacher declares that the Founders were
across differences, now suffer under the claim that that effort
correct in every respect. To be sure, slavery was an unfortu-
itself is but another name for "normalization" and cultural
nate blemish, but it was corrected. As a democratic educator at
imperialism. All those dedicated teachers In all those public
the end of the twentleth century, she must reaffirm her stu-
schools-the vast majority of them women-who work long
dents' devotion to the Founders and the Republic. After all, did
hours for low pay and see their work as a vocation, relegated
they not distill the essence of the wisdom of the ages, good for
by some contemporary radicals, Including militant multicultur-
12/21/95 13:01 T312 702 6048
all times and all places, in their handiwork? They were states-
alists, to the status of agents of domination, sometimes witting,
men, above the fray, not politicians. Here, uncritical adulation
sometimes not.
triumphs.
There are two off-kilter positions, then. In one, the mes-
The hagiographer's mirror Image is offered by my third
merized worshiper of authority, who will brook no criticism
teacher, who declares that nothing good ever came from the
of the Founders, denles herself the critical freedom that Is
hand of that abstract, all-purpose villain, the "dead, while
hers as an educator and that should be Imparted to her stu-
European male." The words and deeds of such men, Including
dents. In the other, the agitated negator of all that has gone
the Founders, were nefarious. Nothing but racists and patri-
before preaches freedom from the dismal and spurlous past
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
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and what she sees as an all-pervasive and menacing tradition
somewhat eccentric tutelage of Miss McCarthy, the recitation of
that she would cast off, and she insists that her students see it
the Gettysburg Address was quite an event. We would line up
that way, too. But a genuine education in and for democracy
in a single row around the classroom On Miss McCarthy's sig-
would bring matters to the surface; would help us engage in
nal, we would begin to hum the stirring song of the American
a debate with Interlocutors long dead or protagonists who
Civil War, "The Battle Hymn of the Republic," as Miss
never lived, save on the page; and, through that engagement,
McCarthy reclied the Gettysburg Address with flourlsh and fer-
would elaborate alternative conceptions through which to
vor. She had a way of tralling off each sentence in a trembly,
apprehend our world and the way that world represents
melodramatic whisper that sometimes left us hummers in
Itself.
stitches. But I never forgot the Gettysburg Address and its
"Perhaps," wrote the political philosopher Michael
promise of democratic equality.
Oakeshott,
My democratic dream was nurtured by a presumption
that none of us is stuck Inside our own skins; our Identities
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we may think of the components of culture as voices,
and our ideas are not reducible to our membership in a race,
each the expression of a distinct condition and under-
an ethnic group, or a sex. I remember my father telling me that
standing of the world and a distinct Idiom of human self-
understanding, and of the culture itself as these voices
the "Mexican kids" were sometimes smart and nice and some-
joined, as such voices could only be joined, In a conver-
times not, just like other kids. (Mexican was the term of
sation-an endless unrehearsed Intellectual adventure In,
respect in that time and place.) I had learned long before Mar-
which, In imagination, we enter into a variety of modes of
tin Luther King, Jr., made II the central theme of his great "I
understanding the world and ourselves and are not dis-
Have a Dream" speech that I was to judge others not by the
concerted by the differences or dismayed by the incon-
clusiveness of M all.¹⁰
color of their skins but by the content of their character and
the quality of their deeds. It would never have occurred to me
T312 702 6048
This openness to diverse voices helps to keep alive both our
that I should think girlishly or that my friend Raymond Barros
distinctiveness and the possibility of commonalities.
was required to think "with his blood."
