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91149-012
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S
2009-0275-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection:
George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
91149
Folder ID Number:
91149-012
Folder Title:
Other (December 1990)
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
G
34
48
6
7
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Cable
White Houset to Elysee Palace
12/1/90
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to President Mitterrand from President Bush (2 pp.)
01b. Memo
Philip Zelikow to Brent Scowcroft
11/29/90
(b)(1)
Re: Message to Mitterrand on Lebanon (1 pp.)
01c. Message
Re: Message to President Mitterrand from President Bush (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1
02a. Memo
David C. Gompert to Brent Scowcroft
12/1/90
(b)(1)
Re: US Policy on the "European Pillar" (2 pp.)
02b. Summary
Re: Summary of Conclusions (5 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03a. Memo
Brent Scowcroft to POTUS
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1 pp.)
03b. Draft Letter
President Bush to Former Prime Minister Thatcher (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
03c. Letter
A. M. Wood to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)
11/22/90
(b)(1)
03d. Letter
Former Prime Minister Thatcher to President Bush (1 pp.)
11/22/90
(b)(1)
03e. Message
Re: Text of a Message from the Prime Minister to the President,
11/22
(b)(1)
Dated 22 November (2 pp.)
Page 1 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (December 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1253
OA/ID Number:
91149-012
Date Closed:
7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
04. Talking Points Re: Contingency Points for CSCE Closed Session Topic: Future
n.d.
(b)(1)
of CSCE (1 pp.)
05. Cable
U.S. - Chile Relations: Letter from President Aylwin to President
11/21/90
(b)(1)
S
Bush Seeking Action on GSP and Kennedy Amendment (6 pp.)
Page 2 of 2
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Files
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (December 1990)
Pinksheet Number:
cap1253
OA/ID Number:
91149-012
Date Closed:
7/15/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
GINUIN IILL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9009420
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 29 NOV 90 19
TO: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
FROM: PRESIDENT
DOC DATE: 01 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: FRANCE
SYRIA
There
LEBANON
HS
PERSONS: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS
AOUN, MICHEL
ASSAD, HAFIZ
SUBJECT: PRES MSG TO PRES MITTERRAND RE LEBANON
ACTION: PRES APPROVED CABLE
DUE DATE: 03 DEC 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GANTT
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSWEA
DOC 2 OF 2
CONFIDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 9420
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
90 DEC 90 DEC I A 9 I I
1
12/18
d
D
West Wing Desk
2
12/18
D
NSC Secretariat
3
2
A = Action
I = Information
D - Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
IMMEDIATE
CONF IDENT
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 02
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER SIT
SIT: NSFEG HOTLINE : 2 : OUT ZELIKOW
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <DTG> 010335Z DEC 90
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO ELYSEE PALACE
0
N
D
E
VIA BLUE CHANNELS
0000
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH.
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR FRANCOIS:
RECALLING OUR DISCUSSION IN PARIS, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT I
RAISED THE SUBJECT OF LEBANON WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN GENEVA. (1
DID SO IN OUR ONE-ON-ONE, SO AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO ACT
IF HE SO CHOSE. ) I TOLD ASSAD WE THOUGHT AOUN SHOULD BE ALLOWED
TO LEAVE SO THAT THIS CHAPTER OF LEBANON'S HISTORY COULD BE
CLOSED. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE RELEASE OF AOUN WOULD DO A
LOT FOR SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.
ASSAD SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT HE WOULD TRY. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO REINFORCE YOUR EFFORTS TO GAIN A SATISFACTORY
SETTLEMENT OF THIS PROBLEM.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0731-MR
5/16/2011 MM
CONF IDENT IAL
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 02
END TEXT
DECL: OADR
=0114
CONF IDENT IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
9420
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 29, 1990
Deputy Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
DAVID My SDMPERT/RICHARD LHAASS
for RH
THROUGH:
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW
m
SUBJECT:
Message to Mitterrand on Lebanon
A short message to President Mitterrand, to be sent through White
House channels, is attached at Tab I. It lets Mitterrand know
that we did raise the Aoun issue with Assad.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize, for the President, transmission of the
message to President Mitterrand attached at Tab I.
Approve 8
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Message to President Mitterrand
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MM NARA, Date 10/28/2013
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH
VIA BLUE CHANNELS
Dear Francois:
Recalling our discussion in Paris, I wanted you to know that I
raised the subject of Lebanon with President Assad in Geneva. (I
did so in our one-on-one, so as to make it easier for him to act
if he so chose.) I told Assad we thought Aoun should be allowed
SDÓ
to leave so that this chapter of Lebanon's history could be
closed. I also made clear that the release of Aoun would do a
lot for Syria's relations with France.
