State - Summary of Consular Reports Relating to Conditions in Occupied Countries, July 8, 1941

PSF State Dept. Summary of Consular Reports be conditions in Occupied Countries as of July 8, 1941 DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON August 20. 1941 My dear Mr. President: There are enclosed for your information copies of 27 reports prepared by American consular officers who returned to the United States on the S.S. West Point from various European posts describing conditions in their respective consular districts. There are also enclosed three memoranda summarizing the reports cover- ing Germany, Italy and the occupied territories respectively and a brief covering memorandum setting forth the sali- ent points in the various reports. Faithfully A yours, Enclosures: Dalhs As listed. The President, The White House. STRICTLY COMPIDENTIAL August 10, 1941 s MP. Secretary: There are attached three memorands, with their attach- sents, summarizing reports submitted by returning consuler officers from twenty-seven European poste concerning condi- tione in their respective consuler districte 00 of July 8, 1041. The three memoranda dest with conditions in Germany, occupied countries and Itely. respectively. In Gereany civilian nerale 10 reported to be slowly deteriorating Be the VEP 1s prolenged, although the morale of the militory forees and Party officials continues high. British bombing 1s becoming increesingly effective in northern and vestern Geranny. There has been no impair- ment of the health of the civilion population but food shortages are deviloping. The Gerunn people are spathetic toward the ver and are only impressed by a ruthless use of force by the enemy. The British blockade is generally effective. There 10 no reason to expect internal disturb- sneee in Germany in the near future. In occupied countries, excepting France, morale 10 high and confidence in A British victory general. German of- rigials and occupying troops are hated and civilion resistance in a variety of forms 10 wide-sprend. Underground organizations -2- organizations are developing to direct resistance to the Germens, and serious reprisals against Germans and their local puppets may be expected in the event of a German collapse Food shortages in occupied countries are be- coming increasingly severe but food shipments from the United States are not desired by the people as long as German occupation continues. Industria enterprises in occupied territories are being integrated into German economy. British broadcasts have a wide audience and an important effect in maintaining morale, but exaggerated claimes of damage caused by bombing raids arouse doubts 88 to their reliability. The hope and conviction that the United States will enter the war is general. Morale in Italy is very low and there are critical shortages of foodstuffs and raw materials. Anti-German sentiment 1s general and the possibility of American participation in the war is dreaded. It may be pointed out that the bulk of the information contained in these reports has been available previously to this Division. Ray Atherton Eu:FBstevensiofn STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL August 18, 1941 SUMMARY OF CONSULAR REPORTS CONCERNING CONDITIONS IN GERMANY AS OF JULY 8, 1941. The following summary is based on reports submitted by returning consule from Heaburg, Cologne, Stuttgart, Bremen, Leipsig, Munich, Vienna and Känigsberg, which are attached under separate cover, and on personal interviews with officers from these posts. 1. Morale. Civilian morale in Germany is reported to be slowly deteriorating due to the unexpected prolongation of the var and the increased severity of shortages in food, fuel and clothing. Public discontent appeare to be more articulate in southern Germany and Austria than in the northern region. No officer reporting from Germany, however, feels that civilian morale is approaching the breaking point or that there is any likelihood at present of any internal attempt to overthrow the Nazi regime. It is suggested that civilian morale may be further depressed by emphasizing in foreign broadcasts to Germany that the war may be prolonged indefinitely and by concentrated bombing attacks on indi- vidual German cities for several consecutive nights. The morale of the German military forces is uniformly reported to be good. The morale of government officials and Party members is also standing up well, although some doubts concerning -2- concerning Party unity have arisen since the Hess incident. 2. Bomb Damage. While the new British bombs are stated to be very effective and the percentage of unexploded bombs has been sharply reduced in recent months, most districts in Germany have experienced only intermittent bombing raids and damage has been negligible. Since April 1941, however, substantial damage from bombing has resulted at Cologne, Mannheim, Bremen and Hamburg. Kiel is reported to have been so severely damaged that the civilian population has been evacuated, but the naval base 1s still in use. Bombing raids have caused only limited interference with industrial pro- duction. Explosive bombs are believed to be more effective than incendiaries due to the efficient organization of German fire fighting squads. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. The most strategic bombing targets in the various districts are listed in the respective reports. They comprise for the most part communication facilities, shipyards, industrial plants and power plants. While daylight raids are reported to be preferable for bomb- ing strategie objectives, night raids are more useful in impairing civilian morale. 4. Health. The health of the military forces is uni- foraly reported to be good. They receive ample rations and are well cared for. There has been no serious impairment to date of the health of the civilian population and no epidemics -3- epidemics of any consequence have occurred. Supplies of medicines are adequate. Minor silments resulting from malnu- trition are beginning to appear in certain districts and there are also housing shortages in some areas. The possi- bility of a serious deterioration in civilian health during the coming winter is foreseen. The principal food shortages are in fats, milk, " potatoes and fresh fruits. 5. Current Rumors. Except for local rumors concerning various Party officials, the only spontaneous rumor which appears to have enjoyed vide currency at the time the consu- lates were closed conserned the likelihood that the United States would actively enter the war. It is pointed out that the Nazi Party frequently launches inspired rumors for propa- ganda purposes. There has been little private discussion recently of the projected invasion of England. 6. British Propaganda. Reception of B.B.C. broadcasts is reported to be good in most districts. Estimates of the number of persons listening to British broadcasts vary greatly in the different districts and are apparently dependent to some degree on the severity with which the Gestapo enforces penalties on persons apprehended listening to foreign broad- casts. British radio propaganda is reported to be inept and inefficient and to carry little weight with the German people. This 10 attributed to exaggerated claims made concerning damage caused by British bombers which can be readily disproved -4- disproved by observers in Germany and which tend to discredit the entire content of British broadcasts. A secondary factor is the failure of the British to particularize their war aims and to offer the German people any assurance that they will not suffer severely through a German defeat. It is suggested that the effect of British broadcasts might be increased if the above faults were corrected and the following innovations made: (1) Inclusion of personal information concerning German prisoners; (2) More emphasis on the United States var effort; (3) Late evening broadcasts. Leaflets dropped by planes in Germany are immediately gathered up by Party organizations such as the Hitler Jugend and have had only a very restricted circulation and no visible effect. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. Information on this subject is carefully guarded and was not accessible to American consular officers. A few statements based on observation or rumor are made in individual reports. In- dustrial production in Germany is reported to be holding up well and to have suffered little dislocation either from the British blockade or from British bombing. 8. Civilian Defense. Public and private air raid shelters have been provided in most cities but are not prov- ing satisfactory when subjected to heavy British bombing. The civilian population has been well trained to meet air raids -5- raids, and air raid precaution and fire fighting squada are well organized although their equipment is inadequate. Dis- tribution of gas masks to civilians has been limited. 9. Prestige of the Party. While in exceptional instances the prestige of the Party 10 reported to be high because of the relative success of the German war effort to date, many Party leaders are said to be unpopular and the hold of the Party over the German people is now maintained primarily because it is in a position of absolute control. Goering and Hess are stated to have been the most popular Party leaders and the flight of Ress to Great Britain has caused such speculation concerning dissension in the Party ranks. 10. Prestige of the Services. The prestige of the armed forces and particularly of the air force is very high. The public prestige of individual officers is not permitted to be exaggerated. 11. Main Sentiments or Emotions of the People. The German people as a whole are apathetic toward the war and show no enthusiass for Nasi victories. The beginnings of war weariness are noted in some districts. The principal desire of the people is for the end of the war with an honorable peace for Germany. The German attitude toward the United States varies in different districts. On the whole there is no antagonism toward -6- toward individual Americans but little respect for American policy. In some quarters the entry of the United States into the war has been taken for granted since the President's fireside chat last December and its effect has been discount- ed; the bulk of the people expect and dread it because of the memory of 1918 and the effect it will have of further pro- longing the war and enhancing the probability of German defeat. It is emphasized that only strong and ruthless measures have any effect on German public opinion. 12. Migrations of Population. Although individual Germans are not permitted to change their place of residence without official permission, there have been substantial mass movements of population since the outbreak of the war. Child- ren have been evacuated from the bombed areas of northern and western Germany to central and southern Germany and to occu- pied countries. German residents in South Tyrol have been resettled in Austria and a large number of Bessarabians of German origin have been resettled in Austria and southern Germany. Germans in eastern Germany and Posen have been transferred to the Leipzig area to make room for Germans re- patriated from the Baltic states. The civilian population of Kiel is reported to have been almost entirely evacuated. There is said to be some resentment against the returning Balts in Posen and Pomerania and against the north German evacuees in southern Germany. 13. Channels -7- 13. Channels for Obtaining Future Information. Most consular officers have no suggestions concerning channels for obtaining information from Germany and emphasize that the lives of any contacts they may have had would be placed in jeopardy through the indiscreet or inadvertent disclosure of the names of such contacts. They add orally that the secrecy of the Department's cipher codes is open to serious question. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents. Most reports contain no information under this heading. White Russian emigrés are stated to be used as Axis espionage agents in occupied territories and Jews and German-Americans in the United States. This information corroborates the evidence upon which the Department based its action in further re- stricting the admission to the United States of persons from occupied territories. 15. British Blockade. The British blockade has effec- tively prevented the importation into Germany of the bulk of supplies formerly obtained from overseas sources. The effects are apparent in the shortages of industrial raw materials and consumers' goods. Prior to the German attack on Ruesia a steady stream of supplies was received from the Far East via Siberia. Limited supplies are still received from South America via Spain and Portugal and an occasional blockade runner has been able to reach Hamburg. 16. General Comments. While opposition to the Nazi regime -8- regime is slowly mounting it has not crystallized in a forceful movement and there appears to be no reason to expect internal disturbances at any predictable date in the future. Resentment against the church policy of the govern- ment is growing and may become a rallying point for the opposition. Communist influence is reported to be spreading among the laboring classes at Vienna. There is said to be wide interest in the programs broadcast regularly by two clandestine radio stations. Eu:FBStevens:mjh:frm August 18, 1941 fuz STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL SUMMARY OF CONSULAR REPORTS CONCERNING CONDITIONS IN COUNTRIES OCCUPIED BY AXIS FORCES AS OF JULY 8, 1941 The following summary is based on reports submitted by returning Consuls from Paris, Bordeaux, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Antwerp, Luxembourg, Copenhagen, Oslo, Bergen, Belgrade, Zagreb, Athens and Salonika, which are attached under separate cover, and on personal interviews with officers from these posts. While the variety of con- ditions in the various occupied countries leads to a wide diversity of reports under most of the listed headings, the salient points are recapitulated herewith. 1. Morale. The morale of the German fighting forces is stated to be higher than that of the German occupying troops who are usually older men and increasingly concerned about the prolongation of the war and the mounting danger to their families in Germany from British bombing raids. German combat troops in Greece were depressed at the prospect of the Russian campaign. The passive resistance of the civilian population in occupied territories and their re- fusal to associate with German troops is stated to have lowered the morale of the German forees of occupation. The morale of Party officials in occupied territories re- mains high and they are still confident of German victory. Except in France where influential circles are favorable to -2- to collaboration with the Germans, the overwhelming majority of the people in the occupied territories are strongly anti- German and give vent to their sentiments through a variety of measures, ranging from social ostracism of the Germans and deliberate slow downs in industrial plants to outright acts of sabotage and violent attacks on German troops. with the exception of France, where the population is still con- fused, discouraged and apathetic, morale of the civilian population of the occupied territories is high and confi- dence in a British victory general. 2. Bomb Damage. At the date of these reports British bombing in most of the occupied countries has not been ex- tensive and the results have been insignificant. Damage from British bombing, however, is noted in the reports from Antwerp, Bordeaux, Rotterdam and Oslo, details being availa- ble in the individual reports. The desirability of in- creasing British air attacks on objectives in occupied territories is emphasized as a means of impairing the German war effort and of strengthening civilian morale. Bombing by the Germans, during military operations in the various countries, was intensive and effective. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. Vital bombing targets, in- cluding communications, German defenses, German staff head- quarters and barracks, shipyards, port installations and industrial of -3- industrial plants, are indicated in detail in the individ- ual reports. It is believed that this information is of extreme importance. 