Navy - Probability of an Outbreak of War - Document I. Naval Attache Paris - Vol. I, March 9, 1937-August 6,1940

Documents I Paris Vol. I Secret PROBABILITY of an Outbreak of War Documents I Naval Attaché PARIS Volume 1 Documents Numbers 1 to 72 (9 March 1937-6 Aug. 1940) BECLASSIFIED R O. 11652, Rec. S(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letur. May. , 1972 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHÉ'S REPORT quickly diserminating Information from attachés. The copies will be distributed by 0. N. I. M per fooloote of amonding to subject matter. Forward pares copies (original and als this sumber is summary because of the limited personal is O.N.L and because of the urganry for From Y Date 2 Larch , 19.32. Serial No. 1.8 File No. 103. (Comment ser series (Seient proper number Source of information Reliable. erb January first) trues 0. N.L. Index) Subject Z.L.CE POLITICE 70HCES - Internatio nl Rel. (Nation reported es) (Inder title M per Indes sheet) (Subuitie) Reference this space. Mention leading peopraphical, personal, or political - and the girl of the report.) review, Indecing, and distribution of reports by o. N. will be greatly expedited if a brief number of the contants la entered is FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: Discussion in Tranch Senate on Anclo-Italian editorranean "Gentlemen's Agroement". CONFIDENTIAL Report N° 138 (103) of March,1937, is transmitted herewith. BECASSIFIED O. 11652. See 3(1) and 5(D) or & OSD letter. Hay, 1, 1933 By SLR Date MAY 1973 - - for - - 1. Check - el - - - - - - - - engal de - el - - - - the - - - - A-B-C-D-E Director HRAKMHL Mary And Ires [ C.N.O. Ges'l We Board College M.L.D. No. Ord. T.60. C. n. Full Eng. S.&.A. MAS Aara, U.S. B-12, M.C. N.O. Task C.W.C. Cas. Com. CHC Com Com. Attaché all Operations Der. U.S. les, Fer. S.S.S. Min Com- Return to Bei. Far. Asia Air Ca Die, W.P. y To - Lue No. I Use forma for all copies. Use only form - supplied by 0. N.I. Make all strictes, etc. uniform in sise with this form where practical. Submit eatra reples of dippings, carbona of skatches, etc., visare practical. If prantimble, submit statcher is suitable nyle for blueprinting or photostating 11. PRINTING effice ! I TRANG 100 - Political Forces Report No.138 103 - International March,1937. Relations. FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: Discussion in French Senate on Anglo-Italian Medi terranean "Gentleman's Agreement". 1. A discussion in the French Senate, on France's foreign policy - especially the possible consequences of the recent Anglo-Italian Medi terranean Gentleman's agreement, took place in the French Senate on 23 February, 1937. 2. The Government's foreign policy was approved by a vote of 413 for, and 1 against. 3. While the many aspects of France's relations with the Little Entente, Germany and Italy, were discussed, as well as the Spanish Civil war, this report deals principally with the reaction of France to the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean "Gentleman's Agreement". 4. The replies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Marine, to the interrogations on the Medi terranean Pact, are of particular interest. 5. Referring to paragraph 17 that the Franco-Soviet Paot was voted as a reaction to Hitler's pressure against Soviet relations, and that the Paot was followed by Germany's occupation of the Rhineland : this is only partially true as the Soviet Pact would have been voted anyhow but, perhaps, with a smaller majority. The French Foreign Office was informed, ahead of time, of Germany's intention to occupy the Rhineland using the Franco- Soviet Pact as an excuse. But the French well knew that Hitler had intended to occupy the Rhineland as another step in bilging the Versailles Treaty. 6. Referring to paragraph 25 on Italy's and England's interests being "complementary" in the diterranean, the right French press (still pro-Italian) is carrying on a mild propaganda for an immediate rapprochement with Italy so as not to be caught in what it terms "future rivalry" of these two powers in the Mediterranean. That England's interests are complementary" to Italy's is not accepted by the military opinion in France. Military writers see cause for "dagger's points" between Italy and England in the Eastern Mediterranean, and claim that Red Sea and Ethiopian waters are ohly a con- tinuation of the l'editerranean inso far as England's route tothe Indies is concerned. 7. Contrary to the [ress propa ganda in Italy and Germany that France was excluded from the discussions between Italy and England, on the Mediterrancen Accord, and must therefore interpret such an "exclusion" as England's moving towards closer relations with the Facist block, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (see paragraph 47), states that France was kept informed by the British Government of the entire conversations .concerning the Gentleman's Agreement. AS France has continually refused to send an Ambassador to Italy due to the fact that the Italian Government RELAND requires the credentials to read "King of Italy and E O, 11002, Sec. S(E) and 6(D) St as OSD letter, May, 1, 1072 By SLR Date MAY 2.1.1978 GERLASTED FRANCE (la 10 - Jolitionl Forces Report No.138 nrch,1937. OSD Inter, Day. 1972 103 - International elations. By ELE Date MAY 21 1973 and Superor of Rthiopis", no doubt Italy took advantage of this situation to exclude French representation at the Itale- nglo Mediter anean conference. The entire exposé of the Vinister of Foreign ffairs shows that France is completely in accord with Italy and ngland on the terms of the editerransan greeent. 8. The admission contained in paragraph 54 by the inister of Morrign \ffairs that France did at first refuse to prohibit voluntoers going to opain, when Germany and Italy were in favor of the roposition, is of note. The reasons given by the Minis- ter, and his citing the names of such liberty bearers as LAPA- ITE, ROCHARDEAD, GARIBALDI, etc., to rowe the right of "individual liberty" in defense of threatened democracy, are of particular interest and somewhat humorous. The ajority opinion in France, both Left and 1cht, feel that France deliberately permitted the freedom of volunteers to BP to spnin in order to help the canish leds to settle the war before the Facist volunteers got underway. 9. The statement by . Bergeon (see paragraph 40) about the ashington Treaty being od with ingland and the United States, and then inviting France and Italy to "sign" is of interest. 10. The entire roply of the inister of arine to the questions brought u: in the dobate (see paragraphs 59-68) is of particular interest. lie doals principally with the "readi- ness® of the French Savy for any ergency, and confirms the statement of the inister for Foreign Affairs that the nglo- Italian \greement is highly 6008 table and roved by the entire French Navy. 11. Principal points of cilitary interest brought out in the debate are as follows: Fronce's Allies Little intente - Soviet Paot. (Mon- -sicur .rubruster). 1-. On the 17th. of October, October,1936, when no were delighted to have heard reassuring declarations from the Government on the foreign situation, the Belgian Government denounced the Locarno treaty. It invoked as the principal reason that a large majority of the Belgian people, for local as well as political reasons, did not want to be tied down with a military alliance with Trance. King Leopold, in a discussion n fow days later, infored us that he did not wish that his country be dragged into n wer with Gerenny as a result of the Franco- Loviet not. 13. Tugo-Javia is drawing closer and closer to Berlin by reason of economic trenties; ournnia, notwi thatanding the assuring statements of her Foreign inister, is headed more and поге towards Derean 1 Cons; Cascho-Jovnkia now has doubts, due to Gorman for ti iontions on the Rhine, whether France can come to her nid in case of attnck. 14. ,oland is James in between Russia and Germany, and is continually haunted from all sides. the shows alternative signs of friendshi for France and Germany, depending on her -2- - E a 110M, Sec. add and (D) or (if) TIMES OND father. May, 1, 1978 100 - Polition: Forces Report No.138 SLR Date MAY 103 - International Enroh,1957. Relations. her needs, until such time as she is OR able of making a defini to decision. 15. Are our tions with Italyas cordial as they should be ? The Stresa front has mel ted ! 16. with reference to the Anglo-Italian "Gentlesnn's agree- ment", I understand England has granted Italy the facility of transi through English Somalie from the porte of Deila and Berbera. Is not this agreement detrimental to the port of Djibouti , 17. France is accused from all sides to have thrown Surope into a turnoil by contracting an alliance with Soviet Russia. I objected to this Pact in the Chamber, but without success, but permit BO to tate that I think a good many of the members of the House voted for this Pact in order to give the impression that they were not ceding to pressure from Mitler. The Pact was followed by the occupation of the Rhine; afterwards, by the German-Japnnese pact, and perhaps it will eventually be the cause of an alliance between Germany and Spain where at present, in Spain, is boing fought the first round of the fight for the Russian oil and wheat fields. 18. While on the question of Spain permit ne to state that the I ason that Italy and Germany consented to the blookade of Spain is tint they consi der the "trick" as done, and that General Franco's success is assured. 19. I voted against the Franco-Sovist ,not because it was dangerous. It is no mere talk when I state that very few French- men will put their knapsacks on their back and 8 and fight for the glory of STALINE in front of the German fortifications erected on the Rhine. 40. 1 while these questi one present a small picture of present European conditions, their importance to France is by no means small, and we expect enlightenment of the may policies involved. inclo-Italian 'editerranean Agreement (Mr Plaisant). 4. If we understand correctly the recent Anglo-Italian accord, it can ly be a source of satisfaction to us: easing of present tension, recognition of existing rights,oto. However, if we accept the literal interpretation of the letters exchanged between Count Ciano and Ar Erio Drumond, it is nothing more than a promise to respect the integrity of Jpaniah territory - the status que of the Western editerranean. --- If we must only ane in the inglo-Italian accord the "status quo" in the Mostern edi terranean - especially viewing it the day after the "big flects" arrived in the Rediterranean - it is a paychological element and retains our entire attention, If, to the contrary, WO -ust consi or it, no it was interpreted in Rome, an net of "confirmation" or "weakening" of the equilibrium of naval forces in the l'edi terranean, we hereby declare it un- acceptable; the accord can only raise in Trance strong reserva- tions. In brief, that the nglo-Italian secord adheres strictly to its bilateral character and not retond to incompass the entire international theatre of the Vediterrenean. FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.138 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. 23. After the signature of the accord it was proclaimed to be of benefit to all - such may be the case. But, it is impossible that Medi terranean interests should be discussed with- out the presence of France; in Kedi terranean matters France's interests are superior to any other nation. 24. It has been stated that the Anglo-Italian accord was only natural on the part of England to safeguard her route to India. We know, that since the time of Nelson, England has never had a better Ambassador in Europe than a Battleship in the Mediterranean. 25. In order to have us accept the accord, the dangers of which I have mentioned, we are told that there are no oon- flioting interests between England and Italy - that their in- terests are "complementary". I like this "expression" and I have noticed that it is greatly used in the Chancelleries in bringing conflicting interests into harmony. 26. Oh, indeed, there are no conflicting interests in the Mediterranean ! How about Ilot d'Ibiza, the smallest and most southern of the Balearics which indirestly commands the outlet of Gibraltar. lie could likewise say that it is in our line of communications - Oran-Algiers-Port-Vendres. A question to which we would like an answer is: "1s the Ilot d'Ibiza still occupied by Italian troops, and what are the hopes and plans of Italy in this section # 29. There is also the Ile de Pantellaria, South of Sieily. It is often repeated that there is no point of friction here - that this isle simply commands the passage towards Malta. This Ile de Pantellaria is also oriented toward the Tunisian coast and, having been strongly fortified by Italy during the last three years, is now capable of commanding the Western Mediter- ranean basin. So you see, Gentlemen, that there are opposing interests in the Western Mediterranean which require a conference of the interested powers to arrive at an understanding somewhat similar to the Montreux Conference on the Dardanelles. Anglo-Italian Medi terranean Agreement (Monsieur Bergeon). 48, Gentlemen - my intervention in this debate is at the request of the Naval Committee in order to develop a few points brought out in the debate of Monsieur Plaisant. 29. The Naval Committee, as well as the Foreign Affairs Committee, in June 1935, suffered some penible sentiments at the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty; this treaty threw out the balance of naval power as established by treaties. 30. Again, in the Anglo-Itali an Gentleman's Agreement, we were not called to present our observations on the possible reac- tions of this agreement. & a 11052, Sec. a(T) and S(D) of (if) OSD letter, May, 4 1972 By SLR Date MAY 1973 4 TANGA 100 - Polition1 I'de ces. Report No.138 103 - International March,1937. Relations. 31. AS the appointed interpreter of the Naval and Foreign \ffeirs Committees, and in order to avoid similar procedure " entioned above, 1 had written in the question- naire presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 15 lloven- ber, 1936, the followings "If a edi terranean not should be considered, is France assured by England that the negotiations will not be condue ted wi thout her cooperation 34. You well know the senti ente of the Navel and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Jenate regrding the mgotia- tions between Italy and ingland on the Rediterrenean Agreement. You must have been ablo to judge the displeasure and disappoint- ment of the two Committees when they learned that a "Gentleman's agreement the be twoen these two countries was terminated without France bit ne included in the conference. 33. Spenking particularly for the Naval Committee, its displansure is readily understood when France, a big Meditor- renean . owor not invi ted to take part in the conference, several years a,30 took the initiative of a Medi terranean Naval Agreement of the interested powers as being necessary to pease thin the framework of the League of Nations. 34. That is really at the botton of this refusal to have France resent at the anglo-Italian conference: this is the question to be answered. 33. 111 that was conceded to France, in this Contleman's agreement, was a vague notice expressing the desire of the two contracting parties to "see an amolioration of the rola tions between the two si matories and all the Rediterranean powers," and to "ros- peet the rights and interests of these powers." 36. It 1a precisely because Transe is rentioned in this Agreement, just like any one of the other small :edi terrenean powers, that the Noval Committee has well founded preocoups tions in the matter. 37. From a simple reading of the text of the "Gontleman's agree eat. it could be inoffensive; but if one considers that such accords - experience has tought us - can be a course of danger fr nations not invited to resent their views and who may remain disared as a result of an inter retation of certain phrases in a Fact. 38. Just what are the "rights and interests" nentioned in the agreement that it is a "question of respecting ? 39. It is for France to evaluate these, in full equality with Angland and italy, in a conference where Trance would have a chance to explain her editerrenean position. In the : edi terrenean France's interests are economic and strategie. 40. No must not forget the sad memories of our being kept apart from the reliminaries of the Washington Conference in 1941. Wixtoen yours ago the -ashington conference took place and this conforence was preceded by n preliminary conference between Angland and the United States; France was not invited. Afterwards DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIA & 0. 11652 Sec. S(E) and MD) of (I) OUD letter, May, 3, MAY 1978 (972 5. By SLR Date & a 11652, See ano and ID) of (E) OSD belief, May, 4, 1972 CONFIDENTIAL FRANCE By SLR Date MAY 21 19/3 100 - Political Forces. Report No.138 103- International March,1937. Relations. Japan a): eared on the scene and arranged her required quote. Then onne the turn of Prence and Italy who found themselves confronted with an irreducible position. The same method was Gentle en, the provisions of the nglo-Itylian Pedi terranean used in the nglo=German naval coord of 1935, For this reason, accord do not give us any too much assurance. 41. Finally, a strong Havy 18 what wehced 1 a strong Navy is the best and cost eloquent Ambassador and the one who geta 30 the non t attention. Spanish Intervention and inglo-It-lian Meditorrenean ACCORD - Minister of Foreign Affairs N. Delbos ). posed during this debate. 4. Gentlemen, I will endeavor to reply to the questions 43. and agland in the editerranean, this Government has never lost Apropos of the "Gentlenan's \greement" between Italy sight of the importance of this agreement to France. importance and necessity of a l'edi turranean agreement of all 44 Last June, before the Senate, I remarked on the by Italy. interested powers due to the aftermath of the Ethiopian conquest 45, when I spoke in the Senate, the Jpanish Civil har had not as yet broken out The result of this war was to have delayed a general Rediturransan agreement which I have just mentioned. we could not very woll have asked the Opanish plex international negotiations. Republican Govern ent, fighting for its life, to undertake com- was to keep the Spanish war from developing into a world war. 46. The most important problem, as the Senate well know, Under such conditions the French Govern ent looked favorably on the desire manifested in home and London to arrange Rediterraneen differences arising out of the Ethiopian and Spanish ware, A Mediterranean accord, therefore, should not have raised any objections on our parts this accord never had, and could not have, any other object than that intended. 47. The idea of regulating Redit rransan interests, with- out the resenee of France, would be absurd. Having boon kept informed by the British Governo ent of the entire eonser vations of the Italc-Britich accord, and being assured that France's interests were not endangered, 18 the accord was meroly the retention of the status quo in the (som thing to which France is sincerely attached) we could not do otherwise ings between Italy and ingland. than look with sympathy on an accord which removed misunderstand- 48. In the declaration signed - January at Rome, the Italian and British Govern ents proclaimed their 0 00 on sttach- sent to the status quo in the Meditorraneam: at the same time the letters exchanged on 31 December between Jir Erie Denummend and le Coate Ciano contained precise assurances on the status que of the editerranean; the French government also received -Re CELLASSIFIED & a 11652, See 3(3) and S(D) of (i) OSD letter. May, 4, 1972 By SLR Date MAY 19/3 FRANCI 100 - Political Forces Report No.138 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. received confirmation of these assurances in communicationswith the Italian Government. 49. The permanent position of France in the Medi to rranean and North Africa is not endangered by this accord. Is there any need of me adding, Gentlemen, that France will know how to defend her position, as she has in the past, if threatened ? 50. France welcomes any Mediterranean accord which can be completed in the same spirit, and which does not menace any nation. But, I am in complete accord with N. Plaisant - b1- lateral accords will not suffice for a general peace. They may have their usefulness, but their extent is limited: a guarantee of treaties and general security, we must not forget, are subor- dinated to other conditions. 51. If we consider the entire Ledi terranean problem, it is not by a series of declarations and bilateral accords that we can solve, for example, a reduction in Mediterranean Fleets. Nothing definite can be arrived at until each terested power is assured that in case its lines of communication are menaced the aggressor will find himself confronted with all other powers. 52. What applies to the Mediterranean is equally appli- cable elsewhere. It is for this reason that the French Govern- ment is reso lutely attached to pacts which are open to all na- tions under the guidance of the League of Nations. 53. I do not care to enter a discussion on the different phases of intervention in Spain by various powers. No one, I hope, doubts that France will permit her lines of communication, or the security of her frontiers, to be threatened. 54. Experiences in Spain clearly showed us that non- intervention should not be limited to arms, but extended to volunteers. In this respect it is correct to state that the ques- tion of prohibiting volunteers was proposed by Italy and Germany. At that time we estimated that the respect for individual liberty and the glorious precedents which we had the right to invoke - sufficient to quote the names of "Rochambeau", "Garibald1", "La- fayette", and "Byron" - did not permit us to agree to this sug- gestion; we were under the impression that only purely individual cases of volunteering would occur. 55. But, events proved different and risked to assume a serious aspect: intervention direct and of a massive nature; for this reason the London Commission was requested to take steps to prohibit all volunteers entering Spain. 56. Replying to certain remarks in the Chamber, I do not share the pessimism of M. Ambruster in regard to France's friends and allies. I think that France in her alliances and friends can look into the future with confid ence. Never have our relations with Great Britain been 80 friendly - and my words are only an echo of what is said across the channel - and this solidarity of the two nations, ready for any sacrifice to guarantee peace, is the best guarantee of peace in Europe. 57. The communion of ideas which tes us to the Republic of the United States should also contribute to the F. D. 11632 Sex. ano and (D) of X CON OSD letter, May, I, 1972 By SLR Date MAY 1913 FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.138 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. maintenance of peace because this ideal, affirmed by three powerful democracies, is a powerful force for peace in that it menaces no other nation and has no other object than the collaboration of people in independeme and liberty. 58, The Franco-Soviet Pact keeps its full value - defensive and pacific; also our alliance with the little entente and Poland. Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Agreement Minister of Marine (M.Gasnier-Duparo). 59. Gentlemen, after the description of M. Delbos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), I would not have spoken had it not been to show my respect and courtesy for the Naval Committee and its Vice-President M. Bergeon. 60. The question put to me is "What does the French Navy think of the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean Accord ?" I should state, without any hesitation, that the French Navy which is responsible for the lines of communication with our colonies, and especially North Africa, highly approves the accord. 61. That Navy was, and is, anxious about events taking place in the Medi terranean. It is certain that if the present situation in the Mediterranean becomes definite we would find ourselves in a precarious position. 62. We'are pleased that the "Gentleman's Agreement" first of all eased certain friction in the Mediterranean - friction susceptible of creating an incident which would have had con- siderable consequences. 63. The "Gentleman's Agreement", in declaring for the status quo in the Mediterranean, brought a feeling of relief to the Navy. 64. Referring to the question of the Balearics, notably the Ile d'Ibiza, this island serves for commercial aviation. As to the Ile de Pantellaria, belonging to Italy ( which has no harbor), it can only serve as a temporary landing place for airplanes. 65. It was mentioned, in the course of the present debate, that the distribution of our naval forces in the Medi- terranean placed us in an inferior position to that of Italy. Permit me to state that if the Italian naval forces concentrated in the Western Medi terranean, it would only need a few days for us to transfer our Atlantic Fleet to these waters. 66, Mention was also made that we must beware of any treaties reducing naval forces, and precedents have been cited. There is nothing, that I know of, that would lead one to suppose -8 FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.138 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. that France will accept any arrangement fixing definitely and sine qua non the Mediterranean naval forces as they exist to-day. The London 1936 naval paot was concluded on the basis and principles al together different and, on the question of quantity of tonnage and quantity of vessels, we conserved full liberty of action. 67. It was stated that the country should have a navy in keeping with its policy. Last June when I took over the Ministry of Marine, I had a "splendid navy", in excellent con- dition, turned over to me, and up to present date it has further expanded and improved. At this very moment, the new projected naval program is ready for presentation to Parliament for approval. 68. Finally, when we examine the "Medi terranean Gentleman's Agreement", between Italy and England, from any aspect, we can only 806 happy results for France; I repeat it again, speaking because it preserves the status quo ante, was an event of for the French Navy, that the accord between Italy and England, absolute necessity for the defense and security of France. WELLASSING E.O. 11652, Ses. I(E) out D) w a OSD letter, May, 1, 1973 ELR Date MAY 21 1973 - 9 - V.N.LM ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT Forward BETER copies (original and als ourbons): this number . Decembry because of the limited personal in o. N. I. and because of the urgene? for quickly information from attachés. These copies will be distributed by O.N. 1. M per footnota or according to subject matter. From I Date 15 March 1937 Serial No. 158 File No. 103, (Commence DEF aeries (Beinct proper number each January first) from 0. N.I. Index) Source of information Press. Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES n. International Rel. (Nation reported en) (Inder title M per Indes about) (Bubtitle) Reference review, Indesing, and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be greatly expedited if a brief numbery of the contants la entered is this apace. Mention leading geographical personal, If political DAMMA, and the girl of the report.) Irreconcilable Differences between Policies of ENGLAND and GERMANY CHIMERICAL Illusions of LOCARNO No.2. Report N° 158 (103), March, 1937, is transmit ted here- with. 3 231937 hopes - is Check - of the - - - - - Dese - de - el - - - to - - - - - A-B-C-D-E -RAL Mano- And Cell We Director E C.M.O. N.L.D. Nov. Ord. T.S. CAL J S.