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470766449
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August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
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470766449
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August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
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CF00302-012
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Records of the National Security Council (George H. W. Bush Administration)
Latin American Directorate Chronological Files
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Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
FOIA Number:
2015-0017-S
2015-0017-S
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.
Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
OA/ID Number:
CF00302
Folder ID Number:
CF00302-012
Folder Title:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
V
8
5
6
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
01a. Memorandum To: Brent Scowcroft From: David Pacelli
8/25/89
(b)(1)
Re: Letter to the President (2 pp.)
01b. Letter
To: President Bush From: American Security Council
7/19/89
(b)(3)
Re: Nicaragua [redaction] (1 pp.)
02. Memorandum
To: Brent Scowcroft From: William Pryce
8/24/89
(b)(1)
C
Re: OAS Foreign Minister Meeting (2 pp.)
03. Memorandum
To: Brent Scowcroft From: William Pryce
8/23/89
(b)(1)
Re: Colombia (1 pp.)
04a. Memorandum To: Brent Scowcroft From: William Pryce
8/22/89
(b)(1)
Re: Policy on Use of US Military Shops by Panama Canal
Commission Employees (2 pp.)
04b. Memorandum To: George Cole From: Philip Hughes
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Access to Military Shoppettes by US Citizen Employees of
the Panama Canal Commission (1 pp.)
04c.
Memorandum To: Executive Secretary From: George Cole
8/15/89
(b)(1)
C
Re: Coordination with Department of State on Proposed
Commissary and Post Exchange Privileges for American Citizen
Panama Canal Commission Employees (1 pp.)
Page 1 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Pinksheet Number:
MB8089
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2015-0017-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
05a. Memorandum To: Brent Scowcroft From: William Pryce
8/22/89
(b)(1)
/
Re: Policy on Use of US Military Shops by Panama Canal
Commission Employees (2 pp.)
05b. Memorandum To: George Cole From: Philip Hughes
n.d.
(b)(1)
Re: Access to Military Shoppettes by US Citizen Employees of
the Panama Canal Commission (1 pp.)
05c. Memorandum To: Executive Secretary From: George Cole
8/15/89
(b)(1)
C
Re: Coordination with Department of State on Proposed
Commissary and Post Exchange Privileges for American Citizen
Panama Canal Commission Employees (1 pp.)
06a. Talking Points Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Carlos
n.d.
(b)(1)
Andres Perez (2 pp.)
06b. Talking Points Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Julio
n.d.
(b)(i)
Sanguinetti (2 pp.)
06c. Talking Points Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Michael
n.d.
(b)(1)
Manley (2 pp.)
07a. Memorandum To: Brent Scowcroft From: Everett Ellis Briggs
8/22/89
(b)(1)
Re: Message from President to Prime Minister Manley (1 pp.)
07b. Memorandum To: President Bush From: Brent Scowcroft
n.d.
(b)(1)
/
Re: Message to Prime Minister Manley (1 pp.)
Page 2 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Pinksheet Number:
MB8089
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2015-0017-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Doc. No. / Type
Subject/Title
Date
Restriction
Classification
07c. Letter
To: Prime Minister Manley From: President Bush (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
08. Memorandum
To: Brent Scowcroft From: David Pacelli
8/22/89
(b)(1)
/
Re: Request by the Prime Minister of Barbados (1 pp.)
Page 3 of 3
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Pinksheet Number:
MB8089
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
FOIA/Sys Case #:
2015-0017-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 25, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR PETER ROMERO
FROM: DAVID A. PACELLI DAP
The attached letter to the
the President was delivered on
the day the RN Commanders visited 8/9 -
a draft response.
White House. Please prepare
CHRON FILE
SEPUBLICA DE MICARCUME
Resistencia
CENTRAL
Nicaragüense
August 4, 1989
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
We, the commanders and members of the Politico-Military
Commission of the Nicaraguan Resistance, wish to thank you
for the support and assistance that the people of the United
States has provided to the cause of democracy in Nicaragua.
We also wish to thank in particular your Administration for
the continued loyalty it has displayed towards the
combatants and their families.
During the diplomatic visits of the Politico-Military
Commission to the presidents of Central America, the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, and the U.S.
Congress, we have reaffirmed our support for the electoral
process in Nicaragua. Our position is to remain as a viable
military force until elections--although we are prepared to
become part of a demobilization process if political
conditions inside Nicaragua permit.
