Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
702533
label
Tritium (1990)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
702533
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Tritium (1990)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
29173-006
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Chief of Staff to the President (George H. W. Bush Administration)
John Sununu Issues Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
702533
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
9da5b7cd8144f79f
ocrText
Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
foia Number:
1998-0004-F[1]
S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:
Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:
Issues Files
OA/ID Number:
29173
Folder ID Number:
29173-006
Folder Title:
Tritium (1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
15
25
4
4
George Bush Presidential Library
Transfer Sheet
COLLECTION:
ACCESSION NUMBER:
Bush Presidential Records
93-01
FOIA/SYSTEMATIC
Office of Chief of Staff
PROCESSING CASE
John Sununu
NUMBER (if app.):
Transferred During Accessioning
Transferred During Processing
The following material was transferred to:
Audiovisual Collection
Book Collection
Museum Collection
Other
Other (Specify):
DESCRIPTION:
Two copies of The Tritium Factor: Tritium's Impact on Nuclear Arms Reductions published by the Nuclear
Control Institute and the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, transferred from [OA/ID CF00153] to the
book collection.
When transferring
Donor:
material to the
museum
Donor Org.:
collection,
complete the
Address:
following.
Telephone:
Book Location:
Map Case Location:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Series:
Box Number:
Office of Chief of Staff: John Sununu
Folder Title:
OA/ID Number:
1990 Tritium [OA/ID CF00153]
Transferred by:
SMM
Date of Transfer:
3/27/1998
Received by:
Doug Campbell
Date Received:
10/16/2017
Go to Database
Go to Accession
Go to Withdrawal Sheet
Print Record
Navigator
Register
George Bush Presidential Library
Transfer Sheet
COLLECTION:
ACCESSION NUMBER:
Bush Presidential Records
93-01
FOIA/SYSTEMATIC
Office of Chief of Staff
PROCESSING CASE
John Sununu
Transferred During Accessioning
NUMBER (if app.):
Transferred During Processing
The following material was transferred to:
Audiovisual Collection
Book Collection
Museum Collection
Other
Other (Specify):
DESCRIPTION:
Two copies of The Tritium Factor: Tritium's Impact on Nuclear Arms Reductions published by the Nuclear
Control Institute and the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, transferred from [OA/ID CF00153] to the
book collection.
When transferring
Donor:
material to the
museum
Donor Org.:
collection,
complete the
Address:
following.
Telephone:
Book Location:
Map Case Location:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Series:
Box Number:
Office of Chief of Staff: John Sununu
Folder Title:
OA/ID Number:
1990 Tritium [OA/ID CF00153]
Transferred by:
SMM
Date of Transfer:
3/27/1998
Received by:
Doug Campbell
Date Received:
10/16/2017
Go to Database
Go to Accession
Go to Withdrawal Sheet
Print Record
Navigator
Register
AUG-29-89 TUE 16:26 NuclearControlInstitute o P.02
file
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
August 29, 1989
Governor John Sununu
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Governor Sununu:
I wanted to be sure you saw the attached op-ed article in
The New York Times that I wrote with Milton Hoenig on possible
Soviet interest in a mutual halt in production of nuclear weapons
materials, including tritium. I will be in contact with you
shortly as you suggested at our meeting on August 4.
Thank you again for your interest in this matter.
Sincerely,
P.Ls
Paul Leventhal
Enclosure
00: Roger Porter
Ed Rogers
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford. David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AUG-29-89
TUE
16:26
NuclearControlInstitute
P.03
The New York Times
MONDAY, AUGUST 28, 1989
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
Mutually Assured
Arms Reductions
By Paul L. Leventhal
In June, a Soviet Embassy official,
plenishment could come from war-
reading his Government's response
and Milton M. Hoenig
heads retired "under the Strategic
to a letter we sent to Mr. Gorbachev,
Arms Reductions Talks, from weap-
told us that the Soviet Union could
ons in storage or slated for retire-
WASHINGTON
raise the possibility of halting tritium
ment and from more efficient tritium
he Soviet Union may be
production If talks were to begin on
management in deployed weapons.
T
signaling to the U.S. a
halting uranium and plutonium pro-
Negotiations beyond Start could re-
willingness to engage
duction. Responding to our question,
duce both sides total arsenals by at
in a complete, mutual
the official said that Mr. Gorbachev
least 50 percent in 12 years If reduc-
halt in production of
could raise the tritium question at a
tions are paced by tritium decay.
the essential elements
summit meeting, depending on "cir-
Because each side has an abun-
of modern nuclear weapons: plutoni-
cumstances at the time."
dance of long-lived plutonium and
um, enriched uranium and tritium.
Mr. Gorbachev clearly has severe
uranium, a cutoff in these materials
This unexpected development coin-
nuclear headaches of his own. Aside
alone leads to no reductions in arms.
cides with the breakdown and shut-
from facing a post-Chernobyl popular
But including tritium - because of its
down of facilities used by both super-
uprising against civil nuclear power,
steady decay - guarantees an arms
powers to produce nuclear weapons
he is shutting down his five oldest
reductions payoff, which makes In-
materials. It presents a historic path-
military reactors by 1991, operating
trusive verification measures worth-
way to peace and a way to avoid oper-
nine others (none probably built after
while for both sides.
ating unsafe plants and building
the 60's) and spending billions on
A complete halt, which requires
costly replacements.
three breeder reactors capable of re-
shutdown of all production reactors,
In May, Mikhail Gorbachev pro-
placing them. This situation presents
can be verified promptly by satellite
posed negotiating a verifiable mutual
a major opportunity for Washington.
and begun immediately on an Interim
halt in production of two of the three
The U.S. might do well to accept the
basis. Since each side has a deterrent
nuclear weapons materials - plu-
offer to negotiate a verifiable halt in
of more than 20,000 warheads, there
tonium and uranium. The U.S. has not
production of plutonium and uranium
is ample protection against cheating
accepted the offer - presumably be-
for weapons, but on two conditions.
during the interim halt,
cause the Savannah River production
First, we must require the Soviets to
Verification measures and the first
reactors are shut down for safety rea-
join the U.S. in an immediate shut-
reductions in warheads would have to
sons. The U.S. can hardly consider an
down of all military reactors, effec-
be worked out by an agreed date,
arrangement in which all its military
tively halting production of plutonium
within perhaps two years. Otherwise,
reactors are inoperable but some
and tritium, while pledging that civil
the Soviets could stall and put the U.S.
Soviet reactors produce tritium.
reactors will not be operated to make
at a possible disadvantage if they had
these materials. (Each side already
a relatively larger tritium reserve.
has unilaterally halted production of
Assuming agreement was reached,
enriched uranium for weapons.) Sec-
the U.S. could hold its repaired reac-
Tie them
ond, the Soviets should agree to ex-
tors on "cold standby" and the Sovi-
pand negotiations to Include an ex-
ets could hold theirs on standby as
to the decay
tended tritium halt as well.
well. Tritium production could re-
An agreement like this would put
sume If the agreement broke down or
of tritium.
the superpowers' nuclear materials
arms reduction could not keep pace
production on equal ground, while
with tritium decay. Meanwhile, the
shielding President Bush from accu-
superpowers could reduce their ar-
sations of dealing from weakness.
senals at a steady, meaningful pace
Production of weapons materials
for the sake of sanity, safety, econ-
Unlike plutonium and uranium,
would be stopped for the first time
omy and peace.
which last for tens of thousands of
and the arms race would shift into re-
years and are in abundant supply,
verse at a manageable speed, in line
tritium decays much more rapidly.
with foreserable arms reductions,
Thus, It must be produced regularly
No more tritium need be produced
to maintain or enlarge arsenals.
If both sides retire their warheads at
a rate that equals or exceeds the
Paul L. Leventhal and Milton M. Hoe-
nig are president and scientific direc-
decay of tritium: 5.5 percent a year.
Each would continue to recover
tor, respectively, of the Nuclear Con-
tritium from retired warheads to re-
trol Institute, a research center on
plenish remaining ones. Tritium re-
nuclear arms control.
AUG-29-89 TUE 16:25 NuclearControlInstitute P.01
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
FAX TRANSMISSION
FAX NUMBER: ( )
-
TO: JACKIE KENNEDY
FROM: PAUL LEVENTHAL
2 PAGES FOLLOW
MESSAGE:
I would appreciate your bringing the attached to
Don. Samunin's attention. I will telephone later
this week, an the Dovernor suggested at on meeting
Thank you.
NCI FAX NUMBER: (202) 452-0892
NCI PHONE NUMBER: (202) 822-8444
66108
file rinkium
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
August 21, 1989
Mr. John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Sununu:
With reference to the letter of August 4 from Paul
Leventhal, please find enclosed the paper we asked Dr. Carson
Mark to prepare.
As you suggested during our meeting, we will be back in
touch with you at the end of the month.
Sincerely,
Mitton Hung
Dr. Milton M. Hoenig
Scientific Director
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford. David Cohen. Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes. Julian Koenig. Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter. Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Page 1
On the Significance of a Possible Soviet Tritium Surplus
Carson Mark
The United states has not produced any new tritium for over a year. As
a result. its reserve supply has been drawn down far below its intended
level.
The Soviets have (as far as is known) continued to operate their tritium
production facilities throughout this period. It may be supposed that their
tritium reserve is fully up to some intended level.
It is not known (at least to the author) just how the intended reserve
level relates to the forecast demand rate either for the U.S. or for the
USSR; and these need not be the same.
It would seem reasonable to assume that to allow for contingencies a
planned reserve would be sufficient to meet anticipated needs for at least
a year or SO. Indeed, from official statements made concerning our own
"tritium crisis" it appears that we must have been carrying a reserve of
about two years at least. On the other hand, it is not to be supposed that
anyone would find it attractive to maintain a reserve to cover a very much
longer period. For example, if one assumes a constant rate of
Page 2
consumption, and a reserve capable of maintaining that rate for four years
after a cut-off of production. it would be necessary to produce about
twenty-five percent more tritium than needed to meet the consumption
rate just to make up for tritium decay in the reserve. If the forecast were
one involving an increasing consumption rate, maintaining a four-year
reserve would put one in a situation like that of the Red Queen in "Alice in
Wonderland." With a constant consumption forecast, to maintain a
four-vear reserve would seem at best to make marginal sense. With a
consumption forecast declining only as little as five and a half percent a
year, no reserve would be necessary.
Of course, we do not know the Soviet's policy with respect to reserves.
We may, however, be confident that they act in what they consider to be
their own best interest without expending a great deal more effort than
necessary. We must assume, further, that at present they have their
planned reserve supply on hand. It would seem safe to assume, in addition.
that their reserve supply is sufficient to maintain their present rate of
consumption for several years: two or three, quite probably; four, possibly;
much longer, unlikely.
The situation to be considered, then. is that the U.S. has essentially no
Page 3
reserve. while the Soviets have several years' supply. In this context the
question has been raised as to the effects on our interests -- our own
deterrent capability, in particular -- of our offering to negotiate an agreed
and verifiable cut-off of tritium production. There are basically two
alternatives: 1) they might refuse, or agree to negotiate but in the course
of this introduce such self-serving conditions that after some period we
would feel we had to withdraw the offer: or, 2) they might accept.
In the first case, the U.S. Administration would earn considerable
credit for having taken such an initiative: and some of this credit would
remain even if the offer had later to be withdrawn in the face of
demonstrable Soviet intransigence. In the case of outright refusal nothing
would be changed with respect to our present situation. We would
re-start Savannah River production as soon as that might be shown to be
acceptable. and we would proceed with plans for new production as
deemed necessary and feasible. There would be no real effect on our
deterrent capability, even in the event of a quite extended delay in
acquiring new tritium.
With respect to the case in which the Soviets accept our offer to
negotiate a tritium production cut-off. the U.S. Administration would. as
Page 4
before. gain credit for having introduced such an initiative. And the
Soviets would share in that from having accepted it: but that does no
harm to US. In this case an Interim halt in production by both sides would
appear to be in order, even though a number of important matters (such as
verification procedures, certainly; and stockpile numbers, presumably)
would still need to be negotiated.
From having little or no tritium reserve. and assuming that new
tritium production were suspended, before long the U.S. would have to
begin to reduce the total number of warheads in its stockpile at a rate
ultimately approaching the tritium decay rate of five and a half percent a
year. There would be blood on the floor in the Pentagon as the services
squabbled over who was to give up what; but apart from that. the nation's
real security would not suffer. In most particular. our deterrent
capability would not be threatened. After all, our stockpile numbers have
varied in the past, and it is currently planned. for example, to retire a
large number of naval tactical weapons. In addition, present START talks
discuss the possibility of reduction by some 600 warheads a year over
seven years. It is true that our nuclear war-fighting capability would
fall below the maximum levels we might otherwise be able to establish:
Page 5
and it is said by some that a nuclear war-fighting capability is an
inseparable part of deterrence. But this is evidently a mindless thought.
since nuclear war is just what we are most anxiously striving to avoid.
That is the quintessential motive of deterrence.
In contrast to the United States. the Soviets most probably have a
reserve supply of tritium on hand. Even after stopping new production they
could, in principle, add somewhat to their stockpile, but only at the
expense of advancing the time at which they would have to initiate a
reduction program. More plausibly, they could defer the time at which
reductions would become necessary for those several years their reserve
might cover. Perhaps most plausibly, they could initiate reductions in
parallel with the U.S. and retain their (decaying) reserve for some
unforeseen contingency. In a superficial, bean-counting, assessment this
would appear disadvantageous to the United States. But whether this
would be seriously, or even meaningfully, disadvantageous is another
matter.
We would still retain -- and retain for a very extended period -- a fully
adequate deterrent capability. Such a capability is not appreciably
affected by modest fractional differences in the size of the stockpile of
Page 6
an opponent. Indeed, by some estimates the Soviet's current stockpile
has about 40% more nuclear warheads than ours. This doesn't seem to call
our deterrent capability into question, nor should it. After making
worst-case allowances for survivability following a first strike a
deterrent force is to a large extent a thing in itself. It is adequate if it is
large enough. We, most certainly, have more than enough.
The essence of deterrence consists in maintaining an assured
capability to inflict devastating damage on any aggressor even after
having been subjected to a surprise first strike: and that capability must
be known, and credible. A few hundred weapons on target would reduce any
organized twentieth century society to a primitive state. It wouldn't
matter if we still had more weapons on hand. nor if we used more. It
wouldn't matter if the aggressor had more shiny new weapons in reserve
than we had. At present we have more than ten thousand strategic nuclear
warheads. If we produce no new tritium for twelve years, we could still
have more than five thousand; or for twenty-five years. more than
twenty-five hundred -- even if we were not to transfer any tritium from
our ten thousand, or so, non-strategic warheads. We would still have a
fully adequate nuclear deterrent. Of course. the Soviets have one, too: and
Page 7
they, also, would still have one under the same conditions.
In terms of simple reality, or, one might say, S0 far as the physics is
concerned, the extra tritium the Soviets presumably have makes no
significant difference. It doesn't change the likelihood of nuclear
materials being used, nor the outcome if they are. However, with respect
to political reality some account would no doubt have to be taken of such
an asymmetry. There are a number of possible ways of going about this.
and it doesn't much matter which are followed SO long as an acceptable
result is achieved. For one thing, we know (that is, It would be possible
for persons having complete information concerning our stockpile to
determine) when and at what rate we would have to remove warheads
from our stockpile In the event of a tritium production cut-off. We do not
know whether or not the Soviets are as dependent on tritium as we are.
and so we do not know whether a tritium cut-off would force them to
retire weapons at the time and the rate necessary for us. We could,
however, require that they retire (or destroy) warheads at the same rate
(presumably percentage-wise) as would be necessary for us. It wouldn't
really be important to us whether the weapons they disposed of were
tritium-bearing or not. Indeed, if they depended less on tritium. S0 that
Page 8
some of the retirees were nontritium-bearing. SO far as we would need to
be concerned they could use up their tritium reserve to keep their
tritium-bearing units alive.
There would. of course. be a need for some additional provisions in
conjunction with a tritium cut-off agreement. For example. it would be
necessary that retired delivery systems of theirs and of ours be
destroyed, SO that any reserve or secret stocks of tritium could not be
used to change the relative stockpile balance on any short time-scale.
There would also be a need of assuring that neither side was fabricating
replacement delivery systems. And S0 on. But such provisions are of the
same general type as would seem to be necessary in connection with
START, or any stockpile reduction agreement.
60928
caps gl.
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
August 4, 1989
Governor John Sununu
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Governor Sununu:
Thank you again for the opportunity you gave me and Dr.
Hoenig to discuss the tritium question with you today. We have
asked our consultant, Dr. Carson Mark, to prepare a brief paper
responding to the point you raised about the impact of a Soviet
tritium surplus. I will be happy to share it with you as soon as
we receive it.
By the way, you might consider contacting Dr. Mark directly
if you are interested in obtaining an expert, independent view on
matters under consideration in the government. He has the
necessary clearances on a need-to-know basis, and, given his 25
years as leader of the theoretical physics division at Los Alamos,
he has much to contribute. Of course, the Nuclear Control
Institute would be out of the loop if you contacted him directly.
His telephone number is 505-662-5025.
Please let me know if it would be useful to have additional
copies of the The Tritium Factor book summarizing our workshop
with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I would be
pleased to send them to you.
I will telephone you toward the end of the month, as you
suggested. With best wishes
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
J
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6165
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND ARMS CONTROL
320 Galvez Street
The Honorable Sam Nunn, Chairman, Armed Services Committee
The Honorable J. James Exon, Chairman, Strategic Forces
and Nuclear Defense Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee
U.S. Senate
222 Russell Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-6050
April 28, 1989
Re: Alternatives to new DOE production reactors:
Views of arms control negotiators.
Gentlemen:
Eminent scientists state that there is no critical shortage of tritium for
U.S. nuclear weapons. (See statement of Bethe and others dated April
7,1989: "For a New Nuclear Materials Production Policy: Solving the Military
Tritium Problem") If that is the case, we urge that before the Congress
authorizes new materials production reactors costing $7.5 billion by DOE's
current estimate, the United States should explore with the Soviet Union
whether verifiable agreements are possible which would eliminate the need for
new reactors and complement the reduction of delivery vehicles being
negotiated in START and already negotiated in the INF Treaty.