I think of my own education, and my democratic dreams,
Our text for the high school English class In that isolated
as they were nurtured In the rural Colorado village in which I
little place was called Adventures in Reading. 1 still have my
grew up. The Timnath Public School, District Number 62,
copy-I bought it from the school because 1 loved so many of
13:01
Incorporated Grades 1 through 12 in a single building. I
the stories and poems In it. The table of contents list "Good
remember that we memorized the Declaration of Indepen-
Stories Old and New," with such bracing subsections as "Win-
dence and the Gettysburg Address. When my classmates and I
ning Against the Odds," "Meeting the Unusual," and "Facing
were in Grades 7 and 8, in a single classroom under the firm If
Problems." We read "Lyrics from Many Lands" and "American
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Songs and Sketches." I looked at this text recently as I thought
some specific Invitations to encounter particular adventures in
about democracy and education. By no means was it domi-
human self-understanding."¹
nated by a single point of view, that of the dread dead white
This work of self-understanding cannot be the exclusive
European male. We read Mary O'Hara, Dorothy Canfield, Mar-
purview of the family or of some overweening state or bureau-
garet Weymouth Jackson, Elsie Singmaster, Selma Lagerlöf,
cracy that is pushing either homogenelty or multiculturalism. It
Rosemary Vincent Benét, Kathryn Forbes, Sarojini Naidu,
is primarily a task of civil society, of which schools are a part.
Willa Cather, and Emily Dickinson, among others. We read the
Of course, education in and for a democratic culture is a porous
great abolitionist Frederick Douglass and the black reformer
affair, open to the wide world outside the door and beyond the
Booker T. Washington. We read Leo Tolstoy and Pedro de
playground. But that does not mean it must become the play-
Alarcón. We read translations of Native American warrlor
thing of purveyors of passing political or pedagogical enthusi-
songs.
asms. The danger in continuing down our present path Is that
Now this reading was not done under the specific rubric
our understanding of education Itself is increasingly impedied
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of multiculturallsm. It was undertaken on the assumption that
because we have done too little to protect education, and the
life is diverse, filled with many wonders. Through Adventures
children being educated, from heavy-handed Intrusion by those
in Reading, we could make the lives and thoughts of others
who would have both education and children serve this political
our own in some way. In my Imaginings and yearnings, I did
master or that Ideological purpose, whether in the name of
not feel constrained because some of the writers I admired
change or in defense of some status quo. Thus, we increasingly
most were men. I later chafed against the constraints I encoun-
give over to education all sorts of tasks it is Ш equipped to han-
tered outside my imagination, of course, but education is
dle. At the same time, we seem Intent on stripping education of
about opening the world up, not Imprisoning us in terms of
what it ought to be about: an Invitation to "particular adventures
6048
race, gender, or ethnicity. I was taught, as the preface to the
in human self-understanding."
textbook said, that: "Reading is your passport to adventure In
A democratic drama Is the playing out of the story of self-
faraway places. In books the world lies before you, its paths
limiting freedom. The danger in any Ideological definition of
radiating from great cities to distant lands, to scenes forever
education is that it undermines this essential dimension, In
12/21/95 13:02 T312 702
new, forever changing. Reading knows no barrier, neither
much the way Pericles argued that Sparta undermined autlien-
time nor space nor bounds of prejudice-it admits us all to the
tic, self-chosen civic bravery by mandating harsh and severe
community of human experience." Clearly, I was a lucky child,
sacrifice. Because democracy requires freedom as responsibil-
a lucky democratic child, for I learned that, in Oakesholt's
ity, any definition or system that sanctions the evasion of
words, "Learning is not merely acquiring information
...,
nor
responsibility, as I sink my Identity totally Into that of a group
is it merely 'improving one's mind'; it is learning to recognize
and its "groupthink," Imperils democracy. Education is atom-
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ized; civic Identity is splintered. Whether In the name of
spheres of human freedom, responsibility, and Identity. Accept-
change or to forestall change, an Ideological system of educa-
ing the risks of free action-an affirmation that education in
tion is the worst way for human beings to try to order and to
and for democracy makes possible but does not guarantee-
ensure their collective democratic affairs. For once a world of
marks one as a person and forms the basis of one's identity.
personal responsibility with its characteristic virtues and marks
Any mode of thought or program of education that reduces
of decency (honor, friendship, fidelity, and falmess) is rup-
human responsibility narrows the horizon of human possibility.
