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Andrew Card's Files
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George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
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Card, Andrew, Files
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15
21
7
THE WHITE HOUSE
Nov. 17, 1991
Dear Mr. Edley-
It was a special pleasure
to meet and talk with you during
the luncheon at Camp David.
The Drug advisery Council briefing
for the President was impressive.
I am confident that by working
together significant progress can be
made in sidding drugs from the workplace.
Keep in touch. Sincerely, Andy Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Mr. Christopher F. Edby
President Emeritus
United Negio College Fund
500 East 62nd Street
New York, NY 10021
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1991
Dear Captain Eng,
In response to your tour request, I have arranged a White House
tour for 35 people on Saturday, November 23, 1991 at 8:00 a.m.
Your group should proceed to the East Executive Entrance of the
White House located between the Residence and the Treasury
building. Upon your arrival, simply give your name to the guard
on duty (the "Air Force ROTC Cadets" group) and an agent will
escort you through the building. The tour will last
approximately 45 minutes and will take you through the public and.
social rooms of the White House.
You have my best wishes for a wonderful visit.
Sincerely,
Yes w
Robert S. Nichols
Office of the Chief of Staff
Captain Keylor Eng, USAF
Department of the Air Force
Detachment 355, Air Force ROTC (ATC)
Boston University, 118 Bay State Road
Boston, Massachusetts 02215-1501
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1991
MEMORANDUM
TO:
ROB NICHOLS
FROM:
DEBRA ROMASH DUNN, DIRECTOR
VISITORS OFFICE
SUBJECT:
SPECIAL GROUP TOUR
This memorandum will confirm that you have a special group tour
of the White House for 35 people from the AF ROTC Cadets on
Saturday, November 23.
The members of the group should arrive at the Visitors Entrance
on East Executive Avenue at 8:00 a.m. Please have the person in
charge of your group check with the officer on duty upon arrival.
He will be expecting them.
On behalf of President and Mrs. Bush, we express best wishes to
your group for a most enjoyable visit to the White House.
Linda - tour still needs to be set up
No one answered tonight in the visitor's
office.
deb
Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page
Request
submitted on
11/5/91
October 30
AC HAS SEEN
Andy,
Assume it's okay to ask for the White House
tour. There will be 35 cadets, SO we'll have
to ask Debbie Romash Dunn for a special tour.
She won't mind, I'm sure, unless she's completely
booked.
Keylor also asks for advice on the White House
Fellows program.
Robert
OK FOR TOUR
NO TOUR
Please
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Captain Keylor Eng USAF
Department 1 aerospace Studies
Boston University
118 Bay State Road
Boston, Massachuretts
02215
THE WHITE HOUSE
11-1-91
Dear Keylor-
Thank you for your letter of October 27.
I will ask that the Visitors office give every
consideration to your request that your
AirForce ROTC Cadets have a tour of The Whit
House.
I am thilled that you will seek selection
as a whit House Fellow. It is an excellent
program. It would not be appropriate for me
to influence the selection process. I suggest you
get your application in promptly. Good lusk!
Andy Card
AC HAS SEEN
DEPART OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 355, AIR FORCE ROTC (ATC)
RECEIVED
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 118 BAY STATE ROAD
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 02215-1501
OCT 30 1991
UNITED STATES OF OF AMERICA
Sunday, 27 Dct 91
Dear Andy,
Please let me introduce myself. My name is Keylor Eng and you know of me
through my brother Taylor or perhaps through your parents or sishr Sara. It
were teaching Sunday school and we met through a
we've met before, it had to have been years ago when church function. mom and dad
Commandant of Cadits at the Force ROTC Detachment at
the reason I'm writing to you is for 6 two-fold favor. Baston As the
the Air Force operated and how much dun public service can be. In
University, I try to arrange activities for the codets to learn how
the attached letter from my commender Lt Col Fry, we 'se asked you
to errance c tour of the White House for the codets. I hope this
is as insignitient as placing our name on a raster and that's it.
I realize how busy you must be because even of our /wel of the
Executive brande, the adoge "doing less with less" seems irrelevent with
the impact at have on these future Air Force officers. Jo these days
in order to heep c quality progrem, We do more to heep students
interested. Hence, the Washington D.C base visit instead of a
couple of trips to Hauscom AFB or Otiv ANGB. Whatever you
arrange will be greatly appreciated
at becoming One of the White House coming your.
Second, my brother spoke to you on Fellows that Sundry about my attempt
Strength Through Knowledge
P2
Im nearing the end of my assignment here of Detachment 355 whe AFROTC
and hope continue on. After elwen years in the Air Force, I've
decided to try computing in this prestigious program. What I ask is
your advice . Is there anything you could recommend to me to help
achieve this ? I have been working on the pachage, have ashed friends
and previous supervisors to write recommendations, and believe I have a
fair chance. the pickage deadline is 15Dec 91 and. should be complete
by the beginning of December.
asproximately 35 codets dy BU but six other AFROTD
thanks in advance for front help. Is all goes well, we'll bring
detachments in the greeter Massachun Hs area. I hope you can find
the time to sey hillo, although I know how precious weekends can
be. Cyoin, thanks Andy Hope to hear from you your
Sincerely How yours.
WARTMENT OF DEPENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 355, AIR FORCE ROTC (ATC)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 118 BAY STATE ROAD
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 02215-1501
AC HAS SEEN
UNITED STATES OF OF AMERICA
The Honorable Andy Card
22 Oct 91
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr Card,
May we ask your assistance in scheduling a tour of the White House on the 23rd
of November?
On 22 and 23 November 1991, approximately 35 Air Force ROTC cadets from
Detachment 355 at Boston University and six other AFROTC detachments in the
Massachusetts area will be visiting Bolling and Andrews AFB, the Pentagon, and
the Washington D.C. area. The visit is part of the Air Force ROTC Base Visit
Program with the purpose to introduce and motivate eligible members towards
the Air Force ROTC and a future as Air Force officers.
We selected Washington D.C. as the site for this semester's visit to better
acquaint our cadets with our federal government. If you could assist us in
any way, I know our cadets will appreciate any help your office could provide.
The project officer is Captain Keylor Eng. He can be reached at this address
or by phone at (617) 353-4705/4707. Thank you for you help.
James L. Z Lt Frey Col,
JAMES FREY, USAF
Commander
Strength Through Knowledge
THE WHITE HOUSE
10.20.91
Dan-
Thank you for your not and
for what you have been doing for
Dick Thouburgh. yes, I will
do all I can to help you.
Please call me.
Andy
andrewHCard THE WHITE
WASHINGTON
Daniel G. Eramian
c/o Thomburgh for Senati
681 anderson Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15220
THORNBURGH
FOR SENATE
5th FLOOR, 6 FOSTER PLAZA
4th FLOOR, PACKARD BUILDING
681 ANDERSEN DRIVE
15TH and CHESTNUT STREETS
PITTSBURGH, PA 15220
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
412/928-5960
215/977-2327
412/921-1032 (FAX)
RECEIVED
AC HAS SEEN
215/977-2328 (FAX)
10/16/91
OCT 18 1991
Dear Andy,
Greetings from Pittsburgh! In less than three weeks Dick will be (should be anyways)
the new Republican Senator. I told Dick before I joined this little crusade
that I would be happy to campaign for him, but I would be less happy to go to
the Senate-- a step back in my mind, and after six years at that great
institutuion in Massachusetts from whence we both served time, I don't think
I could learn much.
The bottom line is that I want to return to the Administration and or work in
the campaign next year. I know my resume is at White House Personnel but not
much has happened. Our mutual Andrew (save the poor starving savages) Natsios
suggested I write to you. Frankly, I would love to spend a season in the
White House. I have attached a resume/political history. Anything you can do
or any suggestions would be greatly appreciated. Many thanks.
Dan
Paid for by Thornburgh for Senate Committee; Ray Dimuzio, Treasurer
Daniel G. Eramian
903 North Wayne St., #304
Arlington, Va., 22201
(412) 928-5960, (703) 358-9081
Skills:
MANAGEMENT/COMMUNICATION OPERATIONS
Career History:
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1990-
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
--Chief spokesman for the Attorney General and Department
with 88,000 employees and $11 billion budget. Promote
administration policy through the media, conduct press
briefings, approve speeches and manage Department's public
affairs staff.
Also oversee media relations activities of 94 U.S. Attorneys
nationwide as well as the public affairs staffs of the
Department's component agencies including Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration,
U.S. Marshals, Bureau of Prisons and Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1989-90
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
--Spokesman for Department. Conducted press briefings, wrote
press releases, coordinated interviews and press
conferences, directed public affairs staff.
CHIEF OF STAFF/SPOKESMAN 1987-89
Republican Leader, Massachusetts State Senate
--Staff director, spokesman to media, developed legislation,
liaison for intergovernmental affairs and lobbyists.
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT/SPOKESMAN 1986-87
U.S. General Services Administration, Region I, Boston
--Assisted Regional Administrator in agency management
including budget, personnel and program operations.
Spokesman to media and Congressional delegation.
PRESS SECRETARY 1982-86
Assistant Republican Leader's Office, Mass. State Senate
--Spokesman to media. Wrote press releases and speeches.
Scheduled press conferences, public appearances.
EXECUTIVE EDITOR 1978-81
Suburban World Newspapers, Needham, Massachusetts.
--Editor and business manager of four newspaper group,
(cir. 30,000) Supervised newsroom and production
staffs.
EDITOR 1975-81
Needham Times, Needham, Massachusetts
--Editor, reporter, photographer. Wrote editorials and
designed layouts.
Education:
Suffolk University, Masters in Public Administration
Pi Alpha Alpha, National Scholastic Honor Society
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
B.A. English Literature
Daniel G. Eramian
(Political background)
1991 Press Secretary, Dick Thornburgh for U.S. Senate Campaign
1988 Senior Advisor to Regional Political Directors (Ron Kaufman,
Andy Card), Massachusetts George Bush Campaign, primary and
November campaigns.
1988 Member of Massachusetts Research and Media Committee for
George Bush Campaign.
1988 Member of Massachusetts George Bush Executive Committee.
1988 Press Secretary, Republican National Convention,
Massachusetts Delegation.
1986-87 Schedule "C" appointment, Executive Assistant to Regional
Administrator, General Services Administration, Boston,
Mass.
1984 Press Secretary, Massachusetts Reagan-Bush Campaign.
1984 Press Secretary, Republican National Convention,
Massachusetts Delegation.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
JOAN SHORENSTEIN BARONE CENTER ON THE
PRESS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
SEEN P.6
79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
(617) 495-8269
Sunday, *8 September 1991
Dear Andy:
Enclosed is a copy of the 9 Sundays proposal.
I apologize for the delay in getting this to you.
They're a little mixed up at the JSB Center.
All Best
John Ellis
RECEIVED
SEP 12 1991
PRESS . POLITICS
RI TAS
PUBLIC POLICY
Nine Sundays:
A Proposal for
Better Presidential
Campaign Coverage
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on
the Press, Politics and Public Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
NINE SUNDAYS:
A Proposal for Better Presidential Campaign Coverage
by
John Ellis
with an Introduction
by
Marvin Kalb
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center
on the Press, Politics and Public Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
by Marvin Kalb
Marvin Kalb is Director of the Joan Shorenstein Barone
Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy and Edward
R. Murrow Professor of Press, Politics and Public Policy at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Over a 30-year
career as Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for CBS News and
NBC News and as moderator of "Meet the Press," Kalb received
numerous awards for reporting. A graduate of the City
College of New York, he has an M.A. from Harvard in Russian
history. He is the author or co-author of six non-fiction
books, including Candidates '88, Kissinger and Roots of
Involvement: The U.S. and Asia, as well as two best-selling
novels.
The Nine Sundays Proposal
by John Ellis
John Ellis was an Appleman Fellow at the Joan Shorenstein
Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy
during the 1990-91 academic year. A former political
producer for NBC News and analyst for their 1988 and 1984
election unit, Ellis now works as a private consultant.
He is a regular contributor to the Los Angeles Times
"Opinion" section on American politics and culture. Ellis
holds a B.A. in American Studies from Yale University.
The Equal Time Provisions and the Nine Sundays Proposal
by Frederick Schauer
Frederick Schauer is the Frank Stanton Professor of the
First Amendment at the Kennedy School's Joan Shorenstein
Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. He
received his A.B. and M.B.A. degrees from Dartmouth College
and a J.D. from Harvard University. Teaching and writing
primarily in the areas of constitutional law, freedom of
speech, and philosophy of law, he is the author of The Law
of Obscenity, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, and
Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decisionmaking in Law and in Life.
INTRODUCTION
The 1988 presidential campaign could have depressed anyone,
even Republicans who won. Photo-ops in flag factories or
tanks, soundbites running all of 9.6 seconds, "debates" that
Walter Cronkite, for one, described as "phony, an
unconscionable fraud," newspaper and radio/tv polls that
relied excessively on charts, graphs and statistics rather
than on old-fashioned legwork, political ads that distorted
records, and, on top of it all, Willie Horton, Boston
Harbor, and flag-burning--day after day, there seemed to be
no end to the trivilization of American democracy,
ironically at a time when it served as a new beacon of hope
for oppressed peoples around the world.
And when, finally, it ended, and another President was
elected, campaign managers and aides representing a dozen or
so Republican and Democratic candidates gathered at the
Kennedy School of Government in early December, 1988 for
some serious reflection about the emerging nature of
American politics. They were all exhausted. The winners--
Lee Atwater, fresh from his final triumph, and the
irrepressible Roger Ailes--tried to sound magnanimous, but
the losers weren't having any of that. They were convinced
that the American people had been shortchanged. Reporters
and scholars eavesdropped on the occasionally heated
-2-
exchanges but soon realized that not enough time had elapsed
to generate deep insights into 1988. Was there any reason
to believe that 1992 would be better? Ailes provided the
quote that still resonates in my mind. "If you didn't like
'88," he said, "you're going to hate '92."