&.A. M.A.S. U.S. può Board College Aara, isso M.C. H.O. \ Task CBC Can. Cam. CWC Com. Com. Attaché al Operations State 3 Return to Des. U.S. Bet. Fee. Sex. Fer. Avia S.S.S. Air Cm. Die. W.P. Com. P.T. - law No. Das forma for all copies, Care only forma as supplied by o, N. 1. Make all sketches, est, uniform in sise with this form when practical. Bubmit estra copiae of dippings, narbona of etc., where practical. If practicable, submit skatches is suitable stying for blueprinting or photostating. GOVERNMENT PRINTING effice ! FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.158 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. IRRECONCILIABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLICIES OF AND (e) : not - CHIMERICAL ILLUSIONS OF LOCARNO No.2. The return of Von Ribbentrop to London, has again started rumors in the French press about "new propositions" from Hitler; mention is made of a Locarno No.2, and of Hitler's desire to straighten matters out before England and France become armed. French opinion accepts the German-Italian relations (Rome-Berlin axis) as the marriage of the "rabbit with the carp". It is freely voiced that Italy and Rome expected the famous "Berlin-Rome" axis to bring pressure to bear on France and England to recognize the danger of the "Bolshevik advance on western civilization". However, unknown turn of events in connection with the Ethiopia conquest and the bid for domina- tion in the Mediterranean of Italy - not to mention the re- militarization of the Rhineland, brought France and England only closer together making the Franco-Soviet Pact all the more binding and compelling England to recognize the Franco-Soviet paot as an essential step in her foreign policy (Montreux agree- ment, giving Russia access to the Medi terranean, engineered by England and France). The fury of the propaganda sent out, through pamphlets and the radio, by the Dictators blinded them to the peculiar political psychology of the Gallic French (who live on internal political disputes), with the result that they became self- convinced that "Bolshevikism" was not far off in France. This glaring error in judgment, of the Gallic trait of controversy, coupled with the mistake of thinking that England would desert a power with a good army, and a key Mediterranean position (France), has now put Germany and Italy in an embarrassing position. The result of the Berlin-Rome axis has done nothing more than awakened the democracies of France and England to the fact they must be armed to defend their positions. The following gist of an editorial from the EXCELSIOR of 12 March, showing the "irreconcilable policies" of Germany and England is considered of interest as showing the trend affairs will take during the coming year. # Now that Von Ribbentrop has returned to London rumors have commenced on the 'new propositions' which he has up his sleeve. Correct inform tion coming from Berlin denies these rumors and prove that Ribbentrop has not a Locarno No.2 to discuss with Eₙgland. The foreign policy since 1919 has been to question the territorial status of eastern Europe. The Republican Government of Germany, who were on friendly relations - 1 - FRANCE 1DO - Political Force Report No.158 103 - International March, 1937. Relations. relations with France and Czechoslovakia, concentrated on the Polish corridor. The Nazis, to weaken the diplomacy of France, did an about face and m de an alliance with Poland and started hostile propaganda against Russia and Czechoslovakia. The tactics employed may vary but the idea remains the same: disassociate the guarantees of peace in the East and West and break down England's and France's influence in Central and Eastern Europe. What is this eternal dream of Germany so often men- tioned in books, speeches, etc., and lately revised by Hitler? Germany intends to make over the chart of Europe from the Baltic to the Black sea. The Brest-Litowsk Treaty gives the best answer to this question and shows German aims. The Brest-Litowsk Treaty, too often forgotten, called for : Roumania having been dealt with by the treaty of Bucarest, Russia was to abandon her provinces of Finland, Estonia, Lettonia, Lithuania and Poland - and of course the Ukraine. All these provinces were to become 'indepen- dent' under the tutelage of Germany (Poland was to receive a Saxon King). This dream came to an end with the victory of the allied nations. The details of the Brest-Litowsk Treaty came to mind when we examine the Nazis' attitude to the negotiation - always announced, and always delayed - to a Western Pact, an Occidental Pact, but which will not be a Locarno No.2 as has been erroneously announced at times. Notwithstanding the illusions expressed recently, in several speeches in England, negotiations for the Locar- -no No.2 start in a very unfavorable atmosphere because Hitler is very displeased with England's actions and es- pecially BO with Baldwin and Eden. England has greatly gone down in Germany's estimation since she refused to join the 'Anti-Bolshevik crusade'. England has aggravated her case by not taking position against the treaties con- cluded between France - Russia and Czechoslovakia. England has become insupportable to the Germans by not declaring publicly to Germany : I I am not interested in anything which takes place on the Continent 20 degrees east of Greenwich Longitude' England, while refusing to become engaged in eastern European problems, maintained her fidelity to the League of Nations, and strict adherence to the pacts of non- aggression; this act of England perhaps envisages the eventual protection of Czechoslovakia from aggression. This is a thorn in Berlin's side if we judge correctly from the Berlin press. .... - 2 - FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.158 103 - International March,1937. Relations. Advice of Neutrality - German sentiment, apropos of a Western Pact, was recently exposed in detail in the 'Observer' in an article by M. Garvin. This article was reproduced in Germany, will thout changing or adding one word. All German propaganda follows the same lines as this article in the Observer: reminding England that she will make a grave mistake to become mixed up in SOOB thing that does not really concern her - anything east of the 20th. degree of longitude of Greenwich. Germany pro- poses as an act of 'wisdom the sagacity of Belgium in decla- ring herself neutral. In such an atmosphere the least that can be said is that the chances of a Western Pact are not 80 bright. German tactics have not changed; her preocoupations are the same - break French oriental alliances and keep England from acting through the League of Nations to defend central european pacts. A Germany well armed on the Rhine has nothing to fear as no one wants to invade her. It 1s, therefore, England, Holland, Belgium and France, that are asking protection. The price of non-aggression sollicited from Germany is well known: the absolute disinterestedness of France and England in German expansion towards the East. The question is squarely put to England by the HAMBURGER FREMDENBLATT, at a moment when negotia- tions are about to open: 'Is. the British Government ready, conforming to its natural interests, to limit its military engagements north-west of Europe, or does she want to engage herself in unknown ground by permi tting herself to be dragged via the Franco-Soviet Pact into the political arena of Central Europe. ?" Note: The French are seriously considering what Germany will do when the economic slump will o ccur when armament is completed. As German rearmacent should be completed in about 1-2 years, -1t is reported that German employment is 60% employed in armament building. the French feel that War is the only outlet to stave off unemployment. German expansion in the East seems, to the French mind, to be the logical step to forstall an economic crisis when Germany can no longer employ her people in manufacturing munitions and armaments. - 3 - N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT Prest copies cortained and aix carbona): this number . - because of the limited personal in 0. N. 1. and benon of the for quintly diserminating information from attachée. The espies will be distributed by o. N. I. M per foofacte of above amording to also mile. Y From 15 March 37 Date Serial No. 160 File No. 105 (Compane - aeries Chalest proper - Source of information Reliable serb January first) trum d. N.I. Index) Subject FRANCE (ITALY AND ENGLAND) POLITICAL FORCES INT.RELATIONS 3 (Nation reported em) (Inder title - per Indes sheet) (Robittle) Reference review, Indesing, and distribution of reports by o. N.I. will be greatly expedited If a brief summary of the contrata is estared la this space. Mention leading geographical personal, of political - and the girl of the report.) ITALY AND ENGLAND - NOT TOO LATE TO BECOME RECONCILED; WAR IN THE SPRING. Report No. 160, 15 March, 1937, is transmitted herewith. - - 2 L Chesk - of - - - - - - - - - the - of - - - - - - - - -- A-B-C-D-E f And Cas'? We Director HRNRHH Beight C.N.O. T.43. F M.L.D. Mar. Ord C.S.R. Exp. S.&.A. M.S.S. U.S. Inco I Aura. M.C. N.O. PVM Two chc Cos. Com. Chc Com. Attachd al Com Operations State Com- Return le Der. F = Bet. For Sea. Fee, Asia 111 Ale Can Die. W.P. Com. PLTs. - Room No. Cas forma for all optive. Cas only forma as supplied by o, N.I. Make all a. uniform in also with this form win prantial. Rubeit extra copies of clippings, mirbone of skatches, ate., where practical. If procticable, submit skatches in suitable styles for blueprincing or photostating. " - PRINTING - ! FRANCE 100 POLITICAL FORCES No. 160 103 INT. RELATIONS March, 1937 ITALY AND ENGLAND : NOT TOO LATE TO RECOME RECONCILED; WAR IN THE SPRING The following article is taken from the French Royalist paper L'ACTION FRANCAISE and is of interest - not so much for the prophesy of war in the spring, but for the warning to Italy that she is taking the wrong road in going counter to England in the Mediterranean. The ACTION FRANCAISE, more pro-Italian than pro-German, due to Italy's Bourbon connections, is very favorable to Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean so the article is more from a friend than an enemy: "Letter received from Rome announcing war in Spring: "What appears to no to be the worst mistake of all, and the most threatening for the world peace, would be for the Government of Rome to avoid the chances of coming to an agreement - which chances are still available - before it is too late. The moment that England feels herself threatened by Germany, which sentiment appears to be more and more confirmed, it 1s not possible that England will increase the number of her difficulties by antagonizing a nation who, in case of war, would be nothing more than a *good second' for Berlin. The best we can say is that Iwly is dangerously placed for a maritime people who wish to have free movement between Gibralter and Suese" - 1 - M. E. - ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 15653-E c-10-m Pervant INTER - indiated and ats this number - - beaus of the limited personal a O.N. 1. and beaus of the urganey quickly information from attachés, Times copies will be distributed by o. N. 1. M per footaste of according to aubject natier, Y From Date 19 April 1937 245 103 Serial No. File No. (Commer - aria (Seient proper Source of information French newspaper with January first) true 0. N. E. Inde Subject POLITICAL FORCES LT. MINIUS (Nation reported ea) (Todes title M per indes sheet) (Bubtitle) Reference Indesing, and distribution of reports by 0. N.I. will be greatly expedited if . brief number) of the contents la mind to this apace. Mention leading prographical, personal, of political DAIDAN, and the girl of the report.) 4 VRANCE FORMIGN POLICY: Speech by inc. Delbos, Winister of Foreign .ffairs. Report No. 245, 19 April, 1937, is treasmitted herewith. - - - - - - la a. N.L. Check - of the - -- - - - - - the - - - - - - - - - . - A-B-C-D-E Describe Mohe/ And E C.K.O. : New, Ord. T.S. U.S. FUR Im Board College M.L.D. CAR. F S.S.A. M.A.S. Awa. N.C. , e Tech CWC 3 3 C.W.C. Cam 3 at Operations Dwv. 0.5. Bet. Fw. See. Fe. Asia S.S.S. Can, Dir. Sexte 3 to Ale W.P. Com. FLT. - Room Phs. Use forma for all copire Use only forms M supplied by o. N.L. Make all ne, usifurm in size with this form where practical. Aubmit extra e of dipplas, carbose of skatches, etc., where practical. If practicable, what skatches in suitable stying for blueprinting or photostaring : - PRINTING enner - FRANCE 100 POLITICAL FUNCES No. 245 108 INT. HELATIONS April 1937 FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: Speech by M. Delbos, Minister of Foreign Affairs. AS a Congress meeting of the Radioal Mosialists Party at Careassonne, on 18 April, 1937, M. Delbos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made several statements concerning France's Foreign relations in the present E uropeen disturbed conditions. M. Delbos reaffirmed the desire of France for years as well as its faith in the League of nations, reviewed the French attitude towards the Spanish conflict, and expressed confidence in the future in spite of the many obstaeles. Speeking of the French desire for peace, K. Delbos said that it was no preserious arrangment bristling with bayonets that they sought, but true peace based on mutual respect, independencemed liberty. The League of dations, weekened though it had been by past events, still remained the surest of peace realities," and that with reforms now under con- sideration the League would conquer may obstacles which lay shead. The Trench proposals for reform of the League adhered to realities, since they proportionad the efforts of each State to the danger it incurred. Instead of all being called upon for their unrestricted support (which would be irrestible, but vas impossible for the moment,) military assistance should be organized by moans of regional pacts between countries threatened by a common danger. Reamhile, while counting on herself and her allies for the of peace, France was ready to sook any ave : to a friendly understanding with other nations. Inferring to the Spanish conflict, N. Delbos declared that their desire for passe had been shown by their fforts to sake non-interveation a reality. The one bright spot in the entire Spanish affair has been the reinformement of Franco-ititish friendship, which, backed by the resources of the two countries, was the surest sefeguard of world penes. And one of the reasons which m/s him view the future with confidence was the knowledge that the the great democracies, Great Britain, Trance, and America, were united in their determination to avoid ideologiesl bloss. This did not man that danger no longer existed. The greatest was the formation of those bloss, of which he had just spoken, though he still believed in the possibility of understandings botween nations with widely differeng forms of Covernment. There was also the are rase, But surely 11 wid net 100 ambitious to ask, as a beginning, for control and the publication of ame programs. That was what Trance would propose at the meeting of the Disarmement Conference Dureeu noxt month. Finally, there was economic iselation, but here, $00, certain signs gave home of an improvement, and there were indications that M. Yes Zeeland would be able to demonstrate his wehnical and statemenlike qualities. Concluding, N. Delbos agreed with Dr. Schacht that a political improvement must precede an sconomie one, and said that above all, and first of all, hearts and minds must be disarmed. The time has come to put a tom to insitement and to break down the spiritual bulkheads between nations. N.N.LM ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT C-10-m ATTACHE'S REPORT 14683.E Forward - - cortained and ats this number . Decembry because of the limited personnel in O.N. 1. and besome of the organes quickly information trues attachés. These copies will be distributed by O.N.I. M per fondacte of according to subject nation. From Y Date 31 Way . 19.37 Serial No. 309 File No. 103 (Comments - aria (Saled proper - Reliable each January first) from 0, lad Source of information Subject FRANCE POLITICAL I.T. RELATIONS (Nation reported ea) (Inder title - per lader sheet) (Bubille) Reference review, indesing, and distribution of reports by 0, N. will be grally expeditat If . brief number of the contents la entered I this space. Mention leading prographical, personal, of political SAIDAS, and the give of the report.) FRENCH POLITICAL ITEMS SENG: Report No. 309 (103), 31 Lay, 1937, is transmitted herewith. JUN 118 1937 DECLASSIFIED 2% o, 11652, Sec. (E) end S(D) cap (i) Cod letter, May, 1, 1972 By SCR Date MAY 21 1973 Invoice - legise - a. - of - - - - - - - 1 - - - of - - - - - - - - - A-B-C-D-E 1 Mana And We U.S. Director C.N.O. Board College N.L.D. Mar. OHL TAB. CAR 4ag. S.A.A. M.4.S. 5 pull M.C. H.C B-12, B-16 Tesh CWC 3 3 CBC Com Cam. Attached at Operations 3 Refere to Des, U.S. Bar, For. Sex. Fer. Asia S.S.S. Ale Can. Div. W.P. I R.T. - / I Use forms for all copies, Use only forms - supplied by O.N.L Make all sibsiches, esc., in case with this form where practical. Bubmit extire copie of elippings, carbona of sketches, etc., where practical, If practicable, submit sizetches is suitable style for blueprinting or photostacing ... - affill ! 100 POLITICAL 10. 309 108 DEPARTMENT REATI 117 V 31 1937 From POLITICAL IT.25 Personal contact with a rember of Tender 3lum's Cabinet, by a represe tative of the Intes 7. developed the following facts: (a) That Guido chaids, Austrien ecrotary of state, had not been able to at . whing tangible in wris beyond endocument towards closer 000,00 ation with and Hungary) that the renth did hear rexs that Angland promised Ouido Debride nxt favored mation clauses provided Austria collaborated with Czecho=< Lovakia. France, for seconds reasons, could not nate any similar promises. (b) The st:ffule of oland towards Cardho-Clowakia is interpreted as being not hostile and definitely unhelpful. (e) It was Delt that Quesolini's attitule towards the ecronation was due to the influsese of Count Ciano, 8 memanophile. as well 40 the influence of are of the you wer Pacists aurounding tussolini. that the older Italian element deplored the anglophote and freneophobe turn which affairs bed taken in Italy. (4) !rance could not understand how Italy who had given br such assurances of ecoperation et the time of Leval's visit to Ras could, in such a short time, develop such anti-Trench feelings. It yes wit that the Italiana -- ungrateful and notion was sede of the fuot that 18 was /TW 100 that refraind from bri vir oil amnotions ou Italy, when England will trying to force the issue: it is claimed this "011" Dered Italy 11 the Athlopian affair. (e) Deforring to the position of the Blum government it 1s :w1t that it is entirely card for the procent; the only cark spot - the results of ep lication of the 40-hour - K which 110 causing economic disinention and wial discontent with t'm middle classes. If elections were held it 140 resered that it would politice: clour the air, 17 would cortainly hring about & walming o the Communist and ocfelist parties. It 1.0.0 centioned that Prenier Blum would to as ocinte hinnelf with a Cover nent compossed or a certain element of his ocialists together with the adioal ocialists and oup at Two the center, with the Comunists definitely out of the picture. Personal controt, DATE course, with on oricial from the Open agation, developed the following facts: (a) Caedh officials not particularly worlod over 000 hoslorakia's proced external relations, particularly with company. Claimed this Omechoslovakia 1a exceptionally well named with a strong "aginot 10" of its wa, and a well defi wd act -0% with prenia whereby, in the evers of hostilities, cent 19 for my atorial 1.19 to be Loonted - $ various prints in outheastorn ont within Members territory, thus * visiting in effective line or street, by slow states, into (b) That Caech my has made great strive since lones becore Prest 'ent, and test to 15 greatly interested in any offaire, holding -> staff nective bi-we kly in progre. 1 E. a 11652, & AB) and (D) of as OSD lotter, May, 1, 1978 MAY 81 xm 1912 By SI.8 Date y NACE No. 209 (e) Little optinism 10 wis for the Austrian position, though it is believed that 414 a good deal to win over Austrien Socialiste to his camp, and that influence of Loodon and Parte will now be foll in Visims who:e it has been sheed all $00 leog. All this will serve to complicate the Derlin-Mame exis. Th $ in the ovent of any as ression against or Austria, would take immediate stops to defend these countries. (d) That sould hald off Certify for at least three months and by that time the Testern powers would have definitely shown their hands. (e) Nome $00 confident 1a the assistance from Covie's Russia in event of attack from Germany. Run-in is considered a total enige and would nore or loss not 03 the injule of the nonent than as & result of a prescribeived military policy. in Orief significance attached to reaffimation of the Pact así that 11 is a warning to the Metators that mither France 100 Has is desired any charge in this Part. (g) That has been given food for thought or late: Mirst, an has realized the superiority of Cortet sir foress, onr Ceman, as displayed in the Spenish vari secondly, that England's reasonsent is no bluef but a reality, and that England's voice will, is the future, b backed with strong vilitary foress. (h) That has macrificed a good doal in the recent commercial treatly with Austria, in order to obtain friendly relations with this power, and this would be resignized when the treaty was published. Note: The optinism relt in peragraph (e) above 201 Frence soning to assistance of Caeshe-Slovaida, is net here out by Treath opinion. Trease 1ght aid financially, but from a military |standpoint the obstasles are $00 great and too many. RUSTO & a IIFT& for 2(2) and S(D) et 05 050 letter, May, 4, 1972 Sly SLR Date MAY 2119 $ N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHÉ'S REPORT 215559 Perved INTER - (ortainal and ats this somber . - because of the limited personal is O.N. I. and of the for quickly Comminating information trees allachés. These espies will be distributed by o. N. - per fontaute of assenting le aubject matter. From Y Date 8 Sept. 1937 Serial No. 444 File No. 103 (Commer - arter (Select proper sumber - Junuary line) true o. R. 1. Index) Source of information or proven reliability Subject FRANCE (EUROPE) POLITICAL FORCES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Nation reported ea) (Indes title - per todax abost) Reference review, Indexing, and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be gratily expeditad if . brief of the to estand is this apace. Mention leading geographical personal, or political MOM, and the give of the report.) THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FRCM THE AUSTRIAN POINT OF VIEW 6 Report No. 444, 8 September, 1937, is transmitted herewith. DECLARATION R. a 11002 - 10 and III (R) ORD lotter May, Visit By SLR Date MAY H - Chest - of - - - - - Inco - - - - - the - - - - - - - - A-8-D-D-E [ Anto Ges'll Va I C.N.O. M.L.B. No. Ord. T.S.B. / cm Reg. S.A.A. M.4.S. Aara. U.S. N.O. Director put Board College M.C. all Operations Tesh cac is 3 Cbc Com. Cos. State Cam- Return le Des. U.S. Bei. Fee. In. Per. Asia ILL a Cm. Div. W.P. 8 FLT. To. - I No. of elippings, carbona of etc., when practical. If procticable, submit in suitable styles for blasprinting - photostating. Use forms for all copies, Das only forms - supplied by O.N.I. Males all sizetches, - spilore in sine with this form when practical Submit nim " - - affice ! FRANCE (EUROPE) No. 444 100 Political Forees September 1937 108 Int. Relations THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION FROM THE AUSTRIAN POINT or VIEW SOURCE OF INFORMATION: - or proven reliability. The following view of the International situation comes from a man who has been for several years the close personal advisor, confident and "arranger" for Chansellor Schuschnigg. He is at present stationed in Paris handling certain aspects of Austrian press relations, but also acts as personal representative and go between for the Chaneellor when such duties become necessary. His knowledge of I repear affairs to rank among the very best, and, within the last year, information, from him by members of our Legation in Viezna has been unfailingly accurate. GENERAL: My informant takes a most pessimistie view of the general situation. The danger is extremely grave and any incident may set in motion a train of events the end of which no one can foresse. For us, with our detached viewpoint, it is easy to accept the present strained diplomatic situation. For the representative of a small country, however, it is as entirely different matter for certainly if events ecose to pass as now indicated several of the small countries will 000.00 to exist. THE NUREMBERG CONFERENCE: The "theme song" of the Nuremberg Conference this year has already been indicated. It is to be justice to German Basi minorities in other lands. Their rights and organization abrond will continue to be discussed as an abstruct principle; that is to say speeches will be in the open and without throwing stones at any particular foreign country. On 18 September, the "Portei Tag", on which date Hitler will address the Conference, there may be mentioned. BOMP surprises along this line - perhaps even specific situations may be EVENTS WHICH MAY ARISE FROM THE MINORITY QUESTION: The first great fear of the Austrians, Oneshe Slevake and others is what may happen as a result of this misority agitation. If Healein, leader of the Must German group in Omeshe-Slovakia, decides (or is told) that the time is ripe to begin a compaign of violenee, a series of disturbances are envinaged in the sourse of which some Germans are bound to be injured. After this has gone on for several days indignation in Germany will reach such a point that intervention will be ordered. When the Germans nove in to supress this disorder it will be the signal for Hungary to march in and take over MP lest territory and By informant's remarks indicate that this has already been arranged. Thus - may me, before Christmas, the disappearence of Ozeshe-Nlevakia from the intermational seems. POSSIBLE REPLRCUCTIONS: It has been definitely stated by may French officials high in public office that if Cascho-3lovaria is attacked France will go to war. Many American observers better qualified to know than the writer believe that she will. Personally, however, the writer believes that although indignation here would rua extraordinarily high and a diplomatic break would probably occur, that the French would net actually attack Germany for this reason alone. There are may others that share this view. BECLASSIFED E. a 11652 See 1(E) and MD) of (i) OSD letter, May, 1072 By SLR Date MAY 22 1975 1 CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSINED FRANCE (EUROPE) g. a 11602 No. 200 and or (E) 100 Political Forces No. 444 OSD latter, Nay, 1972 105 Int.Relations September 1987 By SLR MAY 22 who Russia, most observers feel, is completely occupied in the Far East end dare not risk a way on two fronts. Without the immediate assistance, and in foree, of France and Russia 11 is not believed that any of the Little Entente countries would deslare war to protect Certainly Rumania would not and there is little faith that the Juge-Slave would. Thus Germany's noment for this coup is extraordinarily propitious. Before sontinuing it 18 desire to reemphasize that the foregoing is not a prediction. It is merely a fear of what BAY happen; followed by an attempt to trace events to their logical eonslusion if 11 does happen. POSSIBLE RESISTANCE: The Omera estimate that they can hold out against Germany for two months. Austria, assisted by the Caseks, estimates she can last a month more. This is not much and does not hold out such hope unless strong allies can be obtained. Italy certainly will not object to the first phase, the repartition of Cascke-Slovakia between Germany and Hungary, but will not like the second; the Anchluse. Recently the Caschs and Austrians held Army maneuvers at nearly the same time and near each other along the frontiers which some observers felt were almost "joint maneuvers". LOCAL AUSTRIAN POLITICS AND THE INT RNATIONAL IMPLICATION TO BE DRAWN T *FROM: Last April Chameellor Schuschning, who is as ardent monarchist, brought up with Mussolini the question of the restoration. Muscolini, at that time anxious 1^ solidify the "Rome Berlin Axis", gave Schuschnigg a stern "NO" on the proposition. Just now, however, flushed with success in Spain and anxious to have something to trade with Hitler at the fortheoming conference on 24 September, Mussolini has intimated quietly to the Austrians that restors- tion my not be . dead issue. The Vice Chansellor of Austria is old General Hulgerth, a war hero of the Caporetto, who is getting feeble and will shortly retire. Chancellor Schuschrige is said to be con' emplating a reorganisation of the cabinet soon and appointing as Vice Chanceller Arehduke Eugene (Otto's Unele). This would be a most desisive Monarchist move and would bring all the "restorationist strings" into the Chaneellor's hands. Thus an apparently local matter, the appointment of a new Vice Chansellor, may have a wide international effect. SOLIDARITY OF ROME-B'RLIN AXIS: It may well be that all the protestations of good faith on the strength and hermony between Rome and Berlin are intended to cover real weakness. It is a well known fact that Italy has no relish for the thought of Germans at the Brouner; and this thought will always be a dominating one. Thus while Italy will sit contentedly and watch the partition of Opesho-Slovakia, the Anchluse will be a different - ter and restoration may well be used as a bar. Chanseller Schuechning has al ays indicated that, in last extremity, there will be restors- tion rather than Anchluse. AUSTRIAN POLICY: Austria, like all the other small countries that are merely pawas in the - our only wait and m. Short of a world war Austria figures she is safe for several years because the Caschs are due to be eaten first. If the events herein described take place there may be a little agitation by the party called "Mationalist Opposition", which is in reality the Masi Party that cannot use its real name. In this case the Government might give them one or two seats in the = FRANCE (EURONE) 100 Political Ferees No. 444 103 Int.Relations September 1937 the Cabinet and they would proceed gradually with their Negification of the country, the real objective - Anchluse - being played dom. WORLD WARI If a major war breaks My informant believes that Poland would be used as a spearhood for an attack on Rassia, the terms being that Poland would give up the corridor and pt in exchange a section of the Ukaraine and other territory inside the present Russian frontier. In other words it would be a general easterly novement at the expense of Russia. Som IDENTIAL BECLASSIFIED E o. 11052 Rec. (E) and MD) R (s) OLD butter, blay. \ Dre 4970 The SLR' Date MAY-22 CONFIDE $ N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 6.10 ATTACHE'S REPORT 15653-E Parvi INTER aple coriginal and da this number . - of the limited personnel in o. N. L and el the registry for quiekly information tree These copies will be distributed by o, N. I. M per tasfacts of according to matter. From Y Date 20 Sept., . 