4. Health. All reports agree that the German forces of occupation are well fed and in excellent physical con- dition. There has as yet been no serious deterioration in the health of the civilian populations but the effects of undernourishment caused by food shortages are becoming ap- parent in some areas. There have not yet been serious epidemics although a mild form of influenze is reported to have been widely current last winter. Food shortages are most severe in Greese, occupied France, Belgium and Norway in the order named. The most usual food shortages are in fats, flour, dairy products, meats, potatoes, coffee and tea. Shortages of fuel and elothing are becoming increas- ingly severe. Stocks of some essential medicines are low in certain regions. Notwithstanding the sacrifices caused to the civilian populations by food shortages, many officers report that public opinion in the occupied countries is strongly op- posed to American food shipments on the grounds that such supplies would be confiscated by the Germane and would only serve to strengthen German capacity for war without benefit- ing the populations of the occupied countries. 5. Rumors. Rumors current in the different countries are Law Togness + are chiefly of local interest. The trend is apparently to exaggerate German difficulties and British successes. 6. British Propaganda. Although the Germans have forbidden the civilian populations in most occupied countries to listen to foreign broadcasts, the B.B.C. programs have a wide audience and information received from this source filters further through underground channels. British news broadcasts and special foreign language programs directed to the different occupied countries are considered reliable and are very effective in strengthening morale. It is pointed out, however, that exaggerated claims of damage caused by British bombing attacks and discrepancies between English and foreign language programs should be avoided since they tend to bring all British propaganda into disrepute in areas where the facts are known. Various suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the B.B.C. broadcasts are made, including more emphasis on cultural subjects and more details concerning the "freedom" movements in the various countries. A revision in the hours of certain broadcasts is also suggested. Details are available in the individual reports. 7. Economic and Industriel Intelligence. A consider- able amount of information dealing primarily with German troop movements and the construction of German bases, airfields oze -5- airfields and defenses is contained in the individual reports. Using different methods in various countries, the Germans have succeeded in integrating industrial enter- prises into the German economic machine. As far as possible, the Germans apparently seek to achieve this end through voluntary cooperation on the part of factory owners, but when necessary a German commissar and Gestapo agents are placed in plants to attain the desired result. In some countries there is a systematic effort on the part of the Germans to purchase financial control of certain key in- dustries. Industrial production in the occupied territories does not appear to be holding up as well as in Germany be- cause of the frequent shortage of essential raw materials and breakdowns in transportation. 8. Civilian Defense. There appears to be a marked difference in air raid shelter facilities in the various occupied countries. At Athens and Luxembourg adequate shelters had been provided by the local governments before occupation. The Germans have apparently not been active in providing shelters for the civilian population in the occupied territories although they have taken steps to provide for the safety of their own troops. Air raid pre- caution and fire fighting squads have been organized in some countries under German supervision and although apathetic in their attitude have thus far been able to cope into -6- cope successfully with damage caused by British air raids. Very few civilians in the occupied territories have gas masks. 9. Prestige of the Party. Nazi officials in occupied territories are universally hated and detested by the populations. Puppet Nazi parties which have been established in the various countries exist with German support, but they have attracted no national figures and have very small followings. They are despised by the loyal population and apparently enjoy no respect even from the Nazis. An urge for revenge against both the Germans and their local sup- porters is reported to be increasing rapidly and there is every reason to believe that the withdrawal of German forces of occupation from any occupied country will result in & reign of terror in which the population will ruthlessly avenge itself against its oppressors. 10. Prestige of the Services. Although in Western Europe the occupying troops have been on their best be- havior in an effort to gain the confidence of the civilian populations, these tacties have net with little success and the armed forces are considered only one degree less obnoxious than the hated Gestapo. The populations of the occupied countries resent the presence of German troops and are particularly bitter about the requisitioning of supplies -7- supplies for use in Germany and the general plundering of their countries for the benefit of the German military machine. 11. Main Sentiments and Emotions of the People. The desire for a German defeat and the restoration of the independence of their individual countries is almost universal in the occupied territories. While people are anxious for the war to end they are willing to undergo any sacrifices which may be necessary to prevent a German victory. Only in France does there appear to be a feeling of indifference regarding the outcome of the war. Popular sentiment toward Russia has become more favorable since the Soviet Union became involved in the war but an under- current of fear is noted in some countries that German defeat might result in the bolshevization of Europe. Some reports indicate impatience that the United States has not yet entered the war and there is apparently a general feeling of confidence that the United States will become involved sooner or later and will turn the tide against Germany. 12. Migrations of Population. Substantial transfers of population have occurred to and from the various 00- cupied territories. In most cases refugees who left their homes during military operations have returned. Substantial numbers vieds subby -8- numbers of German officials and business men have ap- peared in the various occupied territories to direct administration and take over business enterprises. Jews have moved from occupied territories to neutral countries whenever possible. Laborers have been recruited in the various countries, usually under some form of ressure, for employment in Germany. In Norway the population has been evacuated from defense zones along the western coast. Some Germans have been evacuated from bombed areas in Germany to safer places in occupied territories. There has been a mass flight of Serbs from territories occupied by the Germans and Hungarians and from Croatia where a campaign of terrorism against Serbs and Jews is in progress. 13. Channels for Obtaining Future Information. Although the names of possible contacts are given in a few reports, consuls emphasize that efforts to communicate with persons who might furnish information will place their lives in danger, and that discovery of their activities will re- sult in summary execution. Many persons who have offered their services for intelligence work are suspected of being in the pay of the Germans. It is pointed out that the British Intelligence and the exiled governments in London have established methods of communication with persons in occupied territories, and it is believed that such channels will bowLog TO unspose of -9- will prove most satisfactory in obtaining any desired information that cannot be procured directly from the American Embassy at Berlin. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents. Most reports contained no information under this heading. It is noted, however, that certain Belgians have received special espio- nage training in Germany, and it is recommended that all persons who entered the United States from Belgium during the past year be placed under surveillance. This report substantiates the Department's information which formed the basis for the restrictive measures taken against the immi- gration of persons desiring to proceed to the United States from occupied territories. The Germans are said to be dis- trustful of the Norwegians, and it is not believed that Norwegian subjects are being used for espionage work. British agents are said to be very active in occupied France and the Germans are offering large rewards for their appre- hension and capture. 15. British Blockade. While the British blookade effectively prevents the importation of goods into the occupied territories from overseas sources, coastal trade and troop movements by sea along the Norwegian and western European coasts are reported to be conducted without notice- able interference. 16. General AT -10- 16. General Comments. German policy toward the occupied territories is apparently determined largely by the role which is planned for the respective countries in the New Order which the Germans desire to establish in Europe and in a lesser degree by the circumstances under which Germany has obtained control of the different countries. In Scandinavia and in Western Europe the Germans have made a determined effort to enlist the voluntary cooperation of the peoples of the occupied territories, since they consider them to be racially akin to the Germans and as such worthy of & privileged position in the New Order. An entirely dif- ferent type of treatment is reserved for the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe since they are considered by German racial theory to be inferior peoples, and as such will be tolerated in the German New Order only if they ac- cept an inferior status and recognize German overlordship. This policy, however, has been without success both in Western and in Eastern Europe. The Germans have not been able to win the collaboration of the peoples of the occupied territories in Western Europe, and underground organizations have already been formed in several of these countries to oppose German plans and to take the leadership in more active resistance at an opportune time. In the East the strength of Russian resistance has heightened Pan-Slav sentiment -11- sentiment and has aroused fierce resistance to the concept of inferiority which the Germans are attempting to impose. All indications point to increasing difficulties for the Germans in occupied territories whenever they are obliged to weaken their garrisons. It may be noted that Denmark has been accorded more favorable treatment by the Germans because of her inability to offer armed resistance to the German occupation. This is intended by the Germans as an example to other small countries of the advantages to be derived from cooperation with German plans and accession to German demands. Eu:FBStevens:emd STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL August 18, 1941 SUMMARY OF CONSULAR REPORTS CONCERNING CONDITIONS IN ITALY AS OF JULY A, 1941 The following sunnery 1s based on reports submitted by returning consuls from Rome (Naples,) Genoa, Hilan, Venice, and Trieste, which are attached under separate oover, and on personal interviews with officials from these posts. The unanimity of opinion expressed in these reports 1s striking. 1. Korale. There is general agreement that Italian that morale is very low and It continues to deteriorate. The morale of the araed forces, notably of the army, has suffered because of look of popular support for Italian var objectives, internal dissession because of the privi- leged position granted to elite Faceist units, and the prevailing enti-Cerman sentiment. The norale of the sir force and the navy, while not as low as that of the army, has suffered because of inferior equipment and frequent defeats. The civilian population has been depressed by the consistent lack of success attending Italian military efforts, and the increasing scarcity of foodstuffs and essential commodities, the lack of interest in the var, and the fear of German domination in the event of an Axis victory. Small riots and demonstrations against the regine are reported to have occurred in Venice and Milan. While an NATURNOO 90 -2- an effective opposition has not yet appeared, the feeling against the government is 80 pronounced in the Genoa dis- triot that it is believed possible that a strong opposition movement may eventually develop in that area. It is suggested that Italiam morale might be further depressed by heavy bombings of industrial centers and communications. 2. Bomb Danage. Extensive damage to communications and industrial plants was suffered during the naval bombard- ment of Genoa in February 1941. French air raids in June 1940 and later British air raids are reported to have caused only negligible damage except at Naples, where strategic objectives are stated to have been destroyed early in July 1941. Italians are stated to have expressed surprise that British bombing to date has been so spasmodio and ineffectual. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. Vital bombing targets, including shipyards, naval bases, communications and industrial plants, are listed in the individual reports. 4. Health. Shortages of essential foods and fuel are becoming more sever, and the situation during the coming winter 1s expected to be difficult. No epidemics have occurred to date, but resistance is thought to be low and increasing tuberculosis and malnutrition among poor children are reported from Genoa. 5. Rumors. Rumors are stated to be largely anti- Fascist tenlage ont = : and as -3- Fascist and anti-German in nature. Stories concerning dissension 10 the Party and the shorteomings of Fascist leaders from Mussolini down enjoy wide circulation. There are reports of Italian troop movements through unoccupied France to Spain end of impending military action against Corsica and Nice. 6. British Propecenda. British boradoasts appear to be limited in effectiveness to the north of Italy where those having sets capable of receiving programs from Great Britain are said to listen in regularly and to spread the information received in this vay by word of mouth. Officially inspired news and propaganda from Italian sources are not believed by the people, and news from British sources is considered more reliable A secret radio station which broadeasts at irregular intervale in the Genoese dialect is said to be very popular at Genoa. It is considered that propaganda leaflets might be effectively circulated. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. While little information has been available to consular officers under this heading, industrial production is reported to have been substantially impaired through 1sek of rav materials and increasing transport difficulties. 8. Civilian defense. No systematic attempt has been made to provide air raid shelters for the civilian population although what adt th Bna Intenst -4- although improvised shelters are available in some of the larger cities. Little has been done to organize air raid precaution and fire fighting squads. Gas maske have not been distributed, although a. limited supply 1s understood to be available. 9. Practice of the Party. Since the Party 10 held responsible for the unpopular policy of collaboration with Germany and participation in the war and for the crushing defeats suffered by the Italian forces, its prestige is very low. The prestige of the Ruling House has also suf- fered because of its failure to take any determined stand against Fascist policies. 10. Prastice of the Services. The unsuccessful mill- tary campaigns have decreased the prestige of all branches of the armed forces, but primary responsibility for the situation 1s placed on the Party. The navy is reported to enjoy greater prostige than the army. 11. Main Sentiments and Emotions of the Posple, The civilain population 10 apathetic concerning the outcome of the war, feeling that Italy has nothing to gain regardless of the outcome, and war-weariness 10 wide-spresd. There is no popular feeling against the United States, and the Italian people, while dreading the possibility of American entry into the war, have been convinced by their propaganda that it will not not and and active mytal ore and -5- not occur. Anti-British feeling was artificially created and is dealining, but there is vide-spread apprehension that Russia may be one of the victorious powers. 