Hardly uplifting but nevertheless notable for its outrageous
candor, the quote for me served a very special purpose: it
focused the mind and sparked a major research effort by the
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on Press, Politics and Public
Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, funded in
large measure by the Markle Foundation, to explore press
performance during the '88 campaign and then, on the basis
of its findings, to suggest a set of recommendations for
improving the process in '92. In different ways, everyone
associated with the JSB Center over the past two and a half
years contributed to the project--Professors Gary Orren and
Frederick Schauer, Visiting Professors Michael Schudson,
Timothy Cook, Lawrence K. Grossman, Jim Squires and Neil
Postman, and a succession of Fellows and lecturers including
Kiku Adatto, Sissela Bok, David Broder, Walter Cronkite,
Dayton Duncan, Albert Hunt, Marion Just, James McEnteer,
Cokie Roberts, Tim Russert, Bill Wheatley, Lewis W. Wolfson
and David Yepsen.
-3-
Spearheading the effort and coordinating not only a series
of seminars and conferences but also the supporting research
was a team consisting of Ellen Hume, Executive Director of
the JSB Center, John Ellis, a Fellow and former political
producer at NBC News, and Carter Wilkie, a research fellow
and writer.
The JSB Center's report falls into two parts: the analysis
of the '88 campaign coverage and a set of recommendations
designed to improve press coverage throughout the '92
campaign, which is being drafted primarily by Ellen Hume;
and "Nine Sundays," a special proposal for improving not
only tv coverage of the presidential election campaign but
as a happy consequence the political process itself, which
was drafted by John Ellis.
The "general election campaign" theoretically runs nine
Sundays--from Labor Day, when the presidential campaign is
presumed to begin in earnest, to Election Day, when it all
comes to a blessed close. It is in this finite period of
time, with increasing interest week after week, like a
metronome beating time to the quickening pace of the
political process, that the American people begin to devote
more of their attention to a rather key question. Who will
be their next President?
-4-
In "Nine Sundays," the Shorenstein Barone Center on Press,
Politics and Public Policy proposes that the three major
networks on a rotating basis, plus CNN, C-Span, Monitor and
PBS, provide ninety minutes of evening or prime time every
Sunday for nine weeks to a serious and substantive
discussion by the two principal presidential candidates of
the major issues that concern the American people. One
issue at a time. For example, taxes may be the subject for
one Sunday, Middle East policy or abortion for another,
education, the environment, or US-Soviet relations on other
Sundays. Such an approach would guarantee a detailed
examination of the principal issues of the '92 campaign and
undercut the current tendency to reduce all political
dialogue to brief sound-bites--and report it that way, as if
substance were secondary. This proposal, if adopted, would
radically change the content of modern-day politics.
Of the nine Sundays between Labor Day and Election Day, two
Sundays would be devoted to presidential debates. We would
prefer four debates, but the experts claim that there is
little incentive for an incumbent President to accept more
than two. Two it is. A new format though is recommended:
no audience, no artificial hoopla and applause, no panel of
journalists, one subject, one moderator, all to be done in a
-5-
simple, unadorned TV studio. A debate is, after all,
nothing more in these times than a tv program, crucially
important though it might be. A third Sunday would be
devoted to one vice-presidential debate, also according to
the new format. The final Sunday before Election Day would
feature two concluding speeches by the presidential
candidates, one after the other, a flip of the coin
determining who goes first, plus whatever analysis or
reporting the networks choose.
That leaves five other Sundays. We propose that these five
Sundays be devoted to thirty-to-forty minute "conversations"
with the two presidential candidates, one after the other,
again a flip of the coin determining who goes first. Each
one of these five "Conversations with the Candidates" would
be on a different subject, and each would be conducted by a
TV moderator and two experts selected by the network
responsible for that Sunday's pooling arrangements.
Network news would be encouraged to offer this unusual
series to commercial sponsorship (tastefully presented, at
the beginning and end of each Sunday broadcast, no
interruptions in-between) so their financial losses, when
and if there are any, would be limited. Given both their
continuing importance as sources of news and their financial
-6-
shakiness, especially after the Persian Gulf war, network
needs must be taken into account.
If, as many scholars contend, television has become the
principal means of political discourse in the United States,
then the "Nine Sundays" proposal is an excellent approach
for elevating the discourse. No one wants a repeat of '88.
This proposal is designed to provide a fixed amount of time
for substantive discussion of the major problems. It
insures a serious textured tone to overall news coverage of
a presidential campaign. It gives voters regular,
predictable access to the candidates, over a sustained
period of time. It sets a framework for constructive
televised exposure to the issues.
"Nine Sundays" deserves the most serious consideration and
support.
THE NINE SUNDAYS PROPOSAL
(T) he press cannot perform adequately as
intermediary between the candidates and the voters
no matter how conscientiously reporters approach
the task. The media simply are not designed to
fulfill this responsibility. They are in the news
business, not the political business, and, as a
result, their norms and imperatives are not those
required for the effective organization of electoral
coalitions.
-- Thomas Patterson
Anyone who has covered a presidential campaign knows that
the substance of politics and governance is the first victim
of the campaign trail. Brave attempts are often made by
candidates and reporters to address substantive questions,
but they are inevitably short-lived. The "stuff" of modern
political campaigns is attacks, mistakes, pictures and
polls. (1) Candidates cannot speak to issues; 9-second
sound-bites do not allow it. Reporters cannot, for very
long, take time out to work up a thoughtful explanation of a
Republican or Democratic presidential nominee's "child care
proposal;" they are on deadline and they are crowded by
other stories that are breaking out all around them.
-2-
Issues of substance and governance are only "in play" when
they have a direct bearing on the immediate political
outcome. For example, Ronald Reagan's use of the Panama
Canal issue in 1976 and the SALT II issue in 1980 struck
real and emotional chords with key groups in the American
electorate. American policy with regard to Latin America
and the Soviet Union is serious and substantive business.
But press coverage of Mr. Reagan's stance on these issues
focused on the political implications of Mr. Reagan's
conservative policies and the efforts of Presidents Ford and
Carter to counteract them, and for good reason.
Candidate Reagan, after all, hammered away at the Panama
Canal issue in 1976 in large measure because he felt the
issue was "working" with Republican primary voters in 1976.
Candidate Reagan hammered away at the SALT II treaty in 1980
in part because his position conformed with a widely-held
view across the electorate that America had fallen behind in
the superpower struggle with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Reagan bit his tongue on the issue of Social Security in
1980 largely because he knew, from previous experience, that
once raised, the issue worked against him. Press coverage,
not surprisingly, focused on the politics of these issues,
-3-
not their substance. That's the way political coverage of
substantive issues of politics and governance works.
Politicians are assumed to be emphasizing and de-emphasizing
substantive matters based more or less exclusively upon
their political "return."
Technology adds pace to this journalistic view of the
political process. Presidential candidates campaign from
media market to media market, jet-fueled and in constant
communication with all sources of information, delivering
political messages calibrated for the highest political
"yield." All the while they work against the deadline
clocks of the print and electronic "news cycles." The
political press corps monitors each and every calibration of
each and every message.
The result is that a modern presidential campaign, in all of
its parts, moves too fast, in too many directions, in too
short a time for there to be any orderly process through
which candidates could and/or would address the major issues
facing the country. Candidates now have only two major,
uninterrupted opportunities to reach the electorate. The
first comes at the nominating conventions, when the nominee
gets thirty-five to forty-five minutes on all the major
television networks to address the nation. The second comes
-4-
during the general election campaign debate(s), which are
also carried, without interruption, by all the major
television networks. The second is considerably more
dangerous, politically speaking, than the first, which is
why Republican presidential candidates tend to do everything
they can to minimize the number of presidential debates.
Given their nearly decisive advantage within the current
composition of the electoral college, Republican
presidential candidates have little incentive to broaden the
playing field of the campaign. The current playing field is
heavily tilted in their direction.
Another factor which mitigates against expanded coverage of
substantive issues of politics and governance might be
called the Hunter Thompson Factor. Hunter Thompson was the
prince of "Gonzo Journalism" in the late 1960s and the
early 1970s. He covered the 1972 campaign from beginning to
end. By Labor Day of that year, he was so exhausted from
his labors and so undone by the sheer tedium of the campaign
that he basically wrote off the Nixon-McGovern battle as
meaningless and instead wrote about how the whole process
had ruined his health and defeated his spirit. Of course,
he wrote for Rolling Stone, not the New York Times or the
Washington Post, and his magazine thrived on his irreverent
copy.
-5-
It goes without saying that most campaign reporters do not
write and produce stories about the effect of the campaign
on their health and spirit. Yet, the Hunter Thompson Factor
is something that affects virtually everyone connected with
a presidential campaign. By Labor Day, most everyone is
already bone-weary. The candidates have given thousands of
speeches, raised millions of dollars, conducted a thousand
interviews, visited every conceivable interest group, criss-
crossed too many time zones, committed a hundred "gaffes,"
done a thousand photo-ops, spoken to every issue on the
political horizon. The political press corps has been there
every step of the way; written thousands of column inches,
filed and produced countless pieces, heard every variation
of the stump speech, chronicled every staff change and
monitored all of the comings and goings, ups and downs, ins
and outs of winning and losing presidential campaigns.
By the time Labor Day rolls around and the opening bell
rings for the general election campaign, what is relatively
new and fresh for most voters is already tedious, if not
meaningless, to almost everyone covering the campaign. For
campaign reporters, the "road show" is as predictable as an
old repeat on television. They need not take notes on
George Bush's stump speech or Michael Dukakis's apparently
-6-
off-the-cuff remarks; they have long since memorized those
lines. For them, the "road show" provides nothing new, save
a new paragraph or two inserted into the stump speech.
So what's new? What's new and fresh for presidential
campaign reporters becomes the production of the "road show"
and the electronic media campaign; the marketing of the
candidate, the calibration and recalibration of the
"message." Not surprisingly, then, these marketing issues
become the focus of the coverage. How things "play" and how
things are "handled" become the political standards by which
candidates and their campaigns are judged. Polls provide
the "objective" ratification or refutation of the prevailing
"conventional wisdom" on these matters. It needn't be this
way. It just is.
This focus on political marketing, although it reaches back
to the Nixon campaigns of 1968 and 1972, is, in large
measure, a byproduct of the Reagan era. Political reporters
have always been fascinated by the marketing of presidential
candidates, but real issues of national concern tended to
dominate the politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The Cuban
Missile Crisis, the assassination of President Kennedy,
civil rights, social disorder, the Vietnam War, Watergate,
oil shocks, hyperinflation, Iranian hostage crisis; all of
-7-
these real and pressing national concerns overwhelmed
American politics through the 1980 election.
What was extraordinary (to the press community) about the
Reagan White House was its apparent mastery over the media.
This became known in Beltway vernacular as President
Reagan's "teflon;" his apparently uncanny ability to emerge
unscathed from whatever political or policy disaster was
happening "on his watch." Mr. Reagan's "teflon" was
attributed in most press reports to the public relations and
marketing skills of his advisors and consultants. James
Baker, then the White House Chief of Staff, and "media
maestro" Michael Deaver, among others, were ascribed Merlin-
like powers of image alchemy. When many of these same
people left Mr. Reagan's employ to join Vice President
Bush's presidential campaign, the press focus remained on
the marketeers and their alleged skills.
All of which contributed to what Joan Didion and others have
called the "disconnect" (between the campaign and the
voters) in the 1988 presidential campaign. (2) Presidential
campaigns are a world unto themselves. Candidates, staffers,
consultants, reporters and producers covering the race have
their own language, their own mores, their own folklore,
their own class structure. A presidential campaign is a
-8-
separate culture, one that Timothy Crouse described in
wonderful detail in his book about the 1972 campaign, The
Boys on the Bus. After a while, it seemed as if the voters
became strange and distant figures known not as human beings
but as data in polls.
Those involved in either working on or covering a
presidential campaign come to be disconnected from ordinary
life. They work crazy hours, travel constantly, are
maniacally up to date on every new tidbit of information and
speak an odd and somewhat technical language.
Voters, on the other hand, go about their daily business.
They are largely disinterested in politics over the course
of a lengthy presidential campaign. They tune into the
process in the latter stages of the campaign (be it the
primary or the general election) and then look to the news
media for information, context, analysis and explanation.
The news media, given its norms (what's new) and imperatives
(make it snappy), feel they have already covered what many
voters, belatedly awakened, now want to know about. Since
they are in the news business, the campaign press corps
focuses on what is new; the new ads, the new attacks, the
new polls, the new marketing techniques, the most recent
-9-
article which has stirred controversy within the Republican
and/or the Democratic presidential camp. One result is that
voters and the press corps often pass one another like ships
in the night.
Reporters and editors point out, with considerable
justification, that while most voters say they are
interested in the substance of politics and government,
articles and news reports about substantive issues are among
the least read stories in their papers and magazines. Time
magazine, after all, did not expand its "Nation" section
into a supermarket weekly; it created People magazine, which
turned out to be the most successful magazine launch in
recent publishing history. Television news abhors long,
dreary takeouts on complicated issues; too wordy, not enough
pictures.
And journalism, after all, is a business. People magazine
and television shows like "Entertainment Tonight" are
important because they are profitable. Success breeds
imitation. Increasingly, the nation's leading television
networks, news magazines and newspapers are no longer
coddled by their parent corporations. They are being asked
to perform journalistically and financially.