1937 Serial No. 453 File No. 900 (Comments - aries Cholest proper another ( Juner 1 trum d. R.L. Endax) Source of information Personal contact Subject FRANCE NAVY GENERAL (Nation reported on) (Indes title - per todas sheet) I Reference Bain-SThe review, indexing, and distribution of reporte by o, N. will be grattly espedited if . brief - of the is entered in this space. Mention leeding prographical, personal, or - and the per of the repart.) FRANCE - Preparedness for war Report No. 453 (900), is transmitted herewith. RECASSIFED & a 11652 5ml 1(1) and 5(D) of (8) DED , 1972 By SLX Date MAY 21 197° - - 3 is a. Class - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A-B-C-D-E X Mame Ando : E C.M.O. Ges't EL M.L.R. 1 14 T.S.B. CAR I S&A M.A.S. 1 Director insure [ F N.C. N.O. papk Tesh cwc 3 C.M.C. Com 1 - of 1 3 les - Cop. Des. U.S. Bet. Per. 3va. Par. Asia ass. Ale Ca. Div. 1 M.T. Ts. - 7 Γ Use forms for all copies. Use only forms - supplied by O.N.I. Make all sistribes, at. salform in stee with this form visas practical. fubeit estra expire of elippings, carbone of abstation, etc., where practical. If practicable, submit statches is suitable style for blueprinting if photostating. 1.1. . nume armes ! NEIDEN FRANCE 900 - Navy No. 455 General September 1937 FRANCE - PREPARKINESS FOR WAR. The writer gave a luncheon today for Commendant Batet, Chief of the Military Cabinet of Admiral Darlan, Chief of Staff of the French Navy. Interesting information gleaned was the following: (a) The French Marine Ministry end the French Air Ministry have bomb-proof, underground quarters prepared, into which they can move at a moment's notice. (b) Commandant Batet is convinced that France will be at war inside of two years, and wagered a luncheon with the writer to that effect. RECLASSIFIED X a 11552, Bec a(E) and 5(D) or (2) OSD letur. Mis. 1, 1972 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 - 1 - FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No. 485 103 - International Rel. Qctober, 1937. 103-100- Treaties. FRANCO-SOVIET TREATY OF MAY 2, 1935, General Duchêne, French Army, has written a few articles on the working of the Franco-Soviet Treaty. In a recent article General Duchene takes up the application of the Franco- Soviet treaty as. affected by the League of Nations. The follow- ing, from a report submitted by the Embassy, is quoted as of interest: "Franco-Soviet Treaty: General Duchêne points out that the Council of the League would first have to render a unanimous decision that there had been an unprovoked aggression, in which case it would determine what, if any, economic and financial measures should be taken by the members of the League against the aggressor . The question of military sanotions would not arise since the League as such has no military force at its disposal. In the case of an aggression against France, the most that the League could do would be to recommend to third 8 parties (that they facilitate the passage of the Russian army forces to the aid of France. In the case of an aggression against Russia by Germany, this situation would not arise since there is a common frontier between Germany and France. General Duchêne points out further that there is a much greater risk of an aggression by Germany against France than there is against Russia He concludes by stating that from the viewpoint of reciprocity of military obligations the treaty is crushing for France and was a great mistake From the political viewpoint, if one contemplated a Busso-German rapprochement, the treaty might be defended but it is doubtful if this compensates for the military disadvantages. . -1- N.L.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 15 Perved - sopies cortiginal and als I the sumber . - Improved of the limited personal is 0. N. 1. and benefit of the urgener for quivity documenting information - attachée. These expire will be distributed by O.N. I. M per of amording to subject matter. From Y Date 12 Oct., 1937 Serial No. 515 File No. 103 (Compter - arie (Balect proper number Personal observation wish Issuary first) from o. N.L. Index) Source of information Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INT.RELATIONS (Nation reported ea) (Inder title - per Index sheet) (Rubticle) Reference review, Indesing, and distribution of reporte by 0. N. L will be greatly expedited if . belat number) of the contants . estered la this - Mention lending people personal, or political - and the per of the report.) France- Reactions of a French naval officer on speech by Premier Chautemps. Report No. 513 (103), 12 October, 1937, is transmitted herewith. BECASSIFED 2% a 11602, - are and 5(D) 1, 1972 By SI MAY 21 1973 1 - - - - - - - Inco - - - I - - I - - - - - - - - la X A-B-O-D-E [ M- Gest We E C.M.O. N.L.S. Mer. Ond. Y.S. S.&.A. M.A.S. U.S. CAR Exp. Aara. Director - - Bard F M.C. c. N.O. B-12, all Tock cwc 3 CWC Com I Operations Suite 3 Rature to 3 U.S. Bel. Pm. in No. E all as Can Dia. W.P. Cost. PLTr. - - No. Dev. of empirate. Das surbone of Mr. where If premissible, mbmit is vollable styles blueprinsing Some for all Da self una M supplied by O.N.I. Make all etc., salform in for - with this form or photostating where printical. Bubmit extra copies - arries - FRANCE No. 515 100 POLITICAL FORCES October 12 1957 108 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBJECT: FRANCE - Reactions of a French Naval Officer on speech by Premier Chautemps. Source: Personal observation. On 7 October the writer took the French Liaison Officer for Naval Attachés to luncheon with him at the American Club to hear the address by Premier Chautemps, copy of which is attached hereto. In the sourse of conversation following the address my guest made the following observations upon the international situation generallys First, that be spoke German fairly well and had recently visited Hormany. b felt that the people there were quite well off and rather happy and that the awful pictures painted in the world press outside of Germany were a lot of hostile propaganda (emetly the writer's ONLY impression after a two-day visit). Es added that be had discussed France-Comany relations with several friends there and all were agreed that, as between France and Germany alone, there - no questions at issue. In this be said he quite agreed. I then asked him why, this being the case, it would not be possible to return same of Germany's former colonies as a gesture of friendship and with a view to quieting Germany's demand for more territory. To this he replied that most of France's Colonies were of little value and, as far as be was personally concerned, Germany could have them. In this category be named Martinique. The Comeroom, however, be stated was a good colony and the French had spent a lot of money developing it. More important than this, however, was the fact that the French would not stand for any situation that would put German troops in Central Africa. This was a very definite threat in that it would constitute a southern "front". He also stated that within the last few days a French commercial airplane reported passing close aboard a small Russian cargo vessel close to the Eastern Coast of Spain. This vessel was proceeding at S-6 knots speed and had a heavy wire tow-line out but the plane could not see what was on the end of it. BECLASSIFIED X O, 11652, Se: 10 and L(D) or (H) OSD letter - , 1972 By SLR Date MAY 21 1979 - 1 - N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT K-3-a, 8201-A Purvet - copies cortgine) and six earbonal: this sumber . securery because of the limited personal and because of the urganery for quickly diseminating information Inc attachée. These copies will be distributed by 0. N. I. M per foodacte - sibre bers, smorting to missing native. From Y Date 18 Oct., , 1937 Serial No. 581 File No. 103 (Companos - series (Bulact proper enister Source of information Press each January first) from o. N. 1. Index) Subject FRANCE (GERMANY-OT. BRITAIN-ITALY) Political Forces Int.Relations (Nation reported on) (Inder title - per Indes sheet) (Dubtitie) Reference nries, indering, and distributies of reporte by O.N.I. will be greatly expedited if . brief number) of the containe to entered in this space. Mention inding geographical, personal, or political and the giel of like report.) COLONIAL PROBLEM: French reaction to German demands for South African Colonies Report No. 581, 18 Oct.,1937, is transmitted herewith. 10 OCT 26 1937 - - below le - is 1. - - of - - - - - - - - - - - el - - - - - - - - - A-B-O-D-E F , 5 We Ord. tax CAR 1 S.&.A. M.S.S. U.S. 1 N.O. Director 1 C.M.O. MIN Mas. push - Board F M.C. B-12 Took che s - - Operations I Cam - I Return - cwc Com. 7 U.S. Bet. Pen. 1 2 Asia 1.1.1. all Can Dis. W.P. Com. P.T. - Room - Use forms for all espies. Das only forms as supplied by o. N.I. Main all - salve in - with this form when prostical Bubeit estima copies of Hippings, surbone of ste., where provided. If premissible. what siguirben is miliable styles for Mespring or photostating - - ! FRANCE 100 Political Foroes Ms. 581 103 International Relations October 18 1939 COLONIAL PROBLEM: French reaction to German demands for South African Colonies. Reference: (a) No. 513 (105), October 12, 1937. Germany's constant demand for the return of her former colonies, though more an English affair than French, brings very little response in the French press. Evidently Briend's offer of the Cemeroons to Stressman in return for Germany's adjerence to Locarno, etc., has made the Germans feel that little opposition will case from the French if England decides to surrender the other German South African colonies. The French, prior to the military comeback of Germany and Italy, generally considered the Cemeroons as a commercial undertaking (and a poor one at that) and this evidently encouraged former Premier Briand to offer the return of this colony to Stressman. Since the return to the status of first class military powers of Germany and Italy, and more especially due to the constant urging of England to have France act in cooperation in all matters (London-Paris axis versus Berlin-Rome axis) the French are now stressing the military aspect of the former German colonies and the absolute necessity of prohibiting Germany from returning to a position in Africa where abo can threaten the frontiers of the French and British colonies. The following points were developed in an article by Pierre Mille, in EXCELSIOR, on this subject, and are transmitted as of interest: *(1) Strategic Frontiers of French and English Colonies: The colonies which Germany reclaims are now the key positions of the vital arteries of the French and British Empires. The German demands for return of her colonies under the excuse of obtaining rew materials is not considered the truth. It is more likely that Germany requires these colonies so as to threaten the colonial frontiers of England and France in Africa. With Italy in Libie, only a short distance across Africa to the Comeroons, it would be an easy matter for Germany and Italy to out the French and English African colonial possessions in two (see chart). (2) Colonial question discussed with Mussolini at Berlin rendezvous: Mitler has advanced many excuses, since coming to power, to enable Germany to obtain her former colonies; viz: (a) Need of expansion for German populace; (b) Need of colonial products; (o) Need of an outlet where German marks can be used as money in exchange due to shortage of foreign currency. When all these excuses failed to register with the English, and the League of Nations in many pemphlets proved that Germany's arguments did not hold good, Germany then hit on the surest excuse: Prestige. It must be assumed that the Hitler-Mussolini talk decided on this reason as the one to withstand all arguments: 'I want what is mine'. Since the return of Mussolini - withous Italy demanding an entire settlement of Germany's problems (colonials) in the interest of peace. 1 N.N.L.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 15653-E c-10-m Proved I sopies cortained and de time sember is - - of - - is O.N.L. and - of the - for quistly disseminating information - attable. Then - will be distributed by o. N. I. M per foolacte - deview to - Y 3 Nov., 37 551 103 From Date 19 Serial No. File No. I I I I Cholest PM employer Source of information Reliable - January lind) trues 6. R. L Indied FRANCE (GERMANY-ITALY) POLITICAL FORCES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Subject (Nation reported es) (Indes title - per Inder sheet) (Dubtitie) Reference Barar (The review, Indexing. and distribution of reports by 0. N.I. will be grady expedited If a brief number) of the contants to mind is as space. Mention leading prographical, personal, of political - and the per of the report.) France enters the first zone of the coming war. - Article by Paul Reynaud. Report No. 551 (103), 3 Nov., 1937, is transmitted herewith. - - - to - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A-B-C-D-E F Ver U.S. S.S.A. M.S.S. hare. E C.M.O. L 16. 1 Ord. T.S. CAR. I N.O. Director push Bord F M.C. C. et Operations Tesh CWC Com. 3 Com Can. 1 3 less be c.b.c. 7 U.S. 7 F 7 T Asia 111 Alle Ca Die. W.P. Com. P.T. The - I / of dipping Use curbone of statabes, sie., where partiest. If practicable, rebeits signtriben is suitable ayis for bluepring - photostating forms for all copies. Um only forms M supplied by o, N.I. Main all - salture is - with this form when practical. fubell extra upin DEFERRMENT PRINTING arries - FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 551 103 International Relations November 1937 FRANCE ENTERS THE FILST zare OF THE COMING WAR Paul Reynaud, Member of the Chamber, after touring Germany and Central Europe holding conferences on financial, economic and political problems, has published his opinions of the trip especially from the stand- point of the military aspect of the present crisis. Paul Reynaud is considered level headed and ultra-conservative in his statements. In the financial and economic sphere he is right 90% of the time; to what extent his political and military observations can be weighed can only be judged by his all round experience as a Minister in several cabinets. The following points wre developed by Reynaud in his statement, published immediately upon his return from his tour: "First War Zone: France has entered the first war zone, and if she wins this bout a war may be avoided. Once again I have visited Germany, and I find 67,000,000 people bent on one idea: expansion of the German nation. In a measure 8s their power increases so their arms are spreading out over Europe for a place in the sun. Two years ago Hitler protested that his struggle was against Communism and that it was purely ideologic. At the recent Congress at Nuremberg Hitler changed his views: "The world is burning around us and Germany is an impregnable block free from the fires of Comunism." "Now we find Hitler exploiting his 'ideologic' compaign to further Germany's political ends. Hitler states that he sees Communistic expansion as destroying the European equilibrium. What does this mean? It means that Hitler reserves the right to interf in the internal affairs of other nations. We now see that Germany's foreign policy has changed in the past two years, commensurate with its increase in power. Mussolini is singing the seme refrain to cover his exploits in the Mediterransan. Formerly he stated that Faciam was not an article for exportation, but on his recent visit to Berlin he stated that "all Europe will be Facist by the logic of events." The two dictators are, therefore, in complete accord on this part of their foreign policy. "Japan, for the same reason 8.8 Germany and Italy, is seeking expansion for her population, has also invaded China to prevent the spread of Comunism. Hitler, who claimed in his book "My Camp" that Germany's colonies were not of much interest, now demands them with full force. These demands for colonies are nothing more than proof of resistance to the democracies. The Germans well know that the return of their colonies will not solve their problems. "How are we to explain this insolent tone of the dictators? Without doubt, Italy has bled herself white to prepare for war. Without doubt Facian has reassured her that democracies are nothing but vermin, and that France is not to be feared. Our loss of the race Istres-Damas 18, in a sense, a factor in the war. Has Italy been the originator of the persistent attacks against our North African colonies? Because, contrary to the opinions of certain elements, the Ethiopian conquest has not satisfied her appetite but only sharpened it. French North Africa 18 to be the reward for cooperation in weakening France's strength. Means to an end? Formenting troubles in Syria, Palestine, North Africa; troops sent to Tripoli; occupation of the Balearics, while Germany occupied the Canary Islands. 1 FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 551 103 International Relations November 1937 "The Dictators recognize also that the war in Spein is a war against France, but Italy can only play a follow-up role. The final attitude of the Dictetors depends on the development of German preparedness, and this development 1s well underway. "It WELB not with idle thoughts that General Ludendorff said, six months ago, that North Africa would be one of the principal theatres of the next war. "Germany, now that she has all new war materials, is loading the armament race in Europe, and outside of the Navy (which plays only a late role in operations) she is winning the race, "In the 'psychological' arena preparedness is no less extensive! Yesterday Hitler stated "the German was always a good soldier, but to-day be is better than ever. If it is necessary he will fight with a different fanaticism than the bourgois German soldier did before the war. # "Are the democracies putting forth the same effort? Two years ago in the Chamber I advocated "quality" if we had not the "quantity", but I was not listened to. We are no longer at the time of Louis XIV when were were won with combinations; nor are we at 1914 when it was only necessary to prolong the period of military service while awaiting mobilization. With the specialization end mecanization of modern ermies it is impossible to prepare for war without the concord of the working masses. "We are now, let thore be no doubt, in the first zone of the coming war. The war of production is on; the war of expansion is declared. The space between the manufacture of planes, anti-aircraft guns, cannons, tanks, etc., in the two camps - dictators versus democracies - are the defeats and victories in this battle of silence. These are the Austerlitz, the Sedans, end the Charleois. The diplomatic set-backs are only the shadows of defeats on the green carpets of the conferences. "Confronted with these facts, what is the reaction of our people? Far from doubting their sincerety or accusing them of lack of comprehension of the gravity of affairs, 1.8 say to them: "Your role is dectsive in the first phase of the war - if it is won, wer can be avoided." The question of industrial production cannot be separated from national defense. The production of industry is an essential element of security for our women and children. It is the welfare of the workers which is at stake in case of losing a war, and it is 6. 60-hour week instead of a 40-hour one that awaits the worker in such an event. "Edousrd Herriot nobley stated at the Radical Socialist Congress apropos of Muscolini's statement "Europe will be Facist": "It 1s the daily production of the French engineer and workingman that will give the reply to this question." In this first war 2010 it is the diplomacy of the mohino the German and French workmen are forging, but at a different pace, their own destiny. "Finally, if you ask ne for conclusions derived from my trip and conversations with important personages, I would state as follows: (a) All the energies of the German people are hernessed to increase Germany's expension; (b) At the present rate in areament race, time is working in fevor of the dictetors; 2 FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 551 103 International Relations November 1937 (c) This is why Germany does not need immediate conversations with France, nor immediate war. She holds Italy in her power, and Italy has a felse conception of French military power and is tempted to find an outlet for hor disasterous financial situation in a war; (d) If France were divided by serious trouble, Herr Hitler would invade hor under the guise of the ideology of Communism, and defense of European order, a system he now uses to divide his future victims; (e) To weaken the democracies the dictators do not stop at treason to the white race; they make overtures to the Moslem and the Asiatic; (f) There does not exist in the dictator countries any morel or religious force capable of stabilizing their desire for power; (E) The demands of the dictators will increase in proportion to the length which they outdistance the democracies in war of preparation; (h) It is urgent for the democracies - whose material wealth is inmense - to harness their resources and bar the route to war andieventual servitude; (1) To be strong is the essential condition for an accord with Cermany. "If the French people understand these conditions they will comprehend that they are in the first war zone. "If they know where they stand, no political or social consideration will prevent them from stiffening their backs in a manner worthy of a nation which does not want to die." The labor troubles in France since the inauguration of the Socialist program is, according to the Military Chiefs, doing more than anything else to encourage the dictators and spur then on to active operations. Due to the social program France is far behind in industrial production, thus jeopar- dizing the military services in their efforts for preperedness. The "war psychosis" developed in Italy and Germany stands out in contrast to the "status quo" mentality of the democracies and their desire to feast on their surpluses like paid up members of the "haves club". The French, while carrying out the "forgotten man's" program, like the two great sister democracies, paid little attention to the fact that whatever right there may be in the claims of humans to "liberty and the pursuit of happiness", such an innovation was no match for the well trained aggressive armies of the dictators. It took the stubborriness of Italy and Cormany in handling the recent delicate European problems (the dictators gave France, England and Russia plenty of chances to fight if they had had any fight in them) to awaken the French to the fact that the "pursuit of happiness" must be left aside end that the workman must don his armor if be even wants to retain his present standard of living. The article by Paul Reynaud, touching the important question of industrial production in France, is only one of the many articles appearing in an andeavor to convince the Trade Unions that they have chosen the wrong time for social changes and that a "war" will be on their hands, brought on by their own social barriers which were intended to avoid war, instead of a "glorious world peace" as dreamed of by their leader. Jaures. 3 FRANCE 1000 Political Forces No. 551 103 International Relations November 1937 The attitude of the Radical Socialist leaders at their Congress (see Y No. 546) towards this important question shows clearly that the Government is finally listening to the reasoning of the French General Staff and putting the soft pedal on the aspir tions of the masses for a torrestrial paradise. While there is still a majority element in France which believes that treaties and negotiations will stop the Germans from expanding, and that the German hates war just as much as anybody, Paul Reynaud belongs to the Clemenceau school of thought whose dictum are that Germany will fight anyone she feels sure of licking and that her thirst will be satisfied when the entire Continent is Germanic. In the last few months, after the Right has been hammering it home for the past 2 years that Spain was only the "try-out" for the big war, the Left politicians are beginning to see the light (this is clearly discernible from official statements and articles in the press) and are now advocating that labor rest on the "pause" and speed up production. The propaganda is being carried on in a clever manner and appeals are made to the "free, democratic birth rights of the Gallic race who knows how to put 'freedom' before 'welfare' and keep the 'musket' 88 bright as the 'spade'." Several French critics even claim that the basis of the Japanese- Italian-German anti-Communist alliance is nothing more than a military alliance under the banner of ideology (just like war is no longer declared - you just move in to prevent disorder from spreading) and will come into play around 1940-1942 when the dictators are strong enough to issue an ultimatum to the democracies to "cough up or shut up." How far propaganda will succeed in arousing the Frenchman to a fighting mood when he well knows that each war left him poorer and more miserable, 1s a matter of conjecture. Some writers state that the situation will become intolerable should General Franco win and install a military dictatorship in Spain demanding return of Spein's former glory and prestige. Such a stand would have the support of Germany and Italy and would attoma- tically throw France into the isolation ward and make her the next victim. Note by Naval Attache: It is my opinion that in spite of the dangerous situation and increase of armaments in Europe, there will be no war for at least two years unless some extraordinary and unforeseen crisis occurs. At present there does not seem a sincere will to fight and the present system of alliances such 8.8 the Berlin-Rome Axis do not inspire enough mutual trust in the partners concerned to allow them to enter into a war fully trusting eachother as allies. Of course the whole situation would change if a country such as France developed grave internal disorders and could be regarded as an easy prey. 4 N.N.LM N. ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 15 ATTACHE'S REPORT Perved - empie inriginal and als this sumber . - I of the - I is 9. N. 1. and - of the - early deministing telermation Ins attachés, These explas will be distributed by 0, N. I. - per . amording to missing moth From Y Date Nov 8 1937 Serial No. 554 File No. 103 . - arter Chica proper Reliable I I 1 the O.K.L 0. Source of information Subject FRANCE (RUSSIA) POLITICAL VOICES INTERNATIONAL RALATI (Nation reported - (lades title - per Index about) Reference review, Indexing and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be greatly espedited if . behalf - of the - - - this - Mention leading prographical, personal, of politional - and the of the repart.) FRANCO-SOVIET MUTUAL ASSISTANCE P.CT Report No. 554, 8 November, 1937, is transmitted herewith. 12 TOTAL - - A-B-C-D-E - - N.L. Check - of - - - - - - - - - - of - - - - - - - - - Mass- à Gos't Ww Director E C.M.O. Ord. 7.8. CAL of I Code M.I.B. 1 J S.A.A. M.A.S. has U.S. graph - M.C. H J ------------------------- Task CHC Can. Cam. che Com 3 E E Operations - 3 Later - Der U.S. M. Per. Pa. T 1 .... F Can Die. W.P. Com. M.Th. - 7 I Das forms for all reples. Use miy forms M supplied by o, N.I. Make all - in - with de form when penetical. Bubsit estra - of dipolas, aurbone of statches, are when If practicable, submit is outside siyies for bioxprinting or photostating. - PRINTING - - FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. ⑉ 105 International Relations November 1957 FRANCO-SOVIET MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PAGT Thefellowing article, taken from the Commist paper "MM/MITE", shows the complete about-face of some of the most ardent supporters of the Transe-Soriet pact. AS the time of the negotiation of the Prance-Seviet pact the French were in an exsited from of mind as they were when they voted to mine no further token payments on the American way debt. Commay was tearing up the provisions of the Vermilles Treaty; Italy wes becoming disgrustled ever the constant anti-Pacist propaganda in France carried OR by exiles. As a "hot-head" more, in reply to Hitler's breaches of the Versailles Treaty, the French Chamber voted the retification of the Seriet Pact. A8 the time it was greeted by all (just like the debt question) with great joy: "Trance is back in hermess with her old time powerful ally", on., etc. For a time the press was filled with glowing articles on Soriet Russia's military power, as well as the potential market for French products. The Spanish question was not then on the agenda, and the Fresch did not recognise the tenacity behind the Third International's desire to spread Ommonist dostrines outside of Ruania. with the flaring up of the Spenish affair, and the determined efforts of Commany and Italy to dental a "show down" for a rearran/ement of rew naterials, and solonies, the Right element is France began to wonder if the Soriet Past was worth anything. for a time the right peliticiens (Lavel and Company) defended the pact as being excellent for France in that it pm her a powerful ally to mep Germany on the mecessity for as anti-Ommentst front, finally rounded off with the propesed Berlin-Roms-Tokio past (interpreted in France as a license to invade and interfore in the affairs of other countries under the guise of maintaining order), the Right and Center politicians of France began to wonder if the pact was not at the bottom of all Berlin-Nome animosity towards Transo, The Left politicians accuse Hitler of starting his anti-Sovist prepaganda when Stalin refused to follow the load of the higher pre-Geman officers of the Soviet Any in making a pact with Germany and dropping Trance. Left opinion in France today elaims that Germany will pick up Russian friendship the day she succeedas in separating her from France. The recent execution of the Soviet Generals (majority of them pre-Geman) was unpleasent for Mitler, if be desired Bussian friendship, and since then the slogan "danger to peace of the France-Soviet Pact" is advanced by Borlin and Rome - all occasions when France's friendship is nentioned. with the present Left Government in power, it does not -- that my ham can befall the Franco-Soriet Pact unless Soviet Bussia completely sollapses. It can be safely stated that the present was executions going on in Imasia is anything but pleasing to the Left Government as it bears out of its enemies that Russia 18.8 is 8. cospool of disorder and not definity's uninosity. Some of the leading military orities have stated that the Soviet military strength - especially aviation - was overrated and that her ABIY could not be relied upon in the event of mr. But the efficiency of Russian aviation in Spain contradisted to a certain extent this opinion of Russian aviation. The ending of hostilities in Spain and China may bring saw decisive action on the part of the French towards the Soviet Treaty, should Germany and Italy insist on this being a condition for pourparlars for a peaceful pact. It is folt, in many French sircles, that England bas little love for the Transe-Sovier past and would publicly disapprove of it (as causing Europees unrest) should she no longer need France's help in front of the distators. 1 FRANCE 100 Political Yeress No. 554 108 International Relations November 1937 Thus the French Conservative government of May 1955, as well as the government press looked upon the Franco-Soviet Pact with the utmost favor. They claimed that "this frank and sincere exchange of views with the heads of the Soriet Government has created, between the lat or and France's representatives, 'an agreephere of friendship and sonfidence'! Ties betwoon the two countries were thus 'consolidated' end collaboration of the two big countries was to be a step towards universal peace." But Morre Lavel went further in his declarations. On a visit to the aviation field of Monimo, near Moscow, where he witnessed plane and parachute performances, be complimented Marshel Verochilov in the following terms: "I pm happy to express my admiration for your planus, your soldiers, your officers. I - greatly impressed with the strength of your air force, its dissipline and the enthusiam of the officers and mon. You possess fine planes, valiant pilots, and you are a great chief!" Then received by the members of the Moseow Soviet Assembly, M. Lavel again declared that he had been extremely touched by the eordial welsoms he had received from the population of loccos and/ and FRANCO-SOVI.T Friendship would endure. Also, during his visit, M. Leval had inspected one of the large Mostow factories and he and his party had been very feverably impressed. In this connection, the Agence HAVA stated: "In this faebory, overything tends to increase the comfort of the workman and stimulate his real and interest in the factory. With its industry progressing as it does, Doviet Hustin is well on the vay to becoming one of the nost powerful industrial nations in the world." I sonsider it useful to recall this trip of Lavel's to Mossow, his impressions at that time, and the comments which appeared in practically the entire French press two years age on this Pranso-Soriet Pact. To-day, alas, - find comment en the subject quite different. Why this redical change? This is what - must find out. At any rate, the Soviet Union is is no way responsible for this complete change. They have during the last two years given many proofs of their desire to maintain peace. They remain faithful to the terms and the spirit of the Pact of May 1, 1935, referred to so enthusiasticully by Yvon Delbos and douard Herriot at the dadical Congress recently hold at Lille. -8- N.M.LM ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT c-10-m 15653-E Forwerd - supies cortained and ais this sumber . - - of the Bested personal is o. N. L and benore of the - be quickly information - allachie. These - will be distributed by o. N. I. - per forfacte of sincerbers, amording to subject natio, From T Date 19 November 37 Serial No. 602 File No. 103-100 (Company - arter proper empler - January Bre) Source of information Press them 0. N. 1. Index) Subject FRANCE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EASTERN EUROPE (Nation reported - (Inder title - per Indes - (Sobilitie) Reference review, Indexing. and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be greatly expedited If . brief Funnary of the contents to entered in this space. Mention inding geographical, personal, of political - and the - of the ripert.) FRENCH FORKIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO CAPITALS OF EASTERN EUROPE Copy 10: Ambessdor, - vary Superreque FOI 1. It has been officially announced that M. Delbos, French Foreign Minister, will leave on a tour of the Eastern European capitals December 2. He will visit Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Czechalovakia and confer with the heads of those Governments. 2. In Prague he will attend the celebration of the XX Anniversary of the creation of the Czechalovakian Army. While in Poland he is also scheduled to visit Cracow, South Poland. 3. This tour of capitale in Eastern Europe at this time reflects fresh French efforts to keep the members of the Little Entente within the sphere of French influence and policy. 4. Undoubtedly the French Foreign Office is also interested in the recent apparent change of German policy to pacific penetration in S.E. Europe instead of military aggression. Poland's key position is therefore deserving of special attention also. 5. It is reported that King Carol of Roumania, when he asked M. Mihailache to form a government, told him that he must include in his cabinet the pro-German, anti-semitic, semi-Fascist leader Dr. Vaida, and give him and his friends key positions. This is of interest in indicating the efforts of the Roumanian sove- reign to direct control of the political policy which is hardly calculated to be pleasing to the French. This constitutes an additional reason for the French Foreign Minister's inclusion of Bucharest in his tour of European capitals. Today's press indicates M. Tatarescu has been successful in forming a Government without including representation of the Peasant Party in the Cabinet (demanded by the King). 13 - - - a. . & - - of - - - - - Dear - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A-B-O-E Mass - C.M.O. Cost We Director B-IL E KIB á 1 T.S. CAR M.S. dars, U.S. Exp. S.&.A. pur - Board F M. M.C. N.O. B-12 PR B-14, B-15, B-16 Task CBC Cas. cwc Com Cre. Attached et Operations Cas. State Cam- Return be Der. U.S. Bat. Fe. See. Fax. Asia S.S.S. : Con. Die W.P. J R.D. - Room No. Das forms for all copies. Das only forms - supplied by o. N.L Make all statches, etc. is alse with this form where practical. Bubmit extra exples of clippings, nurber of are, where practical. or precticable, submit siketches in suitable styles for blueprinting or photostating. NOVERNMENT PRINTING effice - N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHÉ'S REPORT c-10-m, 15653-E Forward MYSS nopies cortginal and als this sumber . - besone of the limited personal in 0. N. 1. and benefits of the - for quickly discreminating information Inc allachés. The copies will be distributed by O.N.I. - per foolsons - slowhers, amending la mother, From T Date 24 Novembero 37 Serial No. 684 File No. 103-100 (Commance - - (Selent proper emplor - January first) Source of information Press true 0. N.L. Index) Subject FRANCE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JUGOSLAVIA/POLAND (Nation reported es) (Inder title - per Inder sheet) (Subilitie) Reference review, indesing. and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be greatly espedited if a brief summary of the controls . entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, of political names, and the give of the report.) FRENCH RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND. PLEDGES OF HELP FOR FRANCE 1. The attached newspaper clipping from the London "Daily Telegraph" of 19 November, 1937, reporting a lecture JUGOSLAVIA AND by Berenger, Chairman of the Foreign POLAND Afteirs Committee of the French Senate, is forwarded 68 of possible interest in case it has not already reached the READY TO MOBILISE Department. IN MARCH, 1936 FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT PARIS, Wednesday. Interesting disclosures on receipt critical (vents in Europe were made in - lecture to-day by M. Birenger. chairmation the Foreign Affairs Com- mittee of the Senate. M. Bérienger said. that on March 1 last year, when the German pation of the demilitarized none because known at Warsaw, Col. Beck, the Pg Foreign Minister, informed France if a Franco-Germati war revolued From the activer Polano Would mobilies and place herself DE the side of France. Colls Beck THE contided to triends that in such an eventuality be would resign from the Government and @ to the trois at the head of bis regiment. The lecturer fürther stated that the Jugeslay Government also informed the Frencir rereign Office that It was ready to order réphilisation to essist Enince if war revulted from the recordipation, # If France did Bot mobilite," continued the lecturer, " It was for very hongur- able motives, of which the chief was the determination always to march in rup with England in all our military and naval action." M. Bérenger advised Frenchmen to reflect before eriticising Viscount Hallfax's visit to Germany and the Mari of Perth's diplomatic discussions at Home." France, be said. would loss nothing through these - consultations and would fall Into the most dangerous of trape If she relaxed in the alightest degine her close union with Great Britain." 14 BRITAIN'S VIGILANCE The lecturer closed with these The British community and the Prencis Republic are to-day sufficiently and To-morrow they will be more so, They represent 500 million human beings who 20 years ago give proof of their courage, tenacity and success. Present on all the continenta, heepling watch on all the oceans, vigilent to all the skies, they have the authority, la agreement with the United States to summer the world to a supreme relig for peace. He said that the final aim of Hert I a Check - 1 - - I - - I I 1 1 - [ Hitlef and Bignor was to A-B-C-D-E establish . General Empire in Central Mar - Ges'l Va Europe and Director } C.N.O. 1 F Bornan N.O. - Baned Empire on all shores. In case of a Togrueo Task CWC Cam. Cam. C.W.C. Com. Com. Attaché of I E Des U.S. Bat. See. Fee, Asia S.S.S. Air Can Dis. W.P. Use forms for all repies. Use only forms as supplied by 0, Make all skatches, etc. Day copies of dippings, nurbons of ase., where presions. If practicable, submit in - N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT Parvent PITES copies intiginal and ats this number is - because of the limited personal is O.N. 1. and beson of the upart a quickly diseminating information true attachés. These espies will be distributed by o, N. 1. - per of amonting to missi naile, From Y Date 10 Dec. 1937 . Serial No. 6.30 File No. 103 DEF arter (Sclect proper nambe Reliable - Junuary first) true d, if I. Index) Source of information (AUSTRIA, EUCHOSLOWAKIA, ITALY etc) Subject FRANCE (GERMANY, ENGLAND, RIESIA, ) Political Int.Relations (Metion reported es) (Inder title M per Index sheet) (Subtitle) Reference review, Indecing, and distribution of reports by o, N.I. will be greatly expedited If . brief asserery of the estable . sund is - space, Mention leading geographical, personal, of political MDM, and the girl of the report IT&MS ON EUROPEAN SITU.TION AUSTRIA GEPLANY - AND COLONIAL QUESTION Report No. 620 (103), 10 Dec., 1937, is transmitted herewith. RECLASSIFIED & a 11652. Sex XB) and 0(D) at et OSD letter. May, L 1978 By SIR Date MAY 21,1973 2 1973 15 - - is Chell - el - - - - e - Date - - - - of - - - - - - - - - A-B-O-D-E CosT Ww U.S. HARRMAL Mater à E C.N.O. M.I.B. Non. OnL 148 CAR Bag. NAL M.A.S. Awa Destribe Buard M.C. N.O. puk dive cac Altorid al Operations Task CWC 3 Com. Com. s - 3 les is Des. U.S. Bel. 3a. Per. Asia 111 : Can. Div. W.P. 3 P.T. - 7 I of dipplan. curbone of items etc., when premisel, If practitable, result statcher is mistle styles for Maspriating or photostating. Use forms for all copies. Use only brea - supplied by o. N.I. Main all - sollore is sise with the form when practical. Submit min repies " ========== PRINTING - ! FRANCE 100 Political No. 620 103 International Relations December 10 1937 ITEMS as EUROPEAN SITUATION - AUSTRIA, CHERMANY - AND COLONIAL QUESTION An interview between a member of this Embassy and the Press Attache of the Austrian Legation in Paris developed the following points of general interest on the European situation: Visit of Von Papen to Paris: With regard to the recent visit to Paris of Ambassador von Papen, the official reason therefor was that it was entirely of a private character. He did, however, 800 certain persons of importance here and, it 1s assumed, discussed the situation in Central Europe, particularly with regard to France's attitude towards the relationship between Germany and A ustria and Germany and Czechoslovakia. Shortly after leaving Paris, von Papen saw Hitler either at Munich or Berchtesgaden. The latter asked him with regard to the Nazi Party in Austria and was told that it was continuing to lose strength and was in rather a bad way. As a result of this, Hitler himself ordered to be written the recent article in Diplomatische Korrespondenz attacking Austria. Austria protested against this and the Assistant Chief of the Press Bureau at Berlin went to Vienna to discuss the situation. As a result of this discussion, which showed that the German press had made many more attacks on Austria than the Austrian press had made on Germany, it we.s agreed that each country would endeavor to prevent the publication of vitriolic attacks on the other country and of articles tending to stir up ill feeling between the two countries. This is the situation at present, but how long it will last it is impossible to say, as such agreements have been made before and have usually lasted only two or theree months before a new outburst occurred. General Situation in Europe: At the present time, due to the Berlin-Rome aris, Austria is much less likely to be the victin of German aggrewsion than is Ozschoslovakia. It would be very difficult for Italy not to intervene in the event of a German attack on Austria, and Germany now wants payment from Italy for favors granted by Germany to Italy at the time of the Abyssinian war and during the present Spanish war. Not only would Germany have to count upon the possibility of Italy's coming to the aid of Austria in case of a German attack, but also she would have to take into account that in Austria there would be no nationalist question to help her, and she would have the whole country against her. Likewise, England and France would probably not sit back quietly and watch Germany gobble up Austria. England would be much more likely to march in the event of an aggression against Austria than she would in the event of an aggression against Czechoslovakia (Dr. Fuchs said that this statement was based on information given by King Boris of Bulgaria when he came through Paris a few days ago, and was based upon impressions obtained by King Boris from conversations which he had with the King of England and with Chamberlain). If Germany wore to attack Czechoslovakia, it would take little time and comparatively few troops to grab off the German section of that country. Even if France did mobilize and declare war, it is extremely doubtful that she would be able to break through the German defensive fortifications in the Rhineland, and even if she could do Bo, it would be only at a terrific cost in men, which she could not afford. The only other line of attack would be through either Belgium or Switzerland, which it 1s believed would not be permitted. France could BECLASSIFIED 1 R. O. 11652, Sec. a(E) and 5(D) or (#) OSD letter. May. L 1972 MAY SLR Date FRANCE 100 Political No. 620 103 International Relations December 10 1937 carry on an aerial bomburdment of German industrial centers, but Germany could reply in kind. Poland, Rumania and Hungary would certainly remain neutral. In the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, Russia would probably not be of any help to France, since it is practically certain that neither Poland nor Rumania would allow the passage of Russian troops. What England would do 18 problematical. If Cermany inveded France, of course England would march. However, if Germany wore clever enough to fight a purely defensive war, doing nothing against France except defend German territory, then it is an open question as to what England would do. If Germany received satisfaction from France and England on the question of colonies, even though it be temporarily only symbolic, she would probably stay quiet for the time being. If, on the other hand, she does not receive satisfaction, it is probable that she will break out, not, however, before the spring or summer of next year. She may first take Danzig and then go after Czechoslovakia, or may strike right away at Czechoslovakia. The spring of next year will be a critical period, because by that time the Spenish war will probably be over and there is the possibility, even probability, that Italy and England will have come to terms, which will result in the complete isolation of Cermany, thus foreing her to obtain some satisfaction on the colonial question or else to attack before such isolation is accomplished. - & a 1165% Sec. 3(E) and 1972 5(13) eit (K) OSD )etter, May. Date 1, MAY 21.1973 is SLR 2 V.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT quickly deveminating information from attachés, The copies will be distributed by 0. N. I. - per footmote of according to matter. Forward MT00 sopies cortinal and als ourboar): this sumber is Decembry because of the limited personal is O.N. 1. and because of the urganey for From Y Date 14 Dec., 37 Serial No. 628 File No. 103 (Commer - certes Chiest proper sumber Source of information Reliable - January Bret) from 0, N.I. lades) Subject FRANCE POLITICAL INT.RELATIONS (Nation reported on) (Inder title - per Index abovt) (Dubtitie) Reference Baier - (The review, indecing, and distribution of reports by 0. N.I. will be gratily espedited If . brief numbery of the contents is entered la state rpses. Mention lending peographical personal, or political MOM, and the pm of the report.) SINC-JAPANEE MR: Extracts from French discussion of Navy Budget for 1938 (continued). Report No. 628 (103), 14 Dec., 1937, is transmitted horewith. I - - - la - - of - - - - - - Dese - - the - of - - - - the - demination - -- B-C-D-E Mana - Gall's We E C.M.O. M.I.B. Met, Ord. T.S.B. CAR Keep. S.&.A. M.S. Aera. U.S. Director può dive Bond Cife M.C. H.O. Tech cwc Cap. 3 cac Com. 3 Attaché all Operations State Com- Return le Dr. U.S. Bei. Fee. Sea. Per. Avia S.S.S. Ale Can Die. W.P. Com. PLT. - Room Ma. Use forms for all copies. Use only forms M supplied by o. N.I. Make all skatches, etc., uniform in stae with this form where practical. Robeit extra copies of dipping. surbone of sketches, are, where practical. If practicable, rebeit sketchee in rultable styles for blueprinting or photostating " - PRINTING OFFICE - FRANCE 100 Political No. 628 103 International Relations 14 December 1937 SINO-JAPANESE WAR: Extracts from French discussion of Navy Budget for 1938. Two extracts from the discussion of the 1938 French Navy Budget concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict, and the Japanese Navy, are translated as of interest. The extract from the "Introduction to the Budget" shows the Sino-Japanese affair as viewed by the "Noval Committee" in their drawing up of the 1938 Navy Budget. While the press and official utterances on this question have been very mild, no doubt exists (as seen from British papers) that the French are. worried over the turn of affairs in the Far East - especially since the Berlin-Rome-Tokio bloc is using the occasion to force acceptance of their demands in Europe. Several inferences in the press indicate that the "triangle" will not even stop at blocking France and England in Europe, but may extend their operations to the For East and, with Japan's support, cause a realignment of interests in China favorable to the triangle: Extract from Introduction of Naval Budget. CONFLICT IN EXTREME ORIENT It is a peculiar incident that a fight between Japanese and Chinese troops stationed at Lou-Kou-Chiao during the night of 7-8 July, 1937, was the cause of the bloody war on the frontiers of the Pucific and which may result in a change of the fate of Europe. Japan found it an occasion to extend her economic expansion in China already commenced in Correa in 1905, Manchuria in 1931, Jehol in 1933. Present hostilities which have been underway for a period of five months, without either side breaking off diplomatic relations, have as their theater of operations: Northern China Shanghai District Chinese Sea. Operations in Northern China: These operations, of a maritime character, have es their principal mission the occupation of the Province of Shan-Tung, the possession of which will give Japan complete control of this area, not only in the Gulf of Petchili, but in the entire Yellow Sea. If these operations are successful, naval communications with Vladivostok and the outer world will be dominated by Japan. If she succeeds in penetrating into the provinces of Mongolia, limits of Manchuria (Sharer and Sui-Yan) she will also threaten the land comunications leading to Vladivostok. We can easily conceive the risks which this conflict may create between Russia and Japan and its possible reporcussions. Operations in the Shanghai District: Shanghai, capitel of European interests in China, is in the heert of the provinces coming under the Government of Nenking and in which sector Japanese influence had no chance of installing itself by pacific means. This explains the military operations of the Japanese being particularly intensive in all this region. However, contrary to that which took, place in Northern China where the conflict may become purely & Russian-Japanese affair, military operations in the Shanghai district interest the leading European powers having possessions in Shunghai. The cards which are now being played in the Far Best not only concern the prestige of all European nations, but that of the entire White Race. Without doubt, since the beginning of the conflict, no prejudice 1 FRANCE 100 Political No. 628 103 International Relations 14 December 1937 SINO-JAPANESE MAR: Extracts from French discussion of Navy Budget for 1938. (Continued) has as yet occurred in connection with foreign privileges in China. But, 178 must remember that China profited (prior to the present conflict) of the Spanish situation to doclare that the citizens of Spain would cease to benefit by the exterritorial privileges which to date they enjoyed. It is manifest, should the Japanese win, or should the Chinese have a complete success, that the conqueror will profit, to regain prestige, if not to suppress entirely the many advantages which were taken from the Yellow Race by the Whites from the West. All weakness on our part will be considered as a sign of abdication. Thus we see the necessity of keeping at Shanghai, e.s well as in the Yang-Tse-Kiang, as strong & naval force as possible. Once again the honor of France is placed in the hands of the Navy. Extension of Conflict in the China Sea: Hostilities in the China 30a, at the mouth of the Yang-Tse-Kiang, will certainly extend towards the South, and already we have learned from the press that Japanese reids have taken place in the Islands "Les Patras", "Les Paracels," and at Hei-Nan. By this move the security of Indo-Chine props up; the same applies for the British interests at Hong-Kong. If Japan has, for hearly a hundred years, her eyes turned towards the Chinese continental provinces, today she is further interesting herself in the islands in the China Sea, - grounds naturally enough leading to British possessions in Asia. We find numerous proofs in studying Japanese economic activity in recent years: penetration into the islands and ports South of Japen and Formosa Island, 5.8 well as into Fu-Kien, Heinan, Paracels, Philippines and as far 88 New Guinea and Borneo. By reason of this economic penstration, present hostilities could easily take a form of outward aggression. If we consider, on the other hand, that Siam, up to present years a friend of France, is actually a center towerds which converge efforts of the totalitarian powers, we can well ask ourselves, in 00.00 the powder keg explodes, what will be the fate of French Indo-China? Without doubt the "triangle" France-Great Britsin-Holland - could easily become the "square" by the addition of the United States if the Philippines were threatened. This "square" could counter-balance the powers now forming the anti-Communist pact (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo), but the difficulty of maintaining thas balance and avoiding all complications should be clear to the eyes of everyone. The Brussels Conference: With e view to conciliating the difference between Japan and Uhina the Brussels conference convened. With Japan absent the conference fell through and the conference edjourned "sine-die". At present writing the problem remains unsettled and all hopes of a pacific settlement of this question are lost. The conclusion to be accepted from the brief summary of facts set forth herein is: Our duty consists of maintaining our position in C hina. Our naval forces in China are entirely occupied. They should act in liaison with foreign naval forces who are defending their citizens at Shanghai. We must also keep our eye on the threats to Indo-China from the coest as well as the Siam frontier. And all these problems cannot be solved unless France maintains a powerful floot. 