12. Migrations of Population. Movements of population in Italy have been limited. Some Germans have been repatri- sted to Austria from South Tyrol, and a number of Italian laborers have gone to Germany to find employment. Some well-to-do families have left their urben homes for the country to avoid danger of bombardment. 13. Channels for Obaining Future Information. Reporting Officers are unable to offer any suggestions concerning channels for acquiring future information and point out the danger to which persons who night agree to furnish such information would be exposed 1f apprehended. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents. No information is offered in the reports under this heading. 15. British Blockade. The British blockade has induced a serious shortage of foodstuffs and vital raw materials for industrial purposes ordinarily obtained from overseas sources. Substitute materials have proved unstis- factory, and Italy has been unable to obtain replacements from the European continent. Loss of overseas export markets has been offset by armament production and increased European sales. Evasions of the blockade have been insignificant wor -6- insignificant, but coastal trade in the Adrintic has not been disturbed. 16. General Comments. While the church in Italy 1s reported to be discreetly opposed to the Pascist regime, the prestige of the Pope is stated to have suffered through his failure to take & stronger position against Axis aggression. Eu:FBstevens:ofn COPY:NE TRIE GRAM Rome Dated July 15, 1941 Rec'd 11:30 a.m., 16th Secretary of State, Washington. 1017, July 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE) Following from Reed. "German action in permitting the occupation of most of Greece by Italian troops aroused fury among Greek population when first announced but the brutal strip- ping of the country by German troops in the meantime changed public opinion which now welcomes the Italian administration as very much the lesser of two evils. However shortage of food in Greece is already appalling and the country is faced with wholesale starvation with- in next few months unless relief is furnished by occupy- ing countries. Shipment of canned milk recently sent by Italian Government for Greek population was seized by German military authorities who are also confiscating all meat for their troops and all other exportable foodstuffs particularly products of Greek canning in- dustry for shipment to Germany. Starvation conditions are expected to result in uprisings which may well be serious since Italian military prestige is low in Greece and Greek troops are believed to have secreted much of their military equipment when demobilized. Considerable troop movements have been noted in vicinity of Athens during past few days. These troops come from Crete which it is learned is being evacuated by German forces and turned over to Italian occupation. Well informed sources in Athens believe that after the departure of the German troops and planes Crete will be retaken by the British with aid of the Cretans most of whom are reported to be in hiding with their weapons. They feel able to deal with Italian troops and if some British aid is available the recapture of Crete by the British seems not impossible. The German troops passing through Athens understood they were due for home leave but have been informed they are bound for Russia and a considerable amount of dissat- isfaction is reported among them some having been seen weeping the night after receipt of their changed orders. In this connection D. Vogel, Secretary of the German Plenipotentiaries Office informed me in a final conversation that the present war had assumed proportions which were never expected or desired by his Government. PHILLIPS Rome Dated July 15, 1941 Rec'd 1:35 p.m., 16th Secretary of State Washington 1019, July 15, 7 p.m. This is Section Two of Embassy's 1017, July 15, 5 p.m. Considerable friction is reported between German and Italian troops in Greece and a rather heavy shooting affray occurred a few nights ago near my house in the suburb of Sychiko which was only subdued by the use of a considerable amount of Italian motorized equipment. Although no official information is available, it is understood that a number of German troops were shot. Street incidents between German and Italian officers are frequently reported. Although most of Greece with the exception of Macedonia was turned over to Italian occupation by the Germans on June 25, the Germans had already sent capable men in various financial and industrial lines to Greece to reorganize the principal financial and industrial enterprises and acquire control- ling interests in them. These persons are bringing their families and assistants to Athens and a considerable number of other Germans are also bringing their families to Greece to avoid the increasing British bombardment of Germany. The demand for housing accommodation by the Germans in Athens is so strong that I have even had considerable dif- ficulty in preserving my own residence. The Greeks are simply told by the Germans that they must give up their houses although rent is paid in new German credit marks printed for use in Greece. In spite of the ostensible administration of Greece by the Italian authorities, the German plenipotentiary's office still retains control of supplies of food and gasoline for the diplomatic corps. It was recently reported that the occupying powers proposed to allow the establishment of a Greek Foreign Office as a suboffice of the new Greek Prime Minister in Athens but this idea seems to have been given up. Charles House, temporarily representative of the American Red Cross in Greece, has visited the British military hospital in Piraeus and reports that the Germans, who are still in charge of this hospital, have fully complied with the terms of the Geneva Convention and that British wounded there, who number over two thousand, have been treated with consideration. It is planned to send them to Austria as their recovery permits. Mr. House spoke personally to the British medical officer in charge of the hospital." PHILLIPS No. - August 9, 1941 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Conditions in the District of Hamburg, Germany. The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington. Sir: I have the honor, in compliance with your instruction dated August 1, 1941, and in collaboration with the sub- ordinate officers at my recently closed office, to submit the following report on conditions in the district of Ham- burg, Germany, immediately prior to our departure therefrom on July 9, 1941: 1. Morale AS to local military, naval, official and citizen morale, -2- morale, while this previously had been generally high coupled with complete confidence in final victory in the existing war, there is now a considerable lessening of that morale, particularly on the part of the general citizenry, because of Germany's inability to achieve the same rapid and decisive results in the Russian campaign that had characterized the earlier invasions of France and other European countries. The factor causing most impairment of the morale of the defense forces 1s the prospect of & longer war than the one originally planned. For example, it was extremely discouraging to medical officers and internes serving in military hospitals in Hamburg in June, 1941, to be advised by the German authorittes that they must be prepared to serve their country for a total period of five years. It is also probable that some men serving in the naval and military fighting units are equally depressed. This time factor also operates upon citizen morale. One of the com- mon complaints in Hamburg is that while the German defense forces reportedly have plenty to eat, members of the oivilian population are living on scant rations even though they are required in some cases to work longer hours than in peace time. The shortage of clothing is another ground for complaint but this factor causes less grumbling than the food situation. In Hamburg, where air raids are fre- quent, complaints have arisen because the civilians are required to spend many nights in air raid shelters with many persons having air raid protection duties to perform, with the resulting unfitness for work during the day-time periods. -3- periods. The most serious complaints, however, arise from deaths or wounds at the front experienced by sons, husbands and sweethearts of the civil population. Means for lowering morale in the Hamburg area should include: (a) Foreign radio and other propaganda to the effect that the war will be prolonged with a consequent intensification of all the complaint factors listed above. (b) Heavier bombing of Hamburg for six nights in succession, and the same treatment of other large German cities, one city after the other. 2. Bomb Damage while bomb damage has been extensive in the Hamburg district, particularly at the naval base at Kiel which even Germans admit to have been ruined, the destructive work in Hamburg has not always been so great as British propagandists have claimed. The most effective British raids on Hamburg occurred during the nights of May 8/9, 9/10, and 11/12, 1941, when the new type of bomb (four times as powerful as the old) was dropped each of these nights by a total of from seventy to ninety planes bombarding all sections of Hamburg, apparently indis- criminately, with a loss of from five to twelve British planes per night. Occurring almost three nights in suo- oession, fresh destruction was caused before the ruins of the previous nights could be cleared away or fires extinguished. At that time it was felt that if such raids could have continued in the same manner for six nights in succession none of the citizenry could have remained in Hamburg any longer. During those three raids the shipyard of Blohm und Voss was so badly damaged that the laborers could not return to work until three days thereafter. After May 12, 1941, the British air raids on -4- on Hamburg apparently were made by small forces concentra- ting on the Hamburg shipyards and airfields. while pri- vate dwellings near these objectives were also hit, the rest of Hamburg did not appear to suffer much damage. It is difficult to estimate the present percentage of unexploded bombs in the Hamburg area, but this is said to be small. In 1940 bombs rather often failed to explode but during the past eight or ten months it has only occasionally been learned that a bomb did not explode. Explosive bombs have caused more damage than incendiary bombs in Hamburg although the latter have started a con- siderable number of fires. The air raid protection ser- vices, however, are very efficiently organized in Hamburg and the greater part of the fire bombs are extinguished before they can cause much damage. The new bombs used by the British since last April have moreeexplosive power and have caused wider demolition than those previously exployed. 3. Vital Hombing Targets The time when bombing would be most accurate would be during the day to enable better aim at military and transportation objectives. On the other hand, night bombing is more damaging to the morale of the population as it keeps persons awake in often poorly ventilated and cold air raid shelters thus rendering them unfit for pro- per work the next day on account of loss of sleep and in- pairing their health with colds and other illnesses caught in the cellars. The vital bombing targets in Hamburg may be said to be -5- be the shipyards, airplane and submarine plants in the free harbor as well as the power plants, railroads and railroad stations. 4. Health From personal observation and information received from others the German soldiers and sailors appear to be in a reasonably good state of health. They are tanned, clear-eyed and full of life. They are said to receive plenty of wholesome food. All are vaccinated against con- tageous diseases, and much attention is given to the so- called "typhus" group. Food deficiencies have not yet had any far reaching effect on the civilian population, but such deficiencies are now beginning to have visible results and in the long run will constitute an ever increasing factor in under- mining the health and morale of the citizenry. Loss of weight and malnutrition, which are often mentioned and are even observable, as well as constant complaints about food deficiencies and dietary inadequacy, tend to corro- borate the above conclusions. Plenty of medicines are now available for both the defense forces and the civilian population. However, shortages of fats, meat, and of fuel and clothing during the winter months, have tended to impair the health of the civilian population. 6. British Propaganda while British radio propaganda undoubtedly has some effect on the population, especially when the broadoast includes a program giving the names of German prisoners taken -6- taken by the British, the results are reduced by the fact that Germans are forbidden to listen to foreign news and are subject to heavy fines and imprisonment if caught. This prohibition prevents most listeners from disoussing the radio news with friends. any of whom might inform the authorities as a patriotic duty. Just how many Germans listen to the British radio broadcasts, is difficult to estimate, but there is reason to believe that a consider- able proportion of the population is doing so secretly. The reception in Hamburg has proved good from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and also in the evening except when artifi- cial disturbances arranged by the German authorities affect reception. Regarding means for improvement in the dissemination of the radio propaganda, the following suggestions are made: (a) The announcements of the names of German prisoners taken should be supplemented with data regarding their health and other personal items which would be welcome news for their relatives in Germany and would cause the latter to listen to the propaganda more often, (b) More emphasis should be given to the activi- ties of the United States in giving aid to Great Britain toward winning the war, as all Germans are greatly interested in what the United States is doing and certainly do not want the United States to enter the war actively. (o) Late night British broadcasts might be ad- visable at the present time to counteract Ger- many's propaganda concerning the Russian cam- paign. Many Germans will be secretly listening in now when the German military machine is ob- viously not making progress "according to plan". Most Germans have simply long and medium wave radio sets capable of receiving British Broad- casting Corporation programs only late at night. The use of propaganda means other than radio is difficult in Germany in view of the total State control of all activities and the vigilance of the Secret State Police -7- Police overywhere. Leaflets and other propaganda matter have been dropped by the British Royal Air Force but very little of it reaches private hands as the authorities are always on the lookout and it would be dangerous for any individuals to spread such propaganda. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence Not in a position to furnish useful information or constructive comment under this heading. 8. Civilian Defense The civilian defense in Hamburg, while still open to improvement, may be considered efficient. Public air raid shelters and water reservoirs have been constructed through- out the city. Air raid squade have been trained and as- signed specific duties throughout the city and each build- ing has its own crew of persons dwelling or working therein. Crews are on the roofs of buildings watching for incendiary bombs which usually are extinguished with sand before they have time to do any great damage, although bad fires, nevertheless, have been experienced from time to time. Other groups are charged with the duty of getting every- body into the air raid shelters. Buckets of water and paper bage full of sand are placed in all houses and apart- ments for quick use in extinguishing fires. Many persons are trained in first aid activities. It is compulsory for civilians to remain in air raid shelters from the beginning to the end of air raids, and it is estimated that about 90 to 95 percent of the population in Hamburg go to the shel- ters as soon as the alarms are sounded. Strange though it may seem, there is scaroely a civilian in Hamburg who is equipped -8- equipped with a gas mask. Gas masks comprise a part of the regular equipment of soldiers and sailors, but no gas maske are now obtainable in Hamburg for private indi- viduals. This may be due to scarcity of raw materials and acute shortage of labor for the production of gas masks. 