On April ,1989, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a halt in Soviet
production of enriched uranium for weapons this year and the closing by the
end of next year of three reactors for producing plutonium for weapons. He
said this move was a "major step towards the complete cessation of production
of fissionable materials for use in weapons." The United States is not now
producing any enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons. For many
years, we tried to get the Soviets to agree to a mutual cut-off of such
production. The Soviets may now be prepared for such an agreement.
Gorbachev did not mention tritium, another key ingredient of nuclear
weapons. DOE's request for new production reactors is based on its estimate
that the United States will soon have a critical shortage of tritium. The
scientists' statement disagrees with this estimate. Instead of authorizing new
production reactors for tritium this year, Congress should allow time for a
thorough study of their need and for an exploration of the possibilities for
verifiable U.S. Soviet agreements to halt or limit tritium. plutonium and
uranium production for weapons.
To those concerned that failure to authorize new production reactors now
would weaken American bargaining power to gain Soviet agreement to a mutual
halt in such production in the future, we answer that what is important is the
credibility of our determination to keep all the nuclear weapons we need
fully effective, until there is agreement to reduce specific weapons.
Congress should state (by joint resolution or statute) its intention to
authorize the acquisition of new tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons if that
becomes necessary. Then, if there is a useful bargaining chip here, the
United States would not lose it by putting off the actual authorization and
appropriation of new funds for a year. Instead of approving new production
reactors now, Congress should authorize funds for a DOE study of both the need
and the most cost-effective method for obtaining tritium in the future, when
and if additional supplies become necessary.
If the United States and the Soviet Union do not do more to reduce their
own stockpiles of nuclear weapons, they will have an increasingly difficult
time persuading non-nuclear-weapon countries not to acquire nuclear weapons.
This issue has been used repeatedly by some countries to justify their non-
adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it will be used by those
seeking to end that treaty in 1995, when a conference on extending its
duration must be held. Indeed, there are likely to be more nuclear-weapon
states in unstable areas of the world before the end of the century if matters
continue as they now are. And many believe that a nuclear war is most likely
to begin in a regional setting involving smaller nuclear-weapon countries
than the United States and the Soviet Union.
The INF Treaty requires the destruction of medium-range missiles but not
their nuclear warheads. Based on current drafts, the same will be true of the
nuclear explosive materials in the strategic missiles to be destroyed pursuant
to a START treaty. Is it not time to explore a verified and mutual cut-off in
the production of nuclear materials for making weapons-- to complement the INF
Treaty and a possible START treaty? Should we not explore an agreed transfer
to peaceful purposes of nuclear materials taken from missiles destroyed
pursuant to agreement?
We urge you to promote prudent planning rather than authorize new
production reactors this year. Give time for a meaningful exploration of our
options.
GeorgeBurn Repectfully submitted
George Bunn, on behalf of himself and the
following co-signers, all of whom have experience in negotiating nuclear arms
control agreements with the Soviets:
Ralph Earle II
Thomas D. Davies
Philip J. Farley
John B. Rhinelander
Gerard C. Smith
Signers of Letter of April 28, 1988
George Bunn: member, Stanford Center for International Security and Arms
Control (CISAC); former employee of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; formerly General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and legal advisor, deputy chairman or alternate
chairman (with personal rank of ambassador) of the U.S. delegation to the
conference which produced the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Thomas D. Davies: Rear Admiral, USN (Ret); formerly Assistant Director, ACDA,
head of non-proliferation bureau and chairman, U.S. delegation to test ban and
environmental warfare negotiations; formerly, Chief of Naval Development and
commander of North Atlantic surveillance operations during Cuban missile
crisis.
Ralph Earle II: consultant and chairman of National Advisory Board, Lawyers
Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control; formerly Director, ACDA; formerly ACDA
representative, alternate chairman and then chairman of U.S. delegation (with
personal rank of ambassador) to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II);
former partner, Baker & Daniels.
Philip J. Farley: member, Stanford CISAC; formerly on staff of AEC and then
State Department backstopper of arms control negotiations; formerly Director
of Politico-Military Affairs, State Department, then Deputy Director of ACDA
and alternate chairman of the U.S. SALT I delegation (with personal rank of
ambassador); formerly Deputy Special Representative for Non-Proliferation
Matters.
John B. Rhinelander: partner, Shaw, Pittman, Potts, Trowbridge and
Rhinelander; formerly special assistant to Secretary of the Navy; formerly
counsel and acting deputy director, Office of Foreign Direct Investments,
Department of Commerce; formerly Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State
and legal advisor to the U.S. SALT I delegation.
Gerard C. Smith: chairman of Consultants International Group Inc. and of
Arms Control Association: worked on nuclear matters on staff of Atomic Energy
Commission and then State Department for many years; formerly Director of ACDA
and chairman of the U.S. SALT I delegation (with personal rank of Ambassador);
formerly Special Representative and Ambassador-at-Large for Non-Proliferation
Matters.
Reprint Series
SCiENCE
2 September 1988, Volume 241, pp. 1166-1169
Policy Forum
The Tritium Factor as a Forcing Function in
Nuclear Arms Reduction Talks
J. CARSON MARK, THOMAS D. DAVIES, MILTON M. HOENIG, AND PAUL L. LEVENTHAL
Limits on Nuclear Materials for Arms
Reduction: Complexities and Uncertainties
W.G. SUTCLIFFE
Copyright © 1988 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science
Policy Forum
The United States and the Soviet Union are presently negotitating reductions in their nuclear arsenals. These negotiations are influenced by many factors, tech-
nological and political, and there are opportunities to debate new proposals for arms control. In this Forum, Mark et al. argue for a mutual halt in the production
of the hydrogen isotope tritium, which is an essential component of fission and thermonuclear weapons, to force substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals.
Sutcliffe responds that a cutoff of nuclear materials production carries a number of risks that need further study before such proposals can be considered by the nego-
tiators.
The Tritium Factor as
Limits on Nuclear
a Forcing Function in
Materials for Arms
Nuclear Arms
Reduction: Complexities
Reduction Talks
and Uncertainties
J. CARSON MARK, THOMAS D. DAVIES,
W. G. SUTCLIFFE
MILTON M. HOENIG, PAUL L. LEVENTHAL
Because tritium in nuclear weapons must be replenished periodi-
cally, it has been proposed that the United States and the Soviet
Both the United States and the Soviet Union depend on tritium
Union reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons by limiting or
to boost the yield of their fission weapons and the fission triggers of
halting the production of this material.
their thermonuclear warheads. Tritium represents the key to the
Although such limits might be desirable in the future, any
compact and efficient designs of modern nuclear weapons. Because
proposal to limit nuclear materials as a means of arms control is
tritium decays rapidly, declining by half in 12.3 years, tritium
premature. Rather, one should first establish the value of production
charges in nuclear weapons become depleted and must be replaced
or stockpile limits vis-à-vis other approaches. It is not appropriate to
with fresh charges regularly. Without regular production of new
look at some of the potential benefits of a halt in nuclear materials
tritium, the large stocks of tritium needed by the United States and
production without analyzing the associated risks. For example,
the Soviet Union to maintain their nuclear weapons would be
asymmetries in nuclear materials production capabilities, design
depleted at a rate of about 5.5% yearly. Thus, the radioactive decay
practices, and delivery system capabilities could lead to disparate
of tritium-the "Tritium Factor," as we refer to it-provides a
impacts on the U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, possibly leaving the
potentially powerful means for reducing nulcear arms.
United States in a vulnerable position. Proposing nuclear materials
Tritium is unique among nuclear weapon materials in its potential
limits is fraught with great uncertainties about the comparability of
to drive nuclear arms reductions if both sides agreed to a halt in its
effects on the two stockpiles and verification issues because of the
production. Plutonium, unlike tritium, lasts for thousands of years,
unknowns about the Soviet stockpile and production capabilities.
and both sides already have enough plutonium to maintain their
Further, the impact on direct arms control negotiations, which focus
existing stockpiles of weapons, and even to modernize them (1).
on delivery systems, could be deleterious. Finally, the question of
The 5.5% annual decay of tritium could serve as a "forcing
whether conventional arms reductions should precede further nucle-
function" to produce steady, verifiable reductions in the superpow-
ar arms reductions bears on the proper timing for a proposal to limit
ers' nuclear arsenals. Such reductions would result in a comprehen-
nuclear materials.
sive 50% cut in warheads by about 12 years after an agreement-the
A halt in tritium production would not necessarily lead to a
year 2001, if the cutoff were to begin now. Thus, the Tritium Factor
reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons in the future. A limited supply
could be applied to achieving reductions beyond even those now
of tritium could lead to a shell game tactic of maintaining the full
contemplated in the ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
capability of some systems while not retiring the other less effective
(START) (Fig. 1). At the time a START agreement is concluded, a
or useless systems. Nuclear warheads can be designed that do not
mutual suspension of new tritium production could be announced
depend on tritium. The early nuclear weapons did not use tritium.
in conjunction with it as a confidence-building measure, represent-
As a result of the inevitable research efforts, new technology might
ing a shared commitment to keep reductions in nuclear armaments
circumvent or reduce the need for tritium in efficient modern
(Continued on page 1167)
warheads.
A bilateral agreement, by itself, to prohibit the production of
tritium would not be sufficient. Multinational agreements and
The authors are associated with the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC 20036.
J. C. Mark is former leader of the Theoretical Division of Los Alamos National
(Continued on page 1169)
Laboratory. T. D. Davies, Rear Admiral USN (Ret.), is a former assistant director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. M. M. Hoenig is scientific director of
the Nuclear Control Institute. P. L. Leventhal is president of the Nuclear Control
The author is with the Evaluation and Planning Program, Lawrence Livermore
Institute.
National Laboratory, Livermore CA 94550.
I166
SCIENCE, VOL. 241
(Mark, continued from page 1166)
the process of arms negotiations? How can each side be sure that a
going at a steady pace.
mutual cutoff of tritium production will have comparable effect on
There are a number of compelling reasons for bringing the
the weapons of the other side? And, how can compliance with such a
Tritium Factor into the nuclear arms reduction process at this time:
cutoff be verified?
1) The Tritium Factor provides the only external means to
Impact on negotiations. The Tritium Factor would serve as a "clock
"force" both sides, given the vicissitudes of negotiations, to make
on the table," as in a chess match. It would provide a mechanism for
steady progress toward sharp reductions in their arsenals.
automatically maintaining a minimum pace of reductions. Although
2) The forcing function imposed by the Tritium Factor would
negotiators may not like to work against deadlines, historically,
influence the pace of arms reduction talks without putting undue
when none exist, negotiations tend to drag on interminably and to
pressure on negotiators. The two sides still would have considerable
be overtaken by events.
latitude in deciding which types of weapons to retire to maintain
Each side could begin cautiously because the full impact of a
mutually stabilizing force levels.
tritium cutoff on weapons reductions could be cushioned somewhat
3) A halt in new production of tritium and plutonium would
at the outset by the choice of weapons systems to be retired and of
allay safety concerns on both sides associated with continuing to
available options for tritium management (2). There would be a
operate their aging production reactors. In the United States, the N
limit to possible reshuffling schemes, however, and eventually the
reactor has been shut down, and the Savannah River reactors are
decay of the tritium inventory would force a steady reduction in the
now required to operate at half power owing to safety problems
number of nuclear warheads.
identified by the National Academy of Sciences since the Chernobyl
Weapons reductions at tritium's decay rate would be dramatic
accident.
over the first dozen years-a 50% cut in the overall nuclear arsenals
4) With a halt in production, plans to upgrade these reactors
of the superpowers by 2001, if begun now. Of course, tritium's
could be set aside. The production reactors of both sides would be
decay rate remains constant, but the number of warheads retired
placed on standby, ready to restart tritium production only if nulcear
each year, as paced by the Tritium Factor, will grow progressively
arms talks break down. The tritium recovered from retired weapons
smaller as the number of warheads remaining in the stockpiles
would be used to replenish the tritium supply in the remaining ones.
declines with time. After 12 years, however, sufficient confidence
5) Decisions on costly plans for new production reactors could
might be built to permit cuts at a rate greater than tritium's decay; if
await an agreement on the level to which arsenals would be drawn
so, tritium's forcing function will have served nuclear arms reduc-
down, or a breakdown in the talks. There is now a proposal before
tion efforts well.
Congress by the Department of Energy to build two new produc-
Some may be skeptical of the Tritium Factor approach to nuclear
tion reactors at a presently estimated cost of $6.8 billion, although
arms reduction, seeing this approach to be a case of "the tail
costs may well be much higher. The DOE plans to put one or both
wagging the dog." Certainly, nuclear materials production policy
of these new reactors into operation by 1999. Congress could defer
never has been used to drive nuclear arms reduction efforts. The
action so long as a mutual halt in tritium production were in effect.
result to date, however, has been little in the way of arms reduction,
Eventually, to maintain a minimum effective deterrent, new tritium
but much in the way of materials production that feeds the arms
production at some much lower level might be needed a few decades
race.
after the cutoff.
What are the risks if the Tritium Factor approach fails? In the
6) The complete suspension of production-reactor operations-
event that arms reduction negotiations break down, the United
for both tritium and plutonium-is verifiable by national technical
States, using the output of production reactors held on standby,
means supplemented by on-site inspections, as needed.
could restore its tritium inventory to 90% of the initial value in 1
Of course, there are questions that need to be examined. How can
year after a 3-year production halt, and to 83% in 2 years after a 6-
a technical measure like the Tritium Factor be expected to "force"
year halt (3). The tritium recovery capability of the Soviet Union is
likely to be comparable. However, to ensure an equivalence of
o
recovery capability, the superpowers could agree on which reactors
are to be held on standby and which reactors are to be dismantled.
Comparability of effect. An important question is whether arms
-10
reductions based on a mutual halt in the production of tritium
would have comparable effect on the Soviet and U.S. nuclear
-20
arsenals. Because of the Soviet advantage in missile throw weight, it
PERCENT REDUCTION
is possible that the Soviets have not pushed the miniaturization of
-30
their fission triggers to the same extent as the United States. Yet, the
nuclear arsenals of both sides have a strong dependence on tritium,
and Soviet tritium production-like ours-is presumably scaled to
-40
START Reductions
meet their continuing needs. Consequently, a tritium production
cutoff would affect both sides substantially enough for the Tritium
-50
Tritium Inventory
Factor to be an effective approach to mutual arms reduction. At the
same time, each side can rest assured that even some 37 years after a
-60
tritium cutoff (a period equal to three half-lives of tritium), enough
o
1
2
3
4
5
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
tritium will remain for at least 1000 to 3000 warheads-a credible
YEARS AFTER HALT
nulcear deterrent-without any resumption of production.
Fig. 1. The percent reduction in a superpower's inventory of tritium for
Of course, the weapons laboratories on each side could work on
nuclear weapons as a result of radioactive decay following a halt in tritium
new designs requiring less tritium or not relying on boosting at all
production. The reduction in the tritium inventory would force a like
(4). The design and production of these weapons may take some
reduction in the stockpile of nuclear warheads. Under the proposed START
agreement, the reduction of 4000 strategic warheads (17% of the U.S.
years, however; and because of their greater weight and size (owing
nuclear stockpile) over even the 5-year period proposed by the Soviet Union
to the need for using fissile material to achieve the same effect), such
would not quite match tritium's decay.
(Continued on page 1168)
2 SEPTEMBER 1988
POLICY FORUM 1167
(Mark, continued from page 1167)
in fuel rods, control rods, or blankets or being diverted for weapons
weapons may require new delivery systems. New designs to replace
purposes from the heavy-water moderator of CANDU-type reac-
present triggers of thermonuclear weapons would require tests of
tors. It would be difficult to trace gram quantities of tritium, but
the complete weapon to confirm the effect of the trigger on the
safeguarding of the kilogram quantities of significance to a large
second stage, and new delivery systems also would require testing.
nuclear weapons program should not be a problem (8).
Such tests would be subject to detection. A ban on nuclear testing
Conclusion. An agreed mutual halt in tritium production would
would be desirable, as would a ban on reuse of fissile material from
confirm the intent of the superpowers to reduce their arsenals
nuclear warheads that would be dismantled by mutual agreement,
significantly. Use of the Tritium Factor to achieve deep cuts at a
although these bans would not be essential to implementation of the
steady pace would be responsive to people's hopes for an end to the
Tritium Factor.
nuclear arms race. It would remove the need to operate aging
Verification issues. It should be emphasized first that verification of
production reactors or to build costly new ones, either of which
weapons reductions, whether driven by the Tritium Factor or not,
would merely continue the arms race. Finally, it would provide
would be by confirmation of destruction of retired weapons. The
meaningful support for an appeal by the superpowers that all
principal verification problems in this case are the same as those
nations avoid nuclear materials production programs that contribute
currently being dealt with in connection with implementation of the
to nuclear proliferation and associated risks of nuclear terrorism (9).
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and negotiation of the START
treaties. Such verification will require on-site inspection.
The nonoperation of dedicated production reactors can be veri-
REFERENCES AND NOTES
fied by satellite surveillance in the thermal infrared wavelength
1. Energy Secretary James Herrington recently told a congressional committee,
region because these reactors are major infrared heat sources when
"We're awash in plutonium. We have more than we need." Testimony before the
operating. Any undeclared source of thermal radiation could be
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, 23 February 1988. Hearing of
the Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies of the House Committee on
challenged as a potential clandestine facility and made subject to on-
Appropriations for FY 1989, Part VII.
site inspection.
2. For example, a surplus of tritium could be created for a period by initially retiring
those weapons that contain the largest tritium charges. Also, tritium reservoirs of
At operating power and dual-purpose reactors, inspectors under
weapons could be recycled more frequently and filled with a somewhat smaller
international or bilateral auspices would be able to detect dedicated
quantity of tritium than is currently the practice without sacrificing weapon
tritium production by utilizing devices for nondestructive irradia-
effectiveness.
3. Here it is assumed that the annual rate of tritium production after restart is 10% of
tion of fresh reactor fuel, targets, and control rods. Such devices
the prestart inventory. For the United States, a realistic situation would be an initial
could use a beam of neutrons to detect the presence of lithium-6
tritium inventory of 100 kilograms (an average of about 4 grams of tritium per
targets used for tritium production (5). In addition, activities in
warhead) with the three operable production reactors at Savannah River resuming
operations at half-power and producing a total of 10 kilograms of tritium annually.
separation plants to recover tritium from irradiated targets would be
See T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin, R. S. Norris, M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons
detected by the monitoring of emissions at the stacks of these plants.
Databook (Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1987), vol. II, pp. 62-75.
