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OCR Page 1 of 2DIARY
Book 438
September 4 - 6, 1941
Regraded I Inclassified
- C -
Book Page
China
See War Conditions
Coe, V. Frank
See War Conditions: United Kingdom
- D - -
Defense Savings Bonds
See Financing, Government
- F -
Financing, Government
Federal Reserve discount rates during war and
immediate post-war period: Digest of policy
letters on (Hase memorandum) - 9/5/41
138
280
Defense Savings Bonds:
Treasury Employees: Record of pledges and
purchases - 9/5/41
300
New York State: Memorandum on organization
by Duncan, of John Price Jones Corporation,
done at Patterson's request - 9/5/41
304
Field Organization News Letter, No. 16 -
9/6/41
393
- G -
Gold
See War Conditions: Gold; U.S.S.R.
Groseman, Mark
Possibility of judgeship in Cleveland discussed
by HMJr and Biddle at instigation of
Henry III - 9/4/41
89
- L -
(von) Lewinski, Emma
See War Conditions: Foreign Funds Control
x . ,
Medallione
See War Conditions: Gold
Regraded Unclassified
- o -
Book Page
Odlum, Floyd B.
See Office of Production Management
Office of Production Management
Division of Contract Distribution established
with Floyd B. Odlum as director - 9/4/41...
438 164
-P- - -
Poland
See War Conditions: Lend-Lease
- R - -
Revenue Revision
Tax Amortisation Legislation:
White House conference; present: Judge Rosenman,
Cohen, Rowe, Gladeox, Crane, Coy, Cox,
Greenbaum, Schieffelin, Hensel, Kyle, Sullivan,
and Eichhols - 9/4/41
1
Second White House conference - 9/5/41
199
- S -
Switzerland
See War Conditions: Foreign Funds Control
- T -
Taxation
See Revenue Revision
- U - -
U.S.S.R.
See War Conditions
United Kingdom
See War Conditions: Military Planning: United Kingdom
- W -
War Conditions
Airplanes:
Shipments to the British, by air and sea - Kamarck
report - 9/4/41
156
- W - (Continued)
Book Page
Var Conditions (Continued)
China:
Fox gives over-all picture of Stabilization
Board operations to date - 9/4/41
438
171
Stabilization and Exchange Control: Conference
of representatives of Treasury, State,
together with Phillips, Niemeyer, Stopford,
and Ritchie - 9/5/41
208,209
Treasury instructions - 9/6/41
410,412,420
Exchange market resume' - 9/4/41, etc
177,347,437
Foreign Funds Control:
von Lewinski, Emma (wife of former German
Consul General in New York City): Separated
from service in spite of references from
Chief Justice Stone and Senators Barkley,
Adams, and Wagner - 9/4/41
141
Switzerland: Effect of blocking of European
credits in United States on working of gold
standard in Switzerland - 9/5/41
338
Gold:
Navy thanked for services in transportation of
gold from Africa to United States; medallions
for commanding officers forwarded - 9/5/41
298
a) Nelson thanks HMJr for medallion -
9/19/41: See Book 442, page 240
Lend-Lease:
Aid to Britain:
Conference of Treasury group and Phillips,
Childs, Bewley, Keyes, Chance, Robinson,
Brown, Mack, and Ladick - 9/4/41
37
a) Australian situation explained
b) Present status of possibilities for
dollar relief (British document)
54
Second conference; present: HMJr, Graves,
Mack, Stettinius, Nelson, MacKeachie. Cox,
White, and Young - 9/4/41
57
a) Memorandum showing steps taken with
respect to Lend-Lease purchases,
together with the everage time
required for each step - Mack
memorandum
86
1) Memorandum sent to FDR.
190
Poland: Authorization of transfer of various
defense articles - 9/4/41
163
Purchases - weekly report - 9/5/41
210
Military Planning:
Reports from London transmitted by Camphell -
9/4/41, 9/5/41
179,349
War Department bulletin:
German armored divisions - organization of -
9/5/41
351
Security Markets (High-Grade):
Current Developments: Haas memorandum - 9/5/41
286
Regraded Unclassified
- ¥ - (Continued)
Book Page
War Conditions (Continued)
U.S.S.R.:
Possible aid discussed by Hopkins and HMJr -
9/5/41
438
190
a) Amount of gold estimated; possibility
of payment for gooda in cash
discussed
1) Arrival in San Francisco of
$5,600,000 in gold destined for
Mint discussed in Cochran
memorandum - 9/18/41: See Book 442,
pages 59, 60, 62, and 218
a) Instructions to Mint - 9/19/41:
Book 442, page 222
United Kingdom:
Coe reports
a) British morale
160
b) Food situation - British press clippings
on
161
c) United States exports under Lend-Lease
162
1) Re-export of American steel not
permitted
British Embasey. Information Bureau, Air Miesion,
and Purchasing Mission: Cost of upkeep
discussed by HMJr and Phillips - 9/5/41
191
Regraded Unclassified
1
MEMORANTUM
To:
Secretary Morgenthau
September 4, 1941
From: Mr. Sullivan
Re: White House Conference Wednesday
evening, September 3, 1941, on
Ihs
Tax Amortization Legislation
Present for the White House: Judge Samuel Rosenman, Hr. Ben Cohen,
and Kr. James Rowe; for the Bureau of the Budget: Kr. Gladeox and
Mr. Crane: for OPN: Mr. Wayne Coy and Mr. Opcar Cox; for the War
Department: Lt. Col. Edward S. Greenbaum and Mr. Bayard Schieffelin;
for the Havy Department: Mr. H. Struve Hensel and Mr. Richard Kyle;
for the Treasury Department: Mr. John In Sullivan and Hr. Robert B,
Sichholz.
The conference was called for 9:00 P. M., in order to attempt to
arrive at an agreement between the various agencies concerned on the
best means for speeding up certifications under Section 124 of the
Internal Revenue Code, particularly with reference to certificates
of nonreimbursement. Under Section 124 of the Internal Revenue Code,
every corporation which desires to secure the benefits of five-year
amortization for tax purposes in lieu of the depreciation deduction
must secure from the War and Navy Departments and the Advisory Com-
mission to the Council of National Defense, a certificate that the
facilities which are sought to be amortized are necessary in the
intereste of national defense during the emergency period. Such cer-
tificates are commonly known as necessity certificates. In addition,
if the taxpayer has a contract with the United States which reimburses
it for the cost of any such emergency facility "because the price paid
by the United States (insofar as return of cost of the facility is used
E.g a factor in the fixing of such price) 18 recognized by the contract
AB including & return of cost greater than the normal exhaustion,
wear and tear," no amortization will be allowed with respect to such
facility. A certificate by the War or Havy Departments and the Advisory
Commission that there is no such reimbursement in a particular contract
is conclusive upon the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue for the
purposes of this statute. Such certificates are commonly known as non-
reimbursement certificates,
Regraded Unclassified
2
DO
Judge Rosenman suggested that the statute be amended to give
authority for issuance of certificates of necessity to OPM only and
to give authority for issuance of certificates of nonreimbursement
to the Treasury Department only. In view of the necessity for speedy
action he inquired as to the possibilities of securing such an amend-
ment as part of the pending tax bill.
Mr. Sullivan explained that the bill had already passed the House,
had been reported out by the Finance Committee of the Senate and ve.s
now being debated on the floor of the Senate with good prospects for
passage by the end of the week. He expressed his fears that the
interjection of 60 controversial an issue a.B amortization at this late
stage would result either in greatly delaying passage of the bill or
in securing no legislation whatsoever with respect to amortization.
He explained that so-called isolationist senators, such as Senators
LaFollette, Walsh, and Clark (of Missouri), all members of the Finance
Committee, would wish to make full inquiry into the reasons for the
transfer of authority from the defense agencies to the Treasury Depart-
ment. Even assuming that an amendment were secured on the floor of
the Senate, the House conferees might well reject it on the ground
that they had been given no opportunity to study the matter.
Other alternative solutions were then discussed and Colonel
Greenbaum suggested renewing a request for legislation to eliminate
the duties of the Advisory Commission and to eliminate the necessity
for certifying contracts other than with the War and Navy Departments
and contracts for less than $15,000. Mr. Sullivan stated that he was
very much afraid that even this legislation would be difficult to
secure in connection with the pending tax bill. He thought that the
maximum that could be secured from the Congress at this time would be
an amendment merely eliminating the functions of the Advisory Com-
mission, on the ground that the Commission was all but formally &
dead agency. The War and Navy Departments were inclined to favor
this suggestion but Mr. Coy and Mr. Cohen feared that, since it ap-
peared to have been the purpose of Congress to use the Commission B.B
a check on the Service Departments, the Congress would wish to replace
the Commission with some other agency. Mr. Cohen felt that the same
objective could be accomplished without the legislation by securing
the resignations of the members of the Commission and replacing them
by B. board of three men familiar with amortization problems. Colonel
Greenbaum felt that this was no solution at all since the chief diffi-
culty from the point of view of the Service Departments was dual
authority to certify conferred by the present statute. He stated
that he would be very glad to use the advice and experience of the
Commission in certification matters but he felt that there should be
one final authority to resolve conflicts of opinion and that that
authority should be the War and Havy Departments. Mr. Hensel BX-
pressed the opinion that in most cases involving specialized military
Regraded Unclassified
- 3 -
3
and naval equipment only the Army and Navy Procurement Officers were
competent to form a judgment as to whether & particular price in-
cluded reimbursement or not. Mr. Cox, on the other hand, felt that
the Bureau of Internal Revenue was best squipped to handle such
questions. Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Eichhols explained that the Bureau
had a great deal of data relating to normal depreciation, built up
on the basis of past experience, but that they were not presently
equipped to handle factors of economic obsolescence relating to items
as to which there is no past experience. They said that if nonreim-
bursement certificates were issued by the Bureau, the Bureau would
have to build up almost from scratch a technical staff to handle them.
Mr. Coy stated that if the suggestion of Colonel Greenbaum were
followed and the authority of the Advisory Commission eliminated, the
Commission would not wish to participate in decisions of particular
cases. Mr. Gladeox stated that the Bureau of the Budget would have
serious reservations respecting legislation which merely eliminated
the Commission from the certification field. The representatives of
the OHM and the War and Navy Departmente then stated that they were
inclined to look favorably upon the proposal to transfer nonreim-
bursement certificates to the Treasury and necessity certificates to
OPM. Mr. Sullivan pointed out that this would create triple authority
rather than the present dual authority which Colonel Greenbaum found
so objectionable. The War and Navy Departments would be making the
contracts, but the taxpayer would be forced to secure agreement B.B.
to the OPM, their terms from the Service Department, and the Treasury.
He also pointed out that the Chairmen of the Congressional Committees
would not consider any legislation upon which all the agencies con-
cerned were not in complete agreement. As to the suggestion to trans-
fer nonreimbursement certificates to the Treasury, he would not wish
to give an immediate opinion. Re asked time to consider the matter.
Judge Rosenman stated that in order to give the Treasury this
time, and because complete agreement had not been reached, the meet-
ing might well adjourn until the following evening. Accordingly. the
meeting adjourned at 11:40 P. M.
Regraded Unclassified
4
September 4, 1941
11:00 a.m.
RE EXCESS RESERVES
Present:
Mr. Currie
Mr. Bernstein
Mr. Ransom
Mr. Goldenweiser
Mr. Stewart
Mr. Viner
Mr. Haas
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Bell
Mr. White
H.M.Jr:
We have taken your request seriously.
Ransom:
Thank you.
H.M.Jr:
We were working on it yesterday, and I got
the message from Mr. Gaston that Eccles was
interested in this thing and we put our boys
to work right away. As soon as the rest of
the people come, I would like, if it is agree-
able to you, to ask the Federal Reserve Board
to state its case. Is that agreeable?
Ransom:
Entirely.
(Mr. Currie entered the conference).
(Mr. Bell entered the conference).
H.M.Jr:
Well, that is where we are now.
Ransom:
Mr. Secretary, the purpose in asking for
a conference with you this morning was to
make two requests on behalf of the Board
of Governors, first that if possible any
long-term financing or any announcement of
any long-term financing that the Treasury may
Regraded Unclassified
2
want to do be deferred until, say, the
fifteenth of October.
The reason for the request is that we would
like in the intervening time to be given an
opportunity to thoroughly explore with all of
you people the question as to what should be
done about raising reserve requirements and
also what, if anything, should be done regarding
the question of such additional powers as
may be needed, in the opinion of all of us,
to prevent an infla tionary rise.
Starting from the assumption, first, that
the first objective is the early and complete
defeat of Hitler, secondly, that in the process
of doing that we are all interested in keeping
the country from getting into more inflation
than is absolutely necessary; now, you suggested
a moment ago that you would like at this time
to have the case stated for the Federal.
It had been my thought - I am perfectly willing
to give it in that direction, but it had been
my thought that if the Treasury could defer
any announcement in the matter until the
time stated, we would have considerable time
in which we could go over the whole thing
and find out what, if any, points of differ-
ence there may be between the Treasury and
ourselves, if any, and secondly, what sugges-
tions as to the operation of this thing,
the timing of this thing, would be appropriate.
I will be very glad at this time to ask Mr.
Goldenweiser to state the whole background
of the thing for your record, if you would
like that done.
H.M.Jr:
Now, let me just ask 8 question.
(Mr. White entered the conference).
Regraded Unclassified
6
- 3 -
Ransom:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
Dan, could we go along as is until the fifteenth
of October?
Bell:
Yes, sir.
H.M.Jr:
We could?
Bell:
Yes, sir.
H.M.Jr:
What, roughly, would our balance be, dropping
those notes to a hundred million 8. week?
Bell:
I will have to get my figures, but roughly, we
ought to have a billion seven hundred million,
I should think, a billion and a half to a
billion seven hundred million going out of
September, and we might lose as much as
seven or eight hundred million dollars in the
first fifteen days of October, so we would
still have close to a billion going in to
October fifteenth, or at least seven hundred
fifty million, I should think.
H.M.Jr:
Well, I had a preliminary meeting. This is
the way I feel. If Mr. Roosevelt's administra-
tion is going to do something about reserve
requirements, as far as the Treasury is
concerned, I doubt whether during the balance
of his term we will have a better time to do it
than right now.
Ransom:
That is our feeling, Mr. Secretary.
H.M.Jr:
Because we are in nice shape financially, and
if we are going to do something after careful
consideration - well, I would like to do it
now.
(Mr. E. M. Bernstein entered the conference).
Regraded Unclassified
7
- 4 -
(Mr. White left the conference).
Therefore, we in the Treasury are willing
to sit around and discuss it until we have B. meet-
ing of the minds on whatever it is. I don't
want to set the fifteenth of October. We
might get together next week or we might
not get together until the twentieth of October,
but I am willing to postpone the thing until
we can get together, provided that both agencies
sort of concentrate on this thing.
I started it, and I would kind of like to get
it out of my system one way or the other. As
you know, I pride myself that I have no monetary
hobbies, so you don't have to dynamite me one
way or the other. I am ready to listen, and
that is why - you (Bell) feel that way, don't
you?
Bell:
Yes, I do.
H.M.Jr:
That if we are going to do the thing, it is
now or never? Now is the time if ever.
Rell:
Let's see what we can do, what we ought to
do now, while we have got the chance.
H.M.Jr:
Now?
Bell:
That is right, yes, sir, and I think you might
announce that there will be no financing in
September. I wouldn't want to put it off fur-
ther than that.
H.M.Jr:
Well, I told the men this morning that we are
studying this whole question of financing, I
put it, in conjunction with the Federal
Reserve Board. I don't see them until Monday,
and if they ask me again, we are still studying
it.
Regraded Unclassified
8
- 5 -
Bell:
I see. But that might mean you are studying
financing with a view to having an issue here
within the next week or 80. That sort of
keeps the market --
H.M.Jr:
Let's see what happens. I won't see them again
until Monday afternoon.
Bell:
All right.
Ransom:
There are two things I think ought to be said
at that point, first, that it is the unanimous
opinion of all the present members of the
Board that something should be done.
Secondly --
H.M.Jr:
Is that unanimous?
Ransom:
Unanimous.
Secondly, that if it is to be done, as you
suggest, this is the time when it should be
done.
And thirdly, that it should not and must not
be done, of course, without the fullest
consultation with the Treasury, cooperation
with the Treasury. That would seem to me to
be required in any event, and under existing
conditions, to be imperative, 80 that there
is no difference of - there can be no differ-
ence of opinion about that. However firm our
present convictions may be, it has to be related
to the over-all problem of the policy of the
Administration in relation to the emergencies
which they face. I think it might be 8. very
good time to have Mr. Goldenweiser state the
position of the Board, with which he is fully
conversant and which has been gone over any
number of times by all the Board members and
Mr. Goldenweiser. Now, if that --
Regraded Unclassified
9
- 6 -
H.M.Jr:
That is what I would like.
Ransom:
I would be glad to have him do that right now.
H.M.Jr:
Do you mind being interrupted or would you
like to go through the whole statement first?
Goldenweiser: I would just as soon be interrupted, Mr.
Secretary. I haven't any prepared statement
of any kind. The facts of the situation, I
suppose, are familiar to everybody in this
ro on. The situation has changed from the
way it has been in the past because of the
fact that we have got a very strong demand
for goods, arising from the very large
expenditures for Defense.
We have shortages in a great many lines and
I don't want to elaborate on this, because
that is all too familiar to you, to make it
worth your time. As a consequence, there
is a very clear case of price advances on
a rapid scale in a lot of fields, and this
Administration, as I understand it, is commit-
ted to try to limit that as far as it can.
A number of things, as you know, are done
about it. The tax bill is one thing.
The attempt of the Treasury to sell as many
of its securities to private owners rather
than to banks and creating additional de-
posits is another. The proposal for price
control is another. The recently inaugurated
regulation of installment buying is still
another. It is the Board's view, I take it,
that all these things are important and
necessary in this situation, but that in
addition to that, it would be supplemented
very effectively if the very large amount of
funds available to the banks for all kinds
of expansion were reduced in some way.
Regraded Unclassified
7
The amount of excess reserves at this time
is five billion dollars. The limit of legal
authority for increasing requirements is
about one seventh of the present reserve
requirements, or something like a billion
point two. If the Board should raise reserve
requirements to the limit authorized by law,
there would still be three billion eight
left, which of course means that the problem
cannot be solved or even approached - an approach
to the solution reached by that method alone.
But it would nevertheless have two effects.
It would indicate a willingness to act
on all fronts, and it would reduce the induce-
ment to the banks for buying securities.
Issuing 8. large number of securities that
are not available for banks is & good thing,
and I take it the Board has been very much
pleased and very much in favor of this policy
of the Treasury in their Tax Anticipation
Certificates and Savings Bonds, and all those
things. But at the same time, 80 long as the
banks have this very large volume of funds at
their disposal, they will be in 8. position to
buy such securities as are already outstanding
from present holders and have the present
holders buy the new securities.
In other words, bank expansion through the
purchase of Government securities is not likely
to be stopped so long as the amount of funds
at the disposal of the banks is as large
as it is at the present time.
For these reasons, the Board would like to
exercise its present power for raising
reserve requirements to the limit, and it
would also like to have considered the ques-
tion as to when and by what method, if any,
the authority for additional control of reserves
Regraded Unclassified
8 -
should be acquired from, either under
Executive Order or under legislation.
Those are the fields that the Board would
like to explore. It raises the question
as to whether there would be any possibility
of that in any way interfering with the
possibility - or with the Treasury's financing
of its program. The best judgment that we
have been able to form on that is that it
would not, because the amount of funds
available for investment in the hands of
investors is very large.
The banks as a possible buffer in case any
security shouldn't go will still have a very
large amount of funds at their disposal
and I take it that the Board which constitutes
the majority of the Open Market Committee
is prepared to take a position definitely
that by raising reserve requirements at this
time it takes a responsibility which - that
nothing unforseen nor untoward should ever
be permitted to happen in the Government
security market.
I think, Mr. Secretary, that perhaps it is just
as well if I would stop right there and then
we can answer any questions that would work
that out in more detail. Does that statement
correspond to your ideas?
Ransom:
The statement is correct and expresses my
own views, and I believe the views of the
entire Board, Mr. Secretary.
Bell:
You don't think that the using of this
authority that you have will materially
affect the bond market? Or the interest
rates?
Regraded Unclassified
12
- 9 -
Goldenweiser: The existing authority? I should say
very slightly. It might conceivably have
some effect on the very short term rates,
but I doubt whether it would have any mater-
ial effect on long term rates.
Bell:
Then from that standpoint it would not be
a deterrent to the banks to loan money?
I mean the increase in interest rates would
not be a deterrent? It would lessen the
supply of funds, but would that be much of
factor?
Goldenweiser: Well, it would be some factor. I think
that there is the point of an important
distinction, that between the cost of money
and the availability of money. I think that
the cost is not going to be materially
affected and I don't think that the cost,
aside from the Treasury cost, is an important
deterrent for anything, that the Treasury is
a separate problem. I mean I don't think that
whether the borrower for non-defense purposes
has to pay four per cent or four and a half
percent or five percent is going to make very
much difference to the extent to which he is
going to borrow. When he forsees the
possibility of a large profit, that is.
But the extent to which banks are willing to
lend indiscriminately does depend somewhat
on what they have in the way of idle funds,
and that is a much more important factor in
the situation, in my judgment, Mr. Secretary,
than interest rates. Now, the absorption
of 8. billion and B. quarter, a billion two
of excess reserves, is not going to hamstring
the banks materially, but a considerable part
of that, perhaps half of that, will be in
New York, and New York is the place where
excess reserves have been diminishing some-
what, owing to currency withdrawals, and
the banks In New York will be definitely
Regraded Unclassified
13
- 10 -
less inclined to shop for all kinds of out-
lets for their funds if as much as a half
a billion was moved out of their excess
reserves picture.
Ransom:
I would like to make clear, Mr. Secretary,
speaking for myself, and I again think I
speak for the Board, that it isn't with the
idea that this action will raise interest
rates, but that it will stabilize interest
rates. I think our concern goes more to the
question whether or not we may not see a
more rapidly diminishing interest rate than
we have even had in the past, and I think
our concern, certainly my own concern, is not
with the question of raising the whole interest
rate structure, but the effect on the whole
economy of an interest rate which may, due
to all these circumstances, be pressed down
further and further until it in itself becomes
a very serious problem with which we will
have to deal. There is some point along
the line at which I think we should pause
and see if we can't check it.
H.M.Jr:
Well, the thing that isn't quite clear in my
mind - it most likely is in Goldenweiser's
mind - you talk about interest rates and
inflation. Then you talk about banks making
too many loans because interest rates are
low. It doesn't seem quite consistent to
me. Let's just take one segment of this
thing. If you don't think interest rates are
going to go up, how are you going to stop
the banks from seeking loans by increasing
your excess reserve requirements?
Goldenweiser: That, I think, is the exact point on which
I --
H.M.Jr:
Just let's take the one thing. If you are
worrying about unsound banking practices,
now on the one hand you say you don't think
interest rates are going up. On the other
Regraded Unclassified
14
- 11 -
hand, you say you think because interest
rates are 80 low the banks are making too
many loans.
Goldenweiser: My answer to that, Mr. Secretary, is that
it isn't the interest rate I am concerned
about. I think the availability of funds,
a very large supply of funds, quite inde-
pendent of the interest rate, is making the
banks very anxious to find outlets for it.
It isn't that the rate would go up, but that
they would be less willing to consider all
kinds of propositions if they haven't as
much cash in their tills or on deposit
with the Federal.
Bell:
You cut down the supply of funds.
H.M.Jr:
I appreciate that. How about the - what effect
will it have on the business man who has 8.
defense contract and wants to get a loan?
Goldenweiser: Well, I think that that is the important
question to be sure of. Our judgment on that
is that such loans as are needed for defense
will be made, that there is not in contempla-
tion cutting down the supply of bank funds to
the point where they will have none. It is
a question of making them somewhat more mod-
erate so they would be more willing - or less
willing to consider speculative loans and
unnecessary non-defense loans. When anybody
comes with an authentic defense requirement,
the banks will have ample funds for it and
I don't believe that anyone has any contem-
plation to cut it down to the point where
they wouldn't.
Ransom:
Certainly that isn't the position of the Board,
Mr. Secretary, and I think most obviously
that if the evidence would support the view
that even increasing reserve requirements
within our present statutory limits would inter-
fere with business financing the defense
Regraded Unclassified
15
- 12 -
program, that that is the strongest argument
which could be made against action at this
time, but it is our judgment, as Mr. Golden-
weiser says, that that isn't the situation
and wouldn't be the situation. Now, I think
that is one of the things that we should
explore most carefully.
H.M.Jr:
He doesn't know.
Ransom:
No, you can't know. You can only reach
a conclusion on your best judgment, weighed
against his best and the present situation.
H.M.Jr:
Confining ourselves again to a weak bank
structure, have you considered the possibility,
if that is one of your worries, of changing
the bank examination rules, do it through
bank examination?
Goldenweiser: I don't know that that has been considered
in this connection. You mean tighten the
requirements?
H.M.Jr:
I mean, if you are worried about a week bank-
ing structure, how about taking a new look
at what our bank examiners are doing?
Ransom:
I am not personally disturbed about B. weak
bank position because it seems to me our
banking position is stronger than it has
been at any time within my recollection. I
see no danger on the front there. There may
be isolated instances, but the over-all
picture of banking today in this country
seems to me to be particularly strong.
Goldenweiser: What we are concerned about, Mr. Secretary,
is the constant increase in the funds
available to private individuals for
spending. They already have the largest
Regraded Unclassified
16
- 13 -
amount that there has been in the history
of the country.
H.M.Jr:
No argument about that.
Goldenweiser:
The amount of goods is diminished and we don't
want to further increase the buying power.
H.M.Jr:
I agree with you 8 hundred per cent, but what
hasn't been able to filter through my brain
yet is that the price of sugar or the price
of wheat or the price of cotton goods or
the lack of steel or the la ck of ships or
the slowness of our guns - I mean that by
locking up additional - a billion or two
billion dollars, is going to help. That
is the thing that hasn't been able to filter
through.
Goldenweiser: That isn't going to solve the problem, Mr.
Secretary. Now, all these are such contro-
versial subjects that you can't ever be sure
you speak for anyone but yourself, but I
don't believe there is any very great differ-
ence of opinion in the Board. My opinion
is that it cannot anywhere near solve the
problem you are talking about, but it can
contribute its share toward diminishing
the amount of money that the people have to
bid those goods out, If the banks should buy
six more billions of Government securities
as they bought something in that general
neighborhood during the past year, and
if they should make another three or four
billions of loans of non-defense nature,
that would add another ten billions of
deposits in the hands of all the people who
get the proceeds of that money, and that
additional ten billions would, added to
the existing seventy billions or 80, or
whatever the figures are, be & further
Regraded Unclassified
17
- 14 -
invitation for bidding up prices. That is
the way I figure it.
Ransom:
I think, Mr. Secretary, that there is one
thing that I would like to see very thoroughly
examined by the Treasury and ourselves. It
seems to me we have a choice of using one
or the other of two mechanisms for controlling
credit or perhaps, and this is my own opinion,
we are going to have to use both. That is,
the over-all control of the total volume of
available credit which is affected by the
control of excess reserves or the selective
credit control such as this consumer credit
thing which we are now trying to operate.
The further we get into that, the more I am
impressed with the fact that you are getting
further and further involved in tremendous
administrative difficulties, in questions
of discrimination between the various trades
involved, to say nothing of the rights of
consumers which come up to perplex you every
day. While I think that is necessary, and
I think under existing conditions we have got
to experiment with it, got to try it out,
I think we ought not to forget that as part
of the whole program we should give very
serious consideration to whether or not the
most effective method is not to control
the total available credit through your bank-
ing system. It seems to me that we are in
& somewhat awkward situation, having stepped
out to regulate consumer credit and having
authority to do something on the over-all
side of the picture, and not doing anything,
so that I think we have got to balance those
two things out and decide whether we are
going to direct most of our attention to
selective credit controls or whether we are
going back to the more well established method
of an over-all control, about which we know
Regraded Unclassified
18
- 15 -
a great deal more than we can know at the
present time about this other.
Goldenweiser: You don't mean that they are alternatives,
exactly. They supplement each other.
Ransom:
I said I thought we had to use both, Mr.
Goldenweiser, and I don't think we can avoid,
under existing conditions, the use of both
of them. Actually, the Board has used up
to 8 percentage of all of its power to con-
trol excess reserves. Now, there is B
remaining balance there that we can use and
it at once raises the question as to whether
or not we should stop at that point if we
now go that far or whether we should consider
perhaps, the psychological effect, 6 united
front, asking the Congress or perhaps asking
the President in an Executive Order if it can
be done that way, to give us authority to
move further if it should develop that it is
necessary to move further. I don't want to
give you the impression for a moment that
I have anything like a dogmatic conclusion
on any of these questions. They are contro-
versial. There isn't any doubt about that.
But the best judgment that I can give you at
the present time is that it seems to me we
should be doing both at the present time.
As against that, we are tremendously interested
in the views of the Treasury, of course.
Goldenweiser:
I would like to add one more word if I may
right there, and that is that as far as I
am concerned, I wouldn't recommend action on
the reserve requirements if I couldn't have
the assurance on the part of the Board that,
along with taking some action, they would take
the responsibility of 8 -- B. double kind of
8 responsibility.
Regraded Unclassified
19
- 16 -
In the first place, to step in firmly
and courageously in the market if there
is anything unforseen, if our analysis
is all wrong and we find that things do
happen, that we won't hesitate to step in.
In the S econd place, that the whole thing
has got to be flexible and it has got to be
reviewed so that if it is a mistake we
would have the courage to correct it.
H.M.Jr:
The last statement was the most important
one, but to go back to your other one
about the stepping in and one of the parts,
if you don't mind, that I liked the least
of your memorandum was this idea. You
say, what you are practically saying
is, you think the two and a half per cent
rate for the long-term bonds is too
little, but the Federal Reserve is
going to step in and at a definite rate
"We are going to fix it at that."
I mean, for you people to assume the
responsibility that you are going to say,
"Well, the two and a half is too cheap,
we will put it three per cent. Why,
we will buy two billion dollars' worth
of bonds if necessary to stabilize
it at that.'