In order to obtain this objective, we ask your support in
sustaining humanitarian assistance to our forces and
families.
If the process to democratize Nicaragua is not successful,
we wish you to understand that our conviction is to continue
to struggle until Nicaragua is liberated. All that we will
ask of the United States is that our families, children, and
over two thousand disabled combatants be provided proper
care and attention that they merit.
With great respect,
Politico-Military Commision
of the Nicaraguan Resistance
Commander Osorno Coleman
Commander Israel Galeane
Atlantic Front/Yatama
Northern Front
Commander Hand Oscar Sobalvarro
Commander Pedro Lara
Southern Front
Northern Front
Joy Commender Luis Lopez
Southern Front
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
6336
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 25, 1989
CHRON FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
DAB
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI DAP
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from the American Security
Council on U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua and the
Nicaraguan Resistance
The American Security Council has written the President to
complain about how the State Department has handled the
Nicaraguan Resistance and to ask for a meeting (Tab II). The
signatories of the letter read like a Who's Who of the American
right that is concerned with Inter-American affairs.
Since the letter was written, the conservatives have become even
more outspoken in criticizing our policy in their newsletters,
talk shows, and press interviews. In the wake of the Tela
summit, they are publicizing the view that they will hold the
President responsible if there is a "sellout" of the Contras (Tab
II).
Although these voices are shrill, our lack of clearly perceived
strategy thus far has fed their discontent. Ted Briggs has
maintained contacts with some of them, and statements such as the
Vice President's VFW speech should help. But we also have to
engage Bernie Aronson in convincing these people that we are not
going to abandon the Contras and that their central target should
be the Sandinistas--not the Administration.
I met with this group last week and was crucified for defending
the Administration's policy. Although we must reach out to the
right, we would not recommend that the group meet with the
President at this time, given the conservatives' anger and our
lack of a firm sense of direction at this point.
Your response at Tab I reaffirms the President's strong support
for the Resistance, assures the conservatives that demobilization
must be voluntary, and asks them to keep the focus on the
Sandinistas.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By Mc NARA, Date 7/16/21
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
CONFIDENTIAL
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter at Tab I to the American Security
Council.
Attachments
Tab I
Scowcroft Reply to Dickens
Tab II
Dickens Letter to the President
Tab III
Washington Times article, August 18, 1989
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Colonel Dickens:
I am replying on behalf of the President to your thoughtful
letter of July 19, 1989 concerning our policy towards the
Nicaraguan Resistance. I understand that a member of my staff
met with the American Security Council recently to discuss our
policy and the current situation.
The President has clearly and emphatically stressed his support
for the Resistance and the need for the Sandinistas to fully
democratize, and the State Department supports that policy. To
demonstrate his commitment, the President met on August 4 with a
commission of Resistance commanders--including Commander Bermudez
and Aristides Sanchez. The group reported on their recent
meetings with the Central American presidents. Although the
Commanders lack formal education, as you note, they expressed
themselves clearly and eloquently.
In his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 21, the
Vice President addressed very specifically some of the concerns
you expressed about Resistance demobilization. Our Bipartisan
Accord and the Central American summit in Tela, Honduras both
provide for voluntary demobilization of the Resistance and their
reintegration into Nicaragua. We would not expect them to return
unless it is under safe and democratic conditions, and the Vice
President stated that it is our moral obligation to support them
with humanitarian aid until those conditions are established.
Looking ahead, I hope you will join us in focusing the attention
of those who support the Resistance on the Sandinistas and what
they must do if the conditions for a free and fair election are
to be achieved. The central question must be the compliance of
the Nicaraguan Government with its commitment to permit the
return of the Resistance to their homeland in peace and
democracy.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
Colonel Samuel T. Dickens
American Security Council
499 South Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20003
Scheduling ASNP
5/27/
CC nsc
AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL
AMERICAN
SECURITY
COUNCIL
July 19, 1989
John M. Fisher
Chairman & C.E.D.
The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
On this tenth anniversary of the communist Sandinistas
coming to power in Nicaragua some disturbing actions have been
taken by the Department of State. These would render impotent
the Nicaraguan Resistance forces, the only leverage existing to
ensure free elections in Nicaragua next February, outside of our
own armed forces.