9. Prestige of Party and Individual Party Members Not in a position to furnish useful information or constructive comment under this heading. 10. Prestige of Services and Popularity of Individual Officers The air service of the German defense forces enjoys the most favorable position and is accorded treatment and privileges hot granted to the other branches. It is con- sidered a special honor to serve in the air force, and only the best qualified applicants are accepted. A dive-bomber pilot is said to receive Reichsmarks 3000.00 ($1200.00 at $1.00 equals Reichsmarks 2.50) per month after attaining a prescribed standard of efficiency. Generally speaking all other defense forces are popular because nearly every family has a son in one or the other. The officers come mostly from the better class families and usually say they are not National Socialists but are solely concerned with defending their country from political or economic on- circlement by jealous nations. Apologists for officers in the defense forces say the latter are compelled to fight for Hitler because of the oath all officers must take to the person of the Fuehrer and pressure from the Secret State Police to force officers to fulfill that oath. If -9- If the above statements are true, it would follow that the vulnerability of the average officer could be reached by: (a) Appeals to his manhood, sense of honor, justice, gentlemanlyness,, with a view to freeing him from remaining a tool of a group of rascals who are making a fool of him simply to keep themselves in power; (b) Propaganda designed to bring him to the realization that the regime of Adolf Hitler could never have remained in power except through a war-time economy and war-time military measures actually introduced shortly after the advent to power of the National Socialist Party; (o) Intimations that the Fatherland has been brought into disrepute by the National Socialist Party and its propaganda designed primarily to deceive the German people themselves. 11. Main Sentiments or Emotions of People So far as it has been possible to ascertain in Hamburg the war is anything but popular in Germany and most Hamburgers (except National Socialist Party members and those dependent on the Party for their livelihood) openly express their earnest hope that the war will soon be ended. Thus far, most citizens have appeared to be certain of Germany's winning the war; they were somewhat bewildered when Germany attacked its ally Russia and were at a loss to understand what was going on; however, they now trust that Germany will somehow eventually be vio- torious in the Russian war, even though it may be a long one. Regarding the United States, the general opinion in Hamburg in the past appeared to be that our country would not take an active part in the war and that American help to England had come too late. When the writer left Ger- many on July 9, 1941, however, doubts had arisen as to whether -10- whether the United States could be relied upon to avoid actively entering the war on the side of Great Britain; and this possibility was viewed with monsiderable appre- hension by the population, particularly in the light of the anti-American propaganda launched by the German controlled press. 12. Migrations of Population There has been no large soale migration from the Hamburg consular district except in the cases of ohil- dren evacuated from the City of Hamburg and other mem- bers of families who have been financially able to move to localities less exposed to air raids. Most of the civil polulation of the naval base of Kiel (about 80,000) however, is said to have left that town because of the destruction of its dwellings. The evacuation from Kiel was undertaken by reason of necessity and was also ordered by the German authorities who, likewise, or- dered the evacuation of children from the City of Ham- burg. 13. Channels for Obtaining Future Information Not in position to furnish useful information or constructive comment under this heading. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents In connection with the abduction by the German Secret State Police of the two dual citizenship children of Ameri- can Clerk Mrs. Aurora Ritter (formerly at Hamburg) while we were waiting the special consular train at Frankfort, Ger- many, in July, 1941, it came to my attention that her divorced husband, Major Ritter, was alleged by her to have been -11- been an officer in the Secret Service of the German Air Force. He visited the United States in 1936 or 1937, cultivated German Americans working in American airplane factories, visited such factories, and made sketches therein. Following his visit to America, he acted in a similar secret capacity in various European countries and later in Africa though his exact stations in the various countries could not be determined by his wife. His full christian names are not remembered but are possibly "Klaus Haviland". During July, 1941, he was being treated in a military hospital in Berlin, having returned from Africa slightly wounded. In foreign countries he could probably pass as either an Englishman or an American and would have no difficulty in obtaining from the Germane either American or British bogus passports. His correct full name and such other specific data as could be ob- tained from his divorced wife were supplied to the Berlin American Embassy's representative at Frankfort. 15. British Blockade From the scarcity of food in Hamburg it would appear that the British blockade has been successful in keeping overseas food supplies from reaching the city and, indeed, practically all commodities. After the occupation of Den- mark, Holland and Belgium, considerable quantities of food were obtained by Germany from these countries, although these supplies are gradually decreasing due to the aoute shortage of fodder kept out by the British blockade. Small unimpor- tant quantities of bananas and dates arrived at Hamburg from Tunis and the Camaroons in May and June, 1941, and occasion- ally, perhaps two or three times during the war, German overseas -18- overseas vessels have succeeded in running the British blockade and arriving at Hamburg. 16. Further Remarks In connection with supplies, it should be mentioned that the Netherlands have for all practical purposes be- come a province of Germany since the recent abolition of customs tax formalities between Germany and Holland and the adoption of the German Reichamark in Holland as a medium of payment. German-Dutch oustoms duties were abolished in May, 1941, and after that time a business transaction between Amsterdam and Hamburg, for example, was performed in the same manner as a deal between Ham- burg and Berlin by payment in Reichemarks instead of by the "clearing account" method. Respectfully yours, Alfred R. Thomson Late American Consul General at Hamburg ART:EEM:AW/rw DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation DATE: August 15, 1941. SUBJECT: Conditions in the Hamburg District PARTICIPANTS: Consul General AlfredR. Thomson (Formerly at Hamburg and Dresden) Mr. Stevens, Eu COPIES TO: ... 1-1498 Mr. Thomson emphasized the danger caused by the British night air attacks between May 8 and 12, 1941 and stated that repeated attacks on successive nights were particularly useful in destroying civilian morale. He said that although Kiel had been 80 severely damaged that the civilian population had been evacuated, the naval base was still in use. Local communications in Hamburg were damaged during the raids but rail communications with other parts of Germany were apparently not seriously impaired, although train service has been drastically curtailed and it 10 necessary to make reservations well in advance if one desires to travel. Gasoline is very scarce at Hamburg and cannot be obtained by civilians. It -2- It is rationed to the military and Party officials and to foreign consuls in charge. Mr. Thomson stated that there was about 35 foreign career consuls at Hamburg at the time of his de- parture. Most of the South American countries are repre- sented and appear on the whole to be favorably disposed toward the British cause. An exception is the Colombian consul who is pro-German. On the whole the population at Hamburg is much more cosmopolitan and less pro-Nazi than at Dresden, Mr. Thom- son's previous post. He stated that there had been a heavy influx of population into Dresden from other parts of Germany since Dresden is considered to be relatively safe. The textile industry in the Dresden district is relatively active in 80 far as the necessary raw materials are available. Military and export goods receive priority. Uniforms are confiseated from the armed forces of occupied countries and are sent to Germany to be utilized for the German army. Mr. Thomson stated that to his knowledge the Consulate General at Hamburg had never been requested by the Embassy at Berlin to purchase basic documents concerning the or- ganization and activities of the Party. Eu:FBStevens:mjh Cologne, Germany August 5, 1941 REPORT ON COLOGNE. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's strictly confidential instruction of August 1, 1941 directing no to prepare a report on con- ditions in the Cologne consular district. I vas stationed in Cologne for almost six years. The district is perhaps the most important industrial area of Germany, and borders on Holland, Belgium, Luxes- bourg and France. I was also stationed on two previous assignments and for a period of seven years in Berlin, so that, with an assignment of two years in Vienna, I have spent a total of 15 years in the German-speaking part of Europe. My contacts in the Rhineland were largely with the industrialists, including Herr Krupp and Herr Thyssen and, through my membership in the Industrie Klub of Dusseldorf, I learned to know practically every leading industrialist. The views expressed is this report are based on ay personal observations and my direct contacts. Comments -2- Comments 1. Morale. The present state of military morale 10 excellent. As Cologne is an inland city I have no knowledge of navel morale, except by hearsay. Relatives of men in the naval forces show considerably more anxiety respecting the safety of those in the navy, especially of those in sub- marine units, than is shown respecting members of the army. Official morale is also very good but not quite as high as military morale. Official morale is less good because of the distribution of officials over an ever- growing area of Europe, 80 that the home offices are weakened, greatly over-worked, and considerably dependent upon new and untrained personnel. Citizen morale of the Rhineland, especially of Cologne, is low and, I suppose, the lowest in Germany, due to the successful and continuous British bombing beginning about April 1, 1941. Further concentrated bombing of populous areas, but on a larger scale, will further lower the morale. There were no current common complaints other than the aforestated. 2. Romb Damage. From May 10, 1940 until July 8, 1941, the time of my departure, Cologne had a total of 243 night alarms. Since the first of May 1941 the raids averaged approximately six nights a week. In the district the greatest damage was inflicted upon the Cologne area, then, in the order named, upon Aix-la-Chapelle, Nuenster, Dortsumi, and Duesseldorf. :- Duesseldorf. There were about six daytime raids but these caused very little damage. In general, damage before April 1, 1941 was very slight. After the introduction of the new and heavy British bombs, up to 500 pounds in weight, the damage was real. There has been, however, very little damage inflicted upon industry. The percentage of unexploded bombs before April 1, 1941 was very high--about 50 percent. Since the new bombs have been put into use this percentage has de- creased greatly, perhaps to as low as 10 percent of the total. Incendiary bombe have also caused a measurable amount of damage. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. Until May 1, 1941, the principal targets selected by the British were industrial plants. Some were attacked as often as a hundred times, as, for instance, the huge I. 6. Farben plant at Leverkusen, near Cologne. About 25 bombs hit the plant but the total damage, up to July 8, 1941, the day of my departure, was not more than one percent. I as unable to visualize any real danger to German industry by British air attack until bombing capacity is increased a great many times, at least ten times the present capacity. Until this happens, the only effect is from so-called "area" bombing of cities, and then in consentrated attacks. To attack 50 cities once does not have a fraction of the effect on the Rhine- land population as a whole as do 50 attacks in succession on one city. Bombing of communications and transportation is 18 very important, but, 80 far, has been very ineffee- tual. In 80 far as the effect on morale, and the diale- cation of local transportation and industry are con- cerned, the best time for bombing 10 after widnight and especially the last hours before dawn. Most of the severe raids on Cologne have been on Saturday nights, giving the people a chance to rest on Sunday. This 18 a mistake. Sunday night raids followed immediately by several more in the succeeding days would be the best timing. Cologne 1s severely damaged. The total loss of life is about 5,000. The number of buildings--sostly houses--destroyed is about 800-1,000. The destruction of historical buildings and seemingly indiscriminate bombing has lowered morale as such as has the loss of life. The destruction of the famous Cathedral would take the heart out of the people, considerably increase their respect for the English, and measurably lower German faith in an ultimate victory. In other words, only ruthless warfare has any effect. The total effect on the morale of Colegne since it has been bombed is definite and measurably very large. But only about 5,000,000 people of the Rhineland are thus affected. The rest are not touched and are not affected in any direct way. The reason that the Rhinelanders were not prepared to take this punishment was that they were convinced that no British planes would reach them. 4. Health. The health of the population in general, and especially that of the army, is amazingly good. There have 78 -5- have been no epidemics of consequence, except for an unusual amount of skin disorders. There 16 no deficiency of medicines, nor food, except fats. But there 16 not a serious shortage of fats. Clothing is adequate but there is beginning to be a definite shortage of shoes, and a serious shortage in this article is expected by 1942. While there was a shortage of fuel in other parts of Germany there was none in the Rhineland. There is beginning to be a shortage of housing facilities in Cologne. Many engaged couples are deferring their marriage because of their inability to find an empty flat or house. There 18 also a real fear of a shortage of food as the people realize that the rest of Europe has been stripped bare. 5. Current Rumors. a. Japan and the United States will enter into a state of war at an early date; which development will have the effect of weakening Great Britain. b. Stalin will capitulate and a Russian "Marshall Petain" will sign a treaty of peace with Germany. e. The British Isles will surrender by the spring of 1942. d. The United States will enter the war and then Germany's chances of vinning the war will be greatly impaired. e. The United States will at the last minute swing back to isolationism. Rumors a., b., e. and e., are officially inspired, whereas d. is spontaneous. 6. British 10 HUDN peas -6- 6. British Propaganda. Direct British propaganda, by radio and leaflets, 18 very inefficient, the number of listeners is almost nil. I believe that in Cologne, a city of 800,000, not more than 50 people listen to the broadoasts. The danger of discovery is very great and the penalty is a severe one. As the individual German is a coward, few people take the chance of listening in on a foreign broadeast. The terror, fostered by the Gestapo, is incredibly efficient. The system of denunciation has been developed to perfection. The quality of reception of British broadcasts was satisfactory. There is no means of improving dissemina- tion by radio. Leaflet distribution can be increased very much. Only the speeches of Churchill have a chance of wide dissemination by radio. I believe, however, that there is a great opportunity for effective propaganda. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. German economic and infustrial intelligence 18 amazingly well organized and efficient. The central authorities have the case history of each unit of produc- tion, beginning with the paw products to the finished commodity. A keg of mails, for instance, can be traced instantly from the iron ore mine to the structure in which the nails finally disappeared. I as not competent to discuss the military and navel activities, but I know something of the air activities intelligence service. The Colegne air activities office employe about 2,000 men and women in 8 hour shifts, collecting, analyzing and utilizing -7- utilizing information regarding all air activities in the Cologne area. From the time a British plane reaches Belgium its course 18 charted until it leaves the continent. Generally its arrival at the Belgian coast is reported in Cologne 45 minutes before it reaches the Cologne area. I as not able, for lack of information, to discuss the rest of the questions under section 7. 8. Civilian Defense. There 1e very little civilian defense of a military character. Fire fighting, too, 1s not well organized and 10 not established on a large scale. During the two main attacks with incondiary bombs, the Cologne fire- fighting forces failed to function efficiently. In proportion to an American city of the same size the fire department of Cologne 10 amazingly small. This 18 due to the fact that ordinary dwellings, as well as factories and public buildings, are vastly more fireproof than those of the average American city. The number of fires in Cologne in a year are only a small fraction of the number in an American city of comparable sise. Because of this fact the fire-fighting equipment of Cologne 10 largely inadequate under air raid conditions. In fact, during an air raid, the fire stations do not enswer any calls. They are on duty only at important locations. Fires in the residential sections are dealt with exclusively by civilien wardens, but without any regular equipment. The air raid shelters built prior to 1941, too, are not standing up antisfactorily under the new large British bombs. -8- bombs. New and better shelters are now in progress of construction. Civilian defense against incendiary bombs was totally ineffectual during the first large attack on March 1, 1941. Since then there has been an improvement. All civilians are provided with gas masks and at low cost. Only persons in the upper tax groups pay full price for the masks. The masks have to be replaced annually, and are effective only for a limited number of hours of use. Civilian training in the use of gas masks and in gas protection 18 very thorough, and includes every person. I do not know of any means of impairing civilian defense. 9. Prestige of Party and Popularity of Individual Party Members. The prestige of the party is very high, not because of high regard but because of respect, due to the party's achievemente and because of the average German's respect for the use of ruthless force. The popularity of the leading party members, however, 18 low-due to their newly-asquired prosperity, their standard of living, and their power to ruin any person. The vulnerability of the party and of the leaders lies in exposing the leaders' standard of living, the security of their positions, and in exposing the fact that they have assumed many privileges of high office for which they had denounced their prede- cessore. 10. Prestige of Services and Popularity of Individual Officers. The army enjoys an unlimited and an unprecedented prestige in the country, but very fev military officers enjoy -2- enjoy an outstanding prestige. The instant an officer acquires prestige, the publicity concerning his is throttled at once. Even letters of congratulation do not reach him. 11. Main Sentimente or Emotions of People. Outside of the immediate bombed area in the Rhine- land, comprizing at the most a population of 5 million people, there is little evidence of way weariness. There was a short-lived touch of war weariness in the spring when Hitler in a speech hinted at the continuation of the war in 1942. While there 1e a friendly feeling toward individual Americans, there is only a little respect for the United States as a nation. Nevertheless, there is a real fear that the United States will enter the war. The first evidence of respect for the United States was when it was positively known that the United States re- fused to feed the Belgians. Instances which increased such respect included the exchange of the 50 cruisers for bases, the Lend-Lease Act and lately, among others, the announced occupation of Iceland. The closing of the German Consulates in the United States, which latter action compelled the Germans, such against their own desires, to close our Consulates in Germany, had not only a bad effect on German morale but a decided effect on their newly-soquired respect for the United States. Only definitely hard measures by the United States are regarded with respect. The hatred of Russia was not sufficient in any degree to justify the invasion of Russia. The people did not -10- not need to be told that the cause of the war against Russia was the urgent need of obtaining grain for the German granaries, which would be empty by the summer of 1942, and the need for 011. The war with Rusaia 18 accepted and supported because it 1s regarded as a military necessity to vin the war against Great Britain. 12. Migrations of Population. In the Rhineland area, a total of about 500,000 have migrated inland due solely to the air raids. Most of these people came from Cologne, Duesseldorf, A1x-1a- Chapelle, Dortmund, Essen and other cities of the Ruhr. About 100,000 children were ordered out of this district by the authorities long before the bombing was serious. The rest of the evacuées left on their own volition in the spring of this year, when the heavy bombing started. Easily one half of the population of Cologne, a city of 800,000, would leave if it were legally possible to do 80. It 18 against the law to leave one's place of on- ployment, and the penalty for doing 80 is very severe. 13. Channels for Obtaining Future Information. I have no channels of obtaining future information, except through two of my foreign consular colleagues who remained in Cologne, and particularly through the Vatioan, nor do I know how to develop contacts at this distance. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents. Among the Axis espionage agents in allied territories are nov the white Russian emigrès. The Germans transported one -11- one batch of about 1,000 White Russians in number from France to Germany for intensive training. They passed through Cologne and I was able personally to verify the report. The Jews are being trained, especially those who have families left in Germany; likewise German- Americans in the United States who own property in Germany or who expect to inherit property in Germany, or who have close relatives there, are all potential candi- dates. Likewise many "Aryanized" Jews who are wealthy have been called into the service of the Gestapo. But the biggnst drive at present is among the French, Belgian and Dutch in the occupied areas. These are the most dangerous ones today. 15. British Blockade. The British blookade of Germany, judged from an industrial point of view, 10 very effective. German 1m- porte from the United States, South America and elsewhere are practically negligible, especially since the loophole in Russia has been closed. Exports have continued, how- ever, in one form or another, up to the present. Most of the legal exports to the United States during the last year were shipments of expensive medicines, drugs, fine implements, et cetera. They were sent by air mail. Other shipments were made via Russia and Japan. My Brazilian colleague in Cologne informed me that there were unusual amounts of goods shipped from Germany, via Spain and Portugal to Brasil. 16. General Comments. Industrial production in general is not curtailed in -12- in any measurable degree by the British bombing. Not a single plant of size or importance in the Rhineland has been crippled. Reserves of war supplies, however, show signs of the initial stage of depletion--due to the blockade--and not to the bombing. There 18 a huge supply on hand of anti-airoraft guns with a range up to 1,000 feet, a sufficient supply of gune with a range up to 6,000 feet, but definitely a marked shortage of guns with a range up to 10,000 feet. Aix-la-Chapelle, for instance, was heavily damaged in one night because of an insufficient number of long-range guns. The Russian campaign has thinned out the anti-airoraft defenses. There is a noticeable shortage of oil and gasoline, leather, iron-even ordinary nails are available only upon requisition--and food reserves needed for 1942. In 80 far as the war 1s concerned there is no differ- ence between Nari-Germans and anti-Maxi Germans, or 80- called moderate Germans. To attempt to make a distinction between these two groups 18, in my opinion, utterly futile. There are quite a number of Germans who do not want Witler to vin the war and to establish a Hitlerian peace, but for all practical purposes there are no Germans who favor an out and out military defeat of Germany. Although Vice Consul J. Kittredge Vinson was stationed in Cologne for only five weeks, having been in Berlin the previous year and one-half, he was asked to collaborate with me in the preparation of this report and the views expressed -13- expressed in it represent our composite views and observations. Respectfully submitted, Alfred V. Klieforth American Consul General AWE:MLM:38 8/5 August 8, 1941. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Conditions in the Stuttgart consular district at the Time of Closing the Stuttgart Consulate. The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department's strictly confidential instruction of August 1, 1941, and respectfully to set forth below my views upon the conditions prevailing in the Stuttgart consular district when the Consulate at Stuttgart was closed last month. 1. Morale. Civilian morale in the Stuttgart district dropped to its lowest level several weeks before our departure from Germany. Up until then, the Schwabians had been better off in nearly every respect than the people living in other parts of the country. Until the raid on Mannheim early in May, there had been no important bombings in the district for over a year and very few alerts. There had been more coal, potatoes, oranges, lemons, and apples, and last winter it was possible for the better classes to obtain the variations of grass that passed for salad. The climate in Southwestern Germany is more moderate, the general surroundings more pleasant, and because of truck -2- truck farming in or near the larger cities, the people are accustomed to ample supplies of fruits and vegetables in season. In the beginning of spring, vegetables, fruits, and berries were seen in the market halls at customary early season prices. However, just at the time when these foodstuffs should have become available for the lower income brackets, they disappeared completely from market shelves. The people at first attributed this shortage to the unprecedented cold and wet spring but, shortly before our departure, information was rapidly spreading that supplies ordinarily destined for consumption in Wurtemmberg were being shipped to the bombed areas and to Northern Germany. The market people complained bitterly to their customers and were inconsed that even potatoes wore diverted to other channels. This situation naturally brought a realization to the phlegmatic Schwabians that they would feel the effects of the war increasingly and made them wonder for the first time what "next winter" would be like. During past years, the morale of the Schwabians was affected most by personal interests and declined as these interests were encroached upon. The food issue was the vital one before our departure, but clothing shortages, excessive taxes, and unaccustomed hard labor, particularly for women, were becoming equal strains on weary nerves. Official morale first showed signs of uneasiness after the flight of Rudolf Hess. However, as long as a year ago, third-hand reports came to me that Dr. Hjalmar Schacht had predicted a breakdown in the economic system and antentined P. I no 20 Flank terms g : -3- and overthrow of the Party during the fall of 1941. He allegedly twice since repeated his prediction and this would seem to confirm the existence of an underground movement. While there is evidence that men in high posi- tions would welcome a change, I am unable to believe that this group could even get started before being liquidated themselves. This belief is supported by the recent drive in Southwestern Germany to eliminate by one method or another anyone who night possibly become prominent in a now movement. 2. Bomb Damage. The only damage by bombs in the Stuttgart consular district of any importance was that caused by a con- centrated British raid over Mannheim on a Friday/Saturday night early in May 1941. According to reliable sources, the tank factory of Daimler-Benz, which employed over 5000 workmen, and the Heinrich Lanz machine tool factory were so badly damaged that half of the workmen in each factory could not be reemployed at their old jobs for a period of three to six months. In addition, a flour mill in Ludwigshafen across the Rhine from Mannheim with a storage capacity of over 10,000 tons was reported to have been completely destroyed, and one of the larger research laboratories of the I.G. Farbenindustrie in the same city was likewise gutted. In the raid on Mannheim, the estimated death toll WAS placed between 800 and 1000. The now bombs used by the British in this raid were supposed to have had immense destructive power, demolishing whole sections of blocks. Few *IJORe bas -4- Few duds were found among these bombs, and incendiaries following the explosives caused great fires which burned several hours. Reports indicated that the destruction of over 50 water mains rendered the water facilities useless and additional chemical sprays had to be brought from nearby towns to quench the fires. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. Kannheim as Southwest Germany's most important rail center with excellent port facilities and connections to all ports along the whole Rhine river, together with its comparative importance as a source of machine tools, is the most vital target for bombing purposes in the Stuttgart consular district. Next in importance, but no where near that of Mannheim, is the city of Stuttgart which is the largest city in Southwest Germany and the capital of Wurttemmberg. The principal objectives here are the railway system which serves a large area, the Robert Bosch plant (principal producer of vital electri- cal equipment for airplanes, trucks, tanks, automobiles, et cetera), and the Daimler-Benz factory which manu- factures heavy trucks, armored cars, airplane engines, and other essential war materials. In view of the hazards of daylight flights to this comparatively remote district from British bases, after- dark raids would be most effective upon targets in the Stuttgart district. Stuttgart itself, however, is extremely difficult to find after dark because of a low mist which hangs over the hollow in which the main tar- gets are located. Raids which send the people to their cellars Invoves torroator tipo exhyenza 1,00 0010 LOANS ⑉5⑉ collars and keep them there are most demoralizing and effective in reducing productive efficiency. 4. Health. The health of the people has been adversely affected by the lack of sufficient quantities of nourishing food- stuffs, especially fats, fresh fruits and vegetables, meats, and milk. Vitamin starvation leading to fainting spells and inability to think and act normally was gradually becoming a problem. Pulmonary diseases were increasing over previous years due to vitamin deficiencies. No opidemies had broken out during our stay in Stuttgart but local doctors felt that the population would be sub- jeet to the danger of opidemics next winter if the situation were not remedied before then. Little hope was held for remodial action since vitamin tablets and drugs of many kinds were either impossible to buy or were carefully rationed out upon a doctor's prescription. 