20
- 17 -
Ransom:
Let me say that I don't like the way you
state that and I don't think it is wholly
fair to us. I don't have the memorandum
you referred to at the moment. It isn't
mine. But can I express my own view about
that?
H.M.Jr:
Sure, but that is the interpretation I put
on it.
Ransom:
I couldn't tell you what is a fair rate for
the Treasury to finance itself in the present
market. I thought last December that two
and 8. half seemed to be about the rate where it
could be done throughout the period of this
emergency. I would have said that in the light
of developments since then that that rate
would seem to be above the figure at which it
seems to me the Treasury can finance for &
considerable period.
Now, I don't know whether that rate is going
to firm up by letting it alone and doing
nothing, or whether it is going to continually
decline. It is my own view that it will
continually decline. That is a thing about
which I am personally concerned. Now, I
think that the Treasury would have to have
some feeling of assurance that if such
action as we are suggesting is taken, that we
must stand ready, as Goldenweiser says, to
come in at the appropriate time and protect
the situation that may develop either 8.5 a
result of what we do - I don't think 80 - or
from other causes now beyond our control.
And if that means that - I think under the
existing emergency that there is an obligation
on the Government, including us, to see that
this financing is done at 8. fair and reasonable
rate. I say yes, I think that is an obligation
on all of us.
Regraded Unclassified
21
- 18 -
Now, the effect, I don't think, has been
emphasized in what either Goldenweiser or
I have said of a situation which might
develop from & continually declining interest
rate which might very well be offset on
the other side by such inflationary rise
in prices as would in the end cost the
Government, as the largest individual buyer
of the things which would be affected.
That is why at the present time it seems to
me that we are all looking at inflation
not only for the effect on the whole
economy and all the people of this country,
but the effect directly on Government
faced with its present dilemmas. Now, you
get an offsetting of your declining interest
rate, undoubtedly.
H.M.Jr:
Well, Ronald, let me make two statements 80
that at least you know where I stand. When
it comes to keeping prices down, increasing
production, I won't take second place with
anybody. I mean, we are as much interested
and we have done as much work on it as
anybody and we think it is terribly important.
I am going to be rash enough to make &
speech about it on Tuesday night. The
other thing, 80 that we can have a clean cut
understanding about the question of financing
and raising the money, I feel that as
Secretary of the Treasury it is my responsib-
ility to raise the money. If I fail in it
I can't say it is because the Federal Reserve
didn't support my bond market, so I take
that responsibility and - I am being a little
bit blunt but I think it is a little bit
better to be blunt now and have a good
feeling afterward - you people, whatever we
do, you have got to support the Treasury
bond market when it is necessary.
Ransom:
I agree fully.
Regraded Unclassified
22
- 19 -
H.M.Jr:
Because I can't have any alibis. I can't
say --
Ransom:
Neither can we.
H.M.Jr:
That the Board didn't support me, and 80
forth and so on. The stock ticker tells the
public every day whether I have or have not
made a success of my financing and I have
got to assume that responsibility and when
I can't do it, I go home. So when it gets
to final analysis, as far as the bond market
is concerned, you people have just got to
support it when it is necessary.
Ransom:
I don't know any alibi we could have for
not supporting it.
Goldenweiser: I think that is a unanimous agreement.
H.M.Jrs
If we have that --
Goldenweiser: Absolutely.
H.M.Jr:
...Then I am sure we can arrive at what
is best for this hundred and thirty million
people.
Ransom:
I feel quite sure that the principal
objectives of both the Treasury and ourselves*
are not different. Now, it is a question
of what must be done to arrive at the best
possible solution of 8. very difficult
situation.
H.M.Jr:
I would just like to ask - if he doesn't
want to answer he doesn't have to, if he
would rather not get in on it - Lauch,
whether you think the statement I just made
is proper or not.
Currie:
I agree heartily and absolutely on that
Regraded Unclassified
23
- 20 -
statement, Mr. Secretary. It seems to
me you have put your finger on two rather
important points in the consideration of
this whole matter. One is, arriving at
some agreement, as far as we can, on the
interest rate policy through the emergency.
As you know, the British Government
financial authorities have taken as 8.
conscious, deliberate policy the policy of
keeping interest rates down, financing a
little bit lower in successive issues.
The Canadians are trying to do the same
thing.
I don't think we have ever had a full
discussion of the long range interest
policy through the emergency. It is
one point. The second point which you
mentioned which clicked with me was that
I take it this move on the part of the
Federal Reserve now is really in the
nature of a precautionary move. You don't
expect it to have any effect on interest
rates or on buying power at the present
time.
Ransom:
I don't personally think what we can do
within the statute would produce an
appreciable effect. You can't be dogmatic
about it, Lauch, but I would like to say
that I agree so fully with your first
point that there is an obligation on Govern-
ment during the existing emergency to finance
itself at 8. reasonable rate and that to me
is & low rate. I start from that point.
Currie:
Then I was leading up to the point that if
this is 8. precautionary measure, as I think
it is, that eventually through the emergency
you will probably feel it necessary to
mop up substantial parts of the excess
reserves. I think this, as the Secretary
Regraded Unclassified
24
- 21 -
says, is as good & time as we probably
will get.
Ransom:
Frankly, it looks to us as though it is
going to be about the only time for some
time to come.
Goldenweiser: Mr. Secretary, may I say another word
about this interest rate? I think you
were referring to the memorandum which I
sent George Haas day before yesterday.
I would like to - if I gave you the
impression that you got out of it, it is
a fault of my expression rather than my
intention. I did not intend at all to
indicate that the Federal Reserve System
certainly would fix a rate and that at
that rate it would support the bond
market and at another rate it would not.
If any such impression got out of that
memo, it was a poor use of language on
my part.
What I meant to say is that the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve together - when
they get together, and the Treasury taking
the leadership, bedause it is the Treasury's
responsibility, decide that for the time
being this is the rate, that for the time
being that is the rate that the Federal
Reserve is under obligation to support and
that if the situation changes and the
Treasury and the System decide that the
rate should be lower or should be higher,
then that re-opens the question. I haven't
any intention to indicate that, in the
first place; very distinctly I want to
disavow any intention of the System's having
the responsibility of fixing it. That is
not in my mind at all.
H.M.Jr:
You missed the point, Goldenweiser. What I
Regraded Unclassified
25
- 22 -
was trying to say is, the impression
I got from your memorandum was that
if we do this the interest rates will
have to rise but when they reach a
certain point, then the Federal Reserve
is going to step in and we will hold
it there.
Goldenweiser:
At any point that you - that we make.
It may be that all that we wish to do
is to see that the rate doesn't go
down any lower. It may be that we -
what we wish to do is to see that
if the rate is to go up, if you
wish it - to have the adjustment -
natural adjustment take it up, that
we see to it that the rise is gradual
and orderly. Whatever decision is
made about the rate, I maintain that
you and the System together are in
a position to make it effective.
That is all I intended to say.
Ransom:
It certainly is not the duty of
the Federal Reserve to fix 8 rate.
Its obligation is more complex
than that, but I think you have
stated it and that I would agree
with your statement of it, with
which Lauch agrees, so I don't
believe there is an issue on that
front.
Now, I think this is quite possible,
that if we use the existing authority
and we should get additional author-
ity and we should use some of that,
8. point might be reached where a
Regraded Unclassified
26
- 23 -
reversal of that action might be
obviously to the public interest and
if I didn't believe - I don't
anticipate it under existing circum-
stances, but I don't think we can see
too far these days, but I would like
to make it clear, speaking for myself,
that if at such a point a reversal
of policy was necessary, I would be
greatly distressed if we wouldn't
reverse that policy because the primary
objective is to accomplish certain
things to get the Treasury financed
through a terribly trying period, and
secondly not to permit the existing
situation to produce an inflationary
rise over which we may be able to
exercise some control.
I have tried to state that in a
very cautious manner because I must
have some reservations all along
the line of that view, Mr. Secretary,
but I think that we obviously face
two dangers, one of which I don't
think is acute. I don't see why it
should be acute. That is that the
Treasury must finance a tremendous
debt through a great and trying
period. Secondly - that through -
for entirely different reasons, we
may find that there is an inflation-
ary rise here over which we should
be exercising some control beyond
those we are now using.
27
- 24 -
Viner:
There are a few points I would like to
bring into the discussion that I think have
not been brought in or not emphasized enough.
My own opinion - my thinking hasn't been as
intense on this 88 it deserves, but my own
opinion is that the new requirements, new
problems, are more significant than the use
of the present powers. That the executive
in a situation like this ought to have all
the powers it has any conceivable use for
any time and ought to get them when the
getting is good and that in general it ought
to be the policy to gather into the executive
now all the emergency powers which under
any conceivable circumstances it might have to
use and use quick, so that I would be certainly
for an increase in the powers of the Federal
Reserve Board over reserve requirements, even
though I might be strongly against the use
of their full present powers at this present
moment, but I would get those powers in where
they are available and do it quick. Secondly,
I think that the Federal Reserve ought to study
the question that was already touched on by
you, I think, as to alternative means of handl-
ing the reserve requirement problem through
banking devices and particularly the capital
ratio phase and the use of the FDIC because
there you may simultaneously get a sort of
happy compromise between the difficulties of
selective control and quantative control and
get them both at the same time. Third, I
think it is B. serious mistake to count on
the selective controls as being genuinely
available quickly enough to meet an emergency
which may develop rapidly. My own guess is
that the consumers' control that has already
been installed is not yet 8. real control and
that if the volume of installment credit
shrinks in the next six months or 8. year -
I am not sure it will shrink - it will be due
to priorities and the lack of automobiles and
Regraded Unclassified
28
- 25 -
not to the control, that the change in the
income situation has made the new terms
already terms more generous than lots of
installment people would voluntarily give to
their customers. They are already beginning
to move on to more severe terms and they are
not real restrictions at the present time.
You may ask, "Why don't they impose real
restrictions?" When you start imposing a
selective control on any sector you soon
find it is a delicate matter. You run into
all kinds of business competition and rivalries
and prior interests and groups and you have
to move carefully and cautiously. Then on
the housing control, are you sure - I mean,
before we say we needn't - We don't need to
increase powers over reserve requirements, are
you sure that the Treasury will be able to
get the restrictions of the housing credit
if it wants to? There are strong powers on
the other side. I would say don't count on
that until you have it in your hands. So
far they are advertising now on & big scale,
trying to extend their field of credit. Can
you stop it? Maybe you can, but I bet it will
take 8. major wrangling here to get any re-
strictions on that, 80 that you will find
that in every step of selective control. It
is difficult to administer. It is delicate
and tough to administer, and the powers of
resistance on every sector are very great.
Goldenweiser: It always leaves an uncovered territory.
Viner:
And it leaves an uncovered territory and the
problems of equity arise there in & very
acute fashion and it is very hard to handle.
Now, the nut of this is that I think that
certainly one thing that I hope you can -
everybody concerned can agree is that there is
no objection to having on the statute books more
Regraded Unclassified
29
- 26 -
powers than you have now over reserve re-
quirements.
Secondly, I think that whole question of
bank capital ratios to shrinkable assets
ought to be looked into and see whether
moves can't be made on that line. There is
another item that I wanted to bring up, and it
has slipped my mind, although I know I think
it is important, so maybe if it comes up
later I will come back with it.
Ransom:
I find it myself impossible this morning to
take issue with anything you have said be-
cause you have pictured the problem of try-
ing to regulate consumer credit quite mildly.
I would say that it is even more difficult
than you would suggest.
H.M.Jr:
Walter, do you want to say something?
Stewart:
I have 8. little to add to what I said yester-
day. I regard the threat of inflation as
sufficiently serious to justify taking pre-
cautionary steps. We have taken some. I
think we will have to take more. I agree
with Mr. Ransom that the probability is that
you need more control on general funds than
the specific selective control, and I think
my chief concern is that in the talk upon
alternative methods the action be postponed
to the point where it either becomes more and
more embarrassing or doesn't take place at
all.
Viner:
I have thought of my forgotten point and that
is on the interest rate, that I think once
you have gotten for a time on 8. particular
level for the long-term rate, it is very
embarrassing to have that rate rise. It
creates all sorts of difficulties and yet it
Regraded Unclassified
30
-
may be that in order to stop inflation you
need 8. rise in the interest rate structure,
and I just want to bring to your attention
the fact that you can raise the level of
interest rates without raising the level of
the long-term rate and that you can starve
the market with long-term securities and
shift into the short-term and let that
rate go up and that what happens to the short-
term rate within requirements is really of
not very much importance; and when it goes
up, it eases lots of situations, but it does
not create collapses of capital values. It
doesn't create a new problem of bank sol-
vency. The rate now is abnormally and in-
conveniently low on the short terms, and you
can't keep the long-term rate at approxi-
mately its present level within limits
with a big expansion of Treasury financing by
moving out of the long-term market and staying
out of it, and if you can rely on the Federal
Reserve's open market operations to come in
to help you whenever you need that, then you
know that you can support your short-term
market if necessary and that at any time if
there are any difficulties there you can be
tided over on them, so that the short-term
rates - the rates may have to rise, but they
can rise on that level. I mean on the short-
term from bills to two- or three or even four-
year notes. It doesn't much matter within
limits what happens to those rates from the
point of view of the effect on the economy,
whereas the long-term rates you have got--
Bell:
That wouldn't hurt our feelings any if they
rose in that area.
Viner:
That is what I am arguing, and yet it may be
important to keep the long term rate from
rising because of what it does to all the
previous structure of long-term securities
Regraded Unclassified
31
- 28 -
you have outstanding where capital values are
so important.
H.M.Jr:
There are two things that Stewart stated
yesterday. One was, he raised the question,
is the present Government bond market inflated?
That was one question he raised, and then the
other one was the question of the soundness of
the bank structure when this was over, how
could it take the shock when this thing is
over? I mean, avoiding the 1920 episode.
Those were two things you raised yesterday
which haven't been touched on here. What I
would like to do, Dan, is this. I don't see
why this thing has to go on until the fifteenth
of October. I couldn't stand it. I wondered
if, as long as these people are here - are
you busy for the next hour?
Bell:
I have an appointment at twelve fifteen, but
I can postpone it.
H.M.Jr:
If they wanted to continue and then set up a
little committee.
Bell:
That is what I would like to do.
H.M.Jr:
And then I would like to sit in again next
Wednesday and then talk the thing over just
as long as it is necessary. We can decide.
This isn't going to take until the fifteenth
of October. I mean, we ought to be able to
settle this, with the talent in this room--
Bell:
I just wondered, Mr. Secretary, if - say
George and I, if we couldn't work with Ronald
and the doctor, if they want to represent the
Board, with their various staffs, the two
staffs, and then--
H.M.Jr:
I would like somebody from White's shop also.
Regraded Unclassified
32
- 29 -
Bell:
Well, that would be part of the staff I was
thinking of. Do you want White on the
committee?
H.M.Jr:
No.
Bell:
I was using Bernstein.
H.M.Jr:
That is all right.
Bell:
And maybe from time to time we could agree
on points, and then we could come to you
and - or anybody else in the Board and say
we have agreed on these steps.
Now, whether the action should be taken at
that time on those steps would be a matter for
decision at that meeting. We certainly are
agreed on the objectives here, and I think we
are all agreed on the housing thing, and maybe
that is one thing that action should be taken
on pretty promptly.
Ransom:
I would like to say that I think the consumer
control thing doesn't make the sense it should
make, leaving housing out of it. Now what
heroic process we get it in, I don't know, and
I am not at all afraid to undertake it because
I think it is so important it ought not to
be overlooked, and I really don't anticipate
quite the opposition in Government that we
might have found at one time.
H.M.Jr:
I mentioned two months ago to Jones--
Bell:
It was longer than that, Mr. Secretary. It
was way back in either March or April that
you told Jones that the limit ought to be
reduced substantially, and I thought he agreed.
H.M.Jr:
I thought he agreed.
Regraded Unclassified
33
- 30 -
Bell:
He said, "I am going to take it up right away."
Ransom:
At our suggestion you gentlemen and Mr. Jones
and the OPACS people are on a sort of advisory
committee for us, and I can go direct to Mr.
Jones and tell him what the problem is and
get his immediate reaction to it and try to get
that thing. I think that no program is com-
plete without that.
H.M.Jr:
That is right.
Currie:
Of course, what you really need there, Ronald,
is over-all powers. If you just do FHA, you
will only throw more business to the non-FHA.
H.M.Jr:
You can't just limit it to them. It will
break out somewhere else. That is the trouble
with the selective credit thing. You stop
it here and it will break out somewhere else.
Bell:
Certainly the banks are not loaning up to
eighty or ninety percent on a piece of property.
Ransom:
Some of these small financing companies and
loan companies and what-not are doing some
very fancy financing. If you stop it one
place and don't stop it at the other --
H.M.Jr:
Well, and as you go along I think you will
have to talk to SEC about selective loans.
Viner:
New issues.
H.M.Jr:
You see, at the suggestion of Jerome Frank, I
recommended - you ought to get that out and
show it to the people - a committee to do just
this sort of thing, and Jerome Frank is very
much interested in it. It was pigeon-holed
in the Budget, and we might dust that off,
and we can do it informally, and then maybe
some day the President may formalize it, and
if he doesn't, we will go ahead anyway.
Regraded Unclassified
- 31 -
34
Bell:
I think that is & subject for discussion in
this committee.
H.M.Jr:
But there is that thing, you know, that
Jerome Frank was so interested in and the
President - I mentioned it to him and he
was interested. And then the Bureau of the
Budget wasn't because it didn't originate
there, I guess.
Viner:
Mr. Secretary, I think that if the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve can work together,
there is something to be said for having it
between those two agencies and calling in
any special agency that is affected rather than
setting up another committee.
H.M.Jr:
I am sorry, Jake, but I didn't hear what you
said.
Viner:
I said that if the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve can work together satisfactorily
on this, I think there are substantial
advantages in their working together on that
and calling in representatives of other
agencies where the problem touches them
particularly, but not taking them into the
over-all problem which isn't really their
business.
Bell:
You couldn't do that on a control of capital
issues.
Viner:
On the control of capital issues you would
call in SEC and on that thing you would have
them participate to the full, but you wouldn't
call them in on housing or reserve requirements.
Bell:
I agree with that.
Currie:
Mr. Secretary, following up the point that you
Regraded Unclassified
35
- 32 -
made about October 15, I should think it
awfully desirable to come to a fairly early
decision on this. I don't know if you
would agree with me, Ronald, but I think one
of the criticisms we could make of the
'37 action was that it was much too late.
We discussed it a long time and then we set
the date way in the future when it would
take effect.
Ransom:
We have no objection at all, Mr. Secretary,
to disposing of it early. I just want to be
sure --
H.M.Jr:
No, it has all been out in the press, how you
people feel about it.
Ransom:
Yes, everything is in the press.
H.M.Jr:
But I mean this whole thing of how you
people feel - what is that fellow's bond
letter?
Bell:
Goldsmith?
H.M.Jr:
Goldsmith and Miss Sylvia Porter in the New
York Evening Post had the whole story, so
somebody had a loose tongue.
Ransom:
I don't take them quite that seriously. But
the reason I suggested October 15 was not
the idea that that - that the issue couldn't
be disposed of sooner, but that I wanted to
be sure this time we had enough elbow room
between us to be reasonably sure our con-
clusions were sound and not rush into a
situation. But when all of us have given so
much thought to it, I don't see why it can't
be brought to an end much sooner, and the
sooner the better from our point of view.
H.M.Jr:
I have set aside Wednesday afternoon at three
Regraded Unclassified
36
- 33 -
o'clock, and if you fellows can make some
progress - just a minute, please, I have a
call.
(The Secretary left the conference temporarily
and returned.)
H.M.Jr:
Well, are you satisfied?
Ransom:
Entirely. I thank you very much and appreciate
your interest.
H.M.Jr:
Are you going to continue talking with them
now, Dan?
Ransom:
We can continue, Dan, at any time that suits
you.
H.M.Jr:
Don't you want to make use of this talent now?
I don't know whether Lauch is free now or not.
Regraded Unclassified
CONFIDENTIAL
(This is not strictly & verbatim report).
37
September 4, 1941
11:00 A.M.
RE AID TO BRITAIN
(Conference held in Mr. White's office).
Present:
Sir Frederick Phillips
Mr. Childs
Mr. Bewley
Mr. Keyes
Mr. Chance
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Brown
Mr. Kades
Mr. White
Miss Kistler-
Mr. Hicks
Mr. Mack
Mr. Ladick
Mr. Cochran
Phillips:
I was going to bring one of the Australian men with me.
Australia has a hard core, as we do, miscellaneous
machinery, etc. Main point which arose in discussion
about Australia was this: they find it extraordinarily
difficult to get any clear or general decision out of
the Lease-Lend. They are always told that the way to
get the decision is to put in a specific requisition.
They are asked to answer a great number of questions
and give a lot of statistical information about how
much for civilians, how much for the Army, for civilian
work, etc. They have to set up complicated trade
controls in Australia, collect a mass of information
if they hadn't it already, bring it over here, fill
out the requisition, and get turned down.
Brown:
Have they been turned down?
Phillips:
Not exactly, but they feel very strongly that they will.
Before they started some of these controls, they would
like very much to have some kind of idea about refusal.
Brown:
I would like very much to see them and find out the type
of thing that they will ask about. They will find that
there is a certain general pattern - type of informa-
tion we would need to have. As you will appreciate,
this Lend-Lease has been expanding and expanding.
Regraded Unclassified
38
- 2 -
Regraded Unclas
Phillips:
For instance the problem with South African mining
machinery.
White:
Try to get them to develop the defense aspects of the
case.
Phillips:
They find it very difficult to concentrate on that
aspect of the case. We would be very pleased to give
them the background and as much of the picture as we
can.
White:
Would it serve your purpose best if some of the gentle-
men had a meeting?
Phillips:
Might have a few minutes talk with Brown which would
clear up difficulties.
Brown:
This would apply to others besides Australians. Use
them as a guinea pig.
White:
Have you reference to gold mining machinery in South
Africa?
Brown:
No, steel mill equipment.
White:
First item here is by Mr. Brown on the progress of
the transfer of plant and supply contracts.
Brown:
It was brought out in a meeting with the Maritime
Commission that the ships involved in the Todd Ship-
building contract, though the hulls were the same,
the power plants were different. British ships are
coal burners and our ships are oil burners. The
Maritime Commission says it cannot use coal burning
ships. It is impossible, therefore, for us to work
out a plan of taking over British orders and having
the British defer their orders to a later date. If
they were the same kind of ship, it would not present
any problem - the Maritime Commission could lease them
to the British under terms of the appropriation act.
But being different kinds of ships, if and when they
get them back they would have the difficulty that
they could not take coal burners which they do not
want to use.
White:
Might they consider having the British changing their
ships to oil burning ships?
-
39
Regraded Unclas
Brown:
It is too late for that. The first have already been
launched and they have ordered the squipment for these
and most of the subsequent ships. The sum involved
for the remaining ships is 80 small that Powell doss
not feel it 1a worth while.
White:
Should mean a very substantial sun.
Phillips:
When the Maritime Commission put in their appropriation
bill, they had planned to transfer ships as ships to
the British or release to the British ... Comdittee
ammended this clause and left it in a form that the
only way ships could be used was that they remained
U.S. property and were leased for the time being.
The original idea was that they should be handed
over. Consequence is that ships must now remain
definitely U.S. property and only be leased to Britain.
On top of this was the coal-burning difficulty.
White:
Does the Maritime Commission feel that it could not
use coal-burning ships after the emergency is over?
Brown:
They feel they could not use coal-burning ships.
White:
Insofar as the ships are being leased to the British,
it would be preferable in the point of view that coal
is less scarce than oil for the British. Is there
any possibility of working out an arrangement that
they could lease these with the understanding that
upon cessation of the emergency the British might
buy the ships at the then prevailing value? The
Maritime Commission would not then be confronted
with the need for taking back coal-burning ships.
Browns
They have not the authority to sell them.
White:
I don't know whether this would fit in. If you think
of some other suggestion which might be worth exploring.
Phillips:
It might be well worth trying. There is $87 million
involved.
White:
Would the ships be worthless? The depreciation from the
point of view of supply and demand for ships in the war-
the market value will be substantially less and the
net loss would seen to me to be similar to the net loss
on other arnament equipment which would be absorbed by
Lend-Lease.
- 4 -
40
Brown:
Lend-Lease could not do anything about it at all. You
can only transfer according to specific Congressional
authority. The Maritime Commission has only the
authority to lease.
White:
Let me ask two questions: (1) Is there any law which
prohibits the Maritime Commission from using coal
burners?
Browns
No.
White:
Therefore they could use coal burners. However, if they
couldn't see fit to use them (a) Is there any reason
to believe that if they possessed coal burners they
didn't want, they couldn't get authority to sell them?
Brown:
They couldn't use the appropriation for the specific
program to buy the specific ships of the kind they
didn't want.
Whites
There should be some flexibility in the arrangement.
They could say that if it could be worked out this way,
the ships could be purchased at the end of the war-
what they would in effect be doing would be providing
ships for the emergency and not being saddled with a
lot of ships that would rot in the waterways.
Brown:
Only the Maritime Commission could decide this. I
would be glad to ask Mr. Scull if this could be worked
out.
White:
I think it should be explored.
Brown:
Prices are all different - Maritime Commission has not
raised any administrative difficulties about taking it
over. I will take that point up with them today.
Phillips:
I will get Mr. Scull to ring you up during the day.
White:
It is 50 large a sum that if we think it could be worked
out, it would be to the interest of the British Treasury
for releasing dollars now - and at the same time
desirable from the point of view of American taxpayers
at the end of the war.
Brown:
To the extent that they take over the British contracts
it means less ships for the Maritime Commission than
they want.
Regraded Unclassified
- 5 -
41
Regraded Uncla
Whites
I find difficulty in accepting that theory. The objective
is the same. The ships are going to be made full use
of. They are going to be used in & way which would be
in harmony with the wishes of both Governments. It is
not & question of depriving ourselves of ships.
Brown:
It would be. You have an appropriation which would have
to be spent.
White:
I an pursuing this as a suggestion. The difficulties
are apt to be insurmountable. The objective is the
same and ways and means are to be sought of introducing
flexibility. The technical difficulties can easily
be insurmountable. I an setting forth my point of
view. Unless there is disagreement around this table -
I would be glad to talk with the Commission if you
think it would be of any help.
Brown:
I will find out what the reaction is.
White:
Naturally the agency which has the work and which is
in a sense being worried about the criticism would be
more meticulous. But, we all have to be careful that
statements do not underestimate or lose sight of the
general objective.
Phillips:
We should get out & statement of various questions.
Status of possibilities.
Brown:
On the question of plant contracts, the Defense
Plant Corporation is now ready to go ahead and take
over these $79 million worth of facilities which would
net about $52-$55 million.
Robinson:
The program is going along all right. Probably will be
completed in less than four months whole $79 million.
Judging by past experience, this first group will
yield $55 million when it is completed.
Brown:
The principle was that they would take them over and
charge & rental BO long as the British supply contract
ran. They charge the same rental that they would to
anyone in this country, a rental that is based on a
depreciation figure - 5% for building, 10% for tools,
etc., depending upon what is in the factory. Most of
the British contracts are fairly short-lived. One is
about ten years.
42
- 6 -
Phillips:
To have no objection to the rental, but in the case of
the Tennessee Powder Plant the first year's rental
was payable on the first day.
White:
I suppose there will be a reimbursal to the extent
that the full year is not up. You feel that it
would be four months before you have actually been
paid for the cost of these facilities?
Robinson:
Machine gun contracts are in the process of being
wound up. Engineers have to go over the plans,
decisions have to be made. Engineers get out and
check over the facilities - somebody else doing cost
accounting - normal inertia. We are doing two at
& time and there are 11 of them altogether. If we
can get the first two moving, we can suggest they
get started on the next two, but some of the accounts
are enormously complicated, especially aircraft.
Phillips:
We hope that in four months the program will be
completed. We have discovered other plums ...
amounting to theoretically $31 million... ship-
building yards, etc.
(Passed around printed lists).
The fourth item on first page.
White:
Why are these in a different category?
Robinson:
Because the 11 have been under discussion since the
beginning of the year. A good many others hadn't
come into line. Todd Shipbuilding wasn't thought
available. Crucible and others were not committed
until after January 1 and the other two didn't seen
big enough to worry about.
White:
Is there any reason to believe that if the 11 go
through that the others won't go through?
Robinson:
The War Department has agreed on the clearance of
the first 11. It is & matter of time. The first 11
were the biggest and were the least complicated.
White:
Well, the $31 million may be regarded as potential
source of revenue during the coming year.
Regraded Unclassified
- 7 -
43
Phillips:
You must not take the figure of $31 million. That is
the most that could be obtained.
Robinson:
If we got into small amounts we could dig up conal-
derably more. The individual items are ao small that
it hasn't been thought wise to tabulate them yet.
White:
This will be brought to our attention on your schedule
when you get around to it - but about the $31 million.
Who should first suggest that these be acquired?
Childs:
On the first program, the initial suggestion came from
the Secretary.
Brown:
Wouldn't it be just as well to concentrate on the program
we now have?
Robinson:
It wouldn't be bad to start these others and get
at least a general agreement.
Brown:
I will ask the Maritime Commission whether they are
interested in these shipyards.
Robinson:
Todd is very reluctant to have anything to do with
Government facilities and if it were confronted with
the possibility of Government ownerhip, it might be
willing to buy the British facilities itself.
White:
Well the alternative would be selling to Todd,
Phillips:
Do we first approach the Defense Plant group or do we
go to the Maritime Commission and the Navy Department?
We will raise the question - get it in the mill.
White:
I take it there are several stages to be reached
before the accountants begin to operate. Do you have
anything special in mind that this would delay now?
Brown:
There has been so much reluctance it might be just as
well not to raise this with the Defense Plant Corpora-
tion now.
Childs:
We could let them know there is a backlog.
Brown:
But the other contracts are larger.
44
- 8 -
Phillips:
There is a danger, isn't there, that if the four
months elapse they will say that we have done a
terrific job of work for you and you should have
told us about these others?
White:
They will say, what is the end of this process?
There is something to be said on both sides.
Robinson:
In starting the $31 million program you will be dealing
with only the top-flight people. Does McCloy's commit-
ment really cover anything except the first group?
