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Meeting with President Soeharto of Indonesia, June 9, 1989
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428080039
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document
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Meeting with President Soeharto of Indonesia, June 9, 1989
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Presidential Memcon Files
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Indonesia
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1989-06-09
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1989
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
4537
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with President Soeharto of Indonesia
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador John Monjo
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Karl D. Jackson, Senior Director for Asian
Affairs (Notetaker)
Miss Barbara Harvey (Interpreter)
President Soeharto
Ali Alatas, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moerdiono, Secretary of State
Abdul Rachman Ramly, Ambassador to the U.S.
Mr. Widodo (Interpreter)
DATE, TIME
June 9, 1989, 4:05 - 4:30 pm
AND PLACE:
Cabinet Room
President Bush: Welcome, anxious to have your views on Cambodia
or any other subjects you would like to bring up.
President Soeharto: Express my appreciation for opportunity to
meet, especially after visit to UN headquarters where I received
an award that recognized Indonesia's success in its endeavors,
especially our population program. Of course our success cannot
be separated from the support of the donor countries, including
the U.S. and the IGGI. For this support I want to express thanks
on behalf of the Indonesian government and people. Our
population program is still, however, far from what we hope to
achieve.
President Bush: Is your population growth rate around 2 percent?
President Soeharto: It has declined from 2.3 to 1.9 percent.
Our infant mortality rate has declined from 142 per 1000 (live
births) to 58 per 1000. We hope to further reduce it to 50.
Also our life expectancy has grown from only 58 to 63. (No years
cited.)
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Declassify: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
CFM
8/21/2009
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2
Our further efforts in health and development are not just in
population programs, but we want to improve living standards and
the well-being of our people. All this depends on the success of
our national development; only then will we have the economic
growth to permit improvement in living standards. However, the
acceleration of development faces difficulties from within and
without. Internally, there has been a decline in the price of
oil in international markets.
President Bush: What are you getting at the loading point?
President Soeharto: Now, $18 per barrel, but there is no
guaranteed price. Therefore we have intensified our non-oil
exports; there is no other way. In this connection, we hope
other countries, including the U.S., could open their markets to
our products.
There is one problem that Indonesia can't overcome by itself --
servicing on our debt. The problem has arisen because of changes
in the exchange rate vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, particularly the
yen and the deutchmark. If there had been no change in the
exchange rate, our debt servicing obligations this year would
have been U.S. $5.2 billion; but with the yen and mark
appreciation, they are $7.1 billion. This trend will continue
for years. This means Indonesia's earnings will be absorbed in
servicing our debts, and we will not have the ability to continue
our development.
Therefore, I hope that money could be reloaned on softer terms.
We have explained this to the World Bank, IMF, ADB, and they have
begun to provide special loans. But apparently among American
officials there is a lack of understanding of this matter, and we
have to continue to supply information to them so they will
understand. We also hope that American officials will establish
a study group to examine this matter.
There are no problems with our dollar loans. We are fully
determined to honor our obligations, but because of this we
should find new ways of enabling us to do SO.
President Soeharto: I would like to bring you up-to-date on the
latest developments in Cambodia.
President Bush: We appreciate your leadership on this.
President Soeharto: From the first to the second Jakarta
Informal Meeting there was a breakthrough a change in
Vietnam's inflexible attitude. Previously they had refused to
negotiate. Originally Vietnam was confident that it could solve
the Cambodian problem on its own terms. After eight to nine
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years in which they have failed to achieve any encouraging
results, their economy has suffered, and they have had massive
military losses. Only as a result have they sought outside help
in solving the problem.
The Jakarta Informal Meetings provide an opportunity for
discussions among those concerned -- the four Cambodian factions,
Laos and ASEAN. At the second JIM there was no conclusive
agreement, but there was a meeting of minds to solve the issue
peacefully, to achieve a political solution. The basis for the
solution is a Cambodia that is independent, sovereign, peaceful,
neutral and non-aligned, through a process of self-determination
supported by the whole population. We have reached a consensus
for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops; this is part of
the integral overall solution. It is separate from the
prevention of interference from other external powers or the
supply of arms to the four contending parties. There is also a
consensus on preventing the return of the Pol Pot regime.