The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs called a special
meeting of field commanders from the Northern, Southern and
Atlantic fronts last week in Washington, D.C. They were given
special briefings reflecting the reality of support for their
cause from Congress, and explanation of existing legislation
affecting their humanitarian aid. They were told in effect, that
any additional aid after November 30th, would be for their
demobilization and relocation. (In other words at least one of
the congressional leaders would exercise his authority to vetc
continuing aid, as authorized by the bipartisan accord.)
The political directorate of the Nicaraguan Resistance was
not invited to these sessions nor were they or the military
leadership consulted as to whom should attend. The selections
were made entirely by State. At one point during the meetings
Enrique Bermudez, the overall military commander of the 12,000
man force on the northern front, and Aristides Sanchez, who has'
played a major role supporting the combatant forces and is also
on the political directorate, were asked to leave the room.
State Department officials then directed the field commanders to
elect two from each front to attend meetings with each of the
Central American presidents. The purpose of these meetings with
the presidents would be to represent the fighting forces during
the demobilization process, rather than to represent their cause
of remaining mobilized until democracy had been assured in
Nicaragua.
Last Friday the Miami office of the political directorate of
Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713
The President
- 2 -
July 19, 1989
the Nicaraguan Resistance was informed that funding for the
directorate, their offices, and political activities would cease
August 15, 1989.
The effect on the Nicaraguan Resistance is devastating. The
Department of State has deliberately undermined both the
political and military authority of the combatant forces. State
has directed that simple "campesino" commanders would meet with
the Central American presidents to determine how they would be
demobilized. Though these young men are fine combat leaders they
are poorly educated and would be "babes in arms" in the conduct
of any diplomatic discussions over their own fate. The spectacle
of these young commanders acting as surrogates to our own
national security interests would severely impact on our own
credibility worldwide.
The Central American presidents meet in Tegucigalpa August
5-7, 1989. High on the agenda will be a review of plans to
demobilize the Nicaraguan Resistance. Actions taken by the
Department of State spur the Central American presidents to
hasten the demobilization process being virtually demanded by
communist leader Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua.
Mr. President, these matters were discussed in detail by
representatives of private sector groups which meet weekly under
my chairmanship to discuss national security issues. We are
concerned that pushing the Nicaraguan Resistance to
demobilization now, leads inexorably to the acceptance of
fraudulent elections in Nicaragua in February. It would appear
that the Department of State is now resigned to that outcome. We
then, the United States and the free Central American nations,
would be backed into a corner where we either accept the
communist state of Nicaragua with its continued export of
subversion and terrorism, or employ U.S. forces.
Maintaining the Nicaraguan Resistance forces until Nicaragua
is a democratic and free nation seems a much better solution.
We would very much appreciate an early opportunity to
discuss this matter with you. During the Carter administration
the United States played a major role in helping bring the
Sandinistas to power. Our nation bears no small responsibility
for the suffering and tragedy that exists in the region. Our
resoluteness is essential if we are to maintain our leadership
role in the free world. We do not believe we can falter
therefore, in our leadership in the Central American region
today. The consequences are too grim.
Respectfully,
Colone STatikurs Samuel T. Dickens
Director, Inter-American Affairs
American Security Council
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
01b. Letter
To: President Bush From: American Security Council
7/19/89
(b)(3)
Re: Nicaragua [redaction] (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2015-0017-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
Mr. President
- 3 -
July 19, 1989
John M Fisher John M. Fisher
Balls
The Hon
Curtin Winsor Jr.
Chairman & C.E.O.
Former U.S. Ambassador
American Security Council
to Costa Rica
Karm Americans President McKay for Freedom
Daniel James
Author, numerous books &
articles on Latin America
Jane National Pro America Association Hueter of
Laurcel Lawrence L. f Tracy Tracy
Former Senior Defense
Advisor, Office of Public
Diplomacy, for Latin America
The Hon
Constintine Menger
Constitlenger
2. Frinces Department Bucky of State
Former Special Assistant to the President
L. Francis Bouchey
for National Security Affairs, 1983-86
President
Council for Inter-American
Security
President, institute the Studyof the American
William Rerry
+ for Chairman of the Lation America Working Groups
for the Bush. Quayle Campaign
Georges Fauriel
C
Director and Senior Fellow, Latin American Studies
Center for Strategic & International Studies
(b)(3)
Member of the Office of Presidential Personnel,
Detailed Evaluation
Office of the President-Elect 1989
Dr. Claudio F. Benedi, Washington Representative
Cuban Patriotic Board.