4. Isotopes other than tritium, such as helium-3, have been considered for boosting,
Under conditions in which the destruction of nuclear weapons at
but use of these is considered not to be within reach of present weapons
agreed rates was being verified, and checked against the number of
technology.
weapons remaining in the nuclear stockpiles, any secret stockpile of
5. A random sampling system could easily be developed to provide sufficient
assurance of detection. Inspectors would also be able to sample air and water, but
tritium would be of little significance. Any such secret inventory
verification by this means may prove to be impractical because of the difficulty in
would be decaying while these procedures applied. This factor,
distinguishing between dedicated tritium production and other modes of reactor
along with the absence of new delivery systems that would be
operation. In particular, at heavy water moderated power reactors (for example,
CANDU-type), it would be virtually impossible to detect tritium production in
required for deployment of additional warheads built from a
targets against the background of tritiated water vapor normally released from the
clandestine supply of tritium, would make any attempt to store or
moderator.
6. It should be noted that even with a secret stockpile of tritium, either side would be
acquire a secret stockpile of tritium unappealing (6).
in an advantageous position to readily terminate or "break out" of a tritium-cutoff
In addition to the superpowers, the other nuclear weapon states
agreement only if it also managed, without being detected, to build or maintain a
(France, Britain, and China) produce tritium for weapons, and there
large secret store of warheads utilizing tritium and of the needed delivery systems-
a most unlikely event. A secret tritium stockpile could be applied to building a large
is some commercial capacity (principally Canada, but also France)
number of new tritium warheads, but this would take a period of time and create a
for recovering tritium from the moderator of heavy-water reactors.
"national crisis" situation sufficient to permit the other side to take extraordinary
However, supplies of tritium from such sources are on a smaller
steps to respond in kind.
7. This situation could change if fusion reactors, which would utilize and produce
scale than the current requirements of the superpowers, and most of
kilogram quantities of tritium, became a reality. However, the lead time for
the military tritium production in other nuclear weapons states will
commercial development of fusion reactors is suficiently long to allow the
superpowers and the IAEA to develop safeguards and inspection measures
be fully committed to meet their own needs, which in any event are
sufficient to prevent diversions of tritium from civilian fusion activities to weapons
on a relatively small scale (7).
programs.
As to the possible commercial sources, there would be the need
8. The. United States needs to produce about 5 kilograms of tritium annually to
maintain its inventory.
for international safeguards barring military use. Civilian power and
9. See P. Leventhal and Y. Alexander, Eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, The Report
large research reactors would have to be made subject to Interna-
and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or bilateral ar-
(Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1987), pp. 45-49; Frank von Hippel, in
Nuclear War, Nuclear Proliferation, and Their Consequences, Sadruddin Aga Khan, Ed.
rangements (or both) to ascertain that tritium is not being produced
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985), pp. 65, 66, and 74.
1168
SCIENCE, VOL. 241
(Sutcliffe, continued from page 1166)
agreement limiting nuclear materials. Thus, such agreements would
safeguards would be necessary to prohibit the United States and the
add another (possibly redundant) verification task.
Soviet Union from obtaining tritium for weapons use from other
In summary, a proposal to limit tritium production raises several
nations, in particular their allies. Any prohibition would be compli-
unresolved issues. The proponents of a tritium cutoff assert that a
cated by the fact that large supplies of tritium will be needed to
halt in tritium production would confirm the superpowers' intent to
develop fusion reactors that could then produce more tritium.
reduce their arsenals (2). However, it has not been shown that such
The risks (and benefits) of a mutual suspension of tritium
a reduction will foster the aims of arms control (in particular,
production have yet to be analyzed and resolved. It is generally
increased stability). They state that costly new facilities ("which
acknowledged that much more is known about the United States'
would merely continue the arms race") would not be needed.
stockpile and production capabilities than is known about the Soviet
However, caution dictates that the United States maintain facilities
Union's. This fact coupled with the asymmetries and uncertainties in
capable of responding to possible noncompliance. Rebuilding or
the potentials for mining stockpiles (for tritium), clandestine pro-
even restarting a tritium-producing facility is a very complex under-
duction, and prompt resumption of large-scale production might
taking. Although claimed as a benefit, the effect on nuclear prolifera-
produce an unacceptable advantage for the Soviets.
tion and nuclear terrorism of a halt in tritium production is
It cannot be assumed that there is little risk because the United
debatable. If the historical path is followed, emerging nuclear
States could restart and replenish its tritium supply. Such an
powers are probably not designing weapons that depend on tritium.
assumption would ignore the asymmetry in the U.S. and Soviet
Finally, any proposal should address how far the United States and
capabilities. In particular, it would ignore the nuclear materials
Soviet Union would go in moving toward a nuclear disarmament or
production capability of the Soviet power reactors and the political
at least a stockpile less dependent on tritium. This is a critical question
system that controls their operation. For example, the Soviets could
because the other nuclear powers of the world cannot be ignored.
produce tritium from helium-3 (decayed tritium) in their power
Turning to more general considerations, it is incumbent upon
reactors. It would also assume no problems (technical, economic, or
those proposing indirect methods of arms control, for example,
political) in restarting our old reactors.
materials limits or a test ban, to show that their proposal is at least an
Although deferring or not upgrading the Savannah River Plant
acceptable if not the best method to attain the aims of arms control.
(SRP) reactors or not building a new production reactor (or both)
A necessary cogent argument should be attempted as follows:
might appear attractive from a financial point of view (1), it is not
1) Generally accepted purposes for arms controls or reductions
likely that the U.S. would risk its national security in this way. The
should be clearly stated and the terms defined. Stability is often
choice between not producing enough tritium in a crisis and
claimed to be the primary aim. Increased safety and control, and
running the SRP reactors at full power is not attractive. Because of
reduced cost and reliance on military power (conventional as well as
the 10 to 20 years to get a new production reactor operating, it
nuclear) are also important.
cannot be responsive to a crisis in the near term.
2) The risks and benefits (for achieving the aims of arms
A mutual halt in tritium production would not necessarily have a
controls) of limits on launchers and warheads, such as INF and
comparable effect on the Soviet and U.S. arsenals. It is acknowl-
START, should be contrasted with the risks and benefits of less
edged that the Soviets have an advantage in throw weight that
direct methods such as limiting the production of nuclear materials
would favor heavier warheads that depend less on tritium. Further, a
or limiting nuclear tests. Further, the possibility of additional risks
concomitant ban on nuclear tests would perpetuate the situation,
or benefits incurred by combining direct and indirect approaches to
and could only be desirable from the Soviet point of view.
arms control should be investigated.
It has been suggested that there is a synergistic relationship
3) If limits on nuclear materials appear attractive when contrast-
between a halt in tritium production and direct arms control
ed with direct limits, the needs for and problems with defining and
negotiations. The value of such a halt as a forcing function for arms
verifying proposed limits should be examined. Specific limits (trea-
control negotiations is debatable. It is arguable that the negotiators
ties) must be defined (proposed) before verification issues can be
would not agree to a halt in tritium production if they were not able
adequately addressed. The asymmetries in production and surge
to agree on a direct arms reduction. In fact, proposals to halt tritium
capabilities will have to be treated in some fashion.
production might unduly complicate direct arms control negotia-
In spite of the issues and questions raised, it is possible that future
tions such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). For
agreed limits on nuclear materials in general and tritium in particular
example, additional advisers, experts on materials production,
might be desirable. For example, it is conceivable that tritium limits
would be required to ensure that the negotiators would not accept
could complement direct limits on hard-to-verify systems such as
or put forth inconsistent or disadvantageous proposals.
mobile or cruise missiles. Heavier warheads that do not use tritium
Verification problems (with tritium limits, production limits, or
would greatly reduce the effectiveness of these systems. Heavier
production capability limits) are not the same as those being dealt
warheads could also reduce the number of multiple warhead missiles
with in the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty and START.
and thus contribute to stability (3). However, as implied above,
Although it is true that these treaties involve on-site inspections,
many difficult problems must be resolved first. It would be prudent to let
INF and START (up to this time) do not address the fate of the
the current arms control talks continue without being encumbered
warheads, and so inspection of the materials production facilities is
by materials, or other indirect, limits. During this time, necessary
not being agreed to or proposed. Such inspections would have
analysis, such as outlined above, could be undertaken.
different requirements and problems than those associated with
verifying the number of missiles or aircraft. Secret stockpiling of
REFERENCES AND NOTES
tritium could be significant even if nuclear weapons were being
1. Because of the costs of safeguards and cleanup, shutting down a reactor or
destroyed. A secret stockpile of tritium would mean that a nation
processing facility might not be financially advantageous.
could maintain a larger, more modern stockpile of nuclear weapons
2. The size of the stockpile should be dictated by its survivability. The aim is to have
enough of the right type of weapons, at the right place, at the right time, to provide
longer. It would also put that nation in a position to readily
an effective deterrent.
terminate or break out of a treaty limiting tritium production.
3. Multiple warhead missiles appear as lucrative targets to the other side. In a crisis
Prudence requires that verification of direct arms reductions
there is an incentive to attack them (with a first strike) before they can be launched.
4. I thank my colleagues, especially P.S. Brown, R. L. Civiak, P. T. Herman, and R.
(missiles, aircraft, and so on) will still be necessary, even with an
F. Perret, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
2 SEPTEMBER 1988
POLICY FORUM II69
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
May 31, 1989
VERIFICATION ISSUES FOR A NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION HALT
Comparison of Verification and Safeguards Requirements in
A Comprehensive Halt and a Fissile Materials-Only Halt
SUMMARY
An agreement by the superpowers to halt the production of
nuclear materials for weapons would impose new requirements for
verification at military production sites and safeguards at civil
nuclear facilities. The added effort, cost and intrusiveness
would be considerable whether the halt is comprehensive --
involving tritium, as well as plutonium and highly enriched uranium
-- or is restricted to fissile material -- plutonium and highly
enriched uranium -- alone.
The verification of a halt at military production sites
probably would be easier for a comprehensive halt than for a
fissile materials halt alone. In a comprehensive halt, the
complete shutdown of declared military production reactors would
be verified by satellite observation of no infrared signature.
This use of national technical means (NTM) would be augmented by
challenge-type on-site inspections, including suspected
clandestine facilities. On the other hand, verification of a
fissile materials cutoff would require on-site inspections to
ascertain that no plutonium is being produced in military reactors
allowed to operate for tritium production. In the same way, under
a comprehensive halt, inspection simply would verify that all
military reprocessing plants are shutdown, while, under a fissile
materials halt, inspections would be required to verify that
allowed reprocessing activities to recover enriched uranium for
reuse in driver fuel of tritium production reactors do not involve
recovery of plutonium.
Under both production halt proposals, the implementation of
safeguards arrangements at the over 150 civil nuclear facilities
in the U.S. and the Soviet Union would require a several-fold
increase over the International Atomic Energy Agency's current
expenditures for safeguarding civil nuclear facilities, and almost
certainly would involve, if not be principally dependent on,
bilateral safeguards applied by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in
addition to whatever role the IAEA might play.
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Tritium safeguards arrangements could be added on to other
inspection activities in a very effective and efficient way. The
major activity of tritium safeguards at civil reactors would
involve item counting of reactivity control rods. The neutron-
absorbing boron usually in these rods could be replaced by
lithium-6 for the purpose of tritium production, without changing
the operating characteristics at civil reactors. Consequently,
the rods must be subject to safeguards, and perhaps even exchange,
with each side collecting the other's rods.
Under tritium safeguards at civil power reactors, control
rods would be accounted for before insertion and after discharge,
with collection, sealing and storage in the spent fuel pond. Fuel
assemblies that also could contain lithium-6 targets for tritium
production would, in any event, be stored in ponds under seal
after discharge under a fissile-only safeguards regime. Control
rods and fuel assemblies could be inspected first in the
fabrication plants for the presence of lithium, and fresh control
rods and fuel assemblies could be assayed for the presence of
lithium by non-destructive means before they are inserted into the
reactor.
Another place in the civil nuclear cycle where tritium
safeguards would have to be applied is at tritium extraction
plants, such as Ontario Hydro's plant in Darlington, Ontario,
which recovers tritium from the irradiated heavy water moderator
of CANDU reactors and promises to be the major commercial supplier
of tritium in the near future. Here safeguards would have to be
applied by materials balance to tritium in the process stream and
in storage, adequate to provide high assurance of detection of a
diversion of tritium sufficient to boost about a dozen nuclear
warheads. Commercial uses of the extracted tritium would be
subject to similar safeguards, and tritium in use and storage at
research facilities would be safeguarded, as well. The technical
procedures for some of these activities already have been worked
out in Canada and at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and their
application should not be unduly burdensome for detecting
diversions of tritium in quantities that would be of significance
to a superpower.
What follows is a concise comparison of verification
requirements under a fissile-materials-only and a comprehensive
production halt:
May 31, 1989
VERIFICATION ISSUES FOR A U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION HALT
FISSILE HALT ONLY
COMPREHENSIVE HALT:
TRITIUM & FISSILE
Impact on
Provides no impetus
Eventually requires boosted
Arms Reductions
to reduce weapons,
warhead reduction at rate
without added measures.
of tritium's decay, 5.5
percent annually.
Significance
Any secret initial
Any secret initial
of Initial
store of Pu or HEU
store of tritium decays
Cheating
essentially does not
by half in 12.3 years and,
decay and retains its
therefore, is of decreasing
significance for
significance over time for
possible weapons use
possible weapons use.
indefinitely.
Significant
Diversion or clandestine
In addition, diversion or
Violation
production of one percent
clandestine production of
of inventory--about 1.0
of sufficient tritium over
metric ton (MT) plutonium
12 years to make the
(Pu) or 6.0 MT highly
reduction of the present
enriched uranium (HEU)--
inventory, due to decay,
per year for 10 years.
significantly less than the
maximum possible 50 percent.
Specifically, the diversion
or clandestine production
of about 2.75% of present
inventory per year--about
2.5 to 4.0 kilograms-so
that inventory is reduced
by 25% rather than 50%
after 12 years.
1
Thus, in the event of such
a significant violation,
still a large decrease in
tritium inventory, as compared
with an increase in Pu and
HEU inventories in similar
situation.
Clandestine
Detect construction
Same.
Production
and operation of
clandestine facilities
In addition, same measures
for production, repro-
used for detection of
cessing and enrichment
clandestine facilities for
---by national technical
tritium production,
means, by monitoring
separation and purification.
communications, and by
other intelligence
means. Invoke challenge
inspections of suspect
sites.
Clandestine
Use of IAEA-type
Same.
Shipments
safeguards at civil and
military facilities,
supplemented by
bilateral inspections
and by national
technical and other
intelligence means, to
police against transfers
to secret production
sites. Third countries
covered as potential
sources.
Declared Military Production Sites
Verification
Each side declares all
Same.
Regime
of its production
facilities to the other.
Verification by national
technical means and
bilateral inspection
regime.
2
Production
Reactors allowed to
All production reactors
Reactors
operate for tritium
shut down. NTM to verify
production; on-site
no reactor operation,
inspection to verify no
augmented by on-site
plutonium production;
and challenge
augmented by national
inspections.
technical means (NTM).
Reprocessing
Reprocessing plants
All military
Plants
allowed to operate to
reprocessing plants shut
recover HEU from spent
down. Use of NTM, on-site
driver fuel of tritium-
inspection and monitoring
production reactors and
of krypton-85 emissions to
from spent naval reactor
detect any clandestine
fuel, for reuse as driver
reprocessing. Spent naval
fuel. On-site inspection
reactor fuel turned in to
and monitoring of
safeguarded facility, but
krypton-85 emissions
not chemically reprocessed.
to verify no plutonium
separation.
Enrichment
Limited production of HEU
Same.
Plants for HEU
in safeguarded facility:
about 5 MT HEU per year
for naval reactor fuel,
with turn-in of equivalent
amount of spent fuel to
safeguarded facility.
Alternative: fuel naval
reactors with HEU from
weapons stockpile.
Civil Facilities
Verification/
All civil nuclear
Same.
Safeguards
facilities in U.S. and
Regime
U.S.S.R. placed under
IAEA/NPT safeguards,
supplemented by
bilateral inspection
regime.
3
Power Reactors
IAEA-type
Same.
safeguards at civil
reactors: safeguards on
In addition, tritium
plutonium and U-235 by
safeguards by item counting
item counting of fuel
of reactivity control rods
assemblies at reactors
(burnable poison rods, flux
and at spent fuel storage
flattening rods, etc. in
ponds, supplemented by
LWRs and Soviet RBMKs)
non-destructive assay,
in which boron could be
camera surveillance and
be replaced by lithium-6
application of seals.
for tritium production.
Item counting at reactors
and at spent fuel storage
ponds, supplemented by
non-destructive assay (NDA)
and seals. NDA would
sample fresh rods, fuel
assemblies and suspect
blankets for presence of
lithium. Also, each side
could collect other's rods.
Research
Conversion of
Same, plus safeguards (per
Reactors
research reactors to
above) to detect clandestine
low-enriched uranium
tritium production.
fuel, wherever possible.
Safeguards, inspection
and intelligence
arrangements at sites
where HEU still used.
Reprocessing
Once-through fuel cycle
Same.
Plants
with final disposal of
spent fuel preferable.
Limited reprocessing for
fast-breeder research, if
necessary.
IAEA-type safeguards
Same, plus safeguards,
on any reprocessing of
bilateral inspections and
spent reactor fuel to
intelligence means to detect
to recover plutonium and
clandestine tritium separation
uranium. Bilateral
activities.
inspections and
intelligence means to
compensate for
inherently large
uncertainty in materials
accounting in large-
throughput plants.
4
Fabrication
IAEA-type safeguards at
Same.
Plants
uranium and plutonium-MOX
fuel plants. Bilateral
In addition, verify
inspections and
absence of lithium by
intelligence means to
inspection and NDA, then
compensate for
seal and tag inspected
inherently large
assemblies and control
uncertainty in materials
rods.
accounting at large-
throughput plants.
Enrichment
IAEA, Hexapartite-type
Same.
Plants
safeguards to verify
production is limited to
low-enriched uranium,
by materials balance and
enrichment assay
augmented by inspection to
assure no rearrangement of
plant stages for HEU
production.
Tritium
Allowed to operate.
IAEA safeguards developed
Extraction
Presently no IAEA
and applied to plants for tritium
Facilities
safeguards.
recovery from the heavy water
moderator of CANDU-type
reactors, including plants in
third countries. (Example:
Darlington, Ontario plant to
recover about 2 kg tritium per
year.) Safeguards supplemented
by bi- and tri-lateral
inspections, if possible, and
by intelligence methods.