tured or emptled, what rushes in to take its place is politics as
To assume full responsibility is not to lapse Into dour morallsm
a "technology of power," In Václav Havel's words. Responsibil-
or to universalize a giddy and boundless compassion; rather, it
ity, according to Havel-and he is as surefooted a guide as any
is to take up the specific, concrete burdens of one's culture.
currently available-flows from the aims of life "in its essence,"
Recently, for example, Havel denounced the troubles faced by
these aims being plurality and Independent self-constitution, as
Eastern Europe's Gypsy population as an example of the search
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opposed to the conformity, uniformity, and stullifying dogmas
in a post-Communist world, for "pseudo-certainiles," Identity
of left- and right-wing Ideologues who abandon reality and
politics being one of the most readlly available and virulent
assault life with their rigid, abstract chimeras.
forms of such certainty. Assaults against Gypsles, for not being
A fusion of freedom and responsibility yields a distinct
one of "us," offer "a litmus test not of democracy but of civil
but definite political conclusion: Democracy Is the political
society. The two are certainly two sides of the same coin.
form that permits and requires human freedom, not as an act
[W]e have created all the basic institutions of democracy-polit-
of self-overcoming or pure reason, but in service to others in
Ical parties, a parliament, elections. Now much more effort
one's time and place. Democrats are so concerned with the
should be focused on building I tivil society, 10 promote ch-
education of children because, through education, children
mate that would encourage people to act as chizens in the best
6312 702 6048
can gel acquainted with the world in a way that will help them
sense of the word. "I) Public education that undermines the
assume responsibility. To live "within the truth," as Havel
possibility of, and responsibility for, this form of citizenship is
called it, is to give voice to a self and a citizen who has
an exercise In speciousness.
embraced responsibility for the here and now: "That means
This is tough stuff. But, then, democracy is for the stout
that responsibility is ours, that we must accept it and grasp it
of heart who know there are things worth fighting for In a
here, now, in this place where the Lord has set us down, and
world of paradox, ambiguity, and Irony. This democratic
that we cannot lie our way out of it by moving somewhere
way-moderation with courage, open lo compromise from a
12/21/95 13:03
else, whether it be to an Indian ashram or to a parallel polis."12
basis of principle-is the rare but occasionally attainable fruit
Havel believes we are all Ilving in the midst of a general
of the democratic Imagination and the democratic citizen In
crisis of human consciousness, which manifests itself In the
action. Democracy is on trial in our time, beleaguered by foes
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JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
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and bedeviled by friends. But there have always been skeptics.
Democracy was both tried and condemned by a number of my
distinguished forebears in the world of Western political phi-
losophy. Perhaps it is worth making a brief detour into democ-
racy's contentious past in order to take the most accurate mea-
sure we can of the current prospects for democracy.
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12/21/95 13:03
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker
This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative
marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.
This marker identifies the place of a tabbed divider. Given our
digitization capabilities, we are sometimes unable to adequately
scan such dividers. The title from the original document is
indicated below.
15
Divider Title:
Note:
This is a draft of my contribution to a larger
group effort to rethink the governing philosophy
of American democracy in response to the
great transformations--economic, social, and
political - - now underway here and around the
world. The threshold idea is that our situation
at the end of the 20th century bears a remarkable
resemblance to the circumstances facing the
Progressive movement in the late 19th century.
Bill Galston
Toward a New Democracy:
Introduction
It is often said that the core of America is an idea, that we are (as Abraham
Lincoln put it) a nation dedicated to a proposition. And this is true. But the idea
is dynamic, not static; not dry and abstract, but suffused with a sense of
possibility and hope. The American idea is a promise extended to all who enter
the community, and it is a dream cherished by generations of Americans.