-10-
This raises a critically important issue. The financial
health of network news is very much in doubt. Of the three
major networks, only ABC News has a chance of breaking even
in 1991. NBC News and CBS News are expected to lose
millions of dollars, despite the relative strength of NBC
television as a whole and the phenomenal success (annual
profit: $70-75 million) of CBS News' "60 Minutes." This has
led NBC News to close its bureaus in New York and Miami,
something that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.
Even ABC News, the healthiest of the lot, recently laid off
over 100 staffers and closed a number of overseas and
domestic bureaus.
Most, if not all, of these cuts are being made in the three
major networks' "news gathering" operations. The most
expensive "news gathering" enterprise for a network news
organization (except for a war) is presidential campaign
coverage. Given the ongoing decline of the network news'
market share of the television audience, it is virtually
certain that presidential campaign coverage will be
dramatically reduced in 1992 and beyond. Indeed, there are
even some who argue that NBC News. and CBS News, as currently
constituted, will no longer exist by the mid-1990s. (3)
The dramatic increase in financial pressure on news
organizations would seem to presage an even greater
-11-
"disconnect" between the voters and the campaign. Less
coverage of politics is not likely to mean better coverage
of politics within tighter constraints of time and money.
Gary Hart, Chuck Robb and the Kennedy family can all testify
that the journalism business has very deep pockets when a
story seems to be moving newsstand sales and Nielsen rating
charts. Stories that do not move sales charts are
increasingly viewed as liabilities. It is axiomatic to
editors and producers in the business of television news
that politics and political coverage are Nielsen rating
losers. This "market" knowledge is internalized by the men
and women who produce the news shows, the news magazines and
the daily newspapers. In the future, it stands to reason
they will be less likely to fight uphill battles for
expanded coverage of substantive political issues if
political coverage remains a market loser.
That said, it should be noted that there is still a
substantial amount of political coverage in the major print
vehicles and on the network and cable news shows. The
presidential campaign press corps is particularly good at
doing certain things. Over the course of a presidential
campaign, they transmit vast quantities of information about
the candidates and their campaigns to their readers and
viewers all across the country. They provide a daily fix on
-12-
how the campaign and the candidates stand at the end of the
day or the end of the week. There are any number of
vehicles ("Nightline," the morning shows, the Sunday talk
shows) for the campaigns and the candidates to get out
"political messages," some in sound-bite form and others at
somewhat greater length. And there is a fair amount of
independent reporting that tackles ambitious assignments and
complicated issues within tight constraints of time and
space. These reports are often genuinely illuminating and
insightful.
There are three major problems. The first has already been
discussed: there is less money (and therefore less space in
print and time on television) available for political
coverage generally and "serious" coverage specifically. The
second problem is what we might call the Superficial
problem: something that can be done very well if done
carefully and deliberately is more often than not done
sloppily and in haste and quickly reaches the lowest common
denominator.
For instance: Polling, which can be remarkably informative
about the mood of the electorate, its anxieties and fears,
its hopes and dreams, can become so excessive as to crowd
out all other discussion. In recent campaigns, polling has
-13-
been overused and abused, serving as a statistical
substitute for old-fashioned reporting. The shorthand (Bush
up by 10!) has changed the dialogue of the campaign.
Candidates and campaign operatives are frequently amazed
that they can go for days, from state to state, airport to
airport, time zone to time zone and hear nothing but
questions about the most recent (Gallup, Harris, CBS/New
York Times, ABC/Washington Post, NBC/Wall Street Journal)
poll. Walter Mondale in 1984 and George Bush in 1988 were
both stunned by the sheer volume of poll-related questions,
according to people who worked closely with them. (4)
Indeed, in 1988, poll stories became "mega" news stories
unto themselves. Prior to the second presidential debate,
on October 12, 1988, ABC News devoted more than half of its
"World News Tonight" broadcast to national and state-by-
state polls conducted by ABC and The Washington Post.
For instance: Advertising. The Selling of the President,
Joe McGinness's book on the Nixon campaign's advertising
effort in 1968, was an extraordinary look into the
operations of a modern presidential campaign. It captured
an important element of Mr. Nixon's political re-emergence.
But most campaign reporting about political television
advertising is cliched, poorly researched and often
misleading. One would think from reading the campaign
-14-
reportage of 1988 that the Bush campaign invested most of
its media budget in something called the Willie Horton
commercial. In fact, the actual "Willie Horton" commercial
was produced by an independent political action committee,
ran on cable television in the month of August, cost roughly
$600,000 for the media buy, was seen in its original form by
a small percentage of the voting population and was probably
recalled by an even smaller percentage of those who did see
it. (5) The news media, by repeating clips of the Willie
Horton ad on local and national news shows, gave it much
greater exposure than it ever received as a paid
advertisement.
Race, of course, has dominated American politics since the
early part of the 19th century. It is an issue which
resonates throughout our political culture and has torn the
fabric of American society. It is also true that the Bush
campaign repeatedly aired a "crime" spot, a revolving door
"freeing" one presumed criminal after another, which raised
the "furlough" issue in a different form. (6) What was
lost were the distinctions and the subtleties of the
advertising. The larger point is that news coverage can and
does exaggerate and distort what is actually happening in a
presidential campaign, in part because of superficial
reporting.
-15-
Toward the end of the general election campaign, the
Superficial problem is in full roar. Television news'
addiction to pictures (now accompanied by words decrying the
careful producing of the pictures), mistakes (Pearl Harbor
Day!), attacks (Willie Horton!) and polls (Dukakis Surge!?)
comes together with all manner of rumors, innuendos and
various forms of character assassination to provide the
electorate with a lurid picture of the political process at
work. To many voters, the whole process seems not only
disconnected from their day-to-day concerns but also deeply
disturbing in what it seems to be saying about the political
process.
It is possible that these two "realities" -- campaign world
and normal life -- are simply separate and distinct worlds
that intersect only if polling or some gripping event create
interaction. If so, we have arrived at a dangerous
political moment. The purpose of this quadrennial exercise,
after all, is the consent of the governed. The country --
its democratic political system and its leadership --
belongs to the electorate. The guiding principle behind the
idea of democracy is interaction and interconnection, not
disconnection.
-16-
This problem of disconnection is exacerbated by the third
major problem, which is that there never seems to be enough
time. Time is the one commodity that is not available to
candidates, reporters, editors and producers. All the best
intentions of political journalism inevitably run up against
this central fact. "This time around," the television news
producer says before the election campaign begins, "we're
really going to cover the issues." But by the time the
general election campaign is in full swing, the issues are
secondary to the norms and imperatives of the business.
The issue of the federal deficit, for example, is
complicated and difficult. It cannot be explained, inside
the context of a presidential campaign, in a one-and-a-half
minute tv story. It takes half-an-hour or an hour just to
scratch the surface of the issue. But as everyone knows,
there will never be a one-hour network news special on the
federal budget deficit. That's not what network television
does.
The absence of time distorts the campaign. Candidates speak
in nine-second sound-bites. Experts "explain" an issue in
two 11-second bites. Fast edits and quick pace are not the
stuff of deliberative choice. They are the stuff of
television. That's what mainstream network television news
has become.
-17-
The problems of less money, superficial coverage and the
absence of time are only heightened by the collapse of
network news. People who are locked into uphill battles for
economic survival cannot waste any time thinking about how
they "should" cover politics. They need to do everything
they can to get their Nielsen ratings up, and they don't
think that politics will improve their ratings. With
network news locked into this deadly endgame, efforts within
broadcast journalism to "improve" political coverage will
necessarily be of secondary importance.
If this is an accurate and fair description of the current
political-journalistic environment, the question is: How do
we get the substance of politics and governance back into
"play" in our general election campaigns? How do we foster
interaction between the campaigns and the voters? What can
we do to improve the tone and content of the debate? The
Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and
Public Policy believes that the answer may lie in a
different approach to television coverage of presidential
politics. We believe that what television does best is
"live" coverage of the candidates in action. What candidates
do best is campaign, debate and answer questions. Our idea
merges the two on a regularly scheduled basis. We call it
The Nine Sundays Plan.
-18-
THE NINE SUNDAYS PLAN
Presidential campaigns, at their best, are a heated argument
about the future direction and leadership of the United
States. Part of the press's role in presidential politics
can be to enrich that debate and to expand our collective
understanding of the issues and the people involved.
Above all else, a Presidential campaign needs time, on
television, to engage the electorate in its political
argument. It seems to us that we must focus on a better
role for television in the political process.
Within the current formats of network and local television
news, there is simply no time available for expanded
coverage of presidential politics. There is only so much
that can be done, after all, inside the Nielsen-driven
confines of a 22-minute evening news broadcast. There are
those programs, such as the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour,
Nightline and the Sunday morning interview programs, which
do have more time, but, whether we like it or not, the
campaign managers still arrange their candidate's days to
project their image and their message on the evening and
morning newscasts. Their basic thrust revolves around two
-19-
news cycles; the evening tv/radio news broadcasts and
morning tv/radio news/talk shows, and newspapers often take
their cues from what is said on these shows.
New vehicles are therefore needed for presidential campaign
debate and discussion. There is general agreement on this
point. David Broder has called for weekly presidential
candidate news conferences during the general election
campaign. Paul Taylor has proposed the "five minute
solution;" five minutes of free network air time on
alternating nights for the major party nominees. In various
forums sponsored by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, Tim
Russert of NBC News, Marvin Kalb and others have proposed
increasing the number of presidential debates. There are
other ideas and proposals. The Nine Sundays Plan borrows
generously from all of them.
Basically this is the plan: there are nine Sundays from
Labor Day to Election Day. We propose that network and
cable television news reserve time on each of those nine
Sunday evenings for at least two presidential debates, one
vice presidential debate, five live "conversations" with the
presidential candidates and one concluding presidential
candidate address to the nation.
-20-
Network news enthusiasm for the Nine Sundays Plan is
critical to its success or failure. Sunday evening is
special. It is when most Americans watch television.
Therefore, we believe that it would be to everyone's benefit
if the debates, conversations with the candidates, and
summary addresses were held on Sunday night, at 9pm eastern
time, to reach the largest number of potential voters.
Obviously, if impossible scheduling conflicts arise,
adjustments can be made.
If the major television networks do not agree to broadcast
more than the three presidential and vice-presidential
debates at 9pm eastern time on Sunday, for financial and
competitive reasons (as well as scheduling conflicts), the
five conversations with the candidates could be scheduled
for 7pm eastern time on Sunday. The candidates' summary
addresses to the nation would hopefully be broadcast at 9pm
or 10pm the Sunday before the election.
Holding these events on Sunday evenings would allow the
candidates ample opportunity to campaign during the week,
all across the country, and yet leave them time (Saturday
and all day Sunday) to recoup and prepare for a nationally
televised appearance. The basic idea is to insure some
"prime time" on network television on a weekly basis for
-21-
political discussion. Such an approach is serious, regular
and predictable. The larger idea is to attempt to
institutionalize a more substantive discussion of political
issues in a way that does not penalize the networks
financially, inhibit the candidates's campaign flexibility
or diminish the concerns of voters and reporters. Let us
look at the formats one-by-one:
DEBATES
It is impossible to know how many presidential debates there
will be in the 1992 general election campaign. Recent
history would suggest that there will be two presidential
debates and one vice presidential debate. That was the case
in 1984 and again in 1988.
Exact details will be worked out by the presidential
candidates, the political parties, the networks and
whichever other organizations the candidates choose.
Presidential and vice- presidential debates are the subject
of long and difficult negotiations which will end up
determining the final shape and format of the 1992
Presidential campaign debates.
In 1988, James Baker, on behalf of candidate Bush, and Paul
Brountas, on behalf of candidate Dukakis, negotiated the
-22-
terms--the number, dates and format of the debates. Baker
held the better cards, and his conditions prevailed. There
were to be two presidential debates, and one vice-
presidential debate.
The debates were, without doubt, crucially important moments
in the campaign, but they were still deeply disappointing.
CBS' Walter Cronkite described the '88 debates as "phony,
part of an unconscionable fraud." The Wall Street Journal's
Albert Hunt called them a "sham." CNN's Bernard Shaw said:
"88 was a charade, these were not debates." A New York
Times editorial tried to be charitable, noting the debates
were "deprived of novelty, crippled by poor questions--
wooden and unfocused--but still, better than nothing."
There were also very specific reasons for the
disappointment.
First, they were not "debates," by any definition. While
the candidates shared the same platform and shook hands at
the beginning and end, they did not address each other, they
did not question each other, they barely looked at each
other.
-23-
Second, they answered questions posed by a panel of
journalists, all of whom had been invited and ultimately
"cleared" by the political parties. According to the terms
of the Baker-Brountas agreement, the debate was to be
divided into two equal parts--one for questions about
domestic policy, the other for questions about foreign
policy. At one point, Baker called the control room to
remind the executive producer that it was time to shift from
domestic to foreign affairs--something the producer and the
anchorman were intending to do in any case. The point is,
Baker felt sufficiently paternalistic about the whole
enterprise to believe that he could call in the middle of
the program and suggest a change.
Third, the debate took place before a live audience, divided
equally between Republicans and Democrats, who couldn't
resist laughing at their candidate's humor or applauding his
prepared throwaway lines. ("Senator, you're no Jack
Kennedy.") The atmosphere was more suggestive of a
political circus than of a political debate. Everything was
calculated. The louder the laughter and the applause,
presumably the greater the impact on the vast viewing
audience.
Finally, because it was more of a circus than a debate, the
networks tried to compete with one another in instant
-24-
polling and analysis. A sampling of 400-600 Americans could
produce a winner or a loser within a matter of minutes.