#
5
NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-8444
The Washington Post
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1988
J. Carson Mark
The Tritium Factor
LOS ALAMOS-The current shutdown of the
the arms-reduction process following successful
mutual, verifiable halt in tritium production is far
nation's weapon reactors at the Savannah River
completion of a START agreement.
preferable to the Energy Department's plan. In any
Plant for safety-related reasons is suddenly focus-
We and the Soviets both rely heavily on tritium,
event, the Savannah River reactors should be
ing attention on the importance of tritium in nucle-
and a halt in production could be expected to affect
restarted for tritium production or readied for
ar weapons. Tritium is short-lived, decaying by 5.5
the nuclear weapons of both sides comparably.
standby status only after a thorough safety review.
percent a year, so the essential question for nation-
Each side has more of the other weapon-reactor
The Tritium Factor could cut the number of
al security is how long a tritium production halt we
product, long-lived plutonium, than it needs. Like a
warheads in the superpower nuclear arsenals by
can tolerate without endangering our nuclear deter-
ticking clock, the decay of tritium-the "Tritium
about one-half within 12 years after a tritium halt
rent.
Factor"-would set a pace for arms-control negoti-
begins. Both sides could salvage tritium from the
The United States has enough tritium in its
ators to reach agreement on steady reductions in
23,000 nuclear warheads to sustain a force of about
the nuclear arsenals beyond a START agreement.
warheads they retire and use it to replenish the
6,000 warheads for longer than 20 years. A recent
Faced with this built-in deadline, negotiators would
tritium charges in the remaining weapons systems.
Brookings Institution study concludes that a strate-
be likely to approach their negotiations in a serious
As confidence was established, deeper cuts could be
gic force of this size on each side would meet the
fashion.
pursued at a rate even faster than tritium's decay.
most demanding deterrent requirements. Others
The weapons reactors of both sides, meanwhile,
Negotiators could seek reductions in the most
would be held on standby, ready to restart for
destabilizing weapons as they proceeded toward the
believe, as I do, that superpower arsenals of 1,000
nuclear weapons apiece would provide an effective
tritium production if post-START negotiations
goal of achieving minimum effective deterrence.
broke down. The shutdown would be policed by
Invoking the Tritium Factor makes sense only if
deterrent; the United States now has enough triti-
satellite observations supplemented by on-site in-
the leaders of the superpowers are truly serious
um to supply this number of warheads for some 50
spections. Moreover, tritium processing plants are
about making arms reductions. There is one way to
years.
notorious for leaking, and the radioactive isotope
put this question to the test. When General Secre-
The Soviet Union may well be burdened with
could be readily detected on site.
tary Gorbachev meets next month with President
some aging production reactors of its own and, for
Use of the Tritium Factor to reduce nuclear
Reagan and President-elect Bush, they should
reasons of age or safety, might welcome an oppor-
armaments would eliminate the need for operating
agree to begin exploring a suspension of tritium
tunity to shut its production reactors down. We now
the aging Savannah River reactors or rushing to
production in the interest of world security.
have a rare opportunity to explore with the Soviet
build large new production reactors that can only
Union a mutual, verifiable halt in tritium produc-
feed the arms race. The Department of Energy now
The writer led the theoretical division at Los
tion. This could be done as an adjunct to the
plans to restart and run the Savannah River reac-
Alamos National Laboratory for 25 years and is a
ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Talks
tors while two expensive tritium production reac-
consultant to the Washington-based Nuclear
with the aim of putting real muscle into continuing
tors are constructed over 10 years. However, a
Control Institute on the tritium question.
NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE
1000 Connecticut Avenue. N.W. Suite 704. Washington. D.C. 20036 (202) 822-8444
The New York Times
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1987
The Tritium Factor
maintain nuclear arsenals at present
By Paul L. Leventhal
haps a few hundred weapons for each
levels of about 25,000 to 30,000 war-
side. Then tritium production could
and Milton M. Hoenig
heads each. But they must continue to
begin anew, but in much smaller
produce enough tritium to replace the
quantities than before it was suspend-
A way to
WASHINGTON - It appears likely
tritium that has decayed. If they.
ed, to maintain weapons stocks at the
that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S.
agreed to stop producing tritium,
agreed level. The arms reduction pro-
reduce atomic
Gorbachev will get together for a
each side eventually would have to
cess could extend over decades or it
summit meeting to conclude their his-
begin retiring nuclear weapons at a
could be accelerated over a shorter
weapons.
toric nuclear arms agreement. But
rate equal to tritium's decay rate of
period.
will an accord on medium-range mis-
5.5 percent a year.
The unexpected convergence of two
siles also represent the first step to-
This process could be used to estab-
recent developments - the super-
ward a dramatic reduction in strate-
lish a minimum rate for retiring
powers' near diplomatic success in
creases the danger that commercial
weapons. It could serve as a self-en-
gic nuclear arsenals that the two
negotiating an arms reduction agree-
plutonium might fall into the hands of
leaders explored at Reykjavik?
forcing mechanism for achieving
ment in Europe, and new concerns
nations or terrorists who want the
If the proposed agreement is not to
steady progress toward significantly
since the Chernobyl accident about
bomb. Moreover, much of the growth
smaller nuclear arsenals. Most im-
be another false start in curbing the
the safety of aging reactors used for
stems from the poor example that the
portant, this approach could be made
nuclear arms race, both leaders
weapons production - provide a
superpowers have set by failing to
subject to strict verification to insure
should be considering how they are
unique opportunity to advance arms
limit the growth of their own nuclear
that all military production reactors,
reduction efforts.
going to keep the arms-reduction pro-
stockpiles.
which are used to produce tritium
Both sides, therefore, might wel-
cess going. This continuity is also
The expected summit meeting
and plutonium, are shut down and
come this method of continuing re-
vital in breathing new life into the
could present an opportunity for the
that weapons are dismantled at an
ductions in weapons, as well as the re-
seemingly hopeless task of prevent-
United States and the Soviet Union to
agreed rate. Both types of verifica-
sulting suspension of production of
ing the spread of nuclear weapons to
consider a suspension of tritium pro-
tion are feasible, based on existing
other weapons materials. A halt in
additional nations and to terrorists.
methods and technology.
tritium production would also encom-
duction as a relatively painless, grad-
One possibility is for the leaders to
Each side could begin cautiously by
pass a halt in production of two other
ual approach to significant arms re-
explore the potential of the so-called
keeping one or two reactors on
weapons materials, plutonium and
duction. A 6 percent annual reduction
tritium factor, which could provide a
standby in case more tritium were
highly enriched uranium. Thus, if new
in nuclear arsenals, beginning with
verifiable way to reduce the number
needed in the event that negotiations
supplies of tritium were not needed
retirement of about 1,500 warheads
of nuclear weapons gradually, at the
for weapons cuts failed to keep pace
for an extended period, the Reagan
on each side, would be considered too
rate of about 6 percent a year.
with tritium's decay. Assuming the
Administration could defer a pro-
slow by some and too fast by others.
Tritium is a radioactive form of hy-
cuts proceeded on schedule, however,
posal to build two new reactors at a
But it could help build confidence and
drogen that is produced in nuclear
no new tritium production would be
cost of $6 billion each to be used in
reduce the number of nuclear weap-
reactors. Small amounts of it are
needed for some time.
production of weapons materials.
ons by at least 50 percent by the year
used in most nuclear weapons to
Tritium from retired weapons
The superpowers would gain a fur-
2000.
boost their explosive yield and for
could be concentrated and reused for
ther bonus from an agreement to stop
Given the potential for continued
other purposes. The "tritium factor"
remaining weapons, and arsenals
production of new weapons materi-
arms reductions and the additional
is a term used to refer to tritium's
could be drawn down to a level of
als: They could enhance their cred-
benefit of encouraging other nations
rapid rate of decay. The few grams of
minimum effective deterrence, per-
ibility in appealing to other nations
to turn away from production of nu-
tritium contained in a nuclear
not to pursue nuclear weapons pro-
clear weapons materials, a suspen-
weapon must be replaced frequently
grams and not to produce weapons-
sion of tritium production is certainly
because tritium depletes by about
usable plutonium and uranium in
worth a try.
half every 12 years. By comparison,
the other principal nuclear weapons
A verifiable
civilian programs.
The world is increasingly danger-
materials, plutonium and uranium,
method of
ous not only because of the superpow-
decay over thousands of years.
ers' enormous nuclear -weapons
The two superpowers have
stockpiles but also because the world
produced all the weapons-usable ura-
insuring
supply of plutonium is rapidly grow-
nium and plutonium they need to
ing.
mutual
Within a decade, European coun-
Paul L. Leventhal is president, and
tries and Japan will have more weap-
Milton M. Hoenig is scientific direc-
tor, of the Nuclear Control Institute, a
security.
ons-usable plutonium for use as fuel
in commercial power reactors than
research center on nuclear-prolifera-
the superpowers now have in all their
tion problems.
weapons. That surge in supply in-
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
The New York Times
TUESDAY, JULY 25, 1989
Restart Put Off Till Late 1990
For a Nuclear-Arms Reactor
By KEITH SCHNEIDER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 24 - The West-
Savannah River has been unable to
inghouse Savannah River Company,
make new supplies of tritium since
which operates the Federal Govern-
June 1988, when the third reactor was
ment's Savannah River nuclear weap-
shut for maintenance and modifica-
ons plant in South Carolina, has told the
tions to safety systems.
Department of Energy it will not be
In October, 1988, the Energy and De-
able to restart the first of three shut-
fense departments said that unless one
down military reactors until Septem-
reactor was restarted by the end of
ber 1990, the Energy Department said
1988, the readiness of the nuclear ar-
today.
senal could be compromised.
The proposed restarting date for the
Pentagon officials said old warheads
giant plant, which produces a perish-
might need to be deactivated to re-
able radioactive gas vital to thermonu-
cover tritium for use in higher priority
clear weapons, comes much later than
weapons.
Government officials and other ex-
perts envisioned in the spring of 1988
Risk Is Considered Overstated
when the last of three operable reac-
Critics of the Energy Department
tors was taken out of service for safety
including the Nuclear Control Institute,
modifications. Westinghouse sub-
a Washington-based arms control
mitted the restarting plan June 26.
group, said the Government was vastly
The Secretary of Energy, James D.
overstating the risk to the arsenal from
Watkins, said in a letter to the company
lack of new supplies of tritium.
last week that he was dissatisfied with
The new data to restart the first
its program for repairing the reactors
reactor at Savannah River, the "K"
and that more had to be done to start
reactor, is the most persuasive evi-
one reactor before late 1990, a spokes-
dence yet that supplies of tritium are
woman for the Energy Department
adequate, Westinghouse Savannah
said.
River, a subsidiary of the Westing
"Timing for Restart Slipped'
house Electric Corporation, took over
"We have some difficulties with Wes-
the vast plant April 1.
tinghhouse's proposed restart strat-
The plan provides new details about
an extensive overhaul of equipment
egy, which we are in the process of
and management of the reactors,
trying to work out," said Christina San-
key, a spokesman for the Energy De-
Energy Department officials say. The
partment.
document, say Government engineers
"My understanding of what's in the
who have seen it, expands on a report
proposed restart plan is that Westing-
late last year by the Energy Depart-
ment that called for $250 million in re-
house's timing for restart slipped sev-
eral months beyond what they were
pairs to the reactors.
originally talking about."
The Savannah River plant was built
The 37-year-old Savannah River Site
by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Compa-
is the largest and most important of 17
ny. Three of its five reactors have been
principal nuclear weapons plants and
operating for 35 years. Two were shut
in 1964 and 1984 because of cracks that
laboratories in 12 states. Three reac-
caused radioactive coolant to leak.
tors that remain operable at the 300-
square-mile plant are the nation's sole
John C. Tuck, the Under Secretary of
source of tritium, a radioactive isotope
Energy, said last week that parts of the
of hydrogen that enhances the explo-
Westinghouse restart plan would be
sive power of nuclear warheads.
made public. Ms. Sankey said the agen-
Yet tritium, unlike the other princi-
cy's public information office had not
pal ingredients of atomic bombs, plu-
yet seen a copy of the document.
tonium and enriched uranium, decays
at a fairly rapid rate. Tritium in war-
heads must be replenished periodically
or it ceases to function properly. Just
when replenishment is needed is one of
the Government's most closely held se-
crets.
The New York Times
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1989
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
IN THE NATION
Tom Wicker
two new reactors to supply tritium.
How to
out of Afghanistan, signaled with that
Production of the gas has been halted
token cut in short-range missiles that
entirely since safety concerns caused
his big lead in these weapons is on the
the reactors at the Savannah River nu-
table too, announced his readiness to
clear plant to be shut down a year ago.
Upstage
make the biggest sacrifice in conven-
Nor is the U.S. now producing any
tional forces, and laid out a scheme
enriched uranium or plutonium for
and a timetable for doing so that not
nuclear weapons. Thus, without sacri-
even a sour-grapes State Department
Gorbachev
fice, Mr. Bush could ask Congress to
can call propaganda.
defer the new reactors, save $700 mil-
But if that's not enough, let's do test
lion (maybe more later), and give
Mr. Gorbachev again - but with a new
him time to find out whether Mr. Gor-
American proposal rather than a
o
nce again, Mikhail Gorbachev
warmed-over idea from the Eisen-
bachev will agree to halt or limit pro-
has left the United States look-
ing off balance and recalci-
hower Administration. Why not an-
duction of nuclear weapons materi-
nounce a unilateral U.S. decision to
als. He's already announced a halt in
trant in the effort to reduce nuclear
Soviet production of enriched ura-
arms competition. Here's one Amer-
continue the present halt in the produc-
nium this year and the closing next
ican - and I suspect there are many
tion of tritium, an essential element in
nuclear warheads? That would make it
year of three reactors producing plu-
- who'd like to see our side get the
tonium for warheads.
jump on Mr. Gorbachev, for a change.
hard for the Soviets to reject an ac-
That national security would not be
And a useful way to do it is at hand.
companying proposal from Mr. Bush
risked by deferring the new reactors
Administration officials say the
that both sides explore the possibility
- which might never be needed if a
Soviet leader's plan for a small cut in
of a verifiable agreement to halt or
joint production halt could be negoti-
his country's short-range nuclear mis-
fimit all production of tritium, plu-
tonium and uranium for nuclear arms.
ated - is attested in a compelling
sile force was mostly propaganda. No
Not only would that grab headlines,
scientific report denying the Energy
doubt; it certainly took the headlines
however unimportant the Bush Ad-
Department's claim that a tritium
away from James Baker's visit to Mos-
ministration may consider them. It
shortage exists. The report contends
cow. Still, these officials argue, Presi-
also could lead to an arms control
that enough U.S. tritium now is avail-
dent Bush need not compete with Mr.
agreement vastly reducing the num-
able or recoverable "to sustain a fully
Gorbachev in what they call "P.R."
ber of nuclear warheads on both
adequate weapons stockpile for at
but should hold to a "cautious" course.
sides, as a new SALT treaty and fur-
léast five years."
So they're calling for more "tests"
ther agreements would presumably
The 11 scientists who compiled that
of the bona fides of a leader who's al-
cut back on delivery vehicles, Such a
report are all long experienced in nu-
ready made a major cut in deployed
proposal, moreover, would not jeop-
clear weapons research and include
weapons in the I.N.F. treaty, agreed to
ardize U.S. warhead stocks or na-
men who were advisers to Republi-
halve the numbers of his biggest, most
tional security - but it would make a
can as well as Democratic Adminis-
threatening ICBM, pulled his troops
real dent in the budget deficit.
trations. Two of them soon will testify
This idea, devised by the Nuclear
before Mr. Aspin's committee.
Control Institute of Washington, has
The arms controllers' letter sug-
been outlined by a group of experi-
gested, however, that Congress make
A good
enced arms controllers to Les Aspin,
it clear, by legislation or a joint reso-
chairman of the House Armed Serv-
lution, that if negotiations failed new
ices Committee. The group includes
supplies of tritium would be author-
opportunity
Gerard Smith and Ralph Earle, chief
ized and produced before the nation's
for President
SALT negotiators for Presidents
weapons stockpile could be affected.
Nixon and Carter.
Halting or reducing production of
Bush to take
Congress is already working on this
crucial materials for nuclear weap-
year's defense authorization bill and
ons seems an idea whose time has
has been asked by the Department of
come. If both superpowers can agree
the initiative.
Energy to put up $300 million in fiscal
to cut back nuclear forces, why
1990 - and eventually about $7.5 bil-
should either want to build more nu-
lion altogether - for construction of
clear weapons?
Stay tuned for another article, with
further details on this beckoning op-
portunity for President Bush.
The New York Times
FRIDAY, MAY 19, 1989
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
IN THE NATION
Tom Wicker
Lemon
And
Lemonade
S the yearlong shutdown of the
Tritium is the key. It's a perishable
By such steps alone, the scientists
reactors at the Savannah River
gas used to "boost" the yield of war-
estimate, the U.S. could maintain "a
nuclear plant a crisis or an oppor-
heads, so that they can be reduced in
fully adequate weapon stockpile" for
tunity? Can a lemon be made into
size and weight. Unlike plutonium and
perhaps five years without additional
lemonade?
enriched uranium, tritium decays rap-
tritium production or costs for new
The shutdown - for safety reasons
idly - at a rate of about 5.5 percent a
reactors. Therefore, the Nuclear Con-
- stopped production of tritium, an es-
year. That doesn't affect the yield of
trol Institute and a group of experi-
sential element in nuclear warheads.
enced arms controllers are urging
That's why the Department of Energy
Congress to withhold funds for the
sees a national-security crisis it wants
reactors while the Administration
to attack by starting construction of
Opportunity
determines whether:
two new reactors at a cost of $7.5 bil-
Start and other negotiations re-
lion, before cost overruns.
in the halt of
duce nuclear arsenals - for instance,
But wait a minute. The U.S. has
by a 50 percent cut in strategic weap-
"enough tritium in its 23,000 nuclear
Savannah
ons - enough so that current U.S.
warheads to support a force of 6,000
tritium demands would be reduced to
strategic warheads for longer than 20
River tritium
the amount needed for many fewer
years and a force of 1,000 warheads
warheads.
for some 50 years," according to an
The Soviets would join in a veri-
eminent, non-governmental team of
production.
fiable agreement to halt all nuclear
scientists working with the Nuclear
weapons materials production. If so,
Control Institute.
both sides then would be forced into
They want to seize the opportunity
steady and verifiable reductions in
they think the reactor shutdown
the weapon, as long as a critical mini-
their nuclear arsenals, owing to triti-
presents, to negotiate with the Soviet
mum charge remains; but it does
um's 5.5 percent annual decay rate,
Union about a mutual and verifiable
determine how long a weapon can re-
until a minimum deterrent level was
halt to the production of tritium, plu-
main operational. Nuclear warheads,
reached.
tonium and enriched uranium - all
therefore, are given an oversupply of
At that point, agreed low levels of
necessary to the making of nuclear
tritium to extend their field life; and
tritium production could be resumed
warheads.
they must be recharged periodically
to maintain both sides' deterrent
The scientists are not advocating ne-
with a new supply of the gas.
forces; but the cost for that would be
gotiation from weakness, since the
Thus if the field life of nuclear weap-
far less than for the new reactors pro-
Soviets are in much the same fix. An
ons was cut from six to three years be-
jected by the Energy Department.
assessment by the Los Alamos Na-
fore a tritium recharge was needed,
Congress could make clear that if ne-
tional Laboratory concludes that
the tritium on hand would go twice as
gotiations failed sufficiently to re-
Soviet military reactors "are,old, ob-
far. If some weapons have a current
duce tritium needs, funds would be
solete and unsafe" and "will be shut
field life longer than six years, a cut-
available for a timely resumption of
down soon anyway." A few weeks ago,
back to three years would extend the
production.