The promise of American life--the American Dream--has shaped our history. It is
the promise of equal opportunity for all, unfettered by the status of one's ancestors
or the limits of one's current condition; of material and social progress from
generation to generation; of equal rights for all to protect against concentrations of
power and secure a zone of individual liberty; of a free society in which we may
form all manner voluntary associations to pursue shared interests and express
core values; of democratic self-government at every level of our public lives; and of
a civic unity that both embraces and transcends our differences.
The American Dream is not a condition to be described, but an ideal to be
realized. Each generation of Americans has been called upon to work toward its
fulfillment. And many have been challenged to chart dramatically new paths.
Some generations have encountered, and surmounted, a single focal crisis. For
the founders, it was the challenge of forging a unified constitutional republic. For
the Civil War generation, it was the "house divided against itself" by the curse of
slavery; six decades ago, it was a Great Depression that threatened not only our
economy, but democratic institutions here and around the world.
Other generations have confronted, not a single focal crisis, but rather profound
challenges along many fronts. Consider the situation at the end of the 19th
century: a great economic transformation from agriculture to the new industrial
order; a pervasive sense of social disorder--family breakdown, crime, and
immorality--as our population moved from rural small towns to rapidly expanding
urban centers; cultural challenges posed by unsettled issues of race and
unprecedented waves of immigration more ethnically and religiously diverse tha
ever before; a crisis of governance in which our public institutions were seen as
ineffective, corrupt, and exclusionary; and a fundamental debate on many fronts
about America's role in the world--the conditions of global economic engagement,
the strategies of military defense, the terms on which we would undertake
responsibilities beyond our borders.
In response to these challenges, a group of innovative thinkers developed a set of
bold ideas for renewing the promise of American life--ideas that provided the basis
for what we now know as the Progressive movement. These ideas included:
0 a stronger national government to cope with economic and social
consequences of industrialization;
0 social legislation and regulation to deal with problems of urbanization;
0 a reformed system of public education capable of transforming immigrants into
citizens;
0 political reform that expanded suffrage and deployed institutions of direct
democracy against state legislatures and local governments dominated by
special interests and corruption.
The Progressive movement was not a party, but rather a powerful new vision that
influenced both parties as well as citizens and leaders who sought to act outside
established partystructures. While it scored important early successes (both
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson implemented portions of the Progressive
agenda), the movement's key contribution was longterm: it created the intellectual
and policy predicate for the New Deal and for the rise of a strong centralized
government using the tools of legislation, regulation, bureaucracy, and executive
leadership to address our national problems. It is no exaggeration to say that the
ideas launched by the Progressives shaped our politics for most of the past
century.
Today's circumstances are different from those that sparked the progressive
movement. Still, the scope of the problems our country confronts at the end of the
20th century bears a remarkable resemblance to those our predecessors faced at
the end of the 19th.
o As the industrial economy yields to the new information age, and as the self-
contained national market gives way to global competition, many Americans are
experiencing stagnant or declining wages, increased job insecurity, and heightened
anxiety about their children's future.
O Family breakdown, violent crime, and the fraying of neighborhood and
community ties have led to a widespread sense of a society coming apart at the
seams.
O High rates of immigration and new forms of ethnic, racial, and religious group
self-assertion have weakened confidence in a common civic culture, of a shared
sense of what it means to be an American.
O Our governmental institutions are excessively influenced by special interest
groups and concentrations of wealth and power, and they are responsive to a
shallow, media-driven, polarized sound-bite politics at the expense of the
considered commonsense judgments of average citizens.
o The collapse of international communism and the replacement of East/West
conflict with ethnic and economic rivalries has given rise to confusion about our
role in the world and about the strategies for reconciling our global hopes with the
means we are willing to devote to their pursuit.
But while our challenges bear a remarkable resemblance to those of a century ago,
today most Americans no longer believe that the solution is to be found in a
larger, stronger central government. And they are right. In the 20th century, the
expansion of central government power--through legislation, regulation, and
bureuacracy--dealt effectively with the challenges of growth, security, and social
unity in the industrial age. But today, this course--still supported by traditional
liberals--serves more to defend the past than to build the future.
