Disarmament Conference, 1933-1935

Disarmament Conference, 1933 PSF:,Giarmament conference Exportation of Arms, Munitions or Implements of War to Belligerent Nations HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTIETH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON H.J. Res. 183 A JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROHIBIT THE EXPORTATION OF ARMS, MUNITIONS, OR IMPLEMENTS OF WAR TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS STATEMENTS OF How, JOHN J. MCSWAIN, a Representative In Congress from the State of South Carolina. Hon. J. MAYHEW WAINWRIGHT, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York. Hon. B. CARROLL REECE, a Representative In Congress from the State of Tennessee. Hox. DWIGHT F. DAVIS, Secretary of War. MR. CHARLES H. HERTY, Chemical Foundation, New York City, Hos. THOMAS 8. BUTLER, Chairman, Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives. Hos. CURTIS D. WILBUR, Secretary of the Navy. MR. H. N. Foss, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Agriculture. Mr. G. 8. MELOY, Assistant Chief Marketing Specialist, Department of Agri- culture. Hon, CHARLES B. ROBBINS, Assistant Secretary of War. HON. FRANKLIN F. KORELL, a Representative in Congress from the State of Oregon. Hos. THEODORE E. BURTON, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, MARCH 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, AND 22, 1928 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 36144 WASHINGTON : 1929 EXPORTATION OF ARMS. MUNITIONS, OR IMPLEMENTS OF WAR TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Thursday, March 15, 1928. The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (chairman) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. I understand COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS representatives of the House Military Affairs Committee are, here to HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES make statements. SEVENTIETH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. McSWAIN. A REPRESENTATIVE IN STEPHEN G. PORTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TEMPLE, Pennsylvania. J. CHARLES LINTHICUM, Maryland. EGG, Ohio. CHARLES M. STEDMAN, North Carolina, Mr. McSwain. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, E. BURTON, Ohio, TOM CONNALLY, Texas. FISH, JR., New York. rather than being representatives of the Military Affairs Committee R. WALTON MOORE, Virginia, OLE, Iown. MARTIN L. DAVEY, Ohio. as a committee, the three gentlemen from that committee who appear HULL, Illinois, DAVID J. O'CONNELL, New York. here, consisting of Representative Wainwright, Representative Reece, MARTIN, JR., Massachusetta. 8. D. McREYNOLDS, Tennessee. and myself, appear as individual members of the House and as the EATON, New Jersey. SOL BLOOM, New York. EN COOPER, Wisconsin, bearers of the greetings of the Committee on Military Affairs, for the BROWNE, Wisconsin. purpose of expressing the very high appreciation of that committee F. KORELL. Oregon. toward your committee for the fine spirit in which it received the LAAS, Minnesota. memorial by the Committee on Military Affairs. When the matter EDMUND F. Eax, Clerk was called to the attention of the Military Affairs Committee, that the possible effects, not certain effects, because that could only be ascer- tained by investigation, of the enactment into law of House Joint Resolution 183, might be such as to impair the preparedness program and might impinge upon the national defense, it was suggested that the Committee on Military Affairs itself ascertain that fact, but upon reconsideration, in the spirit of comity and of courtesy that should prevail between coordinate committees of the House, and especially, in consideration of the high esteem in which the members of the Committee on Military Affairs held the individual membership of this committee, it was decided, rather, to memoralize this committee as to the significance that appeared to the majority of our committee to be involved in House Joint Resolution 183, and for that reason to ask this committee to hear the facts that might be presented by such persons as might desire to appear and to make statements with refer- ence to the consequences of the enactment of the House resolution into law. I have no statement with regard to it myself. I do desire that you hear the other two members of the Military Affairs Committee if they desire to be heard, and especially Mr. Wainwright, former Assistant Secretary of War, which office under the national defense act is charged with the matériel end and the ammunition end of the preparedness program. I EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 3 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS The CHAIRMAN. We certainly appreciate very much your kindly point on some of the proceedings at the Geneva conference with thoughts. We recognize as you do in your country that when the tegard to this subject. The CHAIRMAN. May I say, Mr. Wainwright, to keep the record quality arms the complements begin. in proper shape, that the Burton resolution was introduced on STATEMENT OF HON. J. MAYHEW WAINWRIGHT, A REPRESENTA- December 5, 1927. Numerous meetings of the committee were held. TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK It was not reported until January 30, 1928, a period of almost two months, and during that entire time no one, according to the records of the committee, indicated a desire to be heard either in favor of or Mr. WAINWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I will not assume to present con- iderations involving the merits of this resolution, as I feel there in opposition to the measure. I might add to that, it is not customary others who are so much more able to do so who have been more unless people ask to be heard to request them to be heard. The committee realizes that we are going out of the usual course by recently associated with the activities of the Government that would affected by this resolution. I am sure my valued friends on the fixing this hearing, but we are anxious to hear anybody that desires to be heard on this or any other measure. There was ample oppor- Military Affairs Committee will not deem it out of the way if I say hat in considering this resolution we were impressed with the fact tunity, however, to be heard by simply requesting the committee had it not been for the first section of the resolution, that res- during the two months preceding the reporting of the resolution to would have gone to the Military Affairs Committee, since it the House. nvolved matters that would automatically have sent the resolution to STATEMENT OF HON. B. CARROLL REECE, A REPRESENTATIVE committee. But since this involves a matter of general policy IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE the form in which the resolution is worded in the first section, it entirely appropriate that it should come to your committee, but Mr. REECE. Since the Secretary of War and members of the Mili- felt that there was a joint interest in this matter, and let me con- tary Establishment are here, and since two members of the Committee in the expression of my colleague from South Carolina, in my on Military Affairs have made statements to which I feel I can not ppreciation as a member of the committee of the spirit in which add anything at this time, I would suggest that the Secretary of resolution has been received, because I wish to assure you and, War be invited to proceed with his statement. add to what has been said, that it was with some embarrassment, Mr. BURTON. Has the Committee on Military Affairs formulated with some reluctance we took the action that we did, and it is very any objections to this resolution; I mean, specific objections? ratifying to have it received in the spirit it has been received. Mr. REECE. No, sir; the Committee on Military Affairs has taken I have only one suggestion to make. I see the Secretary of War no positive action with regard to the resolution or any subjects raised I see the Chief of Staff of the Army, and I may say that in the resolution, but in considering the resolution-Mr. Wainwright, Secretary of War succeeded me as Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McSwain, and myself-certain possibilities, certain far-reaching nobody could be more familiar with the considerations involving consequences appeared to the committee and members of the com- ample supply in time of war. I see here also former Assistant mittee, and they were of such far-reaching importance that we ecretary of War, Hanford MacNider, whom we love to call Colonel thought that the members of the national-defense arms of the Gov- facNider. Therefore, I feel that the defense considerations here ernment ought to be asked to present their views as it affected the in abundantly good hands. I would simply suggest that an national defense, with the object of determining just what effect pportunity be given, that the matter be held over, in order that enactment of this resolution into law might have. In reference present Assistant Secretary of War, Colonel Robbins, may have to the policy that was announced by the chairman of the committee, opportunity to be heard through his section, which is definitely the Committee on Military Affairs, the members of the Committee harged with the responsibility in this regard. You will notice on Military Affairs, and I think I might say the committee also, I refer frequently to the Assistant Secretary of War, and I never had the matter called definitely to their attention until after mply wish to recall to the minds of those who were in Congress in it was reported to the House. that at that time the Assistant Secretary of War was given a Mr. COOPER. You say your attention was not called to it until definite relationship to national defense and he was made, as after the Committee on Foreign Affairs had reported the measure. might have been termed abroad, a minister of munitions." He Who called attention to it? charged with the measures for an adequate supply and for ade- Mr. REECE. Perhaps I should not say it was not called to our measures for that purpose for a time of war, and I suggest attention. I, perhaps, should have said that it did not engage our be given an opportunity to be heard. I would also suggest, as attention until that time. am informed that the Assistant Secretary of War is absent from Mr. COOPER. Who engaged your attention? ashington at this time, and I am quite sure the Secretary of War Mr. REECE. Mr. Wainwright and I entered, into a discussion be- mself will concur in the suggestion on my part, that you might tween ourselves about the effect it might have, and we invited the General Ruggles, the Assistant Chief of Ordnance, who, as I attention of the Military Affairs Committee to the resolution itself. was one of the delegates, a fellow delegate with Senator Mr. WAINWRIGHT. We deemed that our responsibility as Members at the Geneva conference, an opportunity to be heard before of Congress justified us in so doing; in fact, demanded that we should committee. He could enlighten the committee from his stand- EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 5 it, due to the functions of the committee of which we are embers. tion, that is, destruction of life and limb. Let us assume you are Mr. REECE. As a result of our suggestion the committee entered right about subsection 14. Will you point out any other item that to a discussion of the resolution. When the Committee on Military could be used in the pursuit of peace? Mr. REECE. Since subsection 14 has been called to our attention, has under consideration legislation which affects, as most our legislation does, the national defense of the Government, we I think we ought to first say that subsection 14 might be very far- reaching. it our responsibility to invite the opinion of the War Depart- The CHAIRMAN. I am assuming that. Go to the other. If there the national-defense branch of the Government, on this legis- before we take action, even though they might ask to be is anything in here that can be used in the pursuit of peace, the committee is anxious to strike it out, and that is the reason I am and it was rather with that policy in view that we came to conclusion. asking you the question. Mr. REECE. As far as I have in mind at this time from my study Mr. WAINWRIGHT. We are not apologizing for it. Mr. MARTIN. Nobody inspired you to do it, then? of the resolution, that is the only section that might refer to mate- The CHAIRMAN. There is no such inference as that to be drawn rials except those which would be used in destruction of life and Mr. Cooper's question. property, but Ithink we might well consider the purpose for which Mr. COOPER. I never heard a more uncalleld-for ejaculation in this such destruction might be brought about, and if that policy should be enunciated and followed, then we would completely do away mmittee room than that of the gentleman from New York. I asked with-it would call for the doing away with all our national defense proper question. functions of the Government. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. The CHAIRMAN. I think that is rather a broad statement. I Mr. COOPER. I questioned no one's authority, but simply asked who their attention to this matter. I did, not question the authority merely wanted to get from you that one point. I assume there is a I did not suspect such tenderness of feeling. question about subsection 14. I will ask you this question, as a member of Congress, as a soldier with the splendid record you have, Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You are only trying to find why the storm so late. do you not think it prudent for the American Congress to take over Mr. COOPER. Yes. control of these instruments of death instead of leaving them in the hands of munitions makers? Mr. COLE. May I refer to the fact, I think it was on the day Mr. REECE. I think the question has the wrong significance. Con- we reported out this resolution, that I received a letter from friend, Col. C. B. Robbins, Assistant Secretary of War, making gress and the executive branch of the Government now have control over munitions, and I would not be willing to admit that the as to the purport of this resolution. Perhaps I should manufacturers of munitions now have control of that subject. laid this before the committee, but it was largely in the nature The CHAIRMAN. You recognize under the law of contraband that personal letter, and it was thought at that time that it might interfere so much with national defense, but with exports of as long as contraband is not declared forbidden, the munitions products as cotton. makers have a perfect right to sell. Of course, they run the risk of The CHAIRMAN. You have read the resolution as reported? capture by belligerents. REECE. Yes. Mr. REECE. The President has authority. "he CHAIRMAN. Have you examined the list of articles enumerated The CHAIRMAN. The President has no authority. The King of embargo in the resolution? England has, but the President has not. He must get authority REECE. I have taken cognizance of them. from the Congress. he CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with the conclusion that these Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We might as well be clear about this ques- and have limb? only one function-that is, the destruction of human tion of policy you are suggesting. The Government of the United States always assumes, as far as its activities are concerned, abso- COOPER. And property? lute neutrality, and not only does the President announce that as the REECE. It is possible that they have only that function, but attitude of the Government when a war comes along, but we have might have a different purpose than we would ordinarily statutes that forbids certain specific things being done. For in- stance, forbidding American citizens enlisting with the belligerents; he CHAIRMAN. Will you point out to me one article enumerated from fitting out expeditions to assist either one of the belligerents, he resolution that has any other function than the destruction and so forth. The question we have is whether that being the condi- life and limb? tion, we are going to continue the right to American citizens, to send REECE. If I may be permitted to say, in one subsection it out implements and munitions of war as they get the opportunity. to the fact that the components of munitions of war might be They do not do it with the direct approval of the Government, but they are permitted to do it if they can find opportunity to do it, to he CHAIRMAN. Let us assume you are correct as to that. I send out weapons of war that are used by a nation against another the question because the committee in drafting this resolu- am nation for the purpose of doing one thing, namely, killing or crip- wanted to limit the embargo to articles that had only one func- pling people and bringing a great deal of distress upon the EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 7 and children of the people who may be injured or destroyed. vould like to ask you this question, as a fine soldier with a fine STATEMENT OF HON. DWIGHT F. DAVIS, SECRETARY OF WAR Would you consent to do that thing yourself! Suppose were two nations engaged in war, could you bring yourself The CHAIRMAN. Have you examined this resolution, H. J. Res. 183? scientiously to the manufacture and exportation of war ma- Secretary DAVIS. Yes. for the purpose of becoming, in that way, an accessory to the The CHAIRMAN. Have you any opinion which you desire to express of the war? Could you conceivably bring yourself to that? in regard to it? REECE. Before we entered the World War we supplied a great Secretary DAVIS. I would be very glad to give you my opinion, Mr. munitions of war, and as far as I am concerned, I have no Chairman. I might say that I did not know until last night that I of conscience because of the fact that we did supply those was to appear before the committee to-day, so I have not prepared of war, although we were strictly a neutral government. any formal statement. Therefore any opinions which I may give MOORE of Virginia. I understand what our practice has been. you may seem to be rambling, but I will try to stick to the point. I purpose of this resolution is to get away from that practice, and agree with Mr. Wainwright that it would be highly desirable to have ask you the friendly question, Would you do a thing I would the Assistant Secretary of War, if- you so wish, to appear before the do for any amount of money, manufacture material to be sent committee, as by section 5a of the national defense act he is the offi- to be used in killing other folks? I do not believe you would. cial of the War Department who is directly charged with respon- McREYNOLDS. I do not think that is a fair question. sibility. The CHAIRMAN. Is he here? REECE. The resolution has much more far-reaching effects embodied in the question the gentleman from Virginia has Secretary DAVIS. He is out of town and will be back to-morrow pounded, and that is what we thought ought to be studied. morning, and also General Ruggles, who is directly in charge of the MOORE of Virginia. We are not foreclosing any discussion. I technical side of the work in the Ordnance Department. interested to get your personal view, because I have so much Mr. COOPER. You said the Assistant Secretary was directly charged for you and admiration for your record. with responsibility for what? REECE. The resolution itself has a much more far-reaching Secretary DAVIS. Under section 5-a of the national defense act than the relations between individual governments, and, there- he has responsibility for planning for mobilization of the industrial the question can not be answered by making an answer to a resources of the country in the event of war, and the general duties as narrow as that. That is the way it appears to me. which would go with a ministry of munitions, and is directly respon- COLE. From the statement that you made a few moments ago sible for organizing the system. I will try to give the committee a regard to the export of arms to the allied nations before we picture of what this whole problem of munitions in time of war the war, you understand, of course, that if we sympathized means. It is a thing which very few people who have not given it a the French or any other nation at that time, we would have thorough study can realize. It is the most complex problem, I believe, permitted to export arms to that particular nation and all that in the whole question of warfare. be required would be an act of Congress? In the beginning, I am not concerned in the slightest with the ques- REECE. Under those circumstances I should think that the act tion of the munitions industry from the standpoint of profits or any- Congress to that effect would very nearly be an act of war and be thing of that sort. I wish that all profits or the question of money from that standpoint. could be taken out of the question of munitions in industries. I am CHAIRMAN. When it reaches a point of war between two na- not concerned with that in the slightest. In fact, our whole plan and we are justified in contributing to the promotion of war by under the responsibility put upon us by Congress is based upon the of these instruments-if that situation exists, we should be idea that we hope to eliminate, in case we are ever again forced into to get into the war ourselves. war, the possibility of slackers and profiteers, and I think that REECE. If I may be permitted to say, it occurs to me that the meets with the approval of the committee. But I am vitally con- is now being consumed by a discussion of academic phases of this cerned in the responsibility which Congress has put upon us with and the purpose of the Committee on Military Affairs in the munitions industry as an essential element in our national secur- this to the attention of this committee was to get beyond ity, and it is on that point I wish to speak. academic discussion of the effect upon our national defense; and I believe the most important lesson of the World War, the major should be desired that I present that phase of it, not feeling that problem presented to all the nations, was the importance of supplies as competent as other gentlemen who are present, I want to of munitions, as we call it, in modern warfare. It is a problem, the are myself before engaging the time of the committee. extent of which was not realized by any of the nations before the MOORE of Virginia. I think it is desirable as you suggest, that war, and one which is an exceedingly complex and difficult one, but these gentlemen. it is one which is absolutely essential in case we are forced into war. LINTHICUM. I move we ask the Secretary of War for his We have been inclined, I think, always to look upon warfare as a question of man power largely, but the World War taught us that man power without munitions power was almost impotent, and that munitions power was just as important in warfare as man power. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 9 To give you a little idea of the size of this problem-you probably more or less familiar with it-but in our studies we find that to sideration when I study these problems and how they affect our na- supply an army requires the provision of some 35,000 different items tional defense, because, after all, it is the soldier in the trenches, the nade up of 700,000 component parts, in quantities which run liter- American boy, who pays the price. into many millions of every possible conceivable kind and I bring that up, and I would like to expend it, but I will not take character. You might be interested in a little illustration which I your time, because of the fact that there are two ways in general in gave a couple of years ago, which I just wrote off this morning to which nations can supply themselves with these munitions. They llustrate the quantities that are needed in the supply of an army. can have large governmental arsenals capable of making tremendous Take, for example, a common thing like shoes-the service shoe-to supplies more or less secretly, or they can rely on the private industry supply an army in a major war with shoes, the sole leather would of the country. require 4,462,500 steers; the upper leather would require 3,750,000 I think it has been American policy, and I believe I agree heartily that it is wise to adopt the second of these alternatives; certainly, Mr. HULL. How large an army.? it is a nonmilitaristic way of providing for the national defense. Secretary DAVIS. Two million men. That is a total of 8,000,000 In the last war we, of course, used our governmental arsenals which of cattle, and it would require, if we were to transport them, were very largely increased to the extent of their capacity. Yet 01,625 cattle cars, a train 3,000 miles long, reaching from New York with their full productive capacity they could supply less than 10 San Francisco. Stacked one on top of the other, the cut soles per cent of the munitions needed for our armies, and, as you all vould reach 375.60 miles in the air, or over thirty-five hundred know, we did not have an adequate supply of munitions at any time higher than the Washington Monument. That is a little up to the armistice, so that we must rely, if we are to continue ypical illustration of the size of the problem, and, of course, the that policy of relying upon private enterprises, and not building sort of an example could be given for all of these 30,000 articles up enormous governmental arsenals, we must rely on our private The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing in this resolution to interfere industries for 95 to 97 per cent of the munitions needed in time of ith making shoes? .war. That shows the importance of our munitions industry to the Secretary DAVIS. No; that is just one illustration. The same national defense, and anything which would cripple that industry could be used with cartridges. That is simply an illustration would to that extent cripple the national defense. had on my desk. Mr. HULL. You said earlier that you were not interested in the Mr. COOPER. This meeting was called to hear those who are op- profit end of the business and hoped the profit end of the business to the Burton resolution previously reported by the Committee could be eliminated. How can you reconcile a program of that Foreign Affairs. You as Secretary of War put in that data. kind with the maintenance of private industries in this business? it had been put in without the comment just made by the chair- Secretary DAVIS. Because it is essential to the national defense of this committee, the casual reader might have gotten the idea unless you are going to build up Government arsenals. the resolution. would injure very materially the cattle industry Mr. HULL. Private industries can not be maintained without the shoe manufacturing industry, when as a matter of fact it does profits. affect them at all. Secretary DAVIS. No: but as I said, in our plans which are so Mr. MAAS. The Secretary simply gave that as an illustration of thoroughly studied. we hope to eliminate any inordinate and enor- magnitude of the War Department's whole problem. mous profits which may be made in time of war. Mr. COOPER. I am telling what the reader would get from reading Mr. COLE of Iowa. Is it your opinion that by permitting these hearings if he did not know what was in this resolution. exports of muntions you keep our munitions makers in practice, Secretary DAVIS. The illustration was certainly not given with that keep them as going concerns so that they will be ready in case we but was given to show you the size of the problem, as I stated became involved in war ourselves? the beginning. I do not think anyone could get the impression Secretary DAVIS. That certainly was the experience in the World state. I simply want to make the point that this question of War. pplies is one of the greatest problems that can confront any coun- Mr. COLE of Iowa. Should we keep our factories in practice by in time of war. It is a most stupendous problem, and I do not permitting them to send those munitions abroad to kill other people this committee or anyone who has not given very thorough with whom we have no controversies at all? Would it not be better to the question realizes the size, the complexity, and the mag- if we financed our factories outright instead of permitting them to tude of that problem. Furthermore, it is important in modern finance themselves by exporting arms to assist those carrying on arfare and it measures the difference between victory and defeat war against people with whom we have no grievances! nether a nation well supplied with munitions is fighting a nation Secretary DAVIS. That is a question which, I believe. has been is not so supplied, and there are countless illustrations in the studied at every international conference we have had, and the ques- orld War that could be given of that. tion as to whether there should be a prohibition such as that put upon There is the further fact that the lack of munitions, the lack of the producing countries has always been strongly opposed by the eparedness, is measured not only by victory and defeat, but by the nonproducing countries, and, I think, has been opposed by our own of our boys, and that is a thing I always try to keep under con- delegates. It raises a rather big question. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 11 10 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Mr. LINTHICUM. You recognize that this resolution does not affect Secretary DAVIS. As far as actual manufacture is concerned; yes; any of these munitions industries except after the President issues a but the best illustration is that in the World War, if this resolution had proclamation that there is neutrality on the part of the United States been in effect, I think unquestionably the nation against which we ultimately fought would have won the war and, if not, American in the event of nations going to war. Secretary DAVIS. Yes. lives unquestionably would have been sacrificed more than they were Mr. LINTHICUM. During time of peace you recognize that this when we did get into the war. resolution does not affect the munitions manufacturers, do you not? Mr. HULL. I think that is quite conceivable with reference to a Secretary DAVIS. Yes. past situation, but this is prospective and not retrospective. The CHAIRMAN. When you refer to munitions factories, you Mr. FISH. Will you put into the record the number of American- mean industrial establishments throughout the United States which made airplanes, American guns, that were used by the American in time of war are converted into munitions factories? Army in the American Expeditionary Forces-we were in the war Secretary DAVIS. Yes. 18 months-the number of guns manufactured and produced for our use, and how much ammunition was made for our use over in France? The CHAIRMAN. In other words, at the present time there are really no munitions factories in America. except concerns like the Mr. COLE of Iowa. Add to that how many combat planes for use in Remington and others that manufacture sporting goods and things the Army. The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. of that sort. Is that the fact? Secretary DAVIS. Yes. Secretary DAVIS. I think also in connetion with the same problem The CHAIRMAN. Then, at the present time, the passage of this of our productive capacity that our potential productive capacity for resolution, as long as there is peace in the world, would not affect in munitions in this country is one of our greatest safeguards for peace. I make that statement after consideration. the slightest degree any industry in the United States: it is only after war has occurred between two or more countries, and the plants Mr. HULL. How is our potential productive capacity affected by this resolution? are converted into munitions factories, that this industry would be affected. Am I correct in this? Secretary DAVIS. Because if we can not make and ship to nations, Secretary DAVIS. To a certain extent, but if there was no possi- if private industry can not make and ship munitions to belligerents, bility of exporting arms in case of war, there would be little en- our productive capacity would not be developed. Mr. HULL. That comes back to the question I asked before. We couragement to any plants to make even the plans which we ask them to make for conversion in time of war. have to foment trouble throughout the world to keep our potential The CHAIRMAN. It is a big problem to convert the ordinary in- productive capacity up to our potential needs. dustrial establishment into a munitions plant. Secretary DAVIS. I think that is wrong. Secretary DAVIS. Yes; and it is particularly important that plans Mr. KORELL. In the final analysis the opposition to this resolution should be made in advance for that very reason. I will come to revolves around the question of whether or not the Government that. wishes to sustain the cost of preparedness to the point of maintaining Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Do the other nations, for instance, England factories and arsenals of its own or desires to be dependent upon and France and Italy, depend on private producers, or do they pro- private munitions factories. duce munitions of war themselves? Secretary DAVIS. It will come partly to that, and it seems to me Secretary DAVIS. Some of them have large Government-controlled that our policy that we have adopted in this country in the past is Government-owned arsenals, and I would like to come to that in a far better and infinitely less militaristic than the policy of large moment. Government-owned arsenals, where any nation which had aggressive Mr. HULL. Following the question Mr. Cole of Iowa asked, would designs against any other nation, assuming there was a militaristic not seem to be necessary to foment trouble in the outside world to nation that intended to attack some other nation could proceed to supplies? keep your factories in practice so that you could have adéquate prepare large amounts of munitions in its government factories. Mr. Maas. Our industries in the United States, if we were at war, Secretary DAVIS. I do not think so. could be mobilized for munitions and implements of war for our use? practice. Mr. HULL. During long periods of peace they would be out of Secretary DAVIS. It would take us considerable time to develop plants up to their productive capacity and that is one of the im- Secretary DAVIS. Our industries which were developed during the portant elements entering into it. Mr. Maas. How would that be affected by some war in which we war were naturally in that condition before the war, and the best llustration of that is that due to the fact that they were able to were not engaged? upply the Allies for two years they were able to supply our own needs Secretary DAVIS. Because, if our private industries, in accordance far better than they would have. with international law, were able to supply munitions to any bellig- Mr. HULL. But as a condition for the utilization of private indus- erents they would be that much further advanced in connection with for the manufacture of munitions and implements of war, you their productive capacity than they would be if they were not. nust have war going on to keep your factories in practice. 12 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 13 Mr. MAAS. Are we proceeding on the theory that any other inter- ence, the traffic-in-arms conference, and the Havana Conference, and national war in which we are not engaged is a mere preparation for in each case they decided against it. war which we are going to step into after we have made sufficient The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would make any difference to the profits out of munitions so that we are prepared to go ahead? family of a man who was killed in the War between the States, Secretary DAVIS. That would not follow. whether the gun that killed him was manufactured in Europe, or Mr. HULL. What is the answer to the dilemma? It is a logical was manufactured in the South? dilemma, fomenting trouble, to keep it going to take care of the Secretary DAVIS. I do not think that is a very good illustration. potential demands in case we get into war. There is the dilemma The CHAIRMAN. Don't you know they would have a feeling against for the War Department to answer. the country that shipped that gun into the South? The CHAIRMAN. That is the point. Secretary DAVIS. You have to consider its effect. Mr. COLE of Iowa. We thought it was not humanitarian, to say the The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to answer that question. least, to keep our factories in practice for making munitions by per- Secretary DAVIS. I do not think you can say that any particular mitting them to export them to nations that unfortunately happen to shell or any particular ammunition came from any certain place, but at war with each other. Why should we help them kill each other you can see what some of these smaller nations say, that we have in in foreign countries just simply to keep our own factories in shape several of these conferences agreed to the idea that there shall not be to make munitions in the event we get into it? an embargo on the shipment of munitions by private manufacturers. Mr. FISH. That goes much further than the question he had pro- The CHAIRMAN. We recognize the fact that we are establishing a pounded. Every thinking man knows that by the shipment of new policy, but this committee thought when it reported this bill that munitions to belligerent nations by private industries, we will be it was high time to establish such a policy. dragged into that war. Secretary DAVIS. A policy which I think we opposed at the last Secretary DAVIS. I think it could operate the other way as regards conference and some of the nonproducing States fought vigorously other countries and particularly small nonproducing countries which against it. confronted with this same problem without the possibility of Mr. BURTON. Which conference! working it out for themselves. That has been brought out many Secretary DAVIS. The traffic-in-arms conference. times, particularly in the Washington Arms Conference, that if they The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. were not able to obtain supplies to defend themselves against attack Secretary DAVIS. There is the point which was brought up in the aggressive nation, if they could not buy those supplies to questioning Mr. Reece about subsection 14, the component parts. I lefend themselves from a neutral nation, they must establish their have told you of the 35,000 different articles, not all of the munitions government arsenals on a large scale. You would be in a posi- but a large part of them, in which 700,000 component parts go into then where instead of decreasing armaments throughout the the question of supplies! As I read that section, it would refer to vorld you would be increasing them. practically every article, of export whether for peaceful purposes or Mr. FISH. How does that affect the smaller nations? They can not, such things as cotton, steel, copper, sulphuric acid, lenses, electri- get them because they do not control the seas, but assuming they cal apparatus, optical instruments, and things of that sort. get them, how does that cause them to declare war against any- The CHAIRMAN. Assuming you are correct in regard to item ody, against the United States? 14. what other items do you object to? Secretary DAVIS. That does not cause them to declare war against Secretary DAVIS. I do not know whether there is anything else. but during the late war there were very strenuous efforts made to I have not read it with that point of view you brought out in one of President Wilson to declare just this sort of an embargo and he your questions. efused because it would be an unneutral act in his opinion. The CHAIRMAN. That is the point of view we want. We do not Mr. FISH. If we are going to act on this resolution the only time cover anything that can be used in pursuit of peace. act is in time of peace, not in time of war when there is belliger- Secretary DAVIS. I have not read it with that in view. The time to act is now when there is no fear of this country Mr. BURTON. Of course, this committee does not wish in any way to war with any nation. to impede the export of articles used for peaceful purposes, but do The CHAIRMAN. Is it not a fact that nations against whom these you think that in the interpretation by the courts of criminal stat- nunitions are used will hold a hatred for centuries against the nation utes, such a provision as this-" component parts of the articles has allowed its people to profit from their manufacture and sale? enumerated above if capable of being used in the assembly or repair 'or instance, take the case of the War between the States, when of the said articles or as spare parts "-would go so far as to include onfederacy. ertain European nations were selling arms and munitions to the cotton, lead, and things of that kind, particularly when you have an enumeration of divers arms here before that provision, and it is not Secretary DAVIS. No; I think not. the evident intention of the section to refer to portions of machine The CHAIRMAN. As a result, would not such action tend to disturb guns, cannons, and things of that kind? good will that ought to exist between the nations of the world? Secretary DAVIS. I should read that to include cotton, steel, and Secretary DAVIS. It would if it was contrary to international law, things of that kind, because they are absolutely essential parts in that thing has been argued time and again in The Hague Confer- the assembly of projectiles and munitions. Furthermore, that very 14 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 15 point was raised at the traffic in arms conference, and it was brought whether or not munitions could be shipped to them. They have up by many delegates, particularly from the smaller countries, that taken the standpoint that was opposed to their rights of sovereignty. it would be impossible to determine what those things were, and it Any restriction of that sort, therefore, I think would be opposed by was left to the good faith of the nations. other countries with whom we have met in amicable conferences and Mr. BURTON. I am somewhat familiar with that. who have argued very strongly against such einbargoes. Secretary DAVIS. So am I. The CHAIRMAN. I can not agree with your conclusion that the non- Mr. BURTON. If the interpretation was put upon that language, manufacturing country at war could treat as an unneutral act on the component parts, it would be more of a question; but it goes on to part of our Government an embargo against shipment of arms and state clearly, capable of being used in the assembly or repair of munitions of war. the said articles or as spare parts." If you take the case of a projectile, Secretary DAVIS. I did not say that. I said in all these conferences a machine gun, or an automatic rifle, would cotton or lead still be the question has been repeatedly brought up by nonproducing coun- a component part capable of being used in repair or assembly! It tries when provisions similar to this have been suggested of opposi- does not refer at all to fabrication. It refers to assembly or repair tion to it, and they are even opposed to the idea that the producing of them. country could limit or restrict shipment of munitions which might be Secretary DAVIS. I should think cotton, steel, and copper, particu- sent to them. larly, would be absolutely component parts of assembly. The very The CHAIRMAN. I am indifferent as to what these nonmanufactur- fact that it raises a question in my mind or the mind of all the dele- ing countries think about it. What I am trying to do is to reach a gates and other people shows what you would get into in case of sound policy for our Government, which has an undoubted right to war. Suppose you had this resolution in effect? lay an embargo any time it sees fit; and if we did it in peace or war Mr. BURTON. The courts would make their own interpretation. no country in the world would have a right to call it an unneutral Secretary DAVIS. Suppose we shipped cotton for peaceful pur- net on our part. poses to any belligerent. What would be the other belligerent's Secretary DAVIS. That is the basis on which President Wilson claim-that it was opposed to this? I am certain they would, and refused to lay an embargo, was it not? they would endeavor to make a serious international difficulty, and The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what was in his mind. I think you would get a serious international controversy on that Secretary DAVIS. I have always understood that was it. very point. The CHAIRMAN. That has always been my understanding of the The CHAIRMAN. Except that there is no article that can be used law. other than for blood letting. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I am willing to admit this resolution rep- Secretary DAVIS. Offhand, I do not think there is anything. resents a departure from international practice, and the only ques- Mr. FISH. If you are sincere in that attitude, and your colleagues tion we have is whether we will take the step. I agree with you to in the War Department, and you think it includes cotton, lead, and that extent. Admittedly the attitude of President Wilson and Sec- so forth, I for one as a member of the committee, would be perfectly retary Lansing heretofore and the general attitude up to this time, willing to strike it out, and if there is the slightest idea that those I believe we simply have the question as to whether we will embark are included, the committee are trying to do one thing, and not in- on a new course. clude those things, and if it does not, as far as this paragraph is Secretary DAVIS. There is one great danger-I am trying to concerned. it would not affect the resolution, and I would strike it look at it from your standpoint as well, because we all want the out and I think the committee would. same thing after all: The danger that I see in anything of this sort Secretary DAVIS. It seems to me that would be a very dangerous is that some nations have a tremendous capacity of producing muni- thing for future international determination, particularly in view of tions either in Government arsenals or other ways, which other the discussions that have already come up in connection with it. nations have not. If any nation with militaristic ideas, with the That very point would raise the question as to whether or not if design of committing aggressive warfare against any other nation, we shipped anything which might be considered as controversial in smaller nation perhaps-if any nation had that design, if it bought this resolution, it would raise international difficulties which would munitions or made munitions before the declaration of war, piled drag us into conflict. up a reserve of munitions, it seems to me the one thing that they construction. The CHAIRMAN. I am assuming that you are correct in your would want would be to have the other producing nations, especially ourselves, as one of the large producing nations, incapacitated from Secretary DAVIS. I think it is important for the committee to supplying with munitions for their own defense the nation which is ider the arguments made by the nonproducing countries, the smaller con- being attacked. countries, which have no arsenals of their own and which have not The CHAIRMAN. In answer to your statement, let us assume that he resources for producing munitions. At the various conferences one of the largest nations in the world attacked one of the smallest, hat have been held that has been a point which has been raised stead- which had no means of defending itself without buying munitions which lv by them, and they have also strenuously opposed any provision from the outside. This resolution provides that with the consent of would leave even to a producing nation the right to say Congress munitions can be shipped to the injured nation. Is it not 36144-29-2 16 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 17 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS better, Mr. Secretary, to trust the control of this traffic to Congress arms rather than private manufacture. The private manufacturer than to leave it in the hands of munitions makers, whom you say of munitions of war has back of him always the opportunity for were profiteers in the last war? That is the very purpose of this profit. There are men in America to-day, I am afraid, from a con- provision in the resolution " with the consent of Congress," and not versation that I overheard when the World War was about to end, make the embargo final, to meet a situation similar to the one you who would deliberately sacrifice lives if it would tend to gorge their suggest. respective pocketbooks. A man said on a train in my hearing, "I Secretary DAVIS. It seems to me the very moment Congress lifted hope they will not sign the armistice; I have a contract to run about its embargo on behalf of one belligerent the other belligerent might another six months. I would like to finish that." He would make properly take that as an unneutral act. money and his neighbor's children would go to death. "A war to end The CHAIRMAN. Under the law of contraband we have a right to war!" What steps does the War Department propose, and what lay an embargo, and no one has a right to question it. Therefore, we steps has the United States Government proposed toward carrying should also have a right to lift the embargo without anyone ques- out that universally indorsed pledge of President Wilson? It was a tioning it. I can not see where the lifting of this embargo in a par- war to end war. It cost 10,000,000 lives and billions of dollars worth ticular case would be an unneutral act, because we have a right to do of property, and yet we see you come here and urge preparations for it or not. an army of 2,000,000 men in this country in the event of war. Secretary DAVIS. Do you not think that any nation against whose Secretary DAVIS. I agree entirely with the high ideals expressed by interest it was lifted would certainly claim, at least, or feel that it Mr. Cooper. My ideals for peace are just as high as his. I know he was an unneutral act against them? will agree. The CHAIRMAN. We are not approaching the problem from the Mr. COOPER. Undoubtedly. standpoint of what nations may claim, but from the standpoint of Secretary Davis. I think I can say any man who went through international law. the hell of war does not want any more war, and if I thought this Mr. HULL. I will call your attention to the fact that there was an was a constructive measure for world peace, I would be one of the embargo on munitions, and war supplies on the Lusitania were given first to be in favor of it. I am afraid it is not. I am afraid instead as the explanation or excuse for the sinking of the Lusitania. Is it of promoting peace it might bring difficulties. not true, as indicated by that experience, that it does net keep us out Mr. HULL. Yet by your own statement you would make ready of war but gets us into war when they ship munitions that way? for war. Secretary DAVIS. The question of the shipment of munitions, as I Secretary DAVIS. I have not in any sense advocated an army of see it, under international law, is one to which no nation has the 2,000,000 men. It is the duty of the War Department under the right to object. mandate of Congress to plan for national defense. That is by Mr. HULL. They might not have a right to object. but they sunk action of Congress, not the War Department, but any constructive the ship. measures for peace I am heartily in favor of, because I know what Secretary DAVIS. That in my opinion is an act of war against us. war means as I have been in it actively. I think any man who has Mr. COOPER. Have they a right to object to an independent, sover- been through it wants constructive measures, for peace. eign country laying an embargo? Mr. FISH. You know what the intention of the committee is in Secretary DAVIS. Possibly they have no right, but I think they reporting this bill. It was a peace measure to keep us out of war, would consider that an unneutral act, which in time of war is serious. instead of getting into war. Mr. COOPER. It has been said that we are embarking on a new Secretary DAVIS. Absolutely. policy. There has not been an advance step in the history of man- Mr. FISH. In the second place, we wanted to help starve out war kind that has not involved a new policy. Its opponents have some- in other countries, not only keep ourselves out of war, but also help times been called conservatives for objecting to it simply because it to starve war in other countries. What we want to hear from the was new. War Department is how this measure will get us into war and in St. Paul's idea of conservatism was to hold fast to that which is what possible way? good, not to hold fast to everything good or bad. Therefore, the The CHAIRMAN. May I add something? There is a third reason fact that the pending resolution embodies a new proposition is not a that moves me very strongly. As long as the workshops of America vital argument against its enactment. The World War, as was re- supply belligerents, Europe is practically helpless to control wars in peatedly stated by President Wilson in proclamations that enlisted the Balkans. If the Balkan countries realize they can not exercise get arms the praise of the civilized world, was fought to end war. Every min- and munitions in America, will it not enable Europe to a ister of the Gospel from every pulpit in this land, of every faith and much larger measure of control over these peoples? creed, repeated that statement to their congregations and their con- Secretary DAVIS. If we got a universal agreement with the other gregations applauded it every time. Yet now, although nearly 10 great producing nations that might be so. " years have elapsed since the fighting ceased, you have just been as- The CHAIRMAN. As Washington said, We have very little in com- serting here the necessity of our being prepared for an army of supplied mon with arms and munitions from America, which countries an in with Europe." When war starts in the Balkans is they entirely are 2,000,000 men in this country and talking about the danger, if we should have a public manufacture or governmental manufacture of different state of affairs than if they had to go to EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 19 Europe that were intensely interested in preserving peace to get and munitions. At any rate Europe would be responsible for get rid of that policy altogether. A writer recently had an article permitting the war. in the North American Review advocating the wholesale abandon- Mr. BLOOM. The only objection which you urge in this entire ment of neutrality, his idea being that it would operate as a deterrent resolution is to subsection 14 of section 3. Can you suggest any way because it would be regarded as a threat. I could not favor that. I which this resolution could be amended to bring about the aims do not think many would favor that. That would be a reversal of and desires of this committee? the policy which was started by Washington. We are now on the Secretary DAVIS. In regard to that section? contrary trying to put something on the statute books in addition to Mr. BLOOM. No. That section is the only thing you have re- what we now have. erred to. Mr. BURTON. And in line with it. That is set forth quite fully in The CHAIRMAN, He said the others so far as his examination was the report on the resolution. oncerned. Secretary DAVIS. In the various international conferences, the Mr. BLOOM. Is there any suggestion you could make with reference Hague conference, the traffic in arms conference, the Havana con- this resolution which would bring about the desires of the com- ference, this same thing has been brought up. I am not an inter- national lawyer. but I think it is pretty well settled that a provision Secretary DAVIS. In order to carry out the purpose you have? similar to this was not international law. It has been brought up Mr. BLOOM. Yes. several times and I think we have always agreed to the conclusion Secretary DAVIS. I will be very glad to examine it and see if I can of the conference which has stricken out that idea. any suggestion. Mr. BURTON. We have undoubtedly up to this moment. We did Mr. MAAS. You are very much concerned with the present practice in Havana. neutrality. In actual practice, is it not true that shipping muni- Secretary DAVIS. Whether it is wise for us to change international and arms is to only one side, when two nations are at war, as law by one nation, as far as we are concerned. is a question. is usually able to enforce a blockade against the other, and Mr. BURTON. That is the whole question, whether we shall under- etually results in taking sides by shipping munitions to only one take to do what is proposed by this resolution on our own account and without relying on the concurrence of other nations, or let them Secretary DAVIS. Not necessarily, unless you refuse to ship to the go in their gate and we go in our gate. Mr. FISH. Not to rely on other nations; we are not even asking Mr. MAAS, It is not a question of refusing. It is a question of not other nations. able to make deliveries to the other side. Mr. BURTON. Have you other points? Secretary DAVIS, It is largely a question of making deliveries Secretary DAVIS. I think not. You remember that in the World War munitions were de- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Your statement has been of help. to Germany through Sweden and other countries, Mr. FISH. Will you put in the record the answer to the question Mr. MOORE of Virginia. What is the difference in principle be- I asked, about the amount of airplanes used by the American Expedi- this resolution and the principle expressed in our neutrality tionary Forces, and the number of guns and munitions, and so forth? with which you are doubtless familiar. The neutrality The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to come back to-morrow. I will not codified in 1818, forbid any citizen of this country to enlist take more than 10 minutes. the service of belligerents with which we are at peace; it forbids Mr. BURTON. I do not guarantee that. citizens of this country or any group of citizens from arming a Secretary DAVIS. Would it not be better to hear some other wit- to take part in a war going on between nations with which we nesses to see what you would develop? at peace. It forbids all citizens of this country from augmenting The CHAIRMAN. This committee, after much study, prepared this equipment of a foreign armed vessel of a country entering our list of absolute contraband. We had only one guide post, and that when that nation is at war with another. There is a prohibi- was to limit it to instruments of destruction. I wish you would take upon citizens furnishing cannon to any belligerent ship that military expeditions here for the service of a friendly power. into our ports. It forbids citizens of this country from organ- carefully coming prepared to point out any of the articles enumerated that list, disregarding subsection 14 for the moment, and examine it that are even as consistent with peace as with war. are severe penalties attached to the violation of those statutes. Secretary DAVIS. I will be very glad to do that. May I just notify has seemed to me that when you come to the spirit of the thing that or come up? can not distinguish between the policy expressed by those statutes The CHAIRMAN. Come up. the policy suggested by this resolution. Those statutes have not Mr. MAAS. The Secretary was asked also if he would prepare his provisions of those statutes by saying that citizens shall not do us into any trouble. We now are intending only to enlarge idea on this resolution. Mr. BLOOM. I asked that. thing forbidden by this resolution. I confess I have been unable Mr. BLOOM. May I suggest that the Secretary said he would because prefer Secretary DAVIS. That would take several days. vancing our general policy of neutrality. Some people want to a distinction. It seems to me that the resolution is simply to let it go until after some of the other people spoke we might want to get different opinions. 20 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 21 The CHAIRMAN. The information I asked I would like to have at at this question, especially the chemicals as applied to chemical war- the opening to-morrow because it is a sort of groundwork from fare, I feel convinced that we can not hope for much through efforts which to examine other witnesses. to control implements of war rather than to give our entire thoughts (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee adjourned to meet to getting at the rooting out of the fundamentals that lead to war. again at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Friday, March 16, 1928.) In connection with this matter of the chemical industry, Mr. Chairman, there are many of us who have been connected with efforts to develop this industry in this country, who have been led not by commercial thoughts but by the belief that through a complete HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, rounding out and firm establishment of that industry, we were con- COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, tributing in our way to increasing the national defense. Friday, March 16, 1928. We have been very successful in building up this industry in this presiding. The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (chairman) country within the last 10 years, and yet it has been largely a do- mestic affair. Two weeks ago I attended a great meeting of the The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. chemical executives of the chemical industry at the Department of Secretary Davis will not be here this morning on account of a Commerce on the invitation of Mr. Hoover, and the whole burden Cabinet meeting, and I desire to announce that there will be no and emphasis of that meeting was that the chemical industry must testimony taken this morning from the War and Navy Departments, but we will hear from those present that desire to be heard. seek greater export fields. Just in the midst of that successful build- ing up of this industry and seeking foreign markets, our share of STATEMENT OF CHARLES H. HERTY, ADVISER TO THE CHEMICAL the world's trade, there come three developments which I would like to call to the attention of the committee, and I am not wandering FOUNDATION, NEW YORK CITY afield from the resolution. I have some very definite, specific things Mr. HERTY. I am adviser to the Chemical Foundation. to say upon certain clauses in the resolution, and I would like to The CHAIRMAN. Have you examined House Joint Resolution 183? lay this background. We are faced here all of a sudden with a Mr. HERTY. I have, Mr. Chairman, and I desire to say just a few combination of the European chemical industries under the cartci words to the committee in regard to this. system, so entirely foreign to the spirit of our legislation, of our The CHAIRMAN. Before you do so I would like to state this: You laws, and of our policies in this country. Those European chemical called upon the Speaker, Mr. Longworth, and he referred the matter industries have combined, and it gives them a temporary advantage to me, I telegraphed you to come on and you very kindly responded. in the elimination of overhead, and so forth. We are living under Mr. HERTY. I am very glad to receive that information. I ap- the Sherman antitrust law, I am happy to say, but I feel confident preciate the opportunity to come here for this reason, that I would of the ultimate outcome of the commercial struggle that is now on like to speak to the committee for a moment regarding certain between this country and Europe in the matter of chemicals as phases of this resolution which may affect our chemical industry, between the competitive system and the monopolistic system. I because the Chemical Foundation, under its charter, is deeply inter- think we are going ahead for the best interests of our brains and ested in everything that affects the welfare of the chemical industry. the consumers. I think I can speak to this committee in a sense in a disinterested In the midst of that comes another development. Our banks way, and, while I was for five years president of the Synthetic to-day are floating loans, taking the money of the investors of this Organic Chemical Manufacturers' Association, an organization that country and directing it toward the support of the European chemi- embraces dyes, and so forth, I no longer am connected with the cal industries which are banded together as a unit in this commercial industry even directly or indirectly in any capacity. I own no stock struggle that is now getting under way between this country and in any chemical concern and never have, and for that reason I can Europe. It is just at the critical stage. Everybody is in the mood in regard to the bill. give, to a certain extent, an impartial discussion of certain points for a fight on this side with confidence we will eventually win out, and every factor that may upset the peaceful and steady development May I say at the outset, that I have the deepest sympathy with of that industry is a threat to its future permanency. the purpose of this resolution? I am one of those who longs to see So in this resolution there come up questions which, as I read and every movement fostered that may avoid war and promote peace reread last night the deliberations of the League of Nations on this among our people. I go so far as to regret exceedingly that Con- question, it seemed to me, ought to give us pause in regard, at least, gress has not seen fit to join the World Court. I go even further to certain features of this resolution, because they gave it up. I have Chan that. I regret that, with proper reservations. we did not join that paper here with me, a very interesting interview in the New he League of Nations to get our men sitting around a table to York Times by Professor Vernetti, who was on the membership of olan an understanding that will avoid war. I watched with the commission. reat deal of interest and have followed closely developments at a Mr. HERTY. A professor of quantitative analysis at Columbia Uni- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Who was he? Geneva, in which efforts have been made to control the implements f war, and, as I watched the fruitless manner in which they labored versity, and he was linison officer between our Chemical Warfare all Service and the French chemical warfare service. He served in this League of Nations work in drawing drafts of various matters. 