Assad said it would be difficult but he would try. We will
continue to reinforce your efforts to gain a satisfactory
settlement of this problem.
Sincerely,
George Bush
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-0731-MR
CONFIDENTIAL
5/16/2011 MM
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9009474
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 03 DEC 90 08
TO: SCOWCROFT
FROM: GOMPERT
DOC DATE: 01 DEC 90
SOURCE REF:
O'hir
KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST
NATO
EC
PERSONS:
CHRON FILE
SUBJECT: US POLICY ON EUROPEAN PILLAR
ACTION: NOTED BY SCOWCROFT
DUE DATE: 06 DEC 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: GOMPERT
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
BYCAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMEN
CLOSED BY: NSMEN
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
#9474
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
December 1, 1990
very Has Seen B that
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
DAVID C. GOMPERT
Das
SUBJECT:
US Policy on the "European Pillar"
As a result of intensive interagency discussion, including
several meetings of Bob Gates' European Strategy Steering Group,
we have arrived at an agreed internal document setting forth a
U.S. stand on a European Pillar within the Alliance. Such a
document is timely for four reasons:
(1) The upcoming NATO Ministerials and surrounding discussions
will confront us with European views on this issue.
(2) The NATO strategy study commissioned at the London Summit
must begin to come to grips with this question if we are to
avoid it becoming a meaningless review.
(3) The EC has begun a specific process to consider what its
role in security policy-making should be, starting this
month.
(4) The British, out of a desire to steer the European Pillar
away from the EC, are energetically advocating a variant of
the WEU which is designed to preserve and strengthen NATO.
We understand that Douglas Hurd intends to deliver a speech
describing this idea within the next 7-10 days.
The thrust of the policy statement is:
(1) The Alliance should have the broadest possible political-
security charter, but stopping short of insisting on
mandatory use of NATO for out-of-area contingencies.
(2) We are open-minded about a European identity centered on the
WEU, with certain conditions which will ensure NATO's
decision-making capacity is not weakened.
(3) We are willing to look at a variety of ways -- except for a
change in SACEUR's nationality -- in which the European role
in NATO's command structure can be expanded.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F15
6/22/2009
SECRET
SECRET
(4) We intend to keep in Europe at least a robust corps,
supplemented by air and naval units and enough
infrastructure to support force regeneration. (JCS is not
ready to give the Europeans a new troop number; our
hesitation on this will prompt continued questions and
anxiety on the continent.)
This overall policy stance, which will be carefully but
consistently drawn upon in discussions with Allies, goes in the
direction of creating conditions that would bring the French
fully back into the Alliance, as we have discussed.
While all agencies have signed off, I have asked that Cabinet
principals be shown the paper without delay. Because the paper
already takes Colin Powell's views into account, I doubt that
principals will have a problem, but I will let you know.
I urge you to read the attachment.
Concurrences by: Arnold Kanter Arle
Attachment
Tab I
Summary of Conclusions from European Strategy Steering
Group, November 29-30
SECRET
SECRET
Summary of Conclusions
European Strategy Steering Group
November 29-30, 1990
1.
This summary of conclusions is a resource document to be
drawn upon by officials, as appropriate, as guidance in
planning further work within the USG and preparing for
consultations with foreign officials. The summary itself is
for internal USG use only.
2.
Our overall goal is to keep NATO strong and viable for the
foreseeable future, as the foundation for Atlantic
cooperation in addressing political and security concerns
and to maintain the United States position as a European
power. To achieve this goal, we need:
To emphasize America's continuing commitment to the
Alliance, including a substantial U.S. military presence in
Europe;
--
To agree on a purpose for NATO that goes beyond deterrence
of the Soviet Union (see point 4) while leaving open the
possibility of a complementary European role in handling
true out-of-area contingencies;
--
To adapt NATO's political structures to encompass European
desires for a distinct security identity within the Alliance
framework; and
--
To adapt NATO's military command structure as necessary to
make the US overseas presence more sustainable, encourage --
within a transatlantic framework -- greater European
responsibility for Europe's defense in years to come, and --
if possible -- draw France closer to the Alliance.
3.