Browns
I will have to check.
White:
I see the justi fication of your comments, Mr. Brown,
but in line of the general situation it might be
better to get the other program started.
Brown:
If it were done from Sir Frederick to Mr. Jones it
would be more effective.
White:
Is it understood Sir Frederick that you will present
this?
Phillips:
Yes.
White:
This next item, would you want this raised?
Childs:
I have discussed the matter with Mr. Kades. The
action now lies in the State Department.
White:
No, it lies with the Secretary. It was on the agenda
last time but he passed it by. Nobody seemed to object
80 it was passed by.
Phillips:
Well, we are not paying them.
...
The problem is that
they could get nasy with the contractors.
White:
It can well rest in abeyance for the time being.
Childs:
The older it gets the less urgent it 18.
Kades:
The only question concerning the Secretary is that of
revoking the British license if they are forced to ask
for a license.
Regraded Unclassified
45
White:
We are not likely to be confronted with that problem,
particularly since everything has gone along this far.
The decision one way or another would be easy when the
time comes. All the preliminary work has been done.
I think that if it is agreeable to you, Sir Frederick,
we will leave it off the agenda.
Phillips:
What I would like to have gotten from the Secretary was
a statement that, were the proposal put up to him, he
would act. Alternatively, we would be perfectly satis-
fied with a general assurance that if the French were
to create disturbances resulting in the holding up of
important contracts that the U.S. Government departments
will deal with the situation by requisitioning, etc.
Childs:
I always felt that we had that assurance. If any
difficulty arose that the U.S. will assist in the
situation.
White:
Mr. Kades is there any indication that the Government
would not be of assistance?
Kades:
The only thing on the Secretary's desk was about
the license. The assurance rests with the Lend-Lease
department. It is a question of requisitioning the
plants. It would simply be a question of whether the
President would requisition the plants by executive
order. I feel personally that it isn't going to get to
that point. I think that Mr. Childs agrees with me
that no court would issue an injunction to restrict
the deliveries.
Childs,
June 17 of last year I was very much worried. Now I
am less worried. They might attack us about paying
them. We haven't the license to pay them. We can
always say that we won't go to jail for ten years in
order to pay them. Secondly, they might go to the
manufacturers and stop delivery. They could say that
we have fallen down on our payments and have no right
to these planes. You might then requisition this stuff
and get it to us on Lend-Lease. Those problems
diminish from day to day. I do not feel concerned about
it now, Sir Frederick.
White:
If you would like, we will put it on the agenda and
would raise it. I would suspect that the Secretary's
reply would be that if you are not paying on the
contracts we might as well wait. Whatever your choice
in the matter is. When did you stop paying on those?
Regraded Unclassified
46
- 10 -
Childs:
April or May.
Kades:
About $20 million of it 1a not a case of French contracts
any longer. Your contract is direct with the manufacturer
60 that the French would simply have a cause of action
against you instead of the manufacturer. $55 million
left - may be even less. As the deliveries are made,
their ability to stop production lessens.
White:
This third item - gold mining machinery for the Belgian
Congo.
Phillips:
Someone called on me from the Belgian Embassy and said
that they had an output of gold from the Belgian Congo
of approximately one-quarter million a month. The
Belgian Congo is part of the sterling area. They
put in & requisition for needed machinery to continue
operation.
Brown:
We have no record of such 8. requisition for machinery.
Phillips:
It wasn't a big order. They were met by the reply
that gold was not essential for continuing the war
and that no steel would be made available for this
machinery.
Brown:
I understand that it is the OPM that raised the
priorities question.
Phillips:
The Belgians have bought most of their mining equipment
here, and 80 have the South Africans. My question is,
what if the same decision should be made on a South
African request for mining machinery?
White:
Let us wait until the question comes up to us as
it probably will. In an item of that kind it probably
would come to us, and I am not sure what our position
would be. The amount of gold production involved in
the present case is small. But the statement that
machinery is being sent to the Belgian Congo with
which to produce gold which comes to us can be made
the subject of discussion which I should think
we would like to avoid if possible until there was
something more at stake. In other words, we wouldn't
want to be confronted with the necessity to defend our
position that we are either encouraging gold production
Regraded Unclassified
47
- 11 -
or discouraging gold production. The Treasury would
like to avoid this. I am afraid that is what would
happen here. Export control, priorities, lend-lease...
Brown:
They were trying to buy it. It is OPM's problem.
White:
I think that it does raise an issue.
Brown:
Sir Frederick is asking the Treasury to bring influence.
Phillips:
In view of our production of gold, the purchase would
involve
finances of the sterling area - mining
machinery must be kept up. We would like to refer them
to the U.S. Treasury.
White:
I don't know that our answer would be any different,
but OPM should have referred to us. It affects sterling
assets. It doesn't come under Lend-Lease anyway.
Phillips:
You are probably quite right. But if South Africa
requests such machinery it will come up later under
Lend-Lease.
Mack:
Your man Grey would be able to help on that. Isn't he
on the Army-Navy Priorities Board?
Phillips:
Yes, I will have him find out. It looks like the fore-
runner of a serious problem. That is why we brought it
up.
Brown:
Has your reply gone back to OPMT
Phillips:
The Belgian's has, I believe.
White:
The next question has pertinence aside from the general
problem in anticipation of the Secretary's appearance
on the appropriations for the Lend-Lease bill. I feel
almost certain that somebody will ask him for a duplicate
of the statement which he submitted in the first Lend-
Lease bill. The Secretary will probably want this. It
was my thought that we might anticipate that and work
out something and assemble the list. Then we would
get together with you men and work out a statement that
would report the situation to your satisfaction.
Phillips:
Go over a few points.
Regraded Unclassified
-12-
48
White:
I can't say whether there will be more interest in BOSE
details or less. One or two will be more interested.
The remainder will be less. It may be that one or two
may push the Secretary around & bit and the quickest
way to handle that situation would be to be possessed
of all the facts.
Phillips: August 30, balance of gold was $195 million. If deliveries
on our contracts hold up for the next six months, we
shouldn't have any cash at all. There is the question
of the trust funds. We haven't made any progress on this.
The lawyers advise us to do nothing about it ... $300
million out of the old estimate ... I don't think that
direct investments show any enormous divergence.
White:
The question of $300 million would have to be gone through
thoroughly because someone at the hearings may ask why
it was not foreseen on January 1, and why it was ascertained
later that it wasn't legally possible. Those arguments will
arise from those who are not in sympathy. I think that on
that point we had better prepare as much material in answer
as we can in anticipation. Would it be all right if we
went ahead with the preparation of a balance sheet and
if you will appoint someone to act -
Phillips: I would suggest that you get hold of the press notice that
Jesse Jones issued at that time. Came up to well over
$400 million. .But value on some other direct invest-
ments which he made very high would amount up to $500
million. Add Viscose and Brown and Williamson - some
quote about trust funds - and it wouldn't be far off
at $900 million.
White:
We will try to work that out. Would it be possible
for someone on your staff to prepare a memorandum dealing
with trust funds, setting forth the salient points?
Bewley:
We have a great deal of material on this.
White:
Since it is American law that causes the difficulty, the
problem of defending it before the Committee is simpler.
Bewleys
We will prepare a memorandum, certainly.
White:
We will go over it with you boys to make it acceptable.
That takes care of item 40
- 13 -
49
Phillips: What 18 basis d' forecast for six months?
White:
We have to make forecast that these are your cash assets
and these are your needs for the coming six months, and
these are your resources. The first thing they are going
to ask for is how much you are going to need, and don't
you have any resources? I think we would sooner or later
have to present that to them. We would prefer to present,
as formerly, your estimates representing your statement
of your cash position and of your needs and resources,
and the only thing that we will do is put it in & form
which would most easily be followed by the Committee.
But there may be closer questioning on some items than
there was last time by virtue of some discussions.
There may be none at all. They may not be interested
any longer.
Phillips:
Six months is about right?
White:
It would seem that six months would be the logical period
that we could presumably estimate chead. Certainly the
British Treasury must look six months ahead on the picture.
Kistler:
They might like to compare the cash position during this
year with the forecast that was made of it on January 1.
White:
Had deliveries been as rapid as anticipated, etc? I
believe that is what Sir Frederick had in mind. The
more information we can give them and the more informa-
tion we have, the easier will be the appropriation.
Brown:
Very much 50.
White:
It probably will be a duplication of the questioning
based on such statement as would be available 50 that
we should get at least as much as we can in anticipation.
This fifth item, coal for bunkers at West Indian ports.
It was mentioned in the last meeting.
Brown:
We are taking care of it. Strike it out.
White:
How much does it amount to - less than a million?
Bewley:
It depends upon how long a period you are considering.
Regraded Unclassified
50
- 14 -
White:
In the next six months?
Bewley:
Considerably less than & million.
White:
Are there any other points?
Phillips:
To return to the first item on the agenda, we didn't
say much about the War Department, but you will see on
our paper that there was very little good news about
important items. I did have a word with Mr. McCloy
and he said that approximately $100 million of the War
Department appropriation was available for this job.
Certainly no real progress has been made since the
Secretary saw the figures last.
White:
There has been no progress?
Phillips:
No.
White:
With whom is it awaiting a decision? Is there some
investigation being made?
Brown:
I talked with Mr. McCloy before our last meeting and he
said he was going to see the Secretary that afternoon.
It was a very delicate situation. He feels it is up
to him to see that something is accomplished. He was
to see Secretary Stimson. I haven't heard that any
answer was given. I am absolutely convinced that he
feels it is on his shoulders.
Robinson:
As recently as yesterday there was nothing.
White:
The money they were to have spent for that was what they
missed in the appropriation.
Robinson:
I don't know that that $40 million is still there. It is
the first item on page 2 - contracts placed since March 11.
Four months ago apparently General Burns arranged to have
$40 million which represented allocations in excess of
requirements to take over British contracts and advised
Army Ordnance. If that $40 million is still there, we don't
know that it is, it could reasonably be applied to March 11
contracts which are now reduced to $30 million. That item
as well as these other items all seem to be very black as
far as any progress is concerned. Not in principle, but
in practice. Cutting appropriations has contributed to ...
if they can possibly avoid.
Regraded Unclassified
- 15 -
51
Browns
Under Lease-Lend it can't be done.
White:
I don't want to appear obtuse, but I know the Secretary
would ask, where is the block? Who does the decision
rest with and what is that person waiting for? Does
the decision rest with Secretary Stimson?
Phillips:
Yes, it does.
Robinson:
Certainly the Army has it.
White:
It would appear that reasonable time has elapsed that such
information should have been gathered. No uncertain
elements are in the picture. Then do you think it would
be appropriate at this time, or at the next meeting,
that the Secretary take up the matter with Secretary
Stimson? In the light of the history of this, it would
appear to me that none of us can do anything.
Brown:
McCloy says he is working hard. That is as far as he can
go.
Robinson:
It has been two months or six weeks with the Ordnance and
air people. ...$44 million and as much aircraft as we
can get.
Brown:
Around $35 million ...
Phillips:
I have $40 - $44 - $30
White:
Over $100 million. Unless there is some view to the
contrary, when it comes up at the next meeting with the
Secretary, we will indicate as far as possible that no
progress has been made and that commitments give no
promise of being handled soon.
Brown:
He should make inquiry of McCloy.
White:
I will speak to the Secretary about calling him before
the meeting. It is a very good suggestion. As far as
this committee is concerned, the ball is in his lap.
Bewley:
Mr. Keyes has some white sheets and these are the things
that have been done by the missions themselves ...
$500 to $5,000 ...
Regraded Unclassified
52
- 16 -
White:
We would like a copy. I will look it over later. Is
there anything on these that you would want to bring up?
Bewley:
Nothing that I know of.
Childs:
Simply as a forewarning, I should like to say that a telegram
came in before this meeting there there is going to be a
crop shortage in the Near East. We are going to be faced
with the possi. bility of supplying the entire Near East.
Because of shipping and other considerations, We will have
to ask for some help here. It covers several countries -
Turkey, Iran, Sudan, Abyssinia.
Brown:
What would be the basis for supplying Turkey? How is the
U.K. concerned?
Childs:
Iran and Turkey because they need grain. Turkey is pro-
Ally. ...Iran has a different political situation.
Browns
Doesn't it mean much as to the why and how of getting
supplies to Turkey?
Childs:
There is a Middle Eastern Supply Center which handles
civilian population demands. Perhaps through the Turkish
Government. Whole supply system has not been clearly defined.
Phillips:
What has happened to Turkey under Lend-Lease?
Childs:
We have requisitioned for it - - handled it straight.
Brown:
Defense of Turkey has not yet been found essential
to our protection.
White:
This problem will be a part of Lend-Lease judgment ...
would in part be political as well as monetary consideration.
It is a matter which would play a role in your valuation.
Brown:
Yes. It seems to boil down to purely a shipping problem.
The supplies are in India and Australia but are not available
as ships are on the Atlantic route.
Childs:
Shipping was a. consideration. I didn't know it was the sole.
Brown:
Let us say transportation. I don't see my difference in
taking it from Australia and taking it from the U.S.
Regraded Unclassified
53
- 17 -
Childs:
It is not an immediate problem. Will be most urgent
though when it comes.
(Mr. Cochran came in as the group was breaking up. White assured
him they had discussed the question of gold-mining machinery in
the Belgian Congo.)
Regraded Unclassified
M. Tile - working
office, 16/1- c, 1-MI,
PRESENT STATUS UP POSSIBILITIES FOR DOLLAR RELIEF
Received
(Pignes are in millions of dollars)
August 29, 1941.
CEPITAL FACILITIES
Tennessee Poyder 21 alroudy paid.
Fachine Gun Plants 24 total, of which About 3 paid--
Rest progressing satisfactorily.
Plants discussed with DPC on which War Department has certified
necessity for national defense and agreed on take out,
Total cost -- 79
Estimated recovery -- 55
Approximate annual rental while
British contracts continue -- 5.5
Discussions held and take-over agreed in principal -
Going ahead with 2 plants with aggregate cost of about
23 (bashd on 79). Others to follow,
Plants over, not yet discussed with DPC but proper subjects for take-
Total cost -- 31. Recovery probably somewhat less, Rental
ould be about 10% during contracts.
These consist of:
Todd Shipbuilding -- 9
Crucible Steel -- 6.6
Savage Arms -- 7.5
Oerlikon 6.6 (including 5 recently authorized)-
American Type Founders -- .6
National Pneumatic -- .7
There are probably many others not involving large amounts
CONTRACTS
4 Nachine Gun Contracts--Total Dollar Relief subject only to
working out details -- 28, of this 6.6 will be repayment of
advances and balance relief from commitment,
Paid balance, to date 5.4 No difficulty is expected in recovering the
Contracts prior to March 11.
Matched orders or Deferred deliveries
Ships-Todd contracts 87. The power to lend-lease
vessels under the new Maritime Commission Appropriation
was limited by Congress to powers to lease vessels which must
Maritime Commission take over the Todd ships they can lease
remain United States property. The effect is that if the
then to the U.K. under lend-lease but cannot deliver them as
defense articles, The Maritime Commission now say that they
own account,
cannot agree to the purchase of this type of ship for their
War Ordnance THIS to place orders for same products out of
Tanks and Tank Engines--Continental and Baldwin 44.
non-Lend-Lease funds, British would cancel contracts and
has contracts and charged to billion three fund. War Department Army
similar products would be Lease-Lent from pre March 11
repeatedly urged and agreeable in principal, Does not want
done nothing about this for about two months although
Regraded Unclassified
its own funds for this purpose and out in appropriations
Arthuted to reluctance.
Airplane Engines-Thess amount in total 80 about 250.
theory 83 tanks and tank engines. Army Air and BAC have
infarred but unable to discover any funds for the purpose.
absequently it was thought 40 might be found in non-Lend-Lease
funis but Army Air has done nothing for about two months
though repeatedly urged. It is now stated that the 40 19 not
available.
Contracts placed since March 11 for ordnance items (including
letters of intention not considered commitments
It was understood that 40 of Lend-Lease funds was
earmarked from Ordnance allocations for take-outs of British
contracts. This represented over-allocations on certain Lend-
Lease Ordnance items, It is not known whether this is still
available since it was set aside more than two months ago and at
that time War Department agreed in principal to take=out. No
action has been taken since in spite of repeated efforts.
Reluctance probably due partly to cut in appropriations,
British Ordnance contracts since March 11 consist
principally of three large tank contracts on which the recoverable
amounts, after agreement with Lend-Lease representatives, may not
total more than 30.
Contracts placed since March 11 for Naval Bureau of Ships items.
There is only one substantial item in this class
(Sterling Admiral Engines) which amounts to 1.25. Although a
Lend-Lease requisition has been filed it is understood that there
are no Lend-Lease funds available for the purpose in the Navy
allocations.
Contracts and amendments since March 11 for Aircraft items,
One large contract amounting to 2 and four large
amendments aggregating 7 fall into this category. It is
understood that Lond-Lease funds are available for the take-over
of the contract although no action has been taken by the Army as
yet, As to the amendments there has been an unwillingness to
consider take-over of these because of the stringency of funds
and the administrative difficulties involved,
Cancellation of Vultee Contract
This will involve dollar relief of about Il and it is
understood that the Army contract has now been signed,
Cancellation of Remington rifle contract
This 1111 provide dollar relief of about 32. Funds
have been allocated and directives given but little progress has
been made due to the company's failure to quote prices. It is
expected that this will work out, however,
Cancellation of Savare rifle contract
This -111 provide dollar rolief of about 24, It is In
the sôme position as Remington but seems to be considerably
further advanced And the Trey contract should be let in due course,
Nachine Tools
There DPV various contracts for machine tools which have
béen made since Norch Il and, since Lond-Lease funds seem to be
available in the cologories within which these fall investigation
is proceeding to determine whether any of these contracts can
profitably be taken over under Lend-Loose.
Regraded Unclassified
DOLLAR RELIEF TO THE BRITISH TREASURY
Plants and Supplies Contracts taken over and to be taken over (amounts
are in millions of dollers and represent approximate aggregate amounts
of cash refunds and relief from commitments).
Certain or
Possible or
almost Certain Probable Unlikely
Plants taken over or to be
taken over:
Tennessee Powder
21
4 Machine Gun Plants
24
Other Plants discussed
with D.P.C.
55*
Other Plants not dis-
cussed (1th D.F.C.
32
4 Machine Gun Contracts
transferred (product)
28
Contracts placed prior to
March 11th:
Ships
87
Airplane Engines
40
Tanks & Tank Engines
44
Contracts placed since March
11th for Naval items
1
Contracts placed since March
11th for ordnance items (in-
cluding letters of intention
not considered commitments)
30
Contracts and amendments since
March 11th for aircraft items
9
Cancellation of Vultee contract
11
Cancellation of Remington Rifle
contract
32
Cancellation of Savage Rifle
contract
24
Total
140
55
242
Certain or almost certain 140
Probable
55
Possible or Unlikely
242
Total
437
.
Provisional estimate of recovery out
of total cost of $79,000,000
3rd Soptember, 1941
Regraded Unclassified
57
September 4, 1941
2:45 p.m.
RE AID TO BRITAIN
Present:
Mr. Graves
Mr. Mack
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Nelson
Mr. MacKeachie
Mr. Cox
Mr. White
Mr. Young
H.M.Jr:
I had a chance to show this to Hopkins, and
he is up now so high he can't be bothered
with these details, but he thinks it is all
right. I mean, that you (Mack) should have
the fifty million dollars. You haven't got
any copies of this?
Graves:
I have & copy here.
H.M.Jr:
That is all right.
Now shoot at me on the other thing, will you.
It is a good memorandum. And when you get
out of this meeting, will you take a look
at that clipping. Don't bother with it now.
You might give Chick Schwarz an answer later
in the day or tomorrow morning.
Mack:
All right.
Well now, this memorandum has to do with the
frozen funds. That is where the priorities
comes in.
Regraded Unclassified
58
- 2 -
B.M.Jr:
Hopkins never left here until two-thirty.
Mack:
And this has to do primarily - well, exclu-
sively with metals, that is, steel, sinc,
copper, pig iron, and so on. We have
requisitions from the British that specify
deliveries over a period of several months.
We get the - the money is allocated for the
entire purchase. OPM has followed the
policy of making an allotment in - an allot-
ment or priority rating, in most cases, on
e monthly basis. Therefore, we have these
lags of the balance of each requisition
beyond one month. As you will notice from
some of these instances I have here, the
first one, eighteen million dollars is the
amount that is required to cover the entire
purchase for all the deliveries, but the
amount allocated, which is the amount that
has been purchased, is about three million
nine, or B. balance of fourteen million odd
that runs into that frozen fund total.
The same way on zinc. Now, we have requi-
sitions for zinc that call for deliveries
over a period of a year and Tie had a
clearance from OPM. For example on zinc,
the orders call for deliveries for twelve
months. We get allocations by the month.
We accordingly may purchase three and a half
millions. We have sixteen and a half mil-
lions that go into that frozen fund total.
Now, the suggestion I have in mind is this:
that first we get straightened out with
these requisitions that are on the fire,
that is, that need to be straightened out
on an allocation basis, and I am sure that
that falls within the picture that Nelson
is now trying to work out to make immediate
allocations of everything they have over
there.
Regraded Unclassified
59
- 3 -
The second thing that I think is - provides
a control as to - and we can do this in
Procurement if you want us to. We asked
the British Purchasing Commission in charge
of defense supplies to tell us before they
submit a requisition, or tell Lend-Lease,
what their requirements for metals will be
for the next three, six, and nine months.
Then we will take that schedule, go to OPM
and say, "Now, here is what they want. How
about the priority ratings or the allocation?"
and they say, "Well, we can give them fifty
percent of this, seventy-five percent of
that, and so on." Then the requisitions can
be made out by the British Purchasing Com-
mission or the China Defense people only for
what has already been cleared by OPM.
Therefore, we don't have any loose ends hang-
ing. We get the money for that amount. We
buy that amount because it has been cleared.
H.M.Jr:
I think it would be much better.
Mack:
That is the suggestion I have in a nutshell.
H.M.Jr:
That would be much better.
Mack:
And I think Nelson would be tickled to death
to do it.
H.V.Jr:
In other words, they would let you know
informally what their needs are?
Mack:
Yes.
Graves:
May I put in two cents worth on this?
H.V.Jr:
I wish you would.
Graves:
I did not understand from Mr. Gaston's memo
Regraded Unclassified
60
- 4 -
to me that there had been any criticism of
Procurement on anybody's part. The sta-
tistics looked bad, and it was Mr. Gaston
who noticed that and called Mr. Mack in,
and said he had better make an explanation
of those low percentages.
H.M.Jr:
I told Gaston to do that.
Graves:
Yes. I simply wanted you to know that accord-
ing to Mr. Mack none of the people that are
present at this meeting have pointed any
finger of criticism--
H.M.Jr:
You want me to be a softie, do you?
Graves:
I don't think it would be wise to give them
the impression that We have been criticised,
because I don't believe we have been.
(Mr. White entered the conference.)
Mack:
Nelson has been very cooperative. Of course
Stettinius is new over there.
H.M.Jr:
But by going into this thing, I have got some-
thing to complain about.
Graves:
That is different.
H.M.Jr:
I have got something to complain about, and
I am going to say, "Now there is a new deal
and new people and I want to - I don't want
to be mixed up in something that takes forty-
two days to clear from the day they give us
the order until the day we buy it.
Mack:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
I am sick and tired of going around and do-
ing every job four times. They had better
do something about it.
Regraded Unclassified
61
- 5 -
We find, Harry, that from the day the English
placed an order until it reaches us, it is
thirty days.
White:
Between the time they place it and the time
it reaches you?
H.M.Jr:
From the time the requisition comes out until
it gets to Mack is thirty days.
White:
Where is that delay due?
H.M.Jr:
Well, we have got a memorandum here. I will
read it out loud.
White:
Maybe they will do better. I should give them
a chance before the new group. I don't think
they will, but I say--
H.M.Jr:
Well, the whole new group is going to be here.
The whole new group is coming here.
White:
I saw a couple of them outside. I mean rather
than laying down the law--
H.M.Jr:
Oh, you fellows are a lot of sissies. Good
God! Everybody around here wants me to be--
Graves:
I don't think there is anything wrong with
your laying down the law with respect to this
new routine. I think that is swell. All I
say is that I don't think we ought to let them
believe that we have found them critical.
H.M.Jr:
No, I am taking the offensive.
White:
All right. Before we had a half dozen and
now we have got six.
H.M.Jr:
Six what?
White:
I say before the new set-up there was a half
Regraded Unclassified
- 6 -
62
dozen and now there is six.
H.M.Jr:
Well, this man Stettinius is in charge of
Lend-Lease and MacKeachie does the buying,
and Nelson does the priorities.
Mack:
That is right. It is thirty days from the
time the requisition is issued by the
British until we get authorization to buy
it, funds allocated.
White:
Have you got & constructive suggestion as to
how it should be done?
H.M.Jr:
Sure, he is in the Treasury, isn't he?
White:
Oh, yes. There is nothing like giving them
a good start. If you have got a way to
shorten it--
H.M.Jr:
We have. He is going to take ten from now
on. He ought to be able to do it in ten.
Mack:
I don't think from that record that we have
done as well as we should.
H.M.Jr:
No, I don't either. I think you could do
better.
Mack:
Yes.
Now, four days in getting these forms
through - of course we have to get estimates
and all that, but that should be shorter.
H.M.Jr:
Was the four days on us?
Mack:
Four days on us.
H.M.Jr:
No, I think a week - you ought to be able to
clear an order in a week.
Regraded Unclassified
63
- 7 -
White:
This average that you have arrived at, is it
fairly representative or is it some kind of
a--
Mack:
We got it as quickly as we could. We had
our fellows take 8. spot, nineteen requisitions,
and follow them through.
White:
Out of how many?
Mack:
Out of a whole case full.
White:
What does that mean, a thousand?
Mack:
Oh, it would be several hundred, yes. But
otherwise it would take weeks to get tabula-
tions on them.
White:
I would be inclined to say that you took a
test sample rather than the average time
required.
H.M.Jr:
It says 80.
Mack:
In the next to the last paragraph, I say it.
H.M.Jr:
It is & good memo. You can't find anything
the matter with it.
(Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Nelson, Mr. MacKeachie,
and Mr. Cox entered the conference.)
H.M.Jr:
Well, gentlemen, the reason I asked you to
come over here was this: You may know we do
a certain amount of buying under Lend-Lease,
and I took a - had Mack take a look at it,
and I think the quickest way to do it is to
read you & page and a quarter. It says:
"As requested, the following are the steps
taken with respect to Lend-Lease purchases,
Regraded Unclassified
64
- 8 -
together with the average time required
for each step:
"(1) Requisitions are written and dated by
the British or China Defense Supplies and sub-
mitted to Defense Aid Reports; thence copies
are sent to Procurement Division and O.P.M.
From date of requisition to receipt in Pro-
curement average lapse of time is two days.
"(2) O.P.M. examines for availability of com-
modity, method of purchase, and whether
supplying will interfere with our own
defense program; then clears to Procurement,
four and one-half days.
"(Note: This average time will probably be
extended by three days when priority ratings
are to be indicated by O.P.M.)
"(3) Form LLA-3--"
Mack:
That is the request for the allocation of
funds.
H.M.Jr:
"
is prepared by Procurement for submis-
sion to Defense Aid Reports. From date of
clearance by O.P.M. to date of submission of
Form LLA-3, four days" - which Mr. Mack says
is two days too long.
"(4) Letter is prepared by Defense Aid
Reports for signature of the President, ap-
proving allocation of funds and transfer of
commodity to the foreign government. From
date of submission by Procurement of Form
LLA-3 to date of letter to be signed by the
President, twelve days.
"(5) After signature by the President, trans-
fer directive submitted to Procurement, eight
days.
Regraded Unclassified
- 9 -
65
"(6) On receipt of transfer-directive - #
which totals up to this point, it totals
thirty days. At that point, "on receipt of
the transfer-directive Procurement proceeds
to make purchase." It takes them an average -
we just picked out nineteen different requi-
sitions and the average of those nineteen was
thirty days from the time the thing was dated
at the British Purchasing Mission until it
reached us. "On receipt of transfer-directive,
Procurement proceeds to make purchase. From
receipt of transfer-directive to date of con-
tract, twelve days," and Mr. Mack says that
that is too long. "The figures above showing
average time required were arrived at by taking
the records on nineteen requisitions which
are believed to be representative of the
usual requisitions received in Procurement.
This procedure requires an average of thirty
days from the date of the requisition before
we are authorized to make the purchase, of
which total twenty days is taken up with
routine having to do with allocations for
each requisition."
This is what we would like to do, if you
gentlemen would approve. It is suggested
that the present revolving fund of ten million
be increased to fifty and authority granted
to use this fund in order that immediate
purchase may be made or that such other steps
be taken to reduce the time now required for
obtaining allotments.
We felt that if, after considering, you would
give us that kind of a thing, and I take it
this goes to you (Stettinius) doesn't it? that
we could do business and cut the thing at
least by two thirds.
Now, Hopkins was here for lunch today, and he
- 10 -
66
read the thing, and he said he liked it.
Nelson:
Well, we can get the priority at the same
time that they are clearing. That was the
procedure we have been setting out to try to
do, you know.
Mack:
That is right.
Nelson:
So at the time of getting the priority, when
it comes into OPM, we would be working on
the priority at the same time they are clear-
ing for the other things, so that that would
eliminate that three and 8. half days.
H.M.Jr:
Could you get rid of it that quickly.
Nelson:
That would eliminate that three and a half
days for priority.
H.M.Jr:
But, Don, if, while you are doing all this
thing, twelve days at the White House and
so forth and so on, if you would give us the
fifty million dollars to operate, somebody,
then we will just go to town, and we will
let the red tape catch up with us a couple
of months later on.
Nelson:
I have always felt that that should be done,
Mr. Secretary. I have talked about that con-
sistently. That takes too much time.
H.M.Jr:
Harry Hopkins said he thought if you did it
for us, you should do it for the Army and
Navy too.
MacKeachie:
I think the procedure is even slower when it
goes through the Army and Navy.
Nelson:
Much slower. It goes through seventeen other
steps when it goes through Army and Navy.