22 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 23 Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You are stating three points-first, a com- Mr. HERTY. At the same time, does not that indicate the futility bination of European chemical manufacturers; second, that We are of isolated action by a measure of this kind when these things can third? making loans to them to build up their industry; and what is the be gotten around in so many ways indirectly? The CHAIRMAN. No. The committee was actuated by an earnest Mr. HERTY. The third relates to certain features of this resolution desire not to interfere in any particular with the ordinary com- which I think will work detrimentally to the chemical industry. mercial life of the nation. One of the purposes of this hearing is to The first point I will ask the committee's attention to is page 2, get the judgment of men like you, because if there is anything in lines 1 and 2, where it specifies in regard to shipments, in section 2. here that does interfere with the commercial life of the nation, we It speaks here of exporting or attempt to export any arms, muni- want to know it and strike it out. tions, or implements of war from any place in the United States or Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You must realiez that the resolution is any possession thereof to the territory of either belligerent or to so drawn that there would be full knowledge by the exporter that any place if the ultimate destination of such arms, munitions, or war was in progress. He would be put on notice by the President's implements of war is within the territory of either belligerent," and proclamation, if not otherwise, that war was in progress, and he so forth-and I call attention to that-" or to any place.' would thereby be warned to determine as well as he could whether My thought is that chemistry is not primarily a war industry. the implements or munitions were intended to be ultimately used for Chemistry is a peace industry. The war people have taken up chem- war purposes. istry and made use of it. But the manufacturer goes ahead with his Mr. HERTY. I will come back to the point later. It shows the legitimate trade, developing export business, and I fear that under difficulties chemical men would have to meet. that restriction there is a danger, and I see exactly what the commit- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You are merely suggesting details and tee intends to do; it is to prevent a roundabout method of getting not reading the heart of the matter at all. Your objection would things which they can not get directly; I recognize the danger there. be answered by using the word which is so commonly employed On the other hand, the manufacturer makes a sale in good faith to in statutes- knowingly." That word is used in thousands of State some other nation, to a customer in some other nation. He can not statutes and in many Federal statutes, so as to attribute actual control where that is going to. He does not know. knowledge to the person charged with violating the law, knowledge As I see this resolution, it is not an international agreement; this that he is doing something that constitutes a violation. is simply an American policy, and so I can not see how our manu- Mr. BURTON. What are the arms or munitions or implements of facturers could ever feel safe or comfortable that they would not be, war made by chemical manufacturers that would come under this of course, unwittingly, because I think that would apply to the great bulk of our people-that they would not wittingly try to circumvent designation? Mr. HERTY. I am coming to that. On line 21 of page 2 of the a law of this kind-but unwittingly they would be shipping material resolution, in subsection 6, it says: Projectiles and ammunition for which would find its way to a belligerent nation through some other the enumerated in number 5 above." country or countries. I arms have in mind a few illustrations here. Picric acid is a dye The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave that, suppose we take them one manufactured by dye manufacturers along with other supplies that of at a time. I realized that the lay mind would be likely to put such dies, picric acid is one of the most powerful explosives would a construction upon that section. the French yet relied on most during the war. In this connection Mr. HERTY. May I say I am not a lawyer? I am a chemist and I picric acid be considered a dyestuff, as it is being used in quantities, am not familiar with the legal aspects. or does it come under the head of munitions? The CHAIRMAN. This is a penal statute, which must be strictly then means everything that is assembled or used in the fabrication would affect The CHAIRMAN. The word munitions," if we apply your theory, of construed, and any prosecution of a company for violating section 2 would put the burden of proof on the Government to show that the these instruments of destruction. and that, of course, bears manufacturer knew at the time he manufactured and exported these goods that they were to be used by belligerents. exports the same relationship to munitions as steel does in the of steel, lumber, iron, and so forth, so picrie manufacture acid Mr. BURTON. Or passed on. of arms. The CHAIRMAN. Or passed on to other parties. I can not satisfy Mr. BLOOM. Or as alcohol to prohibition. your mind as to that, but if you will consult any reputable lawyer he will confirm my statement. There is absolutely no danger what- munitions to the French we were making picric acid tremendously. Mr. HERTY. To my mind, when we were talking about supplying ever. There can not be a crime without an intent to commit a That classed a powerful explosive. crime. If there is anything fundamental, that is. In other words, Mr. is BURTON. Would as picric acid be used as an implement of war? the I might illustrate by a matter with which I am quite familiar. Sup- shell into the The picric acid was the greatest explosive of it here Mr. HERTY. Yes; put right into the shell. You have to put the pose an American firm of pharmaceutical chemists manufactured heroin and sold it to the legitimate trade, and it finally reached the French relied gun. on during the war, and we made most hands of a drug peddler, no one would say the chemist was liable. for them. Mr. FISH. Do we export any of it now? 24 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 25 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Mr. HERTY. I can not tell you offhand, but I have no doubt all tion freely is continued and not abandoned, as we propose. Now, our lines of dyes are going abroad. I have not the export figures with human nature as it is, have you any doubt that as soon as war with me. I came on 15 minutes' notice of this meeting. might break out between two nations, we will say, two large nations, Mr. FISH. I asked the question because you mentioned it. without naming them, that there would be a lot of picrie acid ex- Mr. HERTY. I am giving it as a type. ported? The CHAIRMAN. I assume you know the resolution would have no Mr. HERTY. I imagine there would be. effect unless there were war. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. That is to say, while not necessary to Mr. HERTY. I understand that. manufacture its acid in order to protect the interests of the United The CHAIRMAN. I understand that in case of war your factories States, a concern engaged in the business would send out this picrie could be converted in 10 or 15 days to furnish poison gases to the acid to be used for war purposes in a contest between two nations Government? with which we would be at peace. Now, from the moral point of Mr. HERTY. I am speaking now about the export business. view, what do you think about that? The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to get that point definitely. Mr. HERTY. I think that manufacturers living under our laws as Mr. HERTY. In case of war on our part? they do would have a right legally and morally, when called upon, to The CHAIRMAN. Yes. furnish materials in the ordinary course of business transactions, to Mr. HERTY. Absolutely. I can give you the wording of the League carry that out. I can see in some cases where it might be very f Nations on that. I can give you my own judgment. I think some desirable from every standpoint to do so. Suppose some one would f our factories in a week's time could be turning out the most pow- attack the Republic of Panama where we are so closely concerned. rful materials for our armaments. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I am not talking about the exceptional The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get that more definitely in the case. I am asking you. in any conceivable case of war, human nature ecord. being what it is, is there any doubt at all that the exportation of Mr. HERTY. I am very glad you brought up this subject because I picric acid would be started. the stuff to be used to kill people? I hought we were already sufficiently informed about that. One of am asking you whether that is the moral position to take, any more he greatest happiness to my life is the fact that when I was presi- than for a bootlegger to distribute poisonous liquor to injure people? ent of that association of dye manufacturers I was instrumental in Mr. HERTY. I can not see those two cases on all four legs. ffecting the opening up of every factory to the representatives of Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I should think the manufacturers would he War Department, so that they could be absolutely surveyed in be accessory both before and after the fact. to the destruction of very respect to determine which plant and whatever that plant was human life, should it continue to do that thing. est qualified to make. All that is on record in the War Department Mr. BLOOM. What else is there besides this picric acid that any of ere and those plants can be called upon and equipped with material your manufacturers could in 5 or 10 days' notice export to" foreign make any of these so-called materials for war on short notice, countries? The CHAIRMAN. What is short notice? Mr. HERTY. That is the next article I was coming to, far more Mr. HERTY. Some of them could be manufacturing and turning important than picric acid; that is ammonium nitrate. it powder within a week; others in a month. Mr. BLOOM. The statement is made here that within 5 or 10 days The CHAIRMAN. In case of war between foreign countries, it would the factories could equip themselves so as to export munitions of ot be necessary for your company to manufacture for the belliger- war. I do not believe it is right to have that go out to the world nts, in order to prepare your plant to furnish materials to our Gov- that we are to-day equipped with our factories to export munitions enment in case we became involved in the war? You are ready at of war, whether it is this acid or 10 or more other things. I think it I times without any preparation? ought to go into the record just what the manufacturers, the fac- Mr. HERTY. The material is standing there in the plant. tories, in this country to-day, can export that may be used in case of The CHAIRMAN. I simply want that on the record. war. The statement made which is in the record does not seem to Mr. HERTY. There is no question about it. clarify the atmosphere as to how this country is preparing for war The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you could be ready in 10 days. at the present time. It allows the impression to go out that we are Mr. HERTY. That argument was used with Congress itself to make prepared for war and we can manufacture and export these things at point clear, and I think the President of the United States and within 10 days' notice. e Speaker of the House have written letters testifying to the fact The CHAIRMAN. You did not get the purport of my question. the importance of the industry. That is the basis of the protec- on given by Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, to insure The CHAIRMAN. The point I want to make it that in the usual and Mr. BLOOM. I got the purport of the question but not the answer. at the industry should be developed so that it would be ready for ordinary course of this business you are at all times prepared to fur- tional defense. nish these gases and acids either in time of peace or war? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Referring to Mr. Fish's question as to The CHAIRMAN. My purpose in asking the question is to meet the Mr. HERTY. Yes. hether you export picric acid now, let us assume you do not export now. Let us assume that the present policy of allowing exporta- argument that in the event of war between two foreign countries it is necessary for us to manufacture and ship arms, so that our fac- EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 27 will be prepared in case we become involved in the war. The entleman's testimony eliminates that point so far as chemical war- Mr. HERTY. That was a power conferred by Congress. are is concerned. There is no necessity for the chemical industry Mr. COOPER. And that was gotten through by the influence of ship to belligerents simply for the sake of preparedness in case and as some people said the very adroit work of Mr. A. Mitchell become involved in war. That is what I had in mind. Palmer. A suit was directed to be begun by the then President of Mr. HERTY. Only to this extent, that where other chemical-pro- the United States, Mr. Harding, to set aside the sale of those patents as fraudulent because of the grossly inadequate prices for which countries like Germany, England, and France, might be upon for the same material and supplies they are that much they were purchased and the fact also that the man who made the urther ahead in the indsutrial race. sale was within a few weeks president of the company that owned Mr. BLOOM. What is there outside of acid that you could ship? the patents that he himself had sold. The transfer of these patents Mr. HERTY. That is the very next thing I will bring up-am- was not made until three months or four months after the armistice onium nitrate. was signed. Is that true? Mr. BLOOM. How many things are there that you could ship? Mr. HERTY. Mr. Chairman, in answer to that question this whole Mr. HERTY. I could not answer that offhand. That information matter has not only been heard before the Ways and Means Com- be readily gotten from the War Department, which keeps close mittee, before the Senate Finance Committee, covering weeks of on all of those questions. testimony, all published in the record, but it has been brought Mr. BLOOM. Do you represent the synthetic? through Federal courts, where testimony was taken throughout an Mr. HERTY. No; I resigned from that a year and a half ago. I entire summer, with Judge Morris, of the court in Delaware, giving now with the Chemical Foundation. the utmost freedom to make the record absolutely complete; where Mr. BLOOM. There seems to be another association that you brought the Department of Justice, which was carrying on this suit, had the attention of the committee. What is the difference between access to every document, everything of that kind assembled; where organization, with reference to the manufacture of these things, it was argued at length, and every specification in the bill of com- the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers' Association? plaint was rejected by the judge and a decision given not only en- Mr. HERTY. The latter association is a trade organization of the tirely in favor of the Chemical Foundation but if you will read anufacturers, American manufacturers of synthetic organic chemi- Judge Morris's decision he commended the purposes and the spirit such as dyes, perfumes, flavors, and so forth. of cleanness with which the Chemical Foundation had been admin- Mr. BLOOM. They are just distributors? tered, and at the end of his decision he rebuked the Government for Mr. HERTY. No; manufacturers. It is simply a trade association. coming into court with a case with such serious charges with no Mr. BLOOM. Do they manufacture the same things as your organi- evidence to support them. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. And the Supreme Court 0. K'd that. Mr. HERTY. The Chemical Foundation is an organization which Mr. HERTY. The Court of Appeals heard the thing. not manufacture. It simply owns patents that were bought Mr. BURTON. That is past history. the Government. During the war they licensed these patents Mr. HERTY. It was clearly a matter of public record. received royalties and it uses its profits for educational research. Mr. COOPER. Did not that all hinge upon the fact and was not the is not manufacturing. Supreme Court and other courts estopped from making any other Mr. LINTHICUM. Do they have Bayer's tablets? judgment because of the action of Congress in conferring that war Mr. HERTY. No. Those tablets were bought up by public sale power upon the President, and his authority to give it as he did to were bought in by a selling drug company. Mr. Frank Polk? The transfer of these patents was not made until Mr. COOPER. Did the witness say that he appeared here for the three months after the armistice was signed? emical Foundation? Mr. HULL. What do we gain in this discussion by that? Mr. HERTY. I am adviser to the Chemical Foundation. Mr. COOPER. He said he appeared for that foundation, and I Mr. COOPER. The Chemical Foundation, you say, was organized wanted the character of the Foundation understood. over certain German patents? Mr. HULL. Is not the gist of your objection that it simply inter- Mr. HERTY. That is all on the official records of the courts of the feres with the profits of the business! Mr. HERTY. Of course, there are profits incidentally, although I Mr. LINTHICUM. And on the records of Congress. think there is so much competition in the chemical industry that Mr. HERTY. On the records of the courts, Federal, district, appeal, there is very little profit in it. It would interfere with the legiti- United States Supreme Court. mate, normal production in furnishing these peace-time articles. Mr. COOPER. Yes; and everyone who has examined it knows that Mr. BURTON. Do you desire to have also the right to ship those Supreme Court was obliged to hold that way because of the articles in time of war to belligerents? power conferred upon President Wilson, and then upon the Mr. HERTY. Just as it has always been the case. It is the question Secretary of State by President Wilson's order, to do as of contraband. might respectively please as a war measure. The CHAIRMAN. It is contraband, and the word contraband means against the law. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 29 8 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Mr. TEMPLE. Why do you figure 10 days to get ready to manu- Mr. HERTY. I have never heard any outery or moral objection facture? gainst our shipping materials to the allies before we went in the Mr. HERTY. Because there are certain products that we are not ar. We took the risk, of course. manufacturing that we would have to change over to; there would be The CHAIRMAN. The only exception I took was that you said it slight changes in equipment, cleaning up the machinery, getting rid legitimate to do it. of certain products, changes in material-all that would have to be Mr. HERTY. I meant it was the custom or practice. done. Mr. LINTHICUM. I do not think you brought it out sufficiently in Mr. TEMPLE. It would not interfere with your manufacture of our answer to what Mr. Bloom asked you when you answered the acids or the making of rayon, so far as this resolution is concerned? hairman's question in a way which would lead the public to believe Mr. HERTY. No; that is going on to-day. hat you were ready to manufacture munitions of war of whatsoever Mr. TEMPLE. It would not interfere with that peace-time activity. ature within 10 days. What Mr. Bloom wanted to know and what The passage of this resolution would not affect your peace-time would like to know is what chemicals or other things definitely business. ould you be able to manufacture within 10 days to use in warfare? Mr. HERTY. No: provided no more wars come. Mr. HERTY. For instance, all sorts of apparatus for the nitrating Mr. BLOOM. Getting back to Mr. Hull's question, the only thing cotton. We use it in connection with making film for new skin, that your company or your association is concerned about is the d in rayon, and in connection with viscous manufacture, we can profit that would come from selling munitions? It is not a patriotic trate the cotton. and taking the nitration a step further you get gesture on your part or your association. to gun cotton. That is the chief propeller used to drive a shell out Mr. HERTY. It is a question whether you are selling all munitions the gun. It is the case of concentration of acids for a length of or selling peace-time products. Take the case of chlorine. That ne. With mild treatment we get a mild nitrating and with further is a very powerful war gas. The manufacturers are not making it to avy nitrating the products become explosives. It is the same appa- destroy life, they are making it to preserve life. It is the most tus, the same material, a small amount, a little more time and powerful agent for the purifying of water in our water works in this ength. We are nitrating every day to get nitrates to make aniline country to-day. d from the aniline make the dyes. The apparatus we nitrate with Mr. TEMPLE. The passage of this resolution would not interfere operating to-day while we are talking. with the sale of chlorine in time of peace? Mr. BLOOM. This resolution will not disturb any of your commod- Mr. HERTY. No. is in the least in peace time? Mr. TEMPLE. It would not interfere with the sale of, chlorine in Mr. HERTY. No. this country in time of war? Mr. BLOOM. In war time this resolution would not affect it, if the Mr. HERTY. No: but the exportation of it. esident gives permission or Congress gives permission. How Mr. BURTON. Would it interfere with the exportation of it? ald you folks be in any way injured by this resolution the way it Mr. HERTY. Page 3, line 11, subsection 13, " Poisonous gases, acids, rawn up at the present time? It would not disturb you now. In or any other articles or inventions prepared for use in warfare." er words, if this resolution should become law, in what way would The CHAIRMAN. Prepared for use in warfare. ffect any of the companies that you represent? Mr. HERTY. Prepared for use in peace or war. 1r. HERTY. I think I can illustrate that by an analogy in eco- The CHAIRMAN. It does not say that. nics. Mr. HERTY. You can not distinguish because the Germans are using he CHAIRMAN. I would rather have a direct answer to the ques- it in the same kind of cylinders we use it in to-day, with slight modi- It is very easy to answer it and tell how it interferes with your fication. ness. Mr. FISH. Are we importing any chlorine gas in this country? r. HERTY. In other words, it takes time to get a measure through Mr. HERTY. I think so. You can get that from the Department gress. We all know that. Not through the House, as the House of Commerce. its machinery working fast. In the meantime, whatever other Mr. TEMPLE. Any prosecutions under this act would have to show atries would do in violation of the spirit of this resolution it would that this gas was prepared for use in warfare. That would bring been done, up the intent. he CHAIRMAN. In other words, other countries in the meantime Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Not only prepared but shipped for that Id get the business and you would not? purpose. r. HERTY. Yes; it is a commercial question. Mr. TEMPLE. Yes. I wanted that comment to go on record. It r. TEMPLE. You say it would take a week or 10 days to equip would not interfere with the manufacture of any of these gases unless to enable these chemical factories to transform their present the gas shipped was prepared for use in warfare. That is specifically ucts into munitions. How would the passage of this resolution written in the bill and would have to be proved in court that that affect your present business? You are not manufacturing tions now. was the purpose. HERTY. In many cases we are. They are used for other pur- 30 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 31 Mr. HERTY. If the prosecutor wanted to take the war side of things, Mr. Maas. How will it be affected ne could say it was prepared for war, and the defendant might have Mr. HERTY. Because the chemical industries of other countries right to say it was prepared for peace. with which we are in very keen competition are not bound by this Mr. TEMPLE. He would not only have to say it but he would have to resolution at all. prove it. Mr. MOORE, of Virginia. That is, they would make more profits Mr. HERTY. Chlorine is not a compound. It is an element, one out of war than otherwise they would make? ingle elementary substance. Mr. HERTY. They would make more money than we would. Mr. TEMPLE. The intent to ship for use in warfare would have to Mr. MOORE, of Virginia. They would make more money than we e shown. would in time of actual war. Do you think we ought to be controlled Mr. BURTON. In the ordinary form in which chlorine gas is ex- by that consideration or by the consideration of what is right? orted, could it be immediately used in warfare? Mr. TEMPLE. It seems to me if they had no markets developed in Mr. HERTY. Yes. time of war their competition with you in your peace-time business Mr. BURTON. How so? would be less in time of war. Mr. HERTY. Just as the Germans used it, put big tanks in the Mr. Maas. The only loss you would have would be the loss of the renches, open up the cock, and let the wind blow it across. That is increase for war purposes. hat killed so many British and Canadians. Mr. HERTY. The whole story of the chemical industry in war The CHAIRMAN. The point you raise in regard to subsection 13, time is that all wars result in tremendous expansion of the chemical hat it would render any manufacturer liable, is a legal one. I am so industries of all countries. onfident that the committee is right in its position, that before there The CHAIRMAN. Why not just say tremendous profits, instead of ould be a conviction the Government would have to show that the using the word expansion? anufacturer knew it was to be used in warfare. If you can get the Mr. HERTY. I will say exactly why. So far as we are concerned pinion of any reputable lawyer saying we are wrong in our view, we in a future war I hope that this Congress will provide that there ill strike it out. be no profits. I hope to see the chemical industry and everything Mr. HERTY. Those legal questions I will have to leave to the law- else drafted. ers of the House. Mr. BLOOM. Why should you object to this resolution? The CHAIRMAN. You are raising a legal question. Mr. HERTY. It is not a question of our being involved in war. Mr. HERTY. I am sorry; I thought I was bringing out the chemical Mr. BLOOM. Or of any country being involved in war? You say de of it. I would be lost on the legal side of the matter. there should not be any profits? Mr. Maas. In connection with Mr. Hull's question as to the pur- Mr. HERTY. Here are peace-time articles going into regular com- se of this hearing, we are not concerned particularly with the merce that happen to be useful in war as well as in peace, and when ofits of the chemical industry in time of war. What we want to two countries go to war immediately your whole market is worked 10W is how this will affect the national defense. up. Mr. HERTY. It is affected by anything that tends to upset the bal- Mr. FISH. What are your peace-time articles that you are now ce in favor of the efforts we are making to develop a legitimate exporting that this bill interferes with? What are some of the emical industry in this country. commodities you refer to? Mr. Maas. How does that affect it? Mr. HERTY. Ammonium nitrate, which we are preparing now in Mr. HERTY. It affects it unfavorably financially and would, per- this country at Hopewell, Va., where there is an enormous plant ps, leave the industry on a wobbly financial footing. costing a hundred million dollars. Mr. Maas. You do not mean to say that the industry is dependent Mr. FISH. How much are we exporting now? a war. You are dependent on peace-time developments. Mr. HERTY. Very little at present, because we are developing a Mr. HERTY. Our industry is dependent on competition with so synthetic ammonia that will be ready in a year. ny industries. Mr. FISH. What are you exporting now that this bill would inter- Mr. Maas. In time of war? fere with? Mr. HERTY. Any time. Mr. HERTY. We are certainly justified in looking ahead a year Mr. Maas. In time of peace this resolution does not affect your or two on a question of this kind. ustry. It is only when there is war between belligerent nations. Mr. FISH. It is 10 years since the war. u do not mean to tell us that the preparation of that industry to Mr. HERTY. This country is going to make ammonium nitrate in ist us in time of war is dependent upon some other war, that the enormous quantities for fertilizers. relopment and the profits of that industry are dependent upon some Mr. KORELL. Is that investment being made on the hypothesis of er countries when they are engaged in war? We are not inter- other countries having continuous wars? ng with your peace-time industry. Mr. HERTY. It is on the basis of agricultural fertilizers for the fr. HERTY. This industry has not developed into a big enough farmers without reference to anything else. ustry. 36144-20-3 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 33 Mr. BLOOM. We will have agriculture just the same during war Mr. BURTON. Do you claim your association should have the right Mr. TEMPLE. Yes; it will be stimulated. in war time to furnish belligerents any of your commodities, the Mr. FISH. What are you exporting now that this bill would inter- same as other manufacturing countries? Is that your contention? Mr. HERTY. Yes. with? Mr. HERTY. That I can not tell you in detail. Mr. BURTON. Does not that lead inevitably to this situation, Doc- Mr. FISH. We are not exporting any of these things that this bill tor-let me state this to you, and I want your candid answer-that interfere with at the present time. The only kinds of dyes your industry is interested in the continuance of wars in foreign the common dyes, and if we are exporting them in large quanti- countries? it has nothing to do with war purposes. Mr. HERTY. I do not think so at all. Mr. HERTY. We do not want to stand still in the business of dye Mr. BURTON. Why not? ports. We are trying to develop the dye business every day. Mr. HERTY. Because I know the men; I have lived with them; I Mr. FISH. We are exporting certain kinds of dyes in large quanti- have worked with them. but they have nothing to do with war purposes. You come Mr. BURTON. Well, why not? If you want to retain your equality as an expert, representing the Chemical Foundation, and I will with these other countries, and to obtain the profits that you would you to specify before this committee what kind of chemicals we obtain in time of war, why is it not to your interest to have a con- exporting to-day that would be interfered with by the passage tinuance of wars in foreign countries? this resolution? Mr. HERTY. Because I think our people are of a different type from that. Mr. HERTY. I do not come here as an expert on all these details. on 15 minutes' notice in answer to a telegram from the chair- Mr. BURTON. Well, if they are of a different type from that, why without time to get matters together or to know what the are they not willing to suspend the shipment of chemicals and ex- mmittee wished. All of this is a matter of governmental record plosives used for killing people. Washington and it can be gotten much better through those Mr. HERTY. You ask them to do that; and yet here is the British annels than from me. industry and the French industry that will continue to supply mu- Mr. FISH. Nothing we are exporting to-day would be interfered nitions to belligerents; and you can not stop them; and, therefore, by this bill. I have asked you to specify something. this resolution would not have the slightest effect in preventing war. Mr. BURTON. Your contention is that you should be placed on an Mr. BURTON. Well, it would mean at least that belligerents would unlity with foreign manufacturers of chemicals in time of war, have to be supplied from Europe in time of war? they would manufacture chemicals for belligerents, and that Mr. HERTY. And more than that, let me say this: That I do think domestic manufacturers in the United States also ought to have that, if this measure is passed, there is great danger of the smaller right. Is that your contention? nations, with no chemical industry, being placed largely at the mercy Mr. HERTY. Primarily, the fact is that the domestic manufacture, of larger nations. You spoke of war tools and chemistry is a a legitimate peace-time business, is cut off. war tool- Mr. BURTON. But this is not a peace-time business. Now, is that The CHAIRMAN (interposing). You called attention to that be- contention? I understand you to say that the competition is fore. But the resolution is careful to protect the weaker nations by sharp, and that there is a cartel among those foreign manu- putting in a provision that this embargo can be raised with the con- cturers, and that in order to hold your own among them you must sent of Congress. There was considerable discussion about our the same privileges as they have; is that your contention? position at Geneva last year, when we attempted to protect the smaller Mr. HERTY. I think the whole resolution is very ineffective, unless nations. That is the reason for this provision. is a world-wide agreement. Mr. HERTY. I think that is a very wise provision. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know that it is impossible to secure The CHAIRMAN. Let me put this question, in view of your testi- world-wide agreement? mony that you feel that we are justified in shipping war materials Mr. HERTY. Yes, sir. And, therefore, I think very little of this to belligerents, because other countries will do so: Do you not think solution. I think it is a fruitless gesture. I do not think it will it is to the best interests of America that Congress should control complish what you think it will accomplish. the shipment of these implements of war in time of war? As an Mr. BURTON. Well, it will accomplish what it is intended to ac- American citizen do you not think it would be much better to exer- mplish. Do you think we should have a right in war time, equally cise a rigid control of this traffic? other nations, to supply belligerents? Mr. HERTY. Well, I have the greatest faith in the Congress of the Mr. HERTY. To supply what? United States, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BURTON. To supply belligerents, the same as foreign nations? Mr. MOORE. You are one of the few people who have. [Laughter.] Mr. HERTY. We are not asking at all for a special supply of war Mr. HERTY. No. I say that with no intention of flattering the terial. I am speaking now for the peace-time trade of this members of the committee. I have been before committees of Con- in its usual channels. gress a number of times, and I have frequently made that statement- that I believe that these men are seeking earnestly to do the best 34 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 35 they can, according to their light, for the people of the United States. I am confident of that. And I have only one thought in mind in this resolution, the concrete resolution that we have before us, I would connection-I will answer your question in this way I will say it like to know what it is? would be better for Congress if the Senate could do business on as Mr. HERTY. I think the World Court— quick a basis as the House can. Mr. MOORE (interposing). But we have not gone into the World The CHAIRMAN. Now, then, we have agreed 80 far, I know you Court. also agree with me that the temptation to sell these articles in time Mr. LINTHICUM. How about the League of Nations? of war is great, and that many can not resist the enormous profits Mr. MOORE. We have not gone into the League of Nations. I am therefrom. I know that you also agree with me that this traffic asking whether you know of any proposal that has been offered, reflects seriously on our Government and that it is impossible to except this one thing, which we believe has very great merit, that is secure an agreement among all the nations of the world to prevent it. in the direction of doing what you and I would like to have done. Do you not think if we took the lead, other nations would be very Mr. HERTY. I know of nothing else. likely to follow our example? Again I repeat my question, because Mr. MOORE. You know of nothing else. And now we are attempt- it is the crux of this whole resolution. Is it not better to have this ing something; and you say that we are going against an existing traffic in the control of the Congress than to leave it in the hands legal right. I may say that, too. But I remember that Edmund of the munition makers, some of whom, at least, would act only Burke made a remark to this effect: When I am passing on a with a view to profits, and despite the harm that would result? Can question, I do not do what a lawyer tells me I must do, but I do you not answer that question, 44 yes"! what my conscience tells me I must do." Mr. HERTY. I am afraid-no; I can not answer it yes right off; Now, do you not think that it would be a consciencious thing and because I think it is too much of a gesture, this resolution-a hope- moral thing for this Government to take the same attitude in re- less, fruitless gesture. spect to war material that we are talking about, as in respect to the Mr. COLE. At least, you would not answer that question with a narcotics to which the chairman has alluded, even though the rest of no? the world may say, 44 We will not go along with you on that Mr. HERTY. No. I think this: That if we could get a world-wide Mr. FISH. Because of the profits? agreement among the nations Mr. MOORE. Yes; because of the profits? The CHAIRMAN (interposing). No; that is impossible. Let me Mr. HERTY. I can see where that would apply to shipments for give you an illustration as to the difficulty of getting world-wide war purposes agreements: For a number of years, I have been working to get a Mr. MOORE (interposing). But we are assuming a case where there world-wide agreement to suppress the traffic in drugs; and this is a war and where the companies know when they start to engage S the kind of reply I always receive: One nation says, "Yes; we in actual production and undertake to make the actual shipments, want to quit it, but these other nations will not; and as long as they they are doing that for only one solitary purpose, and that is to ell drugs we will." have what the expert employed in the conduct of the war, with the Mr. MOORE. But we have quit it; and they can quit it. result of killing men and bringing infinite distress upon people who The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we have quit it, and so can other countries. are dependent upon those men who are killed. Now, it seems to me Mr. Maas. You say that you think that you should have the right a pretty curious sort of position for anyone to take the say that, We are against the effort to bring about a discontinuance of that ship munitions to belligerents, because other nations are doing practice," merely upon the theory that the practice has heretofore o, in spite of the consequences. You would not insist on the right been regarded as legal and is at this moment legal. sell carbolic acid in liquors, would you? There are people selling Mr. HERTY. Mr. Chairman, let me mention in connection with that quors with carbolic acid in them? Mr. HERTY. No. statement of Mr. Moore a case of that kind, and also along the line of Mr. Fish's statement, as to combining paragraphs 13 and 14. Mr. MAAS. Well, there are people who are selling liquors now con- Now, Texas is shipping a lot of sulphur. There is a certain section aining carbolic acid. of Virginia where they are making a lot of chlorine. Now, sulphur Mr. HERTY. No. But I do not think a thing like carbolic acid is used and is shipped very widely to be used for the purpose of liquor should be sold at all-and, by the way, carbolic acid is also a ar-time material. spraying fruit trees, grapevines, and so forth, against insects, pests, and has various peace-time uses. And yet when sulphur and chlorine The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moore, you wanted to ask one more question are brought together, the component parts make sulphur chloride. Mr. MOORE. Yes; I would like to ask one question: Doctor Herty Let me get the complete picture before you first, Mr. Chairman. ade a very striking statement awhile ago, at the outset: That he Now, take ethylene gas. Ethylene gas is used to-day, and very hought that war could be eradicated, or the occurrence of war pre- widely used, as an anesthetic. In Baltimore they are making more ented, only by rooting out the elements that lead to war. Have and more of it every day, and it is going to hospitals all over the ou ever heard of any proposed legislation that tends to root out those United States. And yet you take that ethylene gas, and the sulphur ements except this resolution? If you know of anything of that from Texas and the chlorine from Virginía, and combine them, and rt that your company has proposed, or that anybody else has pro- you have got mustard gas. And yet must we stop shipping osed, that shows any hope of leading to results, except this one sulphur- EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 37 The CHAIRMAN. But the language of paragraph 14 of section 3 Mr. BURTON. Well, to this resolution. I understood you to say the resolution reads: you would have no objection. Component parts of the articles enumerated above if capable of being used Mr. HERTY. Well, it says in subsection 13, Poisonous gases, acids, the assembly or repair of the said articles or as spare parts. or any other articles," and so forth. That may mean any chemical; Is there such a thing as repairing a munition such as gas? " poisonous gases may mean any chemical. Everything is poison- Mr. HERTY. Not repairing. ous if it is concentrated enough. We could not breathe if the oxygen The CHAIRMAN. Is there such a thing as assembling it? in the air was concentrated too much. Mr. HERTY. Yes; there is the example I have just mentioned: Mr. BURTON. Well, that would be covered by the expression, " pre- ulphur and chlorine when combined make sulphur chloride. pared for use in warfare." Now, you surprised me a little by say- Mr. HERTY. Simply a combination of the two elements. If you ing that chlorine gas can be used directly for purposes of warfare, them together they make sulphur chloride. without any change or modification. Do you mean to say that? Mr. FISH. Would you have any objection if this paragraph 14 is Mr. HERTY. Mr. Burton, if you will take any book on the history amended as to protect those things that you are talking about, so of chemical warfare-or if you will take the daily papers and read it will only take into consideration the repair, and leave out the account of the battle of pres, where the first gas used, in war, assembling, which would seem to meet your objection? Would you will find accounts of how the Germans simply brought up big object if that was so amended as to cover the very purpose that tanks of chlorine and put them in trenches, and when the wind got all want, and that is to preclude the use of anything- in the right direction, they simply opened the cocks, and this Mr. HERTY (interposing). You mean to prevent the shipment of chlorine gas blew all over the field. And if you will go to the knockdown stuff, and things of that kind? freight yards in Washington, you will find flat cars, with multiple- Mr. FISH. Yes. unit tanks filled with chlorine, being shipped to manufacturers in Mr. LINTHICUM. Is not that what we really had in mind-the re- various parts of the country. And if you wanted to use chlorine and assembly of guns and things of that kind? on the flats of the Potomac, you would simply take the tanks out Mr. BURTON. May I suggest a change in the order of those para- there and open up the cocks-and out the gas would flow. And raphs, paragraph 13 the place now occupied by paragraph 14, so there is no manufacture' in it whatever. the latter would apply only to the articles enumerated above Mr. HULL. Chlorine gas is relatively simple gas, is it not? aragraph 13? Mr. HERTY. Yes. It is an element. Mr. HERTY. I think that would be very much of an improvement, Mr. HULL. It is an element; and it would not require any Burton, if paragraph 14 preceded paragraph 13; because when manufacture? go into paragraph 13, which is strictly a chemical paragraph, Mr. HERTY. No. speak of component parts, it would leave such a haze that I Mr. HULL. And it would not make any difference, so far as your ould not know where the chemical industry stood, on any kind of business is concerned, as to the chlorine? The manufacturers abroad ipment. could produce their own chlorine? The CHAIRMAN. Will you look at that, and see whether, if sub- Mr. FISH. We do not export any chlorine. 14 was moved above subsection 13, so that it would not apply Mr. HERTY. Are you sure we do not-to South America? gases at all, you would have any objection to it? Mr. FISH. I am merely speaking' from memory. I know perfectly Mr. LINTHICUM. Would you strike out the word " assembly' well that we only export from this country certain chemicals in The CHAIRMAN. It would not be necessary. connection with the new dyes we are producing. Mr. HERTY. It would not be necessary, and would not cover what Mr. HERTY. But that business is growing; the chemical business is want; because if you keep in guns you would have to keep the growing. I think the committee should, for its own guidance, call assembly' in there; because otherwise the law would be a on the Department of Commerce to give it the facts in the case. they could ship a lot of "knockdown stuff and put it together Mr. HULL. There is not any export business in chlorine gas, is the foreign country. there? The CHAIRMAN. What would be your objection? Mr. HERTY. That is a fact that could easily be established from Mr. HERTY. To subsection 14? the Department of Commerce. The CHAIRMAN. Yes-if we moved it up so that it would not Mr. HULL. You do not know it yourself? to chemicals at all. Mr. HERTY. I do not know it myself. Mr. chemicals. HERTY. I would have no objection to it if it did not apply Mr. HULL. Your judgement is that it is not exported? Mr. HERTY. That it is not exported. Mr. BURTON. If subsections 13 and 14 were transposed, you would The CHAIRMAN. How do you make chlorine gas? have any objection to this measure? Mr. HERTY. There are two ways. One way, as Niagara Falls— Mr. HERTY. To this section? The CHAIRMAN (interposing). I did not say " where I said, How do you make it? 38 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 39 Mr. HERTY. At Niagara Falls, they take common salt and pass an Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you this question: If subsections 13 and electric current through it; and hydrogen comes off at one pole. 14 were transposed, would you have any objection to this resolution? Salt is made of sodium and chlorine. And they pass an electric Mr. HERTY. Do you mean to the resolution as a whole? current through a solution of salt, and the sodium comes out at one Mr. BURTON. Yes. pole and the chlorine at the other; so that you have the sodium and Mr. HERTY. Yes. chlorine coming out as a result of the operation. The CHAIRMAN. To sum up your position, your objection is this: The CHAIRMAN. You take the chloride of sodium, which is com- That you believe you have a moral and legal right to ship these mon table salt, and extract the chlorine? articles in time of war as well as in time of peace? Mr. HERTY. Yes-which is in solution. Mr. HRETY. The same in time of war as in time of peace. The CHAIRMAN. Salt, which is very common everywhere! The CHAIRMAN. And that if you do not sell it other countries Mr. HERTY. Yes; all over the world. would, and they would make the profits? The CHAIRMAN. Would it be extraordinary for a country in Europe Mr. HERTY. That is the way I look at it. The American industry that wanted this gas to say, We can buy salt and convert it into would suffer at the expense of the foreign industry. gas"? The CHAIRMAN. The fact that you are always prepared to manu- Mr. HERTY. Well, how about our South American neighbors! facture these gases does not make it necessary to sell to belligerents Mr. BLOOM. They have salt down there, have they not? in so far as our preparedness is concerned. Mr. HERTY. But they have no chemical industry down there. Mr. HERTY. Only that it is a fact that, if the chemical industry The CHAIRMAN. Then we come again to that provision, for use in were suspended, American industry would suffer very much. warfare." The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I had any doubts as to the necessity of Mr. COLE. Is chlorine gas the only article that is of such a nature this resolution, your testimony has removed them. that it can be used immediately for war purposes? Mr. HERTY. I am very glad to explain my position, because my Mr. HERTY. You mean without going through manufacture? only purpose in coming here is to give the committee the facts- Mr. BLOOM. Yes. whatever interpretation is placed upon my testimony. Mr. BURTON. I think that is an important question. Mr. KORELL. I would like to inquire whether the testimony taken Mr. BLOOM. Is there anything except chlorine that could be made now is going to be printed, Mr. Chairman? immediately available? The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it will be printed and, I hope, will have Mr. HERTY. I do not think of anything just now, Mr. Cole and world-wide distribution. Mr. Burton, in the way of an element or a compound readily formed Mr. FISH. In view of a careless and misleading statement made into-wait a minute; remember this: There are a lot of things that by the Secretary of the Navy in a letter to the chairman of the Naval are used in traffic or trade to-day, in peace time, that are ready to be Affairs Committee, Mr. Chairman, I think the Secretary of the Navy used. Take the case of phosphene, one of the most violent gases should be invited to come here to-morrow morning. used during the war. To show you how hard it is to regulate things The CHAIRMAN. That will be done. by treaties, may I take a moment to tell you the story of phosphene? Mr. FISH. Because he made a statement in that letter that is en- Our dye manufacturers have used phosphene in making certain tirely contrary to the facts concerning this resolution. He starts off classes of dyes. Now, the president of our association said, " Can by saying- you not get the Government which made phosphene during the war to It is accepted as a legitimate right and need that those countries must be make phosphene for us now, because we do not want to bother with supplied with arms, munitions, and Implements of war for administration, t," because it is a nasty thing to have around the plant. And I policing, and safeguarding the country, and for their defense during war. took it up with the chemical warfare service of the War Depart- This resolution, as we know, does not affect the administration or ment and found that it would require an act of Congress to permit policing of any country in time of peace. It has nothing to do with them to do it. About that time there came to me an engineer-a that. And yet that statement has gone out from the Navy Depart- civilian-who was a graduate of West Point; and he said, have ment. I am reading from the New York Times of to-day. found a large supply of phosphene in Germany." You will remem- Mr. MOORE. You are not surprised, are you? er that, under the treaty of Versailles, Germany can not manufacture Mr. FISH. I will not define my feeling. or store war gases. And I told him to see General Fries, and if it (Thereupon, at 11.55 o'clock a. m., the committee went into execu- was all right with him and the War Department to " go to it "; but tive session, and at 12 o'clock noon adjourned until Saturday, March therwise not- 17, 1928, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) The CHAIRMAN [interposing]. Doctor Herty, we have to adjourn o-day at 12 o'clock. Your statement is very interesting, and we ppreciate it; and if you would like to extend your remarks in the record you may do so. I would like to have an executive session of he committee before we adjourn. 40 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 41 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, resolution does not prohibit the manufacture and exportation of COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, articles for use in warfare except in one particular, and that is to Saturday, March 17, 1928. belligerent nations with which we ourselves must be at peace. It has The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Stephen G. Porter absolutely no application to rebellions and civil wars, or foreign (chairman) presiding. quarrels in which we as a nation have taken a definite side. More- over, the embargo against the exportation of arms and munitions can STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN F. KORELL, A REPRESENTATIVE be lifted at any time in favor of either or both of the belligerent IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON nations if Congress shall consider it expedient or wise to do so. Two things must concur simultaneously in order to constitute the offense Mr. KORELL. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, of exportation in violation of the terms of the resolution. First, it I am in receipt of a letter signed by a gentleman residing in Wash- must be shown that a shipment of one or more of the prohibited ington, D. C., purporting to be written on behalf of a committee of articles was made to a belligerent nation with which we are at peace. the American Legion. The letter contains a protest against the Second, it must be shown that the shipment was made with knowl- Burton resolution-the legislation that we are now considering. edge of the destination of the particular article or articles shipped. My correspondent's objection, although he has not stated it clearly Finally, being a penal statute the language of the resolution will be in his letter, appears to be based upon the ground that the resolu- strictly construed. In view of all this, it is not at all likely, in my tion is in conflict with certain plans for our national defense. IL opinion, that any well intentioned person could act contrary to the reporting the receipt of this letter to the committee I would like provisions of the resolution through inadvertence or mistake. to say that I happen to be a member of the American Legion. Also Reduced to their final analysis, all of the objections that have that I have the profoundest respect for its worthy objects and been voiced so far against the resolution narrow down to a single purposes and the very highest regard for the opinion of its question of policy, which stated in question form is, " Shall the patriotic officers and members. This is especially true, I might United States shoulder the cost of preparedness directly or depend add, in suggestions relating to military and naval affairs, matters upon the output of private arms and munition factories, which in about which the officers and members of the American Legion are turn must rely upon a continuance of foreign wars in order to keep peculiarly qualified to speak. My feeling toward the Legion and their plants and workmen in sufficient readiness to meet the emer- ts officers and members is most respectful and friendly. I am anx- gency of a war, should war unfortunately overtake us again?" ous that they should know that I have been considerate of their Of course, there is much to be said and undoubtedly will be said ommittee's protest against the Burton resolution also that I will not only in Congress but throughout the entire country about the be glad to receive their views on any other legislation pending morality of the United States maintaining a policy of this kind, but efore Congress. However, I do not believe that in this instance I will leave that task for others to discuss. I merely want to speak he object and purposes of the Burton resolution have been fully briefly about some of the definite and specific things that I expect xplained to the representatives of the American Legion. It is also the passage of the Burton resolution will accomplish: First, I believe ery obvious that they have been misunderstood by several of the that the shipment of arms and munitions to belligerent foreign na- entlemen who have already testified at this hearing. I hope that tions with which we ourselves are at peace is almost certain to involve ith a better understanding of the legislation that we are consider- us in war. Certainly the traffic is not conducive to the establishment ag the American Legion will be for rather than opposed to the of a feeling of amity or good will toward the United States. The assage of the Burton resolution. I also hope that the opinions only one of the two belligerent nations that could possibly receive f those who have testified will be changed. With these thoughts our arms and munitions would be the nation that is powerful enough my mind I would like to obtain permission to make a brief to maintain control of the seas. This means that we would in every atement at this time, outlining some of the reasons why I have so case be merely aiding the strong against the weak, regardless of the ar supported and expect to continue to support the Burton reso- justness or merits of the quarrel. In this connection I might remind ation unless convinced by further testimony than that which has the committee of the importance of the sinking of the Lusitania in far been given that my views in regard to its merits and expected 1915. It will be recalled that this ship was torpedoed by a submarine ccomplishments are erroneous. Have I the committee's permis- and that the German Government attempted to justify the ship's on to proceed? destruction on the alleged ground that it was carrying arms and The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. munitions to Germany's enemies at the time it was sunk. It would Mr. KORELL. I think that I can clarify my position considerably by be idle to say and I do not pretend to say at this time that the sink- ating before attempting to give my reasons for favoring the Burton ing of the Lusitania was the cause of our declaring war on Germany; solution that I am personally convinced from the testimony that many other matters were factors in forcing the United States to make is already been given at this hearing as well as by my knowledge of its decision, but I believe that it is fair to state that the sinking of e wording of the resolution itself that none of its provisions relate the Lusitania was a very important and a contributing factor to our late exclusively to specific articles that are manufactured for war any way to articles that can be used for peaceful purposes. They entry into the World War in 1917. Second, it has been said that war has now become so mechanical and the needs of modern armies trposes and can only be used for carrying on warfare. Again, the 42 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 43 80 multifarious that two foreign countries of any considerable size could not continue to battle against each other for any length of this committee, but unless it is sufficient to overcome my present views I expect to continue supporting the Burton resolution and urging its time without receiving supplies of arms and munitions from Amer- passage before the House. I have no authority to speak for others ican arms and munition factories. If this statement is true, and it but I might add that I understand that two other members of the seems reasonable, I believe that we would be greatly aiding the cause American Legion on this committee share the views that I have of international peace by assisting in starving war. If we could pre- expressed. vent war by assisting in starving it we would certainly be doing I thank the committee for its indulgence of my remarks. something for the cause of peace. Third, it is being said abroad and generally throughout the world to-day that we maintain a position STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS S. BUTLER, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE of neutrality and isolation solely for the purpose of enabling our ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES arms and munition factories to profit off of the death and misery of foreign nations suffering with the horrors of war. Indeed, the Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I have just a word to say on behalf world is accusing us of merely talking eloquently of peace and high of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House, and that is that we are ideals but doing nothing constructive or in the interest of peace. grateful to this committee for having complied with the request of In this connection I might say we have rejected the league and have the Secretary of the Navy to be heard. He is present this morning, not accepted the World Court, although both are largely American and I repeat that our committee is under obligations to this commit- ideas. To date our disarmament conferences have not been overly tee for its civility in consenting to hear the Secretary of the Navy. successful. The 5-5-3 naval ratio is about to be abandoned. The The CHAIRMAN. May I repeat what I said the other day, Mr. passage of the Burton resolution at this time will, to my way of think- Butler, when " quality arrives, the compliments begin." ing, be equivalent to our saying If we have not done anything more Mr. BUTLER. Whatever I have to say on this subject will be said we have at least gone on record as opposed to the practice of making in the House. profit off of war." Fourth, the present arrangement of permitting American munition makers to sell arms and munitions to belligerent STATEMENT OF HON. CURTIS D. WILBUR, SECRETARY OF THE nations with which we are at peace prevents the Government from NAVY effectively controlling shipments to a nation or countries that we might conclude to be waging an unnecessary, cruel, or unprinciple The CHAIRMAN. We have with us this morning Mr. Wilbur, the war against another without taking a step that would, under the Secretary of the Navy. Before we begin, I might explain that an existing stringency, be considered equivalent to a declaration of war, inquiry was made by the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Navy and thus indirectly plunge ourselves into a costly and terrible inter- Department as to its opinion of this resolution, and the reply of the national conflict. The passage of the Burton resolution at this time Navy Department was sent to the Naval Affairs Committee instead woultl, in my opinion, anticipate this contingency. Finally, Mr. of this committee. That is the reason I was unable to get the report Chairmen and gentlemen of the committee, I see a real danger in until this morning. In fact, I obtained it the first time when Mr. the policy of having the United States rely upon private munitions Butler kindly handed it to us in printed form, for which we are actories instead of Government-owned and controlled arsenals for quite grateful. complete preparedness. For instance, in foreign wars should sud- Mr. HULL. Does this letter of the Secretary of the Navy to Mr. lenly cease and our munition factories thereby become compelled to Butler bear any date? lose, which appears to be the crux of the argument being made Mr. O'CONNELL. It is in reply to a letter of March 15, and this is gainst the Burton resolution, we would be without adequate national March 17. efense. We would be obliged to make up, if we could, what we had Mr. BURTON. The copy I have is dated March 16. eglected to do on the interim-namely, prepare for the manufacture Mr. BUTLER. This letter was asked for by me about two or three f arms and munitions. It would be disastrous if war should over- there was such a letter addressed to one of the members of the com- days ago, perhaps the day before the date given here. I knew that ake the United States before the lost ground could be recovered. I epeat, it is not wise to depend upon anyone but the Government for mittee, and I desired to have the letter addressed in such a way that ar supplies and munitions. There is no assurance that private rms and munition factories will continue in operation after their ment. Therefore, I addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Navy it might be notice to this committee, or might become a public docu- usiness shall become unprofitable through the suspension of foreign requesting him to furnish it. ars. The War and Navy Departments are charged with a solemn Mr. MARTIN. He says in this letter, In accordance with your sponsibility. They should see to it that we have sufficient machin- y and equipment in our public-owned arsenals to start production request." Mr. BUTLER. I understood that he had expressed his views in some hen production on a large scale becomes necessary. To leave our way, and desired to be heard. Therefore, I made the request I did. tional defense exposed to the visicitudes of private business is a The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, please state your full name and ingerous policy. Before concluding I want to say that I intend to give very careful occupation. Secretary WILBUR. Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy. My nsideration to whatever additional testimony may be brought before occupation is law. 44 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 45 The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly state your views on this House (8) The seizing of these arsenals by revolutionists would add to the turbulence in such countries. Joint Resolution 183? (9) Such countries, being unable to procure arms and munitions when bel- Secretary WILBUR. I have with me this morning a copy of the letter addressed to Chairman Butler, copies of which have been war. ligerents, might feel the necessity of accumulating large reserves for possible handed to the members of this committee. This letter was prepared In the strictest interpretation of the relation which this joint resolution would by the General Board of the Navy for my signature, was examined have to the plans for national defense, it may be briefly stated that the tendency would be to reduce the reserve strength of the United States for war by reducing and signed by me, and expressed the mature judgment of the Navy ability of the private manufacturers to produce in quantity for Government in Department. With your permission, I will read the letter: emergency small arms, machine guns, projectiles, and munitions up*to eallbers of 5.9 inches, and cannon and howitzers of like caliber, together with submarine PROHIBITING THE EXPORTATION OF ARMS, MUNITIONS, OR IMPLEMENTS OF WAR TO mines, depth charges torpedoes, etc. BELLIGERENT NATIONS (H. J. RES. 183) In its relation to international law, in which the Navy as an Instrument for enforcement is keenly interested, here is a marked and radical departure. NAVY DEPARTMENT, The joint resolution prohibits the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements Washington. of war to belligerent nations by municipal law when such commerce is permitted Hon. THOMAS S. BUTLER, by international law, thereby restricting commerce and placing the United House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. States in a particular class by Itself. To quote the committee report: MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN BUTLER: In accordance with your request of March H Under principles of International law. already established, a neutral nation 5, 1928, a careful examination has been given to Joint Resolution 183, which is forbidden to furnish implements of warfare to a belligerent, though its citizens proposes that the United States, without international agreement, should pro- may at their own risk seek to furnish such supplies. In this latter particular, dbit the exportation of arms, munitions, and their component parts to any the resolution seeks to create an important change." ntion that is engaged in war with another. You desire to know how this A neutral government is bound to prevent the sending out of any armed vessel in Its jurisdiction which it has reason to belleve is intended for hostile esolution will affect the plans of the Navy Department for national defense. The United States is an arms-producing country. There are numerous small operations against a power with which It is at pence. Also, there is a limitaton of 24 hours in use of the harbors by belligerent warships and a limitation as to ountries, particularly on the American Continent, that are not arms-produe- ng countries. It is accepted as a legitimate right and need that those countries revietualing them. It further forbids the recruiting, fitting out, and equipping of armed forces from Its shores. nust be supplied with arms, munitions, and implements of war for adminis- Both of these forbidden activities involve the movement of ships, their crews ration, policing, and safeguarding the country, and for their defense during and passengers which, under customary shipping laws, are easily ascertained ar. The act of January 31, 1922, chapter 5, section 236 (ch. 44, par. 1, 42 Stat. and controlled. The shipment of arms as parts of cargoes is much more diffi- 31). reads as follows: cult to follow, and the illieit trade therein, known as gun running. has been long ' Whenever the President finds that in any American country, or in any practiced and it is to prevent such trade that this joint resolution is proposed. ountry in which the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction, con- International law does not forbid such trade. and to correct such evil as itions of domestic violence exist, which are or may be promoted by the use might spring therefrom in the country of destination that country has always arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, and makes assumed the burden. This joint ennetment would. by municipal law, place this roclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export, except under such limi- onerous duty upon the government of the country of origin. Such duty is diffi- tions and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of cult of enforcement and may frequently subject the government to charges of ar from any place in the United States to such country until otherwise laxity and lack of good faith in its International duties. dered by the President or by Congress." Rights and duties of neutrals." Section III. of the Sixth International Con- This act, originating in 1898 and extended in 1922, to cover extraterritoriality. ference of American States, Habana. 1928. reads in part as follows: rticularly in China, gives the President freedom of action in cases where "ART. 15. Among the acts of assistance emanating from the neutral States and ere seems to be an abuse arising from the special nature of commerce in the nets of commerce effected by individuals, only the former are contrary to ms and the power to remedy the evil which might be arising therefrom. neutrality. The effect of the joint resolution as between the United States and such "ART. 16. The neutral State is forbidden: onproducing countries would be: "(a) To deliver to the belligerent, directly or indirectly. and for any reason (1) That no orders from such countries when belligerents could be filled whatever. warships. munitions, or any war material. private manufacturers of arms or munitions in the United States. "(b) To make loans or to grant credit to a belligerent during the war. (2) So that the output from our factories would be lessened by the inability "ABT. 22. Neutral States are not obligated to prevent the exportation or fill such orders. transit, at the expense of any one of the belligerents, of arms, munitions, and in (3) Since such countries could not obtain additional arms and munitions general everything that may be useful to Its military forces." hile a belligerent, It is probable they would not place such orders in time This convention is quoted as the latest recommended international law, but peace with the United States, but would place them with other countries is In entire accord with that recognized before the World War. here there would be no restriction on their orders in war. What the joint resolution hopes to accomplish: (4) The consequent result of this resolution would be, then, a marked (1) That our citizens do not participate in the profits derived from the duction in the factories and equipment capable of manufacturing arms and furnishing of implements of destruction: initions in the United States. (2) That it will be a restraining influence when nations are about to embark (5) A possible corollary of such reduction would be the necessity of estab- on war: and hing additional Government arsenals to meet the needs of the United (3) That other countries will adopt similar regulations. ites. Regarding item (1), it is noted that Implements of destruction are with (6) If the orders for arms and munitions be placed with other countries, equal fairness defined as implements for defense of the home and fireside. present executive control which the President has over shipment of arms Regarding Item (2), as to a restruining influence to prevent war, one of the 1 munitions to American countries, contained in the act quoted above, would two nations always goes to war with the belief that It will win. It usually has longer be effective. This is most important. made preparations in the way of accumulation of arms, munitions, and Imple- 7) Further, that nonproducing countries might become producing countries, ments of war, and frequently believes that It has sufficient stock to enrry It to ablishing arsenals, factories, etc., in which case also the net above quoted victory without turning to neutrals for additional supplies during war. uld not be effective. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 47 At this point it would be well to examine into another statement in the report Américan Government against the deposit of ratification to a convention con- the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, viz: trolling the exportation of arms until it could be done simultaneously by all It is certainly a well-known fact that no nation can wage war for any con- countries. If they felt the necessity for such cautious procedure, where the dderable time, or on any large scale, unless implements of warfare can be ob- countries' delegates had expressed an agreement to such convention, how can It from neutral nations." be hoped that a legislative act made independently by this country can accom- Taking only the three most recent examples as to the historical accuracy of plish sim lar legislation in other countries If the present situation be advan- statement: tageous to such countries? (1) In the War of 1870 neither Germany nor France found it necessary to Finally, the very important principle of freedom of action by the Executive btain implements of warfare from neutral nations. to meet any condition arising in the future is sacrificed and the Government (2) SimWarly, in the Spanish-American War, a war between two first-class becomes bound by legislative action permitting no initiative or discretion on the owers, neither belligerent found It necessary to obtain implements of war from part of the executive department of the Government. Moreover, any attempt neutral nation. to change such legislation by the United States as a neutral might well be (3) Finally, in the World War, waged for a considerable time" and on a considered as a unneutral act and therefore prohibited. scale," the central powers did not find It necessary to use implements of In connection with Africa, the United States already is signatory to the varfare obtained from neutral nations. Brussels conference of 1890, covering the particular abuses that were associ- While giving historical consideration to the World War, what would have ated with the slave trade between latitudes 20° north and 22° south. the effect of the proposed joint resolution upon that war? Summing up the situation: In the spring of 1916, 175,000 tons per month of shell steel, shell, copper, (1) The Navy Department can see no useful result which would come from mall arms, ammunition, etc., were being delivered from America. Twenty per legislation binding by municipal law this country to the special burden for- of the space on American lines was allotted to munitions alone. Having bidding international trade in arms permitted by international law, and punish- view the enormous amount of munitions of war obtained from the United ing Its citizens for international trade permitted by such law. by the allied powers while the former country was a neutral, might not (2) The annulment of the present freedom of action and exercise of discre- have been obtained by the central powers had the joint resolution been tion now reposing in the President to meet future conditions is contrary to in effect? sound administration and Invites embarrassing and difficult situations. The third item which it is hoped to accomplish is the method of legislation In view of all these considerations. the department considers that Interna- example. It would seem unnecessary to make any comment on the probable tional traffic in arms and munitions should continue to be controlled, as hereto- uccess of such method, but it is considered pertinent to submit certain extracts fore, under International law, by the importing sovereign, the exporting sover- the report of the American delegation to the International Conference on eign remaining, as heretofore, free of entangling engagements. traffic in arms, held at Geneva May 4 to June 17, 1925. It gives certain Sincerely yours, onclusions of the delegates to that convention which it is considered bear upon CURTIS D. WILBUR egislation by example. The gist of the conclusions is that the United States not be first to deposit ratification, but It must be simultaneous, lest certain would fall to deposit ratification and thereby gain a certain advantage. JOINT RESOLUTION To prohibit the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war to beiligerent nations The delegates at the conference impressed upon the American delegation their that any international convention for the control of the trade in arms would ineffective unless adhered to by the United States, one of the important arms- Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of roducing powers. America in Congress assembled, That it is hereby declared to be the policy of the The American delegation desires to United States of America to prohibit the exportation of arms, munitions, or state that in their opinion the iccess or failure of the present convention will be In no small measure depend- implements of war to any nation which is engaged in war with another. upon the position assumed by the American Government in the matter. SEC. 2. Whenever the President recognizes the existence of war between for- While registering this view, the American delegation would point out that in eign nations by making proclamation of the neutrality of the United States, it opinion the adherence of all the important arms-producing powers, and not shall be unlawful, except by the consent of the Congress, to export or attempt to that of the United States, is essential to the realization of the objects of the export any arms, munit ons, or implements of war from any place in the onvention. For the United States to ratify and to make the convention effec- United States or any possession thereof, to the territory of either belligerent prior to the ratification by other arms-producing powers would only result or to any place if the ultimate destination of such arms, munitions, or imple- placing n premium upon nonratification by certain producing powers, since ments of war is within the territory of either beiligerent or any mil.tary or would then be free to sell arms to other powers without control and without naval force of either belligerent. ablicity. If, therefore, the convention meets with the approval of the Senate, SEC. 3. As used in this joint resolution, the term arms, munitions, or Imple- If the legislation which will be necessary to make It effective in the United ments of war means- is assured, the delegates of the United States consider that the deposit of 1. Rifles, muskets, carbines. tifications on the part of the United States should be conditioned upon the 2. (a) Machine guns, automatic rifles, and machine pistols of all calibers; of ratifications by the other great producing powers of the world. The (b) mountings for machine guns; (e) interrupter gears. merican delegation would not, of course, suggest any delay in the submission 3. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated In Nos. 1 and 2 the convention to the Senate or its consideration by that body, but considers in the event of senatorial approval the deposit of ratifications, which would above. 4. Gun-sighting apparatus, including aerial gun sights and bomb sights, and the convention binding upon the United States If 13 other powers deposit fire-control apparatus. tifications, should only take place when among the ratifying powers are 5. (a) Cannon, long or short, and howitzers, of a caliber less than five and cluded the other principal arms-producing states. nine-tenths inches (fifteen cent meters) (b) cannon, long or short, and how- It is felt. however. that pending the realization of a definite itzers of a caliber of five and nine-tenths inches (fifteen centimeters) or above: sarmament program It would be futile, and possibly harmful. as indicated (e) mortars of all kinds: (d) gun carriages, mountings, recuperators, accessor- to attempt the arbitrary restriction of the trade in war material, which les for mountings. place the nonproducing powers at the mercy of the producing power. 6. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated In No. 5 above. production by all powers, and, far from accomplishing the purposes of 7. Apparatus for the d scharge of bombs, torpedoes, depth charges, and other armament, might tend toward the Increase of the military establishment kinds of projectiles. certain powers." 8. (a) Grenades: (b) bombs: (c) land mines, submarine mines, fixed or Here we find that the American delegation. after close association with floating; depth charges; (d) torpedoes. iropean powers for several months, felt the necessity for cautioning the 9. Appliances for use with the above arms and apparatus. 36144-29-4 18 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 49 10. Bayonets. Mr. MOORE. The statute that the Secretary has cited does not refer 11. Tanks and armored cars; aircraft designed for purposes of warfare. to such a case a,s is embraced within the terms of the resolution, but 12. Arms and ammunition not specified in the above enumerated prepared or use in warfare. it refers to the case of civil war or rebellion within a nation. 13. Poisonous gases, acids, or any other articles or inventions prepared for Secretary WILBUR. I have just consulted Admiral Schofield, who use in warfare. prepared the communication, and he confirms my impression that 14. Component parts of the articles enumerated above if capable of being that reference is, first, to this legislative authority given the Presi- sed in the assembly or repair of the said articles or as spare parts. Smc. 4. Whoever exports or attempts to export any arms, munitions, or imple- dent by Congress, quoted on the first page, and, second, to the effect nents of war in violation of the provisions of this resolution shall, upon con- of passing such a law upon the freedom of action of the President to iction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceed ng $10,000, and by imprison- recommended to Congress that it impose or authorize the imposition nent not exceeding two years. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the of embargoes, or to secure legislation upon the subject. In other Treasury to report any such violation of the provisions of this resolution to the United States district attorney for the district wherein the violation is alleged words, when Congress itself has placed an embargo upon arms to have been committed. all belligerents, the President might not feel free to recommend the The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before going into a general ex- removal of the embargo in specific instances, because that, in effect, mination, I would like to call your attention to the statement on would be an unneutral act. oage 1825, near the top of the page, as follows- The CHAIRMAN. I am not quite satisfied with your reasoning, Mr. Secretary. The first point I want to develop is this, the President Finally. the very important principle of freedom of action by the Executive meet any condition arising in the future is sacr.ficed and the Government has absolutely no power over embargoes, unless authorized by Con- ecomes bound by legislative action permitting no inintive or discretion on gress. Do you agree with that view he part of the executive department of the Government- which is followed in your summary by this statement: The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you will read the resolution carefully, Secretary WILBUR. I believe that is correct. will see that it would not affect in the slightest degree the act The annulment of the present freedom of action and exercise of discretion ow reposing in the President to meet future conditions is contrary to sound you of 1922, to which you refer, because that act is limited to conditions dministration and invites embarrassing and difficult situations. between two sovereign States. If you will read the act carefully, of domestic violence in the Americas, and does not extend to war Is it not a fact that the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over arms raffic and over embargoes is vested in the Congress, and that the you will find I am correct about it. xecutive branch of the Government has no power over the mat- Mr. MARTIN. I do not see why the writer of this communication er of embargoes without the consent of Congress? should put that in- Secretary WILBUR. Of course, that is a legal question. I think Mr. O'CONNELL (interposing). Why not let the Secretary explain ou are correct as to the fundamental power. The CHAIRMAN. Let me state it in another way: Is not the sole it? Mr. MOORE. Let the Secretary tell us. He has the stand, and he nd exclusive power over embargoes placed by the Constitution in must know about it. Congress, and is it not a fact that the President has no right to put n an embargo or lift an embargo without authority from Congress? Mr. COOPER. It relates to something that is not in the Burton reso- Mr. MARTIN. He signs his name to it. Secretary WILBUR. I think that is true. lution at all. The CHAIRMAN. You think he has not the power? Mr. MOORE. It has no more to do with it than the moon has to do Secretary WILBUR. I think not. with The CHAIRMAN. Then, why do you say that- Mr. bullfrogs. COOPER. Not a particle; and it is entirely misleading. It is The annulment of the present freedom of action and exercise of discretion misleading The CHAIRMAN. as to the Do Burton you agree resolution. with the opinion, Mr. Secretary, the act that of ow reposing in the President to meet future conditions is contrary to sound Iministration and invites embarrassing and difficult situations. the Burton resolution does not in any way interfere with the ex- Secretary WILBUR. I think that relates back to the statute quoted the first page. That relates back to the statute quoted on the portation 1922, giving of arms from the United States to countries the President authority to lay an embargo in the on Americas rst page. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, to simplify the situation, the act where Mr. COOPER. there is domestic That is the disorder? question I want him to give some attention 1922, to which you refer, vested authority, under the act of longress, in the President to take such action. to. CHAIRMAN. The act is there before you, and you off-hand can read opin- it. Secretary WILBUR. Yes. The Secretary WILBUR I am not in the habit of giving The CHAIRMAN. So far as my knowledge goes, there has been no ions on questions of law. stance in the history of the Republic when the President exercised Mr. HULL. Here Here is is a plain a letter question. that you signed within a very letter short of 1e embargo power without express direction from Congress. Still, Mr. COOPER. received the letter requesting it, because and the letter ou say- time inquiry after was you dated March 15, and to-day is March 17, your The annulment of the present freedom of action and exercise of discretion w reposing in the President to meet future conditions is contrary to sound in reply was printed in full on March 16. Iministration and invites embarrassing and difficult situations. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIO OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS says at the outset that he has made a careful ex- Mr. O'CONNELL (interposing). He has a right to exp Mr. FISH. I would like to have him explain this parag have stated here- It is accepted as a legitimate right and need that those coun (interposing). Just a minute, please. I want supplied with arms, munitions, and implements of war for a I have told this committee in detail how this policing, and safeguarding the country, and for their defense dur It was prepared by the General Board. I did This went over your signature to the New York Tim study that I would have given it as a lawyer, published yesterday. This resolution has nothing to do had been prepared by me. I examined it, and time policing or administration; yet the country receive be correct. The man who drafted the communica- ment, published in the New York Times, which is the la Schofield, who is an attendant on the Geneva con- paper in the United States. Do you not think we have has had these matters in charge. He knows a lot resent the sending out to the public of misleading information I do. As to the legal question, you do not need that kind? Would not that be resented by all fairmind nd I do not intend to give it. Secretary WILBUR. Let me go back a little, and I V Secretary, I want to read what you state here, and your question. In the first place, this letter was consid oticed yesterday in the New York Times. You general board. The language was formulated, and it Mr. Andrew. Subsequently, an inquiry came from the your request of March 15, 1928, a careful examination the House Naval Affairs Committee, as a more appropr Resolution 183. and the communication was sent to them. With refe tement of Mr. Butler, who is here beside me. He publication in the New York Times, the department amunication was sent on March 15. The answer to whatever to do with that. Of course, you have the rig and I do not know whether it was sent in the any misinformation or misstatement in this communio fternoon of March 15, was published in the New any other, from the Secretary of the Navy or from any Iarch 16. This whole report, therefore, which you vidual. I believe this to be an accurate statement. examined, was written or issued in one after- Mr. FISH. Do you mean that this is an accurate stat been found with this committee because, while we Secretary WILBUR. What is your question? hearings on this resolution, it is claimed by some Mr. FISH. You make the statement that " It is accepte to it that it has not been given careful consider- mate right and need that those countries must be supplie your representatives in the department, saw fit munitions, and implements of war for administration, I report out in one afternoon for publication in a safeguarding the country." You are referring there to Resolution 183, and that is your statement? tributed to the Secretary of the Navy by the press Mr. LINTHICUM. Why do you not finish the quotatio stands as his statement. their defense during war You do not finish the ser I am able to explain it. When it comes to the all embodied in one paragraph. report, it was formulated by Admiral Schofield. WILBUR. Admiral Schofield informs me the Then, let Admiral Schofield take the stand. No; not just now. personally board. He was consulted by the general board. I mi Secretary draft this letter, but that it was prepared by communication from Mr. Andrews, a member of Affairs Committee, asking for the opinion of the rection. The CHAIRMAN. May I conduct the examination, but upon this resolution. I referred that matter to the bers committee desire to ask questions- comment. The general board prepared these retary, you said something about Admiral Schofie Mr. of LINTHICUM the [interposing]. I want to ask a questi were put on my desk. Then that communication ndrews. Geneval time ago? How long ago? Mr. Secretary LINTHICUM. Will you explain what his duties wer WILBUR. Yes. Several days ago. The propriety of answering individual Congressman was raised. for Secretary the limitation of naval armaments. It was not WILBUR. He was attending the three-part tl I hardly see the relevancy. of this. alluded in this letter. the Secretary should have an opportunity to to here That had no connection with the arms traffi There is no criticism of the Secretary. those Secretary who assisted the Navy Department in the Mr. FISH. WILBUR. No. Admiral Schofield, howeve arm to say that there might be some criticism of the department issuing that communication for pub- ference. This committee is searching for or h York Times, which reads as follows and The CHAIRMAN. this perplexing problem. You a statement, that is light and upon I would like to ask you a few questi EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 53 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGÈRENT NATIONS Secretary WILBUR. I will be glad to answer to the best of my Secretary WILBUR. You are asking me about that? Mr. MOORE. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. The first question I want to ask is the one pro- Secretary WILBUR. You know how difficult it is to construe lan- unded by Mr. Fish. You make this statement: guage like that here, and how different circumstances change situa- tions. The thought came to me that China to-day is turbulent and he United States is an arms-producing country. There are numerous small we are not furnishing arms there, but suppose war with Russia, atries, particularly on the American Continent, that are not arms-producing ntries. It is accepted as a legitimate right and need that those countries Japan, or with England should result from this turbulence, while be supplied with arms and munitions, and implements of war for admin- the turbulence continued. It occurred to me that possibly it might policing, and safeguarding the country, and for their defense during justify the President in prohibiting the sending of arms to coun- tries under those conditions. I would not want to express an opinion Now, is there anything in the Burton resolution that would pro- about it. The main purpose is for what you say. it the shipment by citizens of the United States of arms to those Mr. MOORE. I certainly wish to be entirely courteous to both you manufacturing countries for administration, policing, and safe- and your subordinates. arding themselves? Secretary WILBUR. I thank you. Secretary WILBUR. I think not. Mr. MOORE. I do not want anything I may have said on that point The CHAIRMAN. Have you any idea why that statement was in- to be misconstrued, but having examined this matter a good deal, it in this report? I ask that because it misled me when I read it. seems to me so perfectly clear that only one interpretation can be Secretary WILBUR. For this reason, that the theory of this report is placed upon what Congress had in mind that there is hardly any it is held that the general effect of this resolution will be to limit room for any disagreement. ability to produce arms. Secretary WILBUR. My impression is quite in accordance with The CHAIRMAN. I am coming to that. your statement and that of the chairman, but if I am asked to commit Secretary WILBUR. I suppose that is the theory on which that was myself, either as a lawyer or Cabinet officer, I reserve the right- ntioned as an incidental premise to the letter itself. Mr. MOORE (interposing). You are very much more of an attorney The CHAIRMAN. Let us turn to the act of 1922. We are both than I am, and have had larger judicial experience, and I had sup- yers, and there are many lawyers around the table. Let us turn posed you would be able to reach a conclusion on this point which the act and see if we can not agree on the construction of it. It is relevant to the discussion contained in this letter. as follows: The CHAIRMAN. You understand, of course, Mr. Secretary, that henever the President finds that in any American country, or in any the committee must depend in part, at least, on the departments of in which the United States exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction, con- the Government. The purpose of my examination is not at all of domestic violence exist, which are or may be promoted by the use of or munitions of war procured from the United States, and makes procla- unfriendly, but it is simply to get information. thereof. it shall be unlawful to export. except under such limitations Secretary WILBUR. I have no wish to withhold any information exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or munitions of war from we have. place in the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the The CHAIRMAN. I would like to refer to page 1822, item 6. sident or by Congress. Secretary WILBUR. I want to make it clear that I do not consider it. Now, does not that clearly limit the authority of the President to this Bible at all. If this letter is in error, we will correct an embargo on the shipment of arms to an American country The a CHAIRMAN. It is an official document from the Secretary of domestic disorder exists, and could it, by any stretch of the the Navy of the United States, sent to a committee of Congress. igination, be extended to the shipment of arms to a country that The CHAIRMAN. Now. take the net of 1922. and look at item 6, on Secretary WILBUR. I stand by it as such. in war with another? Secretary WILBUR. My impression is just ns you state the matter page 1822. Item 6 reads as follows: but I would not want to express an opinion. It does occur to and munitions be placed with other countries, of arms the that possibly there might be both domestic violence and war. for instance, the conditions in China- present and munitions Executive to American countries, contained in the act quoted If the orders for control arms which the President has over shipments above, would "he CHAIRMAN (interposing). I mean if you limit it to domestic no longer be effective. This is most important. order. MOORE. Anybody who followed the debate in Congress when there Now, is that would prevent a foreign Central government American Mr. Secretary, will you point out where in this act of from 1922 act was passed knows that it was limited to countries where do- shipping anything arms to any of these South American or violence might exist, and if the gentleman who prepared this did not know that, he prepared it in ignorance. Republics? Secretary WILBUR. The point there is that the President, at his Secretary WILBUR. I resent the statement of the Congressman, be- option, can permit arms to flow in, or not. that is not a proper way to treat an officer who comes here at request. The CHAIRMAN. WILBUR. It I does mean not under say this so. act. As the President situation is in now, the MOORE. I withdraw anything that may seem to be discourteous. the event matter of internal turbulence, and in the event of war, course, Secretary would be within the discretion of the of it EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 55 be with Congress; but if you placed an embargo on, so that matter. It is a technical question, and we are addressing this to did not flow from this country, they would flow from other Members of Congress who have studied the situation and are familiar untries, and if they should flow from other countries, we would with it. I do not believe there was any thought or intention on the no control. part of anybody in formulating this letter to give a wrong impres- Mr. LINTHICUM. As I understand it, that could not take place sion. the President issued a proclamation that war did exist, and that Mr. COOPER. Then, why did you give it to the press so suddenly, were to be neutral. for publication in the New York Times, if there was no intention Secretary WILBUR. The point is that as long as arms come from to influence public opinion? country, we have control of the situation, but if they come from Secretary WILBUR. I can not answer you there. country, we have no control. Mr. O'CONNELL. The Secretary has said that he was not in any way The CHAIRMAN. We would have no power to prevent other coun- responsible for giving it to the press, or giving it to that paper. from shipping arms to these countries. The CHAIRMAN. One of your arguments against this resolution Secretary WILBUR. No, sir; certainly not. appears on the first page, in item 3, where you say: The CHAIRMAN. How does the existence of this act give you that Since such countries could not obtain additional arms and munitions while a Secretary WILBUR. It does not. The point is this: That if the belligerent, it is probable they would not place such orders In time of peace with the United States, but would place them with other countries where there are purchased in this country, and if the belligerents were in would be no restriction on their orders in war. habit of coming to this country for arms, we could control the by regulating our own people, by prohibiting them, if need In item No. 1 you state that the effect of the Burton resolution would be- from shipping arms. If they did not come to this country for but went to France, Great Britain, or Germany, or any other That no orders from such countries when belligerent could be filled by private untries, we would have no control. The control would be with manufacturers of arms or munitions in the United States. In the second item, you state- The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing in this act that would prevent That the output from our factories would be lessened by the inability to fill from purchasing arms and munitions in Europe. such orders. Secretary WILBUR. No, sir. This is dealing with a practical situa- Would it not have been more accurate to have added the words and not with the legislative condition. Do you get my point? " in time of war The CHAIRMAN. I confess I do not. Secretary WILBUR. No, sir. Secretary WILBUR. Take, for instance, the Mexican embargo. The CHAIRMAN. Now, in item 3 you say: comes normally to this country for a considerable portion of arms, and, in consequence, our embargo is effective upon the Since such countries could not obtain additional arms and ammunition situation there. Our embargo or our releasing of arms while a belligerent, it is probable they would not place such orders in time of pence with the United States, but would place them with other countries go into that country affects their domestic situation; but suppose where there would be no restriction on their orders in war. instead of coming to this country, went to France or Great Then they would be the ones to say whether arms should Now, of course, that is largely conjecture, is it not? into Mexico, or should not flow there. It is a practical question. Secretary WILBUR. No, sir; I think not. right of those nations is the same in either event, of course. The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that human nature is the The CHAIRMAN. This does not interfere with the control that the same in the purchase of arms as in the purchase of other articles of resident exercises under the embargo powers contained in the act commerce? 1922. Secretary WILBUR. I do not think that is relevant, if you will Secretary WILBUR. That goes back to your fundamental assumption pardon me. The proposition there relates to the caliber of guns, I think, is correct, that the 1922 law applies only to internal the character of munitions. the possibility of the replacement of sorders. If that is true, there is no conflict between the two. munitions, the parts of guns, and so forth. They would not want The CHAIRMAN. I want to submit this to you, whether an ordinary to get a machine gun from this country, knowing that in time of reading this report would not immediately draw the inference war they could not get the replacement parts. If the calibers of this letter that the Burton resolution interfered with the power the guns were different, they would naturally get them from nations permit those countries to be supplied with arms, munitions, and that would supply ammunition in time of war, when they needed it. plements of war for administration, policing, and safeguarding I take it that that would be the operation of judgment and common country Would he not draw the conclusion that the resolution sense of nations that were preparing for war or preparing to pro- prevent the President from carrying out the purposes of the tect themselves. I think that is a perfectly plain, simple, and of 1922, when, as a matter of fact, it would not interfere in the straightforward proposition. ghtest degree with it? The CHAIRMAN. In paragraph 7, on the second page, you say: Secretary WILBUR. Well, I do not know that I can say. An ordi- Further, that nonproducing countries might become producing countries, man would probably be in a good deal of doubt about the whole establishing arsenals, factories, etc., in which case also the act above quoted would not be effective. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 57 nothing in support of that statement except your opinion The CHAIRMAN. Did we not buy large quantities of cannon and might do that; have you? shell? WILBUR. Why, of course, it is an opinion based upon Secretary WILBUR. I can not answer that. proposition that every nation owes the fundamental Mr. BLOOM. Did they come with the ships? citizenship to protect it, and if they could not get the Secretary WILBUR. I do not know. Admiral Jackson made a study ntalities for protection from other nations they would, of it, and Admiral Eberle says that this statement was made up after in pursuing their obligation of self-defense, be pro- an extensive investigation. Admiral Jackson is a member of the at home. I think that reaches the rather fundamental General Board. in this type of legislation. As pointed out in this letter, The CHAIRMAN. The reason I am making this inquiry is that this personal opinion that a country of great wealth and pur- report of yours will go into the records of Congress, and it may be power must either rely upon its ability to produce muni- referred to 50 or 100 years from now. protection at home or ability to purchase them abroad. If Secretary WILBUR. We will correct any misstatements. to purchase abroad is terminated, then, necessarily, there The CHAIRMAN. I am anxious to have it accurate. ability to produce them at home. That deals with the Secretary WILBUR. We will have it checked over. and if you have of the legislation, and it seems to me that is correct. That any information, we will be glad to have it. reatest difficulty I see in this whole system of legislation. The CHAIRMAN. Your opportunity for getting information on a to be critical, and I am not here for that purpose. If subject like this is very much greater than mine. were to say to America, " You can not buy munitions Referring further to your letter, at the bottom of page 1823, the case you are at war," then we must produce more than we third example you give is that 44 finally, in the World War, waged would. It is a tendency. for a considerable time' and " on a large scale, the Central Powers HAIRMAN. I refer you to page 1823, where you say: did not find it necessary to use implements of warfare obtained from the three most recent examples as to the historical accuracy of neutral nations." As a matter of fact, they could not obtain them from neutra the war of 1870 ne'ther Germany nor France found It necessary to nations. Was not the whole purpose of the blockade to prevent then lements of warfare from neutral nations, from getting them? if the person who wrote that took into consideration the Secretary WILBUR. +do not want to answer that type of question France purchased, or had under contract with the United I think you are absolutely correct, but I do not know of my OWI purchase, enormous supplies of munitions of war left over knowledge. I have no report. of the War between the States, and that supplies of the The CHAIRMAN. Your report deals largely with the question of Army were used largely to equip the French Army in the policy. russian War. You remember the controversy over it, no The CHAIRMAN. Whether or not it is wise for this Government to Secretary WILBUR. Exactly. that WILBUR. No. sir; I do not. I relied absolutely upon the take the control of the munitions traffic out of the hands of the muni respect. tions makers and put it in the hands of a responsible branch of the There was a senatorial investigation of that matter, Government-that is the question before the committee on this investigation furnished the occasion for or led to one of the peeches by Carl Schurz. It resulted in a report that the resolution. Secretary WILBUR. I do not want to concur in that, and I do no had done no wrong in selling to the French Govern- want to comment on it. the sale had been arranged prior to the outbreak of the The CHAIRMAN. Wherein would the passage of this resolution in arms were sent over there in large quantities, and it was terfere with the functioning of the Nation, if at all? famous investigations of that question, and I am surprised Secretary WILBUR. Two things are pointed out in this letter tha that your authorities or advisers in international law might interfere with the ability to procure munitions in this coun of that very widely discussed case. try and cast on the Navy the burden of controlling this contraban In the second paragraph, at the bottom of page situation in the event of war. It is of more importance to th Army than to the Navy. in the Spanish-American War, a war between two first-class powers, The CHAIRMAN. I realize that. As a matter of fact, Mr. Secre Igerent found it necessary to obtain implements of war from any tary Davis said in his testimony the other day, the following, which I will quote: that a fact that our Government obtained implements of war war? establishments The CHAIRMAN. throughtout the United States which in time of war are When you refer to munitions factories, you mean industria con WILBUR. I can not give you any detailed information. verted into munitions factories? we did buy some ships-three, I think. It is Admiral that they were obtained before war was declared. Secretary DAVIS. In Yes. other words, at the present time there are no munition the factories The CHAIRMAN. in America, outside of concerns like the Remington and fact? others, manufacture sporting goods and things of that sort-that is a Secretary DAVIS. Yes. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 59 58 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Secretary WILBUR. Most of them come from the Army. As & matter of fact there are no munitions factories in the United The CHAIRMAN. The question I asked is, where did the Army get States to-day. We have great industrial establishments which can them? Did it make them or buy them? be converted into munitions factories in time of war. Is not that the Secretary WILBUR. They make them. fact? The CHAIRMAN. As far as the Navy is concerned, to sum up your Secretary WILBUR. I believe it is so. I would want to be informed testimony, everything you use is made in Government arsenals or on that before I answered it. navy yards, except half of the powder. Is that correct? The CHAIRMAN. Is there any place you can point out where the Secretary WILBUR. And other explosives-we use a great many passage of this resolution would interfere with the procurement of other explosives. necessary munitions by the Navy Department? The CHAIRMAN. Everything that the Navy uses is made in navy Secretary WILBUR. No. We would have to rely on the general tend- vards or arsenals except half of the T. N. T. and other explosives. encies of the legislation, tending to discourage the production of Is that correct? muntions as affecting the ability to procure those munitions in time Secretary WILBUR. I think in a general sense that is correct. I of trouble. did not give the impression that we made T. N. T. The CHAIRMAN. You do not take the position that factories were The CHAIRMAN. You said half of them. built in America on the strength of the possibility of war taking Secretary WILBUR. Smokeless powder. place some time abroad? The CHAIRMAN. The Government does not make T. N. T. but makes Secretary WILBUR. I think I have made my position fairly clear half of its smokeless powder. and I do not know that I could add anything to the general state- Secretary WILBUR. Approximately, and all our shells are pur- ment. This letter deals with the general tendencies of this legisla- chased from private manufacturers. tion. To say that this would put some given factory out of com- The CHAIRMAN. The shells? mission or prevent the establishment of some other factory-we Secretary WILBUR. Yes; projectiles. have not that data and could not give it. The War Department has The CHAIRMAN. Then in case of war the Navy would be prepared made a study of the situation of procurement. Our department has for action and would be fully equipped except for its needs of smoke- concurred in that. I have not in hand the figures. This report of less powder and shells and T. N. T.? ours deals with the general tendencies of this legislation to discour- Secretary WILBUR. Just exactly what do you mean by that? Do age the production of arms and munitions in the United States in you mean that we would enter the war with full supplies or do you, time of peace by discouraging the exportation of such arms and mean that during the war we would be able to take care of any- munitions to countries which might otherwise procure them. thing? The CHAIRMAN. There are no munitions factories in America The CHAIRMAN. You would not need the aid of munitions facto- to-day. They must be converted for that purpose, which takes a ries. You are supplied now, as I understand? long period of time, and it seems unbelievable that any one would Secretary WILBUR. I am a little at a loss in answering that. The into the industrial business in the hope that a war would occur at plan of the Navy is to be prepared for instant action and have on some future time. In other words, I can not quite agree with you hand not only shells but all other types of explosives, but not in that this action would discourage these industries. quantities that would be used in a major war. As Admiral Schofield Secretary WILBUR. With all due respect, I am not asking you to just suggested to me, we would probably need everything we could agree with me. I am simply presenting the view of the department, possibly get, and after all that is what we are dealing with, that them. and this committee has its own views and will no doubt act upon possibility. The CHAIRMAN. You recognize, inasmuch as you have suggested The CHAIRMAN. Arms and munitions for the use of the Navy for matters of policy, that the shipment of arms from one belligerent to the most part are made in the navy yards, are they not? be used against another causes ill will toward us on the part of Secretary WILBUR. Hardly that. We manufacture over 50 per nations against which these arms and munitions are used. ent of our smokeless powder. We make our great guns. Some of Secretary WILBUR. I think you gentlemen are just as able to form hem are made at Washington, and some are made by the Army. an opinion on that as I am, and I do not believe my opinion would Some of the guns we are procuring now are being made by the Army for us, the large guns, but the rifles are all purchased either from be of any assistance to you. The CHAIRMAN. Is there any doubt about it in your mind? he Army, the small arms mostly from the Army; we do not make hose. Our other explosives are all purchased from private corpora- Secretary WILBUR. None whatever. The CHAIRMAN. We recognize that this resolution is a departure ions-T. N. T., and other explosives. The admiral tells me he thinks from existing customs, I will hardly say of law because I have the other explosives, and that is my recollection, are purchased always doubted that there was such a thing as international law-we lsewhere. We only manufacture smokeless powder. recognize that this is a departure from existing customs. Do you The CHAIRMAN. Are the guns you buy from the Army made by not think it would be safer for the United States to vest the control Army arsenals or by private enterprise? over this doubtful traffic in a responsible branch of the Government Secretary WILBUR. Are you talking about small arms? The CHAIRMAN. Small arms. instead of leaving it to those who make those munitions, and some 60 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 61 of them with only one motive, and that is to make money, without Secretary WILBUR. Senator Burton was there and can speak with regard to the results to the country? Do' you not think it would authority on that situation. He represented this Government to be better to vest the control in a responsible branch of the Govern- the satisfaction of the Navy and I think every other department ment and take it away from the munition makers? of the Government. Secretary WILBUR. I will have to give you a personal answer, Mr. HULL. He has spoken in this resolution. and more or less offhand, to that question, but the fact is that the Mr. Maas. That is his answer. control of that subject is now in Congress. The exercise of that The CHAIRMAN. Would a shell made in America fit an English control can be had at any time Congress chooses to exercise it, and cannon or a French cannon or a German cannon, as made for our the question that is here is whether you exercise it in advance of Navy? future international complications which you can not now visualize, Secretary WILBUR. Broadly speaking, no; and I think I am cor- or whether Congress will await the exigency and act at that time rect in saying that it is not only a question of caliber but that there with full knowledge. The power is in Congress. It is not in the are considerations involved. The answer the admiral suggests is munitions manufacturers. They can not turn a hand without the no, and that would be my answer. consent of Congress implied by silence. The CHAIRMAN. In other words, our factories might go on making The CHAIRMAN. You do not mean that. shells, as an illustration, for years, for the English and the French Secretary WILBUR. I mean the consent of Congress, not verbally and the Germans and the Japanese. Then if we became involved in expressed, but by failure to express, the tacit consent of Congress. a war we could not use that machinery; we would have to get new Do you see what I mean? machinery to make shells that would fit out guns. Is that a fact? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Secretary WILBUR. No; that is rather an erroneous conclusion Secretary WILBUR. That is an offhand answer. from the premise. The possession of machinery for that purpose, The CHAIRMAN. That has been the rule in the past and it resulted the ability to make these shells, could be diverted very readily to the in failure because when the exitement of war is on it is impossible production of other types of shells. The production of these shells to secure any definite action. That is history of the past. Would requires a great technical ability; it is not so much in the caliber as it not be better in times of peace to fix a definite policy in regard to in the strength of the steel, the ability to manufacture steel and have this traffic which disturbs the good feeling of certain nations toward it of the proper tensile strength. the United States? The CHAIRMAN. Do not the manufacturers have to change the Secretary WILBUR. There again I will have to express a personal machinery, to change the dies and gauges? conviction. I think it is covered by the report of our conferees Secretary WILBUR. I can not answer that offhand. I think I at Geneva, that by all means possible we should contribute to the have answered in a general way, and the admirals here can answer peace of the world, and that if by making some sacrifices with you more in detail. We have men who have supervision of the reference to munitions we can contribute to that peace we ought production of these things, and I would not want to give you an to do it, but to tie our own hands irrevocably and leave every other offhand answer on that subject. nation free to supply arms to belligerents all over the world will The CHAIRMAN. What brought up the question is this. We were not be as effective as it would be for us to retain our power of making munitions almost from the very beginning of the war in action and seek by negotiation to get similar action from all other Europe, but even as late as the armistice, unless I am misinformed, nations producing arms so that there will be a cooperation of effort. we had very little artillery in Europe, if any. Why could we That is an offhand personal expression of opinion. not manufacture our artillery? The CHAIRMAN. Are you not losing sight of the provision in the Secretary WILBUR. I will have to speak from general knowledge. resolution, that the decision is left in the discretion of Congress, My understanding is that we were manufacturing the artillery and and ought you not to assume that Congress would take further that the demand for our men was so great that England and France action when the necessity arises? Secretary WILBUR. No: because I have the same feeling you ex- agreed to supply the artillery if we would get the men over there, pressed a moment ago, that to get action in time of international and that we really went before we were prepared. I am not certain of that. turmoil, and difficulty is very hard, and you have control just as The CHAIRMAN. Then two years of munitions making in America much as you would have with this resolution passed. The CHAIRMAN. If a war broke out to-morrow in Europe, and did not help us in the slightest degree when it came to making munitions factories would start shipping hundreds of tons of these artillery for our own Army. instruments of destruction to add fuel to the flame of war, we should Secretary WILBUR. I will again have to give my personal view, permit the traffic as we have done in the past. which is that there was the very greatest possible assistance. I Secretary WILBUR. Don't you believe the movement at Geneva think sometimes we forget the enormous quantities of materials that should result in some modification of that situation? I think our were consumed in that war, far beyond anything nations ever delegates there had faith to believe that there would be. dreamed of. You have seen the figures of comparisons of projec- The CHAIRMAN. If you had the experience at Geneva that I had tiles and powder used in the Civil War with that used in one on the opium question, you would not think so. engagement in the World War, enormous, unheard of quantities. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 63 The CHAIRMAN. I have always understood that we had very lit- Mr. BURTON. Predominantly, are they not for peaceful purposes? artillery in Europe even at the end of the war, and yet the Secretary WILBUR. My answer would be no. rgument is made that if we keep these munitions factories going Mr. BURTON. In your judgment is it storage of supplies for war? will be able to produce munitions much more quickly. I never did Secretary WILBUR. You did not ask me that question. You asked nderstand why we did not have artillery in Europe. Secretary WILBUR. An offhand statement from me would not be me whether it was for peaceful purposes, and I say my judgment is no. any value. I think you can get specific data from the War De- Mr. BURTON. Your judgment is that they are not materials for peaceful purposes. What are these cartridges? Mr. BURTON. You speak here in No. 2 of the decrease in our The CHAIRMAN. They are shotgun cartridges. that would result. Are you at all familiar with the quantity Secretary WILBUR. Or ordinary rifle cartridges. exportation of explosives or firearms or munitions under present The CHAIRMAN. Or pistols. onditions? That is the argument that is conveyed by this No. 2, Secretary WILBUR. Pistols or rifles. that the output from our factories would be lessened by the inabil- The CHAIRMAN. A great many of them go to Switzerland for their to fill such orders." shootfests. Are there metallic cartridges for shotguns? In peace time are we exporting any very great quantity of firearms Secretary WILBUR. The metallic cartridges make up a much larger munitions to other countries? caliber for the fixed ammunition for rapid-fire guns, 3, 4, 4-inch, even Secretary WILBUR. I could not answer that question. There were 5-inch. I do not want to evade your question, but I do not like to unitions shipped to Nicaragua to assist the Government there. We answer something I do not know. I believe, 15,000 stands of arms now in our possession turned The CHAIRMAN. Would that classification of metallic cartridges, by the two belligerents, but the details in support of that can be in your judgment, include charges for cannon and other arms down irnished to the committee. to shotguns, or what would it include? Mr. BURTON. It is not a fact that these exports are negligible, that Secretary WILBUR. It would not go higher than 5-inch guns but amount to less than one-tenth of 1 per cent? it would go down from that to the .30-caliber rifle or to the revolver. Secretary WILBUR. If you have any specific information, it would Mr. BURTON. Are you quite sure that does include charges for better than anything I can say. If you have not, we can get it for cannon? Secretary WILBUR. Am I sure that these items include it? Mr. BURTON. What is meant in the list of exports by metallic Mr. BURTON. That classification, metallic cartridges. rtridges? What are they? Are they for sporting operations, or Secretary WILBUR. The classification would cover it, but whether they for preparations for war? That is the principal item in our any were shipped of that type I have no knowledge. of firearms and munitions. I am asking for information. Mr. BURTON. The summary does not give that. The exports of hat are metallic cartridges? explosive shells and projectiles for the calendar year 1927 were Secretary WILBUR. Have you a list of the exports? $214,561. What do you understand that to include? Mr. BURTON. Yes. Under " Firearms and ammunition," subhead- Secretary WILBUR. I think I will not be very helpful to you in " Firearms and ordnance," it gives for revolvers and pistols, going over that list unless I have an opportunity to study it. I do 13,386 worth of exports for the calendar year 1927; rifles, $723,704. not think I ought to even speculate on it. Are not those used largely for hunting and sporting purposes? Mr. BURTON. Other ammunition, including fireworks-the exports Secretary WILBUR. I could not say. were $518,588. Is that for warlike purposes? Mr. BURTON. Shotguns, $510,238. Those are not used for war. The CHAIRMAN. In China; yes. Secretary WILBUR. Not ordinarily. Mr. BURTON. The point I desire to make is that any idea that this Mr. BURTON. Machine and heavy ordnance guns and carriages, could convey serious injury to our trade is not well founded. The 85,226. That may be for purposes of war and preparations for figures I have quoted are taken from the Monthly Summary of Foreign Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States part Under ammunition, we have shot shells, and the amount given here 1, December, 1927, page 44. $960,765. What do you understand those to be? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. What is the total of the items? Secretary WILBUR. The admiral thinks those are probably shotgun Mr. BURTON. The total for the classification of firearms and am- munition is $6,020,263, the principal item being metallic cartridges, Mr. BURTON. The largest item is $1,993,795, exports of metallic $1,993,795, just about a third. tridges. What are those metallic cartridges. Secretary WILBUR. That does not appeal to me in just that way, Secretary WILBUR. The probabilities are that means small-arms for this reason: The important thing to this country is the ability tridges with the brass case, like revolver and rifle cartridges. to manufacture munitions of war, rifles, and so forth. I do not mean Mr. BURTON. Are those for military purposes or peaceful pursuits, that we should not have the rifles, of course, but we are relying very matches and hunting? largely in our national defense upon our potential ability to produce Secretary WILBUR. They can be used for both. the things needed in war. If a factory can produce a dozen rifles, 36144-29-5 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 65 can probably produce a great many more when the demand comes, I do not think it is as inconsequential as the figures might indi- Secretary WILBUR. Those particular ones. te with reference to our exports. It is a question of ability to train The CHAIRMAN. I doubt if that is the reason, because I noticed en to produce those things in quantity when they are needed. That in the paper the other day that my fellow townsman, Charles M. my general thought. Schwab, was awarded a peace medal. Mr. HULL. Does that ability depend on the production of muni- Mr. Maas. Is not the whole theory of our industrial mobiliza- ons and implements of warfare, or is it dependent upon an indus- tion for war purposes the ability of our industries to be converted ialism of the country that enables them to adapt the tools to that into establishments to supply the Army and Navy rather than exist- rticular use? ing to operate as munitions factories independently! Secretary WILBUR. On both, I should say. Secretary WILBUR. I could not say. I think that is a correct Mr. HULL. Is it not rather the latter than the former? statement. I am not very familiar with that subject. Secrétary WILBUR. The latter. Mr. FISH. You naturally are interested in the national defense? Mr. HULL. I have listened for a long time for some explanation Secretary WILBUR. Yes. the dependence of this country upon the business which munitions Mr. FISH. You stated before this committee that if this resolu- akers and arms makers may have in other countries as a necessary tion went through-or, rather, if we continued as we are, shipping ndition for their ability to supply us with like tools and muni- munitions abroad to belligerent nations-that it would have a ten- ons, but nothing has been produced here of a definite character to dency to drag us into war with nations or they would be unfriendly bstantiate that claim-that their potential power to supply us with toward us. That is your statement-that it would have a tendency ms and munitions is dependent on their doing business with other to create hostility in that nation toward us? untries that are in a state of warfare. It has all been suggested Secretary WILBUR. I think I made that answer to the chairman's a general tendency, but I say there has not been anything pro- question, and I had in mind the strenuous objections advanced by ced here to substantiate that. If we had to supply ourselves with Germany during the World War to our furnishing ammunition unitions and implements of war based upon an industrialism of to the Allies, which we insisted upon doing. at kind, we would have to foment war in Europe all the time. Mr. FISH. If this resolution went through, of course, we would Secretary WILBUR. It does not seem to me that is quite a fair not be endangered by the hostility of any foreign nation. That estion. I do not think there is anybody in our department. seems to be the big point. Mr. HULL. The department has not set out the facts to show how (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee adjourned to meet the manufacture of munitions or implements of warfare for use again at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Monday, March 19, 1928.) other countries is necessary in order to be available as a potential oply for us. Mr. COLE. For our preparedness. Secretary WILBUR. We have not presented that to you, but there HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ve been studies made jointly by the Army and Navy on that COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ject. I think that would be available to the committee. I would March 19, 1928. to give an illustration that occurs to me that may not seem to The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (chairman) 1 exactly germane; but I was on a visit to the Bethlehem plant presiding. years ago, and they were dismantling great machines that must The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. ve cost a tremendous amount of money, which it would take a g time to replace. They had been placed there to manufacture STATEMENT OF HON. DWIGHT F. DAVIS, SECRETARY OF nitions during the war. I think they were for guns and for WAR-Resumed nor plate. They were tearing them down and melting them up put in a different type of plant. I happened to attend a meeting Mr. FISH. Have you that information with you as to the number t day at which a gentleman stated that the Bethlehem-I might of guns and the amount of ammunition used by the American he was conneced with the university and not with the steel Expeditionary Forces? -ks-that they would be able at any time to begin production of Secretary Davis. They are getting that up in the department and will send it in. I do not have it with me. rmous quantities of war supplies. As a matter of fact, by tear- down these machines they were rendering it impossible for them Mr. FISH. When the Secretary of the Navy was here Saturday begin the production of such supplies for a long period of time. the question was propounded to him, whether the passage of such a at may present a picture to you or it may not, but it occurs to me resolution as is now before the committee would not have a tendency the thing we are liable to overlook is that manfacturers will to keep the United States out of war, and, as I remember, he stated retain this type of machinery with the loss of capital involved, that in his opinion it would; because if we shipped munitions of war erioration and all that, unless they are able to use it. to belligerent countries, the country that did not get the munitions, fr. HULL. They are tearing them down now before we pass a of course, would be hostile, and, naturally, human nature being what olution of this kind? it is, would try to prevent the other party from receiving munitions, by the use of submarines or any other method. Do you concur with 6 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 67 at view, that the passage of this resolution to prevent shipment resolution state this will drag us into war, and why this will not stop munitions to belligerent nations would help to keep us out of war? us from being dragged into war. That is the case in & nutshell. We Secretary DAVIS. I do not think it would; no. wish you to present your side to the committee and give us evidence. Mr. FISH. Can you explain the reasons why you do not think sol Mr. COOPER. As I recall it, the Swedish order was made after the Secretary DAVIS. No nation has the right to take the shipment of war began. We propose this resolution in a time of peace so that unitions by private manufacturers as a hostile act of a country, they will have ample warning before the war begins. nder international law. At the time of the World War it was Mr. FISH. I, myself, would hesitate a long while to adopt this roposed and strongly urged upon President Wilson that he place resolution in the way that Sweden and some of the other countries embargo upon such shipments. As I understand it, he took the did. For a big nation to adopt it at such a time might inspire inti- titude that, while legally this country would have the right to do it, mation of fear, but if we are going to adopt it at all, let it be while might be taken as an unneutral act to put such an embargo upon everything is peaceful with no war on the horizon. ch shipments. If it would be an unneutral act, not legally but in Mr. COLE. I think your question ought to be answered directly and e opinion of another nation, to put an embargo on, it seems to me not by any indirection. These shipments that were prohibited- would be much more of an unneutral act, in their opinion, to lift an were those on the part of the government or subjects of the govern- abargo, as provided in this bill, by Congress. ment? Mr. FISH. The question was asked the Secretary of the Navy Mr. FISH. Private munitions. turday, What neutral countries shipped arms to the Central Powers Mr. BURTON. It is universally so. Germany during the war-do you know what neutral powers Mr. FISH. To all; not only Germany. ipped arms to Germany during the war? Mr. BURTON. Also, as well, transit. Secretary DAVIS. No; I do not know. There was a feeling that Mr. FISH. They went much further. In 1915 it would have been unitions were going into Germany from some of the neutral powers, regarded as an unneutral act. I am sure if you can enlighten the t I have no information on that. committee on the attitude that it would bring us into war instead of Mr. FISH. Is it not a fact that the countries adjoining the Central having a tendency to keep us out of war, we could go ahead here in wers passed either laws or executive orders to the effect that they discussing the advisability of proceeding further. uld not export any munitions of war to Germany because they re- Secretary DAVIS. One danger that I see was pointed out by Mr. rded that exportation as an unneutral act? It is very contrary to Hay and Mr. Root in the past. If a nation itself declares certain at you have been stating to us here. articles are contraband and should not be shipped during the war, it Secretary DAVIS. I do not know what the situation was with regard becomes in a sense a guarantor that they will not be shipped. There their laws. I have not heard that statement. is always the danger in anything of this sort, as we know, that Mr. FISH. Perhaps it will be interesting to you if I, should read private people will try to ship out munitions or anything else, and briefly the laws or regulations passed by the Swedish Govern- there will be charges made, at least, that it is being done. If a nation nt at the outbreak of the war. Immediately after the outbreak of has said that it will not do that, in a sense it must stop that exporta- World War, the Swedish Government issued an export prohibi- tion; under international law as it is now, it is up to one of the n for war materials. Those war-export prohibitions were main- belligerents to stop that. The various nations themselves-the ex- ned until the end of the war, and no export licenses were issued to porting nations-do not become guarantors in the moral sense that of the belligerent powers. The prohibition of transit of war they shall not be shipped. Therefore, it would lead to frequent terial was in force from January, 1915, to the end of the war. charges and constant friction, it seems to me, charges that munitions have tried to find /out whether other countries also had those are being shipped, although we have guaranteed that they shall not ulations, and I am told Switzerland did have the same regula- be shipped. ns. Mr. HULL. We do not guarantee. They take an attitude contrary to your attitude, that if they had Secretary DAVIS. In a sense. pped munitions of war to any of the countries-the Allies or Ger- Mr. FISH. Assuming that is correct, that we do not guarantee at ny-it would have been regarded as an unneutral act and would all, but suppose we did, it is just doing the same thing Sweden and dragged them into the war. others did and they had no trouble with them at all. They only had want to find out from the opponents of this resolution how they to ship across the Baltic, which was controlled by the German fleet. ire that our passage of this resolution, which prevents shipment To make munitions takes some little time, and to ship them. We arms, which is what Sweden and Switzerland and other nations would have no difficulty. If the Government did not want to back will drag us into war, as stated in the Post this morning, and, up the law, they would be shipped. Everyone must agree that if the other hand, why it should not keep us out of war? We are all the Government wanted to stop shipment of munitions from this riotic American citizens. Most of this committee have voted for country they could do it. That depends entirely on the Government paring us, and I have been many times with the Chief Executive, at that time. What we want to be advised about is whether the he three battle cruisers last year, on the light cruisers, and on the tendency of this resolution will be to put us into war or keep us out. ation of guns, and so forth. We all have the same desire. The Will you develop that idea? stion the committee wants to find out is why the opponents of this EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 69 cretary DAVIS. There is a further question I can see, particu- as regards any nation in this hemisphere. Suppose an Euro- continuing the present policy it is not going to create hostility in nation should attack some nation in this hemisphere? The France toward us if these munitions are used to kill French nationals, place for them to get their supplies for self-defense would be and will it not have a tendency to drag us into war? country. Under the Monroe doctrine would we not be required Secretary DAVIS. I do not see how it could if we are willing to ship them if the foreign nation should make a landing on their to both sides. We have a perfect right to do it. Mr. FISH. If England controls the seas and France can not get FISH. You answered your own question; that we are practi- them, what then? bound, if it means anything, to do that very thing ourselves. Secretary DAVIS. The fact remains that we have a perfect right to not have anything to do with this resolution. do it, under the international law, if we ship to both sides. If we are two things we are concerned with: One is the national ship only to one side, I agree with you. which we will take up later. The other is whether this Mr. FISH. Assuming that French submarines come out and sink will have a tendency to keep us out of war. Those are our munitions ships, has that a tendeny to drag us into war? matters we want you to discuss before the committee. There Secretary DAVIS. If they do it contrary to international law. use talking about what the Monroe doctrine is. We all have our Mr. FISH. If they attack our ships, is that contrary to interna- on that. If any foreign nation should land on this continent, tional law-attacking our ships with American citizens on board? be compelled under the Monroe doctrine to oppose it. Secretary DAVIS. I should think so. TEMPLE. I want to enter my protest against that interpreta- Mr. FISH. Has not that quite a tendency, therefore, to bring us of the Monroe doctrine. into war with France or with any other country? CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. Secretary DAVIS. If they attack our ships, that would bring us TEMPLE. We have never taken the ground that an European in the war regardless of the munitions question. must not make war on an American Republic. Mr. FISH. Don't you agree, then, that the present policy has a FISH. There is a division of opinion on that. tendency to drag us into war and not to keep us out? TEMPLE. I do not think so. Secretary DAVIS. No; not necessarily. FISH. I do not believe this country, regardless of the Monroe Mr. FISH. You do not agree, then, that the shipment of munitions or any other doctrine, would permit an European nation by this country endangers this country's peace as far as the attitude war on a South American country, but do not let us get of any foreign country against whom the munitions are used is con- that argument. cerned? COLE. Congress can review the situation and can permit ship- Secretary DAVIS. I think as long as international law remains as of arms. it is, by the agreement of all nations, an individual, not the nation, FISH. Certainly. Will you proceed with your argument as to has a perfect right to ship. this resolution may possibly lead us into war, if passed? Mr. FISH. Everybody agrees that we have a legal right to ship DAVIS. Along what line? these munitions, not legally, but under international law we have FISH. That is the line that we want to find out. Opponents the right. resolution claim that this resolution might drag us into war. Mr. BURTON. Not a legal right? unanimous that this resolution will keep us out of war. If Mr. FISH. A right to ship them and a right to sell them. to drag us into war, I will vote against the resolution. Mr. BURTON. That is, we do not interfere with private munition CHAIRMAN. Ask the witness some direct question. makers in the shipment. They make the shipments at their own FISH. I would rather have him talk than talk myself. risk. EATON. Has the Secretary taken the ground that this will Mr. MOORE of Virginia. The citizens have a right to ship. into war? Mr. FISH. We agree to that? FISH. The Secretary first began by stating that he did not Secretary DAVIS. Yes. thought this would not be an unneutral act, the shipment Mr. FISH. What we want to know from you is whether you are and I pointed out that foreign nations had taken the opposing this resolution because you think that this will prevent it would be an unneutral act. Taking the case of the great us from getting into war or may drag us into war? suppose there is war between England and France. Secretary DAVIS. Not primarily. I think there are a great many DAVIS. Do you believe the shipment of munitions by pri- other objections to it which are fundamental. nanufacturers is an unneutral act? Mr. FISH. Do you agree to this statement that if we refuse entirely FISH. You do not think so. to ship munitions that that would have a tendency to keep us out of DAVIS. That was your statement. these foreign wars? FISH. I said that was why these foreign nations, Sweden and Secretary DAVIS. It might or might not, depending on the condi- passed their embargoes. Suppose there is a war be- tions. England and France, and assuming our sympathy is with Mr. FISH. Can you elucidate that? munitions can only go to England. Do you think that by Secretary DAVIS. I would like to read one thing that comes into this, it seems to me, as to what the effect would be-that is, the state- EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 71 ent of our committee to the Secretary of State in reporting on 16 traffic in arms convention: France, could we get any munitions in there? So it seems to me all this argument that it is a discrimination against the less powerful While registering this view the American delegates would point out that in eir opinion the adherence of all the important arms-producing powers, not nations is futile. They could not get those munitions anyway. The ly that of the United States, would realize the objects of the convention. more powerful nation would prevail and prevent. For the United States to ratify and to make the convention effective prior Secretary DAVIS. Would it not mean, therefore, if they could not the ratification by other arms-producing powers would only result in placing get them from other places, that they would have to build up their premium upon nonratifying nations producing, since they would then be trying own military establishments? sell arms to other powers without control and without publicity. If therefore the convention meets with the approval of the Senate, and if Mr. BURTON. That is another question. legislation, which will be necessary to make it effective in the United States, Secretary DAVIS. That is a very important question. assured, delegates of the United States consider that the deposit of ratifica- Mr. FISH. Why is that such an important question? Why should n on the part of the United States should be conditioned upon deposit of we continue to encourage a slaughterhouse? Must we furnish mu- tifications by the other great producing powers of the world. nitions to all the nations for any purpose, whether offense or defense? And a little later they say: Secretary DAVIS. Do you think it makes for the peace of the world It is felt, however, that pending the realization of a definite disarmament to take action which would require every nation to build up their ogram It would be futile and possibly barmful, as indicated above, to attempt own huge government arsenals? y arbitrary restrictions on trade in war materials which would place the Mr. FISH. Do we ship from our Government arsenals even in uproducing powers at the mercy of the producing powers and force produc- n by all the powers, and far from accomplishing the purpose of disarmament time of war to belligerents? ght tend toward the increase of the military establishments of certain Secretary DAVIS. No; but if we did not have private industry, we wers. would have to build up very large Government arsenals-huge arse- Mr. BURTON. It is conceded that this resolution is an advance step nals which, in itself would possibly be taken by other nations as a om the opinion expressed at that time. There is no doubt that it threat against them. oks at it from a somewhat different standpoint. It is thought Mr. FISH. Why should our country be in a different position? ere has been some progress made in the promise of peace by the Secretary DAVIS. We do not want those countries forced to build carno agreement and other negotiations that have been entered up government arsenals in every little country. It would breed o between the powers. I do not altogether agree with the state- suspician and fear among their neighbors and might conceivably nts contained in that report, certainly, not at this time. lead to war. The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, this resolution with the pro- Mr. FISH. Lead to war with whom? ion in it whereby the consent of Congress must be obtained, would Secretary DAVIS. Between them. eck the nonproducing nations as our Government advocated at Mr. FISH. Not with us. Geneva conference; at least, we had that purpose in mind in Secretary DAVIS. Not with us, but between them. isting that the " consent of Congress" must be obtained to sell Mr. FISH. Why between them? They would only be in the same nitions and arms. position, if they had their own munitions, as if some one else shipped Secretary DAVIS. Yet if all the producing countries passed a similar them munitions. bargo resolution, which, I believe, is the purpose that this com- Secretary DAVIS. You know if one nation starts to build huge tee has in mind, the ideal which you would like to work for, it government arsenals, its rival nearby would either have to do the ms to me it would place the nonproducing countries in the power same thing or would feel that nation was preparing to attack it, the producing countries, and that is exactly what they felt in and I think it would certainly lead to sowing the seeds of possible uing very strongly against that proposition. warfare. fr. BURTON. Let us face the practical facts in regard to the rights Mr. FISH. Are you referring to South American countries or to nonproducing countries, about which a great deal has been said. Europe? ppose there was a war between England and France and our Secretary DAVIS. Any countries. apathies were with France. Is it not true that under existing Mr. HULL. Is that the reason the naval building bill is not serious ditions, England having much the stronger navy, that country in its possibilities in stirring up fears of what we are going to do? ld prevent the sending of munitions to France? Take another Mr. FISH. That is the answer. stration which I have already used, Italy and Greece, do you The CHAIRMAN. You might answer that question. ok any munitions shipped from this country could get by the Secretary DAVIS. I am not an expert on naval affairs, but if we ian Navy and get into Greece? Take the case of Latin America, were building up a huge, overwhelming Navy that might be one u and Chile. If Chile had the stronger navy, could we send thing. It is exactly the same principle here, that if any one nation munitions into Peru? So this resolution does not create any in Europe, say, should commence to build huge government arsenals, condition. It merely-I will not say exactly-but it is in line which would enable it to attack its hereditary enemy, and the heredi- and it does have to recognize existing facts. Suppose one of tary enemy was unable to buy munitions for its own self-defense, it e nations in the north of Europe, which are essentially pacific, seems to me it would either be putting the second nation into the eden, Norway, or Denmark, desired to contest with England or power of the first nation or would require the second nation to build up huge government arsenals itself for its own protection, and I EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 73 ink it would tend to defeat the very thing that most people are inking of in the interest of world peace, if the nation which is Would not the fact that there would be doubt about their ability to acefully inclined, which has not large government arsenals, which get munitions from those European countries tend to deter them lies on neutrals for its supplies for purely self-defense, is menaced from going to war? a great belligerent nation militaristically inclined. Secretary DAVIS. I think the great difficulty there is that you have The CHAIRMAN. You stated that you understood President Wilson these understandings or obligations between these various Balkan ok the attitude at the time of the World War that if we laid an States and some other power, divided spheres and influence with abargo it would be an unneutral act. Of course, President Wilson groups of nations. If they can not get munitions for self-defense a very high authority. I must assume your information is largely from some neutral source like this country, which is not interested in any of those groups, they would be thrown into the hands of arsay. Secretary DAVIS. Yes. these various groups which would thus have more power over them The CHAIRMAN. Can you furnish anything in a public paper of than they have at the present time. resident Wilson to sustain your statement? The CHAIRMAN. That group of powers in Europe, the big five, is Secretary DAVIS. I have not looked it up. That was my under- certainly interested in preserving peace in Europe. anding. I do not think that legally it would be an unneutral act. Secretary DAVIS. Yes, but they have separate interests, often di- The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, as far as your reference to Mr. Wil- verse and opposite interests in their relationships with the various n's opinion is concerned, the committee is at liberty to disregard groups of the Balkan States, and that is one danger of that whole sit- uation. at you said in that respect. Secretary DAVIS. As far as the legal side is concerned. On the Mr. HULL. War against one is war against all. I believe they her hand, there is always the situation in any international relation- have a covenant to that effect. p, particularly in time of war, that while a thing may be legal, it Mr. MOORE of Virginia. The argument offered against this resolu- n not bring protection. tion has two prongs. In the first place, it is suggested that to pass the The CHAIRMAN. If a nation wants an excuse for going to war it resolution might compel other nations to do what they are con- 11 find one. ceivably not doing now, to build up factories for the manufacture of Secretary DAVIS. Yes. munitions of war, being disabled from obtaining supplies here. Do The CHAIRMAN. You say that if we have an embargo we would be you not think that argument is continually losing force, in view of nstantly charged with allowing citizens to ship munitions? the new methods of warfare, for instance, submarines? If we go Secretary DAVIS. There is that danger. along as we have been doing heretofore and shipments are sent out The CHAIRMAN. That is the danger. But that, after all, is more by American citizens in American vessels, or foreign vessels, those less of a conjecture on your part. All that our Government would vessels would be liable to attack by submarines. Of course, this bound to do would be to exercise reasonable care in preventing Government could not sacrifice its policy of governmental neutrality ese shipments. Is that a fact? by undertaking to convoy or protect those vessels, and so it strikes Secretary DAVIS. Yes; as far as the strictly legal standpoint is me that the proposition now noticed is whittling away all the time. ncerned. Is that a reasonable view? Mr. BURTON. There might be instances of smuggling. Secretary DAVIS. From our last experience in the World War, the Mr. TEMPLE. That raises the question of due diligence. thought that I can not get out of my mind is that if this embargo Secretary DAVIS. From the strictly legalistic standpoint that is had been in effect and had not been raised, our enemy and not our rect, but in time of war or great international stress, the feelings allies would have won the war. nations are superheated and they do not stick on strictly legalistic Mr. MOORE of Virginia. But we all agree that was an exceptional es. tragedy, and that if such a tragedy occurs again it will probably The CHAIRMAN. You made another statement, that it is our duty shake the foundations of civilization so that there will be, perhaps, defend South American Republics under the Monroe doctrine in nothing much left. I am talking about conditions of warfare of a they become involved in war with European nations. more or less ordinary character, and it seems to me when those Secretary DAVIS. No. conditions occur, what I am presupposing will be the case. The CHAIRMAN. You did not mean to go that far? Take the other prong of the argument, that is, if we discontinue Secretary DAVIS. No; I said if they maintained a landing on the the present practice we may be losing our ability to be prepared for ores of a country in this hemisphere. war. But it was said here the other day by the representative of the The CHAIRMAN. The Balkan States are recognized as the powder chemical interests that it only requires 15 days for a chemical factory gazine of Europe. The World War began there as many others to be converted into a factory for the manufacture of war material, ve. Suppose this resolution were passed. Some of the Balkan and that they would be available in that time. What I would like to ates anticipating war would know that they could not get muni- have you do at your convenience for my information as a person ns from America. They would know they would have to go to ignorant on this subject, is to survey the situation and tell me to antries intensely interested in preserving peace, Great Britain, what extent, in such an emergency as I am forecasting, we are ance, Belgium, Holland, and Germany, to secure munitions. dependent upon private producers, and what would be the expense 74 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 75 and the difficulty for us to supersede private production by under- aking our own production? more in value in food and raw materials, considerably more than I ask you to do that because if we can do it I want to get our we used for muntions, undoubtedly, in finished munitions, during the people out of a business which I consider a homicidal business. I war. That raises the point of how far you want to go into that. lo not believe, and I know you and I have the greatest respect for Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We are not raising the point of an eco- ou, I do not believe you would consent for a minute to produce this nomic boycott here. That question has been raised and talked naterial of war and ship it to a nation to be used in killing people. about. We are aiming to take this one step. I realize the force of Ve might say it is legal for John Smith, Jim Jones, or George what you say, however. ohnson to do it, and they can go along and do it because it is legal, Secretary DAVIS. You would not prohibit the shipment of food ut you and I would not do it, and there are millions of American and certain essential raw materials, That is plain, but there are itizens who would scorn to do it. They would rather go in rags other reflex angles to that. Suppose all the other countries adopted han to do it, and for that reason I will ask you, if you will, to make this same principle of embargo. There are certain essential items he kind of analysis that I am asking for and give me the benefit of in our own manufacture for our self-defense, in munitions, which our information, because as far as I am concerned I would rather we must get from other countries. We can not manufacture all the ave this great rich Nation spend a great deal of money in looking things we need for our own self-defense, purely from the things we fter its own preparations for war than to continue upon a course of have in our own country. If every other nation put on an embargo, usiness now sanctioned but in my opinion wrong. That is all I and particularly an embargo an those essential raw materials, ave to say. would it not be a rather serious question where we were going to Secretary DAVIS. I will be very glad to make that analysis. Off- get those? and, from my own knowledge, I could give you a general statement, Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I think you have two considerations at not in detail. there. First, as to whether the Government if it went into the Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I would like to have it in detail. business could accumulate materials in advance, and, second, how Secretary DAVIS. As regards the chemical industries, I do not important those materials are. now how long it would take them to get in. That is not a serious Secretary DAVIS. They are absolutely vital, the things I have in ifficulty. The one that would take the longest is the question of mind, a certain list of things that are absolutely vital. anufacturing of artillery and munitions. It takes, I suppose, from Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I have asked these questions not as a pro- fessional pacifist. ve to seven months in a great many of the items. General Ruggles n give the details better of getting into production. For certain Secretary DAVIS. I know that, Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I scorn that idea. I supported the naval ems it would take 12 to 18 months to get most production. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. That might point to an exigency for this bill before the House the other day and I believe in reasonable overnment in getting into these operations to wait on people who preparedness, but I am very deeply interested in getting our citi- zens out of this sort of business. ke from six months to a year or more to get ready because nobody n tell what will occur to our disadvantage in that period of time. Secretary DAVIS. I will do the best I can to answer your question in the record. Secretary DAVIS. As regards the Government doing it, I will be ad to make a statement of it. Mr. HULL. You suggested that the passage of this resolution would But we must realize that in modern warfare the problem is so tend to discourage some industrial plants from being ready to pre- pare us with necessary supplies of war. Has the department any mplex that it goes into every possible kind of business. It is very fficult but I suppose you could figure out what it would cost to list of those plants that can supply us with those things, which would ild arsenals, and you have other complex problems affecting raw go out of business if they do not have the right to ship munitions aterials. and so forth. I will have to give general figures. supplies to other countries at war? Mr. EATON. Do you feel as we all do, that it would be very mean Secretary DAVIS. That is a question that can not be answered by d wicked for individuals to engage in producing these murderous any definite names, naturally. We have to go back to our experience oducts, and yet take it away from part of the population and put in the World War, and I will get the figures for you as to what the difference in time would have meant there. Suppose that our manu- upon the whole population? facturers had not been able to take any orders from our allies, not Mr. MOORE of Virginia. No: I propose taking away from citi- is the right to produce and ship it out and vest the right to pro- regarding it from the standpoint of whether it would have meant ce it in the Government, because the Government as a neutral victory for the Germans or not, but suppose they had not been able to make all the different classes of munitions from the time the war uld be prevented from shipping to any belligerents. was on and before we went into it. If we had relied on our own Mr. COOPER. And no motive on the part of the Government for sonal profit. munitions, we would not have had those munitions until a year and a half later than we did. We did not have everything we wanted as it Secretary DAVIS. To develop what you want I will continue that ittle further. There is another side of this matter that has not happened. It took many months beyond the time to get some of the 1, perhaps, sufficient consideration. Munitions, of course, are not essential things, and we would have had practically nothing. Mr. HULL. The Allies did not have very much to supply us. only factors necessary in warfare. We shipped a great deal Secretary DAVIS. They helped out enormously. 6 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 77 Mr. HULL. It was 18 months or more before we began to supply Secretary DAVIS. It is hard to put it into percentages, but particu- rtillery. larly from the standpoint of supplies and for the planning for the Secretary DAVIS. If they had not done that it would have made an things we needed, we were very seriously crippled. normous difference. I would be glad to put that into the record. The CHAIRMAN. The point I am trying to develop is this. Take the Mr. HULL. We have not had war for 10 years. I do not know what position that the production and sale of these munitions during our ne prospects are but they do not look very alarming. I think it is pre-war period prepared us for the war. According to your records fe to say we will not have one for another 10 years. Should all we manufactured and shipped $4,000,000,000 worth of munitions and these industrial plants go out of business and be unprepared to even that experience did not prepare us fully for war. apply us with munitions because we will have no war for another Secretary DAVIS. It prepared us in a great many different lines. years? That was notice to other nations. Secretary DAVIS. No; not necessarily. I am taking that from the The CHAIRMAN. Did you not have to change dies and machinery perience in the World War. If this had been in effect at that time, in practically every munition factory in America to make the kind would have been tremendously hampered; not only hampered, we of guns and artillery that were wanted? ould have had nothing at the time we went to war, and our boys Secretary DAVIS. Only in some instances. ould have lost their lives because they did not have guns to protect The CHAIRMAN. Entirely different from the European kind? emselves. Secretary DAVIS. Only in some instances, and that is what we Mr. FISH. I asked at the last meeting if you could bring here the are planning now, that we will not have to do that sort of thing. mber of American guns and shells used by our boys on the other Mr. HULL. That preparedness is not conditioned upon supplying le. other nations with raw materials? Secretary DAVIS. I will be very glad to. That is an illustration Secretary DAVIS. Not entirely. We divide the planning into va- two or three things which we did not supply even in those 18 onths. I think it was due to other reasons. One was the fact that rious phases: First, a certain length of time to draw up your re- quirements. We did not even know what we would require in the were not prepared and had no plans, no standardized designs last war. In the actual production in any factory work it takes a those things; it was due to our lack of preparation. certain length of time to draw up plans and specifications. It takes Mr. FISH. Artillery is one of the most important parts of the a very great length of time in the artillery end to get jigs, gauges, stem of offense and defense, and we practically did not use any and dies necessary for manufacturing, and it takes a certain length nerican artillery or American shells, and, of course, we could not of time to begin actual production. It takes a certain length of American shells if we did not have our own artillery. Secretary DAVIS. We were able to borrow from our Allies because time, comparatively short, to get into full mass production. By being in production and making these things for the Allies they had shipped them a lot of things. One of the greatest safeguards this country in national defense is the wise provision put by had gone through the first phases and were in the final phase of mass production, 80 that there was a tremendous saving in time, a saving ngress in the national defense act, section 5-a, which puts upon due to the fact that they were making these supplies at the time. Assistant Secretary of War definite responsibility for planning advance to meet the situation for our own defense. That is a rather complicated statement. Mr. TEMPLE. One instance to illustrate the point, which occurred in Mr. FISH. Is not that what you have done for the past five years? the World War was in the production of small arms. One of the Secretary DAVIS. Exactly. fr. FISH. And you have made wonderful strides, yourself, Mac- big manufacturers of small arms in this country had a contract to ler, the previous Assistant Secretary, and the present Assistant supply rifles with Great Britain. A Member of this House who knew of that contract and was intimately acquainted with the man- retary, preparing industrial organizations for conversion into nitions works, and yet if this resolution went into effect, it would ager of the plant, having observed that it took nearly 13 months for harm our defense preparation to the extent of putting them that company to equip itself to make the first shipment of Enfield k to where it was 10 years ago. rifles, began to wonder in what position we were. We had 700,000 ecretary DAVIS. It is not a question of producing but of planning Springfield rifles. He wondered what position we would be in, and dvance. We have made a tremendous advance, and the statement he made an inquiry at a plant manufacturing Springfields of what ut artillery and airplanes would not be a true statement of facts their capacity running 24 hours a day would be in delivering the ay, because if they had gone as far with preparations and plan- Springsfields, and what the wastage would be on the 700,000. before the war as we have gone to-day, we would have had our He inquired of the manager and the manager told him that the airplanes and artillery in the 18 months. fact that they were manufacturing rifles did not enable them to Ir. FISH. That is one of the great things your department has manufacture the Enfield rifle, that they would have to equip them- in the way of defense. selves with jigs and dies and gauges, and that it would have been ecretary DAVIS. Yes. about as easy for the National Cash Register people or the Burroughs he CHAIRMAN. You say when we entered the war there was a lack Adding Machine people to get out and manufacture small arms. reparedness. I To what extent were we unprepared, 50 or 75 per Then, Mr. Tilson introduced a bill in the House appropriating a million and a half dollars for jigs, dies, and gauges, so that they 78 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 79 could transform the manufacturing plants in 2 weeks histead of 12 implements of war by private persons. Therefore, the prohibition of traffic months. The bill was passed. The War Department did not use the in arms, munitions, and implements of war as proposed in the resolution would money, but when the war came on it took nearly a year for those not violate the obligations of neutrality. people to reduce the Enfield rifle to our caliber. There was a differ- Nor would action taken by Congress to lift an embargo constitute a hostile ence in the cartridges used, rimmed cartridges in the Springfield and act, a violation of neutrality, or be cause for declaration of war by a belligerent country, provided such action by Congress applied equally to all the parties to a rimless cartridges in the Enfield, for instance, and it took nearly a war. year before they could transform the machinery and they could much I have the honor to be, sir, more quickly make the modified Enfield than the Springfield. That Your obedient servant, is the reason our men were equipped with the Enfield rifle. It took FRANK B. KELLOGG. them nearly a year to manufacture the Enfield for Great Britain. Secretary DAVIS. Mr. Moore of Virginia, particularly, has devel- It was about a year after we got into the war that that plant was oped a very interesting technical discussion here, that I think is of ready to manufacture the modified Enfield rifle for our soldiers. great importance, and it so happens that General Ruggles, Assistant Secretary DAVIS. That is one instance. Chief of Ordnance, has made very thorough studies of that, and is Mr. TEMPLE. You are familiar with that instance. in charge of the work I am talking about. I think it would be in- Secretary DAVIS. General Ruggles would be familiar with it. That teresting to ask him questions about that. is one instance. There are a great many other things where we did The CHAIRMAN. When Mr. Secretary Wilbur was on the stand I actually use some of the things they were turning out. The very asked him this question: illustration you give shows what Congress has been doing on one You recognize, inasmuch as you have suggested matters of policy, that the scale, and what I have asked them to do in another matter is to shipment of arms from one belligent to be used against another causes III will provide jigs, gauges, and dies. toward us on the part of nations against which these arms and munitions are used? Mr. TEMPLE, I hope you are doing that now. I hope you have got Secretary WILBUR. I think you gentlemen are just as able to form an opinion them ready to be transformed in case of necessity, but I hope the on that as I am, and I do not believe my opinion would be of any assistance necessity will not come. to you. Secretary DAVIS. We get an appropriation of $50,000 each year The CHAIRMAN. Is there any doubt about it in your mind? for jigs, gauges, and dies. Secretary WILBUR. None whatever. The CHAIRMAN. March 15, 1928, I received the following letter Do you agree with Secretary Wilbur that it would cause ill will from Hon. Walter H. Newton: on the part of belligerent nations? Secretary DAVIS. There might be one cause of ill will. It seems to MY DEAR MR. PORTER: It is my understanding that at the request of the Committees on Military Affairs and Naval Affairs, and several individual mem- me the feeling that exists to-day in other nations toward us is not bers of the House, that your committee has decided to hold hearings on the due to the shipment of arms so much as it is to various other matters, Burton embargo resolution. I am very glad to hear this, such as matters of debts. The question is a most Important one, and it would be extremely helpful The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the World War, and stated that to individual members of the House if they can have the benefit of the evidence pro and con before making up their own judgment in reference to the resolution. our manufacturers were an important element in winning that In this connection I should like very much to have the committee invite one war. Of course, there can not be any doubt of that. Did you ever or more prominent International lawyers or publicists such as John Bassett stop to think, in view of what the German Government said, while Moore, James Brown Scott, David Jayne Hill, Charles Evans Hughes, or others we were shipping munitions to the allied powers, what the attitude somewhat similarly known, this in addition to whomever you desire to call from our own State Department. of Germany would have been toward us in case the war had gone against us? Is it not likely she would have been much more severe On receipt of his letter, I felt we should go to the proper officers than if we remained neutral, and would have carried out the threats of the Government to secure this information, and the officer charged to make us pay for all the damages done by those munitions? with that duty is the Secretary of State. I can not subscribe to his idea of going outside when we have officers whose function it is to Secretary DAVIS. I have my own opinion of what Germany would have done to us if she had won the World War, but I would rather discharge a duty of this kind. I have here this morning a reply from the Secretary of State, which I will read. not express it. Mr. HULL. I am bothered with a dilemma in your testimony and (The letter referred to is as follows:) the testimony of all these people who believe the shipment of arms THE SECRETARY OF STATE to other nations is a method of preparation on our part for war Hon. STEPHEN G. PORTER, Washington, March 19, 1928. with some other nation. Surely there is some other way to be pre- House of Representatives. pared for the contingency of war than by the warring of other SIR: In reply to your inquiry of March 17. 1928, regarding House Report No. nations to give our munitions makers and artillery manufacturers 492, which was made on House Joint Resolution No. 183, introduced by Mr. business. Surely there is some other way of meeting the situation. Burton, I have the honor to submit the following: That is an absurd dilemma. Neutrality may be said to be an attitude of impartiality by nonbelligerent States toward belligerent States. It is not perceived that the resolut on would Secretary DAVIS. The alternative would be the building up of have any effect on the definition of neutrality. There is no obligation on a enormous governmental arsenals, spending hundreds of millions neutral State to permit or to forbid the exportation of arms, munitions, or 36144-20-6 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERI and possibly that might be the cause of friction with Secretary DAVIS. If you are willing to take ations. find it interesting to let him outline in general HULL. I do not like to believe that is the alternative-that we is doing and what it effects in point of time. have to build up these great arsenals. How much of the The CHAIRMAN. I would be glad to hear the capital of these industrial plants is spent now or has been with what I am asking-in what respect the the last 10 years in the manufacture of artillery and muni- of $4,000,000,000 worth of war materials involv nations at war? Secretary DAVIS. I will be glad to do that. DAVIS. Very small. Mr. KORELL. Suppose we continue with t HULL. They have been able to survive. upon private arms and munitions factories, a DAVIS. Some of them have gone out of business. are dependent upon the continuance of forei HULL. Suppose they have gone out of business. There is keep their plants in condition to meet the eme spect of an European war that will give them business now. States getting into another war; suppose that DAVIS. The point you miss is that in the case of a new terminate and the private factories should be the World War, if that prohibition had been in effect, we as a consequence-what would become of ou have been able to supply the Allies, in the first place, and defense if we should have a war a couple of second place would not have been able to supply our own down? Would they disappear? Would the of our preparedness! HULL. In case of a new world war we might be neutral. Secretary DAVIS. Of course, the plans are n DAVIS. Nobody can answer that question. in any sense. Our plans can be made and, as HULL. We might be in it some way. show you, there would be a tremendous savir Maas. So far, Mr. Secretary, the line of reasoning has been into production: but if they are prohibited i on the basis of the possibility of a war among other na- making munitions for other nations and the o which we are going to become engaged after a while. What mitted to do it, it certainly gives those other have been made for our necessary defense in case we are advantage over us in case we are drawn into wa from the very beginning? Mr. Maas. If we adopt this resolution, would DAVIS. All these plans I have been speaking of under of the national defense act. that are holding themselves in readiness to con into making munitions and arms, give up tho MAAS. Having our plants in such operation that we can be Secretary DAVIS. No; I do not say that; but or would we have to wait until these plants can be built up? tion was in effect, if this embargo was in effect DAVIS. Absolutely not. I think one of the wisest measures a war similar to the World War, we would be has passed of recent years is section 5-a, which requires what you have in mind. capped by this embargo. Mr. Maas. I can not see, if these industri If the evidence proves that this resolution would inter- have already mobilized will continue to be re our national defense, I would vote against it. There is no if this resolution goes into effect, how it wil advocate of an adequate national defense in Congress than I defense. DAVIS. I think General Ruggles can give you the details. Secretary DAVIS. The experience in the Wor CHAIRMAN. This matter in my mind has resolved itself into ing on that. The fact that you have your ji How far would interference with the manufacture of on hand, that we are already in the process of in time of war between other countries interfere with our means a saving on the average of five to seven n Mr. Maas. Do they not have these jigs and paredness? The poison gas interests were here and said they prepared in 10 days. Secretary of the Navy Wilbur said Secretary DAVIS. No; that is one of the seri the same thing. It does seem to affect the Army in some not. The CHAIRMAN. You made one answer that I would like General Ruggles, or the man in charge elaborate. You said, in case this resolution w to give us a specific answer on this phase of the matter, just what articles munitions factories in the pre-war period took place, we might find ourselves at a gres were used afterwards in the World War. you not think the Congress of the United St DAVIS. I will be very glad to do that. that fact since there is a provision in the reso HAIRMAN. Not in general, but as Doctor Temple pointed out, instances, such as the Remington-Arms Co. making 700,000 embargo? Secretary DAVIS. I do not think so, because in a certain time did not help us one iota when it came become evident to the ordinary citizen until a our own rifles. That may be true in the case of other He does not know about the technical manufa that are important to the national defense. I would like to so forth. nething definite. Mr. MAAS. Would you present that informati The CHAIRMAN. Congressmen are men of oro EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 83 Secretary DAVIS. More than ordinary intelligence. But I did not people think the way to do it is to cripple the nation which has ow anything about it before I came into the department, and I aggressive designs against another nation. Let me put it in words is a citizen of average intelligence. I knew nothing about it, and of one syllable. Suppose nation A is a militaristic nation deter- did not realize the importance of it. mined to attack nation B, which is its leading rival in the past Mr. HULL. Your policy is based upon a general war in which we years, and has built up a great reserve of munitions either from me in a little late. Suppose war is sprung on us without any government arsenals or buying in peace time, and has put itself in her war in advance? What help would the munitions makers and position to make an attack by crushing and overwhelming nation B, tillery makers be to prepare the United States with supplies? which is a peace-loving nation and not desirous of building up these Secretary DAVIS. That would not enter into this situation. enormous reserves or has not the ability to buy munitions for its Mr. HULL. Your answer is always predicated upon the repetition own self-defense for the most laudable purpose; if neutral nations the statement that the World War was going on for three or four cut off their supplies you are absolutely putting the peace-loving ars before we got into it. nation in the power of the militaristic nation. Secretary DAVIS. I can not get out of my mind the idea that if Mr. BURTON. As I have already stated, we must view that question is embargo had been in effect at the time of the World War we from a practical standpoint. ould have been defeated at a heavy cost. Secretary DAVIS. I am trying to view it from a practical stand- Mr. HULL. That is looking backward. We are looking forward. point. The CHAIRMAN. Congress would have the intelligence to remove Mr. BURTON. The small nation would be in such a disadvantageous e embargo in time to save the situation. position, shut off by a blockade, and would have such an insufficient Secretary DAVIS. That is for you to say. I do not think there is supply at the outbreak that it would be at the mercy of the larger ay public demand for it because the public would not understand nation. It is the larger and more powerful nation that would It is a technical question. benefit, regardless of the desire for peace and justice on our part. Mr. COLE. You are presuming a great deal, and also are not able Suppose there is a war between Italy and Greece, would you be able presume that in the case of the World War Congress would have to get by the navy of Italy to get munitions into Greece in case of and permitted the export of arms to the nations that became war? ir Allies. Secretary DAVIS. Suppose nation B, that I illustrated, a peace- Secretary DAVIS. If they had removed such an embargo in order loving nation, has control of the sea, but if they could not get their ship munitions to one side, while legally the other nation prob- munitions from neutral nations that advantage would be as nothing. could not have taken exception to it, I think unquestionably it Mr. FISH. If France and England adopted it. ould have made an enormous amount of friction and probably Secretary DAVIS. Exactly. As I said, the ideal is to have France ould have brought us into the war at that time. and England adopt exactly the same embargo. Mr. COLE. Suppose we had removed the embargo and permitted Mr. FISH. You said if all agreed you would not have any objec- free shipment of arms? tion. Secretary DAVIS. That would have brought us into the war much Secretary DAVIS. I beg your pardon; no. If all producing nations arlier than we did. entered into such an embargo, the nonproducing nations would be Mr. COLE. Perhaps it would have been better. absolutely in their power, in my opinion. Secretary DAVIS. I agree with you. The CHAIRMAN. It has been my observation as a result of study Mr. FISH. The question before us is whether private munitions and service in the House for many years, that everybody is for peace akers shall have control over sending munitions abroad or whether just as long as it does not interfere with economic interests. Inas- power should be lodged in Congress. much as nine wars out of ten result from economic antagonisms, it Secretary DAVIS. It is also bringing in the private munitions is difficult to preserve peace. That is the whole story. as being the case of war. I have never seen a war in all Secretary DAVIS. My position is not due to economic reasons. brought on by that, certainly not in this country, and the The CHAIRMAN. No! of getting into war or not getting into war is always in the of Congress. Secretary DAVIS. It certainly is not. The CHAIRMAN. No; but that is the story. Mr. FISH. I want this on the record. I do not know of any factor tends more to get the United States into war with foreign Secretary DAVIS. Nor the opposition of anybody that I have heard. I have never heard of anybody that had an economic interest, whether than by permitting or continuing the same policy in future reign wars of private munitions makers sending munitions to the they were opposed or not. My interest is not from that standpoint. Mr. COOPER. I understand the chemical interests objected to it who are belligerents and going always to the side that con- the sea. The side that does not get them naturally will be largely because it would interfere with their profits. The CHAIRMAN. Entirely. posed to it and it will probably eventuate in dragging us into the Secretary DAVIS. Probably they did. They are the only ones. The CHAIRMAN. They were the first objectors, primarily, as they Secretary DAVIS. You must remember another thing that appeals themselves stated, because it would interfere with their profits. That me, that we are trying to stop war by various methods. Most is a fair analysis of their statement. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 85 KORELL. I want to say that the testimony of the Secretary ol The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the language of the resolution, has been most helpful, but he has been interrupted in present- used in the assembly or repair of the said articles or as spare his views by a variety of questions, and his testimony has not parts," would not cover cotton, because cotton must go through the necessary continuity. I wonder if the military board has a certain process before it is useful in the making of munitions. specific objections to the resolution as the naval board Mr. Foss. Yes; I would say it would be used for manufacture but not repair. CHAIRMAN. I have a communication from the War Depart- The CHAIRMAN. Cotton could not be used to repair munitions. To assert that is absurd. Thereupon, at 12 o'clock, noon, the committee adjourned to meet Mr. Foss. No. at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Tuesday March 20, 1928.) Mr. LINTHICUM. Do you not think it would remove all doubt if sections 13 and 14 were transposed? Mr. Foss. No; I do not think that would make any difference in House OF REPRESENTATIVES, connection with cotton because 13 refers to gases and acids. Cot- COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ton to my mind would be a minor concern. Paragraphs 5 and 6 March 20, 1928. have to do with cannon and ammunition, so if you placed 14 just before 13 it would still refer to ammunition. committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (chairman) Mr. LINTHICUM. Some one the other day thought the shipment of CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. cotton would be prohibited, and you and the solicitor think it would not. There is a doubt right there. OF H. N. FOSS, ASSISTANT TO THE SOLICITOR FOR Mr. Foss. My recollection is that the suggestion that they be inter- THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE changed was for the purpose of eliminating its application to poison- ous gases and acids. It was the Chemical Foundation man who was on the stand at the time, and his testimony had to do with poisonous Foss. I am assistant to the Solicitor of the Department of culture. gases and acids. CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that position? Mr. LINTHICUM. I would like to have all doubt about cotton re- Foss. I have been there since 1922. moved. because the cotton men are particularly interested in this bill CHAIRMAN. Have you examined House Joint Resolution 183? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. So you do not think the agricultural inter- Foss. Yes. ests will be prejudiced by this bill, however much it may interfere CHAIRMAN. Especially item 14 under section 31 with carrying on war. Foss. Yes. Mr. Foss. Not in so far as exportation of raw cotton is concerned CHAIRMAN. Will you state whether or not in your opinion Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Or the exportation of anything else, as pproval of the resolution containing that item 14 would inter- far as you can say. with cotton or the sale of cotton? Mr. Foss. As far as I know. I do not think that any court, this Foss. I am authorized, I might say, to speak for the Solicitor being a criminal statute and, therefore, strictly construed, would department, who has also considered the bill, and I have ever say that they would prevent exportation of cotton. it myself also, and I am authorized to state that neither Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I think that is beyond peradventure the olicitor nor myself consider that the resolution as drafted most sensible view. prohibit the exportation of raw cotton under the conditions in the resolution. STATEMENT OF G. S. MELOY, ASSISTANT CHIEF MARKETING CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly state your reasons for that SPECIALIST. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Foss. The reasons are based entirely on the language used The CHAIRMAN. What is your official position! ragraph 14. It says, "component parts of the articles enu- Mr. MELOY. Assistant chief marketing specialist, Department of above," and I understand that cotton is used in the manufac- Agriculture, specializing in cotton and cottonseed products. gun cotton. The paragraph goes on to say-if these com- The CHAIRMAN. In the discharge of your duties, is it necessary for said parts articles." be " capable of being used in the assembly or repair you to have contacts with the War Department in regard to cotton Mr. MELOY. In the course of my studies of one form of cotton lin not believe that assembly or repair could be said to mean ters, which form is chiefly used in the manufacture of explosives, facture, and I would consider that cotton would be used in have had some contacts with one branch of the War Department and anufacture and not in the assembly or repair. I noticed the also with some of the munitions manufacturers. My contact in tha that the expert from the Chemical Foundation indicated respect was that I was studying this particular form of cotton known considered in connection with some gases or explosives that as cotton linters for the purpose of establishing standard grades, and be two elements would be an assembly. I do not agree that so as cotton. my might be the requirements of the consumers. That brought me in object was to incorporate in those standard grades as nearly a to 6 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 87 contact with some of the munitions manufacturers and with the ful impression, as I am confident the letter of the Secretary of the Chemical Warfare Service, and I did incorporate in those grades Navy did. I do not like to have the committee now tied down so he requirements of those types of consumers. that Mr. Robbins can not be interrupted should 8 member feel that I suppose, going directly to the point you are interested in, you the prepared article he is going to read is erroneous in its statement vant to know whether I had found any form of cotton which is used of alleged facts. I think the antidote ought to be applied as quickly s such as explosives, and I have not. as possible, or at least an attempt ought to be made to apply it. Cotton is a form of cellulose, and it is not an explosive in itself, Many people might read a lengthy inaccurate, prepared statement ut nitrocellulose is an explosive, and that is manufactured and may and not read anything else, and if there are no interpolations, be manufactured out of any other form of cellulose in addition to entirely misled. otton. The only form of cotton that I have found that is used in Mr. BURTON. How long is this statement? ne war industries, you may say, without change, is a form that has Mr. ROBBINS. I can read it in 5 or 10 minutes. It deals very een developed in the Chemical Warfare Service, where the fiber largely with what the office of the Assistant Secretary of War is f one of those grades is simply floated in water without any chemi- doing under the mandate of Congress contained in section 5-a of al or other change, and that is used not as an explosive but as a life the national defense act toward the national defense. reserver. The CHAIRMAN. I am in accord with Mr. Cooper about prepared Mr. LINTHICUM. Do you know how they manufacture this gun- statements. All we can do is to make a few notes, and it is impossi- ton? ble to elicit the information that a man would like to have. I think Mr. MELOY. Guncotton is cellulose. It is rather a misnomer. It it would be better practice for those who have prepared statements to a common term used to describe nitrocellulose, which is manu- send them to the committee in advance so that we may have an op- ctured by treating cellulose with nitric acid. portunity to study them and be able to ask questions more intelli- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. They use the linters. That is very cheap gently on the subject. compared with other cotton. Mr. LINTHICUM. I reserve the right to ask questions. We do not Mr. MELOY. It is a cheaper form. have power to bind members. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Linters is almost next to what is called The CHAIRMAN. No. fuse. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I think we ought to allow the gentlemen Mr. MELOY. It used to be considered refuse but it has become to go ahead. Tuable and I have seven standard grades for it and each of these Mr. LINTHICUM. You did not hesitate to ask the Secretary of the ades enters into a different channel of consumption. Navy questions. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. The staple is too short for other uses. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I got into trouble. Mr. MELOY. In the higher grades of linters the staple, the length Mr. LINTHICUM. Probably I will get into trouble now, but I re- the fiber is almost equal to that of cotton and may equal it, but serve the right. at is called the staple in linters is not the schedule length of fiber, Mr. COLE. I think we ought to reserve the right to ask questions a blending of the side and top fibers, the short and long fibers, if we find an erroneous statement, but I am of the opinion you will 1 the greater the per cent of short fibers the lower the grade or not find any erroneous statements in his statement. lower the staple, as it is called. The CHAIRMAN. Proceed. Mr. COLE. We are to understand, then, that, as far as the cellulose Mr. ROBBINS. Under the national defense act it is made the duty ustry, especially as far as cotton is concerned, there is nothing in of the War Department to plan for national defense and, particularly, resolution that would interfere with the trade in and export of the duty of the Assistant Secretary of War to make plans for the h products. procurement of supplies for future defense. fr. MELOY. Cotton of itself is not an explosive. It must be manu- Since 1920, under Colonel Wainwright, Colonel Davis, and Colonel tured into an explosive. MacNider, who have successively filled the position of the Assistant fr. COLE. And the language of this resolution does not cover it. Secretary of War, a comprehensive plan has been worked out whereby fr. MELOY. The solicitor of the department advises me that he the industries of the country can be mobilized and utilized to the not believe it does. fullest extent by the Nation in a time of national emergency. The entire country has been divided into what is known as 14 TEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. ROBBINS, ASSISTANT SECRE- procurement districts, each under a chief, a civilian officer of the TARY OF WAR Reserve Corps, capable of dealing with business problems of pur- he CHAIRMAN. Mr. Robbins wishes to read his statement without chase and supply in a business way. In each of these districts a rruption. survey was first made of the factories and utilities which would be Γ. COOPER. The other morning Secretary Wilbur read a letter capable of supplying the various branches of the Army, such as Quar- ch had already been printed in the newspapers and with the con- termaster Department, Engineer Department, Chemical Warfare of which most of us were familiar. A prepared statement Service, Ordnance Department, Air Service, Signal Corps, and Medi- ted in the newspapers in its entirety may convey a very wrong- cal Department. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 89 Through splendid cooperation with the owners of the various fac- It has been stated that the object of House Joint Resolution 183 a survey of the capability of each factory to produce certain is to promote pace, and I firmly believe that is the sincere desire of articles has been made. Each factory has been furnished for each article which would be required from such factory. every member of this committee. Let me add that it is just as sin- schedule of production has been worked out, and the productive cerely the desire of every member of the War Department with whom I have ever come in contact. pacity of the plant has been determined as to its ability to supply needs of our defense program. The War Department does not declare war. Congress does that, and it then decomes the duty of the War Department to do the Many articles, of course, are identical with those now being made, as clothing, tentage, food supplies, and so forth. Others re- fighting, to defend the Nation; but does this resolution tend to pro- mote peace? Would any nation go to war because it believes this changes in machinery of the plant in order for production to Nation can supply it with arms and ammunition? The causes of started. These articles are munitions of all kinds, fire-control ap- and the like. war lie much deeper than that. Whether we like it or not, economic House Joint Resolution 183 deals with arms, munitions, or imple- and political pressure evolves developments which inevitably breed of war, so I shall consider principally those articles required rivalry, envy, and strife. The best way to avoid attack is by being prepared to meet it. the Ordnance Department. Very little ordnance material is manufactured at the present time. We have never entered a war because we could import arms and has become more and more a mechanized affair. Without ammunition, and we have never entered a war prepared for it. If this resolution were carried out throughout the world it would not tomatic guns, tanks, tractor-drawn artillery, airplanes, and other echanical devices an army would be helpless against one equipped prevent war, but would result in aggressive nations spending vast them, no matter how capable its leaders were or how brave sums for stores of war matériel in time of peace, which would place soldiers. Long-range, high-powered artillery plays an increas- weaker nations, too poor to accumulate such stores, at their mercy in time of war. important part in warfare. The manufacture of such artillery The act of Congress contemplated in the resolution to lift the its ammunition is a difficult task, requiring an enormous amount embargo would rightly be interpreted as an unfriendly act by the expensive machinery and skilled workmen. Even with our present nation against which the embargo was made with the result of for conversion of existing machinery, a considerable time must placing this Nation in the attitude of a belligerent. before our manufacturing establishments could be ready for production. There is one further feature of the resolution that is important, and that is the great difficulty in ascertaining whether or not an In time of peace no manufacturing establishment could hold in adiness, for manufacture the enormous amount of expensive ma- article exported to a belligerent nation would come within the pro- visions of the act. necessary to produce our requirements for ordnance material Steel products, cotton, starch, nitrates, and chemicals of all kinds the time of a national emergency. would certainly come within its provisions, while utilities like trac- Our plans must be to adapt machinery used for peace-time pur- tors, searchlights, airplanes, and automobiles should also be included. to the production of war-time requirements. If there was, in Motorized artillery is useless without tractors which are innocent of peace, a demand for the necessary articles so that manu- enough in themselves, but as important in operating a gun as the cturers could have the machinery on hand to manufacture them, powder which projects the shell. thout having to change their entire plant, our problem would be I see no difference in principle between the articles enumerated simpler, but no such demand exists or is likely to exist. Could and these such as I have mentioned. factories have an opportunity to manufacture and sell such In supplementing that I desire to read a portion of a State docu- to a belligerent in time of war, the time required when their ment in which this question was raised prior to our going into oduction along such lines could be turned to our own uses would the war. Austria had made a protest to the United States against greatly lessened and a consequent saving of vast amounts of money the export of arms and ammunition to the allied powers. That the people and, what is much more important, thousands of lives, was made on July 29, 1915, by Burian, then prime minister, and be made, for, as I have said, an army not equipped with modern President Wilson, in replying to the communication of the Central chinery of war is at a hopeless disadvantage. Powers, spoke as follows: we could know when a war starts-a small war-that it would confined solely to the nations that started it, we could rest much To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of inter- national usage on account of special conditions the Government of the United but all experience has shown that war spreads like wildfire States can not accede. other nations, and no one can foretell how soon our country be drawn into it. They had requested that we put an embargo on. Shutting off the right to manufacture war material in our own Mr. MOORE of Virginia. That was Lansing's note you are reading from? would place us at a tremendous disadvantage as against a Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. already so equipped. Our national program looks first of all Mr. COOPER. That was in the midst of war. the defense of our own nation, a preparation not for war, but Mr. ROBBINS. This was in 1915. war. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 91 Mr. COOPER. The war had been going on for more than a year. Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. [Reading:] promises and repudiates them says one thing at one time and the directly opposite thing at another time: Our service must be the service of deeds, the The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international deeds of war, and the deeds of peace. practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in udgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse The CHAIRMAN. You say we have never been prepared when we entered a war? with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government ap- Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. ears to be that the advantages gained to a belligerent by Its superiority on The CHAIRMAN. To what extent were we prepared when we entered he sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by the establishment of a the World War? ystem of nonintercourse with the victor. The Imperial and Royal Govern- nent confines its comments to arms and ammunition, but, if the principle for Mr. ROBBINS. To the extent to which an army of 100,000 can which it contends is sound, It should apply with equal force to all articles operate as compared with an army of 4,500,000. contraband. A belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample The CHAIRMAN. I am not speaking with reference to men, but with upply of arms and ammunition but be in want of food and clothing. On the reference to munitions, those articles which are strictly contraband novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral nations would be bligated to place an embargo on such articles because one of the belligerents and have only one function, and that is to take human life. could not obtain them through commercial intercourse. Mr. ROBBINS. It would be impossible to give it in percentages, But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and sub- because no one knew when we entered the war what we would be re- tantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the quired to produce during the war, and it has been very difficult since oundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practiced un- restricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy the ar to find out the things we did produce in the way of arms and this country to maintain In time of peace a large military establishment ammunition during the war. stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel Invasion by a well- The CHAIRMAN. What I have in mind is this: According to the quipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain nt pence with all reports of the War Department we sold abroad $4,000,000,000 worth ations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of munitions to the allied armies. That would indicate that we were its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset extraordinarily active in the manufacture of munitions? the war seriously, if not fatally. embarrassed by the lack of arms and Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. immunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to The CHAIRMAN. It does seem to me that all that activity should upply the requirements of national defense. The United States has always have made us fully prepared to enter the conflict. lepended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from eutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which It claims for Mr. ROBBINS. If we had been using in our Army the exact artil- tself, it can not deny to others. lery, airplanes, rifles, etc. that were used in the allied armies, we A nation whose principle and policy it is to rely upon International obli- would have been able to use their facilities at that time. ations and international justice to preserve its political and territorial The CHAIRMAN. That is just the point I want. When the war ntegrity might become the prey of an aggressive nation whose polley and ractice it is to increase its military strength during times of peace with broke out in Europe it was necessary for our industrial establish- he design of conquest, unless the nation attacked can, after war had been ments to convert their machinery to make the particular kind of leclared, go into the markefs of the world and purchase the means to defend guns or ammunition that the allied armies required, and that was tself against the aggressor. done at a very large expense by many of the industrial establish- There is more to it. ments. The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly add also the Austrian ambassa- Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. lor's full statement? The CHAIRMAN. And from the time of the outbreak of the war Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. There are two more paragraphs of this. in Europe until we entered it the activities of our industrial estab- Reading:] lishments were devoted to the making of the particular kinds of The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral munitions that the allies needed under their war program? owers ought to prohibit, the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. ompel every nation to have in rendiness at all times sufficient munitions The CHAIRMAN. Our war program, so far as equipment, guns, and war to meet any emergency which might arise and to erect and maintain ammunition, and artillery were concerned, is quite different from stablishments for the manufacture of arms and amunition sufficient to supply needs of Its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. the equipment used by the allied powers in many instances? Ianifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming Mr. ROBBINS. It was at that time. armed camp, ready to resist aggression and tempted to employ force in The CHAIRMAN, When we entered the war these industrial estab- sserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice for the settle- lishments had to be reconverted by changing dies, jigs, gauges, etc. ent of international disputes. so as to make the kind of equipment that we needed to meet our I think that is all. requirements. Is that a fact? No matter how lofty our aims may be for international peace, Mr. ROBBINS. Particularly rifles. I do not think the artillery re- firmly believe our duty to our own Nation should come first and quired so much. "heodore Roosevelt said: The CHAIRMAN. But at any rate it was necessary, was it not? We of America can win to our great destiny only by service; not by rhetoric Mr. ROBBINS. It was in regard to the rifles certainly. that dreadful mental double dealing and verbal juggling which makes The CHAIRMAN. And it materially reduced any advantage which we apparently secured by this enormous production of munitions. 92 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 9 Mr. ROBBINS. It reduced it so far as rifles are concerned certainly. culty, Mr. Chairman, was in expanding an army of 100,000 me We used the French 75's. We adopted that gun and the French 155. into an army of 4,000,000 men over night. It can not be done. The CHAIRMAN. How about our airplanes? Did it help us on The CHAIRMAN. You said, and that has been the testimony of al airplanes? the witnesses, that in case of war it is necessary, to use your exact ex Mr. ROBBINS. If we had adopted the type of airplane which was pression in reference to the industrial establishments, to change thei being used in France and England at that time, it would have been entire plants. an immense advantage, but we decided to have our own type of Mr. ROBBINS. Yes; to some extent. airplane, our own type of Liberty motor, and you will recall we went The CHAIRMAN. It depends on what you are making. on our own way developing our implements instead of using those Mr. ROBBINS. That is true, in speaking of munitions. At th that the Allies were using at that time. Looking back at it, it seems present time, in the making of shells, it is something we all know a very great mistake. there have been plans, what we call factory plans, drawn and giver The CHAIRMAN. We are not here to pass on that. We must take to the man who will be expected to produce the shell in time of war what you men in the War Department say about these matters if it That plan tells him just exactly what he will have to do in the way is a mistake it is behind us. The fact is, however, that all of this of changes in his present machinery, in these well-known jigs, dies conversion of the industries of the country, 80 as to make airships and gauges. That is something we did not have before. for allied powers was of practically no benefit to us when we came The CHAIRMAN. I have no hesitancy in saying I am in hearty ac to make airships for ourselves. cord with section 5 of the preparedness plan. The only fault I find Mr. ROBBINS. I think it was of great benefit. is that Congress has not enlarged it. I feel if that is developed the The CHAIRMAN. I grant that so far as the workmen are concerned, way it ought to be, it is only a question of time until the necessity ot it is more or less of a training for them, but outside of that, was engaging in this munitions traffic will be wholly eliminated. it of much advantage? Mr. ROBBINS, Unless we accumulated a very large reserve of muni- Mr. ROBBINS. Yes, there was in the manufacture of a great deal tions over a considerable length of time, it is hard to say how many of munitions and a great many other things. months will elapse before those factories could be changed. The CHAIRMAN. I am talking of airplanes now. One word further on reserves in our material on guns. By the Mr. ROBBINS. I am not an airplane expert. My personal opinion time we could accumulate reserves for one sort of gun, that type that from the work for the Allies a large quantity of spruce and of gun would become more inefficient, and we would have to accumu- other material was placed at the disposition of our Government. late reserves for a new type. We built a lot of airplanes and then ditched them after we built The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the French system for them. storing explosives at Creusot? The CHAIRMAN. If we acquired such great experience in the mak- Mr. ROBBINS. I think General Ruggles could tell you more about of airplanes for the allied powers, why was it that we were able it. I may say we are endeavoring to do what we can through the so- only to use a few airplanes of American make, perhaps none at all, called educational orders that Secretary Davis mentioned. in Europe. I understand we were unable to put even a single combat The CHAIRMAN. These educational orders that you send out are plane in Europe during the war. so designed to make the kind of munitions that the United States Mr. ROBBINS. Because mistakes were made, which it has been the desires? duty of the Assistant Secretary of War under the mandate of Con- Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. to remedy since that time. We went into this war, not know- The CHAIRMAN. There is no reference whatever to the type of how to make war, not having any previous plan for industrial munitions used by other countries? nobilization, and that is what we have been engaged on since the Mr. ROBBINS. No. The CHAIRMAN. As a rule each country has its own educational The CHAIRMAN. Have you any idea of how many airplanes we program. nade for the allied powers? Mr. ROBBINS. They have become more standardized since the war. Mr. ROBBINS. No, sir, I have not. General Ruggles can tell you much more about that than I can. The CHAIRMAN. Nevertheless, the fact exists that with all this The CHAIRMAN. But before the war each nation was trying to xperience in making airplanes for the allied powers from the time surprise the other. That is about the story! entered the war until the armistice we were unable to put a Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. ombat plane in Europe. The CHAIRMAN. Their equipment was all different. Mr. ROBBINS. We made them, but we did not send them to Europe. Mr. ROBBINS. A great deal of it was different. Mr. LINTHICUM. What did we do with them? The CHAIRMAN. Suppose a war should break out in Europe under Mr. ROBBINS. They were used in training. these educational orders, as you call them, changing the dies, jigs, Mr. BLOOM. Why would they not be serviceable over there if used and gauges, they would be of no value in making the kind of equip- training here? ment that European nations would desire? Mr. ROBBINS. All we were able to turn out were needed for train- Mr. ROBBINS. Some of them might be. the men here before they could be sent over there. The diffi- The CHAIRMAN. Very few of them. 94 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 95 Mr. ROBBINS. Probably. They are intended primarily for our own Mr. HULL. The only way this resolution would interfere with our quipment, but might extend to foreign countries using equipment preparedness would be that in case war broke out in Europe, our similar to ours, depending on the types they have. industrial plants preparing munitions for them would help us to be The CHAIRMAN. There seems to be an impression that we have prepared for our possible entry into the war ourselves. Is that large number of munitions factories in America, when, as a mat- right? er of fact, we have industrial establishments which can be converted Mr. ROBBINS. It would. nto munitions factories, but when you convert them to make a par- Mr. HULL. In other words, the whole theory of your argument is icular kind of gun or shell, they must be reconverted if you want that there must be war somewhere else to keep those plants busy so make another kind of gun or shell. as to be prepared for war on our part? Mr. ROBBINS. Not entirely. Mr. ROBBINS. No. The CHAIRMAN. Not entirely, but largely. Is not that a fact? Mr. HULL. Why is not that the logie of it? Mr. ROBBINS. I would think that would be true to some extent: Mr. ROBBINS. I just got through explaining that the purpose of lthough the time would be considerably lessened, I could not tell this whole planning is to do as much of this preparation in time of ou how much. peace as possible for the conversion of these plants, so that we can Mr. HULL. The logic of your whole argument is that for these convert them in time of war to the manufacture of munitions, and lans to be available to us for purposes of national defense it re- the amount of planning we have done along that line, I am positive, uires that there should be war in Europe before we go in. would make a very great shortening of time over what there was in Mr. ROBBINS. No; I do not say that is the logic of my argument. 1917. "hat would place us in a much better state of preparedness. Mr. HULL. I can understand that. That does not answer my Mr. HULL. If there is a long period of peace, and those plants question. Your planning is not interfered with by this resolution? hould get out of the manufacture of this war material, just as I The shipment of certain munitions of war to other nations is pro- nderstand the Secretary of the Navy said one of the big plants posed to be prohibited by this resolution, and the argument that has Bethlehem was dismantling some of its equipment, and that proc- been made by the department has been that these shipments prepare is going on, as there is no profit in the maintenance of them, the these industrial plants so that they can take care of our needs in case gie of your whole argument requires that there should be a war in we get in. Europe or other countries going on before we get into it, in order Mr. LINTHICUM. Did he not also seem to adopt the letter of Mr. make those plants particularly available to us. Lansing wherein he said in case of war it would be necessary, if we Mr. ROBBINS. It would put this Nation in a better state of pre- were to purchase materials elsewhere, we ought not to deprive other aredness so we would not have to buy so much abroad. people of the opportunity to purchase of us, if we expected to pur- The CHAIRMAN. A foreign war is a necessary condition for the chase from them in emergency? liciency of munition plants for our own use in case we were in- Mr. ROBBINS. That is the point exactly, and really that is where olved in war. this resolution hits the national defense. If adopted by other nations Mr. ROBBINS. No, sir. it would hit us in a vital way in the purchase of arms and munitions The CHAIRMAN. Why is not that the only conclusion from your before the time our plants can get into production from the time stimony? war is declared. Mr. ROBBINS. I do not admit that. I said we had made plans for Mr. TEMPLE. What foreign plants are equipped now to manufac- e conversion of our own factories to our own uses, and that those ture the type of armament that is used in the United States? ans at the present time, as I explained, from drawings of the shells, Mr. ROBBINS. I do not know. ould enormously lessen the period of time it takes to convert those Mr. TEMPLE. Are there any? ants. Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. There are certain things that are used in The CHAIRMAN. That would be true whether we pass this resolu- artillery ammunition and gun carriages. on or not. Mr. TEMPLE The thought occurred to me that if it would require Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. My point about that was that after we got in some time to equip American plants to supply munitions, it would war and before we can turn these factories over to our use the require as much time for foreign plants to be equipped to supply nited States would have gone abroad and everywhere they could American munitions. d them have bought arms and munitions so that our men would be Mr. ROBBINS. There are foreign plants manufacturing explosives operly prepared to meet the enemy. that we could immediately avail ourselves of. The CHAIRMAN. As far as this resolution is concerned, it does not Mr. FISH. You have raised the question of Mr. Lansing's view- ect the preparedness of the country, or your educational program point. Have you spoke to Mr. Lansing about this resolution? initions. designs for converting industrial plants into the making of Mr. LINTHICUM. No; I have not, You were not here when Mr. Robbins read Mr. Lansing's letter, and I simply quoted from Mr. Mr. ROBBINS. It does not affect the planning that we are making Austria. Lansing's letter in reply to one from the Imperial Government of the present time. 36144 29 7 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 97 Mr. FISH. I have spoken to Mr. Lansing about this resolution, but War was started by the shipment of munitions, our war against can better speak for himself, especially in view of his statement Germany by the shipment of munitions? the Austrian Government, and he said that this resolution, of Mr. ROBBINS. It was said it was to make the world safe for de- is a new departure, but he said he could not see any harm mocracy. trying it out. Those were his words. If you want to call on Mr. Mr. FISH. That is after we went in. Was not the cause of the ansing I will be glad to have him here. Mr. LINTHICUM. Personally, I am not interested in Mr. Lansing. war our continued shipping of munitions abroad? Is that a fair question? Mr. FISH. The witness is a personal friend of mine and I will take Mr. ROBBINS. I would not say so. I think the causes of the war vantage of him. I will ask a question. You are here represent- were much deeper than that. the department of national defense and are speaking here from The CHAIRMAN. That was not the proximate cause. point of view of national defense. Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. Mr. ROBBINS. As a matter of fact, we all know that the food Mr. FISH. Every member of the committee is in sympathy with supply is just as vital in time of war as shells because people have to eat, and it is just as vital to the people to have food supplies as program of an adequate national defense. Is it not the highest guns and shells. nceivable national defense to keep us out of war honorably Mr. ROBBINS. That is a question that is impossible to answer. Who The CHAIRMAN. You made a statement that England and Ger- the judge of whether we are in a war with honor? many were bound to get into war over their commercial antagonisms. Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. Mr. FISH. You are the judge. Mr. ROBBINS. No; the people of the United States would have to be. The CHAIRMAN. I assume you agree with me that the World War Mr. FISH. Concede it is honorable. was largely economic. Mr. ROBBINS. If it is righteous, as Theodore Roosevelt said. Mr. ROBBINS. I think it started through economic reasons. There Mr. FISH. I used the word "honorable," but I accept the word are a great many reasons. That is one of them. We are getting off ighteous." Is not that the highest possible national defense? the subject. The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we are. Mr. ROBBINS. To keep us out of war with honor to the Nation? Mr. FISH. Yes. Mr. COOPER. I will make one suggestion to corroborate what the Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. witness has said and it is a quotation from a very high authority. Mr. FISH. That is exactly what this committee is trying to do. President Wilson in two speeches after his return from Paris, nota- believe that the passage of this resolution has a tendency to stop bly the speech at St. Louis, said, We all know now that this was a commercial war." from being dragged into every foreign war by shipping muni- We claim that the highest possible national defense is to keep Mr. MOORE of Virginia. *Of course, any of us who have studied of war with honor, and we claim that is what this resolution have considered the views you have presented in regard to the ex- a tendency to do. pression of Lansing, and I might refer you to the views of other Mr. ROBBINS. As I said in my statement, I have no doubt at all as Secretaries of State who have expressed themselves similarly. But the sincere desire on the part of every member of this committee we are seeking to depart from the rule with reference to this matter be in favor of national defense. that has obtained heretofore. Suppose we do depart from it by The CHAIRMAN. We are speaking of national defense. I am not domestic or municipal statute rather than by international action. accord with the suggestion of Mr. Fish, but do you not think the Suppose that this resolution is adopted and goes on the statute books, defense is materially aided by preserving the good will of and then suppose war should break out-we trust it will not hap- the peoples in the world, and does not the sale of arms and pen-let us say, between this Nation and Japan. What disadvan- nitions create more ill will than any other cause? tage would the United States be at compared with Japan, in the ROBBINS. I do not know. I was hit by a bullet from a German matter of requiring an adequate supply of munitions and other mate- in 1898 and had no ill will toward Germany. I regretted our rial, that it would not be under if the resolution had not been vernment had not purchased rifles as good as the Spaniards had. adopted? The CHAIRMAN. Did the sale by Germany of Mauser rifles to the Mr. ROBBINS. Do you mean if this resolution was universally create ill will between Great Britain and Germany? adopted? fr. ROBBINS. Yes. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. No; I am talking about the adoption of it "hat is a matter of opinion. My opinion is that Germany and in the United States. If it were universally adopted, if there were Britain were bound to go to war sooner or later over their international action, which has been indicated here by most of the mercial rivalry. gentlemen who have appeared as a very desirable thing, that would fr. FISH. There was considerable ill will between those two na- be a different case. I am assuming that there is no international The Secretary here yesterday stated that in his opinion the action, that there will be simply the adoption of this resolution as oment of munitions did not have very much to do with it and that indicating the policy of the United States, and that a war occurs. war had ever been started by that. Is it not a fact that the World How would we be disadvantaged or embarrassed because of the reso- lution being in effect in comparison with Japan? EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 99 Mr. ROBBINS. We would immediately go out and try to buy muni- There is no doubt about that. is absolutely neutral, with hands off, are allowed to go ahead and MOORE of Virginia. And Japan will immediately go out and produce and sell all the things that are used for destructive pur- to buy munitions. poses by nations at war with each other with which this Government Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. And these countries would say, Do you think is absolutely at peace. I take it for granted if we can wipe out that can violate your own statute; you have a statute that denies the sort of an opportunity, you would like to do it. of munitions to us; why do you come to us when you have Mr. ROBBINS. I am in favor of any international agreement whereby pressly forbidden your own people to sell munitions to us!" war can be minimized yes. I do not believe the United States ought MOORE of Virginia. They would know this was a domestic to put itself at a disadvantage in national defense in order to keep and anybody understanding human nature would realize that peace in other nations. country would decline to sell where it could make money simply Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I was asking whether we are at a disad- We had such a statute. I do not see how this great, powerful vantage. Take the case of war between the United States and any the greatest and most powerful anywhere, could be put at a other nation. We are confessedly more powerful than any other advantage in a war with Japan or any other nation because of this nation in the world to-day. Take the case of war between the having been adopted. United States and any other nation. How could this resolution, not ROBBINS. That is just my idea of what the governments looking at it in an academic or theoretical way, but practically, prove to Japan would say to us. injurious to us! The CHAIRMAN. You have overlooked the fact that these muni- Mr. ROBBINS. I can conceive of a situation, if England were could be shipped with the consent of Congress. friendly to Japan and we had an embargo against export of munitions MOORE of Virginia. I lay that aside I am assuming from what to England in the event she got into trouble, would not the British of human nature and its history of nations, that we would Government give use immediately a dose of our own medicine, if we no more trouble in buying from private interests in France went over there to buy. That is just my opinion. England than Japan would have. I have anticipated in my Mr. MOORE of Virginia. That would be contrary to all the history of this matter every objection that has been made in this com- of the commercial and manufacturing activities of Great Britain. room since the Secretary of the Navy appeared here. Every Suppose that Great Britain were to pass a resolution like this and objection, to my mind every objection advanced, unless you the United States declined to do it, and war occurred between Great going to merely confine its opposition abstract or academic Britain and Japan, do you think that private producers in the United gestion, the adoption of this measure would not work out to States would hesitate for a minute because of Great Britain having disadvantage. Therefore, I come to the conclusion, and it is adopted this policy, to make sales just as fully and as freely as they eiteration, that we would not be hampered in war activities, might be able to both of the belligerents? I do not think so. might become involved with Japan or any other nation, Mr. COLE. I will ask the Assistant Secretary a question suggested this resolution would be on the statute books. by his remark that he would favor an international agreement that "here is one other question: Have you inquired sufficiently to would help to prevent war. Did I understand you to say that? what are the processes in the nations of Europe which main- Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. the two greatest military establishments-Russia and France- Mr. COLE. I am wondering what you would think of the League respect to accumulation of war materials? of Nations. ROBBINS. Their policies covering their reserves of war ma- Mr. ROBBINS. I think we would get into a long discussion there. Mr. LINTHICUM. He retains a mental reservation on that proposi- MOORE. Their manufacture or production of it. tion. ROBBINS. No; I think someqne asked that question as to the The CHAIRMAN. I assume you agree with Mr. Secretary Wilbur losives at Creusot. I do not know what that is. in replying to my question as follows: MOORE of Virginia. I know perfectly well that you and a The CHAIRMAN. You recognize, inasmuch as you have suggested matters of many other gentlemen in the War Department are anxious to policy, that the shipment of arms to one belligerent to be used against another, of war and the horrors connected with it. I believe one thing oceasions ill will toward us on the part of nations against which these arms and munitions are used? committee is trying to get at is to do away with the old rule, Secretary WILBUR. I think you gentlemen are just as able to form nn opinion simply means that we turn our people loose to make money on that as I am. and I do not believe my opinion would be of any assistance to assisting in the destruction of other people and property. That you. hat we have in mind. The thing has been discussed here as if The CHAIRMAN. Is there any doubt about it in your mind? trying to break down the national defense, trying to mini- Secretary WILBUR. None whatever. the opportunity for preparedness, but the resolution has no Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Do you think you ought to ask him any conceptions as that and in our opinion can have no such result. I more about Mr. Wilbur's expressions than about the League of that you would be most anxious, if you can do it safely, to Nations? the conditions I have just described, where private citizens The CHAIRMAN. That is behind us. The testimony all tends to United States, in spite of the fact that the Government itself show that the shipment of arms and munitions to a belligerent causes ill will toward the United States by the nation or nations, against EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 101 the munitions are used. I am laying aside the moral side of Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. ufacturing these articles to take human life. That is a disad- Mr. MAAS. Has not something fallen down in our preparations? of the traffic. Do you not consider good will between our Mr. ROBBINS. The Army in time of peace is what Congress makes and the peoples of the world is one of the strongest it; preparation for war in time of peace is a matter of money. It in preserving peace? has never been the policy of the United States to maintain a great ROBBINS. That is going on the supposition that the inhabitants standing army or a great military establishment, and I do not think he nation, which has the same right to sell to every other bel- it will ever be. We have depended on our isolation and a number that we would have, would have ill feeling against us for of other factors to give us an opportunity to bring our military de- the very thing every government had a right to do in the fense program up to that of the nation attacking us. we were engaged in war. I do not admit that. Mr. Maas. I am talking about the industrial mobilization only. CHAIRMAN. You do not admit that at all? Should not our industries be mobilized in such a way as to be ROBBINS. No. independent of any foreign countries assisting us in defending our- CHAIRMAN. You do not think it disturbs their feelings toward selves? Mr. ROBBINS. It would take billions of dollars to do that. ROBBINS. It may but there would be no justice for their claim. Mr. MAAS. Do we expect to get those billions of dollars from other CHAIRMAN. There would be no law. I rather think there countries, selling munitions to other countries before we get into it? be considerable justice. Mr. ROBBINS. The Government does not get a dollar. We get an ROBBINS. That is a matter of opinion. That is my idea. advantage in the machinery and personnel. That is the main thing CHAIRMAN. Assuming it did create considerable ill will to- where a war starts and spreads, involving us as the last war did, us and threaten our peaceful relations with that government, beginning with Austria and Servia. there is no doubt in my mind that the shipment of arms had Mr. MCREYNOLDS. It gives an advantage in organization and to do with our entering the World War, would not that training. dvantage very largely counterbalance the advantage that we have Mr. HULL. Who gets the dollars? prepared for war by having our factories ready for con- Mr. COLE. Is not that connection very vague? to the manufacture of munitions? Mr. BLOOM. You have agreed with him already. ROBBINS. I say the shipment abroad, the trade in arms, is vital Mr. COLE. I agree with him except on that one proposition. He defense of the United States. has not shown us, and I do not believe anyone has shown us, that CHAIRMAN. Without regard to the ill will it creates in other this resolution would interfere with our national defense for pre- paredness. ROBBINS. Yes. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Even if he were my constituent, if I had COLE. May I suggest that the statement made by Colonel Rob- that honor, I could not agree with his views. I would congratulate meets with my most hearty approval? Ithink I can indorse him on preparing his statement. statement he has made, and I think there is no difference be- (Thereupon, at 12 o'clcok noon the committee adjourned to meet him and this committee. again at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Wednesday, March 21, 1928.) CHAIRMAN. Very little. COLE. As to purposes and intentions. The only point that in my mind is that the witness has not shown that this resolu- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, would in any way interfere with the purposes on which we are COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March 21, 1928. McReynolds. Do you agree with the last statement he made? COLE. Yes; I think I will agree with Colonel Robbins on al- The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen G. Porter (chairman) anything he says, as far as statements of facts are concerned. presiding. MOORE of Virginia. He is your constituent? The CHAIRMAN. The committe will come to order. MAAS. I wish to say that this committee in deliberating on this took into consideration and thoroughly discussed every STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. ROBBINS, ASSISTANT SECRE- of this question that has been brought before this committee in TARY OF WAR-Resumed hearings. You are charged particularly with the preparations national defense? Mr. BURTON. I will ask whether the War Department has been ROBBINS. Yes. in harmony with the policy of the United States Government in Maas. Are we prepared to defend ourselves immediately regard to poisonous gases. Let me briefly rehearse. In the con- we be the object of concerted attack by other world powers? ference of 1921-22, our delegates very strongly favored banning ROBBINS. No. the poisonous gases in warfare, a treaty was negotiated which for- Maas. Is not that after all the main purpose of our national bade its use and promised that our Government would use its efforts act? with other countries to the same effect. Joined with that was a EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 103 gulation for the use of submarines. The French Government re- Mr. BURTON. Has not the opposition been more numerous vocally to ratify that treaty because it pertained to submarines as than the others? as poisonous gases. I was chairman of the delegation that was Secretary WILBUR. It so happens that he is that kind of man. to Geneva with instructions to bring forward such a proposi- Mr. BURTON. I might read what General Pershing said-that there in conference for the control of international traffic in chemical warfare should be abolished among nations; it is a cruel, We did bring forward such a treaty which was received with unfair, and improper use of science, fraught with the greatest danger great deal of enthusiasm under our leadership and was signed to noncombatants and demoralizing to the better instincts of hu- the nations represented there, but it has seemed to me there has manity. opposition in the War Department to the ratification of that The General Board of the Navy made an expression on the policy Can you tell us what the attitude of the War Department is of prohibiting the use of gas in warfare. that treaty? Has there been a statement to the Senate Committee It places this country in a very embarrassing position in negotiat- Foreian Relations, to which the treaty was referred, or from the ing a treaty with a foreign country, to have opposition by any of Department favoring or opposing that treaty? the departments of this Government to a general policy which has Mr. ROBBINS. No, sir; that question has never arisen since I have been expressed. It has been most embarrassing to me in meeting connected with the War Department. representatives of the foreign countries in my visit to Europe since Mr. BURTON. Is it not true that certain subordinates, for instance, 1925. head of the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Department, Secretary WILBUR. I think I can assure you beyond any question opposed that treaty in interviews? that both the War and the Navy Departments have been in accord Mr. ROBBINS. That may be; I do not know. General Fries takes with that governmental policy. There might have been individuals position that is the most merciful warfare there is. who felt that the proposition of prohibiting gas warfare was not Mr. BURTON. It is a question of difference of opinion. There can feasible and that nations in their extremity would resort to the use no question about the policy of this Government. In the treaty of gas regardless of a treaty, and that we would find ourselves forced Germany and Austria they are forbidden to use it and in into a situation of that sort if we got into war, and there is the atti- treaty of Versailles, Germany and Austria were forbidden to use tude of General Fries that has just been alluded to. Some men think It would be fair if we are not going to ratify such a treaty to that gas warfare is more humane than other types. them from their obligations. If it is so humane, we ought Mr. BURTON. Like throwing confetti or something of that kind. to impose such an obligation upon them. Do you know whether Secretary WILBUR. That has not anything to do with the attitude predecessors as Assistant Secretary of War have taken a stand of the Government, which has been in harmony with your ques- that? Have they opposed it? tion. Mr. ROBBINS. I have never discussed with any of them the matter Mr. BURTON. Of course, the treaty merely provides as between the prohibition of the use of poisonous gases. We have one themselves, the signers of the treaty, and again I think a nation which partment in the War Department called the Chemical Warfare has favored prohibition of the use of poisonous gas and advocated and that is very active. abolition of chemical operations could resort to reasonable prepara- Mr. BURTON. To use a slang expression, having been sent to Geneva tion against any nation that violates its obligations. propose such a protocol or treaty and communicating with the Mr. COLE. What is the status of the treaty now? Department by cablegram, bringing it forward as an American Mr. BURTON. It is tied up in the Senate. oposition, one that we favored, I feel that I have been left out Mr. COLE. Has the War Department influenced the Senate and the cold." It is hard to explain to these countries why treaties tied it up! ought forward on our initiative and so advocated by us have not Mr. BURTON. I think some subordinates in the War Department favored by every department of the Government. Has not have. War Department been requested by the State Department to give Mr. COLE. Can they tie up the Senate? expression on that in harmony with governmental policy? Mr. BURTON. You know as much about it as I. I only say this, that Mr. ROBBINS. Not since I have been connected with it. I feel that some subordinates in the War Department have been quite Mr. HULL. How long have you been connected with it out of line, not merely with the policy enunciated by the Government Mr. ROBBINS. Since the first of the year. but with the policy of Congress, the policies that this Congress ought Mr. HULL. Since January 1. to take. Mr. BURTON. It naturally would be prior to that. Mr. ROBBINS. Do you know of any specific instances? Secretary WILBUR. I can answer that question because I have Mr. BURTON. There was a very long interview given out by General the matter discussed frequently in the Cabinet by Secretary Fries a couple of years ago, absolutely running counter to the policy and later by Secretary Davis. of the Government. It was published widely in the newspapers. There is not any question but what the War Department is in en- Mr. ROBBINS. About two years ago. harmony with the policy of the Government you have been Mr. BURTON. I think it was about that time. pressing. It has been indicated by Mr. Robbins that General Mr. COLE. I think that shows our impotence to let one man stop a is not in harmony with that. great international treaty. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 105 The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? Mr. COOPER. In that connection I wish to ask a question or two. Mr. COOPER. Mr. Robbins, were you consulted, or did you take Section 2 of the resolution provides as follows: - Whenever the in the drawing up or writing of the letter which was published President recognizes the existence of war between foreign nations the newspapers and signed by the Secretary of the Navy! by making proclamation of the neutrality of the United States, it Mr. ROBBINS. No, sir. shall be unlawful, except by the consent of Congress "-I repeat, Mr. COOPER. I did not know but what as an expert you had been " the exisence of war between foreign nations." sulted as to certain facts. You had nothing to do with that? The letter which the Secretary of the Navy had published attack- ROBBINS. No, sir; the Navy Department stands on its own ing this resolution quotes at the very outset the act of January 31, 1922, which reads as follows: BLOOM. On its own bottom. Whenever the President finds that in any American country COOPER. I understood you to say yesterday that if this resolu- that is, South American countries of which you have just spoken- now before the committee should be enacted, it would result in " or in any country in which the United States exercises extraterri- nation becoming an armed camp. torial jurisdiction "-that would be China-" conditions of domestic ROBBINS. If it was adopted universally among the nations, if violence exist, which are or may be promoted by the use of arms idea was adopted by the other nations. or munitions of war procured from the United States, and makes COOPER. But I understood you to say that it would result, if proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export, except under should pass this resolution and stop the exportation of arms during such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms war, that the knowledge that the prohibition was in effect would or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such in further stopping it before war, in time of peace? country until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress." ROBBINS. What I meant by that is this: I did not understand Can you conceive what relevancy by way of argument in attacking this one resolution was to tie the United States in regard to this this resolution that reference at the very outset of the letter of the but that there would be an effort made to have other nations Secretary of the Navy has? the same sort of policy. Mr. ROBBINS. I am not familiar with the letter of the Secretary COOPER. What are those nations now but armed camps, and of the Navy, and I would have to take the letter and the resolution before in their respective histories have they had as large and study them both before I could answer that intelligently. and been as fiercely belligerent in time of peace as they are Mr. COOPER. The Burton resolution, in lines. 7 and 8, section 2, France has the largest army it ever had. Italy has the largest reads: " Whenever the President recognizes the existence of war be- is most threatening with it. tween foreign nations "-and the act of January 31. 1922, refers HULL. French army has been reduced by 100,000 and it exclusively to cases of domestic violence in American countries or roposed to further reduce it by 100,000. any other countries in which the United States of America exercises COOPER. It is larger than before the war until recently. extraterritorial jurisdiction. So the quotation by that letter of the ROBBINS. No; it is now smaller. 1922 act at the very outset was exceedingly misleading to the HULL. They have shortened the period of conscription in ordinary reader, was it not? from three years down to one, I believe. Mr. ROBBINS. I would rather Secretary Wilbur would answer that COOPER. Italy has a very large army and is preparing for question. He is here this morning. inization of very large military forces. Mr. HULL. You can not get the War Department fighting the Navy ROBBINS. That is discussing international politics. The gen- Department. naturally. Ask him what he means when he says that opinion is that Mussolini has some ideas and feels that they it affected the South American countries. have a large army. Mr. COOPER. What do you mean when you say it would affect the COOPER. Do you think that the adoption of this resolution by South American countries? would in any way affect his attitude? Mr. ROBBINS. Because they would be dependent on the United ROBBINS. No, sir. COOPER. Do you think the adoption of this resolution would in States largely for their import of munitions to defend themselves. Mr. BURTON. To what extent have we exported arms and muni- way affect the attitude of France? tions to South American countries at war? ROBBINS. The attitude toward what? Mr. ROBBINS. Not a great deal. COOPER. On the general subject of military preparedness? Mr. BURTON. Do you know from what foreign countries they have ROBBINS. No, sir. imported arms and munitions? COOPER. Can you specify any nation whose military policy or Mr. ROBBINS. It depends on what standards they have adopted. attitude toward war would be in any way affected by the of this resolution in a time of peace by the United States? I think that probably there are more of French manufacture. That ROBBINS. The nations most directly affected by the prohibi- is just a guess. Mr. BURTON. In Bolivia they are trained by German officers and of export of arms, in my opinion, would be the South American would they not import arms and munitions from Germany? 6 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 107 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Mr. BLOOM. How much? Mr. ROBBINS. They might now. They did not during the war, cer- Mr. ROBBINS. Billions of dollars. nly, and in the period after the war German munitions manufac- ers were not permitted to manufacture, as you recall. The CHAIRMAN, I am not clear as to your answer on the effect of this resolution on the South American countries. As I read the Mr. COOPER. In subsection 14, line 13, page 3 of the resolution, the guage is " component parts of the articles enumerated above if resolution it means this, that in case of war between sovereign bable of being used in the assembly or repair of the said articles States of South America this embargo would be effective, provided Congress did not lift it. as spare parts." Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. Do I understand the witness to say that that would or would not The CHAIRMAN. That is a fair construction. lude cotton? Mr. ROBBINS. It would include cotton. It would include starch Mr. ROBBINS. Between any of the South American countries. steel, in my opinion. The CHAIRMAN. Sovereign States? Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. Mr. COOPER. Analyze that-component parts capable of being used he assembly-you say that would include cotton? The CHAIRMAN. In case of domestic trouble in any of these South Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. American Republics, the resolution would not interfere with the shipment of arms, at the discretion of the President, to those fr. MARTIN. Do you realize what the solicitor of the Department countries; I am correct in that? Agriculture said? Mr. ROBBINS. Yes. fr. ROBBINS. Yes; I heard what he said. He is entitled to his nion. I am entitled to mine. I think it certainly would. STATEMENT OF HON. CURTIS D. WILBUR, SECRETARY OF THE Ir. COOPER. Mr. Ford, by way of illustration, and other manufac- NAVY-Resumed rs, have assembly plants. The General Motors has an assembly it in my district. It ships parts of its own motors there and Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Getting back to your letter which has mbles them, puts them together. been incorporated in the record here, what is the date of it? o you think that there is any difference between the expressions Secretary WILBUR. I believe the printed copy you have is not sembly of parts" and " manufacture of articles dated. I have forgotten the date the letter was signed. I can give r. ROBBINS. I think there is a difference between assembling a you that. I think it was stated here at the time the chairman of the ber of manufactured materials and assembly of two raw ma- House Naval Affairs Committee was here. If there is any im- als to make another material; yes. portance attached to it, I will be glad to advise you. r. COOPER. But a material is not a part. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Your letter itself shows that it is in r. ROBBINS. I would say it was. respect to a request made on March 15. By whom was that request r. COOPER. Component parts capable of being used in the assem- made and in what form? or as spare parts. That shows plainly it does not mean cotton. Mr. BURTON. The letter is dated March 16. on is not a spare part of anything. Secretary WILBUR. That letter was written in response to a letter Γ. ROBBINS. No; but it is a component of gun cotton, and starch from the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. I think component of nitrate of starch. I made that clear when I was here before, that a similar letter in r. COOPER. The resolution says " spare parts "-a component part substance and effect, aside from this preliminary statement, had ble of being used in the assembly or as spare parts. been addressed to Mr. Andrew before that. n that, by any possible, fair, rational construction. especially Mr. BURTON. On what date? you are construing a criminal law, which always requires Secretary WILBUR. The letter was dated March 7. construction, be held to include a material which is used in the Mr. COOPER. Was it not published in the New York Times on the facture of an article? 16th, Friday, of last week? If so, it was published on the day it ROBBINS. I would certainly construe it so. I would construe was dated. apply to cotton, starch, and other raw materials that are used Secretary WILBUR. Before I take up that, let me say that this sembly of gun cotton. letter was held by me after it was dated-I mean the letter to COOPER. I am confining my question to cotton. Andrews-a number of days before it was signed, so it was not dated MAAS. Yesterday, in answering one of my questions, you the day it was sent. I will give you the exact information on all I that the United States is not now prepared to defend itself this if you want it. st sudden, concerted action by other powers. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I am interested in the genesis of this com- RORBINS. Right. munication, which is a formidable attack upon the resolution. The MAAS. Can that be corrected by action of your department, or, Burton resolution was reported to the House on January 30, and ir opinion, will it take additional legislation? there passed the month of February and then considerable time in ROBBINS. It will take money first of all, and Congress holds March. You, of course, knew of the Burton resolution. You must cketbook; but it takes so much money I do not think Congress have known, or your adviser, of the Burton resolution, if they keep ever do it-that is, to be prepared for what we call a major up with the proceedings in Congress or read the newspapers, some ency. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 109 nsiderable time before you heard from anybody on the Naval Secretary WILBUR. Not at all. I understood the matter was com- Committee and some considerable time before this document ing up on the floor of the House in a matter of a few hours. prepared. Is that true? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Who did you get that understanding Secretary WILBUR. If you are asking me a question, I will say from-Mr. Porter? Admiral Hughes refreshed my recollection shortly after the Secretary WILBUR. I assumed that Mr. Andrew desired it for resolution appeared in some form, I do not know whether that purpose. Now, what is your question? introduction in the House or where; he asked me whether we Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Your reason for not doing the things that make any appearance or invite any correspondènce in con- were not done seems to be that you thought in a few hours the with it, and he tells me that my reply was that we would matter would be under discussion in the House. Did you get that until the matter was brought to our attention formally. information from Mr. Porter, chairman of this committee? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You did not address any communication Secretary WILBUR. No. the chairman of this committee? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Or from Senator Burton? Secretary WILBUR. No communication of any kind. Secretary WILBUR. No. I got it from Mr. Andrew. MOORE of Virginia. You did not when you were in correspond- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Why were you depending on Mr. Andrew with the Naval Affairs Committee or any member of that com- with reference to this whole matter in disregard of this committee? indicate that fact to the chairman of this committee? Secretary WILBUR. It seemed to me that ought to be perfectly Secretary WILBUR. No. I will give you the genesis of it. We had plain. The matter had been brought to our attention with the from Mr. Andrew. I sent it as a matter of routine to the request for an answer by Mr. Andrew, and we answered him as Board, and, while they were considering the matter, and, he requested us to do. That is all there is to it. haps, after the letter had been prepared, Senator Burton tele- Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I understood you, and you can tell me in regard to the matter, and that time was the first time my whether I am correct or not, that this document was prepared not was forcibly drawn to the matter involved in his resolu- by you but otherwise. By whom was it prepared? As I said before, I had it drawn to my attention by the Chief Secretary WILBUR. By the General Board on my direction. Naval Operations, Admiral Hughes, and, of course, by the letter Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You directed the General Board to pre- Mr. Andrew. Senator Burton raised the question of propriety pare a statement of views. You did not tell them what views to letter addressed to a single Member of Congress. indicate? HULL. That was after this request from Mr. Andrew had Secretary WILBUR. Not at all. in? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. How much time elapsed after this brief Secretary WILBUR. Yes. was fixed up by the General Board before it was brought to you for MOORE of Virginia. You did not, when this letter was pre- consideration? send a copy of it to the chairman of this committee? Secretary WILBUR. I presume it was brought to me immediately. Secretary WILBUR. No. I talked about it to Senator Burton. I Mr. MOORE of Virginia. How long did you take to consider it? talked about it to Mr. Porter and I had planned to furnish a How many hours? and did furnish a copy to the chairman, but it was the morn- Secretary WILBUR. I think I can ask with propriety what is the of the hearings here. purpose of this line of questions? MOORE of Virginia. It was after the letter had been sent to Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I will tell you what the purpose is, to be Naval Affairs Committee and gotten in different newspapers. entirely frank, and I want to be entirely respectful-the purpose is Secretary WILBUR. It is true that it was after it had been sent to to show that you yourself, not having told the General Board what Naval Affairs Committee, and it is also true that it was after it your views were, got the views of the board in this letter, and took into the newspapers or, at least, one newspaper, the New York almost no time to consider those views as embraced in the letter. and I will repeat what I said, in view of Mr. Cooper's state- Secretary WILBUR. If that is a proper subject of inquiry- that we had nothing to do with the publication of the letter, Mr. MOORE of Virginia (interposing). That is a proper subject I ask Mr. Cooper to withdraw the statement in the question. of inquiry, in my humble judgment. COOPER. In questioning Mr. Robbins, you stated that after the Secretary WILBUR. I may say, if it is a proper subject of inquiry, Department had published the letter-had not published the I am perfectly willing to answer the question. After this letter in the newspapers and had nothing to do with it-perhaps was prepared it was taken up in the Cabinet and it was submitted directly, but you handed it out for publication under the injunc- to the Secretary of State and read by him and taken by him to his of secrecy, and with the very thought that it was to be, of course. office and gone over very carefully. It was returned to me. and I Secretary WILBUR. I deny that. had read it before it was submitted to the Secretary of State, if I MOORE of Virginia. Did you mark your letter personal," to remember correctly. and afterwards the letter seemed to me to be committee or the individual to whom it was sent, or write any sound and I signed it and sent it to Mr. Andrew, and subsequently showing that it would be equivalent to flouting the Foreign asked him to withhold the letter, as I have already stated. Committee if it was given out without being brought to the Mr. HULL. You asked Mr. Andrew to withhold the letter? of that committee? 0 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 111 Secretary WILBUR. I asked Mr. Andrew to withhold the letter Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Does not the Constitution give the Presi- d then made the reply to the chairman of the House Naval Affairs dent the right to make recommendations to Congress on anything per- mmittee. taining to the state of the Union? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. How much time was occupied in all of Secretary WILBUR. Certainly. at detail? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Without reference to statutes that may be Secretary WILBUR. To answer with the utmost exactness would re- in effect or prospective statutes? ire me to check it over. It was a matter of a few days; perhaps Secretary WILBUR. Yes. days altogether. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I come again to ask you what statute is in Mr. at? MOORE of Virginia. This board that you spoke of is called effect save the one mentioned, the act of 1922, which vests, with re- spect to this subject which we are considering, freedom of action, a Secretary WILBUR. The General Board of the Navy. discretion in the President of the United States? Do you know of Mr. MOORE of Virginia. It is the same board that recommended any such statute? nstruction of 71 vessels to Congress? Secretary WILBUR. I have in mind no other statute than the one Secretary WILBUR. Yes; it is the board organized for the purpose we have before us, and the proposed resolution. advising the Secretary of the Navy on technical questions in Mr. MOORE of Virginia. There is not any such statute. Therefore, gard to the development of the Navy. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. You accepted views of the General Board is it not fair to say that that second conclusion is absolutely error? Secretary WILBUR. No; I think it is absolutely right. respect to this matter as you did in respect to the construction of naval vessels? Mr. MOORE of Virginia. In spite of the fact that the statute on Secretary WILBUR. I will not answer that question. which it is predicated is admitted by practically everybody who has Mr. LINTHICUM. Do I understand that this letter was submitted to been here to be irrelevant to this discussion, you still say it is abso- Secretary of State and approved by him? lutely right? Ir. MOORE of Virginia. He says so. Secretary WILBUR. I think the statement there is a fair statement The CHAIRMAN. He did not say it was approved. and a just one. I would not hesitate to make the statement again. fr. LINTHICUM. It was not disapproved. I concede there may be differences of opinion, and I do not question Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We want all the facts. Now. I come to your right and your judgment in arriving at a different conclusion. letter itself. It contains a summary at the end. The letter Mr. MOORE of Virginia. It is not my judgment alone but it is the ds: judgment of this entire committee, including the very distinguished gentleman who sponsors this resolution, who knows more about it umming up the situation than I do. fr. BLOOM. What page? Secretary WILBUR. I do not criticize the committee and have no fr. MOORE of Virginia. Page 1825. Two conclusions are reached, desire to do so. I stand by the letter written. It might have been they are numbered 1 and 2. The second conclusion is as follows: written in different terms and expressed better. he annulment of the present freedom of action and exercise of discretion Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We differ then on that. The committee reposing in the President to meet future conditions is contrary to sound thinks that the second conclusion is without foundation, because there inistration and invites embarrassing and difficult situations. is but one statute that gives the President any freedom of action in "hat apparently has reference, has it not, to the discretion vested the exercise of discretion relative to this matter that we are talking he President, which is the only discretion he has, by the act of about. uary 31, 1922. Is that correct? Secretary WILBUR. What I am pointing out is that the President ecretary WILBUR. I think it is intended to be broader than that. has the right to be untrammeled by such considerations in making ink it primarily refers to that. recommendations to Congress as Thomas Jefferson did in regard to Ir. HULL. Primarily? the embargo which resulted in four days in action by Congress. ecretary WILBUR. Yes. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Do you mean to assert that by this reso- r. MOORE of Virginia. What specifically does it refer to? What lution he would be trammeled in making any recommendation to retion does the President have? Congress he might think fit, or that he would not violate his oath of ecretary WILBUR. Of course, that is a rather difficult question to office if he failed to make recommendations to Congress that ought to ver. be made? r. MOORE of Virginia. It is very important though. Secretary WILBUR. My judgment is that it would have a hamper- cretary WILBUR. The President can recommend to Congress now ing effect upon the President in that you are interfering with a situ- hing consistent with his views of the rights and duties and obli- ation that is crystallized into law, and that he would not have the ons of the United States in reference to any individual contest same freedom that he now has in the absence of this legislation. ny particular contest that may be going on between nations. If That is a matter of opinion. I do not want to be obstinate about it, gress forecloses it by declaring in advance that there will be an but I would adhere to that, not simply because it is written down. argo or that there is an embargo, the President would not have freedom of action. 36144-20-8 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 113 that is my judgment and you gentlemen have it for what it is and, as you might say, a municipal policy. Following that did we Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Let us take the first conclusion: not extend that policy by statutes, without regard to the action of other nations, so as to make certain greater neutrality? umming up the situation, the Navy Department can see no useful result would come from legislation binding by municipal law this country to Secretary WILBUR. I do not believe I will be of any assistance to special burden forbidding international trade in arms permitted by inter- you along the line of your questions involving a study of the statutes law, and punishing its citizens for International trade permitted by and history that I have not made. I know what you are stating now law. is absolutely true, but I do nót believe I will be very helpful to you Am I to assume from that, that if this subject could be dealt with in that line of investigation. international agreement that you would have no objection? Mr. MOORE, of Virginia. I would respectfully call your attention Secretary WILBUR. I think that is a fair assumption. It is our idea to the importance of the statutes, the importance of considering the these matters should be dealt with by international agreement. statutes which are set out at length in the Code of Laws of the hink that is the purpose of this Geneva conference to work out United States, title 18, page 460, where there are quite a number of nething on which all the nations could agree. statutes containing prohibitions against citizens of this country doing Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I will concur in that view with great unneutral acts. For instance, take an example: Supplying cannon As a matter of fact, has not our whole neutrality policy, to the vessels of any or either of the belligerents engaged in war; which this resolution is designed to be an expansion, been a matter organizing on our soil expeditions to aid either one or the other of domestic and not international action from the time of George the belligerents engaged in war where we were at peace with both shington's administration? belligerents, and SO forth-quite a number of statutes. Secretary WILBUR. I do not think I am competent to answer that I may tell you, it is a matter of interest and you may know it My idea is that the American Government has always been already, that in 1818 this body of statutes was under consideration among the nations of the world in advocating and attempt- in the House of Representatives and they were debated by such men to protect the rights of neutrals, if that answers your question. of distinction as Henry Clay, Lowndes, of South Carolina, and MOORE, of Virginia. No; not quite. Is not this true, that at the Tucker, of Virginia, and in substance they were not objected to by of the Government, in George Washington's first admin- anybody. Those gentlemen all apparently thought it was desirable it was found that governments themselves had been the for the United States, mark you, without international action, to reluctant and most irregular in assuming an attitude of neu- extend the doctrine of neutrality as proposed by those statutes. in case of war going on between other nations, and that The point I am making is that we ought not to think, when we are Washington, according to all the historians who have written considering neutrality, that we can not act without international the subject, determined that the United States of America would agreement. its own policy without regard to the attitude of other nations; Secretary WILBUR. I agree to that absolutely. did he not, through his Secretary of State, Mr. Jefferson, take Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We ought to think that it is proper for position that the Government of the United States would remain us to act alone where we think we ought to act as conscience de- where other nations with which it was at peace engaged in mands, without waiting on other nations. not as an international policy, but as a domestic or municipal Secretary WILBUR. I agree to that. Under the embargo act of and that was policy he proposed and inaugurated for us? 1807 American commerce was forbidden to leave the ports in order ecretary WILBUR. That, of course, is a very long and somewhat to keep out of harm-one of Jefferson's laws that passed the Senate question. I do not mean it is not clear. I do not know that one day and both Houses in four days. answer it categorically. Of course, we all know that Wash- Mr. COOPER. That would be sustained as constitutional? policy of neutrality in connection with hostilities between Secretary WILBUR. Undoubtedly. and Great Britain was one of his outstanding policies. That Mr. COOPER. But it never went to the Supreme Court; it was in hat you have in mind, I think. the lower court. MOORE, of Virginia. You remember perfectly well that Mr. Secretary WILBUR. I have not raised any question of constitu- minister of France to this country, protested against the tional law here. States going its own gait in inaugurating a definite policy Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Evene though you and I may differ about governmental neutrality, and that General Washington said, this resolution, Mr. Secretary, I think I am obliged to say that the we are going to do this because we think it is the right Government of the United States has done a great many things for the United States to do." You recall that? with a view of preserving neutrality without waiting on other ecretary WILBUR. I remember the situation has been given us nations to concur. along those lines. That was a very critical time in our Secretary WILBUR. I am very happy to agree with you on that. Mr. MOORE of Virginia. We are trying now to do one thing more, MOORE of Virginia. We are assuming, at least I am assuming, to take one other step. Let us say that we take this step and then ther correctly or incorrectly, that the policy of governmental look at the matter not in an academic way, but in a practical way. as inaugurated by General Washington was a domestic Let us assume that this resolution is adopted, and then that a war takes place. How would this resolution operate to embarrass the EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS States in preparing for war and carrying on war in case it 115 into a war itself? Secretary WILBUR. I think it would. Was the question, in what Secretary WILBUR. True. Will you gentlemen give me the op- would it embarrass the United States? portunity of considering any question you have specially in mind by studying the material? MOORE of Virginia. I do not want to be understood, in the Mr. KORELL. I would like very much to have you consider the I am supposing, that two other nations are at war. I am sup- question that I have just asked because I think, with all respect, a case where the United States happens to be, unfortunately, that you did not give a direct answer to it. You depended on dif- in a war with another power; would this resolution oper- ferent hypotheses than were included in my question and those I if it should be in effect, to embarrass the United States? mention are the ones that are actually at issue in this hearing. ecretary WILBUR. This Nation is at war with another nation, and Secretary WILBUR. I will consider that further. I think I gave question is whether this resolution would embarrass this you, perhaps. the view of the department. The CHAIRMAN. The Burton resolution was introduced on Decem- MOORE of Virginia. Yes. ber 5, 1927, and reported out January 31, 1927. The records in the ecretary WILBUR. As I see it, speaking offhand, that embarrass- committee show that no one asked for a hearing on the resolution. would be entirely in the question of mechanical equipment, "This first letter that you wrote Mr. Andrew was of the date of we would be deprived of by reason of our inability in the March 7. That you say was not mailed until a few days later. preceding the war to utilize those facilities for the production Secretary WILBUR. It was not mailed. It was handed to him. by exportation. The CHAIRMAN. The letter to the Naval Affairs Committee was other words, the embarrassment would not be diplomatic: it dated March 16. That was the letter to Chairman Butler. be simply the result of our own inefficiency in war-producing Secretary WILBUR. They were practically identical, with the excep- and material. That is the only embarrassment I see in tion of the opening statement. The CHAIRMAN. There was no copy of that letter sent to this com- KORELL. In that connection I asked the Secretary of War mittee which had this bill under consideration. other day this question: Secretary WILBUR. The committee did not have it under consid- Suppose we continue with the policy of relying upon private- eration. It was on the floor of the House at that time. If there is and munitions factories, and they in turn are dependent upon any discourtesy there, I am willing to shoulder the burden of it. continuance of foreign wars in order to keep their plants in The CHAIRMAN. I am not raising the question of discourtesy at to meet an emergency in the event we get into another all. I am satisfied it was a mistake. I heard of that letter: in fact, Suppose all foreign wars were to terminate and our private I could not understand where all this propaganda was coming from were forced out of business as a consequence, what would on the floor. Last Saturday I asked you for a copy of that letter, of our plans for national defense if we were to have a war- which you furnished Monday morning when you appeared to testify. couple of years after that? Would they disappear or would Is that a fact? be anything left of our preparedness? Secretary WILBUR. I think we met the day before. WILBUR. What was his answer? The CHAIRMAN. Was it Saturday afternoon we met or the next KORELL. What is your answer? morning? At any rate, Admiral Hughes said he would have some- WILBUR. I have not any answer to that question. There body work late that night and copy the letter for me. many hypotheses in it. I am not saying that in a critical way, Secretary WILBUR. Exactly. not see very far in advance in a war. We can realize that The CHAIRMAN. Those are the facts in regard to the letter. that tends to deprive us of the ability to manufacture arms Admiral HUGHES. It was Friday night we met with you. capacity to produce them will be harmful to us in case. of I do not think in my personal view of this matter that we Secretary WILBUR. I will give you the exact sequence, the exact relying upon foreign wars to make us prepared. hours, if you want it, all along the line. The CHAIRMAN. What I want to call your attention to is this: It had that situation, of course, previous to the World War. thought was more with relation to the situation in time of seems the Naval Affairs Committee did exactly the same thing. what you might call the routine development of our industrial They did not send us a copy, and up to the present date I have not by which there has seemed not to be a great deal of arms even read that letter. The talent would be in existence in this country that Note the situation in which you placed this committee which was enable us to produce larger quantities at any time. The situ- directly in charge of the bill. Your statement goes out. We do when we had an enormous output going to belligerents in the not hear of it for four or five days, and the War Department state- War was unique and unusual. ment goes out. I have never seen a copy of that. The result is that KORELL. You have in mind that this resolution simply relates a great many men on the floor have been misled by this statement. embargo we are at against the exportation to belligerent nations with Secretary WILBUR. I will give you the details of that. Mr. HULL. He said he told Mr. Andrew to withhold that letter. peace. Mr. FISH. You have not the record quite straight in regard to dates. The Secretary made a statement that it was only in the New York Times. That is not the fact. It was in the New York EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 117 on the morning of the 16th, which was Friday morning, therefore must have been written on the 15th. Secretary WILBUR. No. I do not know how far I ought to have ecutive The CHAIRMAN. session. It is 10 minutes to 12, and I suggest we go into gone in discussing a conversation with another Cabinet officer. The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to get you into any controversy (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee adjourned to meet with him. at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Thursday, March 22, 1928.) Secretary WILBUR. I would not be: The CHAIRMAN. I notice you were careful in your testimony to avoid saying that he approved or disapproved of your position, and I assumed that your purpose in handing the letter to him was HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, to keep him informed as to the attitude of the Navy Department COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, on this question. March 22, 1928. Secretary WILBUR. No; my primary purpose in handing it to him esiding. The committee this day met, Hon. Stephen D. Porter (chairman) was to ascertain whether or not the communication which is quoted there from the conferees at Geneva was a confidential matter. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. The CHAIRMAN. That was the primary object? Secretary WILBUR. That was the primary object. He examined ATEMENT OF HON. CURTIS D. WILBUR, SECRETARY OF THE it and said he wanted to go over the whole letter and I let him take NAVY it and he reported that that matter had already been reported to Congress. MOORE of Virginia. May I ask you just one question with ref- The CHAIRMAN. But you do not say now that the Secretary of to your statement of yesterday? I notice in the United State approved this letter except in that manner? Daily of this morning there is a report of the proceedings Secretary WILBUR. No; I have not said anything about it. I think yesterday headed, Cabinet Considered Opposition to Restric- it would be better for him to say whether he approved it or not. of Arms Exports, and then in the text there is this said: The CHAIRMAN. You conveyed that impression to me in your testi- to Its submission to the members of the committee. the naval Secre- mony. That is the reason I got the exact wording. stated the letter was placed before a meeting of the Cabinet and dis- Secretary WILBUR. He did approve it, very emphatically. The CHAIRMAN. There are statements in the letter that I doubt I am trying to get at is, whatèver the fact might be with very much the Secretary of State would approve, especially the state- to that point, whether this letter was read in the Cabinet ment on page 1825: discussed by the Cabinet, and the conclusion reached on it. Finally. the very important principle of freedom of action by the Executive ecretary WILBUR. I would not want to go into that any further to meet any condition arising in the future. if sacrified. and the Government I have. Perhaps I should not have said anything about it. becomes bound by legislative action permitting no initiative or discretion on the that matter was brought up, as I said. part of the executive department of the Government. Moreover, any attempt to did make one mistake in my statement of yesterday, when I change such legislation by the United States as a neutral might well be con- sidered as an unneutral net and therefore prohibited. copy of a letter furnished to Mr. Andrew was exactly the same the exception of the first paragraph as the copy sent to Chair- As a matter of fact. we have the opinion here from the Secretary Butler of the House Naval Affairs Committee. There was one of State that the placing of an embargo or the removal of it was not There was a sentence eliminated from the second draft an unneutral act. is before you. Secretary WILBUR. That is the first letter you received from the he CHAIRMAN. and I notice in your testimony of yesterday this Secretary? answer: The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Secretary WILBUR. I had already read that letter. MOORE. That is a proper subject of inquiry, in my humble judgment. cretary WILBUR. I may say, If it is a proper subject of inquiry, I am The CHAIRMAN. The point I make is this: It do not want it to willing to answer the question. After this letter was prepared It appear in the record that the Secretary approved of the statement up in the Cabinet, and it was submitted to the Secretary of State in your letter when it was squarely in conflict with the views he ex- by him and taken by him to his office and gone over very care- pressed in his letter to the committee. It was returned to me, and I had read It before it was submitted to Secretary of State, If I remember correctly, and afterwards the letter Secretary WILBUR. I do not think there is any conflict in it at all, to me to be sound and I signed it and sent It to Mr. Andrew. and but that question was not discussed and I do not want to say that quently asked him to withhold the letter. as I have already stated. the Secretary specifically approved any given language in this letter. in your testimony you were careful to avoid stating that The CHAIRMAN. Do you say there is no conflict between that state- Secretary of State had approved the letter. As a matter of ment-" Moreover, any attempt to change such legislation by the did you not hand him the letter merely for the purpose of United States as a neutral might well be considered as an unneutral him informed of the position the Navy Department was act and therefore prohibited "-is there any conflict between that statement and the statement by the Secretary of State that to lay an embargo or remove it was not an unneutral act? EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 119 Secretary WILBUR. I would want to compare the two together with Now, this resolution which forbids only the shipment of arms to before passing on it. I do not think that is a matter for me to sovereign states at war could not, under any possible circumstances, on. We presented for you in that letter, which is perfectly interfere with the securing of arms by those countries for administra- lerstandable, that the removal of such an embargo during a war tion, policing, and safeguarding the country. very well be considered as unfriendly by the side as to which Your statement is quite misleading to a man not familiar with the removal applied. Whether that would be technically an un- resolution of 1922. Would you have any objection to deleting this act is another question and, after all, an act of that kind is part of the letter? to be characterized as an unneutral act whether it is in fact or Secretary WILBUR. I think I understand you, but I am not abso- In other words, an injured party in a fight usually claims that lutely certain. As I understand the drift of this letter it is this: favoritism shown the other side is wrongful as well as unneutral. This resolution 183 does not expressly prohibit the furnishing of arms, The CHAIRMAN. I am not disputing your right to your opinion. munitions, and implements of war for administration, policing. and Secretary WILBUR. I am quite sure of that. safeguarding the country during time of peace, but the theory on "he CHAIRMAN. What I am doing is trying to avoid putting in the which this letter is written is that as you favor absolutely prohibiting statements that would indicate the Secretary of State had the exportation of arms to those countries in time of war, that in time ressed conflicting views. of peace the munitions they secure would be secured from other Secretary WILBUR. Suppose we strike out all this last testimony nations from whom they could purchase arms and ammunition in how will that do? time of war. That is a very vital proposition. The CHAIRMAN. No. The CHAIRMAN. That may be the theory, but it does not so state. EATON. How would it do for the Secretary of State to come Secretary WILBUR. This part of it is purely introductory to the dis- and tell us what his views are? cussion of the bill. You are quite right, and there is not question The CHAIRMAN. We have his views here in a written communica- about it, that the resolution does not prohibit directly any such exportation. Secretary WILBUR. I think he would be very glad to give you his The CHAIRMAN. In other words, at any time during peace or war this bill would not prohibit the shipment of arms and munitions to "he CHAIRMAN. How do you know that? these countries for administration, policing, and safeguarding the lecretary WILBUR. He told me so. He did not tell me in just those country? or four words, but he gave me the impression that he would Secretary WILBUR. Would you say that was true also in time of glad to. war? 'he CHAIRMAN. Would you have any objection to deleting some, The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There would be no sovereign State at war, he statements in this letter of yours that are obviously incorrect? if it were a domestic matter. this request because this letter will appear in the record to Secretary WILBUR. You are thinking of a revolutionary affair. by thousands of people. The CHAIRMAN. That is what it has in mind, policing a revolution, HULL. Instead of saying objection, say, do you not want to and administration. Secretary WILBUR. I should say beyond question that you are cor- ecretary WILBUR. Let me answer you in this way: This letter was rect in your statement that the law you propose does not directly pared for another committee. It was not in response to a request prohibit exportation of arms for the purposes indicated, in time of this committee. I thought and still think that it is a fair peace or in time of internal revolution. and easily understandable. I have no objection to framing The CHAIRMAN. Now, passing to the fourth paragraph, after re- in which you may, perhaps, eliminate some of the suggestions citing the act of 1922, which is clearly limited to domestic troubles gentlemen have in mind. You see what I mean? I do not or domestic violence in any American country, I find this statement: to make a statement that is not correct or that is susceptible of This act. originating in 1898 and extended in 1922. to cover extraterritori- interpretation. ality. particularly In China, gives the President freedom of action in cases 'he CHAIRMAN. The difficulty about doing that is that this par- where there seems to be an abuse arising from the special nature of commerce letter runs all through the testimony. in arms and the power to remedy the evil which might be arising therefrom. ecretary WILBUR. I can see that. Do you not think that statement should be limited to any Ameri- he CHAIRMAN. If you put in another letter it would create greater can country where domestic violence occurs? Otherwise one in read- Now, on the first page, second paragraph, you say: ing would infer that it gives the President power to exercise this United States is an arms-producing country. There are numerous small control all over the world. particularly on the American Continent, that are not arms-producing Secretary WILBUR. As I understand your statement, you are abso- It is accepted as n. legitimate right and need that those countries lutely correct. This relates back to the law concerning American be supplied with arms, munitions, and implements of war for administra- countries. policing. and safeguarding the country. The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think the statement in the conclusion stop there and omit the words and for their defense during of the letter should be qualified so as to prevent conveying the im- EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 121 that the resolution gives the President the right to exer- To change such legislation by the United States as a neutral his power all over the world? but the United States is not-can not be-a neutral until after a cretary WILBUR. That should be stated undoubtedly. I believe war has begun between other nations. The Burton resolution does be the truth. not propose to change anything " as a neutral after war has begun. MOORE of Virginia. Do you think it is a little unfortunate, Mr. It proposes to change it now in a time of peace, and so give all that so much weight in discussing this matter should have nations notice before they go to war. placed on this act of 1922 which relates to internal troubles The CHAIRMAN. Yes. to war between nations? Mr. COOPER. The resolution proposes that we enact this, not as a cretary WILBUR. I think the letter was prepared in the utmost neutral, because there is nobody fighting, but as a sovereign nation in faith. It could have been omitted and referred to more briefly. time of peace to help preserve peacé. The sentence I have quoted laws are distinct. There is no doubt about that. from the letter is very deceptive. CHAIRMAN. On page 1825, the paragraph I referred to a Secretary WILBUR. You are interpreting that letter entirely ago, reads as follows: erroneously. I have read the clause in the letter at the bottom of the very important principle of freedom of action by the Executive the page, and it does say that removal of an embargo applied equally any condition arising in the future if sacrificed and the Government to both powers could not be regarded- provided that such action bound by legislative action permitting no initiative or discretion on by Congress applied equally to all parties at war, it would not be of the executive department of the Government. unneutral." I think you will agree with me that this paragraph conveys The CHAIRMAN. It would not be unneutral. mpression that the Executive has control over embargos, when. Secretary WILBUR. What was stated in my letter was that such an matter of fact, the exclusive control over embargoes is in Con- act might be regarded as an unneutral act. It does not assert that Would you have any objection to striking that out? there would be an unneutral act. and I think what we had in mind cretary WILBUR. I would bear in mind what you say with refer- there was that the belligerents might regard it as an unneutral act to a supplementary or modified statement. I will bear that in and probably would. I do not want to answer categorically that particular ques- The CHAIRMAN. Do you say that the laying of an embargo by a I think we discussed that matter yesterday and our opinions neutral power is a neutral or an unneutral act? at one that the embargo power laid primarily in Congress. Secretary WILBUR. I would not want to say that. Do you mean CHAIRMAN. The reason I am taking it up with you is this: in time of peace or war? document has apparently been printed by somebody in the office The CHAIRMAN. Either. Public Printer, and no doubt will be freely distributed over Secretary WILBUR. I would not want to be drawn into that discus- United States, and we, as officials, should correct any inaccura- sion because I am not especially well posted on that. The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the lifting of an embargo sretary WILBUR. I agree with you entirely on that. by 8 neutral, as the Secretary of State has said, if that action applied CHAIRMAN. In the next sentence- Moreover, any attempt to equally to all parties at war. would be an unneutral act? such legislation by the United States as a neutral might well Secretry WILBUR. I am willing to accept the conclusion of the onsidered as an unneutral act and therefore prohibited "-you Secretary of State on that. the position that it is an unneutral act and the Secretary of The CHAIRMAN. That it is not an unneutral act? whom I think is our proper adviser in such matters, says it The CHAIRMAN. This letter of yours was apparently written lift on Secretary WILBUR. Exactly. not be an unneutral act. cretary WILBUR. Do you mind my reading that letter? I read the theory that while it would not be unneutral to raise or an embargo one or more of the belligerents might claim that it was CHAIRMAN. We are in this situation: The Navy Department an unneutral act. is unneutral and the State Department says it is neutral. Secretary WILBUR. I think that was what was in mind of the COOPER. That is one of the most misleading sentences in this Admiral who drafted this. misleading letter. You can, by a mere suggestion, mislead a The CHAIRMAN. It does not say so, It makes the positive state- without making a positive statement. ment that it would be unneutral. cretary WILBUR. That is true. Secretary WILBUR. " Might well be considered as an unneutral COOPER. The power of suggestion can mislead a reader. Here point to this misleading sentence in the letter: act." COLE. There was a dispute yesterday as to what was done in Moreover, any attempt to change such legislation "-that is, to general international law which now permits private sale by that taking did take this letter along with you to a Cabinet meeting Mr. this letter to the Cabinet. Senator Burton and I contended of munitions of war-" to change such legislation by the but you did it for the purpose of turning it over to Secretary and Kellogg that it States as a neutral might well be considered as an unneutral and you did not take it along for presenting to the Cabinet nd therefore prohibited." which was Senator Burton and I placed on that matter not presented to the Cabinet as such. Is that correct? interpretation EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 123 WILBUR. Neither one of you is exactly correct. I do with the President, because, as you must be aware by now, the mem- to discuss that further. I injected that statement to cover bership of this committee believe this report to be most misleading as suggested here that the matter had not been considered. to facts-hearsay. want to drag into this discussions occurring in the Cabinet. Secretary WILBUR. Which report? wish to give the impression that the letter was formally Mr. FISH. I call it the report. It is really a letter. It is called a pressly approved by the Cabinet. document. It is of considerable length and, of course, you must be COLE. I realize your position in that matter but, unfortunately, aware that the views of this committee are almost unanimously that become a matter of dispute based on your statement whether this is a very misleading report which was considered by the Cabinet, ocument was submitted to the Cabinet and passed upon by and it may become necessary for us to call the attention of the Presi- dent to the fact that this committee is unanimous in its belief that this WILBUR. It naturally would be because I did not intend is utterly misleading as to the Burton resolution 183. but Mr. Hull asked a question and I made that reply. Now, Mr. Secretary, do you know what the policy of the neutral MOORE of Virginia. That is the reason I propounded an in- nations was toward Germany during the war as to the exportation of to the Secretary a while ago because it seems to me to be a arms and munitions and implements of war? of tremendous importance if the Cabinet has taken up this Secretary WILBUR. I am not prepared to discuss those questions. and passed upon it and approved it. The knowledge I have of them is the knowledge of a newspaper WILBUR. No. reader interested during the war in those things, less than any mem- MOORE of Virginia. We want to know, in other words, whether ber of this committee, probably, who was charged with some re- resident of the United States is for or against the policy sponsibility at that time. We have facilities for examining this in this resolution. question and making proper report on them, and I think for me to CHAIRMAN. I think that the Cabinet meetings are of such a answer questions offhand about that would be of no value to the nature that we ought not to go into them. committee. MOORE of Virginia. We did not start it. Mr. FISH. You would not want to venture an opinion? WILBUR. That is true. Secretary WILBUR. No. CHAIRMAN. The testimony conveyed a false impression to Mr. FISH. On page 1823 it says: when I heard it and after reading it I saw that the Secre- Finally, in the World War, waged for a considerable time' and on a arefully avoided saying that Mr. Kellogg had approved it. large seale." the Central Powers did not find it necessary to use implements COLE. In the membership of this committee, as far as I know, of warfare obtained from neutral nations. only two of us that believe that this matter has not been Do you happen to know why the Central Powers did not find it Cabinet. All the others assume it was to the Cabinet. necessary to use implements of warfare obtained from neutral MOORE of Virginia. Just as I predicted yesterday at the con- of the hearing, the newspapers this morning have paraded nations? Secretary WILBUR. I can give you in a moment my authority for that this issue has been passed upon by the Cabinet and we that statement. I have asked the Admiral to look it up. this moment in the attitude of it being assumed by the news- Mr. COOPER. They could not get them because England had com- and the reading public that the President of the United mand of the sea. taken this position, and if that is true, I think we ought to Secretary WILBUR. Falkenhayn says: Particular stress was laid upon the promotion of the production of muni- FISH. Just to start out by correcting the witness, I think you tions and the manufacture of long-range guns, the elaboration of the trench the impression originally that the New York Times was mortar into a serviceable weapon, the increase of the machine-gun supply and paper that published your letter? of the nir services. as well as the development of gas ns a means of war- WILBUR. I really do not know. Although the Entente was able gradually to avail itself of the fare. munitions supply of the whole world, excluding the central powers, Ger- FISH. You made a statement. For the purpose of correcting was not only thrown back upon her own resources but was also forced will state that the New York Tribune last Friday also had which we are not discussing. The New York Tribune of other guarantee province of war material. It was only the requirements during the to many her allies ample assistance in this mutter as well as in every has an article in rather large headlines, as follows: 44 Kellogg simultaneous battles on the Meuse. on the Somme, in Galicia, and in Italy ban note, Wilbur reveals. Navy's opposition to embargo in 1916. that, exceeding as they did all anticipations, brought about by Cabinet, Secretary tells House." a of production which had been drawn up continued to supply such increasingly critical August. period in the supply of ammunition for a time. However, the program is in rather large type in the New York Tribune of to-day, enormous quantities of munitions that it was very quickly possible to remove March 22, 1928. the deficiency which had occurred. very well that it is not proper for you or any other Mr. FISH. There were. as you know, a number of neutral nations of the Cabinet to state what goes on in Cabinet meetings, but touching Germany within that region, Norway, Sweden, Switzer- fact, as you stated here, that this particular letter was dis- neutral nations adjoining Germany and within its spheres, land, Holland, and Denmark, and is it not a fact that those nations, issued in a Cabinet meeting, I think it would be perfectly proper committee to consider the advisability of communicating EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS embargo against the exportation of arms, munitions and imple- We will proceed to the first paragraph of this letter where it of war and that is the reason Germany could not get them any other nation? Of course, they could not get them from It is accepted as a legitimate right and need that those countries m because England controlled the seas, and I want to point out a surplied with arms. munitions. and implements of war for administ policing, and safeguarding the country. vital thing that those neutral nations in Europe did the proper the thing that we propose to do by this resolution. Do you still believe that this resolution affects policing an Mr. COOPER. In time of peace. ministration of countries in time of peace? Mr. FISH. In time of war. We put it through now, but it only Secretary WILBUR. Yes; in the indirect way that I have stat into effect in time of war. not directly. The language of this joint resolution does not a am giving you precedent for this action and you know why it Our proposition is that the practical effect of it would be tha them out of war. That is why they did not ship munitions and United States would be deprived of the advantage of buying 1 and that is what this committee is trying to do, to keep us tions when they want them in case of war and would be depriv of war because we know very well that when we ship munitions time of peace from a supply in time of war for building u will get into the next European war. You make the statement supply in time of war. I think that is very tangible and very about Germany. The reason is, you imply, they did not need but there is no disposition here to convey the impression that The reason is that they could not buy any from these neutral embargo resolution expressly prohibits that very thing. It doe Mr. FISH. That is practically the premise of your entire state The CHAIRMAN. Will you limit yourself to questions? and we believe it is utterly misleading as to this resolution. FISH. I will call attention to your reading for about an hour. build the whole argument on this false premise. That is a mat The CHAIRMAN. We should have some of these questions answered. difference of opinion between the Secretary and the committe Secretary WILBUR. You have other witnesses here. that is the feeling. FISH. I am reading you for information just what Sweden Secretary WILBUR. This letter was addressed to a Memb Congress. It was not intended for publication or to provoke I amediately after the outbreak of the World War the Swedish Government feeling one way or the other. an export prohibition for war material. These export prohibitions Mr. FISH. This was discussed in the Cabinet-and that is pa until the end of the war and no export licenses were granted to were this particular letter. he belligerent powers. The same refers to the prohibition of transit war any Secretary WILBUR. That particular phase of the discussio in force from January, 1915, to the end of the war. which the Cabinet is affected. I do not want to go into what wa 'hey went further than this prohibition and prohibited war ma- cussed in the Cabinet, but what I have just said is that this from any other country going through in transit. They went was prepared for a committee of Congress, not for publication than we have asked them to do here. We do not need to pro- Mr. FISH. As long as you raised the question about it being a prohibition against transit. I will show you how I obtained to a Member of Congress- document, for the benefit of the committee, and they can get it Secretary WILBUR. I have said all I wish to say. from the State Department, but I discussed the matter with the Mr. FISH. Did the Representative have anything to do with ( dish minister and he cabled to his own Government because I ing up that letter directly or indirectly? the impression, and I am making this statement because most was Secretary WILBUR. I think that is an impertinent question. are under the impression, and members of this committee, Mr. FISH. I will not press it any further. Sweden and other countries supplied the Germans with arms dur- Mr. COOPER. I would like to have a ruling on that. In the war. I discussed that with the Swedish minister and he abso- respect is it? denied that they shipped arms and munitions to Germany and The CHAIRMAN. That question is perfectly proper. to his own Government and got this statement and I gave it to Secretary WILBUR. To ask whether a Member of Congress ass State Department, and this is a matter of record. There is no in drafting that letter? about it. It is a fact I will put into the record and a most Mr. FISH. Indirectly or directly connected with the drafting fact to the developments in regard to this resolution. and getting up this letter? HULL. Is that document from the State Department? Secretary .WILBUR. If the committee wishes me to answer State Department. I have also taken occasion to ask other to FISH. The Swedish Minister told me he did not give this after what I have said I will answer it. As far as I know he absolutely nothing to do with it. I have spoken to every memb of these neutral countries and they tell me the same thing. the General Board that it was prepared by, and it was referred I I have not it in writing. to them, and the members of the board are here and if you thi WILBUR. If you call upon them and cross-examine them is of sufficient importance you can ask them. As far as I kno as you have me you would find out. had absolutely nothing to do with it. Department did not know the facts. FISH. I had to get it from other sources because evidently the The CHAIRMAN. It would not be an impropriety if he did. is I have been guilty of it a thousand times. EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 127 126 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS Secretary WILBUR. I do not think that is a matter for the com- was to take an advanced step in international law which other nations mittee. This letter is that of the Secretary of the Navy who is would follow. If that is done by all the nations then the only re- course these peoples would have would be to accumulate supplies. responsible; whether he had a Member of Congress assist or not is entirely aside the question. As long as you are interested in this Mr. FISH. Is not this an utterly misleading statement to put into this letter with regard to House Joint Resolution 183? I have no objection to telling you. Mr. COLE. I want to say that the Secretary has a right to get his Secretary WILBUR. No; I think it is a perfectly straightforward statement of the situation for anybody to understand. information from any source he wants to. Mr. FISH. I agree with the chairman that I have a perfect right Mr. FISH. We are not discussing a general embargo by all nations, to ask it. I agree with the chairman there is no reason why it should Secretary WILBUR. That is what you are seeking to bring about by this resolution. not be answered. Mr. FISH. Are you opposed to a general embargo? We have here on page 1822, article 8- Secretary WILBUR. I can not answer that. The seizing of these arsenals by revolutionists would add to the turbulence Mr. EATON. Under what circumstances? in such countries. Mr. FISH. A general embargo on buying munitions. It is not such an important matter I am going to develop here, but Mr. MOORE of Virginia. He said yesterday if there was an interna- is it not a cardinal principle of the American people, the right to tional agreement it would be very satisfactory. revolt against tyrannical forms of government? Is it not one of the Secretary WILBUR. I am here in an official capacity as Secretary fundamentals of American ideals and traditions that people where of the Navy, at your invitation to assist as far as I can. My personal a government is tyrannical have a right to revolt? In the same views are not very important. I do not care to inject them. line I will add for the record that there are certain South American Mr. MOORE of Virginia. Your name is attached to this. governments that, at least in my opinion, without naming them, are Secretary WILBUR. I stand by that statement. But you are asking the worst kind of tyrannies and dictatorships. I did not think that me a question about whether I am in favor of a general embargo by this has any place at all, so far as the argument is concerned, in a all the countries of the world. letter of this kind. Mr. FISH. You answered it yesterday and now you are refusing to The CHAIRMAN. I insist that you ask the Secretary questions be- answer. cause these are merely statements of your own which are very valua- Secretary WILBUR. No. ble to go into the record later. Mr. FISH. Mr. Moore said you answered it by saying you were in Mr. MOORE of Virginia. He did ask him a question, if he does not favor of a general treaty to place an embargo by all nations. realize that has been the traditional attitude of this Government. Mr. COLE. I do not think we ought to put the Secretary of the Mr. EATON. To assist them in revolutions? Navy through a high-school examination. Mr. FISH. No. The CHAIRMAN. The chairman has been trying to limit it to an Mr. EATON. It is an academic question. examination by questions and answers but so far has not succeeded. Mr. FISH. It is purely an academic question and I will ask the Secretary WILBUR. Let me call attention to the difference between Secretary if he agrees with me that it is a cardinal principle of the Mr. Fish's question and Mr. Moore's. Mr. Moore asked, if there was American people? a general agreement to bring about an embargo, if I would favor it, Secretary WILBUR. No. I go as far as the Declaration of Inde- and my answer is yes. Mr. Fish asked me whether I personally pendence and that is where I stop. favor a general embargo. The difference between those is this: If Mr. FISH. I agree with you and I think that covers the whole there is a general agreement reached between nations, that presup- thing. poses careful and intelligent consideration of the whole thing and an The next article on page 1822, article 9, reads: agreement could not be reached in any other way. I would un- Such countries, being unable to procure arms and munitions when belligerents, hesitatingly acquiesce in that. But when you ask me if I am might feel the necessity of accumulating large reserves for possible war. personally in favor of a general embargo I could not tell you. Is not that misleading? Is it not a fact that these governments Mr. FISH. I am satisfied with the former answer. I would not can buy, if they can not buy from us, from other countries, such quibble about it. as England, France, and Italy? Secretary WILBUR. I realize that. Secretary WILBUR. I hardly know how to answer that. Mr. COLE. I sympathize with the attitude taken by the Secretary. Mr. FISH. That is No. 9. I think' some of the questions that have been put here ought to be Secretary WILBUR (reading) transferred to a civil-service examination sheet, and we all know that the questions on those sheets are many of them preposterous. Such countries. being unable to procure arms and munitions when belligerents, Mr. FISH. Getting back to article 9-4 such countries, being unable might feel the necessity of accumulating large reserves for possible war. to procure arms and munitions when belligerents, might feel the I think this letter visualizes the possibility that other nations would necessity of accumulating large reserves for possible war." follow the example of the United States. I think Mr. Burton sug- 36144-20-9 gests here, and perhaps your chairman, that one of the purposes EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 129 Is it not a fact that if we place an embargo under this resolution time of war that they can buy from these other countries, such as Mr. EATON. Yesterday I was unfortunate enough to be detained England, and Italy? in one of the departments. I have not been able to get a clear idea Secretary WILBUR. That is the very question you asked me a of the purpose of this meeting but I want to have it so that I can ago and that is what I answered. understand it. As I understand it, we have reported out a resolution Mr. FISH. Is it a fact? which then becomes the property of the House. On that resolution Secretary WILBUR. Unless they put similar embargoes on. a letter comes from the Navy Department to another committee, and Mr. FISH. Unless they put similar embargoes on. That is the the object of this meeting is to attempt a revision of that letter? I wanted to bring out by the other question. The CHAIRMAN. Could not we defer that point later so as not Secretary WILBUR. I understood you. detain him? Mr. FISH. Is there any one in the Navy Department who can find Mr. EATON. I want to get clear in my mind the purpose of this definitely as to the attitude, and bring the information in when particular inquisition. appear here, as to the attitude of neutral nations in shipping The CHAIRMAN. There is one point I overlooked in my examina- unitions, in not shipping them to the Central Powers! tion, or rather in my suggestion, and that is on page 1823, at the foot Secretary WILBUR. I should think the State Department would be of the page, item No. 1: 2 one to furnish information on that subject. In the war of 1870 neither Germany nor France found It necessary to obtain Mr. FISH. You have discussed here at length this particular reso- implements of warfare from neutral nations, and the Act of January, 1922, which applies to the powers of It will be conceded that is historically incorrect. Doctor Temple President to apply an embargo in civil disturbances. suggested one of the debates in the Senate would cover that question. Do you think this resolution is going to interfere with the right Secretary WILBUR. We have made some research on that since this the President now existing to place that embargo? matter was here before, and that war was practically concluded in The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary has been asked that question at six weeks. The subsequent operations against Paris were more in three times. the nature of a surrounding of a civil city. There was some discus- Secretary WILBUR. Yes, sir, I think so. sion in the Congress here. We have it here in regard to supplies of The CHAIRMAN. And once this morning before you came in. The munitions and arms. I think those statements will pass muster is full and complete. historically. Mr. FISH. I have heard the answer once. Do you feel that it is The CHAIRMAN. You do not care to disturb it? concern of this country if foreign nations build their own muni- Secretary WILBUR. It might be elaborated several pages, but the plants? upshoot of it would be that so far as the effect goes of an embargo Secretary WILBUR. I'do not think I ought to answer that. It is on obtaining arms from neutrals I think that did not figure in the that if the Central and South American countries start up case. It is true that there was a discussion about the sale of arms munition plants it would make a very considerable change in accumulated during the Civil War to aliens who were apparently whole situation in the Western Hemisphere and I do not want to transferring them to France. into a discussion of that. The CHAIRMAN. The fact is, however. that the French Army was Mr. FISH. Of course. those countries can buy munitions from any largely equipped with munitions that were left over as the result of countries besides ourselves? our Civil War? Secretary Willbur. They have to have the money. Secretary WILBUR. The information I have leads me to believe that Mr. FISH. There is nothing under the law to stop them. is wholly incorrect. Secretary WILBUR. I do not believe I am going to help you on that The CHAIRMAN. That is all. I think you had better take some other line. Mr. COOPER. Mr. Secretary, the Burton resolution relates spe- Mr. FISH. I will not press it further except it covers No. 4 of this cifically and only to times when there is a war between foreign regard to the manufacture of arms and munitions. I am trying nations-lines 7 and 8 of the resolution. It relates not at all, I think develop these different numbered points, nine of them, that you you will admit, to cases of domestic violence in a country. And vet raised and some of them are rather misleading. that law of 1922, though totally irrelevant to the discussion of the Secretary WILBUR. I have heard you say that several times but I Burton resolution, was so quoted and referred to in your letter that not think they are. If they have misled you I am sorry. the letter misleads, does it not, anybody who reads it? Mr. FISH. They are misleading and that is why we feel strongly Secretary WILBUR. I do not think so. I have had lawyers before this letter of yours that has gone out to the public. I am not me for 20 years, and each lawyer seems unable to understand the to convince you. We have an honest difference of opinion. position of the other side, and sometimes I can not understand either I believe half of these articles you have enumerated here are lawyer. fair and convey the wrong impression, not that they are erro- Mr. COOPER. You were a judge on the bench? in fact but convey the wrong impression. As far as I am con- I am through asking questions. Secretary WILBUR. Twenty-one years. Mr. COOPER. Let me call your attention to the act of 1922. I do not take that for an answer. Secretary WILBUR. I have not answered you. 130 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 131 Mr. COOPER. The Burton resolution relates only to a time when abuse arising from the special nature of commerce in arms and the there is war between foreign nations. But this act of 1922 has noth- power to remedy the evil which might be arising therefrom." ing to do with wars between nations. It relates only to " conditions It gives him no power at all except in case of domestic violence in of domestic violence in certain American countries or in China." I American countries or in China, but that comment, to the average read from it 44 Whenever the President finds that in any American reader without the Burton resolution before him, would convey the country, or in any country in which the United States exercises extra- impression that that resolution took that power entirely away from territorial jurisdiction "-that means China-" conditions of domestic the President, would it not? violence exist, which are or may be promoted by the use of arms"- Secretary WILBUR. My impression is that the average reader would then he may prevent the exporting of arms to that country from the not read that sort of a letter. United States. Mr. COOPER. The people who are in Congress would read it and What has that to do with the Burton resolution? The Burton res- editors of great newspapers have read it. olution does not relate at all to conditions of domestic violence. 