In discussing the US military commitment to Europe,
Secretary Cheney should be prepared to state at the DPC
that, as the President has assured our Allies, the United
States will maintain substantial nuclear and conventional
forces in Europe that will constitute a significant
contribution to NATO's residual force levels. This presence
will at least include a robust corps, composed of a corps
headquarters, associated corps units, and two ground force
divisions, supplemented by appropriate air and naval forces
and sufficient infrastructure to support force regeneration.
4.
The United States has identified five core security
functions for the North Atlantic Alliance. They are to:
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0233-F/5
6/22/2009 hm
SECRET
2
Deter and defend against a threat of aggression from the
Soviet Union against the territory of any NATO member state.
Deter and defend against any threat of aggression from
countries other than the Soviet Union, such as states in the
Middle East and North Africa, against the territory of any
NATO member state.
Dissuade the Soviet Union from seeking to intimidate or
coerce any European nation or to reimpose hegemony over
Central/Eastern Europe through the threat or use of force.
Promote a stable security environment in Europe based on the
growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the
peaceful resolution of disputes.
Serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on
any issues that affect their vital interests, and for
coordinating their efforts at arms procurement and arms
control.
5.
A preoccupation with new institutions and wiring diagrams
can divert attention from our essential goal: a viable NATO
that is the foundation for Atlantic cooperation on political
and security concerns and maintains the position of the
United States as a European power. Any changes in NATO
should be consistent with that end, anticipating European
trends in order to shape them to NATO's advantage.
Thus, the U.S. is sympathetic to European desires to develop
a greater European identity on security issues in keeping
with the continued viability of NATO and its principle of
unity of security within the Alliance. To keep NATO strong,
we would prefer to see the European security identity
develop within the framework of the Alliance. We want to
keep European leaders from feeling torn between a NATO
security structure and a European security structure.
European governments will necessarily take the lead in
devising a policy to achieve this distinct security
identity. As they seek our views in this process, we should
indicate that we are open-minded about a European identity,
as long as that identity strengthens the Alliance and does
not marginalize it. In our view, a European security
identity centered in the Western European Union could meet
that goal. If adopted, the WEU option should meet the
following four criteria:
(a) The WEU is moved to Brussels. Its member states would be
SECRET
SECRET
3
represented on the WEU Council by the same individuals as
represent them on the NAC. Its military advice would be
provided by the appropriate members of NATO's Military
Committee.
(b) Decisionmaking on issues related to NATO's core security
functions should occur within NATO, even if consultation on
some of those issues also occurs elsewhere.
(c) WEU consultative processes should not require prior
agreement within the WEU before an issue can be discussed
and decided within NATO. This does not preclude prior
agreement on a position by WEU members as long as NATO
processes are not delayed and NATO's decisionmaking
prerogatives are preserved.
(d) The WEU does not form an independent military structure,
outside of NATO, that has any role in the performance of
NATO's core security functions.
As European support grows for a transformation of the WEU,
European governments will need to recognize the limitations
in the membership of that organization that might increase
divisiveness within the Alliance. If the WEU becomes the
focal point for creation of a European security identity,
the United States will raise as a serious concern some
implications of the fact that Denmark, Norway, Greece, and
Turkey are currently not in the WEU. We need more
information on the views of European states on the issue of
future WEU membership and association, and time to consider
how strongly to press our preference.
These criteria are designed to leave room for the WEU's
potential to organize European military capabilities for
out-of-area operations. The close ties and dual-hatting
between the WEU and NATO may actually facilitate
consultation within the Alliance on these issues, as needed.
Ideally, in a future crisis like the one we face now in the
Gulf, we could witness a coordinated and meaningful response
by both NATO and the WEU, by both Americans and Europeans.
6.
The U.S. is prepared to consider adapting NATO command
structures to make the US overseas presence as sustainable
politically as possible and to encourage and reflect greater
European responsibility for Europe's defense in years to
come. The U.S. also seeks to draw France closer to the
military structures of the Alliance in a way that will
support a continued U.S. military presence in Europe,
including an integrated NATO military structure which
includes Germany.
SECRET
SECRET
4
The command structure of NATO should reflect the
reassessment of risks to the Alliance, the new NATO strategy
and its resultant force structure, and national
contributions to NATO's defense. Although it is too soon to
see where this process will take us, the U.S. is prepared to
look at some emerging concepts and is in fact doing so in
the ongoing Military Committee command structure review.