Mikhail Gorbachev announced a halt
tritium supply even further.
Congress is considering the new
in enriched uranium production and
Recharges consist of the timely re-
reactors. Start talks will soon re-
the closing next year of three reactors
placement of old tritium "reser-
sume. Now's the time for President
producing plutonium for warheads. 1.
voirs" in warheads with new ones.
Bush to make some lemonade, before
The U.S., having enough, no longer
Since the old reservoirs are not com-
Mr. Gorbachev begins to squeeze his
needs to produce plutonium or en-
pletely empty, the tritium remaining
own lemon.
riched uranium for weapons purposes.
in them could be recycled into new
Both superpowers have agreed in prin-
charges. More tritium could be ob-
ciple to reduce the size of their nuclear
tained from the reservoirs in war-
arsenals in the forthcoming Start ne-
heads being withdrawn under the
gotiations, and perhaps in others to fol-
I.N.F. treaty, from retired Poseidon
low. Thus, the moment may well be
submarine missiles and from other
ripe for a negotiated halt in production
warheads being taken out of service
of nuclear weapons materials.
for various reasons.
The Washington Post
NUCLEAR CONTROL
SUNDAY, APRIL 16, 1989
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
OUTPOSTS
T
his week, following reports of Soviet cutbacks in production of
weapon-grade uranium and plutonium, 11 American scientists propose a
halt in U.S. production of all nuclear weapons materials-including
tritium, a critical warhead component-while arms-reduction
talks continue, without the need for any new reactors or
any compromise in national security.
ATOMIC WEAPONS
America's Non-Existent Nuclear 'Crisis'
EW PRODUCTION of
Tritium, because of its decay rate,
heads, any reference to a "crisis" in
N
tritium for U.S. nuclear
is a wasting asset; it makes no sense
tritium supply is quite inappropriate.
weapons has been at a
to produce more than is now needed
We believe a new production re-
standstill since the spring
or to fund facilities capable of produc-
actor can be built in five years, rather
of 1988, when the Depart-
ing very much more than will be
than 10, once planning activities are
ment of Energy's reactors at the Sa-
needed. Plutonium, on the other hand,
completed. A great deal more is
vannah River plant were completely
is long-lived and is in ample supply
known now about.reactor design and
shut down as a result of safety con-
without new production to meet cur-
safety than was known in the 1950s,
rent weapons requirements.
and much time and money can be
cerns.
Since those reactors are the sole
Enough tritium exists in present
saved if construction proceeds effi-
inventory to sustain a fully adequate
ciently after thorough planning and
soufce of supply of tritium for nuclear
weapons stockpile, probably for at
safety and environmental review.
weapons, officials of the Departments
least five years without new produc-
The nation is now faced with strict
of "Defense and Energy and some
tion, if the possible effects of different
limitations on federal spending be-
members of Congress have stated
management arrangements and the
cause of the imperative to cut the
that production must be resumed in at
possible use of tritium from weapons
budget deficit. Very large sums will
least one Savannah River reactor this
scheduled for retirement or held in
be required to upgrade elements of
year or our national security will be
storage are taken into account. Con-
the weapons-production complex to
endangered; they view a longer halt
gress needs to obtain complete infor-
achieve improvements in safety, pol-
as tantamount to "unilateral disarma-
mation on these options from the De-
lution control and efficiency, as well as
ment." This concern is based on tri-
partments of Defense and Energy.
to proceed with the necessary cleanup
tium's relatively rapid radioactive de-
In view of the fact that the leaders
of environmental pollution resulting
cay, necessitating its regular replace-
of the United States and the Soviet
from 40 years of past operation.
ment in warheads.
Union have agreed in principle that
Monies now being requested for the
DOE also has asked for over $300
their nuclear arsenals are much too
construction of new production capac-
million in FY 1990 to prepare for con-
large, a continuation of the present
ity should be applied, for at least the
halt and a delay in proceeding with
next few years, to such other pur-
struction of two new production re-
new production facilities would allow
poses.
actors with an estimated cost of $7.5
time to ascertain whether the ongoing
billion. The reactors, to be completed
Strategic Arms Reduction (START)
Maintaining the Arsenal
in 10 years, would supply 150 percent
Talks and other arms reduction ini-
of DOE's perceived future tritium
tiatives will result in significantly re-
duced tritium requirements.
T
ritium, a man-made radioactive
requirements for nuclear weapons.
isotope of hydrogen, is an essen-
They also would be capable of produc-
If prospects for a START agree-
tial element in modern,
ing weapon-grade plutonium.
ment are realized, there would be an
"boosted" nuclear warheads. The fu-
It is our considered view that there
opportunity to reassess the need for
sion of a few grams of tritium with a
is no critical shortage of tritium today
new tritium production capacity and
naturally occurring hydrogen isotope
and that claims of an imminent "crisis"
to take advantage of substantial re-
called deuterium provides a burst of
distort the true situation. Congress
ductions in the size and cost of new
neutrons at the crucial moment to
and the American people should not
facilities if they are required.
amplify ("boost") the yield in fission
be stampeded into restarting the Sa-
If it turns out that these arms-re-
weapons or in the fission triggers of
vannah River reactors and building
duction opportunities will not be re-
thermonuclear weapons. Boosted
costly new reactors. Instead, the ex-
alized, and a new production reactor is
warheads thus weigh less, are more
isting tritium supply should be put to
eventually needed, plans of the kind
compact and efficient and have lower
currently proposed could be rein-
'more efficient use to meet the na-
cost. We are heavily dependent on
stated. The delay of a few years en-
tion's military needs in the near-term
boosting, and the Soviets use it as
tailed by this approach would not
well.
and proposals for new production
erode the nuclear-deterrent power
Because tritium decays at a rate of
should be reevaluated.
the nation now possesses, nor pose
5.5 percent annually (it has a half-life
There are a number of important
any other risk to national security. It
of 12.5 years), the tritium "reservoirs"
reasons to take this cautious ap-
should be understood that with a
of U.S. nuclear warheads must be re-
proach.
stockpile of over 20,000 nuclear war-
filled regularly to maintain the weap-
ons' explosive yield. The reservoirs
would be cut in half and the supply
the non-production period, we pre-
are filled initially with a supply of tri-
extended from one year to two years.
sumably would have prepared at least
tium in excess of what is needed for
For weapons with a service life longer
one Savannah River reactor for re-
the weapon to operate properly.
than six years, the extension of inven-
start. Operating even at half power, it
When the excess runs down, the res-
tory would be even greater.
could supply enough tritium to sustain
ervoir is exchanged for a. new one.
These options would entail a dou-
the arsenal at its present level during
The surviving tritium in the old res-
bling (or more) of the work load at
the approximately five years required
ervoir is recovered, purified and re-
facilities handling the refills. But the
to complete a new production reactor.
cycled. Tritium replenishment cycles
increase would take effect gradually
In the unlikely event that none of the
vary for different types of warheads:
and would not be difficult to prepare
remaining Savannah River reactors
It has been reported that weapons
for. The increased number of reser-
can be restarted safely, there are a
currently in the stockpile have a four-
voirs to be handled also would raise
number of other possible sources: The
to six-year cycle, whereas the new
operating costs in the field. But this
N reactor at Hanford, now undergoing
generation of submarine-launched
would be offset by the net savings
renovation; the DOE test reactors in
missiles may be charged for 10 years
realized from deferring new tritium
Idaho; and even the expedient of com-
or more.
production costs.
mercial power reactors, for which
Provided that the essential mini-
There are a number of other po-
tritium target technology is now un-
mum amount of tritium remains in the
tential sources of tritium that could be
der development. Also, tritium might
weapon system, it will still produce
used to avert a short-range tritium
be acquired from France, Britain or
the certified yield. The size of the
supply problem. Among these are: the
possibly Canada.
charge determines only the length of
500 or so warheads to be withdrawn
time the weapon may remain in the
under the INF Treaty, along with the
Recommendations and Reality
field. To provide a six-year service life
Pershing 1A missiles to be retired
after a fresh filling, the tritium loading
from Germany; the warheads from
must have an excess of at least 40
the Poseidon submarines retired since
P
reparations now underway for
percent over the minimum amount.
1985, along with additional warheads
construction of new production
from the two scheduled for retire-
reactors should be deferred to
An eight-year service life requires an
ment in 1989 to abide by the SALT
allow Congress to become fully in-
excess of 57 percent; 10 years re-
limits; the bombs removed from the
formed about the country's actual
quires approximately 75 percent
needs and to allow time for the
above the minimum.
B52G bombers converted to conven-
tional missions; some 400 enhanced
START process to produce results.
A Crisis Mentality
radiation warheads now in storage (if
The United States should not now
their large tritium supplies have been
resume production of nuclear weapon
n testimony before the Senate
kept intact); and the recovery of tri-
materials that are not needed and can
serve only to further stimulate the
Armed Services Committee, Troy
tium from used heavy water moder-
arms race. Instead, it should move
E. Wade, DOE acting assistant
ators in storage at Savannah River.
toward a mutual halt in the production
secretary for defense programs, said
All these and similar sources should
of nuclear materials for weapons.
it would be necessary to restart one
be exploited before it is concluded
While the present halt in production
Savannah River reactor by the end of
that there is any imminent "crisis."
remains in effect, the United States
the year, since by then the need for
Finally, it should be noted that if
should consider offering not to restart
new tritium would become critical.
the present halt in tritium production
the Savannah River reactors or to
Earlier, Robert B. Barker, assistant to
were continued for an extended pe-
begin construction of new production
the secretary of defense for atomic
riod, the weapons stockpile eventually
reactors for a designated period of
energy, was quoted as warning that
would have to be reduced at a rate
time to give the Soviet Union the op-
delaying restart of the reactors would
similar to the decrease in the amount
portunity to reciprocate. The two
be tantamount to "unilateral nuclear
of tritium on hand-that is, at the
sides may be able to proceed to a mu-
disarmament." These assertions have
decay rate of about 5.5 percent a
tual halt in production of tritium and
led to expressions of congressional
year. For about the first five years,
fissionable materials for weapons by a
concern. Yet a recent internal Pen-
such a reduction in weapons is roughly
series of reciprocal steps. A mutual
tagon study, reported in The Boston
equivalent to the cuts that have been
production halt could be monitored by
Globe, concludes that there is an ad-
discussed in the START negotiations.
national technical means and on-site
equate supply of tritium for 18
Should negotiations continue beyond
inspections, supplemented by inter-
months to two years with no alter-
START with the objective of estab-
national and bilateral safeguards on
ations in resupply of weapons or any
lishing a minimum effective nuclear
civilian reactors. Such a halt is pos-
additional production.
deterrent, there would be no need to
sible in the context of a START
There are a number of straightfor-
resume new tritium production for
agreement and agreements on deep
ward means that could be adopted to
many years. In fact, the United States
cuts beyond START accompanied by
stretch out the period for which a giv-
now has enough tritium in its 23,000
verification of delivery systems and
en reserve supply of tritium would be
nuclear warheads to support a force of
warheads destroyed and retained.
adequate. The most obvious and im-
6,000 strategic warheads for longer
The United States and the Soviet
mediately effective step would be to
than 20 years and a force of 1,000
Union should not let pass an extraor-
reconsider existing plans for tritium
warheads for some 50 years.
service life. Suppose, for example,
But what if the START and other
dinary opportunity to achieve a mu-
that the current schedule calls for
initiatives fail? As a worst-case sce-
tual end to the production of nuclear
nario, suppose that the United States
materials for weapons. For its part,
refilling a large number of weapons
the United States can exercise re-
for a six-year service life. According
were to refrain from producing any
to Troy Wade's testimony, there is
tritium for five years and that at the
straint and turn the present produc-
only enough tritium on hand to con-
end of that time there were no clear
tion shutdown to advantage. It should
tinue the refilling operation for about
prospect of any arms-control agree-
not be stampeded into premature re-
one year. However, simply by chang-
ment. We might then decide that it
sumption of tritium production or con-
ing to a three-year service life, for
was essential to build up our nuclear
struction of new production capacity.
which the required excess in the filling
arsenal. Would we then face a crisis in
If we exercise restraint, the arms re-
tritium supply?
duction process can flourish.
is only 18 percent rather than 40, the
required amount of additional tritium
No. Because even then, other
sources would be available. During
TRITIUM AND THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL
T
ritium, a rare radioactive isotype of hydrogen, is used to amplify the yield
H'
Tritium
H²
Deuterium
of fission weapons or to boost the fission "triggers" of thermonuclear
weapons. This effect is produced by causing the fusion of tritium (which has a
nucleus containing two neutrons and one proton) with deuterium, a naturally
occurring isotope of hydrogen that has one proton and one neutron.
When a warhead is detonated and temperatures reach millions of degrees,
the nuclei of these atoms-which normally would repel each other because
both have positive charges-fuse into heavier forms. One result is a helium
nucleus consisting of two protons and one or two neutrons. The remaining
nuclear particles are released in fusion along with a quantity of energy, boosting
the weapon's force.
He'
Hellum
ENERGY
Because tritium decays
neutron
rather rapidly (it has a "half-life"
of 12.5 years, or a decay rate of
about 5.5 percent per year), it must be
re-loaded at intervals into the "reservoirs" of
nuclear warheads to maintain their explosive yield.
The refilling schedule, or replenishment cycle, varies
according to each weapon's specified service life. But
Reprocessing
in general, the longer the cycle, the more extra
plant
tritium must be loaded to compensate for the
isotope's decay rate. An eight-year service
life, for example, requires an excess of
57 percent; whereas a 10-year cycle
requires 75 percent.
Nuclear
warhead
Nuclear missile,
PETER HOEY-THE WASHINGTON POST
The Authors
T
he following scientists have signed the tritium policy paper,
Kurt Gottfried, professor of physics and nuclear studies at Cor-
prepared in collaboration with the Nuclear Control-Institute in
nell, was an officer of the American Physical Society and a consul-
Washington, from which the above article is adapted:
tant to the Department of Energy's high-energy-physics advisory
Hans Bethe, a 1967 Nobel Prize winner in physics, formerly
board.
headed the theoretical-physics division at Los Alamos National Lab-
Milton Hoenig, a physicist and scientific director of the Nuclear
oratory and is emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University.
Control Institute, was at ACDA during the Carter administration.
Freeman Dyson, professor of physics at Princeton's Institute for
Franklin Long, professor emeritus of chemistry at Cornell, was
Advanced Study, has been a frequent consultant to the Defense
research supervisor of the National Defense Research Committee
Department and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
from 1942 to 1945 and assistant director of ACDA under President
(ACDA).
Kennedy.
Herman Feshbach, former chairman of the nuclear-science ad-
J. Carson Mark, former leader of the theoretical-physics division
visory committee of the National Science Foundation and former
of Los Alamos National Laboratory, serves as a consultant to Los
president of the American Physical Society and the American
Alamos and other government agencies.
Academy of Arts and Sciences, is emeritus institute professor of
George Rathjens, professor of political science at MIT, was chief
physics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
scientist in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and in
Val Fitch, a 1980 Nobel Prize winner in physics and professor of
the Office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and
physics at Princeton University, was a presidential adviser on sci-
Technology.
ence policy and arms control in the Nixon administration.
Victor Weisskopf, former group leader at Los Alamos National
Marvin Goldberger, former president of the California Institute
Laboratory and former director of CERN (the European Center for
of Technology and now director of Princeton's Institute for Ad-
Nuclear Research), is emeritus institute professor of physics at MIT.
vanced Study, chaired the committee on international security and
arms control of the National Academy of Sciences.
April 7, 1989
FOR A NEW NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION POLICY:
SOLVING THE MILITARY TRITIUM PROBLEM
Hans Bethe, Freeman Dyson, Herman Feshbach, Val Fitch,
Marvin Goldberger, Kurt Gottfried, Milton Hoenig, Franklin Long,
Carson Mark, George Rathjens, Victor Weisskopf
This paper was prepared in collaboration with the
Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, D.C.
Introduction
New production of tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons has been
at a standstill since the spring of 1988, when the Energy
Department's reactors at the Savannah River plant were completely
shut down as a result of safety concerns.
Since the Savannah River reactors are the sole source of
supply of tritium for nuclear weapons, officials of the
Departments of Defense and Energy and some members of Congress
have stated that tritium production for weapons must be resumed in
at least one Savannah River reactor this year or our national
security will be endangered; they view a longer halt in tritium
production as tantamount to "unilateral disarmament." This
concern is based on tritium's relatively rapid radioactive decay,
necessitating its regular replacement in warheads to keep them
fully functional.
DOE also has asked for over $300 million in FY 1990 to
prepare for construction of two new production reactors costing
$7.5 billion, according to the department's present preliminary
estimate. The reactors, to be completed in 10 years, would supply
150 percent of DOE's perceived future tritium requirements for
nuclear weapons. They also would be capable of producing weapon-
grade plutonium.