5. Current Rumors. The only rumors current at the time of our departure referred to various difficulties of Gauleiter Wagner of Munich, a close friend of Rudolf Heas, and attempted assassinations upon the life of Gauleiter Wagner of Alsace. According to the reports, Gauleiter Wagner of Alsace had tried to impose German rule upon the Alsatians with customary German brutality and this action allegedly led to at least three attempts upon his life between April and June, 1941. Gauleiter Wagner of Munich on the other hand was supposed to have been implicated in the escape of Rudolf Hess and according to some reports was -6- was shot by the Gestapo for treason. This rumor, however, was denied by sources considered reliable. 6. British Propaganda. Until shortly after the fall of France, British propaganda had no real audience in the Stuttgart con- sular district. Even those Germans sympathetic to the British cause felt that the defensive propaganda of the British during their steady retreats on all fronts was inept and failed to correspond with the facts. Since August of last year, however, the circle of radio listeners gradually increased and at the time of our departure probably over 25 per cent of the upper classes were either listening to the British news broadcasts or were getting their information from friends who did so. Ordinary workmen, however, feared the penalties of listening to news from abroad and certainly not more than 5 per cent of the lower classes in the whole district took the chance of listening to foreign broadcasts. Radio would seem to be the only efficient means of spreading propaganda to the population in the Stuttgart district. The pamphlets dropped by the British on one or two occasions in the district were collected during the night by members of the Hitler Jugend before the people arose the next morning. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. Persons having valuable knowledge upon this subject were so carefully watched by the Secret Police that no reliable information could be gathered. The Robert Bosch and Daimler-Benz research staffs were reportedly engaged -7- engaged in developing now weapons of various kinds but no information as to the nature of the weapons or the methods to be used in firing them could be obtained. One source claimed that the I.G. Farbenindustrie had developed and had produced large quantities of a poisonous gas far more destructive than anything theretofore known but when pressed for details could not elaborate. The same informant claimed that the Germans had used an "Anti-Gonad" liquid in the food and drink of young polish men and women which made both sexes sterile. 8. Civilian Defense. Although the German propaganda machine had steadily told the people that the war would be of short duration, the authorities in the Stuttgart district immediately after the fall of France began extending their air raid precautionary facilities. Prisoners of war were put to work in the fall of 1940 constructing an air raid shelter in the Rathouse square which was still being built when we left the city. This shelter is more than fifty feet below street level and reportedly will have outlets into all of the buildings surrounding the square. Gas- proof and bombproof accommodations for about 10,000 persons will be provided for in this shelter. Another shelter being built in Stuttgart will run under a rocky hill in the center of the city at a depth of 100 to 200 feet for a distance of about two miles. Construction of this shelter was started in April 1941, and should continue until spring or summer of 1942. It will have gasproof and bombproof accommodations for over 50,000 people. The Che about : 2 DO INTERNATION as I A 1 -8- The raid on Nannheim mentioned under bomb damage brought forcefully to the attention of the local authorities the inadequacy of their fire-fighting facilities. Immediately thereafter, air raid wardens wont from house to house checking up on the arrangements made for fire protection and issuing supplementary instructions to meet the new conditions. All large firms and business houses were required to have a large number of fire watchers at all times, and to outfit each building with chemical sprays. The supply of gas masks ran out during the first days of September 1939, before more than 50 per cent of the population had been provided for. Since additional supplies were never brought to the district, it would be safe to assume that probably 25 to 50 per cent of the people in the Stuttgart district are now without gas masks. 9. Prestige of Party. Estimates placed the number of people unsympathetic to the Nasi party at 70 to 80 per cent, yet on public occasions the percentage in favor of the Party and its leaders appeared to be & solid 100 per cent. Fear controls the minds of the masses and until this fear can be minimized or completely eradicated, there can be no hope in & revolt of the people against their oppressors so long as Germany does not suffer a crushing defeat on the battlefield. Rudolf Hess was the most popular of the leaders in the Nazi hierarchy, and the common people hoped that when promite -2- when he flew to Scotland, he would be instrumental in bringing about an end to the var, Their hopes were dashed immediately by instructions from Berlin prohibiting discussion of the Hess affair. 10. Prestige of Services. The masses in our district seem to have placed their entire trust and confidence in the German army and air force, and felt that in so doing they had relieved themselves of all responsibility for the progress of the war. This confidence extended to the fighting forces as a whole rather than to individual groups or officers. 11. Main Sentiments. Since last winter, the most noticeable change in the people has been an ever-increasing weariness and in- difference to military victories. The possibility of American entry into war was disturbing but only because it would mean E. prolongation and expansion of the war. The people were uneasy at the beginning of hostilities with Soviet Russia, but were relieved that the poli- tical connection between Germany and Soviet Russia--never popular--was at last clarified. As news of the Army's progress came in, the uneasiness changed to confidence that the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe would once again nee then through. 12. Migrations of Population. Small groups of repatriated Bessarabians were brought into the district about a year ago and were housed in Dates Abjutive sports to pade & 5 : -10- in Catholic convents and monasteries confiscated by the Government. Later, children from bombed areas wore evacuated to a number of resorts in the Schwabian Alps, and this migratory movement was continuing at the time of our departure. Estimates placed the number of repatriated Bessarabians at about 5,000, and the number of evacuated children at 15,000 to 20,000. 13. Channels of Information. The most reliable contact, but one that must be held in the STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, is was the founder of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut of Stuttgart, and was head of the Stuttgarter Reichslandsend- or at the time the Nasi party came into power. He had connections with several leading British statesmen and had been very friendly with Sir John Rieth. is married to an Englishwoman, and 1s pro-British in sentiment. He has never belonged to any political party and when he refused to cooperate with the new regime, he was severely beaten in his home and was divested of all potentially dangerous positions. Although always under surveillance, he was left alone until three months ago when he was called to the Gestapo on trumped-up charges. The case against him was still pending at the close of the Consulate in Stuttgart. Lt. Commander Pihl of the Embassy in Berlin, who net at Dr. Eckener's home in Friedrichshafen, could renew contact with him. Again I desire to stress that name must be held in the STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. -11- 14. Identity of Axis Agents. I have no information on this subject. 15. British Blockade. In the beginning of the war, the Germans had stocks to carry them through for quite nome time. These were later added to by the systematic plunder of occupied countries which greatly offset the effectiveness of the British blockade. However, the real effect of the blockade began to be felt first in the spring of this year, and the necessity to replenish German stocks became vital. Should these supplies not be forthcoming from continental countries, the British blockade will be a serious handicap to Germany and will play an increas- ingly important part in winning the war for the Allies, Respectfully yours, Edmund J. Dorsz American Consul August 7, 1941. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL The Honorable The Secretary of State Washington, D. C. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's unnumbered strictly confidential instruction dated August 1, 1941, enclosing a memoran- dum concerning conditions in the Bromen consular district. In collaboration with Vice Consul Francis A. Lane the following is submitted: 1. Morale I have no information concerning military, navel and official morale as such. The morale of the civilian population in Bremen may best be described as apathetic. The people were led to expect a short war and as the evidence accumulates that 18 is likely to be of uncertain duration with an ever widening area of operations their assurance of ultimate victory becomes less certain in spite of the fact that Germany has as yet not suffered any serious setback in the field of military operations. It is well known that Bremen has the reputation of being liberel in its general sentiments and long before the war they were called"Britons". While ÷ While there is undoubtedly some enthusiastic Nazi support there, it is not easily discernible. Various estimates place such sentiment at from 20 percent to 40 percent of the population. In few instances have I net anyone who rated it above the latter figure. I would be inclined to place it at midway between the two but Vice Consul Lane who has a far wider knowledge of Bremen is of the opinion that pro-Mazi sentiment is nearer 50 percent and that as the population is coming to realize that its destinies are tied up with the exist- ing regime this percentage is on the increase. We both feel that morale in the Bremen area is not likely to be lowered until Germany suffers at least one major defeat in an important military area, a serious shortage of food, (which was not in evidence at the time of departure) or large numbers of casualties either in the field or by serious bombing. However here again there is insufficient evidence based on past experience to warrent such an assumption. Although the religious problem in the district was a live one before the war, since the out- break of hostilities this question has been allowed to subside and apparently little or no attempt has been made to influence people in their religious convictions. This applies alike to Protestants and Catholics. 2. Bomb Damage Rumours are that fairly heavy damage has been done in the harbor where shipbuilding is concentrated but as this section of the town is protected by an iron enclosure and closed to the public this cannot be verified. Unquestionably -3- Unquestionably some demage has been done according to eyewitness reports received but the extent is not known. So far as the residential and business area is concerned bomb damage has increased but although a fairly large number of buildings and houses numbering around 1,500 have been seriously damaged or destroyed, this has not seriously affected the morale or the appearance of the city and it is not believed that it has been of military importance. While several factories and plants of military importance have been hit, so far as can be learned this did not prevent the stoppage of work for more than a day or two at the most. In one instance a Hollander employed at the Fooke-Wulff airplane assembly plant in- formed no that although the plant was damaged work con- tinued without interruption. No information is available as to the extent of damage caused by the new bombs but they are believed to be more effective. The percentage of unexploded bombs is not known but according to rumors it 10 reported to be high. 3. Vital bombing targets. Aside from the obvious importance of continuing attacks on the harbor, its facilities, and industrial plants which have already been subjected to aerial raids the Dreyer Bridge located approximately 5 miles southeast of Bremen is a vital connecting link with Westphalia and the Rhineland, and if destroyed should affect important communications with the town. In the City itself there are four bridges, which are approximately in the center of the town and if destroyed or seriously damaged would undoubtedly disrupt the traffic for some time both as regards regards city and road transportation with the entire district. In addition this would undoubtedly have an effect on morele. Aside from the foregoing and so far as morale is concerned, the center of the town with its business and shopping district, but especially the main railroad station presents the most likely target and incidentally would result in a minimum loss of life due to the fact that it is surrounded by a large plaza and is not a residential section. While night bombing may result in the least loss of planes, bombing by day would undoubtedly result in greater disruption of production, and if effective would undoubtedly be more impressive. 4. Health From all the information available I am completely satisfied that the armed forces are so well red that there can be no question with regard to their general health. In many instances I have known of food being sent by men in the forces to their families. with regard to the civilian population, while there has been a reduction in the amount of food consumed, the rationing system is working so satisfactorily that there is nothing to indicate from general observation that the health of the population has in any way suffered. Meeting the people in public places, one is impressed by the ir appearance of good health. So far as is known there is no shortage of medicine although some articles have been more or less restricted, such as iodine, alcoholic and similar preparations. Due to the shortage of fats, medicinal -5- medicinal preparations composed of this ingredient have likewise been restricted, but 80 far as 10 known, satisfactory substitutes for all of these are obtainable. Due to Bremen's favorable position near the sea and a farming district, there has been no serious shortage of foodstuffs. In season plenty of fish has been avail- able and fruits and vegetables as ordinarily available in normal times have likewise been obtainable. The ration- ing restrictions on fats and meats are felt more than all other food restrictions, but here again it is not believed that these have been such as to affect the health or the morale of the general population. Naturally there has been a certain amount of grumbling but not of anything like serious complaints. It should be remembe red that Bremen is largely & transfer point and a considerable number of the population is classified as "heavy workers" entitled to extra rations. Many families in Bremen and vicinity were receiving extra food parcels through friends and relatives in the United States, but whether the loss of this is likely to make any difference is questionable. Although the purchase of clothing is restricted in common with the rest of Germany there was no indication that this adversely affected the health or general appearance of the man in the street. During the winter of 1939 - 1940, due to transporta- tion difficulties there was a shortage of coke, the fuel mostly used in Bremen for heating. However, this problem was overcome during the following spring and summer when householders were required to stock up for the winter's needs and while there were some restrictions, on the baste DEAR TTREATED -6- on the whole all necessary requirements were not during the last winter. Before the outbreak of war there was a housing shortage in Bremen and this has continued, and there has been only a limited amount of now construction. It is not believed however, that this shortage is serious, and with the exception of the evacuation of children on other grounds, it is not known that there has been any evacuation because of housing shortage caused by bombing. 