Spin doctors let loose their predictable optimism, and
almost invariably it was used, raw and unchecked. One such
spin doctor told a reporter before the October 13, 1988
debate: "If I don't see you later, just quote me as saying
our guy won by a knockout."
No one believes that in this age of television we can
suddenly return to the Lincoln-Douglas model, but our
research clearly indicates that serious analysts of the
political process want to change the '88 model. Simply put,
they want real debates.
Some observers point to the Canadian model--the two
candidates in a tv studio with a single moderator. It was
spectacularly successful. A similar model was tried during
the 1990 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign, but there
were so many rules and regulations imposed by the
candidates' handlers that a potentially interesting debate
lost much of its spontaneity.
A consensus model seemed to emerge in our many seminars,
conferences and interviews--that the next series of debates
be marked by simplicity and substance. The ingredients are
-25-
easily identifiable: two candidates, one moderator, a tv
studio, no audience, live.
We understand that there are many different opinions about
what constitutes the best format. The Joan Shorenstein
Barone Center believes that we should go back to the future.
A "modified" version of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates
offers the most promising and uncluttered format. They took
place in a television studio, with a moderator and no
audience. A panel of reporters, though, is no longer
necessary. The moderator could easily begin the debate and
keep it moving along if need be. The important feature is
not the moderator but the quality of the candidates. The
JSB Center format would have the two candidates simply
square off in front of the cameras, with the moderator
making sure things are proceeding fairly. The simplicity
itself would make for gripping television. This format can
work in the 1992 presidential campaign.
The same format could be used for the vice presidential
debate. We would argue that the vice presidential debate be
held on Sunday night, and be treated as politically
equivalent to a presidential debate. We understand that the
presidential campaigns may negotiate a different status for
the vice presidential debate.
-26-
The issue of sponsorship is problematic. Ideally, within
the framework of the Nine Sundays Plan, the television
networks would "sponsor" the presidential and vice
presidential debates. If the networks end up as sponsors
of, say, two presidential debates and one vice presidential
debate, they should be allowed to sell advertising (or
enlist sponsors) whose commercial messages would be seen at
the very beginning and the very end of the debates to help
defray costs and recover some lost revenues.
The ideal situation, of course, would be to have no
advertising at all, but we believe that, if handled
correctly, commercials should not diminish the value of the
broadcast. Viewers and voters are sophisticated enough to
understand the need for commercial sponsorship. It would be
no longer than 90 seconds at the top of the show and 90
seconds at the end. The revenues from these advertisements
would completely cover all costs and the profits could be
pooled to pay the legal costs incurred for filings with the
FCC and possible legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved
parties.
-27-
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES
Assuming that there are at least two presidential debates
and one vice presidential debate at 9pm eastern time on
Sunday during the 1992 campaign, that leaves six Sunday
nights open from Labor Day Weekend to Election Day.
Part Two of our Nine Sundays Proposal is that five of these
six Sundays be devoted to two, back-to-back, 30- or 45-
minute "Conversations with the Candidates." These
conversations could be open to commercial sponsorship.
Network coverage of these programs could rotate from ABC to
CBS to NBC. Public television, CNN, other cable news
organizations, and various radio networks would presumably
cover all five Sunday night "Conversations with the
Candidates" as regular programming. Rotating coverage
worked well during the Iran-contra hearings. The first week
CBS News was responsible for covering the hearings. The
second week NBC News had the responsibility. The third week
ABC News covered the hearings. PBS, cable news and the
various radio networks covered every week of the hearings.
This same model can work in the 1992 Presidential campaign.
Because of the Major League Baseball playoffs, the World
Series and other network broadcasting obligations, the best
-28-
window on Sunday nights for rotating network coverage of the
"Conversations with the Candidates" is from 7pm to 8:30pm
eastern time. Playoff and World Series baseball broadcasts
usually begin at 8:30pm. At least two and possibly three
Sundays in October will be given over to these baseball
broadcasts.
What about the structure of the broadcasts? We'd suggest --
in the interest of fairness -- that each presidential
candidate be interviewed by a separate three-reporter panel
for 28 minutes (assuming 30 minutes per candidate) or 42
minutes (assuming 45 minutes per candidate). The first
panel would include a network anchorman or anchorwoman and
two reporters well-versed in the evening's subject matter.
The second panel would include a CNN (or PBS, or Monitor or
NPR) anchorman or anchorwoman and two expert reporters.
Now what about the substance of these broadcasts? Each of
the five Sunday night "Conversations" would address
different issues. There are basically three major issues in
American politics: the national security, the national
economy (broadly defined) and the national culture (also
broadly defined). Issues of national security include
diplomacy, foreign policy, military preparedness and various
"threats" to the national interest abroad and at home.
-29-
Issues of the national economy include national and
international economic forces which, in concert, create the
American economic way of life. Issues of national culture
touch on a central political question: What kind of country
do we want? These "cultural issues" include questions about
race, crime, the environment, education, drugs, the Supreme
Court's role in American society, school prayer, the role of
religion, abortion and capital punishment. These "cultural
issues" (and others like them) are often the most important
in American presidential politics.
One Sunday would. therefore be given over to national
security issues, another Sunday to national and
international economic issues, another Sunday to issues of
our national culture. Two Sundays would be given over to
whatever questions (within the three general issue groups)
seemed appropriate at that stage of the campaign.
So, hypothetically, let's say the first Sunday night
"Conversation with the Candidates" concerned issues of
national security. Alphabetically, ABC News might be first
up in the network rotation. A flip of a coin would
determine candidate order. Let us assume that President
Bush is the GOP nominee. He wins the coin toss, he goes
first. Mr. Bush is then interviewed at his office (or
-30-
wherever he happens to be) by Peter Jennings and two expert
national security correspondents. That broadcast goes out
over the ABC Television network and (one hopes) PBS and
various radio and cable channels from 7pm eastern time to,
say, 7:30pm eastern time. Immediately afterward, the
Democratic nominee would be interviewed by Bernard Shaw
(e.g.) and two other expert national security
correspondents. That conversation would also go out over
the ABC Network, PBS, radio networks and various cable
channels, ending at 8pm eastern time. CBS and NBC News
could carry these conversations or run their normal
entertainment programming.
The following week, the Democratic nominee would go first,
the Republican nominee second. CBS News might be up next in
the rotation. Dan Rather would anchor the first panel. Judy
Woodruff would anchor the other. The reporters would be
selected by CBS according to their knowledge of the subject
matter.
The overall schedule might look something like this
(assuming the Republicans won the coin toss):
-31-
DAY
TIME
NETWORK
ISSUE
NOMINEE ORDER
Sunday 1
7pm
ABC/CNN
Nat. Security
GOP First
Sunday 2
7pm
CBS/CNN
Economy
DEM. First
Sunday 3 9pm
ALL
Presidential Debate
Sunday 4
9pm
ALL
Vice Presidential Debate
Sunday 5
7pm
NBC/CNN
Nat. Culture
GOP First
Sunday 6
7pm
ABC/CNN
More Security
DEM. First
Sunday 7
9pm
ALL
Presidential Debate
Sunday 8
7pm
NBC/CNN
More Nat. Culture GOP First
Sunday 9 9pm
ALL
Summary Addresses
Candidate participation would be voluntary. One candidate
(usually the one behind in the polls) will always want to
participate. Should the other candidate choose not to
participate, the time allotted would simply revert back to
regular entertainment or news programming.
We also recommend that voters provide, through the mail, a
selection of the questions for the candidates. The anchor
and the two "expert" reporters could choose the best
questions submitted and read them aloud to the candidates.
After the candidates responded, the reporters could follow
up with questions of their own, should that seem appropriate
at the time. This would give the average voter a sense of
participating in the process.
-32-
Back-to-back "Conversations with the Candidates" on five
Sunday evenings during the general election would
significantly improve the political dialogue of the 1992
presidential campaign. The networks would not lose money,
since these conversations could be sponsored. They may even
be able to turn a small profit. Since each network, except
CBS, which would be responsible for one, would only be
responsible for two Sunday nights, lost revenues would be
minimized. And the five Sunday night "Conversations with
the Candidates," organized around the three major issues of
American politics, would help focus the print, radio and
television news coverage leading up to and following the
Sunday night broadcasts, and encourage deeper, more
substantive reporting.
In this way, one of the major benefits of the Nine Sundays
Proposal, in our view, is that editors and producers would
be able to plan some of their coverage according to the
schedule of these issue-oriented programs. For instance,
the executive producer of an evening news broadcast, knowing
that next Sunday's "candidate conversation" was going to
focus on national security issues, could order up two pieces
on how the candidates stand on those issues. Editors at the
major newspapers and newsmagazines could also order up
-33-
stories of considerable complexity well in advance of the
actual event, thus providing the reader with an overview and
some context for the issues under discussion. Monday and
Tuesday newspaper, radio and television coverage could also
go into more detail and analysis.
The five "Conversations" at 7pm eastern time on Sunday are
likely to be very attractive to NBC Television and ABC
Television, as well as the cable and public broadcasting
networks. That time period (7-8pm eastern time) is
currently dominated by CBS News' "60 Minutes" broadcast.
Both ABC and NBC spend over $1 million for programming in
the 7pm-8pm time slot on Sunday nights. Neither of their
shows does very well in the Nielsen ratings, resulting in
low advertising revenue. The Nine Sundays broadcasts, on
the other hand, cost no more than $100,000 to produce (per
show) and the advertising revenue generated by the
broadcasts should be at least $200-250,000 per network per
night.
"60 Minutes" is the life blood of CBS News, generating
$70-75 million in annual profits. CBS is unlikely to tamper
with the Sunday schedule for just that reason. However, it
is not at all clear that the presidential candidate
conversations pose any serious "ratings" threat to "60
-34-
Minutes" at 7pm, particularly during the first six weeks of
the presidential campaign. Voter (and therefore viewer)
interest in presidential politics accelerates dramatically
only toward the end of the campaign. It is also true that
more people watch television as time passes through the
evening. On the one, or possibly two, occasions when CBS
News would be responsible for carrying the presidential
candidate conversations, it is likely that a delayed "60
Minutes" would garner a market share at least equal to if
not greater than the one it normally gets from 7pm-8pm on
Sunday nights. This might allow "60 Minutes" producers to
charge a higher rate for advertising thirty-and-sixty-second
commercials. It might also have the unintended consequence
of strengthening CBS's Sunday night schedule, since "60
Minutes" drawing power as a "lead-in" to other shows has
helped the network dominate Sunday night television. In
the past, the three networks have been more competitive in
the Nielsen ratings after 9pm eastern time, depending on the
drawing power of their programming.
The point here is that given the enormous financial
pressures under which network news divisions labor, it is
important that any plan seeking to increase substantive
political discussion on television be sensitive to network
costs. The viability of the Nine Sundays Plan is that it
makes financial as well as journalistic and political sense.
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CANDIDATE ADDRESS TO THE NATION
The final piece of the Nine Sundays Plan is that the
candidates be given fifteen to thirty minutes of network
time on the Sunday night before the election to present
their case to the nation's voters. A coin toss would
determine candidate order. All the major networks would be
allowed to sell advertisements that would immediately
precede and follow the two major party candidate
presentations. The presidential candidates would be
required to appear on camera at all times during the
broadcast. This would not be a campaign commercial with
tape inserts. We would hope that the candidates would
conduct these summary addresses in a "live" format, either
in studio or from a "remote" location.
We are aware the the Nine Sundays Proposal raises a number
of questions. Chief among them: Is it legal or does it
violate anti-trust regulations? Attached is a professional
judgment written by Frederick Schauer, who is the Frank
Stanton Professor on the First Amendment at the Kennedy
School's Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,
-36-
Politics and Public Policy, which states, convincingly in
our view, that the Nine Sundays Plan is "doable" within the
existing interpretations of the relevant statutes and
regulations.
Another question: what about third party candidates? Third
party candidates would be excluded from participation in all
of the proposed formats unless, like George Wallace in 1968,
their candidacies could reasonably be considered crucial to
the outcome of the race. How does one measure whether a
third party candidate is viable or not? We would suggest
that a third party candidate who is able consistently to
garner a double-digit poll rating (10% or better) in
nationally-recognized independent polls (Gallup, Roper, CBS
News/New York Times, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, ABC
News/Washington Post) qualifies for inclusion in the overall
plan. Those third party candidates (like Gene McCarthy in
1976 and John Anderson in 1980) whose poll numbers wallowed
in the single digits and who were in fact inconsequential to
the final outcome of the race would be excluded from
participation in the Nine Sundays Plan. By getting a legal
waiver from the FCC prior to the general election campaign,
the networks could avoid frivolous legal challenges from
allegedly aggrieved third party candidates.
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Still another question: what about football and what
happens if a game runs over? First, this is an issue that
is relevant only to CBS and NBC. ABC carries football on
Monday nights. Because of rules changes in the NFL, the
vast majority of football games now "run to time" or take
less than three hours to play. NFL Sunday games begin at
either 1pm eastern or 4pm eastern. Almost all of them will
be over and done with by 7pm eastern time. Inevitably, there
may be one 4pm NFL game that will go into overtime and run
past the 7pm starting time that the Nine Sundays Plan calls
for on five Sunday nights. Since at this writing we do not
know what the 1992 NFL schedule will be, the key will be to
fashion the Nine Sundays schedule so as to minimize the
possibility of NBC or CBS experiencing a Sports
Division/News Division conflict. This too should be
"doable." In the event that all the best plans nevertheless
result in a conflict, the Sports Division would win, and
viewers would have to turn to PBS, cable or radio networks
for the Nine Sundays broadcast.