Bush Library Photocopy
Mr. President
-4-
July 19, 1989
Eric Light
Ein Libt
David Ridenour, President
Liberty Institute
President Coalitions for America
Miss Any mority
Amy Moritz, President
Duncan W. Sellars, Chairman
National Center for Public Policy Research
International Freedom Foundation
Right will blame Bush if Contras 'sell out
By Peter LaBarbera
MINIGUIT
18,1989
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
President Bush will be held responsi-
ble for the "sellout" of the Nicaraguan
resistance if he lets the anti-communist
fighters be disbanded before democracy
takes hold in Nicaragua, conservative ac-
tivists warned yesterday.
They said Mr. Bush faces a powerful
conservative backlash if he fails to main-
tain the resistance to guarantee fairness
in the Sandinista regime's elections set
for February.
"I know of no issue that more concerns
grass-roots anti-communist activists na-
tionwide than the selling out of the Con-
tras," Conservative Caucus. chairman
Howard Phillips said.
The Washington Working Group for
Freedom in Nicaragua, a coalition of pro-
resistance groups, urged Mr. Bush to re-
ject a Central American accord signed
earlier this month in Tela, Honduras. The
agreement calls for the "voluntary de-
mobilization" of the estimated 12,000
fighters by Dec. 6 - over two months
before the elections.
"If, despite the president's avowed
commitment to a policy of 'no demobi-
lization without democratization,' the
boast of [Nicaraguan President] Daniel
Ortega proves accurate - that the death
warrant for the Contras has been signed
Photo by Don Preisler/The Washington Times
- history will record the signature of
George Herbert Walker Bush on that
Retired Army Col. Lawrence Tracy, a former State Department adviser, displays a photo of Nicaraguan weapons yesterday at a
document," Mr. Phillips said.
news conference in which conservatives warned President Bush not to "sell out" the anti-Sandinista resistance force.
Several pro-Contra groups in town feel
the administration didn't do enough to
support for the resistance in the weeks
1980, compared with $132 million in U.S.
zation primarily composed of despotic
dissuade its Central American allies
military aid to the resistance.
and tyrannical governments should be
and months leading up to their decision
from agreeing to disband the resistance
He said Soviet arms deliveries are pro-
entrusted with an oversight capacity to
to disperse the rebels.
before the elections.
Lawrence Tracy, a senior policy con-
jected at $600 million for 1989, the high-
ensure that a democratic election will
"Free elections cannot and will not
sultant for Americans for Democracy in
est annual rate since the Marxist regime
take place in Nicaragua," he said.
have any chance of taking place if the
came to power. Any decrease in Soviet
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, who has
Latin America, said the State Depart-
supplies has been picked up by Cuban,
worked to support the resistance since
shadow of the Nicaraguan Contras does
ment either was "incompetent" in con-
not fall over the commitment to tyranny
veying its support for the resistance or
East German and other East bloc allies,
1984, said its demise without democracy
of the Sandinista government," said Alan
he said.
in Nicaragua would cause a stream of
displayed "a cunning, diabolical, almost
Keyes, a former aide to Jeane Kirkpat-
Mr. Keyes said the White House can't
millions of refugees to flee northward.
Machiavellian effort to send signals" that
let the United Nations assume a central
"It is quite clear if they lose the hope
rick when she was U.S. ambassador to the
U.S. support for the resistance is over.
United Nations.
Mr. Tracy, a former Army colonel who
role in policing the demobilization - as
of going back to Nicaragua as a result of
worked for the State Department's Office
stipulated in the Tela accords - or in
the demobilization, which they believe
Mr. Keyes faulted the White House and
of Public Diplomacy for Latin America,
pronouncing judgment on the election.
would be a total capitulation, they will
State Department for sending "confus-
ing" and "contradictory" signals to the
said the Soviet Union has provided $3
"It seems to me not only ironic but
start looking for ways to get to the United
more than slightly absurd that an organi-
States," he said.
Central American presidents about U.S.
billion in military aid to Nicaragua since
Steve Goldstein said.