Regraded Unclassified
- 11 -
67
MacKeachie:
Ninety days.
Cox:
That is right.
White:
Mack says only about five percent of those
were eventually turned down.
(Mr. Young entered the conference.)
Mack:
We now use a ten million dollar supply fund
for purchases that are to be put through in
a hurry, and it is working very well, and that
is the reason for suggesting the same thought
but at an increased amount of fifty million
because now, of course, that ten million is
out of commission when we put through nine
and a half or nine and three-quarters million
dollars worth of requisitions. We are stopped
until we can replenish the fund, but with a
larger fund we can keep it rotating con-
stantly. That is the whole thought.
White:
Supposing you go ahead and order these
requisitions and the requisition is not
finally approved. What machinery would you
have for - how would you handle it?
Mack:
We have a control in this sense, that we
wouldn't ask approval to use the rotating
fund until we have an approval from OPM.
White:
Which is up to what period?
H.M.Jr:
The first four days.
White:
Then you save twenty-five days.
H.M.Jr:
What is the matter with it?
Nelson:
I am all for it. I believe it is the only
thing to do.
Regraded Unclassified
68
- 12 -
H.M.Jr:
What do you think, Ed?
Stettinius:
It sounds all right to me. Oscar says it is
all right. Phil of course is the one that--
Young:
I missed the first part of it, for which I
am sorry. Is this the same idea you were
talking to me about last night?
Mack:
Yes.
Young:
On blanket requisitions or on--
Mack:
On all requisitions. I think with the full
work we now have, fifty million dollars would
be enough to take care of all requisitions,
because We would have to figure only for a
sufficient length of time in order to replenish
the fund, you see, which would be a matter of -
well, two or three weeks.
Young:
Using the revolving fund for all requisitions?
Mack:
Yes, and the routine that is now being fol-
lowed to be used for replenishing the fund
and crediting the allocations to bookkeeping
and accounting.
Young:
Why don't you use the revolving fund now in
every case where it is required within the
two weeks' period or whatever time it takes?
Mack:
Well, we use it now. We use it now for trans-
actions that are hurry-up transactions, but
I am speaking in terms of using it for all
requisitions.
Young:
Well, it - you are using it now for all requi-
sitions in which you have to place an order
before the time you get an allocation made,
ordinarily.
Regraded Unclassified
- 13 -
69
Mack:
Well, I think it is this, that we use it now
for all requisitions that the British Pur-
chasing Commission say they want expedited.
They want them handled immediately. But I
am thinking in terms of stepping up the whole
procedure, you see.
Young:
Yes.
Mack:
That is the thought I had in mind.
H.M.Jr:
I always go on the theory if Sears-Roebuck
can get an order in the morning and fill it
and get it out every day--
Nelson:
Ninety-five percent of them.
H.M.Jr:
we ought to be able to do it within a
week.
Nelson:
Yes, sir.
H.M.Jr:
That is what I would like to do and, of course,
holding the thing at the White House twelve
days, sending it back to Budget and all the
rest of it, is ridiculous, and if you fellows
will give us this thing and then - I don't
care about the red tape. You can work it
out afterward. It comes over, we send it to
OPM, and somebody says, "O.K.", go ahead and
buy it, we will buy it and we will do it within
a week.
MacKeachie:
Mr. Secretary, we are going to put a man over
with Mr. Mack who will clear those on the
spot, a very large part of them, and I think--
Mack:
To take the place of John Sanger? Fine.
MacKeachie:
We will put him right over there.
Stettinius:
What do you think, Phil?
Regraded Unclassified
- 14&15 -
70
Young:
Well, I don't think we ought to settle the
fact now that we are going to do that par-
ticular thing. I think that we can work it
out 80 the thing will go through speedily
as possible to put it through.
H.M.Jr:
Phil, if you people can't give us the orders
quicker than you have been doing, you are
going to have to get somebody else to do your
buying.
Young:
Can't do what, sir?
H.M.Jr:
If you can't do it better than you have by
far, I am not going to be mixed up with this
thing, because I don't want to be mixed up
with something that fools around for thirty
days to get the thing cleared. There is
no reason in the world why we shouldn't
have this revolving fund.
Young:
No, you have it.
71
- 16 -
H.M.Jr:
No, I want it so we can go ahead and
operate. Everything has to be done four
or five times and if the British want some-
thing, they ought to be able to get it
and the day they sign the requisition they
ought to have it within a week. I don't
want to be mixed up with something that
is done so badly.
Young:
We are quite in agreement on that, on this
twenty-day lag between the time Cliff sends
the form back to us and the time he gets
the allocation funds. That is a situation
which is done with the full knowledge and
approval of you (Mack) and the various other
departments.
Mack:
That is right.
H.M.Jr:
It was?
Young:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
But it isn't any more.
Young:
No, we aren't doing it any more. It was origin-
ally decided we would hold those requisitions
on A cumulative weekly basis, which was
agreed to by everybody.
Whiter
Do you have some other suggested way which
would eliminate the twenty-five days delay
without the use of & larger revolving fund,
Phil?
Cox:
There is B way, and that --
Young:
We have spent four solid weeks working on this.
We have had 8. man out in the field, as you
know. We also have additional authority from
the President to Burns, Mr. Stettinius now,
I imagine, to make necessary adjustments,
Regraded Unclassified
72
- 17 -
switch allocations, increase or decrease
quantities, substitute articles, in other
words, to give it flexibility which cuts
out the White House lag of & week in there.
H.M.Jr:
But that doesn't interest me. What is the
matter with the idea of giving us enough
money 80 we can go ahead and do business?
You fellows can fool around with the red
tape while we do the buying.
Young:
I have no objection to giving you enough
money to go ahead and buy it as long as
the thing can be handled so that it makes
sense on the records, which I think it can.
H.M.Jr:
What I would suggest, give us the money and
we will do the buying and then you try to
keep pace with us on your records.
Young:
On this revolving fund business, it was
designed to be used for any purchase which
you wanted to make which in the normal course
of events had to be or should have been placed
before the time to get an allocation.
H.M.Jr:
Well, it doesn't work to my satisfaction.
Young:
Then there is some reason for it. Either
it isn't large enough or else it is not
being used for those purchases.
H.M.Jr:
It is not large enough. We want to use it
all. I am sure that when these gentlemen get
into this thing they are going to change this
thing. Nobody can run a business. When
a man is at war he certainly needs a thing
a damn sight quicker than when a fellow is
in a peacetime business, and these people
are at war.
Regraded Unclassified
73
- 18 -
Cox:
Well, I think, Mr. Secretary, the two
practical ways to cut down the time are,
one, to have the allocation of funds, the
directives, made at one time, and not by
the President, but by Mr. Stettinius, 80
that you don't get the pile-up of requisi-
tions and the delays --
H.M.Jr:
I mentioned that to Hopkins at lunch, and
he thinks that is good.
Cox:
That is one thing.
The second thing, it seems to me, is to
increase the revolving fund but at the same
time keep sufficient checks SQ that in terms
of policy, not red tape, you are buying the
kind of things that you won't regret later
on. Now, for example, all those questions
of re-export and - such as cotton for example,
you have policy questions involved which
Cliff might or might not know about.
H.M.Jr:
Well, Oscar, we can't go ahead and don't
want to go ahead until somebody, and I
take it when it goes over to the OPM somebody
over there says "O.K. go ahead and buy it."
Cox:
But OPM doesn't determine that, you see.
They don't test the policy. They cover
availability of supplies and how it will
measure with our own program, but the policy
as to whether it should be bought will be
Mr. Stettinius' job. Now, I would say 8.8
8 purely practical matter in ninety-five
per cent of the cases the policy has been
revolved and you can probably map it out so
that revolving fund can be used for those
purposes.
A8 to the policy questions, you just handle
them in the regular way, except it doesn't
go to the White House.
Regraded Unclassified
74
- 19 -
H.M.Jr:
Well, Oscar, why isn't the practical thing -
I mean for the policy to be settled in the
first instance?
Cox:
I agree. I think it ought to be. That is
the way to do it.
Nelson:
That is the way I have always felt about it,
that when that requisition issues from
Lend-Lease, policy should have been settled
50 that everybody goes on it. Sometimes we
have worked on these things two or three
times.
H.M.Jr:
That is my complaint. We go over and over
the same ground.
White:
I still don't see the objection to the larger
revolving fund in the light of - Mack says
that he doesn't begin to operate until
the end of the six and B. half days, when he
gets your requisition.
Cox:
No, but you see the present procedure now,
there isn't necessarily 8. final policy
decision on the requisition by the time it
goes to OPM and by the time Mack would want
to operate. If you decide the policy in
advance through the Lend-Lease organization
before it goes out to OPM or other agencies
for other kinds of determination, then Mack
as 8 practical matter, can operate.
White:
Isn't it possible to have somebody during that
six-day period flag those things sbout which
there may be 8 doubt? You say it constitutes
five per cent. Those things about which
there may be a doubt, Mack can just wait
until it is resolved, but the ninety-five
per cent of the cases can be taken care of.
Cox:
I should think so, and either they ought
to be flagged or the policy determined.
Regraded Unclassified
75
- 20 -
White:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
When I come back to what I said, it seems
to me that Mr. Stettinius in the first
instance should say we do or don't want
to buy the thing. It would save a lot of
trouble. If he says it is O.K. and OPM says
it is O.K. --
Stettinius:
Of course inmany instances, Don, we have to
check with you for release.
Nelson:
No, what happans there Ed - I mean, if you
decide them for policy, then of course
we send them back in case there is any
question about availability. Now, however,
you have got - I won't institute an entirely
new procedure with the appointment of this
Board. What has happened, of course, when
we can't supply it or we have to take it
away from our own military services, then
it goes back and then it takes 8. long time to
resolve. Probably some of these nineteen
requisitions were some that we had difficulty
on. That really takes time, Mr. Secretary.
Now, I have been thinking that that ought to
come right up to SPAB if it is turned down
by OPM. Then instead of going through
all that cumbersome procedure, going back
to you (Cox) and back and forth, it ought
to come right up to SPAB and be decided.
H.M.Jr:
What is that?
Nelson:
That is this new agency. I haven't learned
yet.
Cox:
Supply, Priorities and Allocations Board.
(Laughter).
H.M.Jr:
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals?
76
- 21 -
Nelson:
I will be invoking that, I' am afraid. But
you see then, Mr. Secretary, if it came
right up then we could get those resolved in
much less time than it has been taking now,
Phil. It just takes you months on some of
these where the Army objects.
H.M.Jr:
Well, do you think you gentlemen, as far as
we are concerned, could put the thing in
Mack's hands so when it comes to Mack, the
policy has been settled and he can go ahead
and do his buying, and then give him enough
money that he can have & revolving fund?
Stettinius:
We can agree on that in principle, can't we,
Phil?
Young:
Yes, as far as the Lend-Leaseability of the
requisitions is concerned, we are doing that
now. On the money end of it, I am perfectly
sure we can work out the revolving fund opera-
tion 80 that it can move as fast as it is
possible to do SO.
H.M.Jr:
How long will it take you to make up your
mind, Phil?
Young:
I think I am about ready to jell. (Laughter).
H.M.Jr:
Well, I didn't expect you to crystallize that
quickly. But you are in the process of jelling?
Young:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
Well, who do I get an answer from, from you?
Nelson:
He is the man to give it to you.
Stettinius:
Sure. Oscar and Phil and General Burns and
I will discuss it and give you an answer
when?
Regraded Unclassified
77
- 22 -
H.M.Jrt
Monday morning?
Cox:
Yes.
Stettinius:
Monday morning all right, Phil?
Young:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
Now we have got one other thing, if I may,
please. I will read this. This is on some
of the future orders.
"The allocation of lend-lease funds as of
July 31, 1941, included "frozen" funds to
the extent of $98,930,860.72. As of
August 31, 1941, the total of "frozen" funds
was $101,886,225.33. "Frozen" funds
represent allocated money to cover lend-
lease requisitions specifying future deliv-
eries of from three months to longer periods
up to twelve months for which we can make
purchases only on a month-to-month basis
because OPM priority ratings or material
allotments are, as & rule, for but one
month. The following requisitions are illus-
trative:"
Then it goes into steel, zinc, copper, and
80 forth. Allocated a hundred million dollars
to be purchased, and thirty or forty million
dollars is the balance.
"In order to overcome the duplication of work
necessitated by monthly allocations and monthly
purchases against requisitions for deliveries
extended over 8 period of several months,
the following recommendations are made.
"1. That allocations be made, to the extent
possible, to cover these requisitions for which
we now have only partial allocations and that
the unrequired balances of funds be cancelled.
Regraded Unclassified
78
- 23 -
"2. It is also recommended that the British
Purchasing Commission and China Defense
Supplies, Inc., be requested to provide a
forecast of their future metal requirements
for supply allocation or priority rating
determination and that requisitions then be
submitted for the quantity approved by OPM.
Such a procedure would avoid the necessity
for repeating allocations month by month and
the repetition of making purchases month
by month against long-term requisitions and
one allocation and one purchase would be the
result."
You see, on the books it looks as though we
had a lot of orders which we weren't filling
and I would just like to have enough orders
to do business, but if informally the English
say, "Over six months we need 80 much steel,"
then we would have something to gauge it
by.
Nelson:
That is right, and that is the way it should
be, Mr. Secretary.
H.M.Jr:
You like that?
Nelson:
Yes, sir.
H.M.Jr:
And then it doesn't look as though we had
a lot of orders on our books that we weren't
executing.
MacKeachie:
It would make the allocation easier, as a mat-
ter of fact.
Nelson:
It would make it much easier. The thing
would be much easier for us to allocate if
it were done that way.
Mack:
As a matter of fact, I think that in that
memorandum that I probably plagiarized your
Regraded Unclassified
79
- 24 -
own idea because this is something you
have talked about a good deal.
Nelson:
That is right. I have taken it up with
others, too.
Stettinius:
May we analyze this, and Phil, can we come
back Monday with the answer on this one?
Young:
Yes, surely.
H.M.Jr:
Well, I will tell you what you do. I may
not be here Monday, 80 if one of you gentlemen
will call a meeting and then Graves and my
people will come to you, because I am not
sure I will be here. They will come over
to see you.
Stettinius:
Why don't we set a definite time inyour office,
Phil, on Monday and then we can have a roundup
in this whole business. Is that all right,
Oscar?
Cox:
Yes.
Stettinius:
What time, Phil, Monday afternoon?
H.M.Jr:
Any time you say.
Young:
Yes, I think Monday after lunch will be &
good time.
Stettinius:
How about two thirty in Phil's office Monday
afternoon?
Mack:
Fine.
H.M.Jr:
Have you got anything you would like us to
do that we are not doing?
Nelson:
As far as the end of it that I am connected
with, I think it has been working very satis-
factorily. Mr. Mack has worked cooperatively
Regraded Unclassified
80
- 25 -
B. hundred per cent, and things have been going
back and forth. I think we have had very
little waste of time.
H.M.Jr:
If anybody has any complaints or suggestions,
I would like to have them.
Stettinius:
I am pretty green, I think, but in ten days
I might want to knock on your door.
H.M.Jr:
Quick cured, is it? Ten days, that is pretty
good. They will have to apply the heat.
(Laughter).
MacKeachie:
Mr. Mack, you have authority now to go out and
negotiate when it is necessary, is that true?
Mack:
We don't have, no.
MacKeachie:
That is one thing, Mr. Secretary, that is
becoming more and more necessary. As these
things get tighter, sending out regular invi-
tations to bid will really do a lot of harm.
H.M.Jr:
Didn't you try to get a bill
on that, Oscar?
Cox:
We tried to get some language in the next
appropriation act.
H.M.Jr:
What happened?
Cox:
Well, the next appropriation request hasn't
gone up yet.
H.M.Jr:
Is that being taken care of?
Cox:
Budget thinks it ought not to go in, and
Foley talked to their lawyer over there.
My own personal feeling is it is not necessary,
but if the Treasury feels it is, it ought to
go in.
Regraded Unclassified
81
- 26 -
H.M.Jr:
Does Ed think it is necessary?
Cox:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
You might speak to Foley, Mack.
Young:
Budget said this morning they didn't feel
it necessary and they are, I gather,
planning on getting a written memorandum from
the Comptroller General on it saying that it
is not necessary.
Nelson:
That is very important, Mr. Secretary.
H.M.Jr:
I know it is.
Nelson:
Many of these things where they are very
scarce, we have to really tell Mr. Mack from
now on you can buy it from so-and-so, because
he has it --
Mack:
Don't have the justification.
H.M.Jr:
Well, the General Counsel holds we haven't
been able to do that, isn't that right?
Mack:
Well, we can buy outside of statutory authority
provided we have sufficient justification
and Mr. Nelson has given us justification
in those cases where it should be done, but
that means & special job in each case.
Nelson:
Each case.
Mack:
In other words, you build a case for the
Comptroller General.
Nels on:
You have to build a case.
H.M.Jr:
Anything else we can do that we are not?
Philip? Have you got any suggestions?
Regraded Unclassified
- 27 -
82
Young:
We still get repercussions from the British
which I just pass on for what it is worth,
because I don't know anything about it, to
the effect that the personnel organization
of Treasury Procurement is still not spread
far enough so that they can handle requisitions
concurrently instead of consecutively.
H.M.Jr:
Those are two dollar words.
Young:
That is exactly what they told me. I am
quoting them.
White:
They can't handle more than one requisition
at a time?
Young:
They say the Treasury Procurement keeps
building up a backlog of requisitions for
future attention, because they are forced to
take the most urgent items as they come
along. Therefore you are accumulating more
and more of a backlog all the time, which
ought to be handled concurrently.
Nelson:
I think it is your bidding that does that.
If you were negotiating, most of that would
disappear, because you have to handle each
one now and negotiate a bid. Naturally, you
have to make out your papers and file them
and so forth, and give them a number. That
is what happens, why they have to go con-
secutively, rather than being able to negot-
iate. You can negotiate a dozen at a time,
and he would rather do it.
Young:
I think they were speaking of the angle of
just not having sufficient personnel of the
proper caliber to handle all the requisitions
on a smooth flow through. I pass it along
for what it is worth, Cliff. I don't know
what there is to it.
Regraded Unclassified
- 28 -
83
Macks
We have heard more or less along the same
lines from this source. There is a group
with the British Purchasing Commission that
handles chemicals and acids, for example,
They have been contacting our sources, that
is, going to our sources on these chemical
acid requisitions. Now, their suggestion
has been that we take over the personnel
in the British Purchasing Commission, that
is, certain ones from each of the groups,
and we are reluctant to do that because
we feel that we should use ^merican personnel
within our own organization. That is about
what it boils down to,
Whiter
Well, don't you have enough personnel to
prevent an accumulation of 8. backlog?
Vsck:
We are increasing personnel all the time.
As the work increases, we increase personnel.
White:
Is this charge correct, that you are build-
ing up a backlog because of personnel?
Mack:
I wouldn't think so, no. Of course, our
backlog is increasing with our work load,
of course. The more requisitions we get,
the more our total is and negotiations would
help, there is no doubt about that. But I
don't think that - I don't think it would
serve any good purpose to take on a number
of these commodity men that are now with
the British to spread them in our organiza-
tion because they merely tell us what they
think we should do and then we do the work.
I would rather get Americans to supplement
our force as we need them. Of course, we
are putting them on all the time.
Nelson:
Do you think it would help any, Mack, if
Mr. MacKeachie took 8 few of those into
the Division of Purchases? I have had that
Regraded Unclassified
- 29 -
84
in mind for some time, that as the work of the
Commission died down, we might take them into
the Division of Purchases and have a closer
relationship with them.
One of your difficulties now is that they go
out and do 8 lot of preliminary work. Then
you have to come in and duplicate all that
work.
Mack:
That is right.
Nelson:
You may not agree with them.
Stettinius:
That is, the British, Don?
Nelson:
The British do a lot of preliminary work.
H.M.Jr:
I think Morris Wilson is going to lay 8 lot
of those people off.
Nelson:
There are 8. few of them that are good people.
H.M.Jr:
I think he is going to do that, particularly
in New York.
Stettinius:
Yes, I heard that too.
H.M.Jr:
I spoke to him in Montreal, you see, when
I was up there. His payroll is too big.
They are using too many dollars. He has
got, I think, an eleven or twelve million
dollar payroll, and they are not doing
any purchasing to speak of. It is too
big. And he agrees with me. So maybe some
of this is people, you know, trying to get
jobs.
Mack:
Well, we have one man from the British
Purchasing Commission on steel. He is a very
good man. He is an American fellow, formerly
Regraded Unclassified
- 30 -
85
with Jones and Laughlin, and he is an excellent
man. There is a man that you took over with
your organization, I believe, on chemicals
and acids. He is an American and he is
8 very capable fellow. And there is one
man on machinery that we are thinking of
getting into our organization, and he is
an American.
Nelson:
Yes, he is a good man.
Mack:
But we are trying to keep it within those
lines.
E.M.Jr:
You can't employ anything except American
citizens, anyway.
Mack:
Well, that is 80.
White:
It would seem very peculiar for the Procure-
ment Division to have British employees
buying goods for Britain.
H.M.Jr:
It wouldn't do.
Nelson:
Yes.
H.M.Jr:
Anything else, Phil?
Young:
Not a thing, except Cliff has done 8 grand
job.
H.M.Jr:
I am glad to hear it. Well, I appreciate
very much your coming over and if you will
give us an answer Monday we will try to do
better.
Regraded Unclassified
September 4, 1941
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY:
As requested the following are the steps taken with respect
to Lend-Lesse purchases, together with the average time required
for each step:
Av. Time Required
(1) Requisitions are written and dated by the
British or China Defense Supplies and sub-
mitted to Defense Aid Reports; thence copies
are sent to Procurement Division and O.P.V.
From date of requisition to receipt in
Procurement average lapse of time is
2 days
(2) 0.7.M. examines for availability of com-
modity, method of purchase, and whether
supplying will interfere with our own
defense program; then clears to Procurement
4à days
(Note: This average time will probably
be extended by 3 days when priority ratings
are to be indicated by O.P.M.)
(3) Form LLA-3 (Request for allocation of funds)
is prepared by Procurement for submission
to Defense Aid Reports. From date of clearance
by O.P.M. to date of submission of Form LLA-3 4 days
(4) Letter is prepared (based on LLA-3) by Defense
Aid Reports for signature of the President,
approving allocation of funds and transfer
of commodity to the foreign government. From
date of submission by Procurement of Form
LLA-3 to date of letter to be signed by the
President
12 days
(5) After signature by the President, transfer-
directive submitted to Procurement
8 days
Regraded Unclassified
87
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY
9-4-41
- 2 -
Av. Time Required
(6) On receipt of transfer-directive Procure-
ment proceeds to make purchase. From
reseipt of transfer-direstive to date of
contract
12 days
x
The figures above showing the average time required were
arrived at by taking the records on 19 requisitions which are
believed to be representative of the usual requisitions received
in Procurement.
This procedure requires an average of 30 days from the date
of the requisition before IN are authorized to make a purchase,
of which total 20 days is taken up with the routine having to do
with the allocations for each requisition.
It is suggested that the present Revolving Fund of $10,000,000
be increased to $50,000,000 and authority granted to use this fund
in order that immediate purchase may be made 07 that such other
steps be taken to reduce the time now required for obtaining
allotments.
Clifton of I. hast Mack
Director Procurement
Regraded Unclassified
LiFe
88
September 4, 1941
Memorandum to the Secretary:
The allocation of lend-lease funds as of July 31, 1941, included
"frozen" funds to the extent of $98,930,860.72. As of August $1, 1941,
the total of "frosen" funds was $101,886,225.33. "Frozen funds rep-
resent allocated money to cover lend-lease requisitions specifying
future deliveries of from three months to longer periods up to twelve
months for which no can make purchases only on a month-to-month basis
because OPM priority ratings or material allotments are, as a rule, for
but one month. The following requisitions are illustrative:
No.
Allocated
Purchased
Balance
489-Alloys & Special $18,000,000.00
$3,990,551.76
$14,009,448.24
Steels
421-Zine
20,000,000.00
3,553,460.60
16,446,539.40
1157-Copper
13,720,000.00
2,142,250.00
11,577,750.00
3-Plain Carbon
40,000,000.00
31,302,376.28
8,697,623.72
Steels
487-Pig Iron
7,680,000.00
1,352,715.00
6,327,285.00
In order to overcome the duplication of work each month necessitated
by monthly allocations and monthly purchases against requisitions for de-
liveries extended over a period of several months, the following recom-
mendations are made.
1. That allocations be made, to the extent possible, to cover these
requisitions for which We now have only partial allocations and that the
unrequired balances of funds be cancelled.
2. It is also recommended that the British Purchasing Commission
and China Defense Supplies, Inc., be requested to provide a forecast of
their future metal requirements for supply allocation or priority rating
determination and that requisitions then be submitted for the quantity
approved by OPM. Such & procedure would avoid the necessity for repeating
allocations month by month and the repetition of making purchases month
by month against long-term requisitions and one allocation and one pur-
chase would be the result.
Clifton E. Mack,
Director of Procurement
Regraded Unclassified
89
September 4, 1941
4:20 p.m.
HMJr:
Oh, back in March I wrote you 8 letter about
8. Mark Grossman of Cleveland, as a possible
judge for the vacancy out there.
Francis
Biddle:
Uh huh.
HMJr:
And I'd just like to bring it to your
attention again, if you don't mind.
B:
Yes. I think we had rather in mind a man
called Freed in Cleveland.
HMJr:
Freed.
B:
But - do you know Grossman well, personally?
HMJr:
Well, I don't, but my son is out there
B:
Yeah.
HMJr:
and he knows him - Henry.
B:
Uh huh.
HMJr:
And Henry knows both Freed and Grossman.
B:
Uh huh.
HMJr:
And he talked to me several times about
Grossman, and he thinke Grossman.....
B:
Would he have political Senatorial backing?
HMJr:
I believe BO.
B;
You think he would?
HMJr:
But I don't want you to take it on my say-so.
B:
I know. I understand. Oh, we've got the
idea.
HMJr:
But between Grossman and Freed, I think
you'll find - Just 8.8 to their qualities.
Regraded Unclassified
90
- 2 -
B:
Yeah.
HMJr:
.....
that Grossman's a better man.
B:
Yeah.
HMJr:
But.....
B:
Well, I'll look into it.
HMJr:
But, Henry's out there. He's been interested
in it
B:
Yeah.
HMJr:
.....and he knows both the people, and.....
B:
Yeah.
HMJr:
.....I
wouldn't
B:
Well, that's just the kind of thing I want
to know in case there's some choice.
HMJr:
Well, I gather that between the two men,
Grossman has a better civics record.
B:
I see. I see. Well, that's very important.
What's his age, do you know that?
HMJr:
Well, my guess.....
B:
Is he reasonably young?
HMJr:
My guess is he's around forty.
B:
Well, that's good, too. All right, Henry,
I'll look at that. I'm not going to speak
to the President about those vacancies until
I get back. I'm going off for about ten
days.
HMJr:
Good for you.
B:
Next week.
91
- 3 -
HMJr:
All right.
B:
Thank you, Henry.
HMJr:
Good-bye.
B:
Good-bye.
Draft of Secretary Morgenthau's Speech
to the Advertising Club of Boston, September 9, 1941.
92
A few hours ago it was my privilege to stand at the wooden
bridge at Lexington where the men of New England first proved that
Americans could defend their homes and their freedom. Today, the
people of these States are proving that they are still New
Englanders. In hundreds of factories and shipyards from Connecticut
to Maine, the men and women of New England are responding magnifi-
cently to their country's needs. I am glad to be here tonight to
pay my tribute, on behalf of the entire Administration in Washington,
to the great work that New England labor and industry are doing to
arm America.
I am glad also that my host tonight is the Advertising Club
of Boston, for the advertising profession is 8 mighty force in
creating public understanding. We cannot make ourselves the
arsenal of democracy and the defender of freedom unless our people
understand the tremendous issues involved in this Battle for the
Regraded Unclassified
- 2 -
93
World. In the same way, we at the Treasury shall find it more
difficult to accomplish our task of financing the defense program
unless the public sees clearly the need for greater sacrifice and
for greater effort.
In particular, I think that clear understanding is needed
if we are to avoid the economic evils that might otherwise spring
from 8 defense program as great as ours. The worst of those
economic evils has been constantly uppermost in my mind 8.8
Secretary of the Treasury. This is the evil of inflation and
this is the subject which I should like to discuss with you
tonight.
We have been talking about inflation for a long time as
if it were a threat remote from our daily lives. It is a distant
threat no longer. We are facing it now and we must deal with it
at once.
Regraded Unclassified
- 3 -
94
If we are selfish or shortsighted in facing this issue,
the consequences may haunt us and our children for years. But
if we look at the problem with clear vision and firm resolve, we
can beat this thing. If we keep always in mind the interests of
our country as 8. whole, if we provide promptly the appropriate
means and use them vigorously whenever necessary, we can prevent
inflation from fastening its grip upon us.
That task calls for alertness and mental toughness on the
part of everyone in the executive departments of the Government,
everyone in the halls of Congress and every one of us here tonight.
The word "inflation" is cold and lifeless, 80 cold that
even you advertising men here tonight might have difficulty in
making it real, but the thing it describes is treacherous and
cruel. Memories are 80 short that I suppose many of us have
forgotten what happened the last time inflation struck us 25 years
ago, but the effects of that inflation lasted for many years and
B
Regraded Unclassified
- 4 -
95
brought untold heartbreak and misery in their train.
We are now just where we were in 1916 - on the very edge
of inflation.
Let us look at the record to see what happened a genera-
tion ago. In 1916 the cost of living began to rise sharply but
there were few who saw its significance. It was only when prices
had risen by 70 per cent that President Wilson recommended any
steps to prevent inflation. In fact, the country was 80 blind to
its dangers that 8.8 late 8.8 June, 1917, Congress actually hastened
inprices
inflation by reducing the reserve requirements for member banks
of the Federal Reserve System.
The consequences x every American were 80 serious that
there must be many housewives even today who can remember them.
By 1920, a ten-pound bag of sugar cost $2.67, a dozen eggs cost
92 cents, a ten-pound bag of flour cost 88 cents, a pound of butter
cost 76 cents and & pound of pork chops cost 50 cents. By that
- 5 -
96
year prices had skyrocketed to twice the level of five years earlier.