(a) Alliance forces, including U.S. forces, would be organized
into multinational corps. These corps structures would
function in peacetime, and not just be contingent structures
that could be activated to supplant national corps only in a
crisis.
(b) The question of SACEUR's nationality need not even be
introduced to Allies by the US.
(c) The US would be prepared internally to review the peacetime
responsibilities of NATO's Military Committee.
7.
In reviewing the concepts listed above, and in the context
of pursuing our objectives, any NATO command structure
should conform to the following principles:
(a) Peacetime command relationships must be able to transfer
smoothly to an effective wartime command structure. There
must be unity of command during crisis and transition to
war.
(b) Elements of the peacetime command structure which are
essential for Allied forces to be interoperable in wartime
must be maintained.
(c) The chain of command should be simple, and reduced where
possible to reflect the smaller size of NATO forces. At the
same time, the chain of command must be capable of
accommodating NATO's increased reliance on the
reconstitution of military forces.
(d) The command structure must be capable of assimilating forces
which have not been committed to NATO in advance of a crisis
or hostilities.
(e) The command structure must be capable of accommodating the
likelihood of more flexible and mobile forces.
(f) Allocation of key decisionmaking positions (aside from
SACEUR) should be generally commensurate with national
military contributions and regional responsibilities.
SECRET
SECRET
5
Significant additional work will be needed within the USG to
translate these concepts and principles into clearcut goals
for a revised NATO command structure. This organization may
have a simplified chain of command, as described above, and
structures capable of assimilating French or other forces
not now in the integrated structure.
8.
This material supplements the guidance on NATO's future
mission and responsibilities already sent, on November 11,
in State 382263.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9009240
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 13
TO: SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
FROM: ZELIKOW
DOC DATE: 06 DEC 90
GOMPERT
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
HS
other
PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET
SUBJECT: DRAFT LTR TO FORMER PM THATCHER RE RESIGNATION
ACTION: OBE PER APNSA OFFICE
DUE DATE: 07 DEC 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW
LOGREF: 9009226 9009241
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSLMS
CLOSED BY: NSMJT
DOC 4 OF 4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHRON FILE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
9240
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
December 6, 1990
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT,
THROUGH:
DAVID GOMPERT
Vas
3
FROM:
PHILIP ZELIKOW
SUBJECT:
Draft Letter to Former PM Thatcher Re Resignation
State Department has drafted a letter to be sent to former PM
Thatcher regarding her resignation. NSC concurs with the draft
letter with some changes which we have made. The letter is at
Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I which
forwards the draft letter for his signature.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Letter to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab B
Incoming letter
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
9240
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Letter to Former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher
Purpose
To reply to Prime Minister Thatcher's letter informing you of her
resignation.
Background
Prime Minister Thatcher's letter informed you of her resignation
and describes her government's decision to reinforce British
forces in the Gulf. An appropriate reply is attached at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to Mrs. Thatcher
Tab B
Incoming letter
CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
By MM NARA, Date 10/28/2013
Declassify on: OADR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Margaret:
It was with profound regret that I learned of
your resignation as leader of the Conservative
Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
While I look forward to working with John Major
and have every expectation that relations
between our two countries will be as solid as
ever, it just will not be the same without you.
We have all benefited greatly over the past
eleven years from your wisdom and determination.
Your decision to reinforce UK forces in the Gulf
is only the latest example. I have had the
greatest respect for the way in which you have
been able to mold the world about you --
conducting a peaceful revolution at home while
shaping attitudes on East-West relations, on
vital principles, far beyond Britain's shores.
I know that you will continue to fight for what
you believe in and that you will remain a force
in British and world politics.
Barbara and I send you and Denis our very best
wishes and hopes for the future.
With warmest personal regards,
The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher
House of Commons
London, England
T-TU
UK RESTRICTED
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
22 November 1990
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House G/WW
Washington DC 20503
Den taxt kowcop,
I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to
President Bush. I would be grateful for your help in
transmitting it to the President.
The message refers to an announcement, to be made in London
shortly, of further British military deployments to the Gulf. I
enclose details of that announcement
your sacerely,
Andrew Her 4
for
A M Wood
Charge d'Affairs
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
UK RESTRICTED
2009-1264-MR
9/8/2011 MM
9240
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
The Honorable
28 November 1990
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Room 1/WW
Washington DC 20500
Jean Brent,
I have been asked to pass to you the enclosed original of a
message to the President from The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS
MP; a telegraphic version of which was, I think, passed to you
last week.