5. Current rumors Before the outbreak of hostilities with Russia there were persistent rumors that, on the one hand Russia was about to enter the Axis actively, and on the other, that large numbers of troups were being con- centrated on the German-Russian frontier by both countries in anticipation of war. The invasion of England still continues as a speculative rumor, but more and more this is being relegated to the background. There is, of course, constant talk concerning the possibility of the United States entering the war. Finally, the possibility of peace negotiations with Great Britain takes every imaginable form including an alliance against Russia. 6. British propaganda. The dissemination of leaflets by British planes was considered to have been highly ineffective and those who commented were derisive. Nothing is known concerning the effect on the population of British broadoasts in German -7- German due to the severe penalties involved for listen- ing. Because most news published or broadcast by the Germen authorities is usually delayed, it is important that any news broadcast to Germany be prompt and re- liable. Every effort should be made to check carefully news purporting to come from Germany concerning damage done and discontent there since it is a simple matter for a German, for example in Bremen, to verify for him- self whether or not the center of Bremen has been 0 0m- pletely destroyed. Such stories completely nullify any faith that even a discontented German may have in the reliability of British broadcasts. Aside from the foregoing the question arises as to whether threats or promises are more likely to have the desired effect upon German morale. I believe that the former may be immediately dismissed as being ineffective. In consider- ing the question of promises they should be couched in language to impress the hearer with the likelihood that they will be carried out. This, broadly speaking, in- volves the whole question of war aims. Nevertheless, I an firmly convinced that it is time for Great Britain to decide to what extent it is intended to penalize the German people at the termination of the war. A frank statement concerning the measures to be taken, even though severe, if they are of a military nature and do not involve economic or other measures which would affect the livelihood of the ordinary man, would, it is believed, make a strong impression. So long as this is not done the ordinary man is bound to feel that with the defeat of Germany his means of a livelihood would be -8- be destroyed. No propaganda which does not take this into account, is, in my opinion, likely to be successful. 7. Koonomio and industrial intelligence No information available. 8. Civilian defense. So far as may be determined fire fighting in Bremen has been expeditious and effective and is so considered by the public. The construction of public air raid shelters at the time of my departure was far behind schedule but several had been completed. On the whole the shelters in individual houses are satisfactory. Provision has been made for extra support by props in those rooms devoted to air raid shelters. Most casualties occurred where people failed to go into shelters or where they were living in houses without cellars. Generally speaking, very little stress has been placed on gas masks. Às a matter of fact, this appears to be a dead letter. No suggestions can be made for impairing civilian defense. 9. Prestige of Party and popularity of individual party members. Generally speeking, Goering is the most popular of all party officials and with all classes. Very little is known about Hess but his flight to England created a feeling of uncertainty with regard to party dependability. One hears relatively little comment about Hitler. The continued successes of the German foroes are attributed to him and while the war is not popular his prestige has not apparently suffered and among some it has in- creased. Goobbels is on the whole not liked and while full faith is given to the High Command reports, very little -9- little faith is placed in those apparently coming from his ministry. Since the Hess affair the general reputation of the party has suffered and the prestige of the Army has increased proportionately. This is shown by rumors that with the termination of the war, or because of any setback, the party in its present form would give way to some form of government closely affiliated with the military. 10. Prestige of Services and popularity of individual officers. The services stand very high in public opinion and every German is exceedingly proud of what they have accomplished. They also seem to have a high regard for the military and neval leaders and apparently do not consider them 68 being politically motivated. 11. Main sontiments or emotions of people. Although the war is not popular in Germany the point has not been reached where one can speak or war weariness. AS previously stated this will depend upon the extent of hardships which the people may be called upon to endure. Among those who know America there is a feeling that our entry into thewar would be decisive. On the other hand, the large mass of the population knows little or nothing about the United States and is inclined therefore to accept German propaganda concern- ing our country and our strength. Very few if any favor the tie-up with Italy or Japan. The former they are inclined to despise, the latter to dislike because they are so alien and therefore not trustworthy. While the pact with Russia was welcomed solely because it appeared -10- appeared to assure Germany's eastern frontier, it was not popular. The feeling toward that count ry add its people is a mixture of fear and hatred because it is felt that Germany would never be in 6 position to depend upon her assistance and that she would attack Germany at the most favorable moment. As & matter of fact this may be seid not only of Russia, but of Itely and Japan. The feeling is that Germany, while allegedly concerned with the fate of the "white race", is apparently choosing allies in the opposite camp. 12. Migrations of population Because of the bombing children, and mothers with babies, have been evacuated from Bremen since early in the present year. In addition, those who were in a position to do 80 have moved to small towns and villages in the immediate vicinity, taking small houses, rooms in hotels, inne and farm houses wherever possible. Many have moved their household effects and those who could do 80 have stored their valuables in bank vaults. This necessarily has affected only a small part of the adult population as only those with means were in a position to move. It is estimated that approximately 75% of all children under 14 years of age have been evacuated from Bremen. 13. Channels for obtaining future information. No information available. 14. Identity of Axis espionage agents No information available. 15. British blockade No information available. 16. Remarks -11- 10. Remarks Summarizing the situation in Bromen it may be stated that although it is one of the least pro-Nasi districts in Germany and while the war is not popular there are no signs as yet of popular discontent. Whether this would occur under great hardship is debatable. Given a popular cause I am satisfied that the north German would stand the strain as well 68 the Britisher. While the popular cause does not seem to exist, the fate of the country is so tied up with the present regime that this may serve as a substitute. In the light of the foregoing I believe that no one is warranted in anticipating 6 concerted opposition in Germany. If however, such an event should occur it would find its seeds in the attitude of the women there who unquestionably are more in- dependent and more outspoken in their oriticism than the men, who are more accustomed to servile obedience. Very truly yours, Laz Sidney A. Belovsky Consul In triplicate. August 7, 1941. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Conditions in the Leipzig Consular District. The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Sir: I have the honor, in compliance with the Department's strictly confidential instruction of August 1, 1941, to submit the following information available to me and to my subordinate officers (Consul Robert L. Buell and Vice Consul Paul M. Dutko) on conditions in the Consular District of Leipzig, Germany, containing about 7,000,000 people. 1. Morale. The Leipzig Consular District, being inland, contains no naval station and, far removed from combat areas, has relatively small forces in garrison. Military personnel is confined primarily to units in training camps, war prisons, and at anti-aircraft stations. The morale of the armed forces appeared satisfactory, but there was a marked absence of enthusiasm over the campaign against Russia, and there were indications of growing war-weariness. The troops in the Leipzig District, chiefly on garrison duty, receive the same rations as civilians and both classes frequently complain of the inadequacy ÷ inadequacy of nourishing food, especially animal fats and fruits. The morale of the officials is ostensibly satis- factory but that of the civilian population shows signs of deterioration, due to (1) the unexpected duration of the war, (2) increased difficulties in procuring food and drink, (3) anticipated worsening of the food and fuel supply during the coming winter, and (4) anxiety lest the Russian campaign, instead of augmenting Gorman food rations, may curtail supplies to civilians. Civilian morale 10 especially being lowered by a growing know- ledge of increased American aid to Britain and anxiety lest the United States enter the war. 2. Bomb Damage. There have been few air raids, and relatively little damage from bombing in the district. The only important exception was the reported destruction of & few units in the extensive Leuna Werke, one of Germany's largest synthetic gasoline plants. Reduction of output in this extensive plant, however, was only slightly delayed by bombing which occurred chiefly during 1940. There were few attacks in 1941. The important cities of the Leipzig District contain few visible signs of bombing damage. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. The most vital bombing targets in the Leipzig District are the Louna werke, the railway junctions, stations, and yards at Leipsis, Halle, Erfurt and Magdeburg, and the power stations in these cities and at Böhlen. Bombing by day would be more effective than by night because of greater accuracy and increased my UNITED Imagednes -3- increased interference with civilian activities. 4. Health. The health of the population, including the armed forces, in the Leipzig District, 1s still good despite growing deficiency in quantity and variety of food supplies. There have been no epidemics. The "common cold" was due in part to lack of protective food. Serious shortages of food are limited to a few types such as fresh fruit. There 1s also a lack of fuel for heating dwellings. 5. Current Rumors. Nothing to report. 6. British Propaganda. There is no way of ascer- taining the extent of listening to British broadcasts. Probably only one percent of the population listens to anti-Axis broadcasts in view of the heavy penalties imposed. The quality of the reception is very good for short-wave broadcasts in German from London. Means other than radio broadcasts for disseminating propaganda might include the dropping of leaflets in German over densely populated areas. Such leaflets might reach people who do not listen to broadcasts. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. Nothing to report. 8. Civilian Defense. Special precautions have been taken to cope with explosive, incendiary and gas bombs, and to educate the population in defense against aerial attacks, but these measures have never been put to a severe test in any part of the Leipsig District and -4- and, therefore, their adequacy cannot be determined. Elaborate public and private air-raid shelters have been and are being erected, especially near railway stations, in anticipation of increasingly sharp raids. 9. Prestige of Party and Popularity of Individual Party Members. The prestige of the Party has been high, except among the intellectual, conservative, and persecuted classes, but has been impaired even in the eyes of Party members by the unpopularity of the campaign against Russia, and by fear of the existence of dis- sension among Party leaders as demonstrated by the dis- affection of Rudolf Hess. The individual Party chiefs are not held in high estoom by the educated classes because of a realization of their lack of statesmanship and integrity. Many active Nazis are former hack politicians who have no conspicuous qualifications or good record of service. 10. Prestige of Services and Popularity of Individual Officers. All of the armed forces enjoy high prestige, especially the Luftwaffe. Among the high Party leaders, Goebbeln is detested, but Goering is regarded by most people as a hero and is possibly in as high esteem as Hitler. 11. Main Sentiments or Emotions of People. The general public is decidedly apathetic to the continuance of the war and longs for early peace but on terms favor- able to Germany. There is much anxiety lest entrance of the United States into the war would lead to its prolongation, -5- prolongation, and also fear that such action would bring the ultimate defeat of Germany. There is no ovidence of hatred of Russia, but there is & confident belief that the defeat of the Soviet military forces is inevitable. 12. Migrations of Population. In the Leipzig District there has been no exodus of civilians, but instead a temporary influx of persons from the Rhineland and the Ruhr, because of bombing, and from Western Poland, due to room being made for Baltio German evacuées. 13. Channels for Obtaining Future Information. The only means of obtaining information from the Leipzig District henceforth would appear to be from our own Embassy or from the Argentine Embassy or the Swiss Loga- tion in Berlin, since the only consular officers of career in Leipzig, except Italian, are the Argentine and Swiss. 14. Identity of Axis Espionage Agents. No infor- mation. 15. British Blockade. The British blockade prevents the importation of much greatly needed food and fodder, petroloum products, and textiles and raw materials such as cotton and wool. There are unconfirmed reports of small shipments to Germany from Switzerland of urgently needed supplies emanating from the Western Hemisphere. 16. Purther Remarks. News of the departure of American consular personnel came as a surprise and shock to -6- to the Germans, who interpreted it as the first definite indication of the probable early entry of the United States into the war. Religious Persecution. At Leipzig members of the Christian Science Church were in June startled to learn that many of their leaders, German citizens, were arrested without any assigned reason. Some neutrals considered this move as a retaliation against Rudolf Hess, whose parents are stated to be Christian Scientists. In the general Christian field, the clergy are not admitted to hospitals for visits on a voluntary basis. They must now present evidence that the patient has requested a visit. German Christians were encouraged in June 1941 when, for the first time during the war, the Catholic clergy read in the pulpit a complaint signed by the German hierarchy against wrongs done to the Church and its members. The protest included recital of closing of Parochial schools, confiscation or assumption of possession of numerous monastaries, and direct restriction of hours of service. No Church may announce services by bell before 1 p.m. following a night of local air raids. Moreover, services following such attacks may not begin before 10 a.m., even on Sunday. Although Christians may expect further restrictions upon religious services should the Germans lose the war, there -7- there may be still more drastic action if Germany is victorious. Respectfully yours, Edward A. Dow American Consul General DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation DATE: August 9, 1941. SUBJECT: Conditions in the Leipzig District. Consul General Edward A. Dow PARTICIPANTS: (Formerly at Leipzig) Mr. Stevens, Eu COPIES TO: ⑉ 1-1498 Mr. Dow was questioned concerning the purchase of publications through the firm of Harrassowitz at Leipzig. He stated that Harrassowitz was a reputable and well- known book firm and that it represented many American institutions, private as well as official, in procuring publications from Germany. He stated that he had placed a number of orders with the firm in accordance with the Department's instructions on behalf of other agencies of the Government, but added that he had never been requested by the Embassy at Berlin to order publications on behalf of the Department itself. Mr. Dow emphasized that British bombing damage in the Leipzig district had been negligible and stated that 80 Ot Wewolauque of -2- 80 far as he was able to ascertain only a very emall proportion of the population listened to British broad- casts and that the general tendency was to discount them because of their inaccuracy concerning conditions in Germany. He stated that & considerable number of persons had been moved from the annexed Polish territories to the Leipzig district in order to make room for 70- patriates from Eastern Europe, but that so far as he had been able to observe there was no resentment against these steps and the newoomers were being absorbed in industry and agriculture. Eu:FBStevens:mjh August 8, 1941 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Sir: In compliance with the request contained in instruction dated August 1, 1941, I have the honor to report on conditions in Bavaria. 