The money the housewife paid for one loaf of bread in 1914 bought
only half a loaf in 1920. The money she paid for a pound of bacon
in 1914 bought only half a pound in 1920. The money she paid for a
yard of cotton cloth was only enough to buy only 1/3 of a yard in
1920. The consumer found that food, fuel, shelter and clothing
which cost & dollar in April, 1916, had risen to almost two dollars
by 1920. The family with no increase in income found its purchasing
power cut in half.
We have now, as we had then, a moderate rise in the cost of
living, a great rise in wholesale prices, and a still greater rise
in the prices of basic commodities like wheat, hogs, cotton and
lumber. It is the rise in the prices of basic commodities that
constitutes our red light, our warning signal, today, for such a
rise is always the advance guard of an increase in the cost of
living.
Regraded Unclassified
- 6 -
97
If we fail to use the controls at our disposal, if we fail
to do the specific things which are in our power now to control
inflation, if we allow prices to go on rising as they did from
1916 to 1920, we may find that food, fuel, shelter and clothing
which now cost a dollar will once more cost almost twice as much
before the process is ended.
The rise in prices is by no means confined to foodstuffs
and clothing. I have before me, for instance, the actual figures
on the cost of constructing & standard six-room frame house in one
of our typical cities. This home that could have been built a year
ago for $6,000 now costs $7,140 to build. Here we have an increase
in prices of nearly 20 per cent and if it goes along the 1916 pattern,
we are only at the beginning of the story.
Not only is the cost of building homes rising, but higher
rentals are also on the way for the millions who do not own their
homes. In scores of areas where industrial expansion has first
B
Regraded Unclassified
- 7 -
98
taken hold, rents have already risen 10, 20, 30 per cent, and even
higher.
I have brought with me tonight a pictorial chart which I
wish the radio audience could see because it shows 80 plainly the
road we traveled once, and the road which we must not travel again.
The chart shows how the buying power of your dollar shrank from
1914 to 1920, how your dollar bought less food, less clothing,
less shelter, less heat and light because prices were allowed to
run away. It shows how your dollar is already buying less in 1941
than in 1939, and it leaves a big question mark for the space
showing what your dollar may buy in 1942. The answer to that
question is in our keeping as Americans, whether we are officials
of the Government or private citizens. And I have written on the
chart, around the question mark, the words "The answer depends
on us". We can determine now, this year, we in Washington and
you in the country at large, whether we shall have the common sense
Regraded Unclassified
- 8 -
99
determination
and self-control to avoid what we went through twenty-five years
ago.
David Floyd George
Let it not be said of us, as & great British statesman said
of his people in 1915, that we were "too late in moving here, too
late in arriving there, too late in coming to this decision, too
late in starting with enterprises, too late in preparing." There
is no excuse for us to be too late in meeting this threat of infla-
tion that faces us.
We now know, or ought to know, what is going on; that is
the greatest difference between conditions today and in 1916. This
time our eyes are open to the dangers that lie ahead of us. We now
know that the time to do something about inflation is before it
occurs, not after it has gathered momentum. We should profit by
our greater knowledge and take prompt and effective action now.
There is no need for me to remind this audience in detail
of the reasons why prices have already risen. The reasons are plain
Regraded Unclassified
100
- 9 -
for everyone to see. Our economy today resembles an overloaded
steam boiler. The fire under the boiler is being fed by billions
of additional purchasing power in the hands of the public. The
fire is growing hotter and is generating more steam than the boiler
can safely hold. If we are to prevent the boiler from bursting,
we must damp down the fires by withdrawing purchasing power, and
we must also enlarge the boiler by increasing the supplies of goods
available to the consumer.
In speaking of these things I am not being an alarmist or
defeatist. We can, as I have said before, defeat this threat,
just as we can turn back the forces of evil that have been let
loose upon this earth. But we need to understand the issues and
we need to see clearly the consequences of inaction or delay. I
should like, therefore, to look at the problem quite coolly for a
few minutes, to see first what we have done and then what we need
to do in order to stop prices from rising further.
D-B
Regraded Unclassified
- 10 -
101
In the first place, Congress is on the point of passing a
huge tax bill designed to raise almost four billion dollars in
additional revenue, thus withdrawing a great amount of purchasing
power that competes with the defense effort.
Secondly, the Treasury in its borrowing program is trying to
obtain as large B. portion of its funds as possible from current
consumers' income. Through a new form of note - the tax anticipa-
tion note - it is seeking to increase the effectiveness of the
income tax as a check on current purchasing power, and I am happy
to report to you that more than & billion dollars' worth of these
notes were sold in the month of August.
The Treasury has also begun a program of selling Defense
Savings Bonds and Stamps to people of moderate and low incomes. The
people have responded to a tune of a billion and a quarter dollars
in four months, without coercion of any kind; and in making that
response possible the advertising profession has been of truly
B
Regraded Unclassified
- 11 -
102
invaluable help.
The President has recently issued an order authorizing
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to control
consumers installment credit. The Congress is considering, and
I hope will pass without undue delay, a bill to limit price rises
and to supplement the efforts of the Office of Price Administra-
tion, to limit price rises by voluntary cooperation.
All these are useful steps to a necessary end, but they
are not enough.
We shall have to tax ourselves much more heavily next
year than this year, great and far-reaching as the present tax
bill will be.
We may have to extend general controls over bank credit
and create controls over selected capital expenditures.
I hope that we may extend the social security program
80 as to increase the flow of funds to the Treasury from current
D-B
CO
Regraded Unclassified
103
- 12 -
income during the emergency and increase the outflow of funds when
needed in the post defense period. In addition, I have already
suggested the creation of what I have called & "separation wage" --
that is, an entirely new form of contribution out of which a worker
may draw & regular wage in case he loses his job.
We shall have to reduce the Federal lending and underwriting
program such as non-emergency housing expenditures and mortgage
guarantees.
We must, as I have said many times, reduce nonessential
Federal expenditures. We must also appeal for economy in state and
local government expenditure and a curtailment of their borrowing
for nondefense purposes. As the President showed clearly & month
ago when he vetoed a bill calling for 320 million dollars worth of
highway construction, there is 8. clear distinction nowadays between
the spending that is necessary for defense and the spending that
can be postponed until a later day. I think the country can
Regraded Unclassified
104
- 18 -
congratulate itself on the President's veto of this measure, and
also upon the action of the Senate only last week in approving
the creation of a joint committee of the taxing and the appro-
priating agencies of Congress to study the possibilities of
economy all along the line in nondefense activities. I have
several times suggested the creation of such a committee and I
am very happy that my suggestion has been adopted by the Senate
at last. I hope now that the House will also approve the idea,
because it seems to me that such joint action is the only sensible
way to proceed if we are to cut the costs of government and clear
the road for defense spending.
All of the measures I have 80 far suggested for combatting
inflation would attack the problem by reducing the demand for
goods now and by helping to build up & backlog for the post war
world. But we should also attack the problem from the opposite
B
105
- 14 -
direction by making every effort to increase the supply of goods
available to the consumer wherever this can be done without en-
croaching upon the defense program. Above all, we must make full
use of those supplies that are available not only in defense pro-
duction but in the civilian goods which do not compete with defense
output.
I wonder if the housewife knows when she pays 20 per cent
more than she did & year ago for a bag of flour that our supply of
wheat is the largest on record, and that 498 million bushels of
two years' crops are stored in our neighbor democracy of Canada.
It is true that there is a tariff on the importation of Canadian
wheat, a rate of 42$ a bushel on milling wheat and 5 per cent on
feed wheat; but it is also true and not generally realized that the
President has authority under the Tariff Act of 1930 to reduce the
import duty on wheat for emergency relief purposes whenever he
declares an emergency to exist. The emergency now exists, the
Regraded Unclassified
- 15 -
106
President has declared it by proclamation, and the reduction of
these tariffs would seem to be both practicable and necessary.
The same situation exists in other fields. I wonder if
the housewife knows when she pays 15 per cent more for a pound of
sugar, that there are unusually large sugar stocks in this country
and also stocks in Cuba which could be admitted speedily by a
the
reduction of tariff or by the enlargement of the import quota. I
wonder if the housewife knows when she pays 25 per cent more for
butter that we have great stocks of butter in storage, and large
reserve stocks of farm products of many kinds which should be
released for consumption as fast as necessary to prevent un-
reasonable price rises.
The Government now holds 7 million bales of cotton in
reserve, and cotton prices have risen from 91 cents & pound on
August 1, 1939 to over 16 cents a pound at the present time. In
spite of this rise of almost 100 per cent in two years, Congress
B
- 16 -
107
recently sent to the President & bill to freeze government stocks
of cotton and wheat for the duration of the war, and thus to
prevent the government from disposing of any of the surplus wheat
and cotton it had acquired. The President promptly vetoed the bill
and I am delighted, because this measure, which I called "wicked",
would have aggravated the danger of inflation and would have
frustrated all our efforts to fight it. We ought not to withhold
surpluses from the market in times like these. The housewife ought
not to be made to pay a tribute to profiteers and speculators when
she buys a cotton sheet for her home or a shirt for her husband or
a suit for her child.
Millions of people still go without the milk, butter and
eggs which, according to the testimony of food experts and the
dictates of plain common sense, are necessary to good health and
good morale. Yet we are withholding the largest reserve of milk,
butter, eggs and cheese in our history. I know from experience on
Regraded Unclassified
- 17 -
108
my own farm that within two months we could increase our supply of
milk by feeding some of our huge surplus of corn to the cows. I
know that we could use some of our surplus grains as feed for
chickens and get more eggs, yet the price of a standard poultry
ration has increased 60 per cent since the war began.
This has been historically a land of milk and honey. There
is still plenty of milk and honey but too much of it is in the
warehouses Let's make it flow. If we were to let it flow to the
public we would not only help in keeping prices stable but we would
be doing something even more important; we would be helping to make
our people healthier and happier.
It is sheer folly from the farmer's point of view to push
prices up by creating scarcities in times like these. The farmers
suffered cruelly for twelve long years after the collapse of the
inflation of 1920 and 1921; they should not be made to suffer again.
It is sheer folly in the same way for labor leaders to seek continual
Regraded Unclassified
109
- 18 -
increases in wages which in turn produce higher manufacturing costs,
higher prices, and a higher cost of living. It is shortsighted for
landlords to charge all that the traffic will bear in cities where
housing space is at & premium because of defense needs.
There are always selfish groups in any country which think
they can profit from inflation. They are wrong.
Inflation does more than merely to rob the wage earner of
a portion of his earnings. It does more than saddle the farmer
with a load of debt which he cannot repay. It is more destructive
of morale than any other single force. Inflation divides the
country. It sets up producers against consumers, workers against
employers, the people who owe money against the people to whom the
money is owed. No group in a community profits from inflation in
the long run except the Three Horsemen - the Speculator, the
Profiteer and the Hoarder.
Regraded Unclassified
- 19 -
110
These are truths that should be self-evident. They should
be especially 80 now, in view of the fact that rising prices will
only add to the cost of our defense program and make the arming of
our country steadily more difficult. They should be self-evident
now in the light of the experience that we suffered only 25 years ago.
We Americans have more than 150 years of self-goverment
behind us. We are not children any longer. We are a mature nation,
and we should be able to face up to our responsibilities as mature
men and women. My plea to you tonight is that we should learn from
bitter experience. My hope and my belief is that no group among us -
whether farmers, working men or business men - shall be tempted by
the illusion of selfish gain into allowing prices to rise unchecked.
The cost of inflation is too ruinous to producer and consumer alike
for anyone in authority to tolerate it now.
I can give you only this pledge - that we at the Treasury
will do everything humanly possible to check the rise in prices
D-B
Regraded Unclassified
- 20 -
111
before it will do any lasting damage to our economy. But we at
the Treasury must have the firm support and the clear understanding
of 130 million Americans behind us. If we have that support and
that understanding, I know that we shall not fail.
9-1- 41
Draft of Secretary Morgenthau's Speech
to the Advertising Club of Boston
112
September 9, 1941
in front of n famous statue z the Minute man 4 sende Chester thench
A few hours ago it was my privilege to stand at the wooden
at the very place
on the green
bridge at Lexington, where the men of New England first proved that
^
Americans could defend their homes and their freedom. Today, the
people of these States are proving that they are still New Eng-
landers. In army camps and naval stations, in hundreds of
factories and shipyards from Connecticut to Maine, the men and
women of New England are responding magnificently to their
country's needs. I am glad to be here tonight to pay my tribute
to the great work that New England is doing, like all other sec-
tions of the country, to arm America.
I am glad also that my host tonight is the Advertising Club
of Boston, for the advertising profession is a mighty force in
creating public understanding. We cannot make ourselves the
arsenal of democracy and the defender of freedom unless our people
understand the tremendous issues involved in this Battle for the
Regraded Unclassified
- 2 -
113
World. In the same way, we at the Treasury shall find it more
difficult to accomplish our task of financing the defense program
unless the public sees clearly the need for greater sacrifice and
for greater effort.
In particular, I think that clear understanding is needed
if we are to avoid the economic evils that might otherwise spring
from a defense program as great as ours, a program that is making
such enormous demands upon our productive resources. The worst
of those economic evils has been constantly uppermost in my mind
as Secretary of the Treasury. That is the evil of inflation and
that is the subject which I should like to discuss with you tonight.
We have been talking about inflation for a long time as
if it were a threat remote from our daily lives. It is B. distant
threat no longer. We are facing it now and we must deal with it
at once.
D-C
Regraded Unclassified
- 3 -
114
If we are selfish or shortsighted in facing this issue,
the consequences may haunt us and our children for years. But
if we look at the problem with clear vision and firm resolve, we
can beat this thing. If we keep always in mind the interests of
our country as a whole, if we provide promptly the appropriate
means and use them vigorously whenever necessary, we can prevent
inflation from fastening its grip upon us.
That task calls for alertness and mental toughness on the
part of everyone in the executive departments of the Government,
everyone in the halls of Congress, everyone of us here in this
room and everyone that may be listening to me tonight.
The word "inflation" is cold and lifeless, so cold that
even you advertising men here tonight might have difficulty in
making it real, but the thing it describes is treacherous and
oruel. Memories are 80 short that I suppose many of us have
forgotten what happened the last time a price inflation struck us
D-C
- 4 -
115
25 years ago. The effects of that inflation, however, lasted for
many years and brought untold heartbreak and misery in their train.
Let us look at the record to see what happened & genera-
tion ago. In 1916 the cost of living began to rise sharply but
there were few who saw its significance. It was only when prices
had risen by 70 per cent that President Wilson recommended any
steps to prevent inflation. In fact, the country was so blind to
its dangers that as late as June, 1917, Congress actually hastened
the rise in prices by reducing the reserve requirements for member
banks of the Federal Reserve System.
The consequences were so serious for every American that
there must be many housewives even today who can remember them.
By 1920, a ten-pound bag of sugar cost $2.67, a dozen eggs cost
92 cents, a ten-pound bag of flour cost 88 cents, a pound of butter
cost 76 cents and a pound of pork chops cost 50 cents. By that
D-C
Regraded Unclassified
- 5 -
116
year prices had skyrocketed to twice the level of five years earlier.
The money the housewife paid for one loaf of bread in 1914 bought
only half a loaf in 1920. The money she paid for a pound of bacon
in 1914 bought only half a pound in 1920. The money she paid for &
yard of cotton cloth was only enough to buy only 1/3 of a yard in
1920. The consumer found that food, fuel, shelter and clothing
which cost a dollar in April, 1916, had risen to almost two dollars
by 1920. The family with no increase in income found its purchasing
power cut in half.
We have now, as we had then in 1916, a moderate rise in the cost
of living, a great rise in wholesale prices, and a still greater
rise in the prices of basic commodities like wheat, hogs, cotton and
lumber. It is the rise in the prices of basic commodities that
constitutes our red light, our warning signal, today, for such a
rise is always the advance guard of an increase in the cost of
living.
D-C
117
- 6 -
If we fail to use the controls at our disposal now, if we
fail to do the specific things which are in our power to check
inflation now, if we allow prices to go on rising as they did from
1916 to 1920, we may find that food, fuel, shelter and clothing
which now cost a dollar will once more cost almost twice as much
before the process has ended.
The rise in prices is by no means confined to foodstuffs
and clothing. I have before me, for instance, the actual figures
on the cost of constructing a standard six-room frame house in one
of our typical cities. This home that could have been built a year
ago for $6,000 now costs $7,140 to build. Here we have an increase
in prices of nearly 20 per cent and if it goes along the 1916 pattern,
we are only at the beginning of the story.
Not only is the cost of building homes rising, but higher
rentals are also on the way for the millions who do not own their
homes. In scores of areas where industrial expansion has first
D-C
Regraded Unclassified
- 7 -
118
taken hold, rents have already risen 10, 20, 30 per cent, and even
higher.
I have brought with me tonight a pictorial chart which I
wish the radio audience could see because it shows so plainly the
road we traveled once, and the road which we must not travel again.
The chart shows how the buying power of your dollar shrank from
1914 to 1920, how your dollar bought less food, less clothing,
less shelter, less heat and light because prices were allowed to
run away. It shows how your dollar is already buying less in 1941
than in 1939, and it leaves a big question mark for the space
showing what your dollar may buy in 1942. The answer to that
question is in our keeping as Americans, whether we are officials
of the Government or private citizens. And I have written on the
chart, around the question mark, the words "The answer depends
must
on us". We on decide now, this year, we in Washington and you
in the country at large, whether we shall have the common sense
D-C
Regraded Unclassified
- 8 -
119
and determination to avoid what we went through twenty-five years
ago.
Let it not be said of us, as David Lloyd George said of his
people in 1915, that we were "too late in moving here, too late
in arriving there, too late in coming to this decision, too late
in starting with enterprises, too late in preparing."
There is no excuse for us to be too late in meeting this threat
of inflation that faces us. We now know, or ought to know, what is
going on; that is perhaps the greatest difference between c onditions
today and in 1916. This time our eyes are open to the dangers that
lie ahead of us. We now know that the time to do something about
inflation is before it occurs, not after it has gathered momentum.
We should profit by our greater knowledge and take prompt and
effective action now.
There is no need for me to remind this audience in detail
of the reasons why prices have already risen. The reasons are plain
D-C
- 9 -
120
for everyone to 800. Our economy today resembles an overloaded
steam boiler. The fire under the boiler is being fed by billions
of additional purchasing power in the hands of the public. The
fire is growing hotter and is generating more steam than the boiler
can safely hold. If we are to prevent the boiler from bursting,
we must damp down the fires by withdrawing purchasing power and
also by increasing the flow of supplies of goods available to the
consumer.
We can, as I have said before, defeat this threat of
inflation, just 8.8 we can defeat and destroy the forces of evil
that have been let loose upon this earth. But we need to understand
the issues and we need to see clearly the consequences of inaction
or delay. I should like, therefore, to point out, first, what
We have done, and then what we need to do in order to stop prices
from rising further.
D-C
121
- 10 -
In the first place, Congress is on the point of passing a
huge tax bill designed to raise almost four billion dollars in
additional revenue, thus withdrawing a great amount of purchasing
power that competes with the defense effort.
Secondly, the Treasury in its borrowing gram is trying
to obtain as large a portion of its funds as possible from current
consumers' income.
Through a new form of note - the tax anticipation note -
it is seeking to increase the effectiveness of the income tax as
8. check on current purchasing power, and I am happy to report to
you that more than a billion dollars' worth of these notes were
sold in the month of August.
The Treasury has also begun a program of selling Defense
Savings Bonds and Stamps to people of moderate and low incomes. The
people have responded to a tune of 8. billion and a quarter dollars
in four months, without coercion of any kind; and in making that
response possible the advertising profession has been of truly
Regraded Unclassified
- 11 -
122
invaluable help.
The President has recently issued an order authorizing
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to control
consumers installment credit.
The Congress is considering, and I hope will pass without
undue delay, a bill to limit price rises and to supplement the
efforts of the Office of Price Administration to limit those
rises by voluntary cooperation.
All these are useful steps to a necessary end, but they
are not enough.
We shall have to tax ourselves much more heavily next year
than this year, great and far-reaching as the present tax bill
will be.
We shall have to invest much more widely and systematically
in Defense Savings Bonds and Stamps. In particular, the rising
- 12 -
123
payrolls of the past year have been a clear call to the wage
earners of America to set aside & portion of their earnings each
week for their own good and their country's good.
We may have to extend general controls over bank credit and
create controls over selected capital expenditures.
I hope that we may extend the social security program 80
as to increase the flow of funds to the Treasury from current
income during the emergency and increase the outflow of funds
when needed in the post defense period. In addition, I have
already suggested the creation of what I have called & "separa-
tion wage" -- that is, an entirely new form of contribution out
of which a worker may draw a regular wage for 8. stated period in
case he loses his job. These measures would be good and desirable
in themselves, but they are especially necessary at this time,
for they should help us to decrease purchasing power now and in-
crease it in the future when it may be needed.
124
- 13 -
We shall have to reduce the Federal lending and underwriting
program in such fields as non-emergency housing expenditures and
mortgage guarantees.
We must, as I have said many times, reduce nonessential
Federal expenditures. We must also appeal for economy in state
and local government expenditure and a curtailment of their borrow-
ing for nondefense purposes. The President pointed the way a
month ago when he vetoed a bill calling for 320 million dollars
worth of highway construction. By this action he demonstrated that
there is a clear distinction nowadays between the spending that is
necessary for defense and the spending that can be postponed
until 8. later day.
The country should congratulate itself on the President's
veto of this measure, and also upon the Senate's action only
last week in approving the creation of & joing committee of the
taxing and the appropriating agencies of Congress to study
the possibilities of economy all along the line in
- 14 -
125
nondefense activities. I have several times suggested the crea-
tion of such & committee, and I an very happy that my suggestion
has been adopted by the Senate at last. I hope now that the House
will also approve the idea, because it seems to me that such joint
action is the only sensible way to proceed if we are to cut the
costs of government and clear the decks for defense spending.
All of the measures I have 80 far suggested for combatting
inflation would attack the problem by reducing the demand for goods
now and by helping to build up 8. backlog of purchasing power for the
post war world. But we should also attack the problem from the
opposite direction. We must make every effort to increase the supply
of goods available to the consumer wherever this can be done without
encroaching upon the defense program. Above all, we must make full
use of those supplies that are available, not only in defensez pro-
duction, but in the provision of civilian goods which do not compete
with defense output. This is a time when we must flatten the peaks
D-C
Regraded Unclassified
- 15 -
126
and fill up the valleys in our sconomic picture. If we reduce
purchasing power now and keep prices down now, we shall be helping
to provide for the day when these vast defense expenditures will
end and when our defense workers will take up the work of peace again.
The most effective way to prevent a damaging rise in prices
is, quite simply, to release surpluses from storage.
15
I wonder if the housewife knows, when she pays -30 per cent
more than she did a year ago for a bag of flour, that our supply
of wheat is the largest on record, and that 498 million bushels of
several years' crops are available in our neighbor democracy of
Canada. It is true that only three months ago 8. rigid quota was
applied to the importation of wheat from Canada 80 as to keep up
the price of wheat in this country. But it is also true that only
the other day the quota on sugar from Cuba was enlarged 80 sub-
stantially as to absorb most of the reserve stocks in that country.
Regraded Unclassified
- 16 -
127
It seems to ne desirable and necessary that we now follow the
example set in the case of Cuban sugar and permit the entry of
Canadian wheat in larger volume.
Here in this country we have large reserve stocks of farm
products of many kinds which should be released for sonsumption
as fast as necessary to prevent unreasonable price rises.
The Government now holds 7 million bales of cotton in reserve,
and cotton prices have risen from If cents a pound on August 1, 1939
to over 16 cents a pound at the present time. In spite of this rise
of not far from 100 per cent in two years, Congress recently sent to
the President a bill to freeze government stocks of cotton and wheat
for the duration of the war, and thus to prevent the government from
disposing of any of the surplus wheat and cotton it had acquired.
The President promptly vetoed the bill because this measure would
have aggravated the danger of inflation and might have frustrated our
Regraded Unclassified
- 17 -
128
efforts to fight it.
We ought not to withhold cotton surpluses, or any surpluses,
from the market in times like these. The housewife ought not to
be made to pay a tribute to profiteers and speculators when she
buys a cotton sheet for her home or a shirt for her husband or a
suit for her child.
Millions of people still go without the milk, butter and
eggs which, according to the testimony of food experts and the
dictates of plain common sense, are necessary to good health and
good morale. Yet the reserve stocks of butter, cheese, beef and
pork now held in this country are far higher than they were a year
ago and far higher than the average of the past five years.
129
- 18 -
This has been historically a land of milk and honey. There
is still plenty of milk and honey but too much of it is in the
warehouses Let's make it flow. If we were to let it flow to the
public we would not only help in keeping prices stable but we would
be doing something even more important; We would be helping to make
our people healthier and happier.
It is sheer folly from the farmer's point of view to push
prices up by creating scarcities in times like these. The farmers
suffered cruelly for twelve long years after the collapse of the
inflation of 1920 and 1921; they should not be made to suffer again.
It is sheer folly in the same way for labor leaders to seek
new
every few months - new increases
continual increases in wages which in turn produce higher manufactur-
ing costs, higher prices, and a higher cost of living.4 It is short-
sighted for a landlord to charge all that the traffic will bear in
defense centres where housing space is at a premium 4 It is poor
- 19 -
130
business, in the long run, for any businessman to seek exorbitant
profits in this period of defense spending. It is bad banking,
in the long run, for any banker to exploit the present demand for
funds by seeking to charge unreasonable interest rates.
There are always selfish groups in any country which think
they can profit from inflation. They are wrong.
Inflation does more than merely to rob the wage earner of a
portion of his earnings. It does more than saddle the farmer with
& load of debt which he cannot repay. It is more destructive of
morale than any other single force. Inflation divides the country.
It sets up producers against consumers, workers against employers,
the people who owe money against the people to whom the money is
owed. # No group in & community profits from inflation in the long
run except the Three Horsemen - the Speculator, the Profiteer and
the Hoarder.
- 20 -
131
These are truths that should be self-evident. They should
be especially 80 now, in view of the fact that rising prices will
only add to the cost of our defense program and make the arming of
our country steadily more difficult. They should be self-evident
now in the light of the experience that we suffered only 25 years
ago.
We Americans have more than 150 years of self-government
behind us. We are a mature nation, and we should be able to face
up to our responsibilities as mature men and women. My plea to
you tonight is that we should learn from bitter experience. My
hope and my belief is that no group among us - whether farmers,
working men or business men - shall be tempted by the illusion of
selfish gain into allowing prices to rise unchecked.
The cost of inflation is too ruinous to producer and consumer
alike for anyone in authority to tolerate it now.
Regraded Unclassified
- 21 -
132
I can give you only this pledge - that this Administration
will do everything humanly possible to prevent inflation. But
in this fight the Administration must have the firm support
and the clear understanding of 130 million Americans behind it.
If we have that support and that understanding, I know that
we shall not fail.
Thursday septkat
- 9 -
Deings house, 8:45 pm
for everyone to see. Our economy today resembles an overloaded
133
steam boiler. The fire under the boiler is being fed by billions
of additional purchasing power in the hands of the public. The
fire is growing hotter and is generating more steam than the boiler
can safely hold. If we are to prevent the boiler from bursting,
we must damp down the fires by withdrawing purchasing power and
also by increasing the flow of supplies of goods available to the
consumer.
We can, as I have said before, defeat this threat of
inflation, just as we can defeat and destroy the forces of evil
that have been let loose upon this earth. But we need to understand
the issues and we need to see clearly the consequences of inaction
to point out,
or delay. I should like, therefore, ^ to look at the problem for
& few minutes, to 300 first, what we have done, and then what we
need to do in order to stop prices from rising further.
D-C
Regraded classified
- 13 -
134
We shall have to reduce the Federal lending and underwriting
program in such fields as non-emergency housing expenditures and
mortgage guarantees.
We must, as I have said many times, reduce nonessential
Federal expenditures. We must also appeal for economy in state
and local government expenditure and a curtailment of their borrow-
pointed the way
ing for nondefense purposes. As the President showed clearly &
month ago when he vetoed a bill calling for 320 million dollars
worth of highway construction, there is a clear distinction now-
By this action he demonstrated That
adays between the spending that is necessary for defense and the
spending that can be postponed until a later day.
should
I think the country ean congratulate itself on the Presi-
Senate's
dent's veto of this measure, and also upon the A action of the
Senate only last week in approving the creation of a joint com-
mittee of the taxing and the appropriating agencies of Congress
to study the possibilities of economy all along the line in
Regraded Unclassified
-14-
135
nondefense activities. I have several times suggested the orea-
tion of such & committee, and I an very happy that my suggestion
has been adopted by the Senate at last. I hope now that the House
will also approve the idea, because it seems to me that such joint
action is the only sensible way to proceed if we are to out the
decks
costs of government and clear the way for defense spending.
All of the measures I have 80 far suggested for combatting
inflation would attack the problem by reducing the demand for goods
of purchasing hower
now and by helping to build up a backlog for the post war world.
But we should also attack the problem from the opposite direction.
must
We should n make every effort to increase the supply of goods avail-
able to the consumer wherever this can be done without encroaching
upon the defense program. Above all, we must make full use of
those supplies that are available, not only in defense production,
but in the provision of civilian goods which do not compete with
defense output. This is & time when we must flatten the peaks
C
- 15 -
136
andfill up the valleys in our economic picture. If we shave off
e
the peak by reducing purchasing power now and by keeping prices
down now, we shall be helping to provide for the day when these
vast defense expenditures will end and when our defense workers
will take up the work of peace again.
The most effective way to prevent a damaging rise in prices
release pluses from storage.
is, quite simply, to bring prices down.
I wonder if the housewife knows, when she pays 20 per cent
more than she did a year ago for a bag of flour, that our supply
of wheat is the largest on record, and that 498 million bushels of.
several years' crops are available in our neighbor democracy of
Canada. It is true that only three months ago & rigid quota was
applied to the importation of wheat from Canada 80 as to keep up
the price of wheat in this country. But it is also true that only
the other day the quota on sugar from Cuba was enlarged Bo sub-
stantially as to absorb most of the reserve stocks in that country.