2 FRANCE 100 Political No. 628 103 International Relations 14 December 1937 SINC-JAPANESE WAR: Extracts from French discussion of Navy Budget for 1938 (continued) EXTRACTS FROM DISCUSSION OF BUDGET: Japan: The size of her fleet has not ceased to expand. It is not without reason that the Japanese government championed the right of all nations to freedom of construction. While speaking of Japan, especially at this time when we witness what is taking place, we night recall that Monsieur SARRAUT (former Minister of Colonies) often stated that the faith of Europe would be decided in the Pacific. We have not the right to forget the Maritime efforts put forth by Japan. As soon as the Treaty of Washington was scrapped, Japan refused to consent to be tied by any further restrictions on tonnages - end she has profited by her stand. Ber building program of January 1937 comprises 65 million pounds expenditure for a 5-year program, in addition to annual budget credits: 2 battleships, carriers, cruisers, mine-layers and destroyers, as numerous submarines are under construction. On November , 1937, the carrier HIRYU (10,000 tons) was launched end this unit is capable of carrying 40 planes. And 3 N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 21249 ATTACHE'S REPORT Perved - sopies cortained and six this somber . - because of the Insted is O.N. L and I of the - for quistly discomfacting information from The emples will be distributed by 0. N. - per feefacte of asserting le matter. From Y Date 29 Dec., 1937 Serial No. 662 File No. 105 (Comments - arter Chelest proper number arb Junuary final) trees d. N.L Indian) Source of information Reliable Subject FRANCE (ROUMANIA) POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Nation reported ea) (Inder title - per Index sheet) (fubilitie) Reference review, Indesting and distribution of reports by O.N. dised If . brief summary of the contants to entered is this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, of political - and ROUMANIA - Defection from the Little Entente. Report No. 662 (103), 29 Dec., 1937, is transmitted herewith. BECAUSIFIED X a 11652 Sec. ME and 5(D) or of OND to May, 1, 1972 By gr" Date, MAY 21 1973 Have C.N.O. - for - in a. N.L. Class - of - - - di - - - 1 - - of - - - - de - - - --- A-B-C-D-E Mono á E C.M.O. Gas Vv RIA 1 Ord. 1.88 CAR s S.A.L. M.A.S. U.S. Aws. N.O. Director 1 I bed College N.C. cwc 3 3 cbc Com. 3 al Operating Can les to 1 7 U.S. Ma. Par. Fe. F I ALL # Can Dir. W.F. s P.T.. - 7 Γ Use forms for all copies. Use only forms M supplied by o. N.I. Make all skatobes, de, collore is - with this form when practical. Bobert extra copier of dippings, narbone of are., where prantinal. If practicable, esteil sketzber is sultable styles for bineprinting or photostating. .. - PRINTING error - FRANCE (ROUMANIA) 100 Political No. 662 103 International Relations 29 December 1937 Subject: ROUMANIA - Defection from the Little Entente. Source: Reliable. The European hoad of a large American oil company to-day informed the writer that be regarded the present crisis in Roumania as a most serious threat to European peace. Through his associations in the oil business he was able to keep quite well informed on Roumanian affairs and be stated that the present crisis is a very definite break by Roumania from the French orbit and an alignment on the side of the Facist states. He said that the movement would be anti-semetic and pro-Facist in nature and would most probably result in the ousting of Lupescu and the possible abdication of the King. He regarded this turn of events as encrmously strengthening Germany's war-making powers, for if the Roumanian oil wells were held by a strong group instead of being blown up as in the last war, Germany's supply of petroleum would be assured. My informant stated further that the French had been aware of this impending situation for some time and had rushed Mr. Delbos around the circuit to try and prevent it. He visited the other Little E Intente countries in order that the visit to Roumania would not be too pointed. Mr. Delbos' visit, however, was foredoomed to failure, primarily because he represented a leftist government and, secondarily, because his personal reputation did not carry great weight. My informant was thus of the opinion that this first definite break in the Little Entente would be followed by others and would greatly increase the prestige and power of Germany at the expense of France. While other observers with whom the writer has discussed this development think that the foregoing 18 a rather extreme view, none deny the importance of the event. - Director Archived BIS- bond- W.P. W. Div BECLASSIFIED E. a 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (i) OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 By SLR Date 1932 1 N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 21555-G ATTACHE'S REPORT C-9-2 Forward - supies cortained and als ourbons); this number is - because of the limited personal is O.N. I. and benefits of the for quietly information trom attachés. These copies will be distributed by O.N.I. M per fooloote of according to mubject From Y Date 4 Jan , 1938 Serial No. 2 File No. 103 (Commance - and (Salect proper assiber with January first) from d. N.L Index) Source of information Beliable Subject FRANCE POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Nation reported on) (Indes title - per Index short) (Bubtitie) Reference review, Indexing. and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be V . brief NUMBER of the la entered is this apare. Mention leading prographical, personal, - political - and the girl of POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING JANUARY 3 1938 JAN 12 1938 Report No. 2, 4 January, 1938, is transmitted herewith* BECLASSIFIED R. a 11662, Snc. 2(E) and 5(D) or (N) OSD lotter, May, L 1972 Dr SLB Date MAY 21/1973 Filled. - - - is a . Class - of - - - - - - - - 1 - - of - - - - - - - - - A-B-C-D-E F Ges'l We U.S. - C.M.O. ats. Mar. Ord. 1.48. CAR J S.S.A. M. M.A.S. $ N.O. Director 1 f Buard College M.C. C. all Operations Tech cmc 3 Com. c.b.c Com. Com. State Com- Return to Des. U.S. Bal. Fee. 3as. Per. E I.S.S. : Can Dir. W.P. J P.T.. - Room No. Das forma for all copies, Um only forms M supplied by o, N.I. Make all - sollore is - with this form where presical. Bubmit extra copies of dispings, carbone et chotobes, no., where If practicable, submit is sultable styles for blosprining or photostating. - - OFFICE ! FRANCH 200 Felitionl No. a 105 International 4 January 1999 POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING $ JANUARY 1999 STANTSK STRUATION The - of the Synnish Republican forces is cayburing Termel - as a surgerise to the majority of Freach opinion. I'ves the Left proce weadered if the many reports coning in were true - doubt of the extent of the Republism as mentioned is desparches from Walsasia - expressed. At present writing 18 appeare as if the compler-attack by General Transe's forces has associated is recayturing last ground and routing the Reyublicans. It is prodicted that the France forces will fail to follow - this recepture as usual. Omb good 02/05/20 will be the adverse wather conditions. The Spanish affair has lest its "featured" positicain the French proce and lit:le or not interest is maillated since the Germa and Italians 0.20 net taking outh as active interest. Invon the question of withdrawing volunteers is not played up. The "Right" proce feels that the Spanish affair we lest its importance, in comparison to more pressing problems is the Meditorrenses and Central Europe, while the "Left" proce feels that I aglend has was is Spain regardless of fimal results between Republicans and Insurgents. Condeased opinion, obtained from followors of the Spenish affair, leans to the view that all edda are is favor of General Franse's foress and that slew bet sure pressure, both from seal and land, will emable him to win in the final count. It be long been accopted that Franco's forces were better organized to earry on a protracted way. Namever, the resognition of the fact that the "norals" of the Spanish Hepublicans is on the up-grade is MW freely admitted by French elements who traditionally consider anything "Left" being sysemmous of "disergnaisation". CENTRAL EUROPEAN AF/AIRS: The sew Register is Remania, under the leadership of GOOAS, has ml been well received in France. This change coming immediately after Monsieur Delbos' visit and his assurances that Rumania would remain a faithful friend of the Little Extents has only compliented matters nere. Even though GOGA's party is a misority - end the opposition may be streng, the more fact that King Carol has called him to take ever the govern- next is proof to the average Frontence that - form of distatorship is about to we not up in Rusania. Any form of distatorship, though mild is the beginning, will overtually work out in favor of Germany and Italy, and to the detriment of France. All policies of Monsieur Goga age pre-Hitler, and anti-demeratio. Kis interier policies, especially his attack on the Jews, and yours, 4a interpreted in Trease to nees that Hitler and Musselini will be his guide in froming the future of humain. Monsieur Goga, according to the French press, is violently anti-Sovist and will line up with the anti-Omentaint nations. The extreme Left and Right process REPLICE Monsieur Delbos of being foeled and obtaining as exrectous impression of Remain friendship for Trease and the Little Datente on his recent visit to that country. It is, however, too early to form as opinion on the exmet maning of the formation of Dogn's government insefar as 11 pertains to Franso-Rumanian relations. For the present, it is viewed with caw concern by Frenchmen who feel that the Balkan blogiis decidedly pro-Facist. The excuse that "secumic" conditions am7th bottem of all the Central Exropean and Balkas troubles mine the picture all the mere black as "esonemie" ills are not easily cured and, as a rule, do not react to statemenship. 1 BECASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) of of OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 By SLR MAY Date 2 1973 BECLASINED E a 11652, See. 2(1) and III) - DD OSD letter, May, WAY By SLR Date MAY 211973 FRANCE 100 Fulitical No. 8 105 International 4 January 1998 SINO-JAPANISM AFFAIR: The favorable reply of the Japanese to the "Passy" incident was well received in the French prose. It was resulted that the Distator and Facist nations could, when real opposition was is sight, be brought to their conses just like any week nation. the following peace conditions, according to the pross, have been offered to China by the Japanese: (1) Repudiation of Communism and cooperation with Jayan against 11. In other words, China must coase to be anti-Jayane se and become anti-Russion. (s) Becommic ecoporation: this to include the sotablishment of joint sir services and the construction of certain railways in North Chim. (S) Acknowledgemt of Chima's liability for the course of Jayanese military operations. As North Ohina is unable to pay a way indemnity this sondition implies the giving of security in the form of rights and interests of the surnaring of Customs revenue. (4) Resognition of Manchulano. This may take the form of commercial and agreements. (5) The creation of a demilitarized sono around Shanghei and possibly at other places where Japanese interests require this form of protection. (6) China to employ Japanese advisors and to agree that Jayanese troops occupy certain places for a time. Items is the French press state that these conditions, which are desidedly German in origin, are only preliminary conditions and that a complete list of sonditions are now bein- worked up by the Berlin-Roms-Tokie blos. Hope is still expressed in the French preas that Franse-England-United States may sombine and use their influences to preserve their sombined interests in the yer last. The Right press states that whatever may be the military results of the way in the For Kast, the days of the White nations are ended in China and that the future will witness & "packing up" process is properation for Japen's next nove in the course of the mext deende. Depending on the strength of the - bloo, and its ability to stick together until a redistribution of solenies takes place, will depend Japan's noxt nove, perhaps taking in the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-Chima. Company en the United States is to the effect that the favorable compreial balance of ever 60,000,000 dollars is a much stronger factor than more prestige and the retention of doubtful assets in Chima. Comments by military writers, should the United States remain aloof, is that France and England are helpless in face of Jayance aggression and expansion is the Far Last. It is stated that pressure being brought in Egypt by Italy and Germany will make England think twice before she- risks anything but "polite notes" to the Japanese; that Singapore and Hongkong sould 60 by the board and England would not dare move her floot from the Mediterramen for fear of Italian and Cermits agrression. INTERIOR SITUATION: The strim situation is still very embarrassing to the Government in that the Chautemps Deverment is trying to mediate between the Employers and Employees and with a view to leaving with the workers the much needed social benefits granted under the Social Laws. The strength of the Chautemps government lies in the fusion with the Socialists, homeo the --- ity for maintaining as may of the social benefits as possible for the mares. $ RELASSIFIED E. a 11652, See. a(E) and S(13) 12 (i) FRANCE OSD letter, May, MAY By SLR 21 1973 100 Political Date No. # 105 International 4 Jamery 1950 Loading politicians, both is the Desite and Chamber, consider the present strikes as a natural streightening out process due to the drastic changes is working conditions of the wasses to to Social Laws. The uphoaval of the country's secuents end industrial system was too drestie to eller its being piesed together again except by a long process of adaption that is only possible by the expreise of consiliation and good will or the part of everyone conserned. The many decrees and laws 1ssued to met difficulties as they aress, many of them ineffective or imapplicable because they are at variance with economic principles, or principles of authority, placed employers in uncompromising opposition to the unions. While a year ago strikes were prevalent for the enforcement of the five- day week, wages and collective contracts, they have lately been revived for a renowal of contracts with provisions which deprive employers of authority. The cocupation strike at the Gesdrick Rubber factory, may Paris, is a typical instance of labor's attitude. It was undertaken for the reinstatement of certain discharged verbe re. Yes the first time the Government sont a military fer or to expell the men from the factory, but the fores was confronted by a barrier of strike sympathiners and the and pelice were withdrawn. The employers, on the other hand, are adhering to the plan of not discussing terms with the strikers while the plants are occupied. The strike, which is considered most serious, and compying the City and Federal Government, is the "transport" strile in the Department of the Seine. the Paris municipal transport workers (buses, subways, etc) west on a 24-hour general strike ever a w.go dispute and in half-sympathy with their colleagues on strike at the Paris delivery markets. Transportation was completely stopped, except taxis, for a period of 26 hours. The Government immediately ordered mechanical ratings from the Nevy Yards Brest and Toulen, as well as from the Amy, to proceed immediately to Paris and take ever all manicipal treasportation. Finally, there was no need of using military mechanies as the strike ended with the M-hour protest. While the reasons given by workers for the recent strikes are "increases of "allowaness", etc., the underlying issue appears to be the right of employers to dismiss nos without submitting the cases to arbitration. A cress section study of the many arguments conserning the recent strikes indicate that the employers are willing to submit to arbitration on every point except the right to dimise mon. To belittle this "right" on the part of employers is to ignore the meaning of the word"possession" to all Frenchmen. Hewever, the workers,who pay little hand to "tradition" of the pessessing class, are best on obtaining rights which will ensure them from discharge at the whime of - employer as was the case in the part. It is "now or - with the workers and they 40 not intend to abandon the struggle without a fight. Newever, 1% must not be assumed that the "majority" of French workers, in all industries, are is favor of those continued disputes with the Employers. A of the leading department stores, banks, insurance companies, municipal employees, show that over 60% are is faver of the costs of living will est up any mall increases accorded after protrasted "perse" and consolidating present (ains. This entegory realizes that rising disputes. POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE STRIKES: Assuming that there is nothing more unprodictable then phlitical developments in France, it is not thought that the present unrest from strikes contains any impodiate threet to the Chautemps government. It may be stated, however, that the "Frout Pepulai " has been shaken as a sequence to Chautemps' Government jostmying to appease both the employers and the employees. the "rightists" who ge k pensational events is anything and everything prodict that the Choubenps Government my "fall" or "resign" as a result of these strikes. However, the conservative elements (who would probably wish a shaffle of the Oabinet) feel that the Socialists and Commissists will seek strength is union, regardless of the $ TRANGE 100 Political No. 8 105 International 4 January, 1990 strikes, at the first signs of danger to the Treat Populaire fusion. the class affiliation between the Chautemps Government (Redical Socialists) and the Senate sugers well for any action the Government may take to bring about a solution to the problem. CLOSING or PARTS EXPOSITION: By a vote of 196 votes to 95 the Senste rejected the bill to reopen the Paris exposition in 1958. While Senster Caillaux (Nadien]-Socialist) in noving the rejection of the bill, stated that the expesition had been nicumanged from a financial point of view, and that the country's financial resources should w devoted to national defense and not in furthering the 1988 experition, 18 is - knowledge that the Provinces have strengly objected to a responing of the Paris Expenition (all trade drifted to Paris). Senater Gaillamx' notion ml only the voice of the Provincial Radieal-Socialiste consening a Bill which the Chartenge Government passed through the House knowing that the Senate would be able to handle the matter and relieve the Government from the responsibility of not submitting the Mill. - o - - 1 A a 11652, Sec. XE) and O(I)) of OSD latter, May, i twis by SLR Date MAY 21/973 973 CONTIDENTIAL lie A. Paris FRANCE 100- Political Torees Report N° 5 103- International January 4,1938. Relations. ADDR 1 CASTELS abandonment of distant colonies and concentration or frican colonies. The following excerpt from the Brest Depache, discussing the theory of Admiral CASTEX on France's Colonial impire in his "Volume III- Théories Stratégiques", is transmitted as of particular interest at present writing. The article agrees with Mairal Castex, that France cannot defend her distant possessions, and should have bargained them off at the proper time; Distant Colonies: A short while ago I remarked the weakness of our fleet in the Crient to defend French interests now in peril by Japanese aggression. This con- dition also applies to United tates and Ingland who have more to lose than Franee. I have re-read Cestex' Volume III "Théories tratégiques" which deals with "Colonial expan- sion and Naval strategy. Contrined therein are many subjects for thought. It is a eatter of common glory to boast of France's colonial domain in five corners of the Globe. . are accustaned to praise the economie and military ad- vantages in time of peace and war. dairal Castex shows us that while our frienn solonies have imense advantages and possibilities, the seene charges to one of great 18- convenience when we consi 'or our possessions in Asda and Pacific. No ned of remarking that Indo-China is defense- less in front of Japan, or oven China, and that the vorry of holding then and protecting them costs enormous RES, His conelusion was that se should abandom all our distant colonies and get the best bargain possible for them. This would permit us to concentrate our efforts in fries - from the Mediterrancen to the Conge, when this work of .dmiral Castex appeared in 1930, it was received with indignation by the Colonials - the question of sentiment and ties use discussed. But, if we adhere to solid logical arguments we must admit that \doiral Castex was correct. Castex and that - must Dever less sight of the wisdoms 0.00 quat proportion the political front, and military front, to existing possibilities. N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF of NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT C-9-g INVER sopies Indianal and ats this number to securery because of the limited personal la O.N. 1. and because of the upser for quickly Information trues attachés, Times espies will be distributed by O.N. 1. - - forfacte or according to mile. Y From Date 15 Larch 19 38 Serial No. 138 File No. 103 (Comments - - proper sumber Source of information Relishle - January Bew() - d. Index) 20 Subject POLITICAL FORGES INTERSIGNAL RELATIONS (Nation reported ea) (Inder title - per Indes sheet) (Subilitie) Reference review, Inducing and distribution of reports by O.N.L will be grady la entered la this space. Massion leading prographical, personal, of political - and the or of the report. POLITICAL NAME PERIO ENDING 15 LARCH, 1938 MAR 22 TEX Deport %. 138, 15 Inrch, 1938, 1a treamitted herewith. & a 11617. 5% 100 and 5(D) ut (E) OGD lessor. May, 4, 1972 MAY 9 1973 By SLZ Data, this - - an Cheef - - - - - - - Inco - - - - - - - - - - - A-B-C-E for luck Gas? 1. U.S. Dester I C.N.O. M.I.B. Ne. Bid, T.S. CAR Eng. 14L M.S.S. Am gruph - Board City of N.C. N.O. Task CWC Cam. 3 C.W.C. Com Com. Attached el Operations ass Scate 3 Return is Des. U.S. Bet. Fer. See. Fee, Asia Ale Can Div. W.P. Com. PLT. - I / Use forms for all copies. Use only forma M supplied by o. N.L Make all siruiches, ese, usiform in sisa with this form where practical. Rebeit min exples of elipping, carbona of skatobes, atc., where practical. If presticable, submit situtches in auttable styles for bluegrinting or photostacing. 11. PRINTING EFFICE CONFIDENTIAL Bn BIS F74 N. Inchem Archurs in R BILL kee helmi MID kes FRANCE 100 Political Terces No. 190 kes mileau 105 International Relations 15 March, 1988. BECLASSIFIED POLITICAL EVASITE PERIOD ENDING 15 MARCH 1990. a 11652. Sec. 3(1) and 500) or (I) OSD letter, May, 4, 1972 ENCLOSURE: 1400 of - Cabinet of Premier Léen Mim. by SLR Date, MAY 21,1843 SPANING SITUATION: According to the proce General Transe's present drive on the Aragen front is a well propared of:ensive and sky be leading so a decision is the Sysaish conflict. the Right proces states that complete demoreliantion exists in the Republican reaks, as well as within the Reyublism controlled sections, and that a complete collapse sould take place at any time. During the discussions entering into the formation of the we Blues Cabinet, 10 was noticeable how the ladieal-Conialists, as well as all Right parties, insisted - absolute neutrality in consection with the Spanish situation. This is in knoping with the "ritish policy of "hands off in Syain 80 as net to complicate the Itele-Angle-Coman negotiations ser underway. late you reports state that General is Llane, Nationalist Radio General, - relieved of his consented and confined to his residence - the following charges: (1) Anti-Nritish radio specches; (a) Accusing Comen troops of theft; (8) Antagonistic attitude towards Comma and Italian officers. The proce also reports that recent air raids on Republican navel base at Cartagena seriously damaged the eruisers LIBERTAD and MENDEZ NUMEZ, and the destroyer LEPANTO. Confirmation of this is awaited, but should it be a feet it places the Republicon floot at a great disadvantage. AND AUSTRIA: While France was without a Government during the march of Misler into Austria, the pross severely commented on the probable future in store for Cmechoolovakia. the prose states that Trease bas usked England to decide, now, what will be her resetion in case Generay proceeds against Omeshoslevakia is the - may as Austria. The French press strengly inforred that Freace would - to the aid of Cascheslevakia and that it would -- TOP. The Right proce, over deubtful of England, stated that Georing's addition to Caschoslevakia will be accepted by England as proof of Commany's good intentions and that 10 obvistes the memossity of England consiting herself at the present moment. Items appearing in the pross indicate that Italy was wounded, mare then the Italian papers indicate, by the invesion of Austria by the Generas. It is pointed out that the average Italian had been 10d to believe, for the past 5 years, that Italy was the garding of Austrias liberty. While Musselini had to submit to Comma foree, 11 is informed that his pride received . severe shock. The press states that the letter from Mitler to Mussclini, giving him last nimute notice of his intentions to invoice Austria, only made matters wores as 11 elearly indicated that Hitler considered Italy as a second-rate nation is limiting Itelian frontier to the Dreams pass. INTERIOR SITUATION: 1x) Registration of devenuest Premier Chantemps, after reading a deslaration before Parliament, handed in the maignation of his Government. Chartemps, after mature deliberation and collaboration with all political parties, decised that his Government vas net representative H enough for all parties to efficiently handle the may deliente problems confronting France and Europe. 