By contrast, many conservatives argue that the overgrown federal government is
the source of our problems and that dismantling the government in favor of the
free market will solve them. If only our national life were SO simple! The market
is the best means ever devised for creating wealth. But the invisible hand does
not create equal opportunity, or defend equal rights, or renew our civic culture.
At the threshold of the 21st century, the challenge of this generation is to chart a
new course to the American Dream
--a course equally removed from the big government structures of the old
liberalism and the no-government dogmas of the new conservatives;
--a course that builds on the strengths of the market, that reinvents public
institutions to serve public purposes, that brings more effective self-government
closer to the people, that helps us rebuild community and a shared civic culture.
We call this course the New Democracy. It rests on three straightforward but
powerful ideas.
First: despite all their historic accomplishments, the economics, society, and
politics of the Industrial Age are now in irreversible decline. To pretend otherwise
is to succumb to nostalgia. For late 20th century progressives, there is no
alternative: we must reconstruct our agenda in response to the imperatives of the
rising Information Age.
Second: we must retrieve, and renew for our time, the most enduring social
ideal of our history, articulated in different ways by Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, by Populists and Progressives alike: the ideal of a nation in which there
is equal opportunity for all and special privileges for none.
Third: to realize the ideal of equal opportunity, we must conduct both our
politics and our social life on the basis of a moral principle--mutual responsibility.
The practical meaning of that principle is clear: We cannot receive benefits unless
we give something back to our community and our country. We cannot enjoy our
individual rights without doing our fair share to maintain the overall system of
rights. And we cannot rightly exempt ourselves from obligations that bind our
fellow citizens.
Like the Progressives a century ago, we offer a new politics based on ideas in
place of an old politics beholden to interests. Like the Progressives, we hope that
the ideas we propose can transform American politics, not just one party; can
build new common ground, not new partisan divisions. And like the Progressives,
we believe that the New Democracy is the work--not of a day or a year--but of
generations to come. Still, we must do what we can. And the time to begin is
now.
The Three Cornerstones of the New Democracy
Our country rests on one simple idea: the people have the right, and the
ability, to govern themselves. But transforming that idea into reality is anything
bu simple. Policies and institutions that promote self-government in one era may
impede it in the next. Democracy cannot be carved in stone, and the task of self-
government is never done. That is why the Declaration of Independence tells us
that in addition to the unalienable rights of individuals, there is a collective right
of the people, acting as a whole, to alter their institutions to better serve their
purposes.
Our current institutions and policies have served us well through the
Industrial Age, and through the long struggle against fascism and communism.
But today we face new challenges, and we must change to meet them. These
challenges have disrupted the old order, and they have brought insecurity and
anxiety to millions of average families. But they also offer unprecedented
opportunity.
We believe that our nation stands at the threshold of a new era: of growth and
prosperity in which all can share; of revitalized free associations among our
citizens; of more effective self-government, not just for the people but by the
people, closer to them and more responsive to their concerns.
We call this era the New Democracy. It is possible, but not inevitable. It will
come to pass, but only if we have the clarity to envision it and the strength to
build it.
To make the New Democracy a reality, we must change how we act. But
before we can do that, we must change how we think--about the way prosperity
and security are produced in the economy, about the way opportunity can be
enhanced through progressive self-government, and about the way we must deal
with one another as fellow citizens throughout our society.
The New Economy
A century ago, Americans faced a great transformation of their economy, from
agriculture and individual artisanship to giant industrial corporations. Appealing
to the tradition of Jefferson and Jackson, some Americans sought to resist this
shift as incompatible with equal opportunity and democratic self-government.
Others argued that the transition was inevitable. Our nation's intellectual
challenge was to decouple enduring Jeffersonian and Jacksonian values from their
dying socioeconomic base; our practical task was to craft new policies to
strengthen these values within the context of the emerging industrial order. This
was the historic mission of the Progressive movement.