A final question: who organizes all of this? The answer is
the over-the-air and cable television networks would
organize the schedule in consultation with the political
parties, the presidential campaigns and whichever other
groups they choose to include in the process. Ideally, an
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executive committee would be formed to handle all details,
execute operations and arbitrate whatever disputes might
arise.
This then is the Nine Sundays Proposal. Assuming two
presidential debates and a vice presidential debate, we
would call for the addition of five Sunday "Conversations
with the Candidates" and one Sunday night concluding
candidate address to the nation.
The Nine Sundays Plan rewards serious discussion of the
issues. It does not hurt the network bottom line. It
encourages the national political press corps to organize
its coverage around a pre-arranged set of important campaign
issues. Most important, it gives the voters regular access
on television to the presidential candidates over the length
of the general election campaign.
The Nine Sundays Plan is designed to create a fixed and
reasonable amount of television time during the general
election campaign when candidates can speak to issues of
national concern, while insuring some political flexibility.
Candidate participation is voluntary. Should the plan be
adopted, the 1992 presidential campaign would be altogether
different from its immediate predecessors. That alone
recommends serious discussion of the plan's merits.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Roger Ailes, President Bush's media consultant for the 1988
presidential campaign, is fond of saying that the media
(covering politics) are interested in only three things;
"pictures, mistakes and attacks." (Runkel, David R. (ed.),
Campaign for President: The Managers Look at '88. Auburn House
Publishing Company, 1989) We added "polls" to the Ailes formula
after talking with candidates, campaign operatives and
reporters, all of whom remarked upon how important and
ubiquitous polls and poll stories have become in presidential
campaigns and presidential campaign coverage.
2. Joan Didion wrote about the 1988 presidential campaign at
some length in an article entitled "Insider Baseball, which was
published in The New York Review of Books (October 11, 1988)
before the election.
3. Most recently, the whole issue of whether all three networks
would survive financially was reported in The New York Times.
See NYT, Monday, 29 July 1991, Section D, Page 1 article by Bill
Carter, NYT Media Correspondent. For a much fuller look at the
network financial picture, the forthcoming Three Blind Mice, a
book about the three major over-the-air broadcast networks, by
Ken Auletta, will be published by Simon & Schuster in September,
1991.
4. Based on interviews with Tom Donilon and Jack Corrigan of
the 1984 Mondale-Ferraro campaign conducted by the author in
1984 and in early 1991. Bush staffers interviewed by the author
in 1988 included Lee Atwater, Roger Ailes, Rich Bond and George
W. Bush. In private conversation with the author, President Bush
described the impact of polling on his daily life while
campaigning for president in quite humorous detail. But the
author took no notes at the time of that conversation.
5. This data is based on interviews with Larry McCarthy, who
wrote and produced the "Willie Horton" ad for the National
Security Political Action Committee. Mr. McCarthy was
interviewed in August, September, October and December of 1988.
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was interviewed in August, September, October and December
of 1988. Attempts to confirm the precise details of the
media buy and its weight, frequency and reach were
unsuccessful in 1988 and again in 1990.
6. The "Revolving Door" ad was produced by Dennis
Frankenberry for Ailes Communications for the Bush-Quayle
'88 Committee. The Bush-Quayle campaign spent over $2.5
million airing this commercial in national and spot markets.
After putting it on the air, they waited to see how Governor
Dukakis's campaign would respond. The Dukakis campaign, in
the eyes of Bush media strategist Roger Ailes, never did
respond to the "Revolving Door" ad. Said Ailes: "I was
stunned they didn't hit back. But they never really did.
So we just left it on the air, basically, and it did some
damage."
THE EQUAL TIME PROVISIONS AND THE NINE SUNDAYS PROPOSAL
It is possible that someone could question the compatibility
of the Nine Sundays proposal with Section 315 (a) of the
Communications Act of 1934, commonly known as the "equal time"
provision. Under current FCC interpretations of that
provision, however, it does not appear that there could be a
substantial objection. And even if this is not the case,
there is no doubt that the consistency between the Nine
Sundays proposal and Section 315 (a) is a quite plausible
position.
Section 315 (a) provides that a broadcast licensee who permits
"a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station" must "afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station." There are four major exemptions, those
being for "bona fide newscasts," "bona fide news interviews,"
"bona fide news documentaries," and "on-the-spot coverage of
bona fide news events." "
There has been continuing concern about the extent to which
presidential debates are covered by this provision, or covered
by the exemptions, since non-exempt coverage would entail
requirements with respect to third-party and other so-called
"minor" candidates. Obviously these candidates are excluded
in the Nine Sundays proposal, and there is little doubt that
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the literal language of Section 315(a), taken alone, would
suggest that there is a legal problem. But if one traces the
development of the FCC position, it appears that there may be
less of a problem than appears at first sight.
The first presidential debates were held in 1960, but there
was no Section 315 (a) problem at that time because Congress
explicitly suspended Section 315 (a) for those debates. Equal
time issues were debated and litigated in both 1964 and 1968,
but not in any context related to actual or proposed debates.
The debate issue in fact arose seriously for the first time in
1972, when CBS attempted to include on "Face the Nation" both
George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey but not Shirley Chisholm.
Although the Commission upheld the decision of CBS to exclude
both Chisholm and Sam Yorty (35 F.C.C.2d 572 (1972)), this
decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia (24 R.R.2d 2061 (D.C. Cir.
1972) ) As a result of this reversal the FCC granted Chisholm
thirty minutes of prime time shortly before the election (35
F.C.C.2d 579 (1972))
Since 1972, however, the courts, consistent with increasingly
prevalent practice where administrative agency interpretations
are concerned (see especially Chevron, U.S.A. V. Natural
Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applied
-3-
to Section 315 (a) and the FCC in Branch V. FCC, 824 F.2d 37
(D.C. Cir. 1987)), have been more willing to defer to the FCC
determinations. And the FCC, in turn, has shown itself
increasingly willing to defer to the broadcasters (see Kennedy
for President Committee V. FCC, 636 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.
1980) ) In 1975 the Commission ruled that debates between or
among candidates were within the exemption for "bona fide news
events" so long as they were sponsored by someone other than
the broadcaster. Moreover, the Commission said at the same
time that it would be willing to defer to any "good faith"
judgment of the relevant broadcasters (Petitions of Aspen
Institute and CBS, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975)) This ruling
was appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals upheld
the FCC by a 2-1 vote (Chisholm V. Federal Communications
Commission, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) The full court of
the District of Columbia Circuit refused to overrule that
decision, and the Supreme Court, with only Justice White
dissenting, refused to hear the case (429 U.S. 890 (1976))
In response to those rulings requiring a non-broadcaster
sponsor in order to be exempt from the requirements of section
315 (a), the League of Women Voters sponsored a number of
presidential debates in the 1970s and 1980s. As long as the
League and not the broadcasters were in charge, the debates
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were considered the kind of news event that broadcasters could
cover without triggering the equal time requirements.
Were this the current state of the law, then there would seem
to be questions about the Nine Sundays proposal. In 1983,
however, the FCC (Petition of Henry Geller, 95 F.C.C. 2d 1236,
54 R.R.2d 1246 (1983)) indicated that even broadcaster-
sponsored debates could be considered bona fide news events
and thus exempt from Section 315(a). This ruling was
challenged by the League of Women Voters, who claimed that it
gave the networks excess power to prefer some candidates to
others, thus violating both the letter and the spirit of
Section 315(a). This challenge was rejected by the Court of
Appeals, however (League of Women Voters V. FCC, 731 F.2d 995
(D.C. Cir. 1984)), and there was no appeal to the Supreme
Court. Moreover, other decisions of about the same time, such
as one ruling holding that the Donahue show was a bona fide
newscast under Section 315 (a) (1) (Multimedia Entertainment,
Inc., 56 R.R.2d 143 (1984)), make clear the increasing
proclivity of the FCC to defer to broadcaster judgments and
thus to remove much of the sting from Section 315(a). And
this, of course, is consistent with the FCC's actions first in
relaxing its enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and then, on
August 4, 1987, eliminating it entirely. Moreover, the FCC's
First Amendment rationale for eliminating the Fairness
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Doctrine, saying that "The First Amendment does not guarantee
a fair press, only a free press," suggests that there would in
1991 be a non-frivolous challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 315 (a), the Supreme Court's ruling in Red Lion
Broadcasting V. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), notwithstanding.
In light of all of this, it seems more likely than not that
the Nine Sundays proposal would be consistent with existing
FCC and judicial interpretations of Section 315 (a) and its
exemptions. And even if this is not right, there seems no
doubt that at the very least a professionally respectable and
legally plausible argument could be made supporting that
conclusion. And in any event there are arguments that could
be made about Section 315 (a) 's constitutionality. But it is
unlikely that it would be necessary for anyone to go this far,
as it seems that the proposal is likely to be found to fall
within the "bona fide news event" exemption as that term is
currently interpreted by the FCC.
The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center does not consider this brief
analysis as a formal legal opinion, and we are confident that
any broadcaster considering the Nine Sundays proposal would of
course get formal legal advice before proceeding. But our
initial research indicates that we not hesitate on Section
315 (a) grounds from offering the proposal for consideration.
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INSTITUTE OF
POLITICS
OHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT*HARVARD UNIVERSITY
FAX
617 495-1364
DATE:
9/5/91
TO:
ANDY CARD
FAX #: 202 456-2397
PAGE 1 OF 20 PAGE(S)
FROM:
JOHN ELLIS
Message:
Institute of Politics
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1360
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Determined NOT to be
National Security Classified Marking
By TML (NLGB) on CONFIDENTIAL 03/25/25
Thursday, 5 September 1991
Dear Andy:
I understand there is some concern down your way about the 9
Sundays Proposal. Attached are the exact details of the plan. You
should be aware that:
1. Today's Washington Post account is inaccurate.
2. The 9 Sundays Proposal essentially calls for 5-6
nationally televised news conferences on Sunday night
and a "summary" case speech by both major party nominees
on the Sunday night before election day.
3. The plan was written by me (except for some bullshit that
Kalb threw in about the debates) and is designed to
benefit President Bush by: (a) reducing the number
of debates to the established minimum and (b) maximizing
the number of "press conference" formats which the
President handles so well.
4. Candidate participation is voluntary. If a candidate
chooses not to participate, programming returns to regular
news or entertainment programming. Presidents might be
unavilable due to foreign travel, for instance.
5. The proposal, if accepted by the networks (doubtful),
will put the Democratic nominee side by side with Presi-
dent Bush on a weekly basis, but only in debate format
twice (as in 1988 and 1984). You guys win that one
BIG TIME.
Cheers. I can be reached at 617-495-1360.
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THE NINE SUNDAYS PLAN
Presidential campaigns, at their best, are a heated argument
about the future direction and leadership of the United
States. Part of the press's role in presidential politics
can be to enrich that debate and to expand our collective
understanding of the issues and the people involved.
Above all else, a Presidential campaign needs time, on
television, to engage the electorate in its political
argument. It seems to us that we must focus on a better
role for television in the political process.
Within the current formats of network and local television
news, there is simply no time available for expanded
coverage of presidential politics. There is only so much
that can be done, after all, inside the Nielsen-driven
confines of a 22-minute evening news broadcast. There are
those programs, such as the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour,
Nightline and the Sunday morning interview programs, which
do have more time, but, whether we like it or not, the
campaign managers still arrange their candidate's days to
project their image and their message on the evening and
morning newscasts. Their basic thrust revolves around two
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news cycles; the evening tv/radio news broadcasts and
morning tv/radio news/talk shows, and newspapers often take
their cues from what is said on these shows.
New vehicles are therefore needed for presidential campaign
debate and discussion. There is general agreement on this
point. David Broder has called for weekly presidential
candidate news conferences during the general election
campaign. Paul Taylor has proposed the "five minute
solution;" five minutes of free network air time on
alternating nights for the major party nominees. In various
forums sponsored by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, Tim
Russert of NBC News, Marvin Kalb and others have proposed
increasing the number of presidential debates. There are
other ideas and proposals. The Nine Sundays Plan borrows
generously from all of them.
Basically this is the plan: there are nine Sundays from
Labor Day to Election Day. We propose that network and
cable television news reserve time on each of those nine
Sunday evenings for at least two presidential debates, one
vice presidential debate, five live "conversations" with the
presidential candidates and one concluding presidential
candidate address to the nation.
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Network news enthusiasm for the Nine Sundays Plan is
critical to its success or failure. Sunday evening is
special. It is when most Americans watch television.
Therefore, we believe that it would be to everyone's benefit
if the debates, conversations with the candidates, and
summary addresses were held on Sunday night, at 9pm eastern
time, to reach the largest number of potential voters.
Obviously, if impossible scheduling conflicts arise,
adjustments can be made.
If the major television networks do not agree to broadcast
more than the three presidential and vice-presidential
debates at 9pm eastern time on Sunday, for financial and
competitive reasons (as well as scheduling conflicts), the
five conversations with the candidates could be scheduled
for 7pm eastern time on Sunday. The candidates' summary
addresses to the nation would hopefully be broadcast at 9pm
or 10pm the Sunday before the election.
Holding these events on Sunday evenings would allow the
candidates ample opportunity to campaign during the week,
all across the country, and yet leave them time (Saturday
and all day Sunday) to recoup and prepare for a nationally
televised appearance. The basic idea is to insure some
"prime time" on network television on a weekly basis for
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political discussion. Such an approach is serious, regular
and predictable. The larger idea is to attempt to
institutionalize a more substantive discussion of political
issues in a way that does not penalize the networks
financially, inhibit the candidates's campaign flexibility
or diminish the concerns of voters and reporters. Let us
look at the formats one-by-one:
DEBATES
It is impossible to know how many presidential debates there
will be in the 1992 general election campaign. Recent
history would suggest that there will be two presidential
debates and one vice presidential debate. That was the case
in 1984 and again in 1988.