4 Secretary WILBUR. Certainly; we hope so. Now, I will ask you if it is not true that the only impression that Mr. COOPER. And they have commented upon it in the way I have any reader who did not have the Burton resolution before him could mentioned, and ridiculed this committee for doing what it has not get from reading your letter, would be that the Burton resolution , done at all. Let me call your attention to the last clause in this letter. undertook in some way to modify that law of 1922. Secretary WILBUR. I would like to have five minutes after questions Secretary WILBUR. I can not undertake to tell about the mental are over to make a statement. operation of other people, but as far as I know you are absolutely Mr. COOPER. Then after that discussion in the letter, which is not wrong. relevant at all, after the inference in the mistaken suggestion that Mr. COOPER. I am unable to understand how you stayed for 21 some powers would be taken from the President which he now has years on the bench if that is your interpretation of language as plain under the act of 1922, we come to this: as that. Finally. the very important principle of freedom of action by the Executive Secretary WILBUR. I will not try to explain that. to meet any condition arising in the future is sacrificed and the Government Mr. EATON. That does not come under the purview of this inquiry. becomes bound by legislative action permitting no initiative or discretion on the Mr. COOPER. That is the Burton resolution. part of the executive department of the Government. Secretary WILBUR. I concede that it deals with a different subject. That conveys the impression that the power of initiative and dis- There is no question about that. cretion of the Executive was removed entirely. or greatly limited, Mr. COOPER. You know as a good lawyer and a good judge that the although, as a matter of fact. the law of 1922 is neither referred to power of suggestion to many readers is a great thing, and if you nor affected in any way by the Burton resolution, and no power of begin to discuss something that is not included in the Burton reso- initiative is taken from the Executive or proposed to be taken from lution at all the impression on the reader is that it is included in the him. Is that true? Burton resolution, and therefore he is misled. Secretary WILBUR. No. Secretary WILBUR. That might happen. Mr. COOPER. We read it with this difference: You are a judge and Mr. COOPER. It would happen, of course. I am a Representative in Congress. Secretary WILBUR. This was directed to a Member of Congress Secretary WILBUR. I am not speaking as a judge; I am speaking who was supposed to read it with some care. of the practical effect. I think I have made it clear to the committee. Mr. COOPER. And it was published in newspapers and is now edi- Do you not think so, Mr. Moore? orially and otherwise commented upon very severely by way of Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I can understand your views fully. I am omment upon the action of this committee in doing a thing so foolish going to make a remark that you will not consider disrespectful: I when it did not do it at all. This committee did not report a reso- can perfectly understand how you as a practicing lawyer somewhere ution that modified the law of 1922, did it? might have prepared this brief to support one side of the case. As a Secretary WILBUR. I think we have exhausted that in what we matter of fact you did not prepare it, as you said frankly. It is in- ave already said. conceivable to me that as a judge you could have ever prepared that Mr. COOPER. Answer yes or no. We did not report a resolution paper as an opinion. hat related to the law of 1922 or in anywise modified it. Secretary WILBUR. I will answer you briefly, Mr. Moore. I think Secretary WILBUR. As a law, no: but as a practical thing. the difference between the committee and myself, if I may express it Mr. COOPER. Why was that put on the front page and so early in to Mr. Cooper as well as to others, has been in, shall I say, confusing our letter and commented on in this way: " This act, originating in legal questions with the practical effect of legislation. I do not think 898 and extended in 1922 "-the one I have just read, which relates we would disagree as to the legal effect of this legislation or the legal xelusively to cases of domestic violence in American countries or in effect of the law of 1922. The question is what would be the practical China, where we exercise extraterritorial power-" to cover extra- effect in the administration of the law and in our relations with erritoriality, particularly in China "-this is the comment-" gives other nations of the introduction into the international situation of ne President freedom of action in cases where there seems to be an a law of this kind. There would be no disagreement between us as to the interpretation of the language used. 132 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS 133 Mr. MOORE of Virginia. I quite understand that your view is very Mr. COOPER. I want to ask one more question of the Secretary as different from ours as to the practical consequences that might ensue, this is the last opportunity to examine him. This principle of inter- yet I can not help believing that you must have some sympathy with national law is set forth in your letter: the efforts of people here to enact some legislation-the very first A neutral government is bound to prevent the sending out of any armed legislation that has been proposed since the armistice-in the direc- vessel in Its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended for hostile tion of trying to reduce the possibility and horrors of war. We have operations against n. power with which It is at peace. not heard from your department or the War Department or any Now, England with her powerful navy has always strongly con- other department a suggestion of any legislation whatever that would tended for that proposition in international conferences. England carry out the hope-the fervent hope that was entertained particu- wants that and has stood by it vigorously, but can you point out any larly by those gentlemen sitting around the table who participated in difference in principle between the law of nations which now pro- that war and who know what it meant-that we should do something hibits the sending out of cannon and shot and shell on armed ships to bring about a more peaceful condition. I believe and I have be- from the harbors of our country to be used in war against a nation lieved all along, in spite of all you have said in expressing your views with which we are at peace, and the Burton resolution, which would of the possible practical effect of the passage of this resolution might stop the sending of rifles and powder and shot and shell on merchant have, that the time has arrived for us not to look at this situation in a vessels to be used for exactly the same purpose? Is not the Burton perfectly academic and abstract way but to go forward as a Nation resolution simply an attempt to extend the principle of long-estab- able to go forward, not controlled by fear or apprehension unduly lished law which I have just read? and do something in the way that we are all anxious to move. I Secretary WILBUR. Undoubtedly. believe you are sympathetic with that desire of the committee. Mr. COOPER. If it is simply extending that principle, how is it Secretary WILBUR. Absolutely. wrong in any way? How does it deprive any American citizens of Mr. MOORE of Virginia. And what I could wish is that you give any right? the benefit of the doubts to the committee and to Congress, if the Secretary WILBUR. You are taking me a little further in that di- Congress believes with this committee, rather than look at this matter rection than I want to go. I said undoubtedly to that recital of too entirely an old-fashioned and ar ademic manner. That is the principle. The questions of the rights of neutrals has been argued fault I find in the letter or the brief, whatever you call it. for hundreds of years and there are court decisions. I do not want Secretary WILBUR. Here is the situation: The Navy Department to go into them. You gentlemen are familiar with them. I cer- and officers of the Navy and of the Army are called upon always to tainly hope the committee will not get the impression that the Secre- neet practical situations, and the only reasons for asking the advice tary of the Navy is trying to impose his judgment upon this commit- the opinion of those two departments would be to advise Congress tee in a legislative matter. That is for the committee and for Con- reactions and effects of proposed legislation which may not readily gress. ccur to Members of Congress. This has been treated by the depart- as a problem to be answered to the Members of Congress who STATEMENT OF HON. THEODORE E. BURTON IN REVIEW OF ave asked the question. This committee has not directly asked a TESTIMONY IN HEARINGS ON H. J. RES. 183, TO PROHIBIT THE uestion about the matter. I confess entire sympathy with the views EXPORTATION OF ARMS, MUNITIONS, OR IMPLEMENTS OF WAR xpressed in this letter as to the probable effect upon international TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS elations and upon future wars. I do not want to go into the matter, we are having a number of these problems on our hands now. In the hearings upon this resolution, a great variety of interests Mr. COOPER. From the discussion that I have heard here in the have been represented, and prominent officials in the War and Navy ommittee, no one of its members is actuated in the support of this Departments have been called upon to express their views. The Burton resolution by any other thought than this, that for private objections to the resolution may be grouped under several classes: ndividuals or corporations in this country to make fortunes out of First. Those who emphasize the profits from domestic manufac- he manufacture of munitions of war used in fighting battles between ture of the articles, the exportation of which the resolution seeks to ations with which we are at peace is wrong morally, fundamentally forbid. rong. As Judge Moore said the other day, nothing could induce It certainly is the sentiment of the committee that this argument im to engage in a business of that kind and make money out of it. should not have weight. Our country can not afford to enjoy profits the United States of America, the most powerful of nations, from the manufacture of death-dealing implements, or promote an hould by adopting the Burton resolution put a stop to this traffic industrial or business interest which depends for its success upon thus in effect declare that it is morally wrong for us to help foreign wars. urder people with whom we are at peace, would not that have a Second. The cessation of shipments to belligerents in time of war remendous effect upon public opinion throughout the world? would very much hamper private manufacture of arms, and so forth; Secretary WILBUR. I do not really know. I appreciate what you manufacturers and dealers in this country, in order to have a suffi- and I never had any doubts about the motives of the committee. cient volume of business, must rely on the demands of foreign belligerents. 134 EXPORTATION OF ARMS TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS It is to be noted that the resolution places no restriction upon exportations in time of peace. Indeed, in case the popular opinion of the country should favor one belligerent as against another or favor the removal of all restrictions upon both belligerents, Congress might give its consent for the exportation of, the munitions and im- plements described in the measure. The answer to the argument set forth under the first heading applies here as well. It is unworthy of the United States that profits should be derived from the calami- ties of war. Third. A third argument is that if we should forbid the selling of arms, and so forth, to belligerents, neutral nations and, of course, belligerents as well would forbid the selling to us of necessary imple- ments of warfare, and thus we should be disabled in case of war. There is perhaps more plausibility in this argument than in either of the other two; but, in the first place, it is altogether im- probable that a neutral nation, in case we should adopt the prin- ciples embodied in this resolution, having military or naval supplies for sale, would refuse to sell to us. Again, our Nation is becoming more and more self-sufficient in all supplies which would be needed both in peace and in war. Still further, if regulations such as are provided in this resolution should be adopted by other countries as well-and it would be hoped that the adoption of this resolution would be an entering wedge for such course-war would become practically impossible. Of course, in time of war there are unusuál demands for food supplies from other countries. It was not thought best in this resolution to pro- hibit the exportation of food or articles used alike by the civil popu- lation as well as in the prosecution of war. Since this resolution was introduced nearly a year ago, great progress has been made looking toward peace, in which dur own country has taken a leading part. The multilateral pact for the renunciation of war, as an instrument of policy and declaring that the signers expected to resort to peaceful means for the settlement of their controversies was signed by a number of nations last August, and already practically 60 countries have, through their duly con- stituted authorities, expressed the purpose to agree upon the terms of this treaty. Newly framed treaties of conciliation and arbitration have been signed by the United States in large numbers, and a conference is contemplated at Washington in which practically all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere will join which gives great promise for the future. It may be said, without fear of contradiction, that there is an increasing sentiment, having its foundation in the moral and intel- lectual qualities of various peoples, for the outlawing of war. As the United States has taken a leading part in these great move- ments for peace, and it is especially desirable that the outlawry of war be made effective, there are added reasons for adopting the policy embodied in this resolution. I have no pride of opinion, and any other resolution or statute which may embody the same ideas would be entirely satisfactory to me. (Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon the committee adjourned to meet again at the call of the chairman.) TREATY PROVISIONS GOVERNING german MILITARY OBLIGATIONS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 1. Article I of the Treaty between the United States and Germany of August 25, 1921 reads as follows: "Germany undertakes to accord to the United States, and the United States shall have and enjoy, all the rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations or advantages speci- fied in the aforesaid Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States of July 2, 1921, including all the rights and advantages stipulated for the benefit of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles which the United States shall fully enjoy notwithstanding the fact that such Treaty has not been ratified by the United States." 2. Article II of this Treaty defines the obliga- tions referred to in Article I more specifically by stating that the rights and advantages stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles "for the benefit of the United States, which it is intended the United States shall have and enjoy, are those defined in ... Part V" (among other Parts). 3. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles is headed "Military, Naval and Air Clauses," and contains the articles which govern Germany's disarmament. The pre- amble to Part V reads as follows: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." Behalf PSF (2) Daniel Having taken part at various intervals during the past three years in discussions and negotiations bearing on a reduction and limitation in armaments, I an persuaded that there is no subject on which it is quite so difficult and yet 00 necessary and important to get general agreement. There 18, indeed, no problem that involves more intricate technical and political questions affecting national pride and ambition or national policy and security. Nations will not discard their arms or limit their sovereign right to arm unless, or until, they are convinced that it is safe and in their interest to do so. And yet, in spite of all the delays - due to the diffi- culties inherent in the problem itself and to the opposi- tion of those who do not believe in disarmament or who have a selfish interest in opposing it - progress has been made. The conviction is growing that it 18 a practical problem which can and must be solved. Such & vital issue will not down. The regulation of armaments by international agreement is a comperatively new question. There were, it is true, a few restricted agreements relating to armaments between two -2- two adjoining countries, such Be that between the United States and Canada, over a century ago based on a political understanding not to maintain naval forces on the Great Lakes, which has promoted benefits and confidence on both sides. But, for the first time in history, a reduction and limitation of armaments by general international agree- ment began to be a pressing and vital issue about fifteen years ago as a result of the World Tar which nearly wrecked civilization and from which the world has not yet recovered. Whereas in former times wars were fought out between the armed forces of the nations involved, modern warfare is fought by a whole nation and waged against helpless womon, children and non-combatants with a view of breaking down the morale of an enemy country, and inflicting every possible destruction upon the people as a whole. Out of the horrible experience of the World War there grew an overwhelming conviction that positive steps must be taken to prevent another such calamity and, since the policies which were expressed in the suicidal armaments race during the preceding decades had been a cause of that war, & new conception and policy regarding armaments were incorporated -3- as a fundamental part of the settlement at the Paris Peace Conference. #1th a view of preventing a future race in armaments it was then, in effect, agreed that armaments had ceased to be a question of purely national concern and that measures should be taken for their general limitation. Ae a first step in this direction the armaments of the defeated powers were reduced to a basie which would render aggression on their part impossible and would suffice only for the maintenance of internal order. As a further move looking towards multilateral disarmament, the victorious powers voluntarily assumed the unprecedented obligation to take steps to reduce their own armies and armaments to the lowest point consistent with national sofety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. For various reasons few of those contemplated steps for the reduction of land and air armaments have been taken. Nevertheless, they have been a subject of almost continuous study and negotiation, particularly during the past three years, in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. This Conference has not yet achieved the results hoped for -4- but it is the only agency that exists for securing or exhausting every possibility of agreement. Failure to make greater progress has been at times discouraging but it is a significant fact that the nations still desire to keep the Conference going and to avoid the alternative of its failure. And I may also say that one of the very important phases of the armaments question will be discussed in Geneva in the near future. The appropriate Commissions of the Disarmament Conference have been summoned to work out e. Treaty, to enter into effect with the least possible delay, which will provide for the treatment of the Manu- facture of and Traffic in Arms, Budgetary publicity, and the setting up of a. permanent central body to oversee the functioning of the Treaty. The American Delegation has presented a draft which it is hoped will form the basis of this treaty, and the attitude of the various powers, already expressed, justifies the hope that real accomplish- ment in this field may be expected. Let no one think that in dealing with the Manufacture of and Traffic in Arms, one is dealing with a secondary question. Indeed, I know -5- of no one problem, the solution of which would do so much to bring about a general agreement on disarmament, or which would so far alloviate the apprehensions of the various Powers with respect to each other. Although no agreements on air and land disarmament have been resched as yet at Geneva, very definite and far-reaching steps in naval disarmament were taken at the Washington Conference in 1922, when the five principal naval Powers agreed to reduce and limit battleships and aircraft carriers, and subsequently at the London Naval Conference in 1930, when Great Britain, Japan and the United States agreed to extend limitation to all other categories of naval craft. Disarmament, like most other problems, 18 a con- tinuous one, not susceptible of quick or permanent set- tlement. Naval disarmament, which had been settled for a period and largely quiescent since the conclusion of the London Treaty in 1930, once more necessarily became active in the course of last year because the provisions of that Treaty called for a. new conference in 1935 to frame a Treaty to replace and to carry out the purposes -6- of the existing one, following its automatic expiration at the end of 1936. To this end preliminary conversa- tions were held in London last nummer and autumn at the initiative of the British Government. These were formally adjourned on the 19th of last December and Japan's notification ten days later of her intention to terminate the Washington Treaty, brought to a conclusion the first phase of the renewed consideration of naval limitation. It would be a great mistake, however, to treat either of these two events as setting a definite period to all naval discussion. On the contrary, the London talks were specifically suspended "in order that the Delegates may resume personal contact with the Governments and the resulting situation can be fully analyzed and further considered". Moreover, the participating Governments agreed to keep in close touch with each other and with the other Governments parties to the London and Washington Treaties, with the hope that "the situation will so develop es to justify a subsequent meeting as soon as the opportune moment arrives in which case the British Government would again -7- again take the appropriate steps". Finally, the denunciation of the Washington Treaty, by formally reopen- ing the entire problem of naval limitation and of the basic principles and methods by which it had been achieved in the past, has greatly increased the actuality and 10- mediacy of the subject for each naval Power. While diplomatic exchanges and negotiations are thus for the time being in abeyance, the issues with which they have dealt and must again deal in the future are now in a state of intra-governmental consideration. 80 much 80 is this the case that I do not feel at liberty to discuss publicly the present situation in any detail. It is indeed the better part of responsible statemanship to avoid at this juncture any statements which might create ill-will or sisunderstanding and thus affect ultimate agreement. AB you will realize, it 1s not merely or even primarily, a technical naval question which 10 now involved; for while each of the Governments concerned is now con- sidering the questions raised with regard to naval limitation, they are also in the process of examining and formulating policies and principles which have a -8- vital, bearing on that whole complex problem commonly known 08 the "Far Eastern problem". And I may here point out that, while the United States has important interests and treaty rights in the Pacific and the Far Sast, the 00-called Far Eastern problem is not an American-Jepanese problem. Neither is it an Anglo-Japanese, a Franco- Japanese, B. Russo-Japanese, or a Sino-Japanese problem. It is not an exclusive but a common problem of all the nations with possessions and treaty rights in that area and it is in the interests of such nations to cooperate in the most friendly and constructive way. My hope and belief is that a solution through cooperation and common agreement can and will be ultimately found, but, for the present 1 feel that I must confine my remarks to a rather general analysis of recent developments and of the basic policy of the United States. Although last year's conversations, as I have stated, were initiated under the London Naval Treaty and remained largely circumscribed by its provisions during the first stage, lasting from the middle of June until the end of July, they became broadened in scope after their -9- resumption in October, 86 a result of suggestions and proposals submitted by the Japanese Delegation (which then actively participated for the first time) covering the entire field of naval limitation as embodied not only in the London Treaty but also in that of Washington. The result was that every aspect of the neval problem was fully and frankly considered. It was not, however, the curpose of these preliminary conversations to reach definite conclusions. The talks had no purpose other than to explore and prepare the ground for future negotiation and agreement. Moreover, while the French and Italian Governments, as parties to the Washington Treaty and signatories to that of London, were kept currently informed of developments, they did not actively join in the conversations but would, of course, become full participants in any later negotiations intended to reach final solutions. It would be idle to maintain that important dif- ferences of opinion did not develop in the course of the talks or that it was possible to reconcile all of them. I can sssure you, nevertheless, that the frequent rumors -10- of sharp cleshes and frayed nerves were idle speculation. I have attended many an international discussion during the past few years and none was more amicable than that from which I have just returned. A11 three participating Governments were in secord in advocating continued navel limitation by international treaty; all three recognized the need for bringing about as large a reduction in total tonnages as could be agreed upon; each one was profoundly aware of the dangers involved in arms competition and anxious to avoid a recurrence of a naval race. They were at variance, however, as to the methods of achieving this common end, partly as a result of divergent views on fundamental principles. Questions of principle, indeed, were at all times in the forefront, and technical problems, to the extent that they arose at all, were always sub- ordinate. Then I consider the long and futile wrangling over purely technical questions, which often occurred at the Disarmament Conference at Geneve largely because of failure boldly to face an underlying conflict of theory, I find, in looking back on the recent London talks, that perhaps one of their most valuable aspects was the frank -11- and realistic manner in which the Delegates recognized the importance of tackling at once the basic difficulties of principle and policy. There was a general absence of haggling over points of detail and a continued facing, of rock bottom issues. The dominant issue involved was that of "equality of security" versus "equality of armaments". I have already analyzed this question in a speech which I made in London on December 6th, but it may not be amiss for me briefly to take it up again since it is the crux of the naval problem. I should like to state with all the emphasis of which I am capable, that I regard, and I know the President regards, equality of security as the fundamental sovereign right of each power. If erms equality were the only means of making that right effective, I would be the first to advocate it. It is evident, however, that equality of navel armament not only fails to give equal security, but it 1s, on the contrary, utterly incompatible with equal security. Á moment's consideration of the widely varying defensive needs of individual nations due to such factors as geographical -12- location, coast lines, distribution of outlying territory, commerce on the sea, combined strength of land, sea, and air forces, et cetera, makes this clear. It is just because equal security was the guiding concept underlying the pro- ceedings of the Washington Conference that the latter was a success and that it was able to achieve not only limita- tion but also a drastic reduction of naval armaments. Although the word "ratio" is not mentioned in either the Washington or London navel treaties, the relative naval strength fixed by the Washington Treaty for the United States, Great Britain and Japan resulted in a ratio of 5-5-3 or 10-10-6. The significance of this has been some- what misunderstood. It has been erroneously considered by some to sean or to imply a different degree of national prestige or novereign right, whereas it means nothing of the kind. AB a matter of fact, military power consists of a navy, on army and an air force, and the combined strength of Japan in these three branches of arms 1s greater than that of the United States, yet even so, I do not consider that this affects the national prestige of America. The simple truth is that at the Washington Conference -13- it was recognized by all that much harm and no good could come from the naval race which was then in progress, that the only way to stop it was to stop it where it was, and that to do 80, it was necessary to settle certain political questions which were the underlying cause, and to readjust and fix naval strength on a basis which would give mutual confidence and security. On such a basis the United States, which had a potential lead in the race which would shortly have given it naval primacy, willingly agreed to give up its dominant position and to reduce and limit its navy in the interest of peace and cooperation. It was recognized that while there was a difference in total naval strength or tonnage, which was due in the first instance to the difference in actual needs, each power was entitled to equal security, and it was at the time admitted by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Japan that the naval treaty, together with the other agreements made, established equal security. Once there had been established a definite squilibrium through mutual agreement providing all-around security, any further proportionate reduction in armaments could not -14- disturb this balance but, on the contrary, tended to increase the sense of security of each country in equal measure. Thus it was only on the foundation of the equal security created at Washington in 1922 that a further limitation and reduction of naval armaments could be achieved at London in 1930. On the name basis, the proposals which I recently made at London on behalf of the United States, for a substantial all-around reduction in naval armaments in such manner as not to change the relative strength of the nations concerned, could in no sense jeopardize the security of any one of these states. In all my long association with the disermament problem, I have been able to discover no alternative method of arms reduction which does not alter the delicate equilibrium on which equal security rests. In using the term "equilibrium". I am not thinking exclusively or even primarily of relative strengths in armament. The balance which was established at the Washington Conference was not in the first instance one of naval tonnage. The work of the Conference was an in- tegrated whole which had as its purpose, and which in -15- fact accomplished, a political appeasement through removing the causes for suspicion and aggression by setting up a collective system of cooperation for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and the Far East and for mutually beneficial economic development in the Far East. On this foundation of security in the policial, economic and psychological spheres was built the navel agreement which offers to each security, also, in the sphere of naval armaments. I have dealt thus far only with the main principle at issue, that of equal security versus equal armaments; a secondary one is that relating to aggressive weapons. The idea has been advanced that aggression can be prevented solely by abolishing so-called aggressive weapons. That 1s a fallacy. In land warfare certain armaments are used almost exclusively for initial attack and invasion but in naval warfare it is not possible to make such & distinction between offensive and defensive armaments. In fact, in case of war, any naval vessel may become aggremsive as well as defensive once it gets beyond the three mile limit. Even agreements between the most heavily armed Powers not to attack one another are not sufficient, however, to prevent aggression, ÀS experience her proven, peace is disturbed less often by the attack of one strong nation upart another strong nation than by the attack of a strong nation upon a work and help- less one. It is an obvious fact that the United States has no torritorial ambitions anyshere. If we had had any other design in the Fur East we would not have agreed to surrender naval predominance and to with- draw from the Philippines and Ke would not have entered In 1922 into the Naval Treaty by which ve agreed not to increase our fortifications In that area. The aim to which the United States Is dedicated is to be a good neighbor, respecting the rights of all nations both weak end strong, and to cooperate 1n the pro- motion of world peace and progress. No other country need foor any serious disagreement with us unless it disregards the rights or obligations of treaties to which we are & party. AS -17- As a result of my official service in the cause of disarmment, I as vinced that the method of the Washington Conference is the prototype for every effective effort to solve the armaments problem, whether on the sea, on land, or in the air. I do not imply that the reduction of armasents is not in itself & vital factor in promoting end strengthening peace. From the beginning of the international disarmament movement, the United States Government, irrespective of the party in power, has been a consistent advocate of the thesis that the limitation of armaents, fol- lowed by their proportionate reduction, generates a sense of security and fosters mutual trust and friend- ship. The primary purpose and advantage of dis- armement is to increase donfidence and security and to put & curb on aggression. The effect is more peace, less taxation and more economic progress. Neverthe- less, it is equally true that, without & foundation of international cooperation to remove the causes and -18- and assist in the settlement of political and economic conflicts in an orderly way, no nation is willing to limit its arnaments, not to speak of reducing them. Political and economic instability is the nourishing ground of every armaments race. The meagre results to date of the General Dis- armasent Conference at Geneva can be traced directly to the international unsettlement that has held the nations of Europe in its grass during the past years. There has recently been manifest & definite trend toward finding to solution to the political problems of Europe through international collaboration, and during the past few weeks the tension on the continent has been eased, AS you -20 aware, to & considerable degree by a series of interrelated steps effected through a spirit of autual accomodation. And already there is a growing indication that the disarmement effort may well be resumed shortly with renewed determination and with greatly improved prospects as a result of this new stmosphere. Thus, we are witnessing a demonstration in a different -19- different part of the world and under vastly different circumstances, of the ossential truth so visely recognized and effectively applied st the Washington Conference, that there is no other path toward schieving the limitation and reduction of naval or other armaments than by the frank facing of the political and economic problems disturbing the relations and hence the security of States and by the mutual collaboration of all the countries involved. There is nothing essentially incapable of settlement by those means in the Far Eastern situation. I an happy to see this view reciprocated by the Japanese Foreign Minister, who in his speech before the Diet on January 23 stated "there exists no question between the two countries which is in- trinsically difficult of amicable solution". All the greater is the regret in this country that the Japanese Government should have considered It necessary or advisable to exercise its unouestion- able right to denounce the Washington Noval Treaty. The cooperation of Japan with the other great naval powers of the world is highly important to the -20- maintenance of peace. In fact, to strive through international cooperation to preserve peace and lessen the burden of armaments is in the interest of every power and a worthy mission for any power. The loss of so important & power as Japan from a general accord would naturally be deplared. But we should not be unduly disturbed by the present ap- parent deadlock. Any loose talk of an impending naval race cannot be sufficiently deplored. The fleets of the principal Naval Powers remain strictly limited by the present treaties;until January 1st, 1937. The London Treaty has, in fact, run only two- thirds of its course. If each people sincerely rules out of its consciousness all thought of aggression, and through its actions gives its partners in the treaty system convincing evidence of its pacific purposes, - then there is no reason why, during the period which remains, an accomodation which maintains and even strengthens the Selise of security of all cannot become an accomplished fact. PSF: Disarmament conference [march 15, The VICE ADMIRAL OSAMI NAGANO Vice Admiral Nagano is the Chief Japanese Naval Delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. He was Naval Attaché at Washington from 1920 to 1923 and during the Washington Conference was aide to the Naval Delegates. In 1930 he was Vice Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff and he is now attached to the General Staff. He 18 & descendant of a Samurai family and is now 52 years old. It is believed that one of the reasons for his selection as delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Confer- ence is his moral courage and reputation for speaking fearlessly. PSF:,Disarmament Conference mam PARIS This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated March 20, 1933 fore being communicate to anyone (A) Rec'd 3:10 pm Secretary of State Washington 101, March 20, 5 pm. My 98, March 18th. When Daladier received me this afternoon he said that he wanted to tall: over a little the situation in Geneva since the presentation of the MacDonald plan and the efforts of Aussolini as indicated in the project presented by the British Prime Minister at Rome. He said that affairs in Geneva had reached an im- passe in which Italy and Germany were together opposing all progress and that the MacDonald plan was an effort to save the situation; that it was based on elements from all the plans hitherto presented and thus contained certain ideas acceptable to each nation but that as it was presented without any previous consultation there was no possibility for France or any other nation to say without profound study exactly what it would mean in detail in the working out. He did not think even that the three days debate, schedule on the plan beginning Thursday at Geneva, would suffice for a proper apprecia- tion of it but he felt definitely that it could not be accepted man 2- #101 from Paris accepted in any way it was. I gathered that on the side of security he folt that progress at Geneva might have permitted a broader the subject. treatment of With respect to the disarma- ment provisions themselves it seemed to be his opinion that the rearmament of Germany thus permitted was not compensated for by sufficient guarantees or assurances to Franco. He likewise pointed out that in allowing Russia five hundred thousand men and Rumania and Poland rospectively one hundred and sifty thousand and two hundred thousand, accoptanc. by the two lattor powers was mad) impossible. Ho said that frankly he had preferred the mothod of roduction suggested in the Amorican plan presented present last year, namely, porcentage reductions on sequested basos. Ho then turned to the conversations in Roms, and said that tho proposal of Mussolini for a kind of pact of the four principal European powers while it negatived the principles at the base of the Loaque of Nations, namoly, oquality of nations and contained nothing now, novertheless, at the prosent moment had a valuable psychological effoct sinco it indicated cloarly that Mussolini had no intontion of tying himsolf up too closely with Gormany alono and ho added that ho folt ans chluss that tho foar of any possible succhluss with Austria playod mam 3- #101 from Paris playod a considerable part in this attitude. Ho folt that the four groat powers. however, would have to rockon with a now olemont in Europo, namely, the asso- ciation of groups of small powers such for examplo as tho rocont agrocmont among tho Little Entonte which soomed to be working vory woll at Goneva where thoir solidarity had boon romarked at the rocont meetings and such groups as the Scandinavian powers. Although ho did not toll mo himsolf I learned from an intimato friend of his that it was possible that Franco might malio the puggestion that (AND SECTIONS OFD, TWO AND THREE) MARRINER KLP CSB mam Report PARIS This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- fore being communicated Datod March 20, 1933 to anyone (a) Rec'd 5:10 pm Secretary of State Washington 444 welf 101, March 20, 5 pm (SECTION FOUR) instead of a Four Power agreement along the lines Mussolini suggested the agroement should provide for the four powers plus a representative of each of the associated groups and powers such as Scandinavia and the Little Entento and possibly two other powers to be chosen along the basis of the non-pormanont seats of the Loague of Nations. This idoa has 0.3 yet not been clarified or put into any dofinite form. The Primo Ministor roalizes that Franco at the present moment is in a difficult situation with tho ovidont hostility in Cormany, an unfriondly attitude in Italy, no strong backing in England and the difficulties with American public opinion engonderod by the debt question. He felt that this last question could be rogulatod and that samo progress had boon mado rocontly toward changing tho opinions of the Chamber but it was his opinion that France could not possibly risk another failure on this subject and it was necossary at presont to persuade tho Socialists to chango thoir votos in order to mako possible a succoss. He said that the question had (END SECTION FOUR) CSB MARRINER HSM Paris This tologram must b Dated March 20, 1933 closoly paraphrased before being communicated Rec'd 6:22 2. m. to anyone. (a). Secretary of State, Washington. 101, March 20, 5 p. m. (SECTION FIVE). unfortunately become a political issue and that the Right parties which would certainly, if in power, vote immediately for payment wore opposed to it when a Left Government was in power. He said that he had welcomed very much the kind initiative of President Roosevelt in talking with the French Ambassador and felt that patience was the only means to bring about the change which he most ardently desired. He inquired when Norman Davis would reach Paris and I told him probably in the early days of April. (END MESSAGE). MARRINER OX PSF: April 5, 1933 CONFIDENTIAL My dear Mr. Cumming, In accordance with the President's instruction, I am returning cablegram which was forwarded to the President this morning directing your attention to the notation written in pencil by the President on this dispatch, Number 130, approving the suggestion that the press release be given out only for Thursday morning papers. Yours sincerely, Louis McH. Howe Secretary to the President Hugh S. Cu ing, Jr. Acting Assistant to the Secretary Department of State "ashington, D. C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON April 5, 1933. Confidential My dear Mr. Howe: In accordance with the Secretary's instructions, I am enclosing for the information of the President copies of confidential telegrams, Nos. 130, April 5, 2 p.m.; 131, April 5, 3 p.m., and 132, April 5, 3 p.m., from Mr. Norman Davis. As the telegrams were transmitted in one of the department's most confidential codes, it would be appreciated if the telegrams could be returned to the department at the President's convenience. Sincerely yours, Hugh S. Cummy Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Acting Assistant to the Secretary. Enclosure: Telegrams. Hon. Louis McH. Howe, PSF; Conference DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Paris, April 12, 1933. CONFIDENTIAL My dear Mr. President: M. Laval sent me word that he would like very much to see me and would appreciate it if I would fix a time at which he could call. He said, however, that 1f I would prefer to call on him at his home 80 as to be sure of avoiding any publicity he would be glad to have me do that. I decided to do the latter. As you perhaps know, Laval has made a combination with Caillaux and some others and is now the leader of the so-called Center Bloc which puts him in a. rather strategic position when the time comes to form a National government. After considerable talk on disarmament, Laval let it be known that the principal reason for his wanting to see me was to explain why he had opposed and was still opposed to France making the December 15th payment, and to ask me to convey this to you. I accordingly asked Robert Pell, who acted as interpreter, to dictate a memorandum The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Washington. Devarmment Canf 23 - 2 - memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with this, which I transmit to you herewith. I learn from dispatches today to the Embassy from the State Department that it is decidedly preferable for M. Herriot to sail on the 19th as originally con- templated instead of moving it up a couple of days so as not to overlap too much with MacDonald's visit, which I can well understand. It seems that the French Govern- ment does not now see how it can undo the arrangements which have been announced partly because Herriot really wants to be there at the same time as MacDonald and they had some difficulty in keeping him from taking the same boat as MacDonald. Had I known in advance what your desires were with regard to Herriot's visit I could no doubt have arranged it so as to avoid this embarassment. With best wishes, I am, Faithfully yours, Enclosure. April 11, 1933. MEMORAN DUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN NORMAN H. DAVIS AND SENATOR PIERRE LAVAL, PARIS, APRIL 11? 1933. MR. PELL INTERPRE Upon Mr. Laval's invitation, Mr. Davis called at his home and reviewed informally and in some detail the status and possibilities of the disarmament negotiation. Towards the close of the conversation, Mr. Laval asked Mr. Davis whether he would object to a word or two with re- gard to debts. Mr. Davis replied that he had no objection to listening although he wished Mr. Laval to understand that he had no authority to discuss this subject. Mr. Laval then stated flatly that were the proposal to pay the installment on war debts due on December 15th to the United States to come before the Senate he would feel obliged to vote against payment. He proceeded to give his reasons and said he would appreciate it highly if Mr. Davis would convey his viewpoint to President Roosevelt. In the first place, Mr. Laval explained, that as the man who ne otiated the Hoover moratorium agreement with Secretary Mellon and Ambassador Edge in July 1931, he felt bound to state that this accord established once and for all a definite liason between debts and reparations. That was the sig- nificance of the terms "intergovernmental payments" which could have no other meaning. - 2 - It established the priority of reparations over debts. Mr. Laval reminded Mr. Davis that the crux of the negotia- tions from the French standpoint was his insistence on the payment of the unconditional portion of the amounts due from Germany into the Bank for International Settlements. This arrangement the American negotiators at first refused to accept and actually threatened on instructions from Washing- ton to break off negotiations 1f France maintained its view and publish a statement over the signature of President Hoover laying the blame for the world financial collapse at France's door. Despite the threat M. Laval held his ground. The American negotiators left to telephone Washington. That evening they returned to announce that the American Government conceded the French thesis that the continuity of unoonditional payments by Germany should be maintained. As a consequence, the American Government was a party to the agreement establishing the principle of priority of reparations. In October Mr. Laval went to the United States to confer with President Hoover. The purpose of his conversation was to determine what action should take place with regard to intergovernmental payments at the close of the moratorium year. The conversation dealt largely with the necessity of a further moratorium. The result was set forth in a communique which was accepted by both parties. Mr. Laval thereupon recited the essential paragraph of - 3 - "Insofar as intergovernmental obligations are concerned we recognize that prior to the expiration of the Hoover year of postponement some agreement regarding them may be necessary covering the period of business depression, as to the terms and conditions of which, the two governments make all reser- vations. The initiative in this matter should be taken at an early date by the European powers principally concerned within the framework of the agreements existing prior to July 1, 1931." The former Premier commenting on this paragraph observed that "intergovernmental obligations" meant reparations and war debts. It was therefore understood that some agreement with regard to war debts and reparations might be necessary. It was understood, moreover, that this agreement should cover the period of business depression, that is to say, it should be a moratorium. The term "may be necessary" was used instead of "must be made" because it was understood by both parties that according to the procedure outlined in the Young Plan the final decision had to be taken by the Experts' Committee and it was improper to prejudge their recommendation. In short, Mr. Laval left the United States confident that the Hoover Administration was morally obligated to extend the moratorium should the experts 80 rew mmend and charged with the task of inviting Germany to call the experts' meeting. As a consequence, immediately upon his return to Paris, M. Laval conferred with Ambas ador von Hoesch of Germany and suggested to him that his government should take the initiative leading to a further arrangement regarding intergousemental - 4 - After overcoming many difficulties it was finally agreed that the Committee should be created strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Young Plan. The Com- mittee met with representatives of all the interested powers present including an American and eventually concluded that in the year beginning July, 1932, Germany would be unable to transfer its conditional reparations payments. Evidently, therefore, it was necessary to hold a con- ference. The British Government proposed January, 1932. Mr. Laval was prepared to participate on that date but after discussing the program with M. Herriot, at that time leader of the Opposition, was obliged to bow to the latter's demand for postponement of the Conference until after the French elections. In June the Conference met at Lausanne and although M. Laval could not look with equanimity on the decision reached as the result of British pressure to terminate the Young Plan and Hague accords before an agreement had been reached with the United States in regard to debts, insofar as it provided for a moratorium 1t, fell within the terms of the Washington communique and was therefore a fulfillment of the European half of the understanding. It was conse- quently incumbent upon the American Government to fulfill its half of the moral agreement and extend the adjournment of debt payments beyond the time limit imposed by the Hoover - 5 - No further payment should be expected from France, according to M. Laval, until the United States agreed to this moratorium and he for one would vote against any proposal to pay the installment suspended on December 15th pending the negotiation of this moratorium. Replying, Mr. Davis pointed out that subsequent to the Premier's conversations in Washington the American Congress had repudiated President Hoover's policy and refused to agree to a moratorium. He remarked that assuming President Hoover had made a moral commitment, evidently Congress had refused to accept it - even before the Lausanne settlement. It would therefore be as unreasonable to insist now that the United States was bound by the Treaty of Versailles because President Wilson signed it. He also explained that American opinion resented the placing of debts in the same category as reparations. M. Laval reiterated that France owed the money and stressed that he was not claiming that the United States was obligated to cancel or reduce debts, but was solely com- mited to an extension of the moratorium. Mr. Davis told M. Laval finally that nothing could be gained by further arguing over a past occurrence as to which there was an honest difference of opinion and said that in his view it was distinctly to the interest of France to pay up. The failure of France to pay the December 15th installment had added to the intransigence of Congress and - 6 - made the task of the Roosevelt Administration which sincerely seeks a solution of the debt problem more difficult. M. Laval admitted that the action of Congress had inter- vened but said that in the event that its attitude was un- changed there would be nothing for France to do but go back of Lausanne and invite the Germans to return to a reconsider- ation of the whole problem. In any case, he sincerely re- gretted that the instrument of reparations which might have served a useful purpose in general negotiations with Germany had been abandoned and especially deplored that the surrender of the Young Plan had taken place without anadvance agreement with the United States. Throughout his conversation M. Laval underscored his belief in the necessity for an agreement between France and Germany in the political field and repeatedly stressed that the hub of his policy had been the idea of a ten-year Franco- German truce, a breathing spell, during which negotiations would take place for the settlement of problems such as that of the Polish Corridor and the education of public opinion to the idea of discussion and agreement between the two governments by means of the Franco-German economic committee which he founded during his visit with M. Briand to Berlin in September 1931. R.T.P. Conference DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Paris, April 13, 1933. Dear Mr. President: When I left home I promised to look into the pro- posed Four-Power Pact and report to you. I have not communicated about this sooner because it is not pos- sible to tell just what the Pact will be or what will become of it until the negotiations are concluded be- tween the four Powers. Furthermore, I wanted to get the German point of view. The four Powers have, of course, looked at the proposed Pact from different angles: In substance, the British look upon it as the best means to prevent Germany from rearming in case the Dis- armament Conference should break down and Germany should as a result thereof renounce the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that the other Powers had not carried out their obligation to disarm which they incurred when they disarmed Germany. They also think it would help to insure the success of the Dis- armament Conference and furnish a practical means for revising The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Washington. PSF: Disamment Coref- 26 - 2 - revising the Treaty of Versailles by composing some of the contentious questions; prevent the division of Europe into two armed camps or, in other words, prevent a balance between rival groupings of powers; and perhaps it would enable Great Britain to act as broker between the three other Powers and even between the four Powers and any other Power outside the Pact. As to Italy, my impression is that one of the chief motives of Mussolini was to counteract the recent agree- ment of the Little Entente; to facilitate the revision of the Treaty of Versailles; and to extricate himself from the embarrassment of having to decide whether to tie up with Germany or not. Apparently he became quite concerned about the rise of Hitlerism because of the agitation for the rearmament of Germany and also he feared that the Hitler brand of Facism would discredit the Italian brand. Un- doubtedly Mussolini very much wants peace but he is not doing anything to help promote peace in Yugoslavia where the enmity between the Croats and Serbs is creating a more dangerous situation than that between Germany and Poland over the Corridor. The French, and particularly Daladier, saw certain definite advantages for them in respect of security against Germany but they were suspicious because of the origin of the proposal and also because of the opposition of Poland and the Little Entente. They also feared that it was a - 3 - move to supplant the League. Notwithstanding this, Daladier was quite in favor of amending it in order to maintain the advantages and to eliminate the chief obstacles but he has not felt free to follow entirely his own judg- ment because of the active hostility of Herriot. I am sending to the Secretary of State a memorandum of a con- versation I had with Herriot on the subject. However, I am satisfied that on his visit to Washington Herriot will expound his theories to you and that you will get two very conflicting views from him and MacDonald. The Germans were willing to accept the Pact as originally proposed, primarily because of the implied promise of a treaty revision and of consideration of their colonial needs and also because it gave them a position of equality and prestige which they do not now enjoy. They no doubt felt that since England and Italy are favorable to revision France would thus be put in a minority and this would put Germany in a better position with regard to Poland. Baron von Neurath told me that while the pro- posal was satisfactory to them in its original form he doubted very much if Germany would accept it after France gets through amending it. The strongest argument which Herriot makes against the Pact is that these Four Powers would set themselves up as a hierarchy to impose their will upon Europe and that it would merely be a repetition in effect of some- thing - 4 - thing like the Holy Alliance to which our countermove was the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. In other words, it would be going counter to the democratic principle of equality as between nations or the basis upon which the League of Nations was founded. My own judgment is that there is not so much danger in this as Herriot seems to think and I suspect that his hostility is influenced some- what by his pique against MacDonald and Mussolini. Such a Pact would, of course, be susceptible of de- generating into a hierarchy and into a united front against other nations including ourselves. On the other hand, I do feel that it would be possible to avoid such a danger and that there would be a considerable advantage in an agreement between those four Powers to prevent war in Europe. The British told me they hoped there would be some way in which the United States could associate itself with the four Powers even though we would be unwilling to commit ourselves to the extent that the others might do. I told them I did not know 1f this would be practicable; that while the United States has a vital interest in the maintenance of peace in any part of the world and would wish to cooperate to the extent that it could for promoting peace and composing controversies which threaten peace, there is an inherent opposition to giving guarantees to maintain peace or to take specific action against Powers which - 5 - which break the peace. We can, and should, in my opinion, cooperate with the four Powers in dealing with questions which would facilitate a general agreement on disarmament, economic recovery and the promotion of peace, but not go so far as to assume any positive commitments as to our policy or action in unpre- dictable future contingencies. While I have endeavored to give my views on the pro- posed Four-Power Pact, it is becoming increasingly probable either that it will not materialize or that it will be so modified that consideration of its present terms would be a waste of time. M. Daladier has sent me word that next week he would like very much to have some extensive talks on disarmament. I am just a little afraid that Daladier will be somewhat hesitant about taking final decisions on disarmament while Herriot 1s away since the latter 1s the leader of the Radical Socialist Party, but I hope that Herriot's absence will not delay us very much in this respect. It would be most helpful for you to impress upon Herriot the f act that the people want disarmament and are getting tired of the delay and of the technical objections offered as an ex- cuse for inaction. I suggest that it would be well for you also to let him know that while we are prepared to cooperate in every reasonable way to get a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments through an agreement - 6 - for a controlled disarmament and thus to avoid disaster in Europe, we could not be expected to continue our efforts indefinitely unless there 1s some more encouraging evidence that Europe wants peace and 1s prepared to remove some of the chief obstacles to peace. I may say that I had never known M. Daladier before but I am most favorably impressed by him. He 18 not so well informed or educated as Herriot but he is able, direct and level headed. MacDonald, who has seen more of him than I have, thinks he 1s the most satisfactory Frenchman to deal with he has ever known and considers him as more practical than Herriot. With best wishes, I am, Very sincerely yours, P.S. I am enclosing a copy of this letter so that you may, if you wish, send it to the Secretary of State. PSF: Disarmament Conference the e Paris, April 13, 1933. Dear Mr. President: When I left home I promised to look into the pro- posed Four-Power Pact and report to you. I have not communicated about this sooner because it is not pos- sible to tell just what the Pact will be or what will become of it until the negotiations are concluded be- tween the four Powers. Furthermore, I wanted to get the German point of view. The four Powers have, of course, looked at the proposed Pact from different angles: In substance, the British look upon it as the best means to prevent Germany from rearming in case the Dis- armament Conference should break down and Germany should as a result thereof renounce the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles on the ground that the other Powers had not carried out their obligation to disarm which they incurred when they disarmed Germany. They also think it would help to insure the success of the Dis- armament Conference and furnish a practical means for revising The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Tashington. - 2 - revising the Treaty of Versailles by composing some of the contentious questions; prevent the division of Europe into two armed camps or, in other words, prevent a balance between rival groupings of powers; and perhaps it would enable Great Britain to act as broker between the three other Powers and even between the four Powers and any other Power outside the Pact. As to Italy, my impression is that one of the chief motives of Mussolini was to counteract the recent agree- ment of the Little Entente; to facilitate the revision of the Treaty of