Mr. Luian is one of for
6336
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
comi ID#
INCOMING
RECEIVED
DATE RECEIVED: JULY 26, 1989
JUL27196
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: COLONEL SAMUEL T. DICKENS
SCHEDULING
SUBJECT: EXPRESS CONCERN ON SOME DISTURBING ACTIONS
OFFICE
TAKEN BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONCERNING
NICARAGUA AND URGE MAINTAINING THE
MR
NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FORCES UNTIL THE
KS
necarogua wifree
deminister and request
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO: meeting with President the
ACT
DATE
TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
JOSEPH HAGIN
ORG 89/07/26
e89107127
REFERRAL NOTE:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
RSI 89/07/26
C 89/07/26
NSscow
REFERRAL NOTE:
A 8909127
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ 7
7 7
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
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OF SIGNER
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KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
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MANAGEMENT.
# 6336
E HOUSE
Sept.
NGTON
Please David make the : changes Scoucroft TO
resolventation
has indicated on the attached.
President to your thoughtful
Thanks,
ing our policy towards the
Diane
:stand that a member of my staff
Council recently to discuss our
Diane Ross
on.
The President has clearly, and emphátically stressed his support
for the Resistance and the need for the Sandinistas to fully
democratize and the State Department supports that policy.
To
demonstrate his commitment, the President met on August 4 with a
commission of Resistance commanders--including Commander Bermudez
and Aristides Sanchez. The group reported on their recent
meetings with the Central American presidents. Although the
Commanders lack formal education, as you note, they expressed
themselves clearly and eloquently.
once ayain set firth U.S. policyand
In his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 21, the
Vice President addressed very specifically some of the concerns
you expressed about Resistance demobilization. Our Bipartisan
Accord and the Central American summit in Tela, Honduras both
provide for voluntary demobilization of the Resistance and their
reintegration into Nicaragua. We would not expect them to return
unless it is under safe and democratic conditions, and the Vice
President stated that it is our moral obligation to support them
with humanitarian aid until those conditions are established. The
Looking esteblishment ahead, I hope of those you will cereditions join us in focusing can lest the attention be
of those who support the Resistance on the Sandinistas and what
they must do if the conditions for a free and fair election are
to be achieved. The central question must be the compliance of
the Nicaraguan Government with its commitment to permit the
return of the Resistance to their homeland in peace and
democracy.
Sincerely,
That reintege must be into
Brent Scowcroft
Colonel Samuel T. Dickens
holding pee and
demonistrated by The
American Security Council
499 South Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20003
deworkatic February. elections next
# 6336
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
as way TO
resolitionation
Dear Colonel Dickens:
the
I am replying on behalf of the President to your thoughtful
letter of July 19, 1989 concerning our policy towards the
Nicaraguan Resistance. I understand that a member of my staff
met with the American Security Council recently to discuss our
policy and the current situation
set forth policy
The President has clearly, and emphátically stressed his support
for the Resistance and the need for the Sandinistas to fully
democratize and the State Department supports that policy.
To
demonstrate his commitment, the President met on August 4 with a
commission of Resistance commanders--including Commander Bermudez
and Aristides Sanchez. The group reported on their recent
meetings with the Central American presidents. Although the
Commanders lack formal education, as you note, they expressed
themselves clearly and eloquently.
once ayain set firth U.S. policyand
In his speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 21, the
Vice President addressed very specifically some of the concerns
you expressed about Resistance demobilization. Our Bipartisan
Accord and the Central American summit in Tela, Honduras both
provide for voluntary demobilization of the Resistance and their
reintegration into Nicaragua. We would not expect them to return
unless it is under safe and democratic conditions, and the Vice
President stated that it is our moral obligation to support them
with humanitarian aid until those conditions are established. The
Looking ahead, I you will join us in focusing the attention
establishment hope trose caraditions can lest be
of those who support the Resistance on the Sandinistas and what
they must do if the conditions for a free and fair election are
to be achieved. The central question must be the compliance of
the Nicaraguan Government with its commitment to permit the
return of the Resistance to their homeland in peace and
democracy.
Sincerely,
Mentreintegiation must be into
Brent Scowcroft
Colonel Samuel T. Dickens
American Security Council
holding pre and
demonistrated by The
499 South Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20003
deworratic February. elections next
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CHRON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 23,
SAtiN mischandani V.P.
julant, him caredit 9 21-89
Dear Mr. Warnecke:
David Pacelli, who works with me here in the Latin
American/Caribbean Directorate of the National Security Council,
has told me about your invitation to him to participate in the
DWAC this year.
Knowing of my personal connections with Dartmouth, Mr. Pacelli
asked me if I would want to butt in, or propose myself as an
alternate invitee.