1 FRANCE 100 Political Turess Me. 190 108 International Relations 15 March 1999 The first mjer problem which influenced the government to resign vas the impliate messasity to procure 40,000,000,000 freese for the State: 20,000,000,000 the required purposes and 20,000,000,000 for fiscal running expenses for the year. Chantemps fols, after creating the Tational Defease Special Treasury Account" proparatorytte taking over all funds subscribed for the requirement, that a large political backing comprising all parties should m behind the government is its endorser to flest net a lamp amount is a country where Government bonds are at a low abb. the assend major problem confronting the Chartenge government was the - Labor Code which around animesities and coused much neolose bichering is the Opthor - the Rightists defending the employers and the Leftists defending the more. The entire proces agreed with Premier Cheutenge, in handing in his resignation, as 10 wes felt that kis Cabine's was too "mm to keep hamosy in the discussion of smoth therey problems. Beat papers objected to the fact that Chautenge did not name his denands for proter a matter of confidence and them place the Socialists is as enharrasing position. Premier Chauterps proferred resignation, without debate, so as net to have the responsibility of breaking the Fresh Poyulaire agreed by confrosting the Socialists with reality is the form of a vote of confidence. After three days futile offert be from a National this Cabinet, 1'm I'm (Secialist) was forced to from another Cabinet of the "mp" of a Treat Repulaire Government similar to his first enbinet of July 1936. 31am was given a tree hand by the Sceialists to form a National Vales Government. But m had little as the Right miserity groups (Flandia and Maria) decided not to participate ta a government with Commists who received their instructions from a foreign country (Hesew). The decision of the Right minerity groups to refuse to participate is a National Union Covernment was communicated by Monsieur Flantin M follows: "In the presence of the gravity of the internal end external situation the Presidents or presentatives of all the groups of the miserity have decided to adopt a - attitude. They have declared themsolves realy to participate is or give their support to a government of union est public safety on a progress whom content appears to this to be incompatible with Commist participation." It Was consluded, in view of the foregoing, that Idea Blum should appear before them and answer specific questions conserning progress Yesis Poliey - (1) The yearsh Government's nation toward events in Austria, (a) Nen intervention in Republican Spain under any form whatsoever; (s) Liquidation of Franso-Italian differences, with the appointment of as Ambassader to Home and recognition of the sthiopian armir. 8 D. 9. usere - all 10) di B 4ED May., 0,1972 MAY 19/3 By SIX FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 198 105 International Relations 15 March, 1998 Tinancial policy - (1) Precise information as to the overbuality of a forced less or of a conversion of bonds; (a) Hostility to exchange control. Social policy - (1) Presise information concerning hiring and firing, no: new Labor Code) (a) Coesation of occupations of factories. I'm appeared before a second meeting of the minerity groups to to INVOICEMENT the above questions. Indenvoring to calm the objections to the participation of the Communists, in a National Union Government, Blum recelled how his former Government defended Presce's interests by a strict policy of non-ixtervention in Spain. To the criticism that the inclusion of Commists in the Cabinet would provoke a bad impression on foreign powers, Blum resorted that 11 was undignified to think that Trance sould not remain herself. Blue acknowledged that there existed points of friction betwon them conserning foreign policy but that they could be irened out. The minerity group asked Blues certain questions, ,fer example those conserning resognition of the Athiepian Empire; sending an Ambassador to Rome, financial problems, etc. Certain opposition groups relt, be (Blam) said, in a tage of warning, that sous one else than be would be more qualified to head a national union government. That eight be possible today night not be possible tenerrew. low exceptional sircumstances made that union pos-1ble, since the formala had received sountry-wide approval. Blue stated: Tabe care; if you do not accept it 10-day the country will be against you, and you may be sure that tomorrow under paws eirematances you may not secure the support of the Socialist Party indisponsable for that formation." Im spite of Blum's declaration, the minority groups remained adminat, adopting any their previous deslaration of nen-partisipation is a government where Communists hold seats. In view or such as attitude, on the part of the miscrity groups, Blum soueluded that 11 would be impossible to form a government of National Union, and stated: "I feel I have good the extreme limit in my efforts to form a government which the country demands. All the groups of. the minority, except the Popular Democrate, have given - their refusal. I sen ot hide my surporise or my endoese. "Had I thought that to formation of such a government. under the initiative of another politician, had a better chance of sussess I would immediately resounce Ky mandate. Dut, the events of the day have furnished proof to the contrary." BECLASSIFIED 5 B. O. 11652, See ME) and B(D) or (15 OSD letter, May, 5, 1972 MAY ,973 By SLR Date FRANCE 100 Politionl Forces No. 190 105 International Relations 18 March, 1938 Lien Blum, as present writing, has fimally formed a not embinet around the "image" of the Front Populaire government of July 1936. The cabinet is composed, principally, of Socialists one Indical Secialists (noo Insleaure). Blue intends to present this sobinet, with outline of program, to the Chamber on 19 March. the general reaction of public opinion to the failure to form a National Union Covernment is more or loss of a disappointing minure. It - folt that the time had - to bury differences and give Frease a stable government to traverse the present difficult poried in Nuragean affaire. Even Illum's most bitter political apponents give his credit for his liberal and brondminded views in end-avoring to form a National Union Cabinet. It would not be surprising If Alam's prestige will not be exhanced by recent events. However, Alam being a Jew and a Secialist handicaps his chances of scoporation will friendship from the uppor classes is Frence. May French Ter". people who admire Alam's sincerity always remark that "it is too bad he is a It is yes too early to exempt on the program of the - Blum Government, week 10 as prophesy what it will have in piloting the may difficult problems on the political calondar. Blue must be very careful is handling financial problems (proposed 40,000,000,000 frese leas) as his party is and capital may well take flight at the first signs of secreion or even foreed loans from banking institutions to cover bond incues. Notes: (1) Last minute reports indicate that the French Chember will hold a Bearet mossion to discuss Trace's foreign policy is the light of by military emposities. (a) Runors are going around that the present Alm Cabinet is a stoggap government pending a National Union Government under either Deladier or Servict when the fusies time is "rige". Merriet is reported to have stated when asked to head a government of National Union: "I will leave the temperature of the Chanber work in favor of such an event." BECLASSINED & O. 11652 But 3(5) and S/D) OF (ii) OBD letter, May, 4, 1072 By SLR Date MAY 1973 4 W.W.L.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 15363-1 ATTACHE'S REPORT C-10-1 Forward - - defigied and - this sumber . - - of the limited - is o. N. 1. and - of the - quickly In These expires will be diviributed by o. N. L - per of - be - - Y From Date 22 March 38 Serial No. 145 File No. 103 - - Chica I I I 1 bm d. Source of information deliable Subject FRANCE POLITICAL ORCES INTERNATIONAL RELAT (Notion reported ea) I I I I 1 a (Pobilitie) Reference neview, indesing, and distribution of reparts by 0. N.I. will be greatly expedited If . brief namery of the - . 21 this space. Mention lending prographical, personal, of pollimi MIM, and the per of the report.) FIANCE: Items compiled during week following invasion of Austria X Commany. CANCIONATION " 1938 Report No. 145 (103), 22 March, 1938, is transmitted herewith. Original +7 RECLASSIED R. a 11032, 8x, D(D) and t(b) of as OSD latter, May, L, 1972 3 SLR Date MAY 24 1973 theme - - - - of - - - - Drue - - - - of - - - - - - - - - ABCDE F And Director I C.N.O. GesT Ww - Inco I F M.L.B. Mar. Ord, T.S. CAR Ins. S.A. U.S. M.A.K. des M.C. - J Tock CMC Com. 3 C.K.C. Com. Com. Attachd et Operations Des. U.S. Bai, Fee, Sex, Fer. Ania Air Can. Bin W.P. Com. PLT. 1 3 Raters se 111 - In No. Use forms for all copies, Use only forms M supplied by 0, N. Make all sketches, Mr. sallors in sine with this form visas practical. Submit extra - of dippings, outbose of skatches, etc., where If practicable, submit sketches in auitable styles for bluegrinting or photostacing ... - PRINTING OFFICE ! BECLASSING E. O. 11032, Sec 3(E) and MD) or - OSD letter, May, 1, 1977 MAY 21 19/3 FRANCE By SLR Date 100 Political Forces 145 22 March, 1938 103 International Relations FRANCE: Items compiled during week following invasion of Austria by Germany. With the fall of the French Cabinet, and inability to form a National Union Cabinet, coupled with the invasion of Austria by Germany, it may be said that Peris had the "jitters" during the past week. The Attaché has compiled, as & matter of passing interest, several little incidences of importance: COMMIST WESIGNATION: Charles Rappoport, one of the founders of the French Communist Party and Paris correspondent of the Moscow newspaper ISVESTIA, has handed in his resignation both us e member of the Commist Party and as correspondent of ISVESTIA on learning of the recent executions in Moscow. MOBILIZATION CARDS: Mobilization cards have been mailed to all French Reservists up to the age of 50 years. Periodically, mobilization cards are mailed to bring records up to date. On mobilization the reservist is informed what depot to report for further disposition. Information received tends to show that a percentage of reservists: artillery, tenks and aviation, have been diverted from former depots in northeestern France to more southern points close to the Spanish-Franco frontier. While this is e natural sequence of troubled events in Spein, it 10 of interest as show's that the French have their eye on probable developments in that sector and Northern Africa. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FRENCH AID: The Attache has spoken to many French officers, as well as foreigners, on how France would came to the aid of the Czecha and received the reply, "we do not know." The press reports that Mtler will make a demand on Ozechoslovakia, in the immediate future, to grunt autonomy to the 3,000,000 Cermans (Sudests) on the borderland, and the creation of e neutral state on the style of Switzerland for the remainder of Czechoslovakie. If the Czechs agree Hitler is willing to guarantee the security of the nation. Otherwise, Czechoslovakia will be placed on the "index" and will await Hitler's "power politics" at his pleasure. It 1a also rumored that Hitler, in & bid for Rungary, will guarantee Hungary's security under the guise that Hungary is a step-sister to his beloved Austria and has kindred ties end relationship. Possible sources of action for France: Many people in France, particularly the poorer classes, believe that France should code to the rescue of Czechoslovakia. The workmen and communists 000 the selvation of France in aiding Spain. But as much as the French General Staff would love to secure their route to Africa, which French military writers have writter many articles on recently, it is a great temptetion for France to seize the Balcario Islands or to set up a puppet state in Catalonia, whfch would have a French naval base and air stations, butythey would not dere risk this because England objects very seriously to any adventures in Communistic Spain. The French officers are also worried, probably due to their fears of what steps Hitler and Missolini may take next, as they think that the longer Berlin dogs ask not the better England and France will be armed, but there'is the possibility of Italian action against Tunis where there are so many Italians under Fronch rule. British officers discount this but think that the next action may be taken by Mussolini. They frankly state their fears that Egypt will be the next Italian objective. There 16 evidently no cooperation between the British and the French. The officers I have talked 1 DENTIAL BECAUSE 2. a 11812 See a(E) and S(D) or (B) INVOICE CGD latter, May, 1, 1972 100 Politicol Poross No. 145 By SLR 22:22ph, 1938 Date MAY 21 1973 103 International plations to 5:00 Mrly Materidday of 10078 11 the of Marine end linistry of --1r in: the Hillitary. = initiative is still ev: itly 1= the hunds of 1220 Mai 12" Mtlor. STATE UI... Conversation with = Drinish official 0 : 1 Me to : 10" 10:11 0712 the uncertain situation 1n Dirope. - :: the as 02 to Mail % that the of 100 about Covelop 198, 20 unitile Nit the the mus curprise 1079 will ecca ri. Itely and 4: 1.5 the of -:.: or 2018. -- stuted that 1f Ital: uid not "do it 14 to 112 1901 she 18 ur 94. Le 0180 should that be VOID ot 11 close touch 1th the -1%.0 Meral Stepies he reluctantly 0210 "round to offices oaking for and _08 1, that = could give him. - the . renoh National Cou oil of Defence consultation "It" the Soviot with udor, Spanish President :13 10:41ng Commission to 11:01:00 the of Brench troops into Spain to $0120 over Reports have 1t that the .rench General staff, in agreement 1/1th to National Difense Comcil, planned to nove into Spain 11.120 >pray was a 1 oking out for .distrie. liowever, it 1.0.8 decided to consult 4% antentor to : ve hr join in so that a armon front willi è producted to the Dictators. Ingland refused to condt herself so the full through. - J.L.: L. SP.IN HAME IDAH: kmore use rife in Poris that Mthr's tole_mas to Discolini aftor the Instrien coup: "I will nover for it Ma for ou* 000 be interpreted to rean that Mtler will back up Missolini, 11th troops, 1: as vonture ho may care to make. now of the your informed that 12 Litunce your into Spota, Comany will interpret it tornan the hor ally, Imly, is threatened me that Centary will come 1,to ottor 01 the .rench ^rontivr. CILLICE I. == STATES I. MIS: Notwithsteading the tur oil of the just tack, the silence 0." the Puristons has hear noot recertable. No no.tings, protects 0" shouting of 167 sort Yes occurred. Such state of offairs - the situation *11 $2.90 1.0/N serious and indicates that novements the on :bot both in the diplartic nd ilitory world. CANADA - Informs b: 201 = Jim to "ori 5 National Union foiled 1.0 to the 1.0rity - mising to join in e with Commits hil, LE they claim, no ot program other the to 00110 for "union" user 110" to .ront Populaire only out its program. I'm - 20 L. whate to 011 perties to sink thoir dif orences stating that they not the suction 0'0.00. :- the objection to the Communists Lim stated that the Commists composed 6 / It of the electorate und the in to ovent THE they vould expected to diculiar the rifle, just 11's the and that they could not, therefore, to Abjected to on polition? products. Even 2011 Laymoud un tratents t'is ead tried to his collengues that the Comunists would be justified 11 refusing to buir - ime 10 they 11:40 Seprived of representation 1: the government of the country. While to ..... rik much oupital of the 100 of Live for ing a Autional Union with is Commists forming pet thereof, serious thinking 200210 06.1 that the "Co. uniote" are jim onl yrool of the people and u.t to receptived. It is naction 4 th to the Committe EN powerful in the 21 le Juions - 01/1201 they industrios; house L strike 01 Mair XII could easily paralyze information in to event of var. 0121 ot 1:00 the had ut oup ant then in the Chamber a* ould ho to 10.2 industrial purce in the country. & DECT ARLE BECLASSINED X O. 11012, See 3(2) and S(D) or (1) OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 No. 145 MAY 21 1973 100 Political Torous By SLH Date 28 Whrch 1938 103 International Delations FREE I: IN: Loasteur Zyrmski, one 0." the Militants of the -rench Social Party, 1a on article 1: the Socialist paper LE POPULAINS, une the Covernent to send troops to occupy Spenish Minorce and Spanish Morocco, and a1d in every my the nod forces of Spoin. A resolution 148 taken by the workers in the Puris uns feetory of "ering to work an hour E day extra to manufacture ares for .epublican Spain. 12. MILL's SPINCH: The Lritish Attaches (Naval and ..ir) stated that they 1,019 highly pleased with 2. Hull's spe ch on American foreign relations. HOISTING 07 - no a. ASTRIA: CONSULATE: When the Austrian Consul Genoral in Peris received orders to houl down the Austrian flag and hoist the German flas, he replied to the effect that he would not hoist any flag but resignation. the Constitutionsl Austrian Fleg end that he had already handed in 1:10 AUSTRIAN MILITARY ATTACHE TAXES UNITED CF or ICE LEFORE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE: General de Jahn of the Austrian AN, end Austrian lilitary Attache in Puris, TO orted for duty us Assistant Military Attache at the Jorman Embassy. if SPAL PR/CICO DEFINES STAND: Reports from Spain, dated 1e March, state that Generel Franco ennounced that be will not cede one inch of territory to any foreign power, end that there will he no changes in the Western Ledite rancan. Franco further stated that he has now 20% less foreign volunteers than a year REO, and they are barely 5% of his forces; that he had no further 1020 of foreign assistance, end that all reports of recent German and Italian troops arriving in Spain were false. Frenco 13 reported CS stating that he hoped for very friendly relations with France and England when the conflict 170.8 over. TRIP OZ VETERINS' SONS TO CHILNY CANCELLED: A two-weok visit to Jersany by 1,000 sons and daughters of French war veterens, planned for the month of april, has been cancelled. The leader of the novement, Monsieur Pinchot, in 8 letter to the Nezi youth loader stated: "with great regret in the name of the Zederal Union on the eve of the departure of our youths for Cemany, I have to decline your invitation. de cre forced to do this by the course of intoructional events, the gravity of which cennot be ignored. In order that no ambiguity my arise from this decision, I offirm pert." that the desire for Pronco-German entente redins complete on our VISIT or - TIMANING SHIP "EDIN" TO TOULDI CANCELLED: The projected visit of the }-rmen treining ship ADD to Toulon, na a return visit for the JANE to K1-1 last year, has been oficially postponed. Elaborate program inview of making the trip of the 2021 e huge success. The press stated that the trip was 20 tponed by mutual agreement between the Trunch and German governments. The Toulon paper L. PUTIT V.S. a. roves the postponing of the visit for the zuman that Trulon is a Commist center and there cortainly would have has struct contings and de onstitions to protest Certiny's power politics in Central Europe. PRANCE (czechoslovaxia) 100 - Political Forees Report No. 150 103 - International March 24, Relations. FRANCE - Doubt of French 1d if attacked. Since the seisure of ustria, W Gerumny, the question of French e14 to is taking a "reeli ⑈ turn in French discussions. the refusel of Chamberlain to commit England to a14 Osechoslovakia, in event of attack from Germany, has made the Frenchman realise what that he has off his heads. The exposure of the Caechs frantier, with tris now in Germany's hands, has mode French militory leaders dmit that the problem has another cupeet. It 10 now freely admitted that the French Government in making the statement that "France will fulfil her agreement with the Oseshe" was only voicing the politiciams and endeavor- ing to beloter up the treaty rights until a more subtile way out Was found. It is pointed out that, whatever my be the strength of the Caseh army, the whole strategis pesition has now changed now stands isolated, with the German any our- reanding the northern, watern and southern frontiers of the German specking cestion of the country. The Caechs are now negotisting with the Germa Sudists (mo doubt with the approval of Porie-Berlin) in an effort to streighten matters out before it is too Into. Naturally, with Berlin behind them, the Sudiste are wking rather strong demands on the Casehs. It is admitted here that the Caeche will be foreed to accede to the domands of the German Sulists if they do not went the Comens to step in and "protest their followen beyond the fromtiers" The consert of public opinion riving against the risk of plunging r DOB into war my be gunged from the following re- presentative prees quototions 8 SPARE LE JOUR And If M. Corbin told Lord Halifex "France will fight for he could only have dome se on the B, instructions of M. Leon Bluin and M. Paul Bonsour, and such a B-10 thing would be simply mometrous." B-11 Le JOUR goes on to point out that in the last war arch. France lost 1,800,000 mill, and that it is mrdness to think that the French noti on should be mobilised again to protect Caseho- Storrida. MDD, "NO AGGRESSION." Cen: Div. . Doubtlees France has always the daty to inter- vome in favor of Cascho-Slevekia, but if the events took a tragle turn, 18 is not the duty of France any more than that of Great Britain to declare a war of aggreesion against Germay." .... 081 -1- E O4 RECUSSIFIED 11652. Bec. XII) and SIDE of of OSD latter, May. 3, 1972 MAY 2.1 1973 By SLR Date SLOVEXI ) 1 0- Political Foress Import No. 150 103 -International Inreh 24, 1938. Relations. The in the J UR, the Léon G-ribaldi, study- ing the possibilities of such a war, points out that Transo would be held up by Cernany's fortifiontions, that Russian air sid would be held in check W the roles at that the issue of the whole war would have been nettled long before the French aray could have piereed the Germen fortifications. 22 . It 18 only by diplom ey, by NBL grosment with Knglned, by a accord with Italy and by agreeing to negotiste with Germany on all the quertions which separate w. in good m, #that - one help ".It is certainly not by bluetering, by - or by pronounsing that terrible phrase 'Pranee will & to WaF. . The banes of one French soldier 1.20 will more to the French then all the Cascho-1ovaks and all the peoples of the world. . No, M. Blum, IT nee will only fight for her - independence and you connot we our any to defend peoples in Enstem Europe who Mr. too for away for our assistmes to be of any real use. DEPECTE X TOULOUSE # The #DepSche is Toulouse. which tom is the strong- hold of French Andienlism, in en prticle on the present si instiem printed in black type, leys down solemnly that France's supress conosm is "to think of her duty 10 hareelf. - She must look after her own security. the recurity of her frontiers, her territory and her inhabitents. he mit -void my will or any net which would risk leaving her isaleted in the midst of a feverish Europs. . Vas & the war-makers went ? No they wast France to edept a policy of adventure when the Soviets. who 520 unging her on this path, did not raise a little finger in aid of their insediate neighbors the Chinese? No, IT nee is net propered to be the in. trusent of any pelicy of false idealism. . l'ARE NOUVELLE No Mareel Deat, Moderate Socialist, writing in l'ERE Nouvelle, sayst - . Very saluly 1 invite our rulers not to talk lightly, not to engrge in an adventure light-heartelly on the filth of 'being prepar 4 down to the last BECAUSITED E. a 11042, See a(E) and ((D) or (in) OSD letter, May. 4 1972 MAY 1973 - : - By SLR Date CONFIDENTIAL 100 - Political report No.150 103 - International March 24, 1938. Relations. . I ask them to remember the last Var, never to take their desires for realities and never to viela to the terrible temptation of 1 musching our country into was in the hope that Great Britein would be obli, ed to fellow . w. Such nistaken mineity would be, in reality, a crime. CTION FRANCAISE I the Charles Mamrres, in 1'ACTION FRANCAISE, points out that the whole Caeeh scheme of defense of the mountoins of Bohamic relies - French intervential, and seket "How onn such AB intervention be promised in the present state of Europe T The policy of the barrier defence who already "tupid in 1919 and now it no longer exists. . *? OR BETTER." * Rend Belin, the Socialist Deputy, general-seerstary of the French Confederation of Trade Unions, writing in IS PEOPLE nd -100 in the 11DEPEND N? of Perpignen, warms the workers of France against engnging in hostilities urged on by the Soviets, and says 8 "Hven unsatisfactory negotistions no- sulting in perso 1/20 better than a war, though it may be vie- torious Mr Maile Roche, Andical, in L reminds his readers that Redicolism hrs always stood for the rights of people to dispose freely of themselves. The EQLAIREUR DE NICE points out that Britnin's no- Imment eunsists of no re eraisers and more eirplanes, and goes as to say Want, against Gemamy's 52 divicions. France can only put 35 or 26 in the field. - In the air, M. Onillamx hrs told m, "the ECLAIRKUR eontinues, *that we eye behindhand, very much behimihand. SHORT 1 TANKS. . AS n recult of strikes and the 40-hour week, Frence has not yet the mumber of tanks which the Wny Minister thought indispensable at the end of 1936, nor a dr forms which is sufficiently strong. # Merchal Joffre said that, to envisage war, it we necessary to have 75 changes out of a hundred of winning 1t. How could enyone dream of dealering an of fensive we war against Germeny when, for from having TO per cant of changes, we would be obliged at the outset to remain on the defensive + "There are - 3 - BEST 2. a 11657, See. 2017 and CODE of (2) OSD letter, May. & 1972 By SLH MAY 10/3 Date CONFIDENTIAL FRANCE 200 - Politionl Foress 150-38 103 - International Relations. - There are may people in Promot and in Englam who do not like to look fasts in the fees. left-wing peli tickams live in the lying stmosphere of Neason and are content to hate the totalianrica tates, such - Generally , Italy, Japan, Transe's Spein, end would like to wage Will on them. - them it is a question of the very existence of our country, we must think of keeping France intert, net expose her to as unsqual war, and must bring about union more Frenslsem. . CANDIDE publishes a leading article on this subjects . Osecho- lownkin constitutes n grave and urgent pro- blam. 98 admit that it eannet be dimissped with a shrug of the shoulders. But N. Bergery (a Deputy) goes too far when in maintrins that to divide up would be as shame- ful as was the pertition of Polami. - Pol-mi was a real country, may eenturies old and possessing absolute unity. Cascho- lov=kia, which is 20 years old, 1s the worst, from the point of construation, and the net heterogenous of the ilsonian States. . while bearing in mind that the Casehs are entitled to independence and respect, it met be realized that this eval- toil of three races constitutes c serious pretext for the final orld Nor in which law and our civilisation will be at stake. . né there exe people who calts what about France's " deplore the feet that France under Brial, Wanting to initate the policy of the Kinge of France, chose her allies to the east from the weaket nations, from those who could never give us useful aid in return. . '0 have antegonised the strongest mong these nations - Juge-Slavia and Polend by engaging in an olliance with Russia. This, there only remain the others, which ask for everything and give nothing. - The worst foult 10 to percevere in the errore alrendy made. To pluage our country into the wr dem-nded by Theres and ori -leading French Communists) to defend the homor of tolin, of Negrin (the Spenish Red lender) and of Benes would be diabolie-1. . France has already been led by a man who parmed sen- timental wars in the four cormore of the World. This unfortunate m-nia ended at sean. BECLASSIFIED M a 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(1)) of (if OSD latter, May. & 1072 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 - 4 - CONSIDENTIAL N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF 19990 NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT C-10-9 ATTACHE'S REPORT Forward exples (wiginal and als ourbona); this sumber is - besues of the limited personal la O.N.I. and besone of the for quickly desminating information Inc The expire will be distributed by o. N. I. - per footaste of according le 25 From Date 1930 Serial No. 154 File No. 103 (Compte - - (Selest proper samber Source of information Journel to 1s Larine - rehunde - January trues 0, N. L Index) Subject - - POLITICAL INT.ILL.TICS (Nation reported es) Clader title M per todas sheet) (Dubtitie) Reference review, Indexing, and distribution of reports by O.N.I. will be greatly expedited if a brief name) of the emints la estand in this space. Mention leading prographical personal, of political - and the pm of Libe report.) The Importance of North Africe's Maritime Role in France's National Defense - ..rticle by French Deputy. Report ..o. 154, 25 Larch, 1936, is transmitted herewith. BELASSIFED E. a 11652, Box 20 and acts et of oan letter, May, to 1972 By SLR Date MAY 1973 H - - - les Chap if I I - - 1 - of - I - to the - - - I A-B-C-D-E 1 E C.M.O. GesT Ve Director Imagi Board Cabe M.S.B. New, Ord, T.S.B. CAR - Eng. S.S.A. MAS U.S. M.C. C. N.O. Tech CWC 3 C.H.C. Com. Com. Altoché all Cop. Operations Day. Bet. Fee. Asia Ale State Case- Return be U.S. Sea. Fer. S.S.A. Can Die. W.P. 3 P.T. Tr. - / Γ Use form for all notes. Um only forms M supplied by 0. N.I. Make all sketches, est. sellorm in de with this form where posetical Bubmit extra copies of dipping, carbone of statches, etc., where practical. If practicable, submit sizetches in multable styles for blosprinsing or photostacing. 