Sincerely
Antoins
Antony Acland
9240
MON
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA
THE PRIME MINISTER
22 November 1990
Dear George
By the time you receive this message, you will probably
already have heard this morning's announcement from 10 Downing
Street of my decision to make way for a successor, and to resign
as Prime Minister as soon as the Parliamentary Party has
completed the necessary procedures for electing a new leader. I
shall of course remain in charge of the Government until my
successor has been appointed.
You have always shown me the greatest kindness and
consideration, and I have very much admired your leadership. It
will be needed more than ever over these next few months in the
Gulf. But I am sure you can count on my successor, whoever he
is, to give you full support: and Cabinet today will take the
decision to send additional forces to stand alongside yours in
Saudi Arabia.
Denis joins me in sending you and Barbara my warmest good
wishes for the future.
llthas been marvellous to work
with you and / shall continue do give
full Support to everything we Your ever behive in
UK RESTRICTED
9240
PRES NOTED SUMMARY
TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DATED
22 NOVEMBER
Begins
Dear George
By the time you receive this message, you will probably
already have heard this morning's announcement from 10 Downing
Street of my decision to make way for a successor, and to resign
as Prime Minister as soon as the Parliamentary Party has
completed the necessary procedures for electing a new leader. I
shall of course remain in charge of the Government until my
successor has been appointed.
You have always shown me the greatest kindness and
consideration, and I have very much admired your leadership. It
will be needed more than ever over these next few months in the
Gulf. But I am sure you can count on my successor, whoever he
is, to give you full support: and Cabinet today will take the
decision to send additional forces to stand alongside yours in
Saudi Arabia.
Denis joins me in sending you and Barbara my warmest good
wishes for the future.
It has been marvellous to work with you and I shall continue
to give full support to everything we believe in.
Yours ever.
Margaret
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2010-0727-MR
Ends
mm 4/7/2015
UK RESTRICTED
The Secretary of State for Defence will announce at 1530 GMT on
22 November the following further British military deployments to
the Gulf:
a) A UK Mechanised Brigade (8,500 men) and support elements
(5,500 men) to establish a UK Armoured Division. The Division
will be fully operational by the end of January.
b)
Two extra mine counter measures making five in all. The
extra ships will be on station in the Gulf by mid-January.
British Embassy, Washington
22 November 1990
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9009240
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 22 NOV 90
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
ROY, J
11/25/90 DATE TIME 0533 Sherre Berjam SIGNATURE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 1/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF, 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9009240
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 22 NOV 90
SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
11/25/90
8:30
asa
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF, 01 PAGES
9024874
United States Department of State
9240
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 28, 1990
UNCLASSIFIED with
(CONF IDENTIAL attachment)
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Draft Letter to Former Prime Minister Thatcher
Attached you will find a draft letter for the President's
use in responding to a letter from former Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher.
Attachments:
1. Draft response
2. Incoming correspondence
UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
CAP
7/15/09
UNCLASSIFIED with
(CONFIDENTIAL attachment)
DECL: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9009240
REFERRAL
DATE: 23 NOV 90
MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J
STATE SECRETARIAT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: PRESIDENT
SOURCE: THATCHER, MARGARET
DATE: 22 NOV 90
SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM PM THATCHER RE HER ANNOUNCEMENT TO RESIGN
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
DUEDATE: 26 NOV 90
COMMENT:
Salutt
FOR
GEORGE VAN ERON
DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
CONFIDENTIAL
Received in
S/S-RMD on
11/25/90 at 8:30 us 8:30
SECRET
RECORD ID
CHRON FILE
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 26 DEC 90 14
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: SCOWCROFT
DOC DATE: 24 DEC 90
0 Then
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: CSCE
HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR CSCE CLOSED SESSION / FUTURE OF CSCE
ACTION: NOTED BY PRES
DUE DATE: 29 DEC 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NONE
LOGREF: 9008535 9009021
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DYKE
GOMPERT
NSC CHRON
ZELIKOW
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSWEA
CLOSED BY: NSWEA
DOC 1 OF 1
SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG #
10023
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM
PRS
NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Ken Hill
Bill Sittmann
Bob Gates
haspem
Brent Scowcroft
Bill Sittmann
Situation Room
A
West Wing Desk
2
54.744
R
NSC Secretariat
3
N/R
A - Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Sununu
Other
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
COMMENTS
DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:
10023
RESIDENT HAS SEEN
NSA Has Seen
CONTINGENCY POINTS FOR CSCE CLOSED SESSION
Nati Sec Advisor
has seen
TOPIC: FUTURE OF CSCE
There has been a lot of discussion over the past two days
about how the CSCE can help prevent conflict in the future.