C
- 16 -
137
It seems to me desirable and necessary that we now follow the
example set in the case of Cuban sugar and permit the entry of
Canadian wheat in larger volume.
Here in this country we have large reserve stocks of farm
products of many kinds which should be released for consumption
as fast as necessary to prevent unreasonable price rises.
The Government now holds 7 million bales of cotton in
(
reserve, and cotton prices have risen from 9½ cents 8. pound on
August 1, 1939 to over 16 cents a pound at the present time. In
spite of this rise of not far from 100 per cent in two years,
Congress recently sent to the President a bill to freeze govern-
ment stocks of cotton and wheat for the duration of the war, and
thus to prevent the government from disposing of any of the surplus
wheat and cotton it had acquired. The President promptly vetoed
the bill and I Lam-delighted, because this measure would have
aggravated the danger of inflation and might have frustrated our
D-c
Regraded Unclassified
- 17 -
138
efforts to fight it.
cotton orawy surfluses,
We ought not to withhold X surpluses from the market in times
like these. The housewife ought not to be made to pay a tribute
to profiteers and speculators when she buys a cotton sheet for her
home or a shirt for her husband or a suit for her child.
Millions of people still go without the milk, butter and
eggs which, according to the testimony of food experts and the
dictates of plain common sense, are necessary to good health and
good morale. Yet the reserve stocks of butter, cheese, beef and
pork now held in this country are far higher than they were 8. year
ago and far higher than the average of the past five years.
X
know from experience on By own) farm that within two months we could
increase our supply of milk by feeding some of our huge surplus of
corn to the cows. I know that we could use some of our surplus
grains as feed for chickens and get more eggs, yet the price of
$
standard poultry ration has increased 60 per cent since the war began.
C
- 20 -
139
These are truths that should be self-evident. They should
be especially 80 now, in view of the fact that rising prices will
only add to the cost of our defense program and make the arming of
our country steadily more difficult. They should be self-evident
now in the light of the experience that we suffered only 25 years
ago.
We Americans have more than 150 years of self-government
behind us. We are not children any longer. We are a mature nation,
and we should be able to face up to our responsibilities as mature
men and women. My plea to you tonight is that we should learn from
bitter experience. My hope and my belief is that no group among
us - whether farmers, working men or business men - shall be tempted
by the illusion of selfish gain into allowing prices to rise un-
checked # The cost of inflation is too ruinous to producer and
consumer alike for anyone in authority to tolerate it now.
- 21 -
140
this administration
/
I can give you only this pledge - that we at the Treasury
prevent inflation.
will do everything humanly possible to check the rise ih prices
in this fight the
before it will do any lasting damage to our sconemy. But we at
<
aaminis tration
the Treasury must have the firm support and the clear understand-
it.
ing of 130 million Americans behind us. If we have that support
and that understanding, I know that we shall not fail.
141
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4, 1941
TO
Secretary Morgenthau
FROM Messrs. Foley and Pehlo
A character investigation of Emma von Lewinski,
a report on which was received today, indicated that Mrs.
von Lewinski, who had since July 1, 1941, been employed by
the Foreign Funds Control, is the wife of Karl von Lewinski,
former German agent before the Mixed Claims Commission and
German Consul General in New York City for many years prior
to 1930. The report indicated that Mr. and Mrs. von Lewinski
are separated and that Karl von Lewinski is now in Germany,
as is their daughter. Mrs. von Lewinski was immediately
separated from the Foreign Funds Control.
In June, 1941, when she was interviewed prior to
her employment, she gave among her references, Chief Justice
Stone and Senators Barkley, Adams, and Wagner. She also ex-
hibited letters from Senator Barkley which indicated that he
was a close friend and fully endorsed her as to character.
The Secret Service report indicates that Senator Barkley stated
he had known the subject for many years and considered her to
be reliable and a loyal American citizen and could be trusted
in every way. It is not unlikely that Senator Barkley will
request the Treasury to reconsider its action in severing Mrs.
von Lewinski from the Foreign Funds Control.
approved
2.
1m:-
then Thank
Regraded Unclassified
IDENTIAL
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS
Comparative Statement of Sales During
First Two Business Days of July, August, and September, 1941
(July 1-2, August 1-2, September 1-3)
On Basis of Issue Price
(Amounts in thousands of dollars)
I
I
Amount of Increase
:
Sales
I Persentage of Increase
:
or Decrease (-)
#
or Decrease (-)
Item
#
$
I
I
September 1
August
:
September 1
Amgusts
I September
I
August
#
July
I
over
I
over
I
over
:
ever
I
I
:
#
August
:
July
I
August
I
July
Series 1. Post Offices
* 3,993
$ 2,967
$ 2,330
$1,026
$ 637
34.6%
27.3%
Series 1- Banks
5,318
6,325
4,124
- 1,007
2,201
- 15,9
53.4
Series 1- Total
9,311
9,293
6,454
18
2,839
0.2
44.0
Series 1- Banks
1,767
1,889
1,802
- 122
87
- 6.5
4.8
Series 1. Banks
11,300
13,687
12,862
- 2,387
825
- 17.4
6.4
Total
$22,378
$24,869
$21,117
-$2,491
$3,752
- 10.0%
17.86
Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Division of Essearch and Statistics.
September 4, 1941.
Source: All figures are deposits with the Treasurer of the United States on account of proceeds of
sales of United States Savings Bomis.
Note: Figures have been rounded to nearest thousand and will not necessarily add to totals.
Regraded Unclassified
CONFIDENTIAL
143
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS
Daily Sales - September 1941
On Basis of Issue Price
(In thousands of dollars)
Post Office
Bank Bond Sales
All Bond Sales
Bond Sales
Date
Series I
Series I
Series 7
Series G
Total
Series 1
Series 7
Series 6
Total
September 1941
2
$ 3,021
$ 3,385
$ 1,182
$ 5,510
$ 10,077
$ 6,406
$ 1,182
$ 5,510
$ 13,098
3
972
1,933
585
5,790
8,308
2,905
585
5,790
9,280
Total
$ 3.993
$ 5,318
$ 1,767
$ 11,300
$ 18,384
$ 9,311
$ 1,767
$ 11,300
$ 22,378
Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Division of Research and Statistics.
September 4. 1941.
Source: All figures are deposits with the Treasurer of the United States on acceunt of proceeds of sales of
United States Savings Bends.
Note: Figures have been rounded to nearest thousand and will not necessarily add to totals.
Regraded Unclassifi
DEFENSE SAVINGS STAFF
144
ADVANCE SCHEDULE OF RADIO PROGRAMS
THURSDAY - SEPTEMBER 4, 1941
Time:
9:00 - 9:15 A.M.
Program:
The Story of Bess Johnson
Station:
WRC and NBC Red Network
Time:
1:00 - 1:15 P.M.
Program:
Young Dr. Malone
Station:
WJSV and CBS Network
Time:
9:30 - 10:00 P.M.
Program:
"Great Gunne"
Station:
WOL and MBS Network
Time:
9:30 - 10:00 P.M.
Program:
Quiz of Two Cities
Station:
WRC - Washington
and
WFBR - Baltimore
THESE PROGRAMS PROMOTE THE SALE OF DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS.
Regraded Unclassified
145
SEP 4 1941
Dear Mr. Kuhms
A Bureen of Facts and Figures is being ostablished
in the Office of Civilian Defense to which will be
attached an Advisory Interdepartmental Committee. You
are hereby designated as the Treasury Department member
of this Advisory Committee.
Attached are copies of files on the subject which
net forth in detail the functionser the Buress of Fasts
and Figures - of the Advisory Committee.
Sincerely,
(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.
Mr. Fordinand Min, Jr.,
Assistant to the Secretary,
Treasury Department.
Enclosures: LaGuardia's ltr. of Aug. 25, 1941
Gaston's ltr. of Aug. 21, 1941
LaGuardia's ltr. of Aug. 14, 1941
5 page memo from Mayor LaGuardia
to Secretary, dated Aug. 14, 1941
WNTIRE
Citize to Mr. Thompson
ccmiss channely
Regraded Unclassified
146
SEP 4 1941
Dear Mr.
I'm are hereby dovignated as the Treasury Department
lisison representative with when direct contacts my be
más by representatives of the Baresa of Paste and Pigares
which is being established in the Office of Civilian Defense.
Attached are copies of files on the subject which set
forth in detail the functions of the Bureau of Faste and
Figures and of the Advisory Committee which is being estab-
lished as an adjunct of the Bureen.
Sincerely,
(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.
Mr. Charles Schwars,
Treasury Departmenticlosures:
Director of Press Relations LaGuardia's ltr. of Aug. 25, 1941
Gaston's 1tr. of Aug. 21, 1941
LaGuardia's ltr. of Aug. 14, 1941
# page memo from Mayor LaGuardia
to Secretary, dated Aug. 1b, 1941
WNTIRE
Copiero Mr. Thompson
ce- Miss channing
Regraded Unclassified
OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE
WASHINGTON.
August 25. 1961
Honorable Henry Morgentheu
Secretary or the Treasury
Washington. D. C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I eur writing you in reference to the olen for a
Bureau of Facts end Figures. wh'ch I submitted to you under
the date of August 14, for your recommendations. After re-
ceiving your comment, and the 00m ente of other interested
parties. I submitted the plan to the President. and he has
directed me to proceed.
You will remember that the olan for the Bureau
called for Bn Advisory Inter-Depertmentel Committee, to meet
regularly with the Bureau. Would you please, therefore, desig-
nste someone from your Depertment to serve on this Committee?
I would like to have a person of sufficient position within
your Department. to meke decisions on Dolicy. At the same
time would you 8180 designate 8 lisison representative within
your Department, with whom the Board could maintain a direct
contact. As soon es you, and the other Departments have desig-
nated your representatives for the Advisory Committee, I shall
oall a meeting of It, to begin operations.
I went to thank you for your zindness in meking sug-
gestions concerning the Bureau of Facts and Figures. I was
particularly pleased that, except for some differences as to
methods of procedure, the recommendations on the plan were
generally favorable. I should like once more to repest that
the Bureau of Facts end Figures will cooperste with the other
Departments, and not attempt to supersede any of their activities.
It will have only one basic objective, to improve national unity.
AB you know, the President is extremely anxious to get started
in this field, 80 that I would supreciate it if you could desig-
nate your representative for the Advisory Committee and the liei-
BUTTIN within your Department 89 quickly AS possible.
Sincerely yours,
L
F. H. LeGuardis
F. S. Director of Civilien Defense
Regraded Unclassified
August 21, 1941.
Nonorable 7. H. Latuardia,
U. S. Director of Civilian Defense,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
By direction of Secretary borrenthau, and in his absence,
I - replying to your letter of August 14, with which you en-
closed a memorandur as to the proposed wffice of Facts and Recures,
together with a questionnaire. The original of the obestionnaire,
with replies on behalf of the Secretary 01 the Transury, 18 one
returned herewish ao you requested.
In accition to Lice three specific inquiries in the question-
naire you state in "our letter that you would like a frank expression
as to whether the job of civilian rorale properly helon Y to the
Office of Civilian Defense. It would 90071 time tide cuestion is
adequatuly answored ist the terms of executive Order of Way 20, 1921,
which you cite, containing the wores "consider proposals, suprest
plans, and pronote activities desirited to sustain the national
morale." In acuition it BURNS to up the the work of cultivating
and sustaining a satisfactory state of civilian rorale is an
*ssential part of the work of an office of civilian defense.
Secretary Dergenthau expresso. to the meat
betterment of your -urale et 02.10A of
Divilian Defense rinute undertake to -11 sú meakine
corpaigns
lost
Very yours,
Merbert E. Gaston
Assistant Secretary of to Treasury.
Inclosure.
Regraded Unclassified
OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DE
August 14, 1941
The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C.
by dear Mr. Decretary:
By an Executive Order of May 20, 1941, the President instructed
the Office of Civilian Defense to "consider proposals, suggest plans, and
promote activities designed to sustain the national morale." Following
these instructions 1 have been studying the field intensively, and in order
to carry then out 1. an considering the establishment of an Office of Facts
and Figures, within the Office of Civilian Defense.
Before proceeding further, however, it is av deaire to obtain
general agreement 88 to operation, and general ains. Clearly, the value
of such an Office must lie in the assistance it can render to departments
and existing agencies of the Government. [ am, therefore, submitting with
this letter the general idea of an Office of Facts and Figures, as suggested
by our studies. You will find at the bottom of the attached memorandum
a simple form, set up for the expression of your approval, your disapproval,
your comments, and so forth. E would appreciate it if you would fill out
this form, stating your frank opinion of the idea as presented here, and
adding any suggestions you may have. If this project Ls to be undertaken,
it is of fundamental importance that it have the approval of all. I enclose
two copies of the memorandum, so that you may retain one in your files.
Desides your approval, disapproval, or comments, concerning this
plan, I should like a frank expression from you as to whether you believe
that the job of civilian norale properly belongs to the Office of Civilian
Defense, or whether you believe that it should be placed somewhere also
or whether you believe that there is no need or desirability for a coordins-
ting office of this kind.
Since 1 an anxious to act us soon as possible, 1 would appreciate
your reply at your earllest conventance. + shall be out of town during the
coming week on speaking engagements. If there are any questions or ampli-
fications that you would like in the acuntime, L wish you would feel free
to call upon Russell Divenport or Captain Robert Kintner, who have under-
taken to help me in developing this plan, and who can de reached through
my Office. The are funiliar with all the details as we have discussed then.
Sincerely yours,
F. H. LaGuardis
U. 5. Director of Civilian Defense
Enclosures
Regraded Unclassified
wight 14, 1941
TO: The Secretary of this Treasury
ROLL Mayor I, H. 011-
UNJECT: Office of y as and Flure
The functions of an Office 02 et- and Fleurom are extresely
important 10 the progr... Yot the puirement. re extremely
simple.
First, in under to make Itaelf conversent with the entira
field, the Office vould ne use copias of .11 the rélouses rent out
of every department and LN the Government. These copies should
De received when relessed.
second, the Office would requir negess to every department
and <genty for the purpose of thering further information concerning
their activities. Neturally, in seking: this information, the Office
would conform to special regulations recarding the release of military,
diplomatic, and other department. socreto. This can very easily be
worked out with each depart ent, providing the general principle is
agreed upon by al. that, with special exceptions, the Office of Facts
And Figures is entitled to nak for information to supplement the
standard releases, whenever the Office déems that such added informa-
tion would be of benefit to public arale.
Third, to Do effective, the Office should have the authority
to make auggestions to departs ent heads and to their public relations
offices, concerning their information
These, I elievo, are the only quirements for the successful
watsbilishment of what we have in mind. I do not feel that it would be
proper for our Office to supplient the present pu dicity or information
services. That work to now win, done if each department nd it should
ramain with the department, Our at ille function is to clarify, and,
WO would hope, mike non: affective, the Torto of agencies Already in
Lbs field. It 10 100 of coordination and not of control
of regulation.
To this general principle there is only one exception, and that
- La do with radio time. AL present the radio companies are being
ed with request for the fro, ,11 the depirt ents. Al. these
registered are note with the sype invention, namely, to help public
Lei yet I an assured that they .TO having quite the op osite ef-
Des, and that the pu lic is not reacting well to -11 the Government
Now bain; taken DEL the dr. In order to make these effort ef-
it will e necessary to coordinate and channel all Govern ent
Data programs in one office, nd this job should belong to an office
at Isots and figures.
Regraded Unclassified
4.
the subject of radio, we have oden con iderin, program
call
Your Government," in which the Office of wets and
Players
wld undertako to maser ny question that any citizen
might OR concerning defende and the national maergency. The In-
formation to answer these questions would have to to supplied to us by
the departmente (subject always to the speci..i restriction, already
mattemed). Basically, this would the A large milling oper tion, but
0006 6 week the questions would ne sifted nd the best ones nskan,
and answered, on the air. Such progra would Lerve two purposest
(1) It would inform us in detail concerning the confusion. ni por-
plexitive of the aver.ge citizon, end (2) would enable us, with the
cooperation of the departments, to ;resent n informed ni coherent
picture of the national affort. The ide. of this ,mgrees is .3 yet
tentative, but it seems to us, and to the notic people consulted, to
hold a grest deal of
The Office of Facts and Figure: would consist of 4. small group
of and and women carefully delected fro, different occupations having
to do with public inforcation-tiat La, new, fature, The sind, r..iio,
movies, clubs, etc. These Jon, thoroughly Failtur with the operation
of government, would study the Departmental releases in! would thus be
thoroughly fumiliar with what the Govern ent La avia, about iteelf at
all times. These specialist would he in touch with -11 parts of the
country through U:eir professional contacts. The communic tionswould be
two-may: That 1s, each min would unlertake to tribute Dute int
figures in his field. And would in the the rather idvic, analyze
situations where morale La ord, at determine what alght be done to
improve morale. In shor's, 1:10.00 en would be conderne., in short, with
foots, figures, and idea, and with their distribution, in the interest
of actional unity.
A detaile: discussion of the nethods of distribution would be
too involved for thi. niu... I can su marize their by sying
that Only will be natural, no's forced; they will employ news, not
onlythoo. Our studio dia that the first, negi of the U.S. today
in in information, in the 20201 dy liter 1 sense of that wor:,
D in be the date of the The DE ni Figure -- help (n-
Man to flow freel, ná rapidly through it natural channels.
In this conno tion, with the perov 1 of the Prisident, we
Qready taken tape to ne ker's ture ⑆ to admist,
D are andious to with the nitional defento program.
Possible other or extended functions for the Office of Facts
woul grow out of 0.10 work. But - the the being /
La that the Office should is d', up ou sound with the
possible air, namely, TAX i nl Sective what
mody in exterince.
In address to 1.8 LAIf Jocan an constituting the Office of
and Figures, vary JCE, 10 ave Govern .ent Advisory
Regraded Unclassified
that is preposed to be in effect the creation of 4
or coordinating office for Government public
alimo and information. It is our understanding that such an
Lee directy extets in the Office of Government Reports and
the ereation of a new office on the lines indicated would
to be - unnecessery duplication. If in his studies of
services norale the Director of Civilian Defense should find that
injury or conflist in the announcement-of governmental agencies
to dafence programs is contributing to en unsatisfactory state
merale, 10 would seem wholly proper for the Director to report
the situation to the agencies concerned, or to the Office of
Devement Reports. It is our view that too much centralisation
La likely to be harmful by obstructing the free flow of information
t
the prose and other agencies of dissemination.
the Treasury is also opposed to the creation of any new
agency to control the allocation of radio time to Government Depart-
usite and agencies. So far as Treasury programs are concerned
the reports of the principal radio analysts, independent polls
and the record of results in the sale of securities NOW to us
to furnish convincing evidence that these program are helping
rather then hurting public norale.
to you think that these functions properly portain to the Office
of divilian Defense, or should they be lodged elsewhere?
4.
Bee above.
De yes balieve that there should be any such set-up?
de
See above.
Regraded Unclassified
Committee, composed of one representative Pro each by department,
or agency, including Government Reports = (Lowell Vellett) -nd Defense
Information (Colonel Willin Donown), ppointes by the head of the
department or hurney. This advisory Corrittoe should meet with the
members of the Office of Factor nd Figure ..t least once week for
the purpose of discussing the need and problems of the department.
I feel that this would coordinale govern ent policy nd mike the Office
both practical nd helpful.
I would by it If you wild expres. your LILTOVEL or
disapproval of this plan in U.L9 sp of or were whatever 1 uggestions
you say have.
Do you think that Her he un 20% roper1, er in to the Office of
Civilian Defense, or shoul! they THAT Combere?
Leliev that ther hould b- The as of-up? of
Regraded Unclassified
THE BRITISH SUPPLY COUNCIL IN NORTH AMERICA 154
BOX 600
TELEPHONE: REPUBLIC 7860
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN STATION
WASHINGTON, D, c.
September 4, 1941
The Honourable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morgenthau:
Many thanks for your kind note of yesterday
regarding my new appointment.
I do not need to tell you that Arthur Purvis
is a hard man to follow. I do not expect to fill his
shoes, but I can at least hope to follow in the path
that he blazed.
He often spoke feelingly of the assistance
you had been to him at all times, and stated that
your wise counsel and advice enabled him to avoid
many pitfalls. I hope you will not mind 1f from
time to time I also seek your counsel and advice in
attempting to deal with the difficult problems with
which we are often confronted.
Again thanking you for your kind letter, I
am
Yours sincerely,
Morris W. Wilson.
T
Regraded Unclassified
155
September 3, 1941.
Dear Mr. vilsons
It was with a great deal of pleasure
that I heard of your appointment to earry
on the work which our good friend, Arthur
Parvis, so ably initiated. I know that this
responsibility is a heavy one, but I feel
also that 11 is is good hands.
Às you take up the nov duties, I send my
congratulations and begt vishes. I shall look
forward to our association during the coming
months.
Sincerely,
(Signed) E. Morgenthas, 3r.
Hr. Morris Wilson,
Chairman,
British Supply Council,
c/o Willard Netel,
Washington, D. c.
GEF/cgk
By Meesenger 10:30 -
Regraded Unclassified
156
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4, 1941
TO
Secretary Morgenthau
FROM Mr. Kamarok
Subject: Airplane Deliveries to the British
Summary
1. A total of 49 planes 1s reported as shipped in the
last statement received, 40 going to England and 9 to the
Middle East.
2. We have now received data on shipments to the British
for the last 30 weeks. From the following table giving shipments
by ten week periods, it is evident that deliveries to the
British have slightly decreased in the last ten weeks compared
to the preceding period.
Total Deliveries to the British
Number of Planes
First ten weeks
563
Second ten weeks
654
Last ten weeks
649
Regraded Unclassified
157
- 2 -
Division of Monetary
Research
Airplane Shipments to the British
(From February 1 to August 30 by air
January 11 to August 9 by sea)
Table A. - Shipments by Area
Total
Latest
Reported
Week
To Date
To the United Kingdom
Light and medium bombers
35
809
Heavy bombers
0
43
Naval patrol bombers
0
72
Pursuit
5
36
Total to United Kingdom
40
960
To the Middle East
Light and medium bombers
9
175
Pursuit
o
516
Total to Middle East
9
691
To the Far East
Light and medium bombers
0
6
Naval patrol bombers
0
9
Pursuit
o
145
Trainers
0
55
Total to Far East
0
215
Totals
Light and medium bombers
44
990
Heavy bombers
o
43
Naval patrol bombers
0
81
Pursuit
5
697
Trainers
0
55
Grand Total
49
1,866
Regraded Unclassified
158
- 3 -
Division of Monetary
Research
Table B. - Shipments by Types
Total
Latest
Reported
Week
To Date
Bell Airacobra (P-39)
5
27
Boeing B-17
o
21
Brewster Buffalo
o
145
Consolidated Catalina
o
81
Liberator
0
22
Curties Tomahawk
o
516
Douglas Boston I
o
1
Boston II
0
72
Boston III
16
189
Glenn Martin Maryland
o
150
Grumman Martlet II
0
9
Lockheed Hudson I
0
1
Hudson III
22
166
Hudson IV
0
18
Hudson V
o
344
North American Harvard II
0
55
United Chesapeake
6
49
Grand Total - All Types
49
1,866
Regraded Unclassified
159
- 4. -
Division of Monetary
Research
Table C. - Plane Deliveries to the British by Weeks
Light
Naval
Week
and Medium
Heavy
Patrol
Ended
Bombers
Bombers
Bombers Pursuit Trainers Total
Feb. 8 #
22
-
3
-
-
25
Feb. 15
#
39
-
-
100
-
139
Feb. 22
-
35
-
-
27
-
62
Mar. 1*
7
-
5
25
-
37
Mar. 8
e
16
-
3
10
-
29
Mar. 15 #
26
1
&
-
-
31
Mar. 22
e
17
-
2
22
-
41
Mar. 29
+
25
-
3
18
-
46
Apr. 5
e
21
-
7
73
-
101
Apr. 12
e
21
2
2
27
I
52
Apr. 19 .
20
3
4
5
-
32
Apr. 26
*
23
2
3
-
28
56
May 3
-
61
1
2
15
27
106
May 10 .
36
1
8
10
-
55
May 17 +
61
13
7
19
-
100
May 25
#
30
10
-
25
-
65
June 1
.
28
5
5
21
-
59
June 8 +
37
2
7
-
-
46
June 15
#
26
1
4
20
-
51
June 22 .
28
-
4
52
-
84
June 29
#
45
-
1
50
-
96
July 6 4b
19
-
3
20
-
42
July 13 .
34
3
48
-
85
July 20 +
41
-
1
32
-
74
July 27
.
45
-
-
24
-
69
Aug. 3
+
45
-
-
11
-
56
Aug. 10 +
53
1
-
15
-
69
Aug. 17 +
49
-
-
12
-
61
Aug. 24 6
36
1
-
11
-
48
Aug. 30
.
44
-
-
5
-
49
-
990
43
81
697
55
1,866
-
The date given is for shipments by air. Shipments by water
start three weeks earlier. That is, the statement reporting
the shipment of planes by air for the week ending August 30
would report the shipment of planes by water for the week end-
ing August 9.
Regraded Unclassified
160
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
H. D. White
FROM
Subject: British Morale
Impressions gained by Coe on B. recent motor trip to Bir-
mingham and Coventry:
1. The "morale of the British people 18 magnificant".
The only soft spot hit upon 18 among some Birming-
ham business men who were supporters of Chamberlain.
The Birmingham clubs are reputedly the only places
in the country where you can still hear appeasement
talk.
2. There still exists an important, though not well
recognized, cleavage of opinion 8.6 to what would con-
stitute B. "defeat of Hitler". Some people would be
satisfied to have the German army remove Hitler and
assume control in Germany, while others demand that
the German military machine be defeated, the Nazi
party uprooted, and a genuinely democratic Government
in Germany be established.
3. Some workers seem over optimistic about the duration
of the war and the prospecte of invasion of the con-
tinent.
-. Among the more educated people, doubts are expressed
6.5 to how the war 1a going to end, because of the fear
that invasion of the continent will not be practical
for B long time to come. In these circles, however,
the more dominant view seems to be that the Russian
campaign has made it clear that Hitler will be defeated.
Coe has obtained the permission from Winant to travel a.B
you requested. Prior to his trip to Birmingham, he made two trips
by train and expects to spend about ten days or two weeks later
In August travelling by car.
(Coe to Secretary, August 11)
Regraded Unclassified
16!
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
H. D. White
FROM
Subject: British press clippings on U.K. food situation
1. Harvest prospects good, with the exception of potatoes.
Early potato yields were disappointing and later crop
may suffer from "potato plight". Emphasis this year was
placed on production of fodder to maintain milk yields.
Number of pigs and sheep on farms have been reduced.
2. The Black Market feeds on bombed food supplies.
The Ministry of Food is accused of being the biggest
supplier to the Black Market of bombed food. Recent order
places more foods under license, both for wholesale and
retail trade.
3. Eggs, Milk and Meat
Bad eggs are being received by retailers and distribu-
tore. No machinery to make good spoiled eggs received by
customers. August allotment is 3 egge per regular customer.
Bad distributive system blamed. Milk rationing eystem to
be introduced October 1; some diluting of milk reported.
Fatter bacon from less choice outs is expected. Meat rations
for miners and heavy industrial workers to be increased.
4. Hot meals for air-raid victims.
Plans are now completed for distribution of complete hot
meals to homes in bombed areas. Meals will be paid for as
they are at communal feeding centers at prices fixed by local
authorities supplying the food. Meals will be cooked at
emergency kitchens and distributed in Ford-donated, specially
designed food vans.
Regraded Unclassified
162
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
H. D. White
FROM
Subject: U. K. Exports under Lend-Lease
1. Re-exports from U.K.of American steel 1a not to be permitted.
Sir Dunoan, President of the Board of Trade, in reply to
8. question asked in the House of Commons as to what steps Bri-
tish exporters should take to enable them to export American
steel, said: "No steel sheets, bare, plates, etc., of Ameri-
can origin may be re-exported from this country".
2. Lend-Lease removes raison d'etre of British export drive.
The Banker in a recent issue reviews the British export
policy since the beginning of the war and examines the reasons
for the changes which have taken place. The points made by
the writer:
&. Lend-Leawe, by insuring receipt of essential supplies
from the U.K., irrespective of Britain's means of pay-
ment, has removed the raison d'etre even for some exports
which bring in dollars.
b. The export drive which was formerly desirable in order to
maximize war production 1e now an impediment to the great-
est possible war effort.
0. Many English exporters believe that British exports are
being hampered by inefficiency or lack of cooperation be-
tween Government departments, or by an exaggerated de-
ference to the susceptibilities of American trade interests.
Some recent newspaper articles have reflected bewilderment
of the British exporter concerning the change in official policy.
They said that more care should be paid to the exporters and to
the markets which they have built up over many years.
(Coe to Secretary, August 12)
Regraded Unclassified
163
FOR THE PRESS
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FOR THE PRESS
SEPTEMBER 4, 1941
The President today announced that he had
authorized the transfer of various defense articles to
the Government of Poland under the Lend-Lease Act and
declared that the gallant resistance of the forces of the
Government of Poland is "vital to the defense of the United
States."
This action, the President said, demonstrates
our intention to give material support to "the fighting
determination of the Polish people to establish onec again
the independence of which they were so inhumanly deprived."
Polish troops are now training in Canada for action
overseas, Under the President's order, machine guns, sub-
machine guns, rifles, artillery equipment, trucks and other
supplies will be sent to these troops in the near future.
The President stressed the importance of this new
aid to the Government of Poland as a continuing expression
of "the policy of the United States to extend aid to all
who resist aggression."
Regraded Unclassified
164
DLD FOR RELEASE
HOLD FOR RELEASE
SEPTEMBER +, 1941
The following statement end the executive Order accompanying 1%
177 for release in payers appearing on the street not earlier than
B:00 P.O., S.S.T., September 4, 1941.
The Jame restriction applies to its use over the radio
STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President
The Prosident today, after conferring with Under Secretary of
Vwp (atterson, Under Secretury of the Navy Forrestal, Mr. William 6.
Knudson and Mr. Sidney Hillman, seting ao the Council of the OPM, and
with Beer Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime
Consission, issued an Executivo Order establishing is new division in the
office of Production Management.