11 NOVERSMENT PRINTING ! FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 154 105 International Relations 25 March 1938 105 - Colonies (N. Africh) The Importance of North Africe's Meritime Role in Frence's National Defense. The following résumé of an article by M. Albert Le Bail (Deputy from Finisterre and vice-president of the Navy Commission in the Chamber of Deputies)which appeared in the "Journal de la Larine Marchande" of 10 March, 1938, entitled "The Importance of North Africa's Laritime Role in Our National Defense," 1s submitted: The writer speaks of e very real anxiety which exists in Algeria and Tunis regarding their defenses against foreign aggression. As contributing causes for this feeling, he cites Balbo's review of 50,000 troops in Tripoli, radio propagende from the Itelian station at Bari.and the numerous maneuvers conducted recently by the Italian navy. All this, he says, shows Italy's interest in the French colonies. The deputy hopes there is a peaceful solution but states that it 1s the country's duty to be ready for war in this locality since the fighting line in Durope would quickly be stabilized after which North Africe would because one of the principal theaters of operation. Ee emphasizes this point strongly. in assues, throughout the discourse, B. war between Trance and Italy. Since avistion would most probably render untenable Toulon LS E base, he feols that in Algeria, offers itself es the logical base for the nevel unite. This port has a good roadsted and is protected from enemy planes by its distance "unless the enemy had the Salearic Istends as e bese," His argument 1s to build Nore-el-Mibir into Et Trench Gibraltor, melding of it c. sentinel as noar 25 possible to the Atlentic-Lediterrenean get. lene end a worthy twin of Lizerta situated at the other end of the French African cœst line. In is connection, he describes Bizorta ES a formidable tase, both defensive and of "onsive. --- Himma Active MID BECLASSIFER E. a 11612, Bee a(E) and (CD) R at OBD letter, May, 1. 1902 By SLR Date MAY 19/2 - 1 - N.N.I.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 15363.E C-10-M quickly decominating information - elischée. These copies will be distributed by O.N.I. - per fontaste or amorting to mile. Forward PAYER emples coriginal and als certions); this somber la Detemary besue of the limited personal mO.N.I. sad because of the urganey for From Y Date 19 38 Serial No. 155 File No. 102 - (Select proper tember Source of information Brunch newspeper "L'Action 2.m - insury Bres) true d. R.L. Index) Subject 2....02 POLITICAL INT.MILITIS (Nation reported ea) (lader title M per Indes sheet) (Subtite) Reference review, Indesing, and distribution of reports by o, N.I. will be grally expedited If . brief number) of the to entered is this space, Mention leading prographical, personal, of political names, and the girl of the report.) L:. "L'nutini POLICY?" Report ... 155, 25 witch, 1938, 1= transmit ed herevith. 2 - - - - - is o. . - - - - - - - - - - - - of - - - - the particial - - -- A-B-C-D-E Name And Cas'1 Ww Director E C.M.O. Ord. T.S.D. CAR Eng. S.A.A. insy College M.I.B. Mar. Bonrd M.S. Aara, U.S. M.C. N.O. pub M Tech cwc 3 Com. cac Com. 3 Attaché et Operations State 3 Return se Day. U.S. Bet. For Sea. Fer. Asia S.S.I. Air Can. Dir. W.P. Com. P.T. - Room Ma. Use forms for all mples, Das only forma M supplied by o. N.L Make all skriches, est. salform in sine with this form where practical. Bubmit excra expire of dippings, carbona of statches, etc., where protical. a practicable, submit sketches is suitable styles for blueprining of photostacing . ---------- PRINTING - FRANCE 100 Political No. 155 103 International Relations 25 March 1938 "CAN FRANCE HAVE A FOREIGN POLICY** The following résumé of an article by M. Pierre Mricourt in "L'Action Francaise" of 27 February, 1938, entitled "Oan Funce have a Foreign Policy?* is submitted: This article vas written after a debate in the French Chamber of Deputies, embracing many subjects. On the question of Spain, one member (Grard) demands to know why France continues to remain aloof from Rome and more specifically why she continues to supply arms and munitions to Darcelona. He then says that the government is denying this but that such statements are made in certain French papers and if they are false, certainly the law could suppress them. But they are not stopped and that would prove their truth. He suggests a commission to investigate in Spain. He then urges the acceptance of Franco rather than allow what is three quarters of Spain to fall to nations which do not love France. A second member (Dupont) followed with the same ideas. Spanish friendship is necessary for French security, comproe and industry. He then seconds the motion of Gérard for a commission to investigate, which, he says, would find French guns of the latest model at Teruel and "the Spenish will know unfortunately that not only French material but French hands have killed their brothers." ******.* M. Delbos, the Foreign Minister, spoke then on his policy (weakly according to L'Action Francaise). He disputes that France is isolated or that the League is irretrievably condemned. He tries to diminish the general pessimism of the speakers. The Minister then sets forth France's dusies - to be foremost (mpeoples wanting peace, to protect their moral end material heritage; a France which has engaged itself to this end and cannot isolate itself to practice a policy of abstention. He affirmed the solidarity of Great Britain end France and his own confidence in the pact with Russia. Throughout this part of the editorial, the writer uses a barrage of sercesm against Delbos. E The next member to speak, M. Montigny, appears to be more appreciated by L'Action Frencaise. He is violent in his denunciation of a policy that D has only words and no actions, specifying that of Sarreut concerning German cannon at Stresbourg. In this connection, he elaborates on the German war and industrial machine. Adding that the French army is orgenized solely on a defensive basis, he urges that an offensive machine be inaugurated. 3 ****.... M. Flendin, greeted by leftist cries of "Heil Hitler," then spoke at long length. After implying that England no longer believed in the League, he wonders why France should continue to base all its foreign policy on this dend effort. There must be & choice between Russia's war policy and Britain's pesceful and, realistic methods. And if France is to lime up with England, then negotiations should be opened with Italy and Cermany, It is then asked if France doesn't have the right to know where she is being led. He makes a résumé of the activities of recent years wherein France was forced to follow Great Britain when it would have been much more to her advantage to converse with Italy and Germany. Eo criticises Blum and Chautemps for their indirect deelings since they followed England who mede an about-face in regard to Italy and Cermany, why not deal directly with them instead of through the British? The French interests in the Mediterrensan and on the Rhine are superior to England's. 1 FRANCE 100 Political No. 155 103 International Relations 25 March 1938 ........ Premier Chautemps spoke shortly preising the work of Delbos, calling for e. strong netional defense program and at the same time assuring the Chamber that, regarding Cermany, the government was exerting every effort towards on agreement despite the many obstacles in this peth (L'Action Francaise then cells attention to the utter lack of Chautemps' words on the complexities of the continued relation with Barcelona). The Premier called for EL long line of the League end ended his speech with an appeal to the Trench people for discipline and peace during the troublous times. ......... The erticle finished in a blaze of surcesm. After Chautemps had finished, a motion for a vote of confidence in the government wes read. The writer of this article then added "The only signature missing is that of Andre Larty, now in Madrid in corread of the International Brigades." The vote showed 439 in favor of the goverment against two but "more than 169 abstentions - - 169 people lacking the course to signify their disgust in those who are leading us to war through the bloody paths of the League of Nations." N.W.LM ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHÉ'S REPORT 15 363.E C-10-m quickly decemissing information Ins These expere will be distributed by O.N.T. - per If according to above mader, Perved - suples and also and this somber la - benes of the limited personal is O.N. 1. and Insure of the unjury for From Y Date 5 April , 19.38 Serial No. 169 File No. 100-103. (Commence - proper name Source of information - January line() Ins d. W. I. Index) Subject FRANCE turantional Rel. (Nation reported ea) (Inder Utile - per todes sheet) Reference review indexing, and distribution of reports by o, N. will be greatly expedited If - belef number) of the la miand la - - Mention leading prographical, personal, of political - and the - of the report.) POLITICAL 373.73 - 3 IOD KD11G APRIL 4th., 1938. Re 11° 169 (1.0-103) of 5 April, 1938, 1a trans- -mitted herevith. 2. DECLASSIFIED E. a 11612, Best A(R) and S(IX) 100 OSD Intern. May. 4, 1972 MAY 21 1973 Ity SLR Date Van File - - - is a - - - - - - - - - - - - of - - - - - - - --- A-B-C-D-E I 5 We Drater E C.M.O. ! M.I. Mar. OnL T.S. CAR Exp. S.S.A. 1 Callege M.A.S. 1 U.S. al M.C. J N.O. 1 cbc 3 I CNC Com Com. % [ Operations 1 3 Return la 7 u. a. Bei. Per. 5a. Far. Avia ass AM 1 W.P. J P.T. I / Γ Das forms for all copies. Use miy time M supplied by O.N.I. Make all sketches, a selform la sine with this form when practical Submit extra copies of elippings, aurbor of skatobas, es., visa practical. If practicable, submit striches in maintable styles for bineprinting or photostating. ... #. - PRINTING arrica ! PRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No.169 103 - International 5 April, 1938. Relations. POLITICAL EVENTS - PERIOD ENDING APRIL 6th.,1938. SPANISH SITUATION: - Press reports on Spain indicate that the fate of the Republisem Government will be decided perhaps in the next few weeks. The military forces appear to be dis- organized with Franco's reeent advance and are retreating wherever retreat is possible. Despatches from Spain state that General Franco's aviation forees are pounding the Republi- can lines, making any definite stand impossible. Reports indicate that the Republicans are short of planes and tanks and that trench worfare is about to set in in order to make a last stand in defense of Bercelona. Over 10,000 Spanish refugees (6,000 soldiers) erossed the fruntier to Prense; the escape was made through the passes to France. which was & such easier route of escape than over the ridges to Barealons. The 6,000 soldiers are the rements of the 10th. Republicam any corps, defented in the upper Aragon at Inseca and Barbastro. Before leaving Lushon the Republican troops were given the option of returning to Bareelone, or of going into General Franco's territory via Irum. No agent of General IT neo was allowed to address the troops, and the terms of the referendum which was to be taken were announced to them by Major Sapatero, a Republican Officer, as follows: Dialn . Do you still wish to fight for liberty s or do you want to join the degraded ranks of those who fight for General Splin tin Franco? . Michines After this the soldiers were morched Bowl through a couryard before French Officers and given their choice. About 500 anti-Republicens, who claimed to have been NID pressed into the Republisan Army, voted to go to Irun to join General France's troops. The remaining troops were sent by Cardin train to Catalonian town to join the Republican Serees. Trains were delayed due to Franco's forees bombing Port-Bou, the Spanish town just over the frontier where the troops were to be convoyed. If the disorder is as great as reported by the press, it is surprising that the unjority were willing to go back. to Repu lican Spain. The prees reports that a high French Official. who passed through the frontier on his way from Barcelona, stated: . The penish war is nearly over. The plight of the Republican Forees in Catalonia and the hopeless disorder pr vailing in Bareelona itself are such that the final downfall may come within D few days." Even a(E) - 1 - (ISD) Metor, May. 1,1072 Zip SAN Date MAY 1973 RECLASSIFIED FRANCE E. a 11632, Sec. a(E) and 5(D) or (M) Report No.169 OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 100- Political Forces 5 April,1938. SLR Date 103- International # mer Relations. Even the most conservative opinion in Paris is that the way will be over inside of a couple of months. Now that the Spenish conflist appears to be drawing to a alose the anjority of the Prench press (moving towards the winner) has taken on anti-Republicen (RKD) attitude and 10 hoping for n. rapid victory for Franco's forces of "lar" and "order". The *dlite* of Prance were always (could not be otherwise) pro-Prance end considered the panish Republicans as "Bed-Communists" from the start of the conflict. This latter view was also held in higher military circles in France. gitation is now on foot, in the RIGHT press, to prevent moss refugees from crossing over the Frontier. Items in the press indicate that Franco intends to deal severely (death) with all politicians and military officers who took leading parts in the civil war. It would be hard for the French to refuse asylun to Spain's lawfully elected Republi- cans, especially in the face of death, but the press infers that it may be the cause of friction with Pronoo in the post- war reconstruction period. Items in the press also indicate the the Republicans have mny thousands of Royalist hostages, including prisoners, and that a general slaughter may take place prior to final surrender. The French LEFT press favorable to the Republicens, infer that French LEFTISTS have requested the Spanish Republican Government not to adhere to wholesele massacre, in event of defeat, and bring the conienna- tion of civilisation on their heads. Last minute inform tion indicates that the 43rd Repu- blican aray division, comped on the panish side of the from- tier, is **ing properations to cross the Aran Valley into France. VON PAPEN APPOINTED MBASS DOR TO TURKEY I Certain sections of the French press take the view that von Papen's appointment to Ankara 10 notivated by a desire on Berlin's part to resuscitate the former Germnno-Turkish alliance, it being apporent that Ataturk holds the key to British-Franco-Ru sin colleboration. EXCELSIOR observes that Hitlerian Germany feeling assured that she will not encounter my serious resistance in Central and Eastern Europe, has resumed her pan-Germanic policy of the "push toward the Bast", and is exerting her effort to resuscitate the alliances of the former German Empire # . Hitler is looking far shead -nd, in the execution of his ambitious plans, is taking no more notice of the secret apprehensions of Italy than of the legitimate fears of France, England, and Russin. . It remains to be seen whether taturk will prove no docile to the orders of Berlin as the "Young Turks" in 1914, t.e wreckers of the European and \sintie Empire of the Sublime Porte. -2- FRANCE 100 - Political Perces Hoport Mo.169 103 - International 5 April, 1938. Relations. . The new Turkey, mistress of the Straits, is a moral and material to ree with which all the Medi terranean powers, 80 unfortu- nately divided, will have to count. It would be imprudent for France, traditionsly Turkey's friend and ally, to nagleet that Power and allow her to fall again under the heel of a Germany who would spare nothing to assure the sympathies and support of the Ankara Government. M There is a rumor that Ataturk is very sick. INTERNAL AFFAIRS $ The importent items at present on the French political calender are: (1) presentation of Premier Blum's financial projects) (2) formation of a National Union Government; (3) ending of industrial strikes. On April 7th. the Blue financial project will be dis- cussed in the Chamber. The following is a summary of the financial measures proposed by Premier Blum: BUDGET ND THE SURY $ 1.- Modification of the income-tax scale and of the income-tax reduction under the heading of family charges. 2.- uppr saion of bearer securities and their replecement by registered securities. 3.- Reduction of the security dividend tax from 24 to 18 per cent. 4.- Suppression of certain tax exemptions in favor of rente holders. 5.- Suspension for two years of the public. debt sinking fund. 6.- Excess profits tax for firms. 9.- Graduated levy on eapital above a certain limit beginning at 150,000 francs. 8.- Discountable drafts for government contractors. 9.- Pacilities for banks to convert their foreign exchange holdings into Treasury bonds. 10.- Issue of chort-term Treasury bonds to small amounts. RECLASSING CREDIT R. a 11652, Soc. 3(E) and ID) or (if -3- OSD letter, May. 5, 1972 By SLR Date MAY 1973 100-Politionl Forces FRANCE 103-International Report No.169 Relations. 5 April, 1938. CREDIT ND CURRENCY $ 1.- Development of middle-term credit. 2.- Obligatory acceptnce of drafts. 3.- Lowering of interest rates. 4.- Supervision of credit operations by the Bank of Prence. 5.- Reveluation of the gold of the Bank of France at present frans rates. 6.- Centralization at the Bank of France of all foreign exchange operations, which will have to be justified. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES # 1.- Adaptation of tariffs to the differences between world and French prices. 2.- Encouragement of tourist traffie to Frame. 3.- Control of price movements in France. 4.- Encouragement of building and construction. 5.- Longer hours in the armant industries. 6.- 014 age pensions. 7.- Completion of the labor code. 8.- Extension of the system of allowances for large families. The publiention of these financial neasures brought The proposed capital levy is expected to be mão the subject of strong opposition from all sides except the extreme Left. a concerted attack by the conservative elements who consider they have already paid a handsome levy by the fall in stocks and bonds sines the coming into power of the Front Populaire Government. It is mentioned that the sheres of the Bank of France falling from 20,000 gold france per share to 2,750 gold france due to Sceinlist tacties, is a nise capital levy of 90% for thrifty citizens. All stocks and bonds, due to additional charges necessityted by the social laws, have lost anywhere from 20 to 60% of their value. The following points give a brief idea of what the new finance lew intends to accomplish I (a) Premier Blue asks decree powere for a period of 3 months; (b) capital levy on capital above 150,000 france, at rising rates from 4 to 17 percent; (o) control of foreign exchanges, in 6 disguised form : DEPARTMED E.G. 11632, Sac. 2(F) and MD) or + (a) OSD lutter, May, 1, 1928 MAY 21 1973 By SLR Date FRANCE 100- Political Forees Report No.169 103- International 5 April,1938. Delations. (a) revaluation of the gold stock of the Bank of France; (a) abolition of 40-hour week in onal in- dustries (probable ino 00.00 to 48 working hours; (f) super-tax on profits from National Defense programs; (g) lowering of interest rates on national bonds by means of conversion; (h) suspension of nrainl reduction of national debt. As mentioned in revious reports, France's principal trouble is "finence". There is an estimated 1938 budgetary deficit (reamment, etc.) of 37,000,000,000 france. It is considered almost impossible for the financial markets to absorb such a stun by loans, etc. Hence, Premier Blum's drastic oper- ation of a "capital levy". Premier Blum estimates that the Government would obtain some 20,000, 000, tr nos by the capital levy - 2,000,000,000 a year for a period of 10 years, and an additional sua of 5,400, 000, 000 france, canually, by suspension of anmial redemption of national debt. Rearment for 1938 takes 47 of the entire budget, but Premier Blum has stated that rearmant is the watch word of the day, and absolutely essential to the national interests. The Finance Committee of the Chamber approved the Government's program by 25 votes against 18. Strong opposition developed in the Radioal ocialist group. But for the votes of the Rndical Ministers, the Radioal Group would have gone on record as hostile to the Government bill, and a split in the Popular Pront would have occurred before the bill went to the Chamber. Opposition of the Endical-Rocinlists was based on the view that it envored of n dictatorship. Opinion in Paris is that Premier Blum will fall in a matter of days It is a question not of an excuse to find to throw him, but only to find a suitable Cabinet to relieve him. It 10 probable that Herriot, Duladier or Chautemps, will replace Premier Blum perhaps at the hend of a National Union Government. The small movement to make Marchal Potain head of the govern- ment 18 growing stronger. dost of the Anciens Combattants and even some of the workmen organizations have placards for him in Paris. Mr.Ridgley Carter, member of the Morgan Banking Firm, informed the Naval Attaché that if a strong National Govern- ment was formed in France, the French franc would be strengthened and French finances would feel the healthful rebound as took place in 1926 when the Poincere Govermeent was formed, as the exported capital would have to return and get over 30 francs to the dollar, if the holders could only trust that a strong govern- ment would be formed that could modify the social laws and pre- vent the present adverse trade balance. -5- As DECLASSIES E. O, 12002, Bac. and and (D) of (i) OSD letter, May, i 1978 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 FRANCE 100-Political Forees Report No.169 103-International 6 April,1938. Relations. As an example of French patriction in financial mattors, a member of this office conversing with a war voteran promoted from Corporal to Captain and fought all through Ve ream) was informed that many war veterans would subscript 100 france for. a 100 frane bond of the proposed National Defense loan, not- withstanding the fast that other Government bonds are selling in the open market for a 20 dissount, providing a National Union Government was formed. NATIONAL UNION GOVERNMENTS The question of a National Union Government 18 still on Will French calander and progress seens to be making slow headway. The min objection of the RIGHTISTS is the fear that the extreme Socialists and Communicts my use the National Union Government to fortor some of their pet schemes for the masses on Parliament. The RIGHT having absolutely refused to join any Cabinet where the Communists are represented seems to have boiled the issue down to the two soletions: (a) dissolution of the Chamber and new elections; (b) form National Union Government with all parties, exclusive of the Communists (this with the consent of the Socialists which would certainly cause a brenk with their Communist friends). While the masses pay little attention to the National Union Government (know little what it means, and care less), the conservative and Right elements are pressing the issue. Some extreme RIGHT elements even go further and downnd a "Council of Public Safety" similar to the "Conité du Salut Public", under Hobespierre, at the time of the French Revolution. Such a pro- position will have a hard time coming to a head as the politi- clams would seal their own fate (nbolish their mandates) by such a creation. The President of the Republic will hardly take the responsibility of creating such an institution as it could, if abused, easily change the entire Republicam structure of the country. There is trouble enough agreeing on a National Defense Union, much less handling the country over to a Committee of Public Safety. However, some Frenchmen are thinking in terms of a "Committee of Public Safety" as will be seen from extracts of a letter written by Rndical-Nocialist Deputy Léen Archimband to the President of Frame. Deputy Archimband is an in:luential member of the Redienl-Socialist Party - the party known as the "boakbone" of Republican ideals and principles - but considers the Country at the "orosoronds" of destiny. In his letter to the President of the Republic, Deputy Archimband states, in parts .... -6- RECLASTED E O. 11602 See 3(5) and 5(1)) at (A) OSD letter, May. & 1972 MAY 21 1973 Dy SLR Date FRANCE 100 - Political Forees Report No.169 103 - International Relations. 6 April,1938. 1938. . Excuse my addressing you in this manner, but events are moving so repidly. and the situation appears to me so serious, that one can no longer respect establiched rules. . I all a Radical-Socialist, and I shall die a Radieal-Coeiclist, but at this very moment I consider party polities should give way before the interests of the nation. . what we need is a Government of Public Salva- tion - not a Government of a few weeks, but a Government which lasts and governs. . We want a strong France and liberty in a power- ful Republie. For the sake of that Republicam France, for that liberty we elamers Enough 1 . The peril of foreign invasion exists, the financial peril exists, the social peril exists. The workman in France suffers, the farmer suffers; the small thrifty Frenshmen are all apprehensive - a great mumber believe the frame will collapse completely. . Many Frenchmen fear a revolution from the Extreme Left, many others a Distatorship from the Extreme Right. To avoid one and the other we ask for a Government of National Safety. TO require nen who have Confidence of Republican Framee and the nation." Reports are current that amy factories are elesing up sooner than submit to financial losses, and continual bickerings with labor, and this with a view. to bringing pressure on the country for a National Union Government. Many white- sollar" strikes have taken place as a protest against the "sit- down" strikes of labor under Commnist influence. This clearly shows that the labor situation is slowly soming to a head and a drastic change my not be far away. STRIKES IN KEY INDUSTRIES: France is again going through 8 mild dose of strikes in the avistion, metallurgical and automobile industries. This after approval of part one of the "Labor Code" who:eby Employers and Employees agreed to mi- mit their differences to arbitration prier to striking. The present strike is weakening the Ilum Government and many of his followers are openly dealaring that the "soft" methods of the Socialists 0.20 of little use in handling the working man partly imloctrinated with semi-Com- munist ideas. Investigation has shown that the present strikes are the work of a "minority" under extreme Left influences This fact has caused dissention within the renks of the Blue followers, and the hostile Senate, as well as the conservative Rndical-Socialists, are phanning an open attack on the Social Policies of the Socialists. Business se represented by the Employers Syndicate 18 showing a stiffer lip in the present dispute, claiming that labor is interested in "privileges" and not "duties". -7- CONFIDENTIAL N.A. Paris Report No.184 100- Political Forces FRANCE 103- International 1: April,198. aletions. POLITICAL STANTS - PERIOD ENDING April 18th. SPANISH SITUATION 8 On pril 6th the reongenisation of the new *Governent of National Union" ( epublica) was constituteds President and Minister of National Defense # Juan Megrin Lopes, ocialist; Minister of State $ J. . del layo, coinlist: Minister of Interior 1 P.O. Sai, Vocialist; inister of Justice : R.G. Pena, U.G.T.1 Minister of Agriculture I Vincent Bribe, Communist; B Minister of /inance 1 P.. Aspe, Left Republican; B-13 Minister of Public Norks, have Onote, Left Depublican; the FIR. Vinister of Co nunice- Artive -tions I B.O. as los doe, Union Hop.1 a Bay Minister of Labor I 14% Left Rep. and M.I.P. Ministors (without Port- Joeé Ciral, Left Rep. and (a Dir -folio) Manuel de Irujo, Becque No- -tionalist. The new Government issued a declaration statings - ire absolute decision to continue the war for the indepenience of Spain until it is freed from the presence of those who have attacked and inveded it with the most monstrous international complicity that has ever existed. - The declaration further states that the President of the Cabinet line received power to apply sanctions to "traitors more and ouwerds", not refers to the recent note addressed to Prence and Knyland on the subject of purchasing munitions in the open market. hile the various declarations recently made by the Republican Government tend to convey the impression that all is woll, and that the fighting spirit is excellent, news leak- ing through from spain initiontes that the Government is making its last stand prior to collapse. It has been confirmed from reliable sources that the @publicane intend to make France pay dearly for final vistory (see Y.No.50 of April 11th.) and the whI could woll be prolon ed for several weeks. 