Exact details will be worked out by the presidential
candidates, the political parties, the networks and
whichever other organizations the candidates choose.
Presidential and vice- presidential debates are the subject
of long and difficult negotiations which will end up
determining the final shape and format of the 1992
Presidential campaign debates.
In 1988, James Baker, on behalf of candidate Bush, and Paul
Brountas, on behalf of candidate Dukakis, negotiated the
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terms--the number, dates and format of the debates. Baker
held the better cards, and his conditions prevailed. There
were to be two presidential debates, and one vice-
presidential debate.
The debates were, without doubt, crucially important moments
in the campaign, but they were still deeply disappointing.
CBS' Walter Cronkite described the '88 debates as "phony,
part of an unconscionable fraud. ITS The Wall Street Journal's
Albert Hunt called them a "sham." CNN's Bernard Shaw said:
"88 was a charade, these were not debates." A New York
Times editorial tried to be charitable, noting the debates
were "deprived of novelty, crippled by poor questions--
wooden and unfocused--but still, better than nothing."
There were also very specific reasons for the
disappointment.
First, they were not "debates," by any definition. While
the candidates shared the same platform and shook hands at
the beginning and end, they did not address each other, they
did not question each other, they barely looked at each
other.
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Second, they answered questions posed by a panel of
journalists, all of whom had been invited and ultimately
"cleared" by the political parties. According to the terms
of the Baker-Brountas agreement, the debate was to be
divided into two equal parts--one for questions about
domestic policy, the other for questions about foreign
policy. At one point, Baker called the control room to
remind the executive producer that it was time to shift from
domestic to foreign affairs--something the producer and the
anchorman were intending to do in any case. The point is,
Baker felt sufficiently paternalistic about the whole
enterprise to believe that he could call in the middle of
the program and suggest a change.
Third, the debate took place before a live audience, divided
equally between Republicans and Democrats, who couldn't
resist laughing at their candidate's humor or applauding his
prepared throwaway lines. ("Senator, you're no Jack
Kennedy.") The atmosphere was more suggestive of a
political circus than of a political debate. Everything was
calculated. The louder the laughter and the applause,
presumably the greater the impact on the vast viewing
audience.
Finally, because it was more of a circus than a debate, the
networks tried to compete with one another in instant
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polling and analysis. A sampling of 400-600 Americans could
produce a winner or a loser within a matter of minutes.
Spin doctors let loose their predictable optimism, and
almost invariably it was used, raw and unchecked. One such
spin doctor told a reporter before the October 13, 1988
debate: "If I don't see you later, just quote me as saying
our guy won by a knockout."
No one believes that in this age of television we can
suddenly return to the Lincoln-Douglas model, but our
research clearly indicates that serious analysts of the
political process want to change the '88 model. Simply put,
they want real debates.
Some observers point to the Canadian model--the two
candidates in a tv studio with a single moderator. It was
spectacularly successful. A similar model was tried during
the 1990 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign, but there
were so many rules and regulations imposed by the
candidates' handlers that a potentially interesting debate
lost much of its spontaneity.
A consensus model seemed to emerge in our many seminars,
conferences and interviews--that the next series of debates
be marked by simplicity and substance. The ingredients are
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easily identifiable: two candidates, one moderator, a tv
studio, no audience, live.
We understand that there are many different opinions about
what constitutes the best format. The Joan Shorenstein
Barone Center believes that we should go back to the future.
A "modified" version of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates
offers the most promising and uncluttered format. They took
place in a television studio, with a moderator and no
audience. A panel of reporters, though, is no longer
necessary. The moderator could easily begin Lue debate and
keep it moving along if need be. The important feature is
not the moderator but the quality of the candidates. The
JSB Center format would have the two candidates simply
square off in front of the cameras, with the moderator
making sure things are proceeding fairly. The simplicity
itself would make for gripping television. This format can
work in the 1992 presidential campaign.
The same format could be used for the vice presidential
debate. We would argue that the vice presidential debate be
held on Sunday night, and be treated as politically
equivalent to a presidential debate. We understand that the
presidential campaigns may negotiate a different status for
the vice presidential debate.
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The issue of sponsorship is problematic. Ideally, within
the framework of the Nine Sundays Plan, the television
networks would "sponsor" the presidential and vice
presidential debates. If the networks end up as sponsors
of, say, two presidential debates and one vice presidential
debate, they should be allowed to sell advertising (or
enlist sponsors) whose commercial messages would be seen at
the very beginning and the very end of the debates to help
defray costs and recover some lost revenues.
The ideal situation, of course, would be to have no
advertising at all, but we believe that, if handled
correctly, commercials should not diminish the value of the
broadcast. Viewers and voters are sophisticated enough to
understand the need for commercial sponsorship. It would be
no longer than 90 seconds at the top of the show and 90
seconds at the end. The revenues from these advertisements
would completely cover all costs and the profits could be
pooled to pay the legal costs incurred for filings with the
FCC and possible legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved
parties.
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CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES
Assuming that there are at least two presidential debates
and one vice presidential debate at 9pm eastern time on
Sunday during the 1992 campaign, that leaves six Sunday
nights open from Labor Day Weekend to Election Day.
Part Two of our Nine Sundays Proposal is that five of these
six Sundays be devoted to two, back-to-back, 30- or 45-
minute "Conversations with the Candidates." These
conversations could be open to commercial sponsorship.
Network coverage of these programs could rotate from ABC to
CBS to NBC. Public television, CNN, other cable news
organizations, and various radio networks would presumably
cover all five Sunday night "Conversations with the
Candidates" as regular programming. Rotating coverage
worked well during the Iran-contra hearings. The first week
CBS News was responsible for covering the hearings. The
second week NBC News had the responsibility. The third week
ABC News covered the hearings. PBS, cable news and the
various radio networks covered every week of the hearings.
This same model can work in the 1992 Presidential campaign.
Because of the Major League Baseball playoffs, the World
Series and other network broadcasting obligations, the best
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window on Sunday nights for rotating network coverage of the
"Conversations with the Candidates" is from 7pm to 8:30pm
eastern time. Playoff and World Series baseball broadcasts
usually begin at 8:30pm. At least two and possibly three
Sundays in October will be given over to these baseball
broadcasts.
What about the structure of the broadcasts? We'd suggest --
in the interest of fairness - that each presidential
candidate be interviewed by a separate three-reporter panel
for 28 minutes (assuming 30 minutes per candidate) or 42
minutes (assuming 45 minutes per candidate). The first
panel would include a network anchorman or anchorwoman and
two reporters well-versed in the evening's subject matter.
The second panel would include a CNN (or PBS, or Monitor or
NPR) anchorman or anchorwoman and two expert reporters.
Now what about the substance of these broadcasts? Each of
the five Sunday night "Conversations" would address
different issues. There are basically three major issues in
American politics: the national security, the national
economy (broadly defined) and the national culture (also
broadly defined). Issues of national security include
diplomacy, foreign policy, military preparedness and various
"threats" to the national interest abroad and at home.
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Issues of the national economy include national and
international economic forces which, in concert, create the
American economic way of life. Issues of national culture
touch on a central political question: What kind of country
do we want? These "cultural issues" include questions about
race, crime, the environment, education, drugs, the Supreme
Court's role in American society, school prayer, the role of
religion, abortion and capital punishment. These "cultural
issues" (and others like them) are often the most important
in American presidential politics.
One Sunday would therefore be given over to national
security issues, another Sunday to national and
international economic issues, another Sunday to issues of
our national culture. Two Sundays would be given over to
whatever questions (within the three general issue groups)
seemed appropriate at that stage of the campaign.
So, hypothetically, let's say the first Sunday night
"Conversation with the Candidates" concerned issues of
national security. Alphabetically, ABC News might be first
up in the network rotation. A flip of a coin would
determine candidate order. Let us assume that President
Bush is the GOP nominee. He wins the coin toss, he goes
first. Mr. Bush is then interviewed at his office (or
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wherever he happens to be) by Peter Jennings and two expert
national security correspondents. That broadcast goes out
over the ABC Television network and (one hopes) PBS and
various radio and cable channels from 7pm eastern time to,
say, 7:30pm eastern time. Immediately afterward, the
=
Democratic nominee would be interviewed by Bernard Shaw
(e.g.) and two other expert national security
correspondents. That conversation would also go out over
the ABC Network, PBS, radio networks and various cable
channels, ending at 8pm eastern time. CBS and NBC News
could carry these conversations or run their normal
entertainment programming.
The following week, the Democratic nominee would go first,
the Republican nominee second. CBS News might be up next in
the rotation. Dan Rather would anchor the first panel. Judy
Woodruff would anchor the other. The reporters would be
selected by CBS according to their knowledge of the subject
matter.
The overall schedule might look something like this
(assuming the Republicans won the coin toss):
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DAY
TIME
NETWORK
ISSUE
NOMINEE ORDER
Sunday 1
7pm
ABC/CNN
Nat. Security
GOP First
Sunday 2
7pm
CBS/CNN
Economy
DEM. First
Sunday 3
9pm
ALL
Presidential Debate
Sunday 4 9pm
ALL
Vice Presidential Debate
Sunday 5
7pm
NBC/CNN
Nat. Culture
GOP First
Sunday 6
7pm
ABC/CNN
More Security
DEM. First
Sunday 7
9pm
ALL
Presidential Debate
Sunday 8
7pm
NBC/CNN
More Nat. Culture GOP First
Sunday 9 9pm
ALL
Summary Addresses
Candidate participation would be voluntary. One candidate
(usually the one behind in the polls) will always want to
participate. Should the other candidate choose not to
participate, the time allotted would simply revert back to
regular entertainment or news programming.
We also recommend that voters provide, through the mail, a
selection of the questions for the candidates. The anchor
and the two "expert" reporters could choose the best
questions submitted and read them aloud to the candidates.
After the candidates responded, the reporters could follow
up with questions of their own, should that seem appropriate
at the time. This would give the average voter a sense of
participating in the process.
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Back-to-back "Conversations with the Candidates" on five
Sunday evenings during the general election would
significantly improve the political dialogue of the 1992
presidential campaign. The networks would not lose money,
since these conversations could be sponsored. They may even
be able to turn a small profit. Since each network, except
CBS, which would be responsible for one, would only be
responsible for two Sunday nights, lost revenues would be
minimized. And the five Sunday night "Conversations with
the Candidates," organized around the three major issues of
American politics, would help focus the print, radio and
television news coverage leading up to and following the
Sunday night broadcasts, and encourage deeper, more
substantive reporting.
In this way, one of the major benefits of the Nine Sundays
Proposal, in our view, is that editors and producers would
be able to plan some of their coverage according to the
schedule of these issue-oriented programs. For instance,
the executive producer of an evening news broadcast, knowing
that next Sunday's "candidate conversation" was going to
focus on national security issues, could order up two pieces
on how the candidates stand on those issues. Editors at the
major newspapers and newsmagazines could also order up
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-33-
stories of considerable complexity well in advance of the
actual event, thus providing the reader with an overview and
some context for the issues under discussion. Monday and
Tuesday newspaper, radio and television coverage could also
go into more detail and analysis.
The five "Conversations" at 7pm eastern time on Sunday are
likely to be very attractive to NBC Television and ABC
Television, as well as the cable and public broadcasting
networks. That time period (7-8pm eastern time) is
currently dominated by CBS News' "60 Minutes" broadcast.
Both ABC and NBC spend over $1 million for programming in
the 7pm-8pm time slot on Sunday nights. Neither of their
shows does very well in the Nielsen ratings, resulting in
low advertising revenue. The Nine Sundays broadcasts, on
the other hand, cost no more than $100,000 to produce (per
show) and the advertising revenue generated by the
broadcasts should be at least $200-250,000 per network per
night.
---
"60 Minutes" is the life blood of CBS News, generating
$70-75 million in annual profits. CBS is unlikely to tamper
with the Sunday schedule for just that reason. However, it
is not at all clear that the presidential candidate
conversations pose any serious "ratings" threat to "60
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Minutes" at 7pm, particularly during the first six weeks of
the presidential campaign. Voter (and therefore viewer)
interest in presidential politics accelerates dramatically
only toward the end of the campaign. It is also true that
more people watch television as time passes through the
evening. On the one, or possibly two, occasions when CBS
News would be responsible for carrying the presidential
candidate conversations, iL is likely that a delayed "60
Minutes" would garner a market share at least equal to if
not greater than the one it normally gets from 7pm-8pm on
Sunday nights. This might allow "60 Minutes" producers to
charge a higher rate for advertising thirty-and-sixty-second
commercials. It might also have the unintended consequence
of strengthening CBS's Sunday night schedule, since "60
Minutes" drawing power as a "lead-in" to other shows has
helped the network dominate Sunday night television. In
the past, the three networks have been more competitive in
the Nielsen ratings after 9pm eastern time, depending on the
drawing power of their programming.
The point here is that given the enormous financial
pressures under which network news divisions labor, it is
important that any plan seeking to increase substantive
political discussion on television be sensitive to network
costs. The viability of the Nine Sundays Plan is that it
makes financial as well as journalistic and political sense.
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020
-35-
CANDIDATE ADDRESS TO THE NATION
The final piece of the Nine Sundays Plan is that the
candidates be given fifteen to thirty minutes of network
time on the Sunday night before the election to present
their case to the nation's voters. A coin toss would
determine candidate order. All the major networks would be
allowed to sell advertisements that would immediately
precede and follow the two major party candidate
presentations. The presidential candidates would be
required to appear on camera at all times during the
broadcast. This would not be a campaign commercial with
tape inserts. We would hope that the candidates would
conduct these summary addresses in a "live" format, either
in studio or from a "remote" location.