My view is that the CSCE should concentrate on the causes of
conflict. This means the CSCE must keep advancing in
practical ways the fundamental principles and human rights
mentioned in my remarks yesterday afternoon.
CSCE has been successful so far as a political process.
X
There is some fear a legitimate fear that we can get
too caught up in institutions and bureaucracies. We might
turn CSCE into just another item of government business.
We can avoid this danger by remembering the importance of
individual rights and minority rights and that the CSCE
relies on the help of individuals and private non-
governmental groups in order to protect these rights.
President Havel's personal experience is a good example.
Support for these rights and for the development of
democratic institutions and procedures will not guarantee
that conflicts won't arise -- but it will go a long way, and
it will keep CSCE from becoming bureaucratized.
Nevertheless, we are prepared to accept some degree of
institutionalization of CSCE. But we government leaders
must maintain our strong political interest, and we should
review how these modest steps work out before more CSCE
organization is built.
( (If widespread support emerges, including from Soviets, for a
stronger CSCE emergency mechanism:)
We are prepared to support the idea of a CSCE emergency
mechanism, if the CSCE chairman determines that a nation's
request for an emergency meeting has additional support.
This is an idea our foreign ministers can pursue further at
the first meeting of the CSCE Council next year.
BUT BEST To LEAVE THIS
For DECISION AT
MINISTERIAL MTG. SET FOR
JUNE IN BERLIN.
SECRET
RECORD ID: 9009262
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 23 NOV 90 19
TO: SITTMANN
CHRON FILE
FROM: ROY, J
DOC DATE: 09 JAN 91
SOURCE REF: 9024861
KEYWORDS: CHILE
0 The
HS
PERSONS: LETELIER, ORLANDO
MOFFITT, RONNI
SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US CHILEAN RELATIONS
ACTION: NO REPLY REQUIRED PER STATE
DUE DATE: 27 NOV 90
STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: STATE
LOGREF: 9009263 9009309
FILES: PA
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
JOHNSON
NSC CHRON
SALVETTI, L
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSLMS
CLOSED BY: NSDAI
DOC 2 OF 2
SECRET
SECRET/EXDIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
9262
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
S/S 9024861
Date January 9, 1991
FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
REFERENCE:
To: President Bush
From:
President Patricio Aylwin of Chile
Date:
November 21, 1990
Subject:
Cable to President Bush from President Aylwin
regarding U.S. -Chilean Relations
WH Referral Dated:
November 23, 1990
NSCS ID# (if any): 9009262
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
DECLASSIFIED
ACTION TAKEN:
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
A draft reply is attached.
By CAP
NARA, Date 7/15/09
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
X We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other (see remarks).
REMARKS:
The letter from President Aylwin to President Bush was written at
the request of the USG and therefore, does not require a response.
Director
Secretariat Staff
SECRET/EXDIS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9009262
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 21 NOV 90
SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US - - CHILEAN RELATIONS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE
ROY, J
11/23
2236
Wmo.,ML
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LOG 9009262
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT
DATE 21 NOV 90
SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US - - CHILEAN RELATIONS
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
DATE
TIME
ROY, J
11/23
2227
SIGNATURE Pn Call
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
COPY: 1
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC SECRETARIAT, ROOM 379 OEOB
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 9009262
REFERRAL
DATE: 23 NOV 90
MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY, J
STATE
'50 NOV-23 10:45 PM
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: PRESIDENT
SOURCE: AYLWIN, PATRICIO
DATE: 21 NOV 90
SUBJ: CABLE TO PRES FM PRES AYLWIN RE US - CHILEAN RELATIONS
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR RECOMS/DRAFT REPLY
DUEDATE: 26 NOV 90
COMMENT:
FOR GEORGE DIRECTOR VAN NSC ERON Salveth SECRETARIAT
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 7/15/09
SECRET
by Wmr.,ML
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05. Cable
U.S. - Chile Relations: Letter from President Aylwin to
11/21/90
(b)(1)
S
President Bush Seeking Action on GSP and Kennedy
Amendment (6 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:
Chronological Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
Other (December 1990)
Date Closed:
7/15/2009
OA/ID Number:
91149-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2009-0275-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.