We look for establishing a stable and peaceful region. We look
for solving the Cambodian problem through an international
conference, internal elections and an international control
mechanism. We believe. the four Cambodian factions should be
allowed to solve their internal problems.
The atmosphere of the May meeting in Jakarta between Hun Sen,
Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann led to concessions conducive to
further flexibility. Sihanouk originally insisted that the Phnom
Penh government be dissolved; then he altered his demand and
proposed a temporary government composed of the four factions.
Also, originally Prince Sihanouk did not accept peacekeeping
forces, but now he has accepted an international control
mechanism.
Hun Sen also made concessions: altering the constitution,
changing the name to "Negara Kampuchea" (State of Cambodia),
leaving out mention of "Democratic" or "People's Republic." He
accepted Buddhism as the state religion, and accepted Sihanouk as
Head of the State of Cambodia.
Sihanouk looked favorably on the proposals and suggested in turn
the possibility of a multi-party system and a private economy.
Consensus was also reached on the participants in the
international cónference: attendees of the Jakarta Informal
Meetings, neighboring countries (Japan, India, Australia,
Canada), the five permanent members of the UN Security Council,
and the Secretary-General of the UN. Prince Sihanouk proposed
Paris as the site, Hun Sen proposed Jakarta; they accommodated
both by agreeing to hold meetings alternately in Paris and
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4
Jakarta.
The round table conference of the four factions is proposed for
the end of July, and the international conference itself the
first week of August.
These are the latest developments and I would like to have
Foreign Minister Alatas brief you further on his recent visits to
Moscow and Paris.
Foreign Minister Alatas: In my meeting with Shevardnadze, he
said there was not much forward movement in the Deng-Gorbachev
meeting. They agreed it was important to prevent at all costs
civil war breaking out after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops,
and ensure that the Khmer Rouge are not able to return to the
jungle and fight. China was fully supportive of an international
conference.
With French Foreign Minister Dumas, we exchanged views on how to
structure the international conference, and agreed that the
preceding round table conference was crucial. The internal
settlement cannot be achieved at an international conference.
The French are trying to persuade Sihanouk to have the round
table meeting earlier, to give enough lead time going into the
August international conference.
President Bush: Interesting. The U.S. admires the way ASEAN has
stayed together. We also have an abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge,
and support Sihanouk. We are glad that the lead on this is
coming from ASEAN. We are not too optimistic, but have reason to
be more optimistic than before. I was a little worried -- for a
while it looked as though Thailand was on a little different
track; it looks less so now. Does that concern you?
President Soeharto: Thailand wanted to take positive steps. The
Thai Prime Minister visited Indonesia before adopting these
steps; he agreed to take them without abandoning previously
agreed upon policies. This is the reason the ASEAN foreign
ministers hold frequent meetings -- so if any doubts or
hesitations occur, they can be resolved.
President Bush: Do you feel you are together with Thailand?
Foreign Minister Alatas: Yes.
Secretary Baker: Where will the round table meeting be held?
Foreign Minister Alatas: Paris.
President Soeharto: Apart from the agreements between the four
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factions, there are still crucial differences between Hun Sen and
Sihanouk on the nature of the transitional government. Sihanouk
believes the Khmer Rouge have to be included ("terikat"), binding
them into finding a peaceful solution. Hun Sen categorically
refuses to have Khmer Rouge elements in a provisional government.
Concerning the disbanding (Soeharto said "dibubarkan," Alatas
said "integration") of the armed forces, it has been agreed that
this would occur only after the election. Sihanouk's demand is
that all forces of the four factions should be integrated and
kept in place until after the election.
President Bush: There is a danger of hard fighting; the Khmer
Rouge are well-armed. I am worried whether China can play a
useful role because of the current turmoil there. Our
relationship is strained, but we are determined to keep it in a
constructive shape. This is hard to do. The brutality in China
has enraged the world.
On the economy I want to salute what you have done. Secretary
Baker is our expert on this. On your success in family planning,
I congratulate you. We would like to be actively involved in
international family planning. We salute what you have done, and
the UN for recognizing you. Thank you for coming by:
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