As a matter of fact, I would welcome an opportunity to meet with
your group. I am a resident of Hanover, and have family living
there. A visit sponsored by DWAC would have considerable appeal
to me.
In any event, one of us should be available -- provided we have
sufficient notice -- to meet with the DWAC, and will look forward
to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Ambassador
Everett WED Ellis Briggs, '56
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Mr. A. Michael Warnecke
DWAC Secretary
World Affairs Council
Hinman Box 5061
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
World Affairs Council
Hinman Box 5061
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
August 4, 1989
They must have
Mr. David Pacelli
gotten my name when
I was the only one
Office of the National Security Council
have Mrs is
The White House
yours.
DAP
Washington D.C., 20500
Dear Mr. Pacelli:
Writing on behalf of the students of Dartmouth College, I invite you to join us during the
upcoming academic year under the sponsorship of the Dartmouth World Affairs Council
(DWAC).
The Council, run by students and sponsored by the College, is dedicated to thoughtful
discussion of issues concerning the role of the United States and other nations in
contemporary international society. To achieve this purpose, we invite informed persons to
discuss issues and ideas with our students and faculty in a variety of forums throughout the
course of a day, culminating in a formal speech on a topic of your choice. The DWAC is not
political and has hosted a group of speakers as diverse as the students who enjoy their
commentary.
A sample of our former speakers includes the following people:
William Webster, Director of The Central Intelligence Agency
Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State
Han Xu, Ambassador to U.S. from The People's Republic of China
El Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Ambassador to U.S. from Egypt
Sanchez Parodi, Head of the Cuban Interest Section
Helen Thomas, "Dean" of the White House Press Corps
Richard Pearle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Gary Hart, former Senator from Colorado
Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the United Nations
On behalf of the college and the community of Hanover, The World Affairs Council would
be honored to have you accept our invitation to address the college.
I will contact your office in the upcoming weeks to discuss further the possibility of a
speaking engagement. In the meantime, if you prefer, you or your office may contact me
through the address above.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
A. Michael Warnecke
DWAC Secretary
24 AVG
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 8906672
NSC/S PROFILE
RECEIVED: 24 AUG 89 09
TO: PRESIDENT
FROM: ADEM, ALEXANDRE
DOC DATE: 16 AUG 89
SEDE, VICTOR
SOURCE REF: 8919078
KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA
LEBANON
HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSONS:
CHRON FILE
SUBJECT: CABLE TO PRES FM ARGENTINE LEBANESE CULTURAL UNION
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR HUGHES
DUE DATE: 28 AUG 89
STATUS: S
STAFF OFFICER: PRYCE
LOGREF:
FILES: WH
NSCIF:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
PRYCE
DYKE
BRIGGS
HAASS
CHARLES
WELCH
PACELLI
RODMAN
ROSTOW
WORKING
COMMENTS:
STATE Treathy
DISPATCHED BY WOnge
DATE 3/24/9 BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSMDC
CLOSED BY:
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
6672
S/S 8919078
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
August 23, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House
SUBJECT:
Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence
Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Bush
from Alexandre Adem & Victor Sede of Argentina
which is transmitted for your information.
This correspondence was received in the Information Resources
Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on August 23, 1989
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.
S.Me Elham/for S. Me
Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991
6672
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(TRANSLATION)
LS1M9.794
EL/JF
Spanish
O 160244Z AUG 89
FM Alexandre Adem
TO His Excellency George Bush
UNCLAS
George Bush
President of the United States of America
Mr. President:
We urge the governments of the free world, guardians of
human rights, to intervene promptly to save what is left of a
Lebanon in flames, which was one of the cradles of mankind's
civilization and history.
Help us to free ourselves of the Syrian forces and an
ambitious dictatorship, avid for bloodthirsty power, which SOWS
terror, destruction, and death in our territory.
The conscience of mankind cannot remain indifferent to the
holocaust of an innocent people whose only wish is to preserve
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country,
where their children want to live in peace and harmony.