Versailles; and to extricate himself from the embarrassment of having to decide whether to tie up with Germany or not. Apparently he became quite concerned about the rise of Hitlerism because of the agitation for the rearmament of Germany and also he feared that the Hitler brand of Facism would discredit the Italian brand. Un- doubtedly Mussolini very much wants peace but he is not doing anything to help promote peace in Yugoslavia where the enmity between the Croats and Serbs 1s creating a more dangerous situation than that between Germany and Poland over the Corridor. The French, and particularly Daladier, saw certain definite advantages for them in respect of security against Germany but they were suspicious because of the origin of the proposal and also because of the opposition of Poland and the Little Entente. They also feared that it was a move - 3 - move to supplant the League. Notwithstanding this, Daladier was quite in favor of amending it in order to maintain the advantages and to eliminate the chief obstacles but he has not felt free to follow entirely his own judg- ment because of the active hostility of Herriot. I am sending to the Secretary of State e. memorandum of a con- versation I had with Herriot on the subject. However, I am satisfied that on his visit to Washington Herriot will expound his theories to you and that you will get two very conflicting views from him and MacDonald. The Germans were willing to accept the Pact as originally proposed, primarily because of the implied promise of a treaty revision and of consideration of their colonial needs and also because it gave them a position of equality and prestige which they do not now enjoy. They no doubt felt that since England and Italy are favorable to revision France would thus be put in a minority and this would put Germany in a better position with regard to Poland. Baron von Neurath told me that while the pro- posal was satisfactory to them in its original form he doubted very much if Germany would accept it after France gets through amending it. The strongest argument which Herriot makes against the Pact is that these Four Powers would set themselves up as a hierarchy to impose their will upon Europe and that it would merely be a repetition in effect of some- thing - 4 - thing like the Holy Alliance to which our countermove was the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. In other words, it would be going counter to the democratic principle of equality as between nations or the basis upon which the League of Nations was founded. My own judgment 10 that there is not so much danger in this as Herriot seems to think and I suspect that his hostility is influenced some- what by his pique against MacDonald and Mussolini. Such a Pact would, of course, be susceptible of de- generating into a hierarchy and into a united front against other nations including ourselves. On the other hand, I do feel that it would be possible to avoid such a danger and that there would be a considerable advantage in an agreement between those Four Powers to prevent war in Europe. The British told me they hoped there would be some way in which the United States could associate itself with the four Powers even though we would be unwilling to commit ourselves to the extent that the others might do. I told them I did not know if this would be practicable; that while the United States has a vital interest in the maintenance of peace in any part of the world and would wish to cooperate to the extent that it could for promoting peace and composing controversies which threaten peace, there 1s an inherent opposition to giving guarantees to maintain peace or to take specific action against Powers which - 5 - which break the peace. Te can, and should, in my opinion, cooperate with the four Powers in dealing with questions which would facilitate a general agreement on disarmament, economic recovery and the promotion of peace, but not go BO far as to assume any positive commitments as to our policy or action in unpre- dictable future contingencies. While I have endeavored to give my views on the pro- posed Four-Power Pact, it is becoming increasingly probable either that it will not materialize or that it will be so modified that consideration of its present terms would be a waste of timm. M. Daladier has sent me word that next week he would like very much to have some extensive talks on disarmament. I am just a little afraid that Daladier will be somewhat hesitant about taking final decisions on disarmament while Herriot 1s away since the latter is the leader of the Radical Socialist Party, but I hope that Herriot's absence will not delay us very much in this respect. It would be most helpful for you to impress upon Herriot the f act that the people want disarmament and are getting tired of the delay and of the technical objections offered as an ex- cuse for inaction. I suggest that it would be well for you also to let him know that while we are prepared to cooperate in every reasonable way to get a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments through an agreement for - 6 - for a controlled disarmament and thus to avoid disaster in Europe, we could not be expected to continue our efforts indefinitely unless there 1s some more encouraging evidence that Europe wants peace and 1s prepared to remove some of the chief obstacles to peace. I may say that I had never known M. Daladier before but I am most favorably impressed by him. He 1s not 80 well informed or educated as Herriot but he 1s able, direct and level headed. MacDonald, who has seen more of him than I have, thinks he is the most satisfactory Frenchman to deal with he has ever known and considers him as more practical than Herriot. With best wishes, I am, Very sincerely yours, P.S. I am enclosing a copy of this letter so that you may, 1f you wish, send it to the Secretary of State. (TRANSLATION) CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM The French Government appreciates fully the is- portance of the proposal initiated by the Chief of the Italian Government on the 18th of March. It recognizes the value that the closer cooperation of the four neighboring powers may have for peace and the fact that their character as permanent members of the Council confers upon them peculiar responsibilities toward the League of Nations and its members and those who have jointly signed the Locarno agreements. Having made the reinforcement of the peace of Europe the unalterable goal of its policy, the Government of the Republic is ready, in 8. spirit of well-disposed frankness, to as- sociate itself actively with every effort which it may legitimately be hoped will contribute effectively to this result. Such an effort must necessarily take place within the frame-work which the engagements assumed by the four powers have provided for their policies; the Locarno agreement; the pact of Paris; the declaration of non-recourse to force proposed by the declaration of December 11, 1932, and accepted by the political commission -3- commission of the Disarmament Conference on March 2nd; finally, and at the foundation of all engagements, the covenant of the League of Nations. If the strict observance of the covenant is a duty of all the members of the League, it is applicable with peculiar force to the powers who are permanent members of the Council; there can, therefore, be no question of those powers detracting in any way whatever from the methods or the procedures provided for by the charter of the League. The latter guarantees to all states that no deci- sion concerning them can be taken unless they accept it. There could not be any question of the four powers arriving at decisions which they might subsequently seek to impose upon others. There can only be question of arriving at decisions concerning themselves alone or of seeking in a general manner procedures, improvements, or more exact interpretations (precisions) concerning one or other article of the covenant for submission subsequently to the regular organs of the League of Nations. Pesides, there cannot be question of an arbitrary choice between articles. "he bond which unites them cannot be separated. Article 19 offers the legal means, exclusive of recourse to force, of adapting existing treaties -3- treaties to international situations, the maintenance of which may be demonstrated as imperilling the peace of the world. This article and these possibilities cannot be contested. But other principles which yield nothing to this one in importance are affirmed by other articles. For example, article 10 stipulates the ob- ligation of maintaining the territorial integrity of the members of the League against all external aggression; article 16 provides for measures of an economic and military nature against states which have recourse to war in violation of their engagements. If one should assign to the collaboration of the powers precise objects within the limite of the covenant, the care to assure the full efficacy of these articles should not be less em- phatically required than that of permitting an eventual application of article 19. The Government of the French Republic, moreover, cannot refrain from emphasizing that by insisting in general terms on the principle of revision there 18 risk of giving rise to hopes which it would be subsequently impossible to satisfy and to awaken fears, which, even if unjustified, would not fail to present an obstacle to the closer relations of nations. It does not believe especially that, at a moment when there is in progress in a part of Europe an evolution of minds and of in- stitution -4- stitution of which it is impossible to foresee the end, it is proper to attempt such an experiment. The Government of the Republic has given testimony by 1ts acts of its desire to see the success of the Disarmament Conference assured. The cooperation of the four powers should have as its first effect to reduce the opposition which has become manifest in their re- spective conceptions (views). The declaration of December 11, 1932, has provided for the concession to Germany of equality of rights in a regime assuring security to all nations: this declaration retains its full effect. The French Government is, moreover, happy to see that the Italian proposal 8.8 well as the British proposal recalls that equality of rights can only be realized by stages and in conformity with agreements which are to be arrived at looking to this end. It is proper to add that these successive stages can only be realized by a progressive disarmament to the exclusion of all rearmament. In presenting a draft convention which embodies a part of the principles included in other proposals, notably in the French proposal, and on which the general Commission has already expressed itself, the British Delegation -5- Delegation has furnished a practical basis for discus- sion which should permit the Conference to arrive at a result. The French Government will fully support the efforts which may be made to this end, reserving to itself, however, just as other governments have done and pursuant to the invitation itself of the British representatives at Geneva, the right to propose such amendments or modifications which appear to it to be indispensable. A policy of cooperation of the four powers would not be limited to questions which fall within the province of the League of Nations. It will apply naturally to all questions which are common to them; it should also lead to consultation on all questions of common interest to Europe, notably those which concern its economic re- covery and which are 80 pressing, it being understood that such a cooperation may not be directed against any state whatever, that it should not exclude any collabora- tion and that it should be coordinated with the efforts of this kind already attempted by the European Union. It is with the considerations which are given above in mind, that the Government of the Republic, on the basis of the proposals of the British and the Italian Governments -6- Governments, submite for their examination the draft agreement, the text of which is appended to this memo- randum. WE: RES: HWB: 88 DRAFT OF A PACT OF UNDERSTANDING AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY. (TRANSLATION) Conscious of the peouliar responsibilities which their permanent membership in the League of Nations Council im- poses upon them toward the League itself and its members, as well as of the responsibilities which result from their com- mon signature of the Lecarno Agreements; Convinced that the troubled state which reigns in the world oan be dissipated only by the strengthening of a soli- darity capable of reenforeing in European confidence in peace ; Faithful to the engagements which they have assumed un- der the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaties, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and recelling the Declaration of Non-Reoourse to Force, the principle of which was adopted on March 2, 1933 by the Political Commission of the Disarmament Conference: Anxious to give full effect to all the provisions of the Covenant by confirming to the methods and procedures which it sets up end which they are not disposed to impair; Recognizing the rights of each State which cannot be in- fringed without the consent of the interested Powers; Have agreed to the following provisions: Article 1. The High Contracting Parties will consult as to all ques- tions affecting them and will endeavor to apply mong themselves within the fremwork of the Covenant of the League of Nations a policy of effective collaboration with a view to the mainte- nance of peace. Article 2 - 2 - Article 2. The High Contracting Parties, bearing in mind the possi- ble application in Europe of the articles of the Covenant, and especially of Articles 10, 16 and 19, resolve to examine jointly, subject to the reservation that all decisions can only be made by the regular organs of the League of Nations, all proposals designed to give full effect to the methods and procedures provided in its articles. Article 3. Henewing,a far as concerns them , their common declaration of December 11, 1932, the High Contracting Parties regard the present British Draft Convention as a practical basis of dis- cussion which must permit the Disarmament Conference to elabo- rate as quickly as possible & convention which will insure a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments with pro- vision for its subsequent revision with a view to a now redue- tion. Germany, on her part, recognizes that equality of rights in a system providing security for all nations can only be realized in stages in conformity with Article 8 of the Covenant and in accordance with the agreements which will be concluded to this effect. Article 4. The High Contracting Parties affirm in a general sense their determination to consult on all questions of common in- terest in Europe, especially on all questions concerning the recovery of European economy, the regulation of which, without becoming the object of procedure before the League of Nations, can usefully be sought within the fremework of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Article 5. - 3 - Article 5. The present Agreement is concluded for a duration of ten years, beginning with the exchange of ratifications. If before the end of the eighth year, none of the High Contracting Par- ties has notified the others of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it will be regarded as renewed and will remain in force without time limit, the Contracting Parties in this case re- taining the power to terminate it by a denunciation with two years notice. Article 6. The present Agreement shall be ratified and the ratifica- tions thereof exchanged as soon as possible. It will be regis- tered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations in accord- ance with the provisions of the Covenant. ARDAVIS DISARMAMENT SECURITY CONSIDERATION. Disarm.conf. PSF MET Paris This telegram must be closey paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (b) Rec'd 5:52 a. m., 18th Secretary of State, Washington. 163, April 16, 8 P. m. CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY FROM NORMAN DAVIS. With r eference to our conversations in Washington relative to the so-called question of security, I have, after considerable thought and extensive discussions with my associates here, reached definite conclusions as to the position we should take but obviously I have not been able to consult with the delegates in the United States. As you are aware the primary obstacle to real progress in disarmament has been the inability to agree upon measures of security. For years France has in- sisted that she cannot afford to effect any substantial reduction in her armaments and thus diminish the secur- ity which her armaments now furnish without commitments from other powers, and particularly England and the United States, to assist her in case of attack. This we have definitely refused to consider and they now accept the fact that we will make mo such commitment. Accordingly thought in Europo has now evolved to the extent MET 2-#163 from Paris, Apr. 16, 8 p. m. extent of formulating a plan whereby, (a), the European states would agree upon measures for mutual assistance to a state in Europe which may be the victim of an aggressor and, (b), non-European states would undertake, One, to confer in the case of a violation or threat of violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact Two, to determine if possible in such con- sultation what state is the aggressor and, Three, in the event that an aggressor is found not to interfere with the collective action which the European states may elect to apply against the aggressor. In other words such an agreement for us would mean that we would merely (#) the implications of the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the precedents estab- lished under it. Aside from any contractual obliga- tion it is our moral duty and in our interests to confer with a view of preserving peace and if, as a result of an investigation of a breach of peace, we should concur in the judgment that a particular power has been the aggressor we could not without stultifying ourselves invoke the rights of neutrality so as to interfere with collective action which might be taken against such power by other nations. (END SECTION ONE) HPD MARRINER MET Paris This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (b) Rec'd 7:23 a. m., 18th Secretary of State, Washington. 163, April 16, 8 P. m. (SECTIONS TWO & THREE) In dealing with this question of security it is becoming increasingly evident that it is especially European or regional since the nations in Europe are primarily concerned and the nations outside deeply but less directly concerned. With regard to a violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in any part of the world outside Europe it is evident that no collective punitive action will be taken without the concurrence of the United States and in fact the others will wait for our lead. This as has been demonstrated is true whether or not we instigate or follow a decision of the Council of the League of Nations. Part one of the MacDonald disarmament plan was in- tended to cover tho security phase of the problem; it is so worded as to contain a specific obligation to confer but a rather indefinito commitment as to the purposes of such consultation and the action which might be determined upon as a result thereof. It is, however, loosely drafted and so indefinite in its implications as to lead to misunderstanding MET 2-#163 from Paris, Apr. 16, 8 P. m. (SECTIONS TWO & THREE) misunderstanding and greater risks than 1f we carefully restrict and define our obligations. Furthermore we do not believe the French will accept it. The French have always maintained that as far as they are concerned the measure of disarmament will be in direct ratio (*) the measure of security. It is thooretically possible, there- foro, towrite additional article of very restricted objectives ombodying only an agrooment to consult in the part doaling with socurity but the very limitod scope of the treaty W ould malco it totally inacceptable to Germany. Thus it would appoar to bo in our own interest to assist in bringing about a comprohensive (*) in which a treaty is possible for Continental Europe and which can bring a real moasure of appeasement. Especially is this truo if as I boliove the maximum obligation we would assumo would bo morely that of non-intorferenco in given cir- cumstances. might be In my opinion tho machinory which/ sot up for col- lective punitive action or for mutual assistance in the ovent of the outbroak of war in Europe would probably broak down if such punitive action should be dirocted Accinst any major power and the courageous course would be to lay moro emphasis on measures to pr event J - 3 - No. 163 from Paris, Apr. 16, 8 .m. SECTIONS T70 AND THREE provent war and particularly to incroase the power (weaken?) of dofence and weaden that of offense rather than to roly somuch on punitivo moasuros to be takon against a nation that starts a war. One of the principlos on which we are constantly insisting and which is daily gaining ground is that the bost security would be to diminish the power of attack and augmont tho power of dofonse. Thile tho soundness of this principlo is rocognizod those statos which are potontially weakor than thoir neighbors in industrial rosources and population claim that the adoption of tho principle must to accompaniod with strict supervision of tho no) gibors activitios and above all by 0 throat of collectivo action which would dotor the noighbor from *a violation of his obligations. Vo should, howover, rocognizo that if the European powers can got any comfort through sotting up the machinory for colloctive action limitod to the Continont thore is no sound roason why wo should stand in the way so long as we can cooporato without bocoming involved oursolvos and furthormoro diminish the probability of a European war or of our boing drawn into it. Fronch policy is, of courso, dictated primarily by foar of Gormeny. For yours thoy word persuaded that - 4 - in No. 163 from Paris, Apr. 16, 8 p.m. SECTIONS TX AND THREE that they could koop Germany down and dominato Europe by thoir own forco and that of their alliancos. For tho past yoar, howover, ospocially sinco thoir last elections, MARRINER HPD WSB (i.) Apparont omission MET Paris This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (B) Rec'd 7 a. m., 18th Secretary of State, Washington. 163, April 16, 8 p. m. (SECTION FOUR) their leaders have come to a realization that the French people are becoming restive under the burden of armaments and that neither their armaments nor their alliances give them adequate permanent security and that indeed they are becoming in (?) a source of resentment, uneasiness and political instability. Although still under the fear of Germany, a fear the more acute because of the war state of mind and the recent developments in that country, French leaders are casting about for 8. way to reduce their armaments, lessen the liabilities of their alliances by giving some appeasement to Germany and, at the same time, build up machinery for the organization of peace and for collective action if Germany runs amuck. Not the least of the difficulties of the French Government in this situ- ation is the problem of allaying the apprehensions of the French people. If they can tell them that effective steps have been taken for the organization of peace in Europe the French people may be satisfied that they can safely accept substantial measures of disarmament by progressive stages. To this end the policy which I am (END SECTION FO UR) WWC-WSB MARRINER MET Paris This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (b) Rec'd 8:25 a. m., 18th Secretary of State, Washington. 163, April 16, 8 p. m. (SECTION FIVE) suggesting will be a valuable contribution. I recognize that Artico 16 of the League Covenant purports to provide for collective punitive action where member states are involved in an act of aggression and that it might be urged that we should adopt the same policy of non-insistence upon neutral rights if any col- lective action is taken under Article 16 in parts of the world other than Continental Europe. This, however, is a theoretical rather than a practical objection to the pol- icy I have outlined. As I have suggested no collective action will be taken outside of Continental Europe unless we are in agreement. The crux of the question we have before us is the maintenance of European peace and it is (sincere?) only here that a really since effort is being made to provide for the organization of peace and collective action. As a practical matter I see no reason why we should not limit our undertaking to non-interference with collective action resulting from a Continental European agreement assuming, of course, that we concur as to the party (responsible?) responsibility MET 2-#163 from Paris, Apr. 16, 8 p. m. (SECTION FIVE) (responsible?) responsibility for the breach of the peace and at the same time retain complete freedom of action in any (END SECTION FIVE) KI.P-WWC MARRINER MET Paris This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyohe. (b) Rec'd 8:40 a. m., 18th Secretary of State, Washington. 163, April 16, 8 p. m. (SECTIONS SIX & SEVEN) situations arising elsewhere. I have not attempted to put our views in the form of a draft for a treaty but have set forth our ideas exten- sively in a separate cable, 164, April 16, 9 p. m., the questions really boil down to this. One, Assuming a general disarmament treaty which flan represents a substantial achievement are we prepared in connection therewith to agree to consult in case of a threat to the peace. Two. Assuming that in connection with such a dis- armament treaty the Continental European powers agree among themselves upon special measures for maintaining or guaranteeing peace in Continental Europe and for determining and taking collective action against a con- 1 tinental state responsible for a breach of peace (or of the Briand-Kellogg Pact) are we prepared to agree to refrain from any action, and to withhold protection from our citizens if engaged in action, which would tend to defeat the collective action which the European states may have decided upon; such a ction on our part to be MET 2-#163 from Paris, April 16, 8 P. m. (SECTIONS SIX & SEVEN) predicated upon our independent decision that the state in question has in fact been responsible for the breach of the peace. Since part one of the British plan regarding security will be the first question brought up in Geneva on the reconvening of the conference it is necessary for my guidance to know if the President and you concur in principle to the adoption of such a policy as that outlined and I shall appreciate as early a reply as possible. If you concur in such a general policy I feel that we should consider most carefully when and how it is best to make our position known, determining whether it should be announced at the appropriate time by the President or be held back and disclosed only in the course of our proceedings in such a way as to be used to the best advantage in our negotiations or whether to adopt a combination of both. In any case until definite procedure is decided upon it is important that the effect should not be weakened by premature disclosure. (END OF MESSAGE) CSB-WSB MARRINER PSF: me THE GENERAL Commission MET Paris This telegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated April 16, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (b) Rec'd 9:30 a. m., 18th. Secretary of State, Washington. 165, April 16, 10 P. m. FROM NORMAN DAVIS. In separate cables, numbers 163 and 164, I have made substantive recommendations regarding our policy in dis- armament matters. There remains the question of procedure. The General Commission will reconvene on April 25. At present no one sees exactly how the Conference can do constructive work immediately upon reconvening and there is very general apprehension that there mgy be a clash on matters of detail (#) the MacDonald plan which might lead to a rupture. The French have urged upon us the desirability of a postponement but are reluctant to make B. move in this direction because of the reaction this would have in Germany. As I reported, Neurath and Bulow both felt that the Hitler Government would be unprepared on April 25 to commit itself on fundamentals and stated that a few weeks' delay was desirable but in the uncertain situation in Germany it is impossible to predict what the German attitude might be a few weeks hence and it is important to keep in mind that they would undoubtedly oppose any MET 2-#165 from Paris, Apr. 16, 10 p.m. oppose any long delay and would probably withdraw from the Conference in the event of a postponement unless a definite date for reconvening in the relatively near future were fixed. MacDonald and Herriot's absence is an added reason for some delay particularly in the case of MacDonald ashis sponsorship of the plan makes his presence here to help push the work along most important. In the present delicate political situation it is particularly dangerous to attempt todo too many things at the same time. On April 25 and for a week or two there- after the attention of the world and the activities of the principal foreign offices will be directed mainly toward the discussions in Washington. A set back in the dis- armament work during this period would gravely prejudice the success of the economic work you will have in hand. To create a basis for successful work at Geneva and to use every effort toward the ultimate success of the Economic Conference I am convinced that it 1s essential to bring about a political appeasement between the European Powers. The recent French memorandum does not seem to me necessarily to close the door to agreement on some such basis as that proposed by Mussolini and MacDonald. If conversations on this subject should be held following the return of MacDonald and Herriot from Washington and are successful in finding REP 3-#165 from Paris, April 16,10p.m. finding any basis for agreement among the four powers it might then be desirable to broaden these conversations to include consideration of the disarmament problem with the United States and later perhaps to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Japan and Russia in so far as this question alone is concerned. Such conversations should pave the way for the Disarmament Conference to resume its work with some hope of success and the Economic Conference could then meet in an atmosphere which would tend to get the best results. To carry out this program it would mean that when the General Commission reconvenes on April 25 it should after a few sessions adjourn its work for a definite period, say three or four weeks. (Before adj urnment is proposed it would, of course, be necessary to secure the acquiescence of Germany and Italy as well as England and France.) Certain of the technical commissions could continue mans their work and thus avoid an adjournment of the Conference. The interval should then be employed for the conversations suggested above. If the President and you agree with the foregoing I would throw in my weight for an adjournment or if necessary even propose it if upon reconvening on the 25th there is any indication that the debates are likely to precipitate a REP 4-#165 from Paris, Apr. 16,10p.m. clash between the French and Germans. In the present state of political tension such a clash might terminate the disarmament work, create a situation which would prevent any political agreement between the western European powers and imperil the success of the Economic Conference. MARRINER CSB WSB (*) Apparent omission \PSF: Disamsment onforence april 19,1933 QUESTIONS FROM MR. DAVIS'S TELEGRAMS TO WHICH HE REQUESTS ANSWERS. 1. Assuming a general disarmament treaty which repre- sents a substantial achievement, are we prepared in connec- tion therewith to agree to consult in case of a threat to the peace? 2. Assuming that in connection with such 8. disarmement treaty the Continental European powers agree among themselves upon special measures for maintaining or guaranteeing peace in Continental Europe and for determining and taking collec- tive action against a continental state responsible for a breach of peace (or of the Briand-Kellogg Pact) are we pre- pared to agree to refrain from any action, and to withhold protection from our citizens if engaged in action, which would tend to defeat the collective action which the European states may have decided upon; such action on our part to be predicated upon our independent decision that the state in question has in fact been responsible for the breach of the peace? 3. Is it our policy to press for a regional treatment of disarmament along the lines suggested by Mr. Davis, with provisions for active disarmament limited in large measure to Europe and leaving the United States and Japan unbound? 4. Should Mr. Davis attempt to bring about an adjourn- ment of the Disarmament Conference after it meets on April 25 for a period of three or four weeks, in an endeavor to work out a political appeasement in Europe, leaving the technical com- missions to continue their work and thus avoid an adjournment of the conference? 5. If the President agrees with Mr. Davis's recommenda- tions, should our policy be announced at the appropriate time by the President in Washington or should it be held back and used as & bargaining point during the actual negotiations at Geneva? DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM. April 19, 1933. U Mr. Phillips: - At your suggestion I went up this morning to call on Mr. Stimson and discussed with him in con- siderable detail telegrams Nos. 163 and 164 from Norman Davis. Mr. Stimson was immensely interested and con- sidered that the Davis suggestions were a logical development of this Government's policy of the past few years. (1) He has from the beginning considered the General Disarmament Conference 8.8 in essense a European peace conference. Before it started he warnéd the European leaders that they should, 8.8 a preliminary step, settle the outstanding European questions. As this was not done, he has been fore- seeing a breakdown in the conference in some form or other. It has teken a crisis to convince Europe of the necessity of putting its own house in order. Germany, by threatening to bolt the conference and to repudiate the Treaty of Versailles, has precipitated an issue which sooner or later would have had to be faced. (2) DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS -2- (2) It is obvious that the United States could not enter into the discussion of how Europe should set its house in order. Political and territorial changes or the evolution of a strong peace machinery involve political considerations from which we must disassociate ourselves. The best we can do is to give Europe a. sympathetic and helpful understanding. (3) On the other hand, if Europe will make this effort, if Europe will set its house in order and build up B. machinery of security, we must not be the country to block it. The broadest conception of our policy is that at small risk we should encourage peace in Europe and view it as a. big national insurance. (4) Two of our wars have been fought on the issue of the maintenance of our neutral rights. If (under given circumstances) we can avoid similar dangers in the future, we stand to be the gainer. This point of view is susceptible of further development. Mr. Stimson, therefore, thoroughly agrees with the purpose of the Davis suggestion. He queries, however, whether there are not sufficient elements in it which would arouse political opposition to endanger the success of the treaty. In other words, is it necessary to tie up in contractual form the Davis suggestions? Mr. Stimson DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS -3- Mr. Stimson therefore wonders whether we could not obtain the desired results by making our contribution in the form of a declaration of the President. This would to a. large degree meet the preoccupation of Europe and yet would not be used as a political football in the Senate with possible adverse repercussions on any treaty which might be signed. It would also make certain beyond peradventure of doubt that we retained the final right of independent decision. He had tried to persuade President Hoover to issue such a. declaration but the latter had been unwilling. As far 8.8 a. consultative pact is concerned, he suggested that we look up two telegrams sent from Senator Swanson in Geneva last March to Senator Robinson suggesting that Congress take the initiative and authorize the President to consult with other nations under certain circumstances. P.M. WE:PM:VAS PSF: Disarmament Conference THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON April 20, 1933. Dear Mr. President: In accordance with your request that I keep you advised on disarmament matters, I beg to send you enclosed the draft disarmament conven- tion submitted to the Conference at Geneva by Prime Minister MacDonald on March 16th last. 2) A synopsis of the comments on the MacDonald plan by the Departments of State, War and Navy. 3) Copies of telegrams from our delegation in Geneva dated March 18th and 20th containing the French delegate's observations on the British plan. Faithfully yours, The President The White House. Leamun! Eng- 24 A SYNOPSIS OF THE COMMENTS ON THE MACDONALD PLAN AS GIVEN BY THE DELEGATION, AND BY THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, WAR AND NAVY AT WASHINGTON. PART II. DISARMAMENT. SECTION 1. EFFECTIVES. Articles 10, 11 and 12 and Section (c) of Article 13 appear incapable of application in the United States and should, in our opinion, be transferred to Chapter II of the plan, which contains specific provisions for the organiza- tion of land armed forces stationed in continental Europe. TABLE I. Inasmuch as this table relates only to continental Europe, the War Department considered it unnecessary to submit any views regarding the figures other than to state that it con- sidered the numerical limitations arrived at by the Hoover for- mula to be superior to the arbitrary figures used in the British proposal. The former, moreover, more adequately safeguarded the interests of the United States (exclusive of the National Guard, etc.). The Navy Department, moreover, believes that the primary method of limitation of naval forces (including air forces as- signed to the Navy) should be the limitation of materiel, which affords the only reasonable basis for the limitation of personnel. SECTION 2. The MacDonald proposal fixes the maximum limit for the caliber of mobile land guns for the future at 105 mms. (4.1 inches). Existing mobile land guns up to 155 mms. may be retained, but all replacement or new construction of guns shall be within the maximum limit of 105 mms. The War Department cannot agree to fixing the maximum caliber for future mobile land guns this low. The 155 mm. gun (that is 6.1 inches) is practically the only type we have in medium artillery for the field forces and is moreover best suited to our purposes. The MacDonald proposal continues that all mobile land guns above 155 mms. and all tanks above 16 tons shall be destroyed in two stages, - 2 -v two stages, one-third within twelve months of the coming into force of the convention, two-thirds within the coming into force of the convention. The War Department maintains that there should not in any treaty be an obligation to destroy materiel. It further considers that there should be no time limit for the conversion of heavy mobile artillery in view of the fact that to place them on fixed mounts will require large appropriations which might not be forthcoming within the required period. The purpose of any provisions for the abolition of materiel might, in the War Department's view, be strengthened by an additional agreement that pending a final disposal, such materiel should not be used in war for any prohibited purpose. This statement of the War Department is in contradiction to the speech delivered by the American Delegation on April 11, 1932, wherein we advanced the theory of increasing the power of defense by doing away with heavy mobile land artillery, heavy tanks, bombardment aviation, etc. We introduced a resolu- tion requesting "the Land Commission to draw up and submit to the General Commission a plan for scrapping tanks and mobile guns exceeding 155 mms. in caliber". The Delegation called attention to the fact that no measures of quantitative limitation of land materiel are found in the British proposal. In the absence of numerical limitation of guns and tanks and other materiel, there is always the danger that the chief result of the provisions adopted would be to start a new race in armaments within the maximum limitation allowed and thereby defeat the very purpose of the treaty, not only as regards reduction of armaments, but also reduction of financial burdens. THE NAVAL SECTION. This follows in large measure the provisions of the Draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission, which were approved by the Navy Department at the time, and also the terms of the proposal submitted by Mr. Norman Davis and Sir John Simon to the - 3 - the French and Italian Delegates on December 14, 1932, as offer- ing a fair basis for the solution of their naval difficulties. PART III. It is in the matter of air armaments that the greatest dif- ficulties are to be found. The Hoover proposal called for a simple undertaking as follows: "All bombing planes to be abolished. This will do away with the military possession of types of planes capable of at- tacks upon civil populations and should be coupled with the total prohibition of all bombardment from the air." The MacDonald plan represents a more complicated approach to the problem. Both War and Navy have concurred in their approval of the abolition of bombardment from the air provided it is universal and complete. They oppose the British reservation in Article 34, making ex- ceptions for police purposes in certain outlying regions on the ground that if any exceptions are allowed, numerous countries will insist on the retention of bombardment aviation and an organization for the exercise of bombardment. If it should prove impossible to delete the British exception, the War Depart- ment would like to add a further exception permitting bombing in defense of outlying possessions. Mr. MacDonald's plan aims ultimately at the complete abolition of military and naval aviation. General MacArthur has told us that he would favor this. The Navy Department is opposed, at any rate without such compensatory advantages as do not seem possible at the present time. They regard our superiority in naval air forces as our trump card and as the one factor which, to a certain degree, compensates for our inferiority in ships below the treaty limits. There are a number of technical objections to the MacDonald air articles, notably opposition to limitation by means of unladen weight, to the use of the expression "capable of use in war", etc. When - 4 - When it comes to the table for airplanes, however, the situation is more serious. In the first place, our Navy would like to see a division of airplanes into military and naval components, but 1f this is not possible, they would like to see, within a lump sum allowance of planes to each nation, a definite limitation upon the number of planes which a nation may assign for naval use, this number in the case of the principal navies to follow the ratio agreed upon as to tonnage. Both War and Navy object to the number of planes allotted the United States and claim that the total number of 500 is inadequate under present circum- stances for the Navy alone. In this section, the British have gone on the theory that as they have fallen behind in the aviation race, the other Powers should first reduce to their level and then all reduce correspondingly from that point, a thesis which they have been unwilling to consider in the case of navies. PART IV. CHEMICAL WARFARE. War and Navy Departments are agreeable, with minor exceptions, to Articles 47 to 51, inclusive, provided (a) it be understood that no set of impracticable conditions on retaliation in kind be agreed to, and (b) provided it be understood that Article 48 does not prohibit the use of tear gas for domestic police purposes. Both War and Navy Departments believe that Articles 52 and 54 should be omitted on the ground that a prohibition of prepara- tions for chemical warfare is unreal and meaningless, a contention agreed to by all experts, but still disputed by politicians. Article 53, however, they consider should be unconditionally rejected. MET Geneva This tolegram must be closely paraphrased be- Dated March 18, 1933 fore being communicated to anyone. (b) Rec'd 9:17 p. m. Sccretary of State, Washington. 579, March 18, 8 p. m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. No had a tallc with Massigli this afternoon who gave us his views on the British plan but warned us that ho had not consulted his government and that they were personal. He said that what struck them most about the plan was its unfairnoss in that the greatest concessions in land, soa and air were all being demanded of France while the proposers of the plan put in nothing whatover that was unaccoptable to the British thesis. Ho was also distressod at the fact that MacDonald had repoatedly asserted that he would not consont to the re-armamont of Germany and thon drow his plan that Gormany may build any number of tanks uo to sixtoen tons, any number of guns up to 105 and that part five of the Troaty of Vorsaillos was disposed of by the simplo expodient of Articlo 96 of the draft convention. In discuss ng matorial, Daladior told MacDonald that so long as he rotained French superior- MET 2-#579 from Geneva, Mar. 18, 8 p. m. could deal with Gormany during the noxt four years ovon if she frood herself from the Treaty of Versailles and this without asking help from any other country and that for that reason, unless something better was provided, he considered the retention of material in the interest of peace. He went on to say that the security given in part one was derisive, the control was inadequate; but that the thing that really distressed him was the thought that France was asked to destroy all her heavy guns within a period of five years without any compensating assurance that at the end of five years a new treaty could be nego- tiated; in other words, there remained the possibility that she would destroy the material which now gives her her margin of superiority over Germany with the possi bility that at the end of five years if the provisions wore not renewed she would start on an even footing with Gormany in building new material. He made an earnest plea for some arrangement by which this material could be maintained and if necessary the strictest sort of international super- vision in order that this means of pressure to induco Gor- many to enter a new treaty might not be lost. Ho pointed out that there was no limitation by numbers on pormitted matorial. Since this is the first time WO have evor hoard any Frenchman rogard such limitation as advan tageous it may be MET 3-#579 from Geneva, Mar. 18, 8 p.m. be worth remembering. He sai d that Daladier had been somewhat soothed by the Prime Ministor on Thursday morning when ho was givona ssurancos that the disagreeable factors in the treaty would bear equal ly upon all and that the re-arma- ment of Germany was not permitted. After concurring with the plan on Thursday might Massigli says Daladior returned to Paris greatly incensed. Just before loaving Genova MacDonald told Daladier that he would ondeavor, on his roturn from Rome, to stop Tuesday night in Paris inorder to confor with him. We believe that the French press has beon restrain- ed by the Government but Massigli expressed apprehension lost thore be an outburst which would aggravate feoling betwoen France and England which ho considors oxtromely dangorous at the prosont timo. Massigli is loaving for Paris tonight and will roturn Tuosday morning. There is to be a cabinot meeting on Monday to consider how the British proposal is to be handlod. As the Fronch Government was only to bogin its study of the plan yostorday he has no idoa as to (*) thoy proposo to doal with it in tho genoral discussion but said they would no doubt try to doal in a conciliatory way wi th MET 4-579 from Goneva, Mar.18, 8 p. m. with tho gonoral conception and deal with objectionable points through amondments in the hope of avoiding public dissonsion with the British. Massigli was tomporato and moasured in his stato- monts and soomod to be more troubled thon irritatod. - FW GIBSON (*) apparont omission. Honference THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON April 21, 1933. Dear Mr. President: There is one further thought in connection with disarmament which you may care to have before you, It deals with the limitation of expenditures and the enclosed memorandum covers three points in this con- nection. Faithfully yours, The President The White House. 1 4 April 21, 1933. The following are problems connected with dis- armament which have not been touched upon in recent discussions. 1. Limitation of expenditures. A great many powers have suggested that all nations make a certain percentage reduction in their military and naval budgets. This is known as an indirect limitation of armaments. It has been strongly opposed by this country for several reasons. (a) It is almost impossible to avoid disguising by budgetary juggling items which are in effect mili- tary or naval items, but which appear under other head- ings. (b) With respect to navies, it is not compatible with the maintenance of ratios and hence would freeze us in our present position of naval inferiority. (o) With regard to armies, it works disproportionate sacrifice on an organization which has already been reduced. to skeleton strength. PSF: Disarmament Comference DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA April 23, 1933. PERSONAL Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, -the Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. President: I am sorry to add to the many things with which you now have to deal but a matter of a some- what personal nature has arisen about which I feel I must write to you. I have been approached by the Chairmen of the Protective Committees for the investors in Inter- national Match Company and Kreuger and Toll to act in the nature of an arbiter on their behalf and, if possible, in collaboration with the Swedish Match Company to formulate a plan with a view of salvaging the maximum for the in- vestors of the three companies. During Kreuger's life the three companies were run more or less as a unit but are now pulling in different directions to the detriment of them all. It appears that the conflict of interests and of legal claims as between the three companies, if litigated, would dissipate the assets and that the only hope of avoiding this is for the three groups to agree upon some disinterested person or persons who would look into the whole problem and -2- propose a plan for united action pending a later determination as to the respective interests of the three companies in the common assets. I am informed that the securities of the International Match Company and Kreuger and Toll are held largely by investors in the United States and that the Pro- tective Committees which have been formed represent the in- vestors and not the bankers who sold the securities. As the task which I am asked to undertake would be constructive and of possible benefit to a large group of investors and would only consume a few months of time and also, incidentally, supplement my depleted income, I have come to the conclusion that I should accept provided it can wait until I have completed my present official work. It would be understood, of course, that I would not take on this work until I have terminated the disarmament work or at least until it has reached a point where my services are no longer needed. In order, however, to permit preliminary work to be done by others, mainly Price Waterhouse and Company, in assimilating facts which would serve as a basis for my con- clusions and proposals as arbiter, it is necessary, if I am to undertake it, to give an acceptance in principle subject to leaving for later determination the exact time when I can take on the work proposed. The first phase of my work over here will soon be terminated, namely that of reporting to you and the Secretary of State on the situation in Europe. In the next few weeks Bingham, Straus and other new appointees will be -3- arriving. While I shall do everything I can to give them the benefit of any knowledge or experience I may have I do not feel that it would be fair or agreeable to them or in the best interests of the conduct of our diplomatic service for me to stay on for any length of time in either London or Paris after their arrival. It would therefore seem that the most dignified course for me under the circumstances is to devote myself for the time required to the specific tasks relating to disarmament and the Organizing Committee of the Economic Conference and then to return to the United States. The work of the Organizing Committee will probably be terminated with the meeting to be held in London on the 29th of this month, or before you receive this letter. With regard to disarmament there are two alternative courses. The first is to press for prompt decisions, as soon as possible after the conclusion of your Washington conversations end the return of MacDonald and Herriot, and to try to find a basis of general agreement prior to the Economic Conference, namely within six or eight weeks. The only hope of doing this as I see it is to have meetings between the responsible heads of the four European Powers with ourselves and possibly one or two other countries represented. It is useless to carry on the Disarmament Con- ference discussions as in the past. It would be undignified for me as your representative to continue to sit around here well into the second year of a discussion of pure theory in disarmament -4- disarmament and I think the time will come in the near future when you can say something which would give the necessary stimulus to put over something worth while and at least to make it known that unless the principal European powers are prepared to come to grips on this problem, which is largely European, we would have to consider the nature of our future representation in the work. If the conversations indicated on the real substance of disarmament are not possible within the next few weeks it might be necessary as a second alternative to frankly face an adjournment until fter the Economic Con- ference because it is futile to discuss disarmament unless we have the attention and collaboration of the competent heads of Government here. On the other hand the idea is gaining ground here that a failure of the Disarmament Confer- ence would be disastrous to Europe; that it is necessary to reach a substantial accord before the Economic Conference; that nothing would BO endanger the success of the Economic Conference as a failure of disarmament; and that nothing would so promote the success of the former as that of the latter. In spite of and partly because of all the difficulties that exist I am still hopeful of real ac- complishment in disarmament and I am so deeply interested in it that I would not permit anything to intereferewith that until it is finished or so long as it seems possible to ac- complish anything. Furthermore, I want to assure you that -5- I wish to be of the utmost help at any time when you feel that I can render any real service to the country. How- ever, in Bo far as concerns disarmament, I see no reason why I can not get through with all that it is possible to do at this stage within the next two months. As regards the new personal task which I am asked to undertake I shall withhold formal acceptance until after you have received this letter which I calculate will be about May 3rd but in any event no announcement of it would be made until after I have terminated my official work. With warm personal regards and with apol- ogies for bothering you with a matter more or less personal, I am, Faithfully yours, NHD EH R DEPARTMENT OF STATE PSF: he THE UNDER SECRETÁRY w/p April 24, 1933. MEMORANDUM ON THE MACDONALD PLAN. From all indications that have reached us, the French are opposed to the MacDonald plan on several counts. a) It permits German re-armament to the extent of doubling the number of men allowed her and permitting her to supply herself without quantitative restriction with certain types of weapons. b) It leaves Germany free from armaments pro- visions of the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of the term of the MacDonald Treaty and thus faces France with the prospect of seeing Germany able to re- arm, starting from a more favorable basis than would be possible today. o) The security clauses of the MacDonald plan are vague and would not give France a precise picture of the commitments accepted by the other signatory powers. d) It gives Russia more men than Poland and Rumania combined, a provision unacceptable to France's allies. 2. Unless Germany obtains enough disarmament from France DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE UNDER SECRETARY 2 France she threatens to bolt the conference and declare that the Treaty of Versailles is null and void. However, in view of the definite warnings that Japan has given the conference that she desires an increase in armaments, it is clear that a universal treaty reducing armaments becomes a virtual impossibility. PSF: [1933] DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY Mr. MacDonald will undoubtedly discuss disarmament in its many phases. On Tuesday, April 25, the Disarmament Conference will reconvene and has agreed to use as a basis of discussion the MacDonald Plan. This plan, which is really a composite of previous suggestions, is designed as a short-term treaty, to consolidate the minimum agreement to which all parties can subscribe. As with all disarmament projects, it is divided into two parts: disarmament proper, and security. With regard to its technical features, it has met some stout criticism from our War and Navy Departments, particularly with reference to its provisions regarding artillery and aviation. The War Department is unwilling to reduce the size of mobile land guns below 155 mms. (6.1 inches), whereas the British Plan calls for the reduction of artillery to 105 mms. (4.1 inches). (Most other countries agree with us in this stand.) With regard to the aviation clauses: (a) we have always favored the complete abolition of bombardment from the air provided it is universal and complete. Mr. MacDonald desires an exception made in favor of outlying districts, such as the Indian Northwest frontier, where bombardment of native tribes can take the place of military expeditions. We have claimed that unless bombardment from the air is entirely and completely abolished without exceptions or conditions, nations will still desire to retain bombardment aviation and an organiza- tion for the possible exercise of bombardment. (b) Mr. MacDonald's Plan is based on additional limitation by means of unladen weight which our experts claim would be technically unsound and impracticable. (c) It is based on the lumping together of planes - 2 2 - - of planes for the Army and Navy and establishing one limit to include both. Our Services insist that there should be some means of subdividing military and naval planes and that the treaty ratios for tonnage should be preserved with respect to the limitation of naval planes. (d) Mr. MacDonald sug- gests that the Great Powers agree to parity in numbers and establishes a limit of 500 for the United States, France, Great Britain, Japan, etc. Great Britain is in effect demand- ing in the air that because she has fallen behind in the avia- tion race, the other Powers should first come down to her figures and then all reduce further,- a thesis which she has been entirely unwilling to accept in connection with navies. With respect to the security features, the MacDonald Plan is based on an agreement of the High Contracting Parties to consult in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This is in accordance with the terms of the Democratic platform which calls for "a firm foreign policy including: ***** the Pact of Paris abolishing war as an instrument of national policy, to be made effective by provisions for consultation and conference in case of threatened violation of treaties". Unfortunately, the article then goes on to define what shall be the duties of the conferees, which are twofold: (a) to agree upon the steps which could be taken in respect of such threat, and (b) in the event of a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact being found to have occurred, to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible. Even these provisions for security have seemed to the French Delegation as completely insufficient. This brings up the whole conception of security as the Frenchman visualizes it. He demands a machinery of peace on the continent for setting up collective action against any violator - 3 - violator of the treaties from and hence disturbance of the status quo. The basic idea behind all French schemes is to make war too much of a risk for any aggressor. To make such collective action effective, British collaboration is essen- tial and French policy has for its constant aim the idea of committing Great Britain to help in the maintenance of the continental order. In the last analysis, France is far more interested in pledges from Great Britain than she is in pledges from the United States. Great Britain, however, is unwilling to make any more commitments on the continent of Europe than she has made to date through the Locarno treaties. She has interpreted the League Covenant as an indefinite obligation rather than a strict contractual undertaking. Her refusal to give France further security pledges is partly due to the natural disinclination of her people to assume any additional risks, but in large measure it is due to a fear that it might complicate relations with the United States, particularly in the matter of neutral rights. Thus French and British interests with respect to any commitments we might make on the political clauses of & treaty resolve themselves more into terms of our views with respect to a League blockade and to neutral rights than they do to affirmative action on our part. Thus the whole problem of disarmament and security resolves itself into a vicious circle which can only be broken by Great Britain and the United States modifying to some extent their position of disinterestedness on the political clauses. Even this, however, is only a first hurdle, as in her present state of opinion, Japan would hardly accept any provisions for real disarmament and it would be virtually impossible for us to bind ourselves while Japan remained free. The only solution would seem to be the creation of regional agreements of the type suggested - 4 - suggested by Mr. Norman Davis and involving the idea of three e. concentric circles, the first for continental Europe with strict disarmament and pledges of mutual aid and collective action; the second covering all European countries, 1.e., the continental countries plus Great Britain and Russia, and the third, the entire world. (See Mr. Davis' telegrams from Paris, No. 163 and 164, April 16.) An article reading as follows might be inserted in Part I of the MacDonald Plan following Article V: Article V(a) The high Contracting Parties agree that the ag- gressor in an international conflict shall be considered that State which is the first to take any of the follow- ing actions: (a) Declaration of war against another State; (b) the invasion by its armed forces of the terri- tory of another State without declaration of war; (c) bombarding the territory of another State by its land, naval or air forces, or knowingly attacking the naval or air forces of another State; (d) the landing in or introduction within the frontiers of another State of land, naval or air forces without the permission of the government of such a State, or the infringement of the conditions of such per- mission, particularly as regards the duration of so- journ or extension of area; (e) the establishment of a naval blockade of the coast or ports of another State. These criteria of aggression shall, however, be re- garded as inapplicable in those instances in which the acts listed in clauses (a) to (e) above are taken against a State which has been found, --in accordance with the procedure set forth in Articles (supervision and control), to have exceeded the armament levels set forth in the present convention." reconference DECLARATION BY THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN POWERS. The undersigned delegates, representing respectively the following European Governments participating in the General Disarmament Conference, solemnly reaffirm the obligations they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments, and, provided these obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory powers, individually agree that for a period of not less than ten years no armed force of whatever nature shall cross their froitiers with hostile intent.