We are aware the the Nine Sundays Proposal raises a number
of questions. Chief among them: Is it legal or does it
violate anti-trust regulations? Attached is a professional
judgment written by Frederick Schauer, who is the Frank
Stanton Professor on the First Amendment at the Kennedy
School's Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,
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-36-
Politics and Public Policy, which states, convincingly in
our view, that the Nine Sundays Plan is "doable" within the
existing interpretations of the relevant statutes and
regulations.
Another question: what about third party candidates? Third
party candidates would be excluded from participation in all
of the proposed formats unless, like George Wallace in 1968,
their candidacies could reasonably be considered crucial to
the outcome of the race. How does one measure whether a
third party candidate is viable or not? We would suggest
that a third party candidate who is able consistently to
garner a double-digit poll rating (10% or better) in
nationally-recognized independent polls (Gallup, Roper, CBS
News/New York Times, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, ABC
News/Washington Post) qualifies for inclusion in the overall
plan. Those third party candidates (like Gene McCarthy in
1976. and John Anderson in 1980) whose poll numbers wallowed
in the single digits and who were in fact inconsequential to
the final outcome of the race would be excluded from
participation in the Nine Sundays Plan. By getting a legal
waiver from the FCC prior to the general election campaign,
the networks could avoid frivolous legal challenges from
allegedly aggrieved third party candidates.
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022
-37-
Still another question: what about football and what
happens if a game runs over? First, this is an issue that
is relevant only to CBS and NBC. ABC carries football on
Monday nights. Because of rules changes in the NFL, the
vast majority of football games now "run to time" or take
less than three hours to play. NFL Sunday games begin at
either 1pm eastern or 4pm eastern. Almost all of them will
be over and done with by 7pm eastern time. Inevitably, there
may be one 4pm NFL game that will go into overtime and run
past the 7pm starting time that the Nine Sundays Plan calls
for on five Sunday nights. Since at this writing we do not
know what the 1992 NFL schedule will be, the key will be to
fashion the Nine Sundays schedule so as to minimize the
possibility of NBC or CBS experiencing a Sports
Division/News Division conflict. This too should be
"doable." In the event that all the best plans nevertheless
result in a conflict, the Sports Division would win, and
viewers would have to turn to PBS, cable or radio networks
for the Nine Sundays broadcast.
A final question: who organizes all of this? The answer is
the over-the-air and cable television networks would
organize the schedule in consultation with the political
parties, the presidential campaigns and whichever other
groups they choose to include in the process. Ideally, an
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5.
023
-38-
executive committee would be formed to handle all details,
execute operations and arbitrate whatever disputes might
arise.
This then is the Nine Sundays Proposal. Assuming two
presidential debates and a vice presidential debate, we
would call for the addition of five Sunday "Conversations
with the Candidates" and one Sunday night concluding
candidate address to the nation.
The Nine Sundays Plan rewards serious discussion of the
issues. It does not hurt the network bottom line. It
encourages the national political press corps to organize
its coverage around a pre-arranged set of important campaign
issues. Most important, it gives the voters regular access
on television to the presidential candidates over the length
of the general election campaign.
The Nine Sundays Plan is designed to create a fixed and
reasonable amount of television time during the general
election campaign when candidates can speak to issues of
national concern, while insuring some political flexibility.
Candidate participation is voluntary. Should the plan be
adopted, the 1992 presidential campaign would be altogether
different from its immediate predecessors. That alone
recommends serious discussion of the plan's merits.
09/06/91 15:46
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002
,
Determined NOT to be
National Security Classified Marking
By Pun (NLGB) on 03/25/25
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
To:
Andy Card and Ron Kaufman
From:
John Ellis
Date:
Friday, 6 September 1991
Re:
Nine Sundays and Bush Re-Elect
I think the Nine Sundays proposal deserves serious consideration by
the White House political operation. It was written with President
Bush's re-election campaign very much in mind. Let me try to
explain why I think the proposal works in your favor.
The situation as we approach 1992 is somewhat similar to the
circumstances under which the Nixon and Reagan re-election
campaigns were conceptualized. There are five basic strategic
political goals for the Bush re-elect campaign operation. They
are:
#1) Establish (as soon as possible) an awesome financial position.
By engaging in a massive fund-raising effort after Labor Day
(1991), the Bush 1992 campaign can easily raise the legal limit
prior to 1 January 1992. Having done that, Bush fund-raisers can
be turned loose on the task of raising "party" and "soft" money for
the re-election effort. A massive Bush 1992 bank balance will
intimidate political opponents, particularly those who are
allegedly "thinking about" running, but who have not made a "final"
decision.
#2) Unite the Republican Presidential coalition of conservatives
and moderates. This is particularly important in key states such
as California (trouble), Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, Washington and New Jersey. The southern and most
of the southwestern states are all very strong. As in 1988, the
political progression of Bush 1992 will be from right to center
over the course of the campaign. Once the Democratic presidential
nominee is (in fact) chosen, right-wing concerns become secondary
to the overall thrust of the campaign. The choice between President
Bush and Democratic liberal essentially freezes the right wing out
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2
of the overall picture.
#3) Enhance division among the Democrats. The longer the
Democratic primary process continues, the less effective their fall
campaign. This worked wonders in 1972 (Watergate not included) and
1984. The Bush White House will want to contribute in whatever
legal and politically savvy way it can to perpetuating the
Democratic 1992 primary season. It will also want to use that
period to undermine Democratic Party confidence, by establishing
organizations like Democrats for Bush (similar to John Connally's
Democrats for Nixon, with a heavy southern and midwestern flavor).
Democrats for Bush can play an important role in the 1992 campaign.
#4) Maintain President Bush's position as President of the United
States of America throughout the campaign, from September 1991
through mid-October 1992. The presidency is your principle
political asset and should be protected by all concerned at all
costs. Mr. Bush should constantly be in the position of speaking
for the national interest, not his own or his party's interest.
#5) Control the Dialogue. Advertising campaigns should be
designed to speak to issues of presidential strength and
presidential advantage. In the May-June period of 1992,
advertising should be bought in spot markets to shore up political
"collateral damage" from the Democratic presidential primaries and
to emphasize experience as the key determinant in voter choice.
The Republican National Convention should unfurl the campaign
themes. September should emphasize President Bush's world
leadership. Lat-September through mid-October should focus on
President Bush's belief in America. The campaign should close with
America's role in the new world (economically, militarily and
politically), under the leadership of President Bush.
Points four and five bear directly on the Nine Sundays proposal.
Basically, we are talking about President Bush speaking from the
mountain-top, above the fray, in a clear and commanding voice.
This voice is supported by a wall of advertising which re-
emphasizes everything he says publicly. The one part of the mix
that spin. is beyond your control is the news media/Democratic Party
The Nine Sundays proposal offers you the opportunity to minimize
the number of chances the Democratic presidential nominee has to
score a "direct" hit to exactly two one-and-a-half hour debates.
Basically, the Democrats will want that number to be 4 or 6 or 8
and will create much noise about it, as will the news media, all
along the campaign trail. This proposal gives you an easy out and
from the Liberal Boutique (no less).
It asks, however that you participate in as many as five separate
news conferences on Sunday nights from 7-7:45p or 7-7:30p
(depending on how the network negotiations play out). The news
conferences are on distinct issue groups (national security, the
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3
national economy and the national culture). They will be scheduled
well in advance, thus allowing plenty of time for advertising to
coincide with it. And they are President Bush's strongest
communications tool. He has used the press conference format over
the last three years with stunning command and self-control.
The best news about Nine Sundays for President Bush is that it
maintains his position as President (Point #4 listed above) and
allows him, through live television, to control the dialogue (point
#5 listed above) without ever leaving the White House.
Since network television is in hideous financial trouble and is
looking for a way not to cover the 1992 presidential campaign, the
Nine Sundays plan, if adopted, may become the principle source for
network news stories not only on Sunday but on Monday and Tuesday
as well. This puts President Bush in the commanding position of
performing in his best format, discussing a wide range of issues
which he thoroughly understands, in prime time television without
any "message" interference from his opposition, while he sits in a
chair inside the White House.
It further allows him the opportunity to really speak to issues of
national concern as President of the United States without having
to engage his opposition at all during the mini-press conferences
or, as they are called in the report, the "conversations with the
candidates."
There are risks, of course. It lets the press at him five times on
national television. But part of the success of the Bush White
House's communications policy is that it communicates so much
through the press conference format. This significantly reduces
the tensions between the two adversaries and creates an atmosphere
of context and understanding. Continuing the "press conference"
mode through the general election campaign, will, I believe, work
to your long term (election day) advantage.
There are other risks. It gives the Democrats some prime time
exposure. (They're not likely to benefit from it and will be much
more mistake-prone than GB; particularly Cuomo, should he ever get
in). The chief could make a mistake. (Causing a big flap, but he
hasn't made a serious mistake in a press conference in 3 years.
The Dems will be the ones making mistakes.) The dialogue is
outside of your control and in the hands of the questioners. (This
is true to a minor degree, but GB knows all those tricks and will
be able to get his messages out.)
In short, the plan is an easy fit for you guys and I'd urge you not
to dismiss it out of hand. It was written, as I say, with POTUS's
interests very much in mind.
Cheers and have a nice weekend.
09/06/91 15:46 617 495 1364
INST OF POLITICS
001
INSTITUTE OF
as ES
POLITICS
OHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT. HARVARD UNIVERSITY
FAX
617 495-1364
9/6/91
340 pm
DATE:
TO: ANDY CARD
FAX #: 202 456 2397
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGE(S)
FROM: John ELLIS
Message:
nine Sundays
Institute of Politics
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1360
OF
RECEIVED
THE TREASURY THE
Systember 10, 1991
SEP 12 1991
andy -
1789
AC has SEEN
Thanks for taking the time to meet with me
this afternoon.
l realize that with the Thomas Leaving your
schedule is quite Lectic and your fitting me in was
deeply appreciated.
Per your instructions - I'll get bach to you in
2 week.
Dary Englated
sent
copies to to harmy Action: anderson F.Y.I
RECEIVED
file
SEAL OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
JUL 30 1991
Andy
7/30/91 State OF Illinois
AUG. 26TH 1818
AC-HAS SEEN
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
Chicago 60601
Jim EDGAR
Governor
July 26, 1991
Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Card:
Illinois recently completed protracted negotiations on a
$27 billion spending plan for the State's 1992 fiscal year
which began July 1. The budget negotiations stretched 19 days
into the start of our fiscal year and closed a $1.8 billion
deficit to balance the State's budget.
The new health care budget features a Medicaid provider
assessment plan to finance expanded Medicaid services and
redistribute funds to support institutions which serve a
disproportionate share of Medicaid beneficiaries. The
assessment plan will also support increased payment rates to
hospitals, nursing homes and mental health providers in an
effort to avert further legal proceedings against the State
under the so-called "Boren Amendment" mandating increased
Medicaid payment rates.
The plan -- as unanimously approved by the General
Assembly -- is the result of a broad and unusual coalition of
the Administration, legislators, providers and beneficiary
advocates. Members of the Illinois Congressional Delegation
have also expressed their support for the State's assessment
plan.
I am concerned that forthcoming regulations from the
Department of Health and Human Services may prematurely end
Illinois' ability to finance its Medicaid program in the
Andrew H. Card, Jr.
July 26, 1991
Page 2
manner best determined by the State. Illinois has had
escalating growth in its Medicaid program over the past two
years: a 19 percent increase in the Medicaid population and a
30 percent increase in program costs (27 percent of which are
the result of federal mandates).
It is absolutely essential to my State that the assessment
option be preserved for federal Medicaid matching funds. The
alternative will require deep cuts in participating Medicaid
provider rates and the elimination of optional services --
program reductions I would rather not force on needy
Illinoisans.
I appreciate your sensitivity to my situation in
Springfield and my concern that the Bush Administration may
change its Medicaid rules in the middle of the game. I hope I
can count on your support for Illinois' Medicaid assessment
plan.
GOVERNOR Jim Sincerely, Edgar Edga
JE:ak
CC: David M. Carney
Director, Office of Political Affairs
170 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500
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Rev. 10/88
THE WHITE HOUSE
8.1.91
Dear Robut -
I'm sorry that I couldn't
meet with you when you were
here earlier today with Sandy.
you've got a rain check.
Sincerely, Andy Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Robert d. Eisenberg
Chairman
Committee for Better america
P.O. Box 339
Topsfield, MA 01983
COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA
Topsfield, MA 01983
P.O. Box 339
Campaign '92
Campaign 92
A BETTER AMERICA
COMMITTEE FOR
R.E.L.Y
Yes, I share the philosophy of sup-
porting a strong national defense, a
more localized government and the
enhancement of private enterprise.
I have enclosed my check as an
investment in the work of the
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER
AMERICA for:
COMMITTEE FOR
$5000
$2500
$250
Paid for by the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
A BETTER AMERICA
$1000
COMMITTEE FOR
$500
Campaign' 92
A BETTER AMERICA
$100
$50
Other
Campaign's 92
Please make your check payable to
the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER
ROBERT J. EISENBERG
AMERICA. Mail to: P.O. Box 339,
Chairman
Topsfield, MA 01983. Corporate
checks are prohibited by law.
617-451-3363
Name
Address
P.O.Box 339, Topsfield MA 01983
City/State/Zip
Telephone
home
work
Occupation*
Employer*
*Requested by the Federal Election Commission
Contributions to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER
AMERICA are not tax deductible.