18 mentions E a 11692, Sec. 200 and S(D) - 00 OSD letter, May. 1972 - 1 - By SER Date MAY 1973 CONFIDENTIAL Deport No.184 100 - Political Forees PR MCK 103 - International 17 April,198. pril, Relations. AB mentioned in previous reports, should the war be lost to the Republionms, it 1a russo red that the lists contemplate the liquidation of "elass enemies" (reports indicate that none 7,000 prisoners not class hoot es are in question) as & final "purge". Frensh po.10y reg rain pnin, reg rdless of extreme left demonstrations voring intervention in one form or another, is one of "non-intervention" following: England's lend. An It linn official of the General Kleetrie Company who had recently been in /ranco pain inf ned the Noval Attnche that the penish far 00:14 very well last for several more months and who VOT, compathetic to the Frenco side. FRENCE AID to $ The /runch Foreign Minister personally handed written instructions to the French !inistors to Froges, Bucerest, Mossow read endsavoring to ascertain from these countries the position they would take in case of a German aggression against Crechoslownkin, in view of the fact that the French and British governments lind now officially defined their position. The French Foreign Finister also received the delegates from time countries end discussed the entire Central European question with them. The journal I'RPO us observes that to clarify the situation that the fore oine inc. rustions have been given $ Polani had always remained faithful to the Franco-Polish allience, that 1 t to DAY. tant she would come to Pronce's aid if Cerruary attacked her. But the question was what Poland would do were France to atto 0. Cerueny to help Csechoalovokia ? on this question Polami whould give alear answer. There was also the question as to whether Polant would permit the passage of Soviet troops over her territory. On this, the reply will probably be negative as Polani fours bolehevik influences. 10 for the Little Entents - Ingoslavia and Ru- *namia zure not 10 help Caechoslovekin except in case of an attack by Sungery. noe wanted to know what their notion would be in case of na attnek by Germany. AB for unenie the passage of Soviet troops over her territory was roleed, which was also quite unlikely. Finally, Turkey should nake known whether she would be disposed to ascure the liberty of the Straits. According to the /rench press moet of the German troops have left Austria, which excludes for the incoment the idea of a coup de foree against Caschoslovakia Prance and /nechlugs $ France, in her turn, has recognized the Ansohluss b: deciding to transform her Legation in /lenna into a Consulste-Cenaral. RELASSED if a 11652, Sec. 3(E) und (D) or (X) - - OED letur, May, & 1972 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 CONFIDENTIAL Report No.184 100 - Politionl Forces FRANCE 103 - International Relations. POLAND'S DR.AND P.R COLOMIKS 1 The Polish Foreign Minister, in a public declaration, advenced the reasone why Polami should have her share of Colonies when the distribution takes place. He stated that the increasing population of Poland, and the need for overseas commercial expansion (same reasons as advanced w Geranny) neces-itated Polend registering her don and for a share of the Colonies now under mandate by the League of Nations , For some time, as previously reported, France has been urging Polami to put in her elain for a share in the Celonial mandates; the reasons are two-felds (1) to compete with Geranny, this placing Poland in the opposition easy and closer to France - her ally I (2) Prance preferring to hand the former German Cameroens over to Poland, the preventing the Be ri in-Home arts from obtaining the strategical position across Africa from Libia to the Comeross. INTERNAL AFFAIRS 8 On 8th. April Preuier Blum's Cabinet resigned. The Senate had ro used Premier Alum power to enset, w decree, measures designed to meet finencial di ifficulties. Premier Blum's government, considered as the Front Populaire Government, was considered is step-gap Govern- went and net expected to survive for May length of time. the Pront Populaire Governments, as controlled by the Socialists and Communists. failed because, though they possessed the confid ence of the wage-earning classes, they were regurated with dislike and distrust by employers and investors, whose cooperation is essential for financial and economic resovery. While the Socialists claim that the Senate (especially Senators Lavel and Caillawx) has a personal hatred for Léon Blum, more conservative opinion is that the fristion between Blum and the Senate is due to the "Grey-haired Senators not having my confidence in Blum's Social dostrimes which are considered extreme (even though ul tra-mederm) for such a tra- ditionally conservative people as the French. French tradition is to "save pennies" and keep sway from "gredit", while the policies of the osinlists (as interpreted by the Senate) is to seise the "savings" and therefore destroy "eredit". Followers of Leon Blum staged 8 demonstration before the Sente building while Blum's fate w being desided but no disorders occurred. On April 10th. a From Populaire doman- tration was hold at Place de la Bastille protesting against the persecution of Blues by the mate. The domonstration passed off quietly. but several shouts of "Down with the Senate" ears from the erowds. DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11622 Sec. 300 and 5(1)) or (a) OSD lotter, May, SHU - 3 - MAY 21 1973 By SLR Date CONFIDENTIAL Report No.184 100 - Politionl Forees FRANCE 103 - International I April,1938. Relations. XP DALADIER GOYKREE XM2 I within 24 hours after the fall of the Blue Cabinet, Monsieur Edounrd DALADIER formed his new Cabinst. DALADIER offered the docialists a place in the Cabinet in an endeaver to form a sort of Union eabinet taking in all parties but the Sceinlists abstained, preferring to remain on the side lines. Daladier then terned towards the Center and Right and has in forming a fairly strong Cabinet. It is expected that this Cabinet will remain in power, providing nothing unforeseen turns up. until the lenste and Chamber are ripe for the formation of a National Union Govermeent The DALADIER Cobinet is as follows: President and Vinister of National Defense - Edousrd (Deputy), DALADIER Vice-Prosident end minister of Co-ordination- Camille (Senator) CHAUTHMPS National Ecunomy - Reymond PATEIOTRE (Deputy). Justice - Pul REYNAUD (Depaty), Interior - Albort SARMUT (Senstor), Foreign Aftairs - Georges BONNET (Deputy). Finance - Paul MARCHANDEAU (Deputy), Navy - Cesar CAMPINCHI (Deputy), /ir - Quy LA CHAMBRE (Deputy), Merchant Marine - Louis de CHAPPEDELAINE (Deputy), Commerce - 7. CENTIS, (Deputy), Education - Jean ZAY (Deputy), griculture - Benri QUEVILLE (Deputy) Communication - Jules JULIEN (Deputy), Public Works - L.O. FREBSAND (Deputy). Lebor - Prul REMADIER (Deputy). Public Health - Mare RUC:RT (Seputy) Fax Veterans and - CHAMPETIER de TIBES (Senstor) Pensions. Colonies - Georges MANDEL, (Deputy). .... E.O. 11657, See 3(E) and S(D) up (ii) - 4 . OSD letter, May, & 1972 By BLR Date MAY 21 1973 CONTIDENTIAL Report Mo.184 100 - Political Yoress PRANCE 103 - International 7 Relations. Premier DALADIER will present his new Govern- nent to the Chamber today. Chief points in Deladier's program are expected to be $ 1- Full powers for n. six-conth periods 2- Maintenance of the resent foreign policy: - intervention in poing 3- Tote of credit of 5,000,000,000 france for 100 mediate treasury needs; 4- steps to obtain a 15, 0.000 framslean for contimution of re-onsement regrems B- Evecuation of cooupied factories: 6- Vote of a strike law destined to put & definite end to conflicts between employers and employees; 7- Immediate deportation of undesirable foreigners. In a brondoast speech 1. the nation Premier Daladier appealed to the patriotion, And common sense, of all Pronotmen to brin the country out of the present difficulties. Pronier Deladier stated, in parts 18 hand of the government responsible for the destiny of the country, it is to all Frenchmen that I núdross myself; 1 have not cought power. Deveral months not 1 would not necept it in order to connecrate myself to Its- tional Defense: To-day, on the contr ry. I have responded without hesitetion. The I vo difficulties in the interier of the country, those which on our frontiers risk becomin even more redoutable; her I called upon you for heavy smorifices to bring our intionaldafense to the strength necessary, at present hour, you replied to ay appeal. But the National efense exceeds today the franswork of the milit ry exymulation. it 2.0 present hour, all that which concerning the life of the country, all the politionl, social, economic and financial problems or closely united to the problem of security, closely linked itealf to the enfeguarding of jenos. There 10 no longer today a series of problem; there is only une rublems the salvation of the country. It 10 n9008eary to mement -11 ite obl Cations nal all its charges." Note: Item (7) Action of Undesirable Foreignerm": this is alred at the .ussion Communists who have obt ined employ- ment in many of It noo's lending industries nd unage the Communist "cells" within the prganisation. RECLASSIFIED E. a 11652, Suc. KE) and (D) or(i) - 5 - OBD letter, May, 1972 By BLR Date MAY 2 1973 CONFIDENTIAL Heport No.184 100 - Fulitionl Forces PHANGE 105 - International IN Relations. Edous rd Deladier is considered the strong all of the hour, and is wide awake to the many problems confronting France. Naturally. like all positisisms, he has way enemies due to his connection with the ricting which took place in 1932. Delaiier, while favoring nen-interyeation in Spain as being one of the items on the Redical Socialist gram, is for a more aggressive attitude infront of the Distators. He is supposed to have opposed Prince being in the NW of England, end favors friendship with Italy and on understanding with Commany. He 18 a "realist" on the military side of the fence, and feels that the strength of treaties, friendships, etc., is commensurate with the sise of the military forees of the country. The. popularity of the Deladier government will be deter- mined when it resents its program to the Chember for approval - probably on pril 12th. In view of the voting strength of the coinlists and Communists, who have decided to support or oppose the government depending on the eircumstances, the outlook - not be considered too ascuring and Dale dier will have to walk earefully to avoid disaster. This government will have the support of the Senate, which beans a lot in France, but the spreading of industrial warest (with most workers leaning towards the opposition) could bring violent opposition from the Sccialists and Comminists. while Daladier's Ministers can be counted a to handle the Daily administrative problems cropping up, from time to time it will be no easy matter to handle the "main" elements eropping up with strikes, etc. Any "hard-boiled" taction, on the part of the Government, in handling Labor would be resented and could result in a general strike; especially of Laber would ⑉ in mich tacties the whig stick policies of Capital ush a policy would only rekindle the meldering fires of Labor due to personation of their leader Blues and place Da- Indier in a precarious position. while Daladier will certainly have the support of Capital and Hight elements (contrary to Blum), this will not be sufficient as labor, whose scoperation 10 essential, must be assured that their recent privileges under the ocial Laws are not disturbed. The vealmess of the Deladier Cabinet may. therefore, w described as due to the "narrow" Parliamentary support which exposes it to the whine of the extr ml Right and left. The Cabinet does not command a safe majority in the Chember, and nush will depend on the support easing from the ocialists. The ocialists an resentful by the way they have been treated by the Redical Senators, and my only give tolerence to the Deladier Cabinet as long as it does not violate any of the principles of Socialism Therefore, with the largest majority in the Chamber (the voinlists) in a revengeful mood and detemined to take the first opportunity to down a Indical- ocialist government, Monsieur Deladier will have to proceed slowly with his program. The continued support of the Right, and extreme light (necessary to maintain a majority) will depend on how tar Deladier CODE to appease the social decends of the Left. Convents BECLASSIMED E. a 11652 Sec. S(E) und 5(D) or (E) OSD lotter. May. 4, 1972 MAY 21 1973 - 5 - Dy, SLR Date CONFIDENTIAL Report No.184 100 - Political Forees FRANCE 103 - International I (pril, 1938. telations. do ment in the /rench prese on the new Deladier government is varied: The extrume Richt is disappointed that a National Union Government was not formed at this critical moment; the Center feels that Deladier can well propere the way for the National Union Gove ment which must eventually come; the Left is disappointed at the weakening of the Front Populaire combination and feels that Deladier will be dream towards the dight (Daladier is personally hoetile to the Pront Populaire). and my eventually make his party (the Indical- coinlists) a "Center-Right" group in the Chamber. Premier Deladier f vors immediate negotiations with Italy, and Franco Spain, with a view to promoting friendships and ironing out differences. It 1a expected that an mbnasnder to lone will be one of the first note of the Daladier Govern- ment; a reprosentative (on the British style) is expected to be sent to General Pranco's pain. These moves show the swerving own.] from the Front Populaire policies of anti- ussolini, nd anti-/ranco. BECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sen NM and (1(D) or (f) OSD letters, 8, 1972 By SLR Date MAY -9- N.N.LM ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 21,35-I C-9-0 Forward NYS copies corrigion) and all this number a - because of the limited personal is o. N. 1. and beaue of the urganing for quickly deseminating information treas slimble These copies will be distributed by o. N. L - per footause of according to main. Y From 10 June Date 38 30% 103 # 19 Serial No. File No. (Commenes DEF seties proper number Source of information such pross en January Ini) the d. N. 1. Index) Subject FRANCE (Nation reported est) Clader title - per indes sheet) (Bubtitie) Reference review, indesing, and distribution of reports by 0. N L will be greatly expedited if . brief number) of the evaluate is estand is this apace. Mention leading prographical, penusal, of political and the give of the report.) Article by General De Cugnae 1833 Report No. 302 (10 June, 1938), is trensmitted herewith. X Regal - - - - . 1. - - - - - - - Dose - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - A-B-C-D-E Mamer Arch- Director Bedget C.N.O. Own'l Va Buird Code M.L.D. No. Ord, TAB puk - C.A.R. Eng. S.S.A. M.B.S. U.S. les M.C. H.O. Tack сыс Com. Com. c.n.c. Com Com. Attached el Optimations Der. U.S. Bel. For Sea. Far. Asia 111 4a State Com- Retern to W.P. 3 FLT. - las No. Ce Lras lot all repies Das only forma as supplied by o N N.I. Make all shriches, etc., uniture in sise with this form where practical Pubmit estra repies of dipping. carbena of skatches, ase. where proctical If submit statches is suitable styles for blueprinting of photostating. , ########## PRINTING error - - FRANCE 100 Political Forces No. 302 103 International Relations 10 June, 1 38 The following article by General . Cugare is submitted as of possible interest to U.S. ejertment 0.8 as illustration of sto present feelings of . majority of the breach: The international situation of burupe 1a today dreamtic to the highest degree. 10 feel ourselves as the of on incident either fortuitous or preseddited There 10 a general feeling that price 10 secured only by a throad. "The Pincipal tapie of solverantion is the question of the uderes, the question of the minorities in Checketovakia, the unstion of the confliet. All these expressions Are instruct in defining the present tousion They n - only details. and do not at all RO to the botta of the problem that perhaps may set durops aflane. "Une can har ? it wid, 'I believe in not going to .ur with wreat over the They 570 the frience of the ovjets and 0.00 will Communist. 'Lat the - and the Checks argue it at, with their minorities, their elections, their constitution. +t is totally 1:41f event : us. : 301 the foolishned of 00:10g ourselves beshed twenty- four yours 823 for the ferbs, and we - not going to get caught n ain for the Theoks. FB *AIL who speak BO huve 10 red understanding of the problem. They have fungotion that : edove preceded Hedas by only four years. IN more " if they have over forgotion the machluss of only two nombre ngo. "The problem that 18 before митор» 10 that of the supremely of 6 nation of Central no po; it 16 that of the of creamy in the center of the continent. To conquer to ntion is no les only " occupy its ter itory; it is to ,08.000 its milways other consinications, :: 10 to its Mas, its 011, end its "not ries. I- Armany 085 x the funur will have at its disposition, besides to region rich in the munitive world of "xode, M :e), for 14bed 1a 1914-18 all the artillery and all the " ittone required by the my. *Once stater of Checkbalovekia, the ,wich will e one NOT step source its domination x$ all of acuthment props. The nost stap will to to take over Hungry with its fortie whec's fields. stenents will cure the sum of end its oil and of Suggalavia with 114 quitile and mod. Two of the ansiler nations in capable or resisting United They - only escaje areas domination by wing supported by the great powers. -ad the question that should 10 put to the Changelleries * 10 to suropeen public opinion should to formilated as follows: 11.10 you willing so accept that Decreary 8' a14 because the mater of all the peoples and of all the new matorials of Central warrings the eltic to the Block 067' "If surpose is willing to allow dursany to budane e. action of 120 to 150 : illion people, together with the resources of the center of the continent, than it slavery for the NA of the people of...... 1 y ANGE 100 olitionl /o ass No. 502 105 International 10 June 1938 Relations of Europe inmediately afternaria. It is no longer morely a question of the Sudetes, nor of minorities, nor of reces, nor of emminists. it is the question of was s.prenacy on the continent, it 1a the realization of the dreams of a it 10 the question of liberty for & rupe or of its enclovement." N.N.L.M ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT 15653-E OF ATTACHE'S REPORT C-10-m Porward PAYER exples Internal and als this sumber . - because of the limited personal in 0. N. 1. and because of the urganey for quickly deminizating information from The copies will be distributed by o. N. L as per foolsole of above according to without matter. From Y Date 13 June 1938 Serial No. 309 File No. 103, (Commento - arter (Salest proper scoler Press. - Junuary find) true d. R. Index) Source of information Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES- International Relations (Nation reported es) (Indes Utile - per Indes sheet) (Rebilite) Reference review, Indexing, and distribution of reports by 0. N. will be greatly expedited If . brief number) of the sontants la and to this spece, Mention lending prographical, personal, of political - and the - of the report.) FRENCH MOBILIZATION ORDERS READY. FOR PUBLICATION on 21 MAY Report N° 309 (103) of 13 June, 1938 is transmitted herewith. BECLASSIFIED 2. a 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) 62 (1) OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973 - - Cheek - of - - - - - - - 1 - of - - - - - - - - ABCDE Mame And Carl We tax U.S. Dester E C.M.O. MIA May, Qrd. CAR I Board / A&L Fife M.A.S. Aws. M.C. M. BLC Twich cwc Cam. Cam. chc Can Com. at - State - Return to Der. U.S. Bar. Fee. 3ra. Fax. Asia 111 Ale Can Dir. V.P. Can R.D. - Boom No. Use forms for all copies. Das only forms M supplied by o, N. 1. Make all sketches, uniform is size with this form where printical, Bubent extra mpl of dipplage, carbone of statches, etc., when practical If presticable, submit statches is sultable styles for blusprinting or photosticing ---------- PRINTING affice ! FRANCE 100 - Political Forces Report No. 309 103 - International June 13, 1938. Relations. FRENCH MOBILIZATION ORDERS READY FOR PUBLICATION on 21 MAY . Referring to the Csech-German tension, on May 21st., Deputy Etienne Flandin (former Premier) stated in & speech to the Center Political Party: "Many Frenchmen will be surprised to learn that. on 21st May the general mobilization orders were ready for signature. Less than 20 years after the armistice we were to again 800 the "White Posters' of mobilization." Premier Daladier, in a statement in the Chamber on June 9th., stated that : "France was a few weeks ago only a 'few centimeters' (meaning May 21st.) from a war. If Rumors were rife in Paris that the British Ambassador in Berlin informed the German Government that if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia the French would come to the assistance of the Czechs and that Britain would fall in line with the French. It was rumored that it was this action that stayed Hitler's hand in duplicating his Austrian experience. So much pro and con has been said and written in France about the French coming to the aid of the Czechs, in case of invasion by Germany, that it is almost impossible to state just how far the French would go if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia. The above statement by Deputy Flandin that the "mobiliza- tion orders" were ready for signature shows that the French in- tended to carry the "bluff" to the extreme limit, or else carry out their agreement with the Csechs which meant another European war. Dirabr TS 1210 B-13 (Aschini) Fee And MID Ca Dr - 1 - ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT ATTACHE'S REPORT 21555-I C-9-e Parent INTER com coriginal and als this sumber . - Incause of the limited personal is 0. N. 1. and - of the - - quickly diserminating information Inc attachés, These expire will be distributed by 0, N. I. - per of assording la - matter. From Y Date 28 June, 19.38 Serial No. 330 File No. 103. (Compane - - Chiest proper master - January Ins) Irom d. N.L. Index) Source of information Press, Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES- International Rel, (Nalks reported em) (Inder title - per Index sheet) (Pubilitie) Reference (The review, Indering, and distribution of reports by o. N.1. will be greatly expedited if a brief - of the - is mind is this space. Mention leading prographical personal, or political - and the per of the report.) PRESS EXTRACTS, POLITICAL 3 VENTS, WEEK ENDING JUIE 28th., 1938. 1939 Report N° 330 (103) of 28 June, 1938, is transmitted herewith. g. o, 11602 Ser an used (D) VT (if) OSD were New, 5, 1972 MAY 1 1973 By SLR Date - - - - is 6. N.L. Chest - of - - - - - - 1 - - el - - - - - - - - -- ABCDE F And CesT : E C.M.O. M.I.B. May OnL T.S. CAR S.&.A. M.A.S. U.S. 1 N.O. Destar 1 insu Board College F M.C. 3 Cra. at Operations Twich cmc Com. 3 Cbc State Can Return be Des, U.S. U. 5. Bet. Fee. Sea. Fer. Avia ALL Alr Can Dr. W.P. Con. P.T. - Γ 7 Use forma for all copies. Use only forms - supplied by o, N.I. Make all shotches, etc., uniform in sine with this form where practical. Bubmit estra exple of elippings, carbone of ass, when practical. If pranticable, rubait statches is suitable styles for blosprinting or photostacing. - PRINTING aprior Report N° 330 100 - Political Forces FRANCE 103 - International 28 June 1938. Relations. PRESS EXTRACTS, POLITICAL EVENTS, WEEK ENDING JUNE 28th., 1938. DECLASSFED K.O. 11617, See. 3(R) and 5(D) ⑆0 (2) SPANISH STTUATION : OSD letter, May, 1, 1973 MAY 1973 By SLR Date Premier Daladier has issued orders to practically close the Spanish frontier to the shipment of war materials. All shipments are now carefully examined by the Customs and shipments of "gune" marked "agricultural machinery" is no longer possible. This was done as a gesture to England in her endeavor to have the non-intervention committee arrive at some definite conclusion on the withdrawal of volunteers. The threat of Spanish Republicans to bomb Italian ports as being the "real" oulprits in the open town bombing in Republican Spain is not taken seriously by the press. It is stated that the French Government informed the Republicans that they must bear the drastic consequences of any rash action such as the bombing of Italian towns While the French Communist press is clamoring for help for Republican Spain, the Daladier Government is decidedly in favor of the British policy of leaving the odds in favor of General Franco and not interfering in any way that would help the Spanish Republicans . Even the section of the Socialists, under control of Léon Blum, are veering around to the point of view that liquidation of the Spanish affair by the defeat of the Republi- cans appears the logical solution of the Spanish affair. INTERNAL AFFAIRS 1 The postponed visit of the King and Queen of England, at the suggestion of President Lebrun, due to the death of the Queen's mother was played up in the press as "another" proof of the complete friendship and understanding between the two peoples. Now that Parliament has adjourned, the Government 1s profiting by the respite to complete the decree laws on the calendar. Labor is accepting certain variations in the rigid 40-hour week, in key industries, BO that & complete test may be made to prove or disapprove the many contentions regarding the economic dangers of the 40-hour law. Economic situation 18, 8.8 is always the case improving due to summer trade in tourists; hotels are all booked up for the visit of the British King and Queen. The trend in economic situation is being closely watched by the Government, and heavy government expenditures are underway in an endeavor to prime the pump for a fall pick-up. The life of the Daladier Government may well depend on the economic situation when Par- liament meets next October. If unemployment is not on the decrease Labor will certainly de and the application of the Social program whereby funds will become available for public -1- Report N° 330 100 - Political Foroes FRANCE 103 - International 28 June, 1938. Relations. public works and increase of salaries of Government employees. FRANCO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 1 The French press contained many articles on the proposed occupation of the French Indo-China island of "HaInan" by the Japanese. It can be gleaned from the press comments that while the French (for reasons of prestige) do not want the Japanese to occupy the island, the French will not use force to prevent Japanese occupation for fear of international complica- tione . The press reports that the British and French Governments have notified the Japanese that the occupation of the island of Hainan would bring such joint action as the circumstances warranted. RECLASSITED of a 11652, See 3(E) and (D) or (15 OSD letter, May, L, 1922 By SLR Date MAY 21,1970 - 2 -