This division is to be known as the Division of Contract
Distribution and is to be coordinate with the existing divisions -- Pro-
curement, Production, Priorities, Labor and Civilian Supply.
Floyd B. odlum, of POW York, has been appointed Director of
The new division.
The conference was held and the Executive Order VIIIS issued in
furtherance of a determined move on the part of the Acministration to
help the analler business units of the country obtain a fair where of
the defunse orders, and to prevent, 30 far as possible, dislocation of
industry and uncaployment of workers in plants where production hua been
Aurtailed by priorition and material shortages.
THE program devised WAS arrived at in consultation with
representatives of the Army, Navy, [Saritime Commission, and OF and has
the full support of these agencies.
The Labor Division and the Dafense contract Service of OPM
have alroady done a great deal in starting the machinery of sub-contract-
the and in retraining and obtaining receployment for discharged workers.
The program is now to be greatly expanded throughout each part of the
Unitud States, 0.5 one of the most important functions of OPM. The
present personnel, records, etc., of the Dofunse Contract Service of
WIS will be transforrud to this new division.
Through this Division, the Office of Production Management will
be emabled more effectively to adjust the dislocations and alloviato
unumployment resulting from pricrities and material chortenes, and bring
about naximum use of the nation's factorico and industrial plants,
repocially the amaller 0006 throughout the nation, This will be done
through Your major steps:
1. The breaking down of Ihrge orders of supplies into amailer
units, and sproading the purchases anong more Time and in
all localities possible.
2,
Providing assistanco through the Labor Division of OPM in
retraining end obtaining reomployment for workers who are
unamployed as a result of the shutting down of same plants
or reduction of their output.
3,
The effective distribution of defense contructs to the
maller business enterprisos, 05 yet largoly anused, through an
expanded use of sub-contracting, contract distribution, and
the pooling of plant facilities.
4. by providing a staff of industrial and production engineers
to formulate and exccute specific plans for the conversion of
non-dofonso industries and plants 10 defunce production.
The Division of Contract Distribution will have branch offices
locato! in the various Status.
Regraded Unclassified
165
The Division will formulate and promote plans and programs for
the purchase of supplies for the Army and Havy in amaller units, but
among a greater number of firms and in as many different localities as
possible. It will also formulate and devolop programs for the conversion
of plants and industries from civilian to dofense production - with
the assistance of the government wherever necossary. It will formulate
the organization and use of local industrial defenso production addocia-
tions, and will promote and stimulato farming out of defonse work and
sub-contracting, wherever feamible.
Tho Division of Contract Distribution will provido an industrial
engineering staff whose responsibility it will be to obtain the maximum
uso of existing facilities and tools by assisting manufacturers and
business enterprises in making the necessary changes in their tools and
equipment for effectivo use in defense production.
The field offices of the Division of Contract Distribution 11
be adequatoly staffed to render needed assistance to businosamen. Pro-
curoment agencies of the Government will assign reprosontatives to the
main office end field offices, na required, for purposes of liaison.
In the various citios will bo established oxhibits or "market
places" where thore will be displayed specific parts - "bits and pieces"
- the compononte noeded for defonse production. Theso may be parts of
a machine gun or an airplane or tank, or any one of 3 thousand other itums
which aro needed. These "bits and pioces" will bo laboled as to the
quantitive needed and the machino tools and opurations required for their
production 80 that any machine shop ovner or manufacturer can determine
whother his facilities are capable of producing such items.
Sub-contracting arrangements can then be entered into on the
basis of what an individual 0808 he is capable of doing, receiving then
and there the export industrial and engineering judgment of thoso whose
assistance he may dosire,
The Division of Contract Distribution will also provide through
the regular commercial banking channels, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, including the Defenso Supplies Corporation and the Defense
Plant Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Banks and thoir branches,
the necessary financing facilities for local industrial production
associations, primo contractors and subcontractors, and will recommend
whenever necessary such additional financial procedures and machinery
36 may be required to obtain the maximum utilization of oxisting plant
and tool facilities for dofonse purposes.
The Director of the Division 10 to appoint two advisory
committees, one to consist of representatives of small business organiza-
tions; the other, to consist of industrial, managoment and production
engineers,
It 18 intonded, on the one hand, to face the responsibility of
alloviating the hardships which have resulted from the defense program
and, on the other, to marshal our productivo capacitios to the objective
that no plant or tool which can bo used for defonse shall bu allowed to
remain idlo.
The text of the Executive Order follows:
Regraded Unclassified
166
SERVICE COC
ESTABLISHING THE DIVISION OF CONTRACT
If THE OFFICE or PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT AND INFINING
ITS FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitu-
tim and the statutes of the United States, and in order to define
further the functions and duties of the Office of Production Manage-
sent with respect to the unlimited national emergency as declared
by the President on May 27, 1941, and to provide for the more effec-
tive utilization of existing plant facilition for defense purposes
the conversion into defense production of civilian industries at-
fected by priorities and rev material shortages; the alloviation of
unemployment caused by the effects of such priorities and shortages;
the local pooling of facilities and equipment; subcontracting; and
the vider diffusion of defonse contracts among the smaller business
enterprises in every part of the nation, it 10 hereby ordered as
followe:
1. There shall to within the Office of Production
Management a Division of Contract Distribution at the hoad
of which shall be 8. Director appointed by the Office of
Production Management with the approval of the Prosident.
The Director shall discharge and perform the following re-
sponsibilities and dutice under the direction and super-
vision of the Diroctor General acting in association with the
Associato Director Ceneral:
a. Formulate and promote specific program for the
purchase of supplios for the Army and Havy in
smaller units but among o. greater number of firms
and in as many difforent localities Ad possible.
b. Formulate and promoto modifications in foderal pro-
curement practices and procodures relating to no-
gotiating contracts, bidding practice, performance
and bid bonds, and other practices and procedures,
to the end that thore shall be A vider distribution
of defense contracts and purchases.
c. Develop progress for the conversion of plants and
Industrice from civilian to dofense production, with
the assistance of the government if recommary.
d. Stimulate the organization and use of local Indus-
trisl dofense production associations,
e. Promote and stimulate subcontracting wherever foacible.
f. In order to obtain use of ordeting productive
facilities and toole, advise munufacturers and busi-
nose enterprises the specific ways in which their
facilitios and tools my be utilized in defonse pro-
duotion; advise such manufacturers and businessmen
with respect to the procodures and practices of the
several federal procurement agencies.
B. Pacilitate through the regular commorcial banking
charmole, the Reconstruction Financo Corporation.
and the Foderal Recerve Banks and thoir branches,
the necessary financing facilitios for primo con-
tractors, subcontractors and local industrial dofenso
production associations, and recommend from time
to time to the Director General and Associate Director
General much additional financial procedures or -
chinery as whall be required to ensure maximum utilize
tion of existing plant and tool facilities for defense
purposes.
Regraded Unclassified
167
hi Provide engineering and technical esistance to such
prime contractors, subcontractors, and local industrial
defense production associations as may require such
assistance in order to participate in defense produc-
tion.
1. Perform such other duties and responsibilities all the
Office of Production Management may from time to time
determine.
2. To ensure unity of policy and coordinated consideration
of all relevant factors involved in the formulation and execution
of industry conversion programs, and contract distribution and sub-
contracting procedures, all such programs or procedures shall clear
through the Division of Contract Distribution.
3. To aid the Director in carrying out the aforessid respon-
sibilities, there shell be assigned to the Division one or more
officers of the Departments of War end the Hevy, respectively, and
one or more representatives of the Unritime Commission, whose duty
shall be to assist AM liaimon in the speedy and successful carry-
10g not of the aforeasid program.
4. There shell be in the Division of Contract Distribution
time Advisory Committees consisting of representatives to be designated
by the Director of the Division with the approval of the Office of
Production Menagement. One sholl be representative of small business
organizations; and the other of industrial, management, and produc-
tion engineers. The Committees shall, from time to time, upon request
by the Director, make findings and submit recommendations to the
Director with respect to procurement practices and procedures; contract
placements and distribution; industry conversion problems; formation
of 10001 production associations; subcontracting; and for such other
atters na the Director may require advice rnd assistance.
:. Within the limits of such funds es may be mode available
to the Division of Contract Distribution, the Director may appoint
industrial and production engineers, economists, statisticians, end
such technical end other personnel aa he shall does necessary to
carry out the duties assigned to the Division herein.
6, The Director may establish branch offloes throughout the
United States and its territories to carry out his duties. There
shall be assigned to such branch of ces such officer personnel or
other representatives of the Army, Navy, United States Meritime
Commiss on end other federal procurement agencies as may be required
by the Director for lisison purposes.
7, There shall be assigned to the main office and to each
field of fice of the Division a representative of the Labor Division
of the Office of Production Vanagement to cooperate with such of-
fices in the Labor Division's efforts toward resmployment of -
ployees or plants whose production has been curtailed b: priorities
and material shortages.
8. In the execution of the foregoing duties, the Director of
the Division of Contract Distribution shall consult and collaborate
with the War Department, the Havy Department, the United States Vari-
Une Commission, and other government procurement agencies, which are
hereby directed to cooperate with and establish close Listoon with
such Division to accomplish the purposes of this order.
D. The Defense Contract Service, established purquent to Regu-
lation No. 9, July 29, 1941, of the Office of Production l'enagement,
18 hereby sholished. The datine and responsibilities of sald Defense
Contract Service are hereby assigned to the Division of Contract
Distribution. All records, files, and equipment of the Defense Con-
tract Service shell be transferred to the Division of Contract Distri-
bution,
PRANELIN D, POOSEVELT
THE THE HOUSE,
Deptember 4, 1941.
Regraded Unclassified
168
TEM
PLAIN
Shanghai via N. R.
Dated September 4, 1941
REc'd 8:29 a.m.
SEcretary of State,
Washington.
1221, Fourth.
The following Army, Navy and Marine officers
have arrived in Shanghai with Grafts issued at Tokyo
on the National City Bank in NEW York, in the amounts
named: Major Stuart Wood, U.S.Army $1400, Captain
Bankson T. Holcomb, U.S.Marine Corps $1400, LieutEnant
William R. Wilson, U.S.Navy $1900, Lieutenant Rufus
L. Taylor $1900, Lieutenant John R. Bromley, U.S.Navy
$900, LieutEnant Forrest R. Biard, U.S.Navy $2260.67,
Licutenant Ferdinand Bishop, U.S.Marine Corps $1900,
Lieutenant Thomas R, Mackie, U.S.Navy $1900 and
Lisutenant Gilven M. Slonim, U.S.Navy $2200. THEBE
officers are unable to cash these drafts in Shanghai
and since they are in need of local currency for
current EXPENSES and travelers checks for travel
purposes out of Shanghai, they request that the
National City
Regraded Unclassified
169
-2- 1221, fourth, from Shanghai via N. R.
National City Bank at Shanghai bE authorized, by what-
EVEr means the freezing regulations will permit to cash
the above mentioned drafts. Inasmuch as some of the
officers are leaving Shanghai on SEPTEMBER 8, an urgent
reply is requested.
LOCKHART
DD
Regraded Unclassified
170
PARAPHR SE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM: American Commulate General, Hong/Kong, China,
via n,r,
DATE: September 4, 1941, 5 p.s.
NO.1 343
FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FROM THE STARILIZATION
BOARD OF CHINA. (This message has not been paraphrased
before sending.)
"At the request of Mr. Fex, the Stabilization Beard of
China 1s sending the following information:
"The Board, at of the close of business on September 3,
has approved sales for imports into Shamghai of
US$ 3,937,737.46. Actual payments made consisted of
3,782,786 U.S. dollars.
"Sterling, September 3, approved for exchange
1 3,780,651; actual payments made 1. 774,000."
SOUTHARD
EATPAX
893.51/7286
Regraded Unclassified
C
0
P
171
Y
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington
In reply refer to
September 4, 1941.
RA
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to
the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses
five copies of a paraphrase of telegram No. 447. dated
September 3. 1941, 8 p.m., from the American Consulate,
Manila, Philippine Islands, transmitting a message from
Kr. A. Manuel Fox for the Secretary of the Treasury.
Enclosure:
From Consulate, Manila,
No. 447, September 3.
1941. (5 copies of
peraphrase.)
Regraded Unclassified
172
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM: American Consulate, Manila, Philippine Islands
DATE: September 3, 1941, e p.a.
NO.: 447
STRICTLY CONPIDENTIAL.
THE FOLLOWING IS FOR THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT FROM FOX.
FOR THE ATTENTION OF MR, BERNARD BERNSTEIN.
An over-all pieture of the proposals seen to be favorable
for a new set up which would (1) involve least modification
of the Agency, created by the letters of April 25, and thus
avoid embarrasement which 10 coonsioned by extreme changes,
and (2) ties the operations of the Board and the Agency more
directly with freezing control than would exist otherwise.
The three major centers in which I work are: Sharshai,
Hong Kong, and Chungking. Because of the possibility of
influencing financial and esonomic notions, I should spend
most of my time in Chungking. Since Hong Kong is in the
sterling area, it presents & special problem. Shanghai
has a consitive and difficult market to observe and work 1a.
Taylor should immediately devote more time to economic
studies and the operations of the Board, and Fress should
begin immediately to devote full time to accounting. Mr.
Ader is needed for problems dealing with freezing control
and for economic studies. Therefore, I should have at
least one competent and effective person for Shanghai and
one for Hong Kong.
The
Regraded Unclassified
173
The Beard is looking for a theroughly reliable and
experienced financial man to take charge of its office
in Hong Kong. It can pay a good salary for such a person,
Do you know of someone you can recommend? It is requested
that particulars be sent to me at Hong Kong at the earliest
opportunity.
There is need for formalising the freeging control in
China as it apparently has been in the Philippine Islands.
If I were furnished with competent assistants for Shanghai
and Hong Kong. I could handle the matter from Thungking.
In regard to the Department's specifie proposals-
my immediate and hurried reactions are all follows:
1. (a) This 18 satisfactory. It will unquestionably
please the Chinese Government and Dr. Kung. (b) This
continues to provide for two parallel exchange algenetes
which may confliet. This may work out satisfactorily, how-
ever, if control over the acquisition of foreign exchange
by the Central Bank is not given to the Agency. Repeated
assurances have been given us that the Central Bank would
turn over to the Board the exchange acquired. (e) This
is satisfactory. (a) This improvisation is attractive.
A drawback (especially If Dr. Kung is one of the three
members of the Agency) is that them, who, as I have previously
mentioned, is already in a difficult pesition might
be embarrassed further should it be necessary
to
Regraded Unclassified
174
to submit to a vote come of the important actions. The
situation, however, can be manaiged except where a firm
position is taken by Dr. Kung. If Chem could be made
joint policy committee shairman, many problems could be
solved. A satisfactory arrangement has been adopted in
the Board whereby an understanding is reached in advance
by Chen, Pei, and myself. This is excellent.
2. (a) The 1dea is good but the strengthening of the
personnel of the Central Bank is easier said than done. (b)
Your difficulty 10 recognized. The new proposal is definitely
worth a trial. As indicated in my last cable, the new decree
for the Board is feasible. (e) It is agreed that the
appropriate steps by the U.S. freezing control in having
exchange funnel through the Central Bank eliminate the
need for the licensing of Central Bank aequisitions by the
Agency.
3. (a) This is all right. (b) This is antisfactory.
(e) The suggested plan come to be better than the two
alternatives which were suggestein 8. recent telegram of mine.
Am I correct in assuming that you propose to amend General
License No. 64 along the came lines? (e) Your reasons are
valid. Either alternative is satisfactory.
4. There is agreement in regard to this; the Beard
has already tackled the problem by having Pei work alosely
with Rogers in regard to this matter. Thus far, there has
been an assurance of cooperation and come progress VAS made
by the end of last week.
5. In
Regraded Unclassified
175
6. In effect, your proposal coincides with the
recommendation that I made on the came. I regretfully
re ort that the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank is the only
bank that is consistently ocoperating with the Board.
The Board has just advised me that the National City
Bank of New York, on instructions of the head office, has
again entered the open market. I have no information in
regard to the Chase Bank at this time. Should the banks
disregard the warming, it may be desirable to withdraw
the generally licensed status from confirmed offenders.
This is the end of the nessage.
HICKOK
SAYRE
EA:PAX
Regraded Unclassified
C
0
176
P
Y
KD
PLAIN
Teingtao via N.R.
Dated September 4, 1941
Rec'á. 8134
Secretary of State,
Washington.
62, Fourth.
BRISTLE REPORT.
The freezing procedure adopted by Japanese
authorities in North China reported B. complete cessation
of bristle shipments to all countries from Tsingtao
during August. Exporters have small stocks on hand
bought for British and American importers but military
permits to ship have been refused.
Local price quotations for bristles were purely
nominal and there were no transactions BO far as is
known. Dressing stations in interior have ceased
operations pending clarification of situation.
Sent to the Department, repeated to Shanghai by
mail to Tientsin.
MEYER.
DD
Copy:bj:9-5-41
Regraded Unclassified
FOS 1 /
177
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 4. 1941.
TO
Secretary Morgenthau
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM Mr. Cochran
Registered sterling transactions of the reporting banks were as follows:
Sold to commercial concerns
£47,000
Purchased from commercial concerns £24,000
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York sold £20,000 in registered sterling to
the American Express Company.
Open market sterling was again quoted at 4.03-1/2, end there were no reported
transactions.
The Uruguayan free peso, which has been quoted at ,4425 for more than & week,
moved off to a closing quotation of 4400 today.
In New York, closing quotations for the foreign currencies listed below were
(
as follows:
Canadian dollar
10-1/2% discount
Argentine peso (free)
.2372
Brazilian milrois (free)
.0505
Colombian peso
.5800
Mexican peso
.2070
Venezuelan bolivar
.2745
Cuban peso
1/2% discount
In the unofficial exchange market in Shanghai, the yuan held steady at 4-13/16#.
The sterling-dollar cross rate again worked out to 4.04.
There were no gold transactions consummated by us today.
The State Department forwarded B. cable to us reporting that the following gold
shipments had been made from Australia. for sale to the Sen Francisco Mint upon
arrival:
$2,092,000 shipped by the Commonwealth Bank of Australie, Sydney, to the Federal
155,000 shipped by the Bank of New South Wales, Sydney, to the American Trust
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Company, San Francisco.
$2,247,000 Total
Regraded Unclassified
178
- 2 -
In London, spot and forward silver were again fixed at 23-1/24 and 23-7/16d
respectively. The U.S. equivalents were 42.67# and 42.554.
The Treasury's purchase price for foreign silver was unchanged at 35#. Handy
and Harman's settlement price for foreign silver vas also unchanged at 34-3/44.
Ve made no purchases of silver today.
-
CONFIDENTIAL
179
THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
PERSONAL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
AND
SECRET.
September 4th, 1941.
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I enclose herein for your
personal and secret information a
copy of the latest report received
from London on the military situation.
Believe me,
Dear Mr. Secretary,
Very sincerely yours,
R.I. Campbell
The Honourable
enry Morgenthau, Jr.,
United States Treasury,
Washington, D. C.
Regraded Unclassified
180
TRIZORAM PROM LONDON DATED SEPTEMBER 2nd, 1941.
Another Canadian Wilitary convey has arrived
in home waters. his injesty's Submarine reports possible
Adt on merchant veasel approaching Benghasi on August 19th
and sinking two out of convey of five large schooners and
steamer between Tripoli and Beughasi on August 23rd and
24th. night of August 30th/31st five Swordfish attacked
withant vessel of 1,000 tons with torpedos. One hit
elserved causing large explosion.
2.
Photographic recommissance September 1st
showed Scharnhorst, Oneisenau and Prince Sugen at Breat.
Tirpita steaming towards Tiel. Schoor Hipper and Intziw
at Xiol. Toln at Travemunde.
3.
Royal Air Force August Slat - September Ist.
Cologne. 93 tons of high explosive 7,000 incendiaries
dropped. Lasen 28 tona of high explosive 8,000 incendi-
aries.
4.
September 1st/2nd. Kearly 60 bombers sent
-minly to Cologne. One missing.
So
August 30th/31st. Whineland. 18 tona dropped
no two enemy aerodromes. Langars hit at one and numerous
fires started at both.
:.
Gezwan Mr /orce. Deptember lat/Ind. About
thirty enemy bombers flew over land: chief objective
Tyneside. Two destroyed by night fighters.
Newcastle. Sharp attack on town and aurrounding
districts. Two railway stations MA and oain London-
Sootland traffic temporarily diverted. Lanage caused to
two Coctories.
Regraded Unclassified
RESTRICTED
181
0-3/2657-820; No. 484
M.I.D., V.D. 11:00 A.M., September 4, 1941
SITUATION REPORT
I. Bectern Theater.
Ground: A group of German infantry divisions advancing north-
eastward from Kingisepp towards Leningrad has captured the villages of
Reysha and Tysotskoye, a few miles to the south of Krasnoye Selo.
Other German forces advancing up the railroad from
Luga towards Leningrad have reached a line marked by the villages of
Vvritsa and Maushta to the south of Krasnogvardeisk.
Behind this front, in an area to the north and northeant
of Luga, strong Russian forces which have been encircled for some days
continue to offer determined resistance.
To the east and southeast of Leningrad, the situation
remains unchanged with German spearheads holding their advanced positions
near Ivanovskoye on the Neva river. The town of Shllsselburg is in
Bussien hands.
Russian counter attacks continue on the central front
along the line: Yartsevo - Roslavl - Bryansk.
The German drive from Gomel sputheastward made no
appreciable goins on September lat. However, nev German bridgeheads were
erected on the southeast bank of the Desna river.
On the lower Dnepr river indication of the approaching
renewal of the German offensive is indicated by recent reports from this
front: viz,
(1) A new German bridgehead has been established to the
east of Kremenchug.
(2) The German bridgehead to the east of Dnepropetrovak
was considerably enlarged on September 1st.
Air: Russia claims effective air action against Gernan tanks
and planes by the Black Sea Air Flest.
Germany reports heavy air activity along the lower Dnepr,
the Crimean Peninsula and Bryansk.
II. Western Theater.
Air: Brest vas the only Axis continental territory attacked by
the R.A.F. during last night.
German night attacks included British oust coast harbore.
III. Middle Eastern Theater.
ASH: The Suez Canal area VAS subjected to a bombing attack.
RESTRICTED
Regraded Unclassified
[00PY]
GRAY
182
London
BS
Dated September 4, 1941
Rec'd. 18:15 p.m.,5th.
Secretary of state,
washington.
4087, September 4, midnight (SECTION ONE)
The following is the text of the Anglo-Russian Pay-
mente Agreement the outlines of which were given in my
telegram no. 3824 of August 22, midnight.
British Treasury states that this agreement only
covers the broad outlines and its execution is being re-
served for an inter-bank agreement which is now being
negotiated. We have been promised a copy of this latter
agreement and will forward it when it is received:
"Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republice
concerning mutual deliveries, credit and methods of payment.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (hereinafter referred to an 'the Government of the
United Kingdom') and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, desiring to arrange for mutual deliveries
and to provide for the associated payments, have agreed as
follows:
Article One.
(A) The Governments of the United Kingdom and of
the
Regraded Unclassified
183
-8- No. 4067 September 4, midnight from Lendon (SECTION ONE)
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to
deliver goods to one another. Such mutual deliveries of
goods shall be regulated by special lists to be agreed upon
between the two contracting parties. Such lists my be
supplemented or modified by agreement between the two con-
tracting parties.
(B) In the event of either contracting party requesting
the other to act as its agent in the purchase of any goods
in third countries such transaction shall not fall within
the scope of this agreement.
Article Two.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing delivery of goods
in accordance with Article one of this agreement shall be
taken:
(A) In cases where shipment 10 made in vessels other
than those of the seller at the port of shipment; and (B)
in cases where shipment is made in the vessels of the soller,
at the port of discharge.
Article Three.
(A) The prices to be charged by the seller to the
purchaser for the goods to be delivered in accordance with
Article one of this agreement shall be based on world prices.
However, in regard to the price of any commodity in respect
of which the Government of the United Kingdom have or shall
have an agreement with the Government of any foreign country
Union of
concluded after the second September, 1939, the
Seviet
Regraded Unclassified
184
-3- No. 4087 September 4, midnight from Lendon. (SECTION ONE)
Seviet Socialist Republics shall receive treatment at least
as favorable as that country.
(B) Prices shall in every case be calculated f.o.b.
port of shipment and the buyer shall pay the freight from
such port onward and shall bear the riske of maritime trans-
portation.
(c) All contracts shall be concluded in sterling and
prices which are normally quoted in United States dollars
shall be converted into sterling at the official middle
rate of exchange for United States dollars in London on the
day on which the contract is concluded.
WINANT
HPD
Regraded Unclassified
185
COPY
GRAY
FROM: LONDON
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 1941
Secretary of State,
Washington,
4087, September 4, midnight, (SECTION TWO).
ARTICLE IV.
The British Government War Risks Insurance Office
and the Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in the United Kingdom shall negotiate the
insurance against marine and war risks of the goods
purchased by Seviet organizations under the present
agreement, of the Soviet ships effecting the trans-
portation of such goods, and also of gold and of such
other cargoes and ships effecting the transportation of
these cargoes belonging to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as may from time to time be agreed upon be-
tween the two contracting parties.
ARTICLE v.
(A) All payments between the United Kingdom and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the do-
liveries provided for in this agreement shall be made,
upon receipt of advice that the delivery of the goods
has been
Regraded Unclassified
186
has been taken, in sterling through AR account in the
name of the State Bank of the Union d Seviet Secialist
Republics to be established at the Bank of England
(hereinafter referred to as 'the account'). For this
purpose, the Bank of England and the State Bank of the
Union of Seviet Socialist Republics shall agree together
upon the necessary technical measures for effecting
payments hereunder.
(B) Repayment by the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics of exissing indebtedness
under the 1936 export credit guarantee agreement may
also be made in each three monthly period through the
account, up to the value of their deliveries of goods
hereunder during that period.
(0) Such other payments may also be made through
the account as the two banks, with the approval of
their respective governments may from time to time
agree.
ARTICLE VI.
The account shall be balanced on the 31st October
1941 and at the end of every three months thereafter.
Any debit balance shall be discharged as follows:
(A)
Regraded Unclassified
187
(A) As to 40% by sterling received by the State
Bank of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics from
the sale to the Bank of England of United States dollars
or of gold to be delivered at centers agreed upon between
the Bank of England and the State Bank of the Union of
Soviet Socialistic Republies; or by delivery of platinum
up to such amounts as the Government of the United Kingdom
may from time to time specify, the sterling value of mush
platinum to be agreed between the two governments.
Sales of United States dollars to the Bank of England
shall be made at the official middle rate of exchange for
United States dollars in London on the day of sale.
Unless otherwise agreed between the Bank of England
and the State Bank of the Union of Seviet Socialistie
Republics sales of gold to the Bank of England shall be
made at the official price of gold in the United States
of America on the day of sale and United States dollars
shall be converted into sterling at the official middle
rate of exchange for United States dollars in London on
the day of sale,
(B) As to 60% in sterling to be paid to the account
by the Government of the United Kingdom by way of advance
to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Any credit balance shall be at the free disposal of
the State Bank of the Union of Seviet Socialist Republics.
ARTICLE VII
Regraded Unclassified
188
ARTICLE VII.
(A) The total of the advances outstanding made
hereunder by the Government of the United Kingdom to
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics shall not exceed the - of 10,000,000
pounds. When the total of the advances outstanding
approaches to said 10,000,000 pounds the sontracting
parties shall enter into negotiations for a further
credit to be granted on the same terms and to be used
for the same purposes as are laid down in this agree-
ment.
(B) The amount of each advance so made shall
be repayable in sterling or United States dollars,
at the option of the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republies, in five equal yearly 18-
stallments, of which the first shall be paid at the
end of the third year and the last at the end of
the seventh year, reckoned in every case from the
date on which the advance was made.
(c) Interest, reekoned in every case from the
date on which the advance was made, shall be payable
on the amount of the advances outstanding, half
yearly
Regraded Unclassified
189
yearly on the 13th of April and on to 31st of
October, at the rate of 3% per annus in sterling or
United States dollars at the option of the Govern-
ment of the Union of Seviet Socialist Republics.
(D) The conversion of sterling into United
States dollars for the purpose of calculating pay-
ments under this article shall be effect at the
official middle rate for the United States dollars
in London on the day on which payment falls due,
FINAL ARTICLE.
This agreement shall come into foree on the
date of signature, and shall remain in fores for the
whole period of the utilization of the credits and of
the effecting of deliveries under this agreement.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly
authorized by their respective governments for that
purpose, have signed the present agreement and have
affixed thereto their seals.
Done at Moseow in duplicate, the sixteenth day
of August, 1941, in English and Russian, both texts
having equal force.
On behalf of the government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and NorthernIreland. (SIGNED) R. Stafford
Cripps.
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (SIGNED) A. Mikoyan".
PLEASE INFORM TREASURY.
WINANT
Regraded Unclassified
190
September 5, 1941
Hopkins called me at 7 o'clock last night and
said he had meant to talk to me at lunch about Russian
gold. "How much did they have? Did they have one-
half a billion?" I said nobody knew, but I would not
be surprised if they had a billion. He wanted to know
did I know any reason why they should not pay for their
goods in cash. He said, "After all, England did for a
long time. If So I said, "I don't know what commitments
the President and you have made to Russia and unless I
did I can't advise you. If He said, "Well, we have made
plenty, but" he said "I doubt if we will be able to make
them 8 straight loan on account of the opposition from
the Hill."
Regraded Unclassified
191
September 5, 1941
Sir Frederick Phillips came in to call on me and
asked if I had any suggestions and I told him that I
thought they ought to check up on the expense of the
Purchasing Mission; that I thought it was running too
high, and it was my understanding that they have not
laid off any of their employees since they stopped do-
ing the buying. He said, well, they were still buying
$70,000,000 worth and I said, well, I understood their
payroll was $12,000,000 and it seemed high. He said
Lord Beaverbrook had the same impression that I did and
one of the things he was going to recommend was that they
send somebody out to look over not only the Purchasing
Mission, but the Air Mission, their Information Bureau
and the British Embassy.
103
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 5. 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
H. D. White
FROM
Subject: British press elippings on U. 8.