It is our considered view that there is no critical shortage
of tritium today. Claims that the United States is confronted
with an imminent tritium crisis distort the true situation.
Congress and the American people should not be stampeded into
restarting the Savannah River reactors and building costly new
production reactors. Instead, the existing tritium supply
should be put to more efficient use to meet the nation's military
tritium needs in the near-term, and any need for new production of
tritium over the long-term should be reevaluated.
There are a number of important reasons for taking this
cautious approach to new tritium production.
Tritium, because of its relatively rapid radioactive decay,
is a wasting asset; it makes no sense to produce more tritium than
is now needed or to fund facilities capable of producing very much
more than will be needed. Plutonium, on the other hand, is long
lived and is in ample supply to meet current weapons requirements.
There is no need to produce more of it at the present time.
In view of the fact that the leaders of the United States
and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle that the superpower
nuclear arsenals are much too large, a continuation of the present
halt in tritium production and a delay in proceeding with new
production facilities would allow time to ascertain whether the
ongoing Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Talks and other arms
reduction initiatives will result in significant reductions in
tritium requirements. As discussed below, if prospects for a
START agreement are realized, there would be an opportunity to
reassess the need for new tritium production capacity and to take
advantage of substantial reductions in the size and cost of new
facilities if they are required.
Congress needs to obtain information from the Departments of
Energy and Defense on how many years the existing tritium
inventory can be extended by more efficient management and use,
without new production. We believe, as discussed below, Congress
may learn that there now exists enough tritium to sustain a fully
adequate weapons stockpile for at least five years, if the
possible effects of different tritium management arrangements and
the possible use of tritium from weapons scheduled for retirement
or held in storage are taken into account.
If it becomes apparent that START and other arms-reduction
opportunities will not be realized, and a new production reactor
is eventually needed, plans of the kind currently proposed could
be reinstated. The delay of a few years entailed by this approach
would not erode the nuclear deterrent power the nation now
possesses, nor pose any other risk to national security.
In any circumstance, there is no need for the further
production of long-lived plutonium for nuclear weapons since
already sufficient supplies exist from weapons retirements and
scrap recovery.
We believe a new production reactor could be built in 5
years rather than the 10 years now projected by the Department of
Energy, once planning activities are completed. A great deal
more is known now about reactor design and safety than was known
in the 1950s, and much time and money could be saved if
construction proceeds efficiently after thorough planning and
safety and environmental review. The several-year tritium
cushion that now exists for weapons gives the nation time to
review its objectives and future needs. It is not in the national
interest, therefore, to move ahead precipitously with construction.
Indeed, the nation is now faced with strict limitations on
Federal spending because of the imperative to cut the budget
deficit. Very large sums will be required to upgrade some
elements of the weapons production complex in order to achieve
improvements in safety, pollution control and efficiency of
operation, as well as to proceed with the necessary cleanup of
2
environmental pollution resulting from 40 years of past operation.
Monies now being requested for the construction of new production
capacity should be applied, for at least the next few years, to
such other purposes.
Tritium's Significance
Tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential
element in modern, "boosted" nuclear warheads. The fusion of a
few grams of tritium with deuterium provides a burst of neutrons
at the crucial moment to amplify ("boost") the yield in fission
weapons or in the fission triggers of thermonuclear weapons.
Boosting allows reductions in the weight of nuclear warheads,
enabling them to be more compact and efficient, and also lowering
their cost. We are heavily dependent on boosting, and the Soviets
are known 1 to make use of its very significant advantages, as
well.
Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent annually,
reducing by half in about 12 years, the tritium "reservoirs" of U.S.
nuclear warheads must be refilled regularly to maintain the
weapons' explosive yield. The reservoir of a nuclear weapon is
filled initially with a supply of tritium in excess of what is
needed for the weapon to operate properly. The tritium excess
lasts for a specified number of years after the weapon is
deployed, and when the excess runs down, because of radioactive
decay, the tritium reservoir is exchanged for a new one. The
surviving tritium in the old reservoir is recovered, purified and
recycled. Tritium replenishment cycles vary for the different
types of nuclear warheads in the stockpile. It has been reported
that weapons currently in the stockpile have a 4-to-6 year
replenishment cycle while the new generation of submarine launched
missiles 2 may be charged with a tritium oversupply lasting 10 years
or more.
Provided that an essential minimum amount of tritium remains
in the weapon system, the size of the initial tritium charge or its
radioactive decay do not affect the weapon's operation to the
extent of failing to give the certified yield. The size of the
charge determines only the length of time the weapon may remain in
the field before it becomes necessary to replenish its tritium
supply.
For example, to provide a 6-year service life after a fresh
filling, the tritium loading must have an excess of at least 40
percent over the minimum amount. This excess represents the extra
amount of tritium that must be added to the tritium recovered from
a weapon's reservoir, after it is returned from the field, in
order to prepare it for being sent back for a further 6-year
service life. To refill a tritium reservoir for an 8-year service
life in the field would require adding an excess of at least 57
percent of the essential minimum amount, whereas a 10-year service
life requires an excess of about 75 percent over what is needed
for the weapon to be operable.
3
The Near-Term Tritium Cushion
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Troy E. Wade, DOE Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs,
said that it would be necessary to restart one Savannah River
reactor by the end of the year 3 since by then the need for new
tritium would become critical. Earlier, Robert B. Barker,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, was
quoted as warning that delaying restart of the reactors would be
tantamount to "unilateral nuclear disarmament. These assertions
have led to expressions of Congressional concern about the
prospect of "unilateral disarmament. However, a recent
internal Pentagon study reportedly concludes that there is an
adequate supply of tritium for 18 months to 2 years with no
alterations in resupply of weapons or any additional production of
tritium.
6
The detailed assumptions leading to these somewhat different
conclusions were not disclosed. It may be assumed, however, that
they were developed on the basis of needs implied by some pre-
existing schedule for the resupply of tritium for weapons in the
stockpile, along with initial supply for a certain number of new
weapons, and that the procedures to be followed were in accordance
with some customary prescription concerning service life.
There are a number of straightforward means that could be
adopted to stretch out the period for which a given reserve supply
of tritium would be able to cover the weapon=filling requirements,
without having to declare a state of emergency or resorting to
"unilateral disarmament."
The most obvious and immediately effective step would be to
reconsider existing plans for tritium service life. By way of
illustration, suppose that the current schedule calls for
refilling a large number of weapons for a 6-year service life.
According to Assistant Energy Secretary Wade's statement
above, there is only enough tritium on hand to continue the
refilling operation for about one year. However, simply by
changing to a 3-year service life, for which the required excess
in the filling is only 18% rather than the 40% required for 6
years, the amount of additional tritium required to refurbish the
same number of weapons would be cut in half, and the supply of
tritium for maintaining the same number of weapons would be
extended from one year to two years. If the proposed program
includes weapons having a service life longer than 6 years, the
change to a 3-year life would result in an even longer extension
of the existing tritium inventory.
A further step to extend the existing tritium supply would
be to redistribute the tritium already in warheads by filling
depleted tritium reservoirs with a portion of the excess tritium
recovered from more recently replenished warheads and thereby
4
shortening the overall replenishment cycle. In this process,
recently filled reservoirs would be brought back from the field
along with depleted ones, and the weapons would be resupplied with
reservoirs having shorter service lives. For example,
redistributing the tritium in the stockpile to reduce the tritium
service life overall from 6 years to 3 years could extend the
tritium supply by yet another two years.
Part of the price for using these means to defer any
tritium "crisis" would be the doubling (or more) of the work load
at facilities handling the refills. But the increased workload
would take effect gradually and would not be difficult to prepare
for. The increased number of reservoirs to be handled also would
raise operating costs in the field, but this increase, like the
higher facility costs, would be offset by the net savings realized
from no new tritium production costs.
There are a number of other potential sources of tritium
that could be used to avert a short-range tritium supply problem.
Among these are the 500 or so warheads to be withdrawn under the
INF treaty, along with the Pershing 1A missiles to be retired from
Germany; the warheads from the Poseidon submarines retired since
1985, along with additional warheads from the two scheduled for
retirement in 1989 to abide by the SALT limits; the bombs removed
from the B-52G bombers converted to conventional missions; some
400 enhanced radiation warheads now in storage, if their large
tritium supplies have been kept intact; and the recovery of
tritium from used heavy water moderator in storage at Savannah
River. These all represent possible additional sources of
tritium. Some may already have been taken into account, and some
may not provide much relief. But certainly these, and any other
similar examples, should be exploited before it is concluded that
there is any imminent crisis.
Once Congress has complete information available, it would
be surprising not to find that tritium requirements to maintain a
fully adequate weapon stockpile (as distinct from some past
projections of possible future stockpile trends and developments)
could be met for a significant period such as 5 years without
any additional tritium production.
It should not take as long as five years, however, to
determine whether the START and other arms-reduction negotiations
are likely to produce cuts sufficient to permit continued
suspension of tritium production. It is widely assumed that it
should be clear within two years whether a START agreement will be
successfully concluded, by which time it also should be clear
whether post-START negotiations for further deep cuts are in the
offing. Still, for the purpose of examining a worst-case
scenario, one could suppose that the U.S. has refrained from
producing any tritium for a period of five years and that, at the
end of that time, there is no clear prospect of any arms control
agreement. We might then decide that it was essential to build up
our nuclear arsenal. Would we then be in a tritium crisis?
5
Even in this worst case, the United States could find other
sources of tritium to meet its military requirements. Over the
interim period we could, and presumably would, have prepared at
least one Savannah River reactor for restart. Operating even at
half power, a single Savannah River reactor could supply enough
tritium to sustain the arsenal at its present level until a new
production reactor is completed. The concerted construction phase
of a new production reactor would begin immediately and could be
finished in 5 years, after having previously completed the design
work and the necessary environmental and safety reviews.
In the unlikely event that none of the remaining Savannah
River reactors can be restarted safely, there are a number of
other possible sources of military tritium: for example, the N
reactor at Hanford, which is now undergoing renovation, the DOE
test reactors in Idaho, and even the expedient of commercial power
reactors, for which tritium target technology is now under
development. Also, tritium might be acquired from France and
Britain, and possibly from Canada.
However, it should be understood that with a stockpile of
over 20,000 nuclear warheads, any reference to a "crisis" in
tritium supply is quite inappropriate. Should the hope for
agreement on START and follow-on arms reductions fail, any
interim measures taken while new reactor construction is being
completed - such as the temporary transfer of tritium from
some less essential weapons to more essential ones would not
diminish our deterrent capability.
Finally, it should be noted that if the present halt in
tritium production were continued for an extended period, the
weapons stockpile eventually would have to be reduced at a rate
similar to the decrease in the amount of tritium on hand that
is, at the decay rate of about 5.5% a year. 7 For about the first
five years, such a reduction in weapons is really quite similar to
the cuts that have been discussed in the START negotiations.
Should negotiations continue beyond START with the objective of
establishing a minimum effective nuclear deterrent, there would be
no need to resume new tritium production for many years. In fact,
the United States now has enough tritium in its 23,000 nuclear
warheads to support a force of 6,000 strategic warheads for longer
than 20 years and a force of 1,000 warheads for some 50 years.
Recommendations
Plans for new tritium production reactor capacity should be
scaled to reflect the country's actual needs. Congress must
obtain from the Energy and Defense Departments documented
information on what these needs are today, to what extent they can
be met from existing inventory, and what they would be in the event
of START reductions and reductions beyond START. Preparations now
underway for construction of new production reactors should be
deferred to allow Congress to become fully informed and to allow
time for the START process to produce results.
6
In the meantime, the United States should not resume
production of nuclear weapon materials that are not needed and can
serve only to further stimulate the arms race. Instead, it should
move toward a mutual halt in the production of nuclear materials
for weapons.
While the present halt in production remains in effect, the
United States should consider offering not to restart the Savannah
River reactors or to begin construction of new production reactors
for a designated period of time to give the Soviet Union the
opportunity to reciprocate. The two sides may be able to proceed
to a mutual halt in production of tritium and fissionable
materials for weapons by a series of reciprocal steps.
A mutual production halt could be monitored by national
technical means and on-site inspections, supplemented by
international and bilateral safeguards on civilian reactors. Such
a halt is possible in the context of a START agreement and
agreements on deep cuts beyond START accompanied by verification
of delivery systems and warheads destroyed and retained.
The United States and the Soviet Union should not let pass
an extraordinary opportunity to achieve a mutual halt in the
production of nuclear materials for weapons. For its part, the
United States can exercise restraint and turn the present
production shutdown to advantage. It should not be stampeded into
premature resumption of tritium production or construction of new
production capacity. If we exercise restraint, the arms reduction
process can flourish.
1. Robert Kelley, "Comments on the Tritium Factor' Proposal,"
Study performed for the Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Intelligence, June 1988 (reprinted in The Tritium Factor:
Tritium's Impact on Nuclear Arms Reductions, a report on a
December 1988 workshop by the Nuclear Control Institute and the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, to be published in April
1989).
2. Michael R. Gordon, "Stretching Gas For Nuclear Arms Studied,"
New York Times, 24 Oct. 1988.
3. Statement of Troy E. Wade II, Acting Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs, DOE, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, 2 Feb. 1989.
4. Keith Schneider and Michael Gordon, "Reactor Shutdown Could
Impede Nuclear Deterrent," New York Times, 9 Oct. 1988.
5. Senator John H. Glenn, "The Mini-Hiroshima Near Cincinnati,"
New York Times, 24 Jan. 1989; also, transcript of "Today Show"
interview, December 28, 1988, 7:17 AM.
7
6. Fred Kaplan, "Tritium Shortage Isn't Critical Yet, Pentagon
Says," Boston Globe, 22 Jan. 1989; "Operator Error at Savannah
River Causes Damage to Cooling System," Boston Globe, 26 Jan.
1989.
7. J. Carson Mark, Thomas D. Davies, Milton M. Hoenig, and Paul
L. Leventhal, "The Tritium Factor as a Forcing Function in Nuclear
Arms Reduction Talks," Science, 2 September 1988, pp. 1166-1169.
SIGNERS OF TRITIUM PAPER
April 13, 1989
Hans Bethe, a 1967 Nobel Prize winner in physics and former head
of the Theoretical Physics Division at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, is emeritus professor of physics and nuclear studies
at Cornell University.
Freeman Dyson, professor of physics at Princeton's Institute for
Advanced Study, has been a frequent consultant to the Defense
Department and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Herman Feshbach, former chairman of the Nuclear Science Advisory
Committee of the National Science Foundation and former president
of the American Physical Society and the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, is an Emeritus Institute Professor of physics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Val Fitch, a 1980 Nobel Prize winner in physics and professor of
physics at Princeton University, was a presidential adviser on
science policy and arms control in the Nixon Administration.
Marvin Goldberger, former President of the California Institute of
Technology and now Director of Princeton's Institute for Advanced
Study, chaired the Committee on International Security and Arms
Control of the National Academy of Sciences.
Kurt Gottfried, professor of physics and nuclear studies at
Cornell University, was an officer of the American Physical
Society and a member of the Department of Energy's High Energy
Physics Advisory Panel.
Milton Hoenig, a physicist and scientific director of the Nuclear
Control Institute, was at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) during the Carter Administration.
Franklin Long, professor emeritus of chemistry at Cornell
University, was research supervisor of the National Defense
Research Committee from 1942 to 1945 and assistant director of
ACDA under President Kennedy.
J. Carson Mark, former division leader of the Theoretical Physics
Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory, serves as a consultant
to Los Alamos and other government agencies.
George Rathjens, professor of political science at M.I.T., was
chief scientist in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
and in the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology.
Victor Weisskopf, former Group Leader at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and former director of CERN, the European Center for
Nuclear Research, is Emeritus Institute Professor of physics at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
#
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
June 26, 1989
Mr. John Sununu
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Sununu:
Today, I and our scientific director, Dr. Milton Hoenig, went
to the Soviet Embassy to receive a response from Moscow to a
letter, attached, that we sent on March 30 to General Secretary
Gorbachev on the subject of a halt in the production of tritium
and other nuclear weapons materials. We request the opportunity
to meet with you personally to discuss what we regard as a rather
significant Soviet position on a proposal contained in our letter.
We believe, on the basis of your position close to the
President and your technical understanding of the unique role of
tritium in nuclear weapons, that you would have a special interest
in the Soviet message to us in the context of prospective
talks between the two leaders.
By way of background, I have enclosed a book that summarizes
a workshop on our tritium proposal that we conducted last December
with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Also enclosed are
two recent columns by Tom Wicker on the proposal and a paper by
our Institute exploring verification issues.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. I look forward
to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
Enclosures
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
March 30, 1989
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Soviet and American missiles are now being destroyed under the
provisions of the INF treaty, and verification inspections of
military facilities in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are being carried
out on a regular basis. Unilateral cuts in Soviet troops and
tanks are being made in Europe, setting the stage for new
negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce
conventional arms in Europe. None of these remarkable
developments would have been possible without your bold leadership
and vision. Changes that seemed impossible a few years ago are
occurring today. It is for this reason that we are writing to ask
you to consider an initiative that truly could change the course
of history by restraining, indeed reversing, the nuclear arms
race.
As you are well aware, many people are hopeful and confident
that when the START negotiations are resumed they will lead to an
early agreement for significant reductions in the strategic
nuclear weapons of both superpowers. Yet, it is by no means clear
what reductions would be achieved beyond START or that there will
be the will on either side to keep the arms-reduction process
going. It is essential that, as an adjunct to the START
negotiations, the superpowers now look to a new way for assuring
continued and deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Only in
this way can we hope to eliminate the threat of nuclear
destruction.
The most important initiative that could be undertaken at
this time by either side, we believe, is to unilaterally halt
production of the essential ingredients for nuclear weapons,
fissionable material and tritium, in the expectation and hope that
the other side soon would make the halt mutual. Although we have
proposed that our government take the first step, we believe, for
reasons noted below, that present circumstances are such that the
Soviet Union, under your leadership, is in the better position to
take the initiative.
This is the crucial time to announce a halt in weapon
materials production. There are some remarkable symmetries
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
March 30, 1989
Page Two
between the situations in our two countries that may never again
be repeated. Neither country easily can afford to spend the many
billions required to upgrade and replace dilapidated production
facilities that are 40 years old at the expense of more essential
services and needs.
In the United States, the military reactors that produce
plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons are now shut down for
safety-related reasons. According to a recent memorandum prepared
by the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory, "Soviet military
production reactors are old, obsolete, and unsafe. They will be
shut down soon anyway."