Protecting the Rights of Every
that arena. The Committee For a Better
American Citizen
America believes that government poli-
You're invited to join
The Committee For a Better America
cies should support and enhance
with us to preserve the
embraces the political philosophy form-
business interests, not compete with
ing the cornerstone upon which this
them. Government, especially at the
rights of all American
nation was crafted. A philosophy which
national level, should be more respon-
holds that government should protect
sive to, and demand fewer responses
citizens. Your generous
the right of every citizen to lead a pro-
from, America's entrepreneurs.
contribution will help
ductive and rewarding life uncluttered
by political interference. By seeking out
Promoting a Less Intrusive and
support:
and supporting candidates for office
More Localized Government
who support less government intrusion
The Committee For a Better America is
into private lives, the Committee for a
A STRONG
dedicated also to a reversal of a decades-
Better America stands ready to demon-
long migration of power away from local
NATIONAL
strate its commitment to a philosophy of
and state governments, to the federal
DEFENSE
private dignity and public restraint.
government. Local government is, by
nature of its proximity, most responsive
Believing in a Strong National
to the needs and desires of each member
PUBLIC POLICIES
Defense to Preserve World Peace
of the community. Citizens no longer
THAT ENHANCE
Specifically, the Committee For a Better
should have to wait for distant pro-
PRIVATE
America believes a strong and unwaver-
nouncements concerning problems on
ing national defense is essential to the
the next street. The uniqueness of each
BUSINESS
preservation of real world peace. Only in
citizen, the potential of each community
peace can the true potential of America
is best realized by local partnerships and
SELF-DETERMINATION
local initiative.
be realized. Peace is essential for busi-
THROUGH STRONGER
ness planning, for scientific inquiry, and
for artistic expression. America's cultural
Bringing Together Citizens
LOCALIZED
richness and diversity can only find
and Candidates to Meet
GOVERNMENT
expression in peace. The Committee
America's Needs
For a Better America is dedicated to
working with candidates who share that
The Committee For a Better America
Please fill out the Reply Card on the
philosophy.
seeks to bring together those candidates
reverse side and make your check
and those citizens who believe that a
payable to the COMMITTEE FOR
strong national defense, responsive
Supporting a Government that
A BETTER AMERICA.
government, and business innovation
Enhances Private Business
can best meet America's needs on the
We thank you for your support.
Likewise, the government that safe-
eve of the twenty-first century.
guards a peaceful arena for business
must resist the temptation to intrude on
Contributions to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER
AMERICA are not tax deductible.
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
CAMPAIGN '92
Aug- 19th
HONORARY CHAIRMAN
Sept 5th
Raymond Shamie
July 9, 1991
CHAIRMAN
oct 15th,16th?
Robert J. Eisenberg
TREASURER
638-0900 Hotel
Brenda Attia
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Randall L. Pinch
Dear Friends,
OPERATIONS DIRECTOR
Victoria G. Haggstrom
Less than a year ago Massachusetts was a ship becalmed, if not aground.
State debt was growing daily and bonds to pay that debt were on the verge
of worthlessness. State spending was growing unchecked and the Democrats
on Beacon Hill showed no desire to change their tax and spend ways. Then
a fresh political wind began to nudge the ship.
Bill Weld was elected governor, Paul Cellucci, Lt Governor and Joe Malone
Treasurer. Stunning GOP gains in the Senate completed the greatest
Republican victory in a generation.
But now the real work begins. The Massachusetts Congressional delegation
is a national embarrassment. THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA,
with your help and generous support, will commit itself to the scrutiny and
unmasking of voting records and positions of our so-called leaders in
Washington. Democratic incumbents are traditionally so secure in their
offices that only the most critical of examinations will allow voters to see
through the haze of Democratic rhetoric.
THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA is pledged to this critical
analysis and pledged too, to enabling new and qualified candidates to
challenge the old order. Only, when balance is introduced to our
Congressional delegation can we begin to congratulate ourselves. Until then
we face a daunting task. Your support is critical to the attainment of that
beginning.
Thanks and regards,
Ray shamee
Ray Shamie
Honorary Chairman
Bob Committee Eisenberg Chairman
PO Box 339, Topsfield Mass., 01983
617-270-3724
PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
Newt Gingrich
June 28, 1991
Mr. Raymond Shamie
Honorary Chairman,
Committee For A Better America
P.O. Box 339
Topsfield, Massachusetts 01983
Dear Ray,
I would like to take this opportunity to wish you all the best as the
Committee For A Better America kickoffs campaign '92. The political
philosophy and ideals of this committee certainly have my support and
encouragement as they begin this worthwhile endeavor.
As our country rapidly approaches the twenty-first century, it is
important that we take the "back to basics" government message to the
American people. I can think of no better vehicle to effectively deliver
this message that the Committee For A Better America.
Please accept my best wishes, Ray. I know that with your leadership, we
will be hearing a lot about the new "Massachusetts Miracle" that your
committee will deliver.
Your Newt friend,
Newt Gingrich
Republican Whip
P.O. Box 130
Riverdale, Georgia 30274
(404) 968-1417
Paid For By Friends of Newt Gingrich
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
CAMPAIGN '92
HONORARY CHAIRMAN
Raymond Shamie
CHAIRMAN
Robert J. Eisenberg
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
TREASURER
Brenda Attla
The Committee For a Better America embraces the
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Randall L. Pinch
OPERATIONS DIRECTOR
political philosophy upon which this nation was crafted:
Victoria G. Haggstrom
That government should protect the right of every citizen to
lead a productive and rewarding life uncluttered by
political interference. By seeking out and supporting
candidates for office who support less government intrusion
into private lives, the Committee for a Better America
stands ready to demonstrate its commitment to a philosophy
of private dignity and public restraint.
Specifically, the Committee For a Better America
believes a strong and unwavering national defense is
essential to the preservation of real world peace. Only in
peace can the true potential of America be realized. Peace
is essential for business planning, for scientific inquiry,
and for artistic expression. America's cultural richness
and diversity can only find expression in peace. The
Committee For a Better America is dedicated to working with
candidates who share that philosophy.
Likewise, the government that safeguards a peaceful
arena for business must resist the temptation to intrude on
that arena. The Committee For a Better America believes
that government policies should support and enhance business
PO Box 339. Topsfield Mass., 01983
617-270-3724
PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
interests, not compete with them. Government, especially at
the national level, should be more responsive to, and demand
fewer responses from, America's entrepreneurs.
The Committee For a Better America is dedicated also to
a reversal of a decades-long migration of power away from
local and state governments, to the federal government.
Local government is, by nature of its proximity, most
responsive to the needs and desires of each member of the
community. Citizens no longer should have to wait for
distant pronouncements concerning problems on the next
street. The uniqueness of each citizen, the potential of
each community, is best realized by local partnerships and
local initiative.
The Committee For a Better America seeks to bring
together those candidates and those citizens who believe
that a strong national defense, responsive government, and
business innovation can best meet America's needs on the eve
of the twenty-first century.
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(as of 7/30/91)
MIKE ARMINI
LEON LOMBARDI
MASS REP. CHMN
RAFIK ATTIA
CALEB LORING
JOHN BARRANCO
REP JACKIE LEWIS
LARRY BEARFIELD
STEPHEN J. MOLLICA
HON. EDNA BOGOSIAN
FREDERICK MUZI
DALE BOCH
AVI NELSON
REP. MARIANNE BRENTON
BRUCE OLSEN
THOMAS BRUCE
TIMOTHY O'SHEA
JAY COGLIANO
ALBERT POLGAR
JOHN COGLIANO JR.
ROGER PROVOST
ANGELO COLLINS
ROBERT RENDINE
REP. GARY COON
R.I. REP. CHMN
THOMAS CORKERY
NELSON SHALLER
THOMAS DI BENEDETTO
MIKE SLEMMER
FREDERICK DUMAINE
DANIEL STAFFIERI, JR.
ROBIN EMERSON
LINDA TEAGAN
BARTON HYTE
CHRIS THURLBY
JEAN INMAN
DAVID TURECK
PETER KOSTOPOULAS
JOHN R. WALKEY
TERRY KOHLER
CHARLES WEBER JR.
NAT. PROJ 170 CHMN
HERMAN WHEELER
LEW LEATHERSICH
CAROL YENNACO
BETH LINDSTROM
PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
SUPPORT PLEDGE SHEET
(please circle yes for your choices)
YES - I would like to attend the August 19th Red Sox fundraiser game.
(Owners Box & Special Guest TBA). I have enclosed my contribution
for $500. (limit 20 people)
YES - I will support the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA'S first
major fundraising event on September 5, 1991 at the Colonial
Hilton Hotel with Guest of Honor, Lt. Governor Paul Cellucci.
I will purchase a table for ten for $150
I will sell 10 tickets at $15 each.
I will attend the roundtable discussion at $500.
—
I will attend photo-op and reception for $100
YES - I will sponsor or host a fundraising event or reception. I will
provide the names of other people who might host a reception.
YES - I will do one of the following to support the COMMITTEE FOR A
BETTER AMERICA'S fundraising program.
I will distribute fundraising packages.
Please provide me 5 , 10 , 15 , other packages.
I will call 5 people each month for support.
I will commit to raise: $
.
YES I wish to serve on the Advisory Committee and you may use my
name for prospect fundraising efforts in contacting the names I've
listed on the reverse side.
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE
ZIP
PHONE
(home)
(business)
(fax)
EMPLOYER*
OCCUPATION*
PLEASE SIGN
. Federal law requires this information be requested
Contributions are not tax-deductable.
PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
PO BOX 339, TOPSFIELD, MA 01983
You may use my name to contact the following people for the purpose of
fundraising or scheduling a fundraising event:
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE PHONE
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE PHONE
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE PHONE
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE PHONE
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY
STATE PHONE
COMMITTEE FOR
PRESS
A BETTER AMERICA
RELEASE
Contact:
For Immediate Release
HONORARY CHAIRMAN
Raymond Shamie
CHAIRMAN
Robert J. Eisenberg
TREASURER
Brenda Attia
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Randall L. Pinch
OPERATIONS DIRECTOR
Victoria G. Haggstrom
COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
CAMPAIGN 92'
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
The COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA will be holding its
CAMPAIGN 92' kickoff breakfast at 8:30 A.M. on July 9th at
the Bostonian Hotel. Committee advisory board members,
administration officials and interested voters are expected
to hear Honorary Chairman Ray Shamie and Chairman Robert
Eisenberg discuss priorities for next year's congressional
elections.
At least six New England House congressional seats,
including three or four in Massachusetts, are targeted by
CAMPAIGN 92' for increased incumbent scrutiny and issue
analysis.
The COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA is fashioned after
national PACs such as GOPAC, and dedicated to the two-fold
purpose of incumbent scrutiny and the enabling of qualified
new candidates. Working in support of and with the state
GOP committee, CAMPAIGN 92' will concentrate its efforts on
issues of national defense, business/government relations,
and the localization of government.
For more information consult the enclosed Statement of
Purpose, or call Executive Director, Randy Pinch.
Telephone:
(617)-270-3724
PO Box 339, Topsfield Mass. 01983
617-270-3724
PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA
Campaign 92
Honorary Chairman
RAYMOND SHAMIE
Chairman
ROBERT J. EISENBERG
Treasurer
BRENDA ATTIA
Executive Director
RANDALL L. PINCH
Director of Operations
VICTORIA G. HAGGSTROM
P.O.Box 339, Topsfield, MA 01983
617-270-3724
Paid for by the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE
april 23,1991
Dear Suran-
Thank you for keeping me
up to date with you new address
and phone numbers. I hope all
is well at Honeywell. (Not many
day ago I met with Michael Bonsignou.)
keep in touch. Sincerely,
Andy Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Tuttonorable Susan Engeleiter
Honeywell Inc.
P.O. Box 524
Minneapolis, MN 55440
Honeywell
Susan S. Engeleiter
Honeywell Inc.
Vice President and
Honeywell Plaza
P.O. Box 524
Staff Executive
Minneapolis, MN 55440-0524
AC HAS SEEN
612 870-6688
April 3, 1991
Mr. Andy Card
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Andy:
I thought you would like to know my new address at Honeywell:
Susan Engeleiter
Honeywell Inc.
P.O. Box 524
Minneapolis, MN 55440
a- P made rolodex Cards,
OR
Susan Engeleiter
for you.
Honeywell Inc.
In
Honeywell Plaza
Minneapolis, MN 55408
612/870-6688
612/870-2011 - Secretary, Jean McAtee
Mail Station MN12-5180
FAX: 612/870-6696
Sincerely,
Ausan/jin
SSE/jm
THE WHITE HOUSE
4-18-91
Richard-
Thank you for your not on
behalf of Randy Erber. I, too,
find him impressive.
as you may now know, Steve Hart,
another able long-time Bush supporter,
has been selected for the slot Randy sought.
keep in touch.
Andy Card
THE white HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Honorable Richard D. English
Post Office Box 17431
Arlington, Virginia 22216
Richard D. English
P.O. Box 17431
Arlington, VA 22216
April 2, 1991
Dear Andy,
AC HAS SEEN
I understand that Randy
Erben is being considered
for a position in the
white House Legislative office.
I worked with him for
ten months in the Texas
Secretary of States office,
From first hand experience,
I can tell you that
Randy [Ealis a hard-working
lawyer with excellent
managerial and executive
skills. Also, he was
for the President in 1980
and in 1988, I think
very highly of him
and have great confidence
in his abilities, especially
in the area of
legislative relations. I
recommend him very, very
highly,
I'm off to conferences
in Berlin and Brussels
and doing fine,
Hope this finds this you
well Pardon
hasty scrawl.
warmest regards
Publiced tuglish