Economic Defense. The U.S. export licensing system "is strictly
enforced", in the opinion of the British Minister of Economic
Warfare, Mr. Dalton. He made this statement in reply to 8 que #-
tion in the House of Commons. He also listed as helping the
British tighten their blockade of Germany, the purchase of
strategic materials in Latin America, the freezing of Axis
funds, and proclamation of a black list. Be said discussions
are being held in an effort to coordinate the black list of the
two countries.
U.S. Bilver Policy. The Secretary's statement on the abandon-
ment of the U.8. Silver Purchase Program aroused some interest
in London silver circles, but little apprehension. The general
belief 18 that such & policy would have little or no effect on
the London and Bombay markets, that in both these centers, ship-
ping and trade restrictions would continue to isolate prices
from outside events. The Financial News states, however, that
abandonment of the silver purchase program "would certainly
aggravate post-war problems".
Distribution of Lend-Lease Goods. À new department to be
called the Sundry Materials Branch, to handle distribution of
Lend-Lease goods, has been set up in the Ministry of Supply.
The Ministry will work largely through existing organizations,
which, in distributing the goods to consumers, will aot BA
gents of the Ministry and not " principale buying for re-sale.
Other topice on which clippings have been received include the
Roosevelt-Churchill conversations, the probable diversion of
war supplies intended for Britain to Russia, Russia's future
position as & European power, American war relief, the American
labor situation, U.S. foreign trade policies, Defense Produc-
tion, U.S. banking situation, and the threat of rising prices
here.
Regraded Unclassified
193
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 5, 1941
TO
Secretary Morgenthau
FROM
H. D. White
Subject: British prese clippings on labor, working conditions,
etc.
Britain's male labor reserve has been virtually exhausted,
Only 102,000 men were registered as wholly unemployed on July
14 and of these, almost one-third were unsuitable for industrial
=mployment, and the remainder were thought to be in the midst
of transferring from one Job to another. Registered wholly un-
employed women total 88,000 on the same date.
American "peo" methods being introduced to Government fac-
tories include poster and radio campaigns, per talks by service
people, departmental competition, and music-while-you-work con-
certs.
A regular mobile force of dock workers to keep the norts
clear 1s to be formed. A National Dock Labor Corporation 18
being set up to control all men working in the big ports outside
the Mersey and Clyde. The men will receive appropriate rates
when on the job, almost $3 per week between Jobs and a week's
vacation with Day. They must be prepared to do any work necessary
to clear the port and to travel to other ports, if they are wanted.
The scheme 1s to be financed by A 25 percent levy on employers on
their weekly wage bill.
Labor cooperation to aid production. Miners of South Wales
recently reversed their previous decision and agreed to work a
special Sunday night shift. Five hundred Liverpool dock workers,
involved in the dispute, offered to work B. day without Day in
order to Drove their anxiety not to cause 8 hold-up.
Contractors must be registered to carry on business after
October 1. Registration of building trades' workers and 8. system
of regional grouping of firms are the next steps contemnlated.
Control of Government departments' building program is also in
the offing.
American ferry bilots receive the equivalent of 87,700 B. year
free of U. X. income tex, according to a statement of 8 Minister
of Aircraft Production.
Regraded Unclassified
194
September 5, 1941
9:05 a.m.
HMJr:
I did as far as the Treasury was concerned,
and I found out what ours was, and - I mean
where they deal with us, it takes thirty
days from the time the British give us an
order until we get it, and I just
Colonel
Greenbaum:
Well, what do you mean, until you get it?
Until you get the
HMJr:
Until I get - until we get an order to buy.
We picked nineteen requisitions at random,
and it took thirty days from the time the
British say they want something until we got
the green light to go ahead.
G:
Well, that's - let's see - that's forty-five
days quicker than my check 1s. I just took
nineteen cases, too. I don't know why nine-
teen, but that's the way I've been working
on the thing.
HMJr:
Well, it took thirty and then it took us twelve
days to buy; but we're going to out that down
to a week, but
G:
Well, now, what I'd like to
HMJr:
but I understand it takes the Army
ninety days to buy after they get a clearance.
G:
Well, you can't have an average
HMJr:
Yeah.
G:
some things much longer, and some take
twenty-four hours, and there's a very good
reason, obviously.
HMJr:
Well, did you know who I had all here yester-
day?
G:
No.
Regraded Unclassified
195
- 2 -
HMJr:
Well, I had Stettinius, and Nelson, and
MaoKeachie, and Cox, and Young.
#:
Yeah.
HMJr:
Those are the fellows that are handling
this thing, and they're going to meet
Monday over in Young's office and they're
going to give me an answer. What I asked
for was a revolving fund of fifty million
dollars
G:
Yeah.
HMJr:
80 we could go ahead and do business;
and I said, "You fellows can go ahead and
fool around with your red tape." It takes
twelve days to get out of the White House.
G:
Yeah. And then it goes back - then when you
have to transfer from the White House, that's
another round trip
HMJr:
which takes maybe twelve days or more.
G:
Yeah. Well, now, would it be possible for
me to look at the way you've got that
HMJr:
Sure.
G:
routing sheet. Whom should I see on
that?
HMJr:
Cliff Mack.
G:
Cliff Mack.
HMJr:
Yeah.
G:
Yeah.
HMJr:
He's the fellow that has it.
G:
Well, would you have someone tell him I'll
be in touch with him, because I'd like to
come over and see that because we're doing
Regraded Unclassified
196
- 3 -
the same thing and had another mession
with Judge Patterson yesterday afternoon
and I got Oscar over for that.
HMJr:
Oh. That's where you heard about it.
G:
Yeah. So we're doing the same thing.
HMJr:
Well, then, it must be good - I must be
good.
G:
And then an Executive Order
HMJr:
I said I must be good if you're doing it.
G:
I heard you the first time.
HMJr:
Well, God damn it, laugh.
G:
You must be marvelous. (Laughs)
HMJr:
Yeah.
G:
All right.
HMJr:
All right.
G:
Henry, one other thing - did Oscar talk
to you about the Executive Order giving
Stettinius these powers, not only for the
revolving fund, but passing on requisitions?
HMJr:
Well, I suggested that.
G:
And did - well, did you see what he drew up?
HMJr:
No.
G:
I guess he didn't have it by then.
HMJr:
No, he didn't have it.
G:
Well, he's drawn that up, and then he 18
supposed to draft with me, kibitzing on it,
a little memo in support of that for Harry
Hopkins for Monday or Tuesday.
Regraded Unclassified
197
- 4 -
HMJr:
Good.
G:
Would you like to 600 it, or don't you
care?
HMJr:
I tell you, Eddie, if - Cliff Mack 1s
awfully able
G:
Yeah.
HMJr:
and if you'd work with him and show it
to him, I'd appreciate it.
G:
Okay.
HMJr:
I'll get word to Cliff Mack that he should
talk to you.
G:
Fine, Henry.
HMJr:
Okay.
G:
Your friend Jim Landis is here.
HMJr:
Give my regards.
G:
Okay.
HMJr:
Thank you.
G:
Thanks.
Regraded Unclassified
198
September 5, 1941
My dear Mr. President:
I an enclèsing herewith a copy
of a memorandum prepared for me by Mr.
Mack, Director of Procurement.
This memo gives you a breakdown
of the 30 days' delay of an order from
the British Purchasing Commission.
Yours sincerely,
The President,
The White House.
The mach's memo of
9/4 attached to
meeting held in
pays office at
2:45 pm 9/4/41
Regraded Unclassified
199
MEMORANDUM
Int
Secretary Norgenthau
September S, 1941
From: Mr. Sullivan
Re: White House Conference Thursday
evening. September 4. 1941, on
Ths
Tax Amortization Legislation
Present for the White House: Judge Samuel Rosenman, Mr. Ben
Cohen; for the Bureau of the Budget: Mr. Gladeox and Mr. Grane:
for OEM: Xr. Wayne Coy and Mr. Sidney Sherwood; for OPM: Mr. John
Lord 0'Brian; for the War Department: Lt. Col. Edward S. Greenbaum,
Dean James H. Landis, Mr. James P. Baxter, and Mr. Bayard Schieffelin;
for the Havy Department: Kr. E. Struve Hensel and Mr. Richard Kyle:
for the Treasury Department: Mr. John L. Sullivan and Mr. Robert B.
Sichhols.
Mr. Sullivan explained that unless there should be & filibuster
on the lasue of the taxation of Income from community property, it
seemed reasonable to expect that the pending tax bill would pass the
Senate on the evening of September 5, 1941. Therefore, it would be
impossible to incorporate in this bill any legislative solution
which might be agreed upon with respect to amortization.
-.r. Hensel stated that the Havy Department did not feel there
vis very much to be gained by substituting for the Advisory Commie-
sion in the statute either the Treasury Department or & new three-
JE2 board, such as had been suggested by Mr. Cohen the previous even-
185. The Department felt that the best solution under all circum-
stances was the proposed joint resolution which had cleared the
Budget Bureau in July but had later been disapproved by the Budget
Bureau et the instance of Kr. Coy. The purpose of this joint reso-
lution Vas fourfold: (1) To eliminate the necessity for any cer-
tification by the Advisory Commission, (2) to provide for nonrein-
bursement regulations to be issued jointly by the War and Kevy
Departments with the concurrence of OEM, (3) to eliminate the neces-
sity of certifying 88 to nonreimbursement with respect to contracts
under $15,000 in amount, and (4) to eliminate the necessity of cer-
tifying as to nonreimbursement with respect to contracts other than
Vità the War and Mavy Departments, the Maritime Commission, and such
other agencies as the President may designate. Mr. Hensel stated
Regraded Unclassified
- 2 -
200
that the War and Navy Departments had never been given any explana-
tion for the reasons which had prompted Mr. Coy to withdraw his
approval from this proposed legialation. Colonel Greenbaum stated
that be VB.0 in accord with the views expressed by the Havy Depart-
ment.
Mr. Ooy stated that, from B. desk survey he had had made of
necessity certificate cases which had cleared the War Department
and were pending action by the Advisory Commission, he had been
driven to the conclusion that it vas vital that some independent
agency check the conclusions of the Service Departments. He felt
this to be particularly important because of conflict between the
Service Departments' desire to procure supplies only from those
companies with whom they had dealt in the past, regardless of how
much expansion would thereby be necessitated, and OPM's desire to
promote subcontracting.
Dean Landis felt it to be essential that the system of dual
responsibility with respect to certification be done away with, BO
that the contractor would be able to know how he stood at the time
his contract was negotiated with the Army or Navy Procurement Officer.
Under the present system no assurances could be given at the time of
negotiation of the contract, with the result that many contracts were
being materially delayed.
Upon being asked by Judge Rosenman how the Treasury Department
felt about assuming responsibility for certificates of nonreimburse-
ment, Mr. Sullivan stated that the Department felt that the nonreim-
bursement requirements of the statute were unworkable and illogical,
and should be repealed. He suggested the substitution of a scheme
similar to that which vas incorporated in the Second Revenue Bill of
1940 as it passed the House. This involved an agreement by every tax-
payer seeking amortization that it would not destroy, demolish, alter,
or impair the facilities sought to be amortized without the consent
of the Secretary of War or Navy. If the taxpayer violated this agree-
ment he would forfeit the tax saving which he had secured during the
amortization period.
Mr. O'Brian stated that he was in full accord with these views,
that the present statute was unworkable, and that it was the better
part of wisdom to admit it now rather than when it because too late.
Mr. Coy and Mr. Hensel stated that they were inclined to look very
favorably upon Mr. Sullivan's suggestion. Mr. Cohen stated his be-
lief that this objective could be accomplished without amendment of
the statute by an announcement by all agencies concerned that here-
after no necessity certificates would be granted without an agreement
by the applicant not to demolish, alter, impair, etc. Considerable
Regraded Unclassified
- 3 -
201
disagreement vas expressed with this view and Mr. Sullivan stated
that if Mr. Coben's purpose vas thereby to avoid a Congressional
investigation he feared that such purpose would not be accomplished.
Deen Landis felt that the nonreimbursement requirement should
be retained in the statute if possible, since he feared that its
removal would be AD invitation to load contract prices. Mr. Sullivan
and Mr. Eichhola stated their feeling that the present statute is an
open invitation to load prices, because, (1) the contractor is un-
certain whether he will get the requisite nonreimbursement certifi-
cate and therefore hedges against possible denial of the amortization
tax saving by increasing his price, and (2) a subcontractor is not
required to secure a. nonreimbursement certificate before being granted
amortigation and can therefore be reimbursed for his facilities several
times over and pass the increased cost to the Government through the
prime contract. Colonel Greenbaum stated that if Mr. Sullivan's aug-
gestion had been adopted last year he would have been heartily in
favor of it, but that it might be more confusing and unsettling at
this stage.
There followed extended discussion of the various solutions
which had so far been proposed. Judge Rosenman asked Mr. Sullivan
what he thought of requiring nonroimbursement regulations to be 1a-
sued by the War and Navy Departments with the concurrence of the
Treasury. Mr. Sullivan stated that he could not 506 what WAS to be
gained by this suggestion, since the chief difficulty of the present
system vas fundemental policy disagreements between the various
agencies concerned and that the interjection of the Treasury would
merely involve one more policy viewpoint to reconcile. Furthermore,
since the Treasury felt that the statute made no sense he did not see
how the Department could be expected to write any regulations under it
which made sense.
Mr. Coy finally suggested that all certificates for amortization
purposes be issued by the War and Havy Departments under the super-
vision and direction of ORM, or such other agency as the President
might designate. Thus, the Service Departments would have complete
responsibility for administration but broad policy and the application
of that policy to particular cases could be controlled by OEM. This
suggestion was finally agreed to (although Mr. O'Brian did not feel
OPM equipped to handle nonreimbursement certification) and it was do-
termined to modify the joint resolution which had been proposed by
the War and Navy Departments in such manner that the following objec-
tives would be accomplished: (1) All certificates, whether necessity,
Government protection, or nonreimbursement, would be issued either by
the War or Navy Departments and the necessity for joint certification
by one of the Service Departments and the Advisory Commission would
be eliminated; (2) such certification would be under the supervision
Regraded Unclassified
- 4 -
202
and direction of the OEM, or such other agency as the President
might designate, it being understood that the President would
designate the Office for Production Management; and (3) the non-
reimbursement requirement would be eliminated with respect to con-
tracts under $15,000 in amount and with respect to contracts other
than with the War and Navy Departments, the Maritime Commission,
and such other agencies as the President might designate.
Mr. Sullivan inquired whether it was clearly understood that
OPM and not the Treasury would be the agency designated by the
President to supervise certification. Judge Rosenman and Mr. Gladeox
stated that such was their understanding.
Thereupon the meeting adjourned at 12:00 midnight.
203
September 5, 1941
10:50 a.m.
John
Sullivan:
I've talked with Senator George and
Benator Barkley, and Senator George is
losing his courage on community property.
HMJr:
Senator what?
S:
Senator George is losing his courage on
community property, I think. He said that
he didn't know but what because of the fact
there weren't hearings, that we might let it
go over to the next bill; and I told him I
thought that we'd have a hard time in the
House if we did that. I then talked with
Senator Barkley, and he's really going to
battle. I asked him if he thought it would
be helpful if the White House called any of
the fellows up there
HMJr:
Uh huh.
S:
and he said to wait until we'd had an
hour or 80 of debate.
HMJr:
Well, he wouldn'
8:
What?
HMJr:
The President won't do anything. He's got
his mind on other places. You can't count
on him. He's too busy with.
8:
Well, in any events, I'm going up and.....
HMJr:
I mean, the President's got all this
destroyer and everything else on his
mind. He 1sn't interested in community
property.
S:
Well, what occurred to me was this, that
as the debate develops, if it seems
necessary
HMJr:
Yeah.
204
- 2 -
8:
I'll call you and then you can decide
whether you
HMJr:
That's all right.
S:
whether you want.....
HMJr:
Well, forget about the President. I'm not
even going to ask him to do it.
8:
Well, you know best.
HMJr:
Well, I'm not going to ask the President
to get in on it, John.
8:
Un huh.
HMJr:
Don't count on him.
S:
All right.
HMJr:
Okay.
S:
Right.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
205
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE September 5, 1941
TO
Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.
FROM
Herbert Merillat
PRESS COMMENT ON TAXES:
SATISFACTION WITH SENATE BILL
Having won its major fights for changes in the current
tax bill, the press has subsided into a satisfied silence.
Editorial comment now consists largely of generalities, point-
ing out the urgent need of the revenue to be raised by the
tax bill and looking ahead to even greater tax burdens which
will be necessary in the near future.
The broader tax base continues to be the feature of
the bill receiving most editorial attention. As if to serve
notice that greater demands are soon to be made of low income
groups, many commentators have pointed out that even under
the exemptions adopted by the Senate, the vast majority of
citizens will pay no income tax. Furthermore, it is pointed
out that only $50 millions will be paid by new taxpayers
brought in by the reduced exemptions. The Senate action is
therefore regarded as a step in the right direction, not 8
final answer to the problem of tapping small incomes in order
to raise revenue and check inflationary tendencies.
Regraded Unclassified
- 2 -
206
(
Community Property
The Senate's last-minute rejection of the community-
property amendment was not in line with the press attitude on
the question. Scattered comment indicated general approval
(outside community-property States) of the amendment. Many
writers have pointed,out the tax savings now enjoyed by residents
of community-property States and hailed the Committee proposal
as a proper measure to end the discrimination against taxpayers
in other States.
Non-defense Expenditures
The press barrage against high non-defense expenditures
has continued throughout the course of the current tax legisla-
tion. Every announcement of an increase in the public debt,
every statement by a political leader urging reduction in non-
defense spending, has been & signal for intensification of the
campaign. Mr. George Benson, president of a small Arkansas Col-
lege, has become something of an editorial writer's hero for his
appearance before the Ways and Means Committee with a specific
list of possible cuts in appropriations.
The press has expressed great satisfaction over the Byrd
amendment calling for creation of & committee to investigate non-
essential Federal expenditures. It expresses the hope that more
Regraded Unclassified
- 3 -
207
will come of this Congressional action than has come of the
activities of citizens' committees and college presidents.
206
Beytember 5. 1941
Files
R.
19 9 e'cleak last night a meeting vot hold is Univer Secretary Bell's effice
with respect to Chisese Stabilization and Exchange Centrol. these present were
our Proterisk Phillips, Sir Otte Niemeyer, Mr. stepford and Mr. Ritchio for Great
Britain: Assistant Secretary Ashessa and Mr. Jemes for the Department of State:
and Moosts. Bell, Feloy. white, Dermatein, Pable and Geshram for the Treasury
Department.
AS the conference hold lake yesterday afterness the Brittsh efficials had been
gives copies of the seesage which W had seal to Mr. Fex. " the dinner hour
they had bad opportunity to wing this document be the attention of Sir Otto Sjemeyer,
who had arrived from New Tork en the 7 v'cleak train. the meeting was limited
principally to a disemssion of the document under reference, Bir Proderisk Phillips
and Sir Otte Bieneyer raising questions with respont 10 or commenting upon the pointe
of particular interest to them.
After the meeting adjeurned at 11:15. Measrs. Bernstein and Cechran telephoned
Mr. Pax at Masila, votablishing communication about 12:15 widnight. They reported
the day's meetings to Mr. Fes. The report which Mr. Bornstein is making of this
serversation summarises the discussions had at last night's conference with the
British.
ml
EMC:lap-9/5/41
Regraded Unclassified
Regraded Unclassified
September 5. 1941
Files
D. Cechram
AS 10 e'cloak this seraing Sir case Homeyer telephened no. Is said 11 we his
understanding that Under Secretary Bell would be phening the American banks is
Nov York this morning. seeking their corporation with the Stabilization Board is
Chisa through their breach banks. Blessyer thought 11 important to let the American
banks know. as the British efficials intended to let the Britteh banks sporating
in China know. that the important phase of emplete cooperation is to restrict their
transactions solely to operations at the afficial rates fixed w the Stabilization
heard. I sold Nieneyer that our plan had been to sook as undertaking for full
cooperation with the Board and leave the details to be verked out is China. Niemeyer
feared that there might be some nismiderstanding or evasion unless we made this point
specific is our conversations with the banks.
After speaking with Sir Otto, I west immediately se the office of Nr. Bell who
was then talking by solephone with the Chase last. Mr. Bell added a few verds la
the Chase last after I let his know of my conversation with Sir 0020. Mr. Durgese
of the National City Teak, with a Mr. Dell had epokens first, called Mr. Bell back
while I vas still is his effice. Mr. Bell pat up the suggestion advanced w Sir 0810
Sismeyer. letting Durgose know that the British were going to request cooperation
free the British basics on the specific point of staying out of the black market.
After a long conversation with Mr. Burgoos. 19 vas agreed that the sablegram should
give instructions for cooperation. bat that the National City management is the Pay
East would discuss with Per at the cening Sunday conference various technical (501-
tions involved is the limitation of all operations to efficial rates.
Upon returning to W eva office I telephoned Sir Orto. I reported that 19 had
let the tve important American banks know that the phase of cooperation which we
importantly sought was that of limiting transactions to the official dollar-yman
rates. The banks vare issuing instructions to their Chinese branches. W understeed.
to cooperate fully. The National City instated. havever, upon the privilege of their
representative at the osning Sunday's senforence diseaseing with Kr. Yez and the
other Board members the tochnical questions involved is the rates. Hearyer reminded
se that our reports indicate that the National City is the outstanding defender of
operations OR the black market and that W may have difficulty is getting the other
banks to stay is line If W de 201 handle the National City firsly. I told his that
VG understeed this and that w would be is toush with Fox and and what stops V0 should
take If the National City does ml fellew a practice similar to that which vo hope
the other banks will adopt. It was 47 understanding that Nieneyer would definitely
let the British basics know that operations at the official rate are requested.
10ml
lap-9/5/41
210
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
PROCUREMENT DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON
September 5, 1941
E ORANDUL TO THE SECRETARY:
Weekly Report - Lease-Lend Purchases
(8/29 - 9/5/41)
Requisitions
Estimated Cost
Cleared by O.P
704, 364.48
Awaiting clearance by O.P.I
25,273,843.75
Total Pending Requisitions
$ 225,978,205.23
Less Requisitions for metals and textiles,
(
here contracts will be made for term periods
and allocations required from O.P.
$ 124,215,216.32
Total Pending Requisitions for Spot Purchases
$ 101,762,991.91
Purchases to 8/29/41
$ 121,939,791.32
Purchases 8/29 to 9/5/41
10,156,975.46
Total to 9/5/41
$ 132,096,766.78
During the past week the B.P.C. requested purchase of 1085 crawler
tractors for delivery this month. Purchases were immediately effected
and high priority ratings furnished through the cooperation of O.P.M.
and the Priorities Board whereby the delivery schedule will be met.
are currently purchasing against requisitions for approximately 4500
tractors which are in addition to 4500 heretofore purchased.
Air)
Clifton E. Mack
Director of Procurement
Attachments-4
Regraded Unclassified
CONTRACT
REQUISI-
NUMBER
CONTRACTOR'S NAME
TIOMER
COME ODITY
QUANTITY
TOTAL VALUE
DA-TPS-1056
S.R. Dresser Mfg. Co.
U.K.
Couplings
* 110,503.50
It
DA-TPS-1057
Palnut Co.
Lock washers
10 GT
421.14
The Blake & Johnson Co.
If
DA-TPS-1058
Special Screws
7a GT
3,420.00
DA-TPS-1060
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
"
Sheets
991,460#
29,049.78
"
2,100,060#
66,199.38
If
DA-TPS-1030
Kennecott Sales Corp.
Copper
5,000,000#
590,000.00
DA-TPS-1062
Brass Goods Mfg. Co.
China
Steel Cups
2,700 N.T.
1,890,775.00
DA-TPS-984
Granite City Steel Co.
U.K.
Tinplate
108,949.71
=
DA-TPS-985
U.S. Steel Export Co.
Tinplate
482,665.08
Il
DA-TPS-986
Follansbeg Steel Corp.
Tinplate
82,163.42
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
11
DA-TPS-987
Tinplate
281,288.20
"
DA-TPS-988
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
Inplate
317,796.78
The Titanium Alloy Vfg. Co.
If
DA-TPS-1063
Titanium Carbide
10,080#
8,164.80
Il
DA-TPS-1064
Inland Steel Co.
Circles
4,653,345#
180,997.56
If
DA-TPS-980
Weirton Steel Co.
Tinplate
531,323.65
If
DA-TPS-981
Wheeling Steel Corp.
Tinplate
132,101.50
=
DA-TPS-982
Republic Steel Corp.
Inplate
183,670.08
211
=
DA-TPS-983
Bethlehem Steel Export Corp.
Tinplate
371,095.30
Regraded Unclassified
TO
THE
SECRETARY:
SEPTEMER
CONTRACT
ZEQUISI-
MADER
CONTRACTOR'S MAE
TIONER
CO. ODITY
QUANTITY
TOTAL VALUE
DA-TPS-1070 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
U.K.
Drun Sheets
$ 52,520.00
DA-TPS-1072 Otis Steel Co.
"
Drum Sheets
152,842.90
"
DA-TPS-1075 National Steel Corp.
Drum Sheets
21,431.20
If
DA-TPS-1076 Spang-Chalfant, Inc.
Pipe
50.8 mí.
338,015.88
DA-TPS-1077 U.S. Steel Export Co.
If
If
50.8 mi.
328,413.47
DA-TPS-1078 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
II
Pipe
17.6 mi.
115,721.76
"
DA-TPS-1079 Empire Sheet & Tinplate Co.
Drum Sheets
24,883.00
If
DA-TPS-1080 Bethlehem Steel Export Co.
Wire Rope
67,616#
15,324.85
If
DA-TPS-1081
Wheeling Steel Corp.
Sheets
55,013.67
If
DA-1PS-1083 Granite City Steel Co.
Drum Sheets
986,959#
51,815.35
DA-TPS-1084 Anaconda Wire & Cable Co.
"
Copper Conductor
1,460,000#
255,920.00
Newport Rolling Mill Co.
if
DA-TPS-1087
Drum Sheets
1,023,000#
31,713.00
If
DA-TPS-974
R.T. Greer & Co.
Lobelia Herb
6,000#
2,100.00
DA-TPS-977
R. J. Prentiss & Co. Inc.
"
Lobelia Herb
10,000#
3,950.00
"
DA-TPS-975
R. J. Prentiss & Co. Inc.
Digitalis Seed
1,000#
1,050.00
If
DA-TPS-996
J. H. Williams & Co.
Wrenches
2,430.00
212
DA-TPS-1034 The Goodyear Tire Co.Inc. & Rubber
"
Rubber reclaimed
1,500 L.T.
226,800.00
Regraded Unclassifie
L'ONTRACT
E ,UISI-
NUMBER
CONTRACTOR'S A.E
TIONER
CC. ODITY
JAMITTY
TOTAL VALUE
DA-TPS-1007
The Mansfield Tire & nubber Co. U.K.
Tires and Tubes
300
$ 17,550.00
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc.
11
DA-TPS-1003
Tires
200
21,144.00
Locomotive Firebox Co.
"
DA-TPS-927
Thermic Syphons
20
14,800.00
DA-TPS-1006
The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
"
Tires and Tubes
30
1,721.40
DA-TP-1008
U.S. Rubber Export Co. Ltd.
"
Tubes
150
1,248.00
=
DA-TPS-887
Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Air Compressors etc
6
26,365.50
DA-TPS-909
A. B. Farquhar Co. Ltd.
=
Potato Diggers
2
1,416.24
DA-TPS-979
H. F. Ritter & Co. Inc.
"
Drills, Breast
1500
4,650.00
Caterpillar Tractor Co.
11
DA-TPS-942
Tractors
1,089,170.00
J. I. Case Co.
11
DA-TP°-359
Tractors
290,346.64
DA-TPS-1021
The Cleveland Tractor Co.
If
Tractors
172,266.08
If
DA-TPO-1032 Botwinik Bros. Inc.
Lathe Turret
1,375.00
DA-TPS-1005
International Harvester Export Co If
Tractors
537,139.50
"
DA-TPS-1004
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Tractors
242,053.20
DA-TPS-771
International Harvester Export Co If
Spare parts for tractors
24,109.60
Brookville Locomotive Co.
"
DA-TPS-1028
Locomotives
36
90,900.00
If
DA-TPP-1029
The Fate-Roat-Heath Co.
Locomotives
30
IT
213
112,500.00
DA-TPS-636
American Car & Foundry Co.
Shear, gate
3
13,500.00
Regraded Unclassified
CONTRACT
HEQUIS1-
NUMBER
CONTRACTOR'S AE
TIONER
COMMODITY
QUANTITY
TOTAL VALUE
DA-TPS-1038
Dayton Stencil Works Co.
D.K.
Stamps, Steel
500
$
295.00
Deere & Co.
H
DA-TPS-855
Harrows, Plows, Drills and Spreader
54,014.02
The Upson-Walton Co.
If
DA-TPS-1052
Clips, Wire Rope
18,000
1,821.00
Caterpillar Tractor Co.
If
DA-TPS-1010
Oil Cooler Groups
30
4,392.00
"
DA-TP*-1055
Masonite Corp.
Wallboard
6,000,000 Sq.Ft.
232,580.00
DA-TPS-1011
Caterpillar Tractor Co.
"
Oil Cooler Groups
22
3,220.80
Armstrong Bros. Tool Co.
H
DA-TPS-991
Wrenches
5,361.00
The Abbott Ball Co.
II
DA-TPS-1059
Balls, Bearing
3,760.92
DA-TPS-976
The Mineralite Sales Corp.
II
Mica, white
100 L.T.
7,000.00
DA-TPS-1027
Linde Air Products Co.
II
Acetylene
3,500.00
DA-TPS-1039
Maurcie S. Dessau
If
Cutters
200
1,430.00
DA-TPS-998
Franklin Railway Supply Co. Inc
B
Equipment to be installed in 10
locomotives
76,250.00
DA-TPS-1066
Hoover Ball & Bearing Co.
"
Balls, Bearing
37,165.60
DA-TPS-1031
Blaw-Knox Co.
It
Ammonia Cylinders
11,000.00
National Cylinder Gas Co.
If
DA-TPS-1026
Oxygen
2,400.00
Total Purchases 8/29 to 9/5/41
$
10,156,975.46
214
Regraded Unclassified
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