Alexandre Adem, President
Victor Sede, Secretary
Union Cultural Argentino Libanesa
[Argentine-Lebanese Cultural Union]
UNCLASSIFIED
S/S-0 6672
INCOMING
Department of State
PAGE 01
160638Z
8567 006231 SS07192
8919078
16/0711Z
INFO SSS-02 SSSA-01 SSI-02 SSO-01 ss,3
A4
RAF
ACTION ARA-00
INFO LOG-00 INR-07 NSCE-00 SSO-00 AMAD-01 INRE-00 /008 W
265336 1607027 /25
0 160244Z AUG 89
FM ALEXANJDRE ADEM
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE BUSH
UNCLAS
SR PRESIDENTE DE LOS EEUU DE NORTEAMERICA
D. GEORGE BUSCH
ROGAMOS A LOS GOBIERNOS DEL MUNDO LIBRE, CUSTODIOS DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS, SU PRONTA INTERVENCION PARA SALVAR LO QUE QUEDA DE UN
LIBANO EN LLAMAS. QUE FUE UNA DE LAS CUNAS DE LA CIVILIZACION Y DE
LA HISTORIA DE LA HUMANIDAD.
AYUDENOS A LIBERARNOS DE LAS FUERZAS SIRIAS Y DE UNA AMBICIOSA
DICTADURA, AVIDA DE PODER SANGUINARIO, QUE SIEMBRA EN NUESTRO TERRI-
TORIO EL TERROR, LA DESTRUCCION Y LA MUERTE.
LA CONCIENCIA DE LA HUMANIDAD NO PUEDE QUEDARSE INDIFERENTE
FRENTE AL HOLOCAUSTO DE UN PUEBLO INOCENTE QUE TIENE COMO UNICO
DESEO, CONSERVAR SU SOBERANIA E INTEGREDAD TERRITORIAL DONDE TODOS
SUS HIJOS QUIEREN VIVIR LIBRES EN PAZ Y ARMONIA.-
UNION CULTURAL ARGENTINO LIBANESA
ALEXANDRE ADEM PRESIDENTE
VICTOR SEDE SECRETARIO
EOT
UNCLASSIFIED
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
02. Memorandum
To: Brent Scowcroft From: William Pryce
8/24/89
(b)(1)
C
Re: OAS Foreign Minister Meeting (2 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2015-0017-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act- - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
P.RM. Removed as a personal record misfile
24 Alle 1989
OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES
REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE-COMMENTS
TO:
NSC, ATTENTION: PACELLi
CHRON FILE
Please review, concur with or without changes, sign for the
Executive Secretary and return to NSC/S
Date Due:
August 24, 1989
Date of Event:
August 27, 1989
Subject:
Presidential message for Monsignor Cyril La Montagne, Ambassador Stanislaus of
Grenada, and all those attending the Seventh Annual Caribbean American Cultural
Heritage Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York Citv.
Requested by:
Lamuel A. Stanislaus
Background:
May we please have your approval on the attached.
Copy of incoming request, FYI.
Copy of last years message attached.
Clearance would be appreciated ASAP.
Thank you.
Signature:
Kathleen Hogan
Date:
August 23, 1989
Presidential Messages
Old Executive Office Building
Room 18
(202) 456-2941
Your Recommendation/Comments:
THE NSC CONCURS AS IS
X
WITH CHANGES
David a Paulh
5/24/81
For G. PHILIP HUGHES
Executive Secretary
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
August 16, 1989
I am delighted to offer warm greetings to Monsignor
Cyril La Montagne, Ambassador Stanislaus of Grenada,
and all those attending the Seventh Annual Caribbean
American Cultural Heritage Mass at St. Patrick's
Cathedral in New York City.
This occasion provides a wonderful opportunity to
celebrate and renew the friendship between the
people of the United States and our Caribbean
neighbors. We are united not only by historical
and cultural bonds but also by our common love of
liberty. Today, as you reflect upon that deep
friendship and the many ties that bind us, I ask
you to pray for the continued blessings of peace
and freedom. Let us also pray for the strength
and wisdom we need to help secure those blessings
for all mankind.
Barbara joins me in offering our best wishes for a
memorable day and for every future happiness.
May God bless you.
Call Stephen Studdert for dispatch
GB: FJK:TD:SMG:ltd PM10
cc: Pres.Msgs.Rm.18/F.Kelly/CF
EVENT: Aug 27 89
DUE: Aug 27 89
Caribbean Heritage Mass
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
aug. 27
assign to FK 8-21
August 21, 1989
1988 msg attached
MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN
FROM:
STEPHEN M. STUDDERT
SUBJECT:
POTUS LETTER TO CELEBRATE 7TH ANNUAL
CARIBBEAN AMERICAN CULTURAL HERITAGE
MASS
I would like to request that a Presidential message be sent in
honor