Further, the United States is now planning to build two new
production reactors for tritium, as well as plutonium, that will
provide far more production capacity than is needed to maintain
the current arsenal of nuclear weapons. Indications from recent
French SPOT satellite images are that the Soviet Union is
constructing one or two new reactors at the Kyschtym nuclear
complex. Each nation also is in a position to turn to its civil
power reactors for military tritium and plutonium production but,
to our knowledge, neither has yet done so in a major way.
At this time, the United States and the Soviet Union both are
in a position to defer plans for rebuilding their respective
nuclear materials production facilities in order not to stimulate
the nuclear arms race and in order to stimulate the ongoing arms-
reduction process. A halt in the production of tritium would,
after several years, require the retirement of each country's
modern nuclear warheads at the minimum rate of tritium's
radioactive decay, 5.5 percent annually, thus reducing the number
of warheads by half in 12 years. In addition, both countries have
accumulated substantial stocks of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium and do not need to produce any more.
This set of circumstances has prompted us, with the
assistance of the former head of the theoretical physics division
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and other distinguished
scientists, to explore the Nuclear Control Institute's proposal for
a "Tritium Factor" approach to nuclear arms reduction. An
article by our collaborator, Dr. J. Carson Mark, caught the
attention of the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., who wrote
to you last November urging your consideration of a production
halt and of tritium-paced arms reduction negotiations. Our
proposal has since been the subject of a conference co-sponsored
by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the proceedings of
which soon will be published as a book.
We are writing to add our voice and our expertise to Rev.
Coffin's appeal to you, and to suggest specific ways in which you
could proceed to make this unorthodox but feasible concept a
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
March 30, 1989
Page Three
reality. We believe a cutoff of fissionable materials production
alone does not go far enough because only by including perishable
tritium in a production halt is it possible to ensure eventual
reductions in nuclear weapons. We also believe that a tritium
production halt can be verified by a combination of on-site
facility inspections and by confirmation of destruction of
delivery systems being retired under START and post-START
agreements.
Under your leadership, the Soviet Union could establish a
dialogue with the United States on a nuclear weapons materials
production halt while the present halt in tritium and plutonium
production is still in effect in the United States. Mr. General
Secretary: we ask you to do two things for the sake of your
nation and ours: first, pending the outcome of START and other
arms-reduction negotiations, announce an interim shutdown of all
military production reactors in the Soviet Union and a consequent
halt in new production of plutonium and tritium for weapons, as
well as a halt in further production of highly enriched uranium
for weapons; second, publicly declare that the nuclear reactors
that now appear to be under construction at Kyschtym are for power
production purposes only. (Such an assurance, we have been told,
was given privately by the Soviet Government to the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency.)
The Nuclear Control Institute is making every effort to
appeal to the U.S. government to delay both the restart of its
shut-down production reactors and the construction of any new
production reactors until there is a complete review of the
prospect for successful arms reduction negotiations. However, we
believe it may be politically and diplomatically impossible for
the U.S. to do this at a time of perceived disadvantage caused by
the present shutdown. But this situation presents you an
opportunity for an historic initiative.
We believe the United States and the Soviet Union should not
let pass an extraordinary chance to achieve a mutual halt in the
production of tritium and fissionable materials for weapons. The
two countries may be able to proceed to such a halt by a series of
reciprocal steps. We urge you in the interest of world peace to
take the first step.
Of course, we are prepared to follow up in whatever way you
may wish to proceed, and to make the experts at our disposal
available to those who advise you.
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
Milton Haveng
Milton Hoenig
President
Scientific Director
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
Q. The Tritium Factor is a technical concept. How might the
two leaders announce an agreement based on the Tritium Factor that
would put the accord in historical perspective for the lay public?
A. A joint announcement of such an agreement might include
the following elements:
"Since the early 1950s, our two nations have been embarked
on a course of building and modernizing many thousands of nuclear
weapons. We each now possess nuclear arsenals capable of
destroying each other many times over. We each have built the
industrial capacity to produce enough nuclear materials to
maintain and even to enlarge our respective nuclear arsenals. The
existence of so many nuclear weapons, and of the capacity to build
so many more, increases the threat of nuclear war and endangers
the entire world.
"The INF agreement on intermediate and short-range nuclear
missiles represents an important milestone: elimination of whole
systems of nuclear armaments. The ongoing START talks hold out
the hope that soon we may be able to agree on mutual deep cuts in
our long-range strategic nuclear weapons.
"These efforts put us within reach of altering the course of
human history. As the leaders of the world's two most powerful
nations, we share a vital interest in, and a deep commitment to,
achieving substantial reductions in our nuclear armaments. We
want to make sure that nuclear arms-reduction negotiations do not
drag on indefinitely and that steady progress is made.
"In this spirit of good will, we have agreed to establish a
framework that will set a pace for the drawing down of our nuclear
arsenals by no less than six per cent a year. Accordingly, we
have agreed to a mutual halt in production of new materials used
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons for as long as we can
maintain this minimum rate of progress at the negotiating table.
"Our objective is to achieve deep cuts in nuclear warheads
far in excess of the agreed minimum yearly rate. But even cuts
negotiated at the modest rate of six per cent a year, if
maintained over the next 12 years, will pay a historic dividend: a
50 percent reduction in our nuclear arsenals by the start of the
new century.
"Nuclear scientists, who made nuclear weapons possible, also
have given us a unique means to put a clock on the negotiating
table to pace nuclear-arms reductions and thereby advance
mankind's quest for world peace. Tritium, a man-made radioactive
material that each side uses to boost the explosive force of its
nuclear weapons, decays naturally at the rate of about 6 per cent
a year. This decay rate is known as the Tritium Factor. If
mutual reductions in nuclear arms can be achieved at this rate or
faster, no more new tritium need be produced because tritium can
be recovered from weapons that each side destroys and can be
reused in remaining weapons as the arms-reduction process
continues.
"So long as both sides can agree to maintain at least this
steady pace of reductions in nuclear weapons, we also will be able
to suspend new production of the other principal nuclear-weapon
materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium. This agreement,
therefore, represents an historic opportunity not only to draw
down nuclear armaments but to halt further production of nuclear
materials used to make nuclear weapons.
"Eventually, our two nations will have to agree on the level
to which our nuclear arsenals should be reduced to provide
effective deterrence, and production of new tritium then would be
resumed in much smaller quantities to maintain the arsenals at
that agreed level. However, no further production of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium will be required because, unlike
tritium, they do not decay at a rapid rate.
"Of course, this agreement has been made subject to strict
arrangements to verify that nuclear weapons are destroyed at the
agreed rate and that no new materials for weapons are being
produced. We also have agreed to maintain on a stand-by basis the
reactors needed to resume production of tritium in the unfortunate
event that arms-reduction negotiations fail to keep pace with
tritium's decay.
"Our hope, however, is that by utilizing the Tritium Factor,
we will be able to keep the nuclear-arms reduction process moving
forward. Our further hope is that in reducing our own reliance on
nuclear weapons, we not only will reduce the chances of destroying
each other, but we will set an example that other nations
possessing or contemplating nuclear weapons can follow. In this
way, we can keep alive the hope that nuclear weapons some day can
be abolished from the earth."
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
August 4, 1989
Briefing Paper for John Sununu
Summary
The involuntary total shutdown of the Nation's aging
military production reactors presents a festering problem for DoE
but an opportunity of historic dimensions for the President.
The Soviet Union has major nuclear problems of its own in
both the civil power and military production sectors. It is now
cooperating with the United States on safety questions in the
first area and might conceivably share an interest in cutting
losses and eliminating risks in the second area. The Soviet Union
has formally proposed to the U.S. the negotiation of a mutual
verifiable halt in production of fissile material, and is now
indicating to the Nuclear Control Institute that it could be
prepared to discuss such a halt in tritium production as well.
Indeed, we were told that Gorbachev could raise a tritium cutoff
at his first summit with the President depending on "circumstances
at the time."
This paper explores how the President, in anticipation of
the summit, could seize the initiative and achieve an immediate
halt in all Soviet production of nuclear weapons materials. By
means of the initiative we propose (page 4), he could bring the
Soviets into conformity with the existing U.S. situation and
overcome the present perception of the U.S. being in a position of
weakness. It could enable the President to announce jointly
with Gorbachev an agreement that would be regarded as historic in
two respects: (1) it would shut down all production of nuclear
weapons materials by both superpowers for the first time, and (2)
it would shift the nuclear arms race into reverse gear at a
manageable speed, consistent with START and other foreseeable
reductions and in a prudent manner that is verifiable and
preserves effective deterrence.
In addition, the initiative would produce a number of
domestic benefits for the President: It would defuse the sense of
crisis and sharply reduce the risks that now pervade efforts to
restart the production reactors and to pursue other options for
achieving tritium production. It would avoid a premature
commitment to construction of new production capacity that may be
many times larger and more costly than eventually will be needed.
And it would avoid possible production of military tritium in power
reactors, a nightmare for the nuclear industry.
* * *
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Tritium's Special Role
Unlike fissile plutonium and uranium, which essentially last
forever and are in abundant supply, tritium decays steadily and
must be replenished regularly in boosted and thermonuclear
warheads. For this reason, new tritium must be produced to
maintain or to enlarge a modern arsenal even if no further fissile
material is produced.
No fresh tritium need be produced if warheads utilizing
tritium are retired at a rate that keeps pace with or exceeds
tritium's decay (5.5% a year) and if tritium recovered from
retired warheads is used to replenish the remaining warheads. Of
course, a tritium cutoff could be agreed to at the conclusion of
talks such as START that produce cuts approximating this pace and
that set the stage for additional deep cuts. But a tritium halt
also could be agreed to as a confidence-building measure earlier
in the process, especially if both sides stand to benefit from the
standpoint of cost and safety of their production programs.
An agreement now to halt production of tritium would require
each side to shut down all of its military production reactors and
associated reprocessing plants and to place some of these
facilities on cold standby-- an outcome that is not possible with
a fissile cutoff alone because of the need to continue producing
perishable tritium. For reasons outlined below, each side might
welcome such a comprehensive production halt at this time.
What follows is an analysis of the growing problem caused by
the involuntary shutdown of the Savannah River reactors, an
opportunity for the U.S. prompted by developments in the Soviet
Union, and a proposed initiative for the President keyed to the
upcoming summit.
Problem
The three remaining Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors,
presently the Nation's exclusive source of tritium for weapons,
are shut down. Restart of the reactors, after an unsuccessful try
last August, has slipped by at least two years to 1990-1991, and
the estimated cost of repair has quadrupled to $1.66 billion.
Successful restart and safe operation of these old reactors is
problematical at best. Another failure at restart or another
forced shutdown (conceivably accompanied by a radioactive release)
could be quite controversial and could transform SRS from a DoE
problem to a Presidential problem--with a possible spillover
effect on the nuclear power industry as well.
Alternative options for producing tritium are not readily at
hand and are themselves risky and controversial:
O Conversion of the incomplete WNP-1 power reactor at
Hanford to dedicated tritium production, according to GAO, will
cost a minimum of about $3 billion, will require at least seven
years before the first tritium is recovered from still untested
LWR target technology, and will raise substantive nuclear safety
and proliferation issues.
2
O Restart of the N Reactor at Hanford will trigger a
threatened lawsuit by the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and will arouse safety concerns.
o Preliminary (Title I) design of two new production
reactors already has slipped another year (without DoE informing
Congressional authorizing and appropriating committees), and
actual cost of the reactors may reach at least five times the
original pricetag of $7.5 billion, using DoE's own acknowledged
cost-overrun experience in long-term construction projects.
O The only other potential domestic source of tritium is to
produce it in licensed nuclear power reactors, using lithium
targets being developed for the WNP-1. DoD is openly discussing
this option as a contingency if one or more SRP reactors cannot be
operated successfully. Exercise of this option would require NRC
to reopen licensing proceedings on safety questions and would
subject utilities to criticism that nuclear power reactors are
being used as nuclear bomb factories an outcome the nuclear
industry dearly wishes to be spared except in a Congressionally
declared national emergency.
Given the problems and risks at SRS, and the unsatisfactory
or unavailable alternatives for new production of tritium, is
there a satisfactory way out of this mess?
Opportunity
The Soviet Union, its civil nuclear power industry reeling
from a series of reactor closings and cancellations caused by
public reaction to the Chernobyl accident, also faces problems
with its weapons production reactors. Gorbachev and Soviet
officials have announced the shutdown of a total of five of the
oldest reactors, located at Kysthym, to be completed by 1991; nine
other reactors, probably none built more recently than the 1960s,
continue to operate at two other sites. Some of them, perhaps two
or three, are heavy water reactors used to produce tritium, like
the reactors at Savannah River; the rest are graphite moderated
reactors, forerunners of the Chernobyl design, presumably used to
produce plutonium. Three reactors of advanced breeder design are
planned or under construction near Kysthym presumably for power
purposes but capable of replacing the shutdown production
reactors.
Until quite recently, the Soviets seem to have been
interested only in the possibility of negotiating a fissile
material halt---an approach that has been developed in a series
of exchanges between Soviet academicians and representatives of
the NRDC and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). On June
26, representatives of the Nuclear Control Institute were invited
to the Soviet Embassy to receive a message from Moscow in response
to a letter NCI had sent to Gorbachev describing its proposal for
a "Tritium Factor" approach to nuclear arms reductions and
suggesting that the Soviet Union was in a position to shut down
its production reactors to match the situation in which the United
3
States now finds itself. An Embassy official, who explained that
he was speaking on behalf of the Ambassador and translating a
cable from the Foreign Ministry, stated at one point: "It appears
that in the context of [fissile cutoff] negotiations, one could
raise the question of a cessation in the production of tritium."
When we asked whether this question would be raised by Gorbachev
at the forthcoming summit, he responded that it would "depend on
the circumstances at the time."
Thus, it appears that the Soviets are prepared to raise the
possibility of a comprehensive cutoff of nuclear materials that
includes tritium if the U.S. is prepared to enter into talks on a
fissile material cutoff. The Soviets probably realize that the
U.S. is not likely to agree to a fissile material cutoff with all
of its production reactors down while Soviet reactors would
continue to operate to produce tritium. Moreover, the Soviets now
may recognize that a fissile cutoff alone might hold little appeal
for either side because there would be no guaranteed arms-
reduction payoff for the acceptance of highly intrusive
verification measures (while inclusion of tritium, because of its
steady decay, would guarantee eventual arms reductions).
Whatever the reason, the Soviets could now be signaling a
willingness to discuss a tritium halt that, in combination with a
fissile material halt, would permit both sides to shut down all
production reactors and to defer new production reactors. Does
this situation present an opportunity for the President? We
believe it represents an opportunity for an historic initiative.
Initiative
The initiative we propose could be a "bold stroke"
a
personal and confidential communication by the President to
Gorbachev, well in advance of the summit, responding to the Soviet
proposal for the start of negotiation of a verifiable halt in
production of fissile material. The President could inform
Gorbachev that the United States would agree to such a
negotiation, but only if the Soviet Union would agree to two
conditions: (1) join with the U.S. in an immediate halt in the
production of fissile material and tritium, including a pledge
that power and research reactors will not be operated for weapons
material production either; and (2) agree to expand the
negotiation to include a tritium production halt. In this way,
the President could achieve a prompt shutdown of all Soviet
production of nuclear weapons materials in military or civilian
reactors, bringing the Soviets into conformity with the existing
U.S. situation and thereby overcoming the present perception of
the U.S. being in a position of weakness.
If the President's offer were accepted by Gorbachev, the two
leaders could announce their agreement at the summit. The
agreement would be regarded as historic for two reasons: (1) it
would shut down all production of nuclear weapons materials by
both superpowers for the first time, and (2) it would shift the
nuclear arms race into reverse gear at a manageable speed,
4
consistent with START and other foreseeable arms reductions and in
a prudent manner that is verifiable and preserves effective
deterrence.
The President's offer would not be made publicly, so that if
the anticipated result were not achieved, it would cause no
embarrassment to the President. But the offer would put
Gorbachev's sincerity, and his ability to deliver, to the test.
If he is sincere in his desire to negotiate a fissile material
cutoff, and in his apparent desire to put a tritium halt on the
table as well, then he should be willing to enter the negotiation
on an equal footing with the President. He cannot seriously
expect the President to enter such a negotiation with all U.S.
production reactors shut down while Soviet reactors continue to
operate. If he is unwilling to enter the negotiation on an
equitable basis, or he is unable to deliver his own bureaucracy to
the table, nothing will have been lost for the President having
tried. And much could be gained if Gorbachev accepts the offer.
Since a comprehensive production halt requires the shutdown
of all production reactors, which can be verified promptly by
satellite, the agreed halt would take effect immediately on an
interim basis, with the understanding that detailed inspection and
other verification measures, covering civil as well as military
and suspect facilities, would have to be worked out and agreed to
by a date certain (perhaps two years hence.) Since it may take
this long to achieve the first START reductions, and since each
side could rely on more efficient management of tritium in
existing weapons and on tritium recovered from any voluntarily
retired weapons, there should be no problem for either side to
sustain their arsenals during this period. And, it should be
stressed, that with each side possessing a deterrent of more than
20,000 nuclear warheads during this period, each is assured of
ample protection against the consequences of any cheating that
might take place under the interim accord. [See items, submitted
separately, that discuss verification and deterrence.]
Beyond shutting down Soviet production of weapons materials
and establishing a basis for reversing the arms race, the proposed
Presidential initiative, if successful, would achieve the
following important domestic benefits: It would defuse the sense
of crisis and sharply reduce the risks that now pervade the
Savannah River restart effort and all the other options for
resuming tritium production. It would give Admiral Watkins the
extra time he needs to complete the SRS repairs and to meet all
NEPA requirements for holding the three reactors on cold standby
as a contingency against a breakdown in finalizing the agreement.
It would avoid a premature commitment to construction of new
production capacity that may be many times larger and more costly
than eventually will be needed. And it would avoid possible
production of military tritium in power reactors, a nightmare for
the nuclear industry.
5
Given these substantial benefits of success, and the
negligible risks associated with failure, the proposed initiative
is well worth pursuing. The opportunity for achieving a
comprehensive, verifiable halt in nuclear weapons materials production
results from the fortuitous coincidence of the aging of the
superpowers' production plants and the current unprecedented easing of
tensions between the two nations. It is an opportunity that may
not be repeated and should be exploited to the fullest by the
President.