1. Morale. The morale of the armed forces stationed in Bavaria and of Bavarian officials is good. The enlisted man is well fed and decently uniformed. He knows the quality of German materiel to be excellent. He also knows that the German military machine is led by men who can plan boldly and execute efficiently. of more immediate moment to himself is the circumstance that the attitude of the lower ranking officers with whom the common soldier comes into contact is such more human than it was in old German army. Furthermore (and of prime importance) the Masi military machine has won campaign after campaign. It is hardly to be expected that impaired morale will be found among victorious troops. The morale of the civilian population has suffered somewhat + semewhat under the influence of several developments. The reduction of the neat ration on June 1 from 600 grams to 400 grame per week was distinetly not welcomed. Know- ledge that further reduction is almost inevitable does not cause the Bavarian to be more cheerful. But even more disturbing to his is the sharp reduction in the quantity of beer allotted each week to restaurants and inno, and the consequent ourtailment of "open" hours at his favorite drinking place. To the bear-loving Bavarian this came as a very real shock and it has given rise to widespread and articulate dissatisfaction. Shortages is secres of lines of consumer's goods, including such small items as needles and thread, have also led to considerable grumbling. OF two that the blookade will besons Another factor in the situation is the persecution of the Cathelie Church which, after a long lull, was resumed last winter with a new ferceity. The loss of the major part of the remaining revenue of the Church is threatened by the refusal of the Beverian Government to continue to collect it when the State taxes are sollected in the outurn. The Church hopes that 18 will be permitted to collect this shurch tax through its own organization, but at the time that I left Munich 18 had received no assurance that permission would be granted. In addition to this blow aimed at the finances of the Church, the Bavarian authorities have closed in recent months a considerable number of convents (all Catholic schools had --- had previously been closed), have instructed the heads of all schools receiving funds of any kind from the State that all crucifixes are to be removed from class rooms, have refused to permit girls to train as nurses in the Catholic Sisterhoods, and have instituted among the youth a campaign designed to undermine the prestige and position of the Catholic clergy. To the devout Bavarian these measures have been profoundly disturbing, as also were, in another field, the so-called mercy slayings of last winter. If it were possible to convince the Bavarian people that the Church will either disappear or else survive as a more shell of its former self if the war continues for another year or two; that the blockade will become increasingly effective and that Germany will find it impossible to organize effectively the economy of Europe, thereby leading to continuing and increasing privation, I think it highly probable that morale would be lowered. I am inclined to doubt, however, that it would reach the breaking point within the foreseeable future, even if bombing raids were greatly intensified. 2. Bomb Damage. Bavaria is not sufficiently indus- trialized to command the attention of a belligerent who is compelled to consider carefully how his limited number of planes can be used to the best adventage. Munich has been bombed only eight times; twice by the French and six times by the British. None of the raids was heavy, and all -4- all available information indicates that damage was slight. Augsburg vas bombed five or six times to my knowledge, but there also the damage vas inconsiderable. 3. Vital Bombing Targets. Since a very considerable volume of traffic to and from the Brenner passes through Munich, my colleagues and I have more than once wondered why the Munich railway net had not been heavily bombed. The answer seemed to be that the British are well avare of the importance of Munich in this connection but that they had not found it desirable to stage a heavy raid as long as many more important points required attention. This view was confirmed by an officer of the British Legation in Lisbon with whom I discussed the matter on July 26. 4. Health. The health of the civilian population and of the armed forces is good. There was last winter an epidemic of grippe in a mild form. Doctors and nurses employed in military and in civilian hospitals state that there is no shortage of medicines. The head of the large military hospital in Freising volunteered the statement that never had he seen a hospital better or "more richly" supplied with pharmaceuticals, and he insisted that I take a look for myself. Although the armed forces are reported to be well fed, there can be no doubt that civilians do not have a well balanced diet. Furthermore, persons who are doing heavy work find the rations inadequate for the maintenance of -5- of normal strength. This is observable by any resident of Germany who has occasion to watch freight being handled at a railway station, or to move his household effects. But the diet of the average person is not sufficiently below requirements to permit the layman to notice any appreciable change in appearance. The middle-aged Bavarian's paunch may not bulge as alarmingly as it did a year or two ago, but his color still is good and he carries himself well. Children are still alert and full of energy, if one can judge by watching them at play and at their interminable Hitler Jugend drills. But medical men are reported to have found signs of the beginning of malnutrition among a number of the cases they have investigated, and to fear that if the present or a reduced ration is given for a long period malnutrition may become a danger. The chief food shortages down to the date of ay departure from Munich were in fats, milk, potatoes and onions. The last two shortages developed only last spring. Eggs and meat have always been obtainable in the amounts permitted by the rationing system. Good fish is almost unobtainable, but there are adequate supplies of the inferior varieties. Black bread, formerly appetizing and wholesome, has been transformed into a sticky and thoroughly nasty product by the introduction of barley. Condiments have almost disappeared from the market. Clothing is obtainable, but only in the rigidly rationed -6- rationed quantities. Because the permissible annual pur- cheses are 80 small, a system of barter has grown up; an old dress for certain undergarments, a pair of trousers for a coat, etc. Parents of children are hard put to it to keep their youngsters in shoes of the proper size, for growing feet will not wait upon the rationing system's timetable. To sum up the clothing situation I say say that any person who is about to proceed to a foreign country where he can replenish his wardrobe is besieged by friends who beg that as a tremendous favor he sell them any article of clothing which he does not absolutely require. There has been no shortage of fuel in Bavaria within the limits of the fairly liberal rationing system. There was considerable suffering in the severe winter of 1939- 1940 but this resulted from extremely heavy snows which impeded deliveries. Coal and coke were at the railway stations or in the dealers' yards, but they could not be quickly delivered to the consumer. Munich, in common with many cities in Germany, is overcrowded at a time when, because of the war, little new construction is under way. The housing situation is not, however, alarming. 5. Current Rumors. Insistent rumor which first appeared last May had it that Stalin was to visit Munich or Berohtesgaden for a conference with Hitler, and that everything would then be amioably arranged between the two -7- two countries. This rumor patently was based upon previous rumors to the effect that Germany had made cer- tain demands upon the Soviet Union and it reflected, I believe, a wish that war between the two countries could be avoided. It also was rumored that Rudolf Mess had demanded a cleanup of the Party but had failed to obtain Hitler's approval. It was said that there had been found among his personal papers subsequent to his departure for Britain, a wealth of material bearing on the private and public lives of many Party members, and that among them were Adolph Wagner, Gauleiter in Bavaria, and the all powerful Christian Weber, a member of the Munich municipal council. Both men were reported to have been relieved of their duties. The absence of both from Munich in early June lent some credence to this rumor. 6. British Propagands. If it is the purpose of propaganda to contribute toward an undermining of the resistance of the enemy; to wean his peoples from the ideas which he himself has sold to them; to weaken their will to continue to resist; to convince them that their own best interests are indissolubly tied up with victory for their opponents, them British propaganda has been a distinct failure. It has failed, I believe, because it has offered nothing which appealed or could be expected to appeal to the German people. In the early days of the war it gave them printed pamphlets which contained -8- contained the promise that they could have peace if only they would rid themselves of their leaders. To this the Germans quite naturally replied that they had heard some- thing very similar during the World Var, that they had jettisoned the Kaiser, and that they received in return-- Versailles. They were and are not now interested in repeating the experience. They subsequently have been told by British propaganda that a better world will come into being when Britein has won the war. It is a fairly safe assumption that almost any human being is interested in an improved world, but it is equally safe to assume that after his unpleasant experience only twenty-odd years ago, the German will want to ... at least a brief bill of particulars before he cuts loose from his own leaders, and that he will want real evidence that the promises made to him will be kept. Before British propaganda can hope for success it must renounce its lingering flirtation with the thought (or is it a conviction?) that the German people can be won by fair words alone. It must realize that while the majority of Germans cordially dislike or even detest the Nazis, this same majority is composed of German patriots who have a deep love of the Fatherland and who do not want to see it divided and impoverished by a victorious enemy. It dust realize that this deep-seated patriotism is the basic coment which holds together the German people and causes them to continue to give support to a Govern- ment which 10 responsible for a var which they did not want -9- want and the end of which they would greet with profound joy. It must realize further that to this date it has completely failed to convince the German masses that a defeated Germany would be permitted to exist as an entity and to take the position in the commonwealth of nations which all patriotic Germans feel is rightfully hers. It is the task of British propaganda to bring this convie- tion to the German people. Only when it has done 80 will it have achieved success. Reception at Munich is almost invariably good. Since very few persons who listen are willing to confess that they do so, it is impossible to give an estimate of the number who hear the programs. Well-informed German contacts are of the opinion that the number is very considerable. Some listen out of curiosity, others in order to hear the names of Germans who are announced to have been taken prisoner, and many in order to feel that they have some contact with the outside world and a check on their own news service. 7. Economic and Industrial Intelligence. I have no specifie information on this subject. 8. Civilian Defense. The few fires caused in Munich by incondiary bombs were quickly extinguished. Basement shelters are available in practically every building, but few of them have been especially reinforced. In general they are merely ordinary basement rooms. Munich has a few zigzeg trench shelters in its small parks, but no subterranean -10- subterranean public shelters independent of basement space in buildings. As recently as last May householders were continuing to construct brick and concrete walls over basement windows in order to obtain some protection against possible bombs. This would seem to indicate that the end of the war within the next few months was not expected. At the beginning of the war I was surprised to learn that none of our German employees and none of my German friends or acquaintances owned a gas mask. For many months thereafter no masks were obtainable. In the second year of the war Air Raid Precautions per- sonnel canvassed all residents of Munich, informed them that maske were available, and instructed them to buy one for each member of the household. It is probable that Bavarians are now well supplied with masks. 9. Prestige of Party, at estera. What little prestige the Party still has in Bavaria 10 based upon the power it commands and not in any important degree on the hopes and faith in it of the people. The hollow- ness and the purposes of Nasi ideology have been exposed; the venality of many Party members, including those of high rank, has become only too apparent. Yet despite this, careerists always are to be found who are prepared to render lip service to the Party. This is particularly true of German youth--even as it is true in Russia of Russian youth--for no young man in Germany can hope to have a successful -11- a successful career in one of the professions unless he is affiliated with the Party. The corruption which is known to exist in the Party places it and its leaders in a position in which they are vulnerable to attack. The many unfulfilled or broken prom- ises which they have made to the German people also place them in an exposed position. I doubt, however, that any attack could be successful unless the masses had become convinced that there was at hand a leadership which offered something markedly superior to the Nazie in the domestic and the foreign fields. The two mostpopular national figures at the time of my departure from Munich were Hitler and Goering; the most unpopular Himmler and Goobbels. In Bavaria the most popular leader is Minister prasident Ludwig Siebert; the least popular, Gauleiter Adolph Wagner. 10. Prestige of the Services. The prestige of the army and of the air force was extremely high down to the date of By departure from Munich, but this is only to be expected in view of the successes they had scored. Little was to be heard about the Navy. Bavarians, remote from the sea and rarely encountering a naval uniform, appear to take little interest in naval matters. An occasional expression of satisfaction over the alleged success of the sounter-blockade was the most that was heard. I have no information regarding the popularity of individual officers. I an unable to suggest any means by