The Progressives' program rested on a comprehensive analysis of the new
economy. They understood that this shift in the basis of national wealth was
creating profound changes in our society as well. Larger units of organization;
concentration and centralization of power; more hierarchy and bureaucracy;
increased routinization and anonymity in human relations; rapid urbanization--all
these changes and more were inevitable consequences of industrialization. And
they would require, in turn, new understandings of worker organization, of
labor/management relations, and of the role of government. Fundamental issues
of individual economic security, public health and safety, and the of public power
to safeguard democracy against the dangers of economic concentration and
inequality had to be rethought.
It took generations to complete this rethinking and to create a new public
order consistent with the industrial economy--through the efforts of Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and decades of national administrations of both
parties from the 1940s through the 1970s. And today, once again, we must think
and act anew. For the economic transformation now underway is every bit as
momentous as the industrialization of a century ago, and its social and political
consequences will be equally profound.
A decade ago, politicians and pundits could still puzzle over basic trends.
Now, the dimensions of the new economy are increasingly clear. Knowledge is
the core of the new wealth of nations. The pace of technological innovation is
accelerating, and product cycles are shrinking. The information revolution is
transforming the design and production of both goods and services. Global
economic competition is diminishing the power of national economic policies and is
producing an inexorable logic of productivity improvements in every sector. The
largely unregulated flow of global capital is creating new opportunities (as well as
instabilities) in parts of the world previously shut out of the international economy
and is contributing to new pressures on established industrial powers.
Today, as was the case a century ago, the new technology of mass production
in linked to new organizational forms. Then it was large, multilayered,
hierarchical, bureaucratized units structurted along military lines. Today, new
information technologies are reversing these trends. In the economy, corporate
workforces are shrinking, organization hierarchies are flattening, top-down
bureaucratic management of information is yielding to the power of personal
computers, and hierarchical authority is giving way to more consensual forms of
leadership.
While many corporations have responded effectively to the challenges of the
new economy, the prospects for workers and their families have dimmed.
Productivity and profits are up, but wages and incomes for many workers are
stagnating. Health and pension benefits are being cut back, and a seemingly
endless cycle of "downsizing" is shattering expectations of job security. By many
measures, inequality is on the rise as the educated professionals who can function
most effectively in the new knowledge economy pull away from the rest of society.
These problems are serious, but not unprecedented. A century ago, the new
corporate/industrial order produced increased inequality of wealth and magnified
insecurity as the economy endured spasms of boom and bust. It took two
generations of public policy experimentation to reverse trends toward inequality
and create new sources of security for working families. Today, in the new
economy, our challenges are much the same. But our responses must be radically
different.
While economic agents have adjusted imperfectly to the new forces of
information, technology, and global competition, our political system has
remained mired in the past. Reform efforts to increase government efficiency by
shriking bureaucracy have met with entrenched resistance, exacerbating the loss
of public confidence and sparking demands for the whosesale elimination of public
agencies and functions. While modern information technology can help
decentralize political as well as economic power, these new possibilities for self-
government have yet to be translated into practice.
While the policy debate remains clouded, the basic point is clear: The new
economy is here to stay, and it is changing the terms on which we must act. We
need new policies--for our economic, social and political life--based on hope rather
than nostalgia, and realism rather than wishful thinking. There is simply no
substitute for bold approaches that acknowledge the irreversible reality and power
of the new economy.
Equal Opportunity for All, Special Privileges for None
As we respond to our rapidly changing economy, we must hold fast to our
enduring values. One in particular stands out as central to our vision of a good
society. It is a principle that has animated generations of American leaders and
has attracted tens of million of immigrants to our shores. It is, simply, the
promise of equal opportunity for all and special privileges for none. It is the ideal
of a society in which individuals earn their rewards through their own talents and
effort within a system of fair and open rules.
In one sense, of course, the United States has always been a society without
special privilege. The Revolutionary War uprooted our homegrown aristocracy,
and the Constitution forever prohibits the granting of titles of nobility. And
because we had no aristocracy, we were spared the class warfare that divided
European societies for generations.