Paul Leventhal
Milton Hoenig
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
July 7, 1989
Minutes of meeting with First Secretary Sergey I. Kislyak,
Soviet Embassy, 11 AM-12:20 PM, June 26, 1989.
Present: Kislyak, Paul Leventhal, Milton Hoenig
Kislyak said he would translate a message sent from Moscow
to the Ambassador for conveyance to us in response to our letter
of March 30, 1989, to General Secretary Gorbachev.
Before he began, we advised him that we were not acting
directly or indirectly for the U.S. Government. We said our
proposal for a mutual, verifiable halt in production of tritium as
well as fissile materials for weapons was an initiative of the
Nuclear Control Institute and was based on our perception that the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might have an overlapping interest in such
an approach at this time.
A summary of Kislyak's translation of the Soviet government's
message and of our subsequent discussion of it follows:
Your message to General Secretary Gorbachev "was carefully
studied, and we thank you for it." The Soviet Union shares your
desire for a "comprehensive solution" to nuclear disarmament. As
for your specific proposal about ending the production of
plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons purposes, we are
cognizant of this question.
The Soviet Union looks upon stopping the production of
fissile material as one component of a program to achieve nuclear
disarmament by the year 2000. This would be a major inhibitor of
the nuclear arms race and would strengthen the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. The seriousness of the Soviet position was
enhanced during the Soviet-British summit in London when General
Secretary Gorbachev announced a halt in production of highly
enriched uranium for the weapons program, the shutdown of one
reactor for production of weapons-grade plutonium in 1987 and the
shutdown of two more plutonium production reactors. The Soviet
Union will not replace them with new capacity.
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret), Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Furthermore, we call your attention to the fact that the
Soviet Union has made a proposal to the United States to agree to
begin work on a verifiable cessation of fissionable materials for
weapons purposes. General Secretary Gorbachev specifically
proposed those negotiations to Secretary of State Baker at their
meeting in May.
"It appears that in the context of such negotiations one
could raise the question of a cessation in the production of
tritium. A comprehensive phased solution to the problem would
undoubtedly be a major contributor to nuclear disarmament." It
could be discussed.
At this point, there was a discussion of whether the
question of a halt in tritium production already had been raised
by the Soviet Union. Kislyak said he could not say for sure that
it was not raised during the Gorbachev-Baker meeting, but when
pressed further, said it probably was not. Nor, Kislyak said,
would he say whether it had been communicated to the U.S.
Government subsequent to those talks. He said he could say that
"when negotiations [on a fissile cutoff] start, your proposal
could be raised." He said he personally thinks that "the Soviet
position is a reaction to your thoughts and ideas." We asked
whether the tritium cutoff would be raised by General Secretary
Gorbachev at the prospective summit with President Bush. Kislyak
responded that it would "depend on the circumstances at the time."
There was also a discussion of the two new reactors that are
understood to be under construction at Kysthym. Mr. Kislyak said
he had no information on two new reactors. We reviewed the
various indicators of apparent symmetry between the U.S. and
Soviet situations concerning the production of nuclear weapons
materials including old, unsafe production reactors and no known
new production reactors---and suggested that this apparent
symmetry could be maintained if the Soviet Union announced that
the two reactors under construction will be used for power
purposes only and will not be used for production of either
plutonium or tritium for military purposes. We also suggested
that the Soviet Union make clear that the plutonium production
reactors being shut down will not be replaced by new capacity for
production of either plutonium or tritium.
There was also a discussion of whether it was necessary for
there first to be a bilateral negotiation on a fissile materials
cutoff before the Soviet Union could act to halt production of
fissile materials and tritium. We reiterated the proposal made in
our letter to General Secretary Gorbachev that he announce
unilaterally a halt in all nuclear weapons material production.
We said we thought this was the best way to reach a negotiation on
a mutual, verifiable halt in weapons materials production---first,
for the Soviet Union to announce a unilateral halt, thereby
matching the present situation in the United States, and, second,
to offer to negotiate the terms of both sides continuing the halt
on a verifiable basis so long as negotiated arms reductions keep
pace with or exceed tritium's rate of decay.
We said we believed that the verification requirements for
such a halt would be burdensome on both sides but quite feasible
and well within the capabilities of the two superpowers if they
had the political will to engage in such a regime. We also noted
that verification of a cut-off of only fissile materials also
would be quite burdensome---and in some respects more difficult
than a comprehensive cut-off that included tritium---but without
the compensating arms-control benefit provided by tritium's decay.
We provided Mr. Kislyak the Institute's paper comparing the
verification requirements of a mutual cutoff of fissile materials
alone and one that included tritium as well.
We suggested, now that the Soviet position incorporated our
proposal for a cutoff in tritium as well as fissile materials,
this would be an appropriate time to begin a non-governmental
exchange of ideas and papers on the subject by experts from each
side. We recommended that the Nuclear Control Institute and an
appropriate Soviet counterpart organization engage in such an
exchange on the particular subjects of verification and of the
pacing effect of tritium's decay on arms reduction negotiations.
Mr. Kislyak said he would pass this suggestion and our
others to Moscow. He again thanked us for the letter to General
Secretary Gorbachev and said the letter had been "studied very
carefully." He said the purpose of the meeting was to give "our
thoughts on the issues you raised."
#
AUG- 4-89 FRI 17:46 NuclearControlInstitute P.01
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 701 WASHINGTON DC 20056 202-822-8144
August 4, 1989
Governor John Sununu
Chief of Staff to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Governor Sununu:
Thank you again for the opportunity you gave me and Dr.
Hoenig to discuss the tritium question with you today. We have
asked our consultant, Dr. Carson Mark, to prepare a brief paper
responding to the point you raised about the impact of a Soviet
tritium surplus. I will be happy to share it with you as soon as
we receive it.
By the way, you might consider contacting Dr. Mark directly
if you are interested in obtaining an expert, independent view on
matters under consideration in the government. He has the
necessary clearances on a need-to-know basis, and, given his 25
years as leader of the theoretical physics division at Los Alamos,
he has much to contribute. Of course, the Nuclear Control
Institute would be out of the loop if you contacted him directly.
His telephone number is 505-662-5025.
Please let me know if it would be useful to have additional
copies of the The Tritium Factor book summarizing our workshop
with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I would be
pleased to send them to you.
I will telephone you toward the end of the month, as you
suggested. With best wishes
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
Strategies for stopping the spread and repersing the grouth of unclear arms.
Paul I.. Leventbal, President, Peter A. Bradford. David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret). Dents A. Hayes. Julian Koenig. Sharon Thuzer Leventhal, Roger Richter. Dr. Theodore B. Thylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AUG- 3-89 THU 17:32 NuclearControlInstitute
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444
August 4, 1989
Briefing Paper for John Sununu
Summary
The involuntary total shutdown of the Nation's aging
military production reactors presents a festering problem for DoE
but an opportunity of historic dimensions for the President.
The Soviet Union has major nuclear problems of its own in
both the civil power and military production sectors. It is now
cooperating with the United States on safety questions in the
first area and might conceivably share an interest in cutting
losses and eliminating risks in the second area. The Soviet Union
has formally proposed to the U.S. the negotiation of a mutual
verifiable halt in production of fissile material, and is now
indicating to the Nuclear Control Institute that it could be
prepared to discuss such a halt in tritium production as well.
Indeed, we were told that Gorbachev could raise a tritium cutoff
at his first summit with the President depending on "circumstances
at the time."
This paper explores how the President, in anticipation of
the summit, could seize the initiative and achieve an immediate
halt in all Soviet production of nuclear weapons materials. By
means of the initiative we propose (page 4), he could bring the
Soviets into conformity with the existing U.S. situation and
overcome the present perception of the U.S. being in a position of
weakness. It could enable the President to announce jointly
with Gorbachev an agreement that would be regarded as historic in
two respects: (1) it would shut down all production of nuclear
weapons materials by both superpowers for the first time, and (2)
it would shift the nuclear arms race into reverse gear at a
manageable speed, consistent with START and other foreseeable
reductions and in a prudent manner that is verifiable and
preserves effective deterrence.
In addition, the initiative would produce a number of
domestic benefits for the President: It would defuse the sense of
crisis and sharply reduce the risks that now pervade efforts to
restart the production reactors and to pursue other options for
achieving tritium production. It would avoid a premature
commitment to construction of new production capacity that may be
many times larger and more costly than eventually will be needed.
And it would avoid possible production of military tritium in power
reactors, a nightmare for the nuclear industry.
***
Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.
Paul L. Leventhal, President, Peter A. Bradford, David Cohen, Rear Admiral Thomas D. Davies USN (Ret). Denis A. Hayes, Julian Koenig, Sharon Tanzer Leventhal, Roger Richter, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
3-89
THU
18:12
NuclearControlInstitute
P.02
Tritium's Special Role
Unlike fissile plutonium and uranium, which essentially last
forever and are in abundant supply, tritium decays steadily and
must be replenished regularly in boosted and thermonuclear
warheads. For this reason, new tritium must be produced to
maintain or to enlarge a modern arsenal even if no further fissile
material is produced.
No fresh tritium need be produced if warheads utilizing
tritium are retired at a rate that keeps pace with or exceeds
tritium's decay (5.5% a year) and if tritium recovered from
retired warheads is used to replenish the remaining warheads. Of
course, a tritium cutoff could be agreed to at the conclusion of
talks such as START that produce cuts approximating this pace and
that set the stage for additional deep cuts. But a tritium halt
also could be agreed to as a confidence-building measure earlier
in the process, especially if both sides stand to benefit from the
standpoint of cost and safety of their production programs.
An agreement now to halt production of tritium would require
each side to shut down all of its military production reactors and
associated reprocessing plants and to place some of these
facilities on cold standby an outcome that is not possible with
a fissile cutoff alone because of the need to continue producing
perishable tritium. For reasons outlined below, each side might
welcome such a comprehensive production halt at this time.
What follows is an analysis of the growing problem caused by
the involuntary shutdown of the Savannah River reactors, an
opportunity for the U.S. prompted by developments in the Soviet
Union, and a proposed initiative for the President keyed to the
upcoming summit.
Problem
The three remaining Savannah River Site (SRS) reactors,
presently the Nation's exclusive source of tritium for weapons,
are shut down. Restart of the reactors, after an unsuccessful try
last August, has slipped by at least two years to 1990-1991, and
the estimated cost of repair has quadrupled to $1.66 billion.
Successful restart and safe operation of these old reactors is
problematical at best. Another failure at restart or another
forced shutdown (conceivably accompanied by a radioactive release)
could be quite controversial and could transform SRP from a DoE
problem to a Presidential problem--with a possible spillover
effect on the nuclear power industry as well.
Alternative options for producing tritium are not readily at
hand and are themselves risky and controversial:
o Conversion of the incomplete WNP-1 power reactor at
Hanford to dedicated tritium production, according to GAO, will
cost a minimum of about $3 billion, will require at least seven
years before the first tritium is recovered from still untested
LWR target technology, and will raise substantive nuclear safety
and proliferation issues.
2
NuclearControlInstitute
O Restart of the N Reactor at Hanford will trigger a
threatened lawsuit by the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) and will arouse safety concerns.
o Preliminary (Title I) design of two new production
reactors already has slipped another year (without DoE informing
Congressional authorizing and appropriating committees), and
actual cost of the reactors may reach at least five times the
original pricetag of $7.5 billion, using DoE's own acknowledged
cost-overrun experience in long-term construction projects.
o The only other potential domestic source of tritium is to
produce it in licensed nuclear power reactors, using lithium
targets being developed for the WNP-1. DoD is openly discussing
this option as a contingency if one or more SRP reactors cannot be
operated successfully. Exercise of this option would require NRC
to reopen licensing proceedings on safety questions and would
subject utilities to criticism that nuclear power reactors are
being used as nuclear bomb factories an outcome the nuclear
industry dearly wishes to be spared except in a Congressionally
declared national emergency.
Given the problems and risks at SRP, and the unsatisfactory
or unavailable alternatives for new production of tritium, is
there a satisfactory way out of this mess?
Opportunity
The Soviet Union, its civil nuclear power industry reeling
from a series of reactor closings and cancellations caused by
public reaction to the Chernobyl accident, also faces problems
with its weapons production reactors. Gorbachev and Soviet
officials have announced the shutdown of a total of five of the
oldest reactors, located at Kysthym, to be completed by 1991; nine
other reactors, probably none built more recently than the 1960s,
continue to operate at two other sites. Some of them, perhaps two
or three, are heavy water reactors used to produce tritium, like
the reactors at Savannah River; the rest are graphite moderated
reactors, forerunners of the Chernobyl design, presumably used to
produce plutonium. Three reactors of advanced breeder design are
planned or under construction near Kysthym presumably for power
purposes but capable of replacing the shutdown production
reactors.
Until quite recently, the Soviets seem to have been
interested only in the possibility of negotiating a fissile
material halt---an approach that has been developed in a series
of exchanges between Soviet academicians and representatives of
the NRDC and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). On June
26, representatives of the Nuclear Control Institute were invited
to the Soviet Embassy to receive a message from Moscow in response
to a letter NCI had sent to Gorbachev describing its proposal for
a "Tritium Factor" approach to nuclear arms reductions and
suggesting that the Soviet Union was in a position to shut down
its production reactors to match the situation in which the United
3
THU 17:34 NuclearControlInstitute
States now finds itself. An Embassy official, who explained that
he was speaking on behalf of the Ambassador and translating a
cable from the Foreign Ministry, stated at one point: "It appears
that in the context of [fissile cutoff] negotiations, one could
raise the question of a cessation in the production of tritium."
When we asked whether this question would be raised by Gorbachev
at the forthcoming summit, he responded that it would "depend on
the circumstances at the time."
Thus, it appears that the Soviets are prepared to raise the
possibility of a comprehensive cutoff of nuclear materials that
includes tritium if the U.S. is prepared to enter into talks on a
fissile material cutoff. The Soviets probably realize that the
U.S. is not likely to agree to a fissile material cutoff with all
of its production reactors down while Soviet reactors would
continue to operate to produce tritium. Moreover, the Soviets now
may recognize that a fissile cutoff alone might hold little appeal
for either side because there would be no guaranteed arms-
reduction payoff for the acceptance of highly intrusive
verification measures (while inclusion of tritium, because of its
steady decay, would guarantee eventual arms reductions).
Whatever the reason, the Soviets could now be signaling a
willingness to discuss a tritium halt that, in combination with a
fissile material halt, would permit both sides to shut down all
production reactors and to defer new production reactors. Does
this situation present an opportunity for the President? We
believe it represents an opportunity for an historic initiative.
Initiative
The initiative we propose could be a "bold stroke"
a
personal and confidential communication by the President to
Gorbachev, well in advance of the summit, responding to the Soviet
proposal for the start of negotiation of a verifiable halt in
production of fissile material. The President could inform
Gorbachev that the United States would agree to such a
negotiation, but only if the Soviet Union would agree to two
conditions: (1) join with the U.S. in an immediate halt in the
production of fissile material and tritium, including a pledge
that power and research reactors will not be operated for weapons
material production either; and (2) agree to expand the
negotiation to include a tritium production halt. In this way,
the President could achieve a prompt shutdown of all Soviet
production of nuclear weapons materials in military or civilian
reactors, bringing the Soviets into conformity with the existing
U.S. situation and thereby overcoming the present perception of
the U.S. being in a position of weakness.
If the President's offer were accepted by Gorbachev, the two
leaders could announce their agreement at the summit. The
agreement would be regarded as historic for two reasons: (1) it
would shut down all production of nuclear weapons materials by
both superpowers for the first time, and (2) it would shift the
nuclear arms race into reverse gear at a manageable speed,
4
17:35 NuclearControlInstitute
consistent with START and other foreseeable arms reductions and in
a prudent manner that is verifiable and preserves effective
deterrence.
The President's offer would not be made publicly, so that if
the anticipated result were not achieved, it would cause no
embarrassment to the President. But the offer would put
Gorbachev's sincerity, and his ability to deliver, to the test.
If he is sincere in his desire to negotiate a fissile material
cutoff, and in his apparent desire to put a tritium halt on the
table as well, then he should be willing to enter the negotiation
on an equal footing with the President. He cannot seriously
expect the President to enter such a negotiation with all U.S.
production reactors shut down while Soviet reactors continue to
operate. If he is unwilling to enter the negotiation on an
equitable basis, or he is unable to deliver his own bureaucracy to
the table, nothing will have been lost for the President having
tried. And much could be gained if Gorbachev accepts the offer.
Since a comprehensive production halt requires the shutdown
of all production reactors, which can be verified promptly by
satellite, the agreed halt would take effect immediately on an
interim basis, with the understanding that detailed inspection and
other verification measures, covering civil as well as military
and suspect facilities, would have to be worked out and agreed to
by a date certain (perhaps two years hence.) Since it may take
this long to achieve the first START reductions, and since each
side could rely on more efficient management of tritium in
existing weapons and on tritium recovered from any voluntarily
retired weapons, there should be no problem for either side to
sustain their arsenals during this period. And, it should be
stressed, that with each side possessing a deterrent of more than
20,000 nuclear warheads during this period, each is assured of
ample protection against the consequences of any cheating that
might take place under the interim accord. [See items, submitted
separately, that discuss verification and deterrence.]
Beyond shutting down Soviet production of weapons materials
and establishing a basis for reversing the arms race, the proposed
Presidential initiative, if successful, would achieve the
following important domestic benefits: It would defuse the sense
of crisis and sharply reduce the risks that now pervade the
Savannah River restart effort and all the other options for
resuming tritium production. It would give Admiral Watkins the
extra time he needs to complete the SRP repairs and to meet all
NEPA requirements for holding the three reactors on cold standby
as a contingency against a breakdown in finalizing the agreement.
It would avoid a premature commitment to construction of new
production capacity that may be many times larger and more costly
than eventually will be needed. And it would avoid possible
production of military tritium in power reactors, a nightmare for
the nuclear industry.
5
AUG- 3-89 - THU 17:36 NuclearControlInstitute o P.07
Given these substantial benefits of success, and the
negligible risks associated with failure, the proposed initiative
is well worth pursuing. The opportunity for achieving a
comprehensive, verifiable halt in nuclear weapons materials production
results from the fortuitious coincidence of the aging of the
superpowers' production plants and the current unprecedented
easing of tensions between the two nations. It is an opportunity
that may not be repeated and should be exploited to the fullest by
the President.
Paul Leventhal
Milton Hoenig