Still, our history has been marked by waves of struggle against special
privilege. Consider the right to vote. It was at first the preserve of relatively
well-to-do white males. Over time, states eliminated property qualifications. A
wave of social activism at the beginning of this century led to women's suffrage. A
hard-fought constitutional amendment eliminated the poll tax. A new wave of
social activism finally redeemed the promise of the post-Civil War amendments
and effectively ensured the right of African-Americans to participate in the
electoral process. Another constitutional amendment erased the unfairness of
requiring young Americans to fight and die for their country while preventing
them from participating in the elections that shape foreign policy decisions. And
today, conflict continues over the enforcement of "motor voter" legislation that
lowers subtle but very real barriers to voting participation by lower-income
Americans.
Similar stories could be told about the long fight, not yet concluded, against
economic and social privilege. Discrimination, for example, is a moral insult. But
it is also an injury--the assertion of unearned and unjustified privilege by some at
the expense of others. It violates the most basic terms of the covenant that unites
us. And that is why we must fight discrimination until it is only a fading
memory.
Our federal budget legislates special privileges, in the form of selective benefits
handed out to favored groups on the basis of raw political power rather than
achievement or contribution to the common good. These privileges do more than
allocate benefits to the undeserving; they divert resources from better uses and
deprive others of a fair chance to succeed on their merits. A budget that better
reflects our nation's values would do a better job of promoting the national
interest. That is why we need to attack fiscal privilege in the national
government--and at every level of the federal system.
At various points in our national history, we have persuaded ourselves that
the elimination of formal, legal privileges--for example, officially sanctioned
aristocracies and racial subordination backed by law--would suffice to create an
equal opportunity society. But experience has taught us that merely negative
steps, though vitally necessary, are not sufficient. There is no invisible hand that
creates equal opportunity; it is a conscious social achievement that requires
affirmative acts.
Today, we must return to first principles and ask ourselves what we must do--
together--to realize the ideal an equal opportunity society. For example: What
effective steps can we take to strengthen families, assure quality education for all,
create bridges for young people to the world of work, and give all workers tools to
retrain to meet the challenges of a constantly changing economy?
As we answer these and many other questions, we must keep in mind the first
cornerstone of the New Democracy: the irreversible economic shift that is changing
our world--and with it, the requirements of equal opportunity. For example: in
today's economy, more and more, computer literacy is a key to employment and
advancement. For opportunity to be truly equal, all our young people must have
the opportunity to acquire this literacy during the course of their elementary and
secondary education.
Equal opportunity means a fair chance for every individual to succeed based on
talent and effort. It is a double-edged sword. On the one side, it requires the
removal of discriminatory barriers and the provision of meaningful arenas for self-
development and self-improvement. But on the other, it is not a guarantee of
success, and it is not a formula for top-down distribution of social goods. The
promise of America is the promise of equal opportunity, not equal results. As we
move toward equal opportunity, therefore, we must dismantle the structures that
in the past have used mandated outcomes to compensate for disparities in
opportunity.
What We Get, What We Give Back: The Ethic of Mutual Responsibility
The third cornerstone of the New Democracy is a principle that should pervade
our social bonds as well as our public policies. It goes by many names, but the
core idea is simple: As a moral matter, we cannot rightly benefit from any
association to which we are not prepared to contribute our fair share or fulfill the
duties of our role. And as a practical matter, no association in which this maxim
is regularly disregarded is likely to work very well. This is the commonsense
meaning of what is sometimes called the "ethic of mutual responsibility."
This ethic is distinguished from three competing principles. First, it does not
call for an extreme of altruism--of uncompensated giving to others--but rather for
a reasonable balance between what we give and what we get.
Second, the ethic of mutual responsibility rejects libertarianism--the idea that
we have no obligations other than the ones we choose. Because we are social
beings, because we become human only through our development in society, we
live in a dense network of interdependence that we are not free to deny or reject.
And third, the ethic of mutual responsibility is at odds with the philosophy of
entitlement--the belief that we can make demands on others, or on the
community, without reciprocating. The reason is simple: Just about everything of
value, whether material resources or social capital, is produced and sustained
through human action, usually in cooperation with others. To demand something
of value without contributing anything in return is to assert as a matter of right
that others should work for me without compensation. That is wrong as a matter
of morality. And in a free society, contributers will soon respond to free riders by
withdrawing their support from common enterprises.
Mutual responsibility rests on a foundation of personal responsibility. We are
not helpless victims of external forces. We are capable of understanding what is
required of us, and of acting on that understanding. That is the faith of a free
society, and of democracy itself.
We are born with the capacity for personal responsibility. But as every
parent knows, we are not born responsible. The capacity must be developed over
an extended period, starting with the family. While our society must hold all
normal adults responsible for their acts, we must recognize the existence of
unequal opportunities for developing responsibility. And we must work to ensure,
so far as possible, that every child has an adequate chance to do so.
As adults, personal responsibility begins at home. We have an obligation to
take care of ourselves and our families--and to avoid unnecessary dependence on
others. Regardless of economic or social status, we have an obligation to obey the
law--and to convey to our children the importance of law-abidingness.
Mutual responsibility means doing our part to sustain the institutions from
which we benefit. For example: because we value the equal protection of the law,
we have a responsibility to serve on juries when asked--not to evade jury duty
based on weak claims of personal inconvenience.
The norm of mutual responsibility should guide public policy as well as
personal conduct. Whenever possible, policies should be structured SO that
citizens who contribute to the community are rewarded, and those who benefit
from the community give something back.
Policies conceived in this spirit of reciprocity are far more likely to work and to
enjoy sustained public support. For example, the GI Bill was one of the most
effective measures in our history because it expressed the nation's gratitude for
our veterans' extraordinary service. And John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps was
electrifying because it challenged the most fortunate Americans to give something
back through service to their country.
If we take mutual responsibility seriously, we must eliminate public programs
that confer one-way benefits on selected individuals or groups. We must reform
programs where benefits exceed contributions over time. And we must
acknowledge that responsibility links to us future generations as well as to one
another. We have received a legacy from our parents and grandparents that we
can never repay. But acting as stewards of this inheritance, we can pass it on--
intact and enhanced--to our children and grandchildren. That is why practical
policy issues such as fiscal discipline and environmental protection also present
profound moral challenges to our capacity for responsibility.
Governance in the New Democracy
Taken together, the three cornerstones of the New Democracy--economic
transformation, opportunity without privilege, mutual responsibility--define a
vision of revitalized enduring values in a context of rapid social change. And they
point toward a new conception of self-government.
Recall the basics:
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Changing structures of production and information are breaking down
bureaucratic organizations, bringing new decision-making power to frontline
workers, entrepreneurs, and individual citizens.
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Implementing the principle of opportunity means dismantling centralized
mechanisms that exist only to distribute and defend privilege.
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Taking mutual responsibility seriously means reforming programs and
institutions that confer one-way benefits and turn citizens into beneficiaries.
All this means a return to democratic self-government based on confidence in
the capacity of average citizens, once furnished with information, to choose
responsibly for themselves. In many cases, government, so understood, will yield
ground to markets and voluntary associations. When government is still needed,
there should be a presumption in favor of decisions made close to the people and
implemented in a manner that respects their liberty and common sense.
This does not mean that the federal government is somehow the enemy of the
New Democracy. Yes, the philosophy of entitlement is incompatible with the New
Democracy. But so is the philosophy of abandonment. What we need instead is
government guided by the imperative of empowerment, government that fortifies
the self-directing powers of ordinary citizens.
For by itself, the invisible hand will not enable all Americans to participate in
the new economy. The commitment to equal opportunity requires affirmative
steps taken by the entire nation. The scope of our responsibilities to one another
crosses state and local boundaries. We need not always act together as a national
community. But even today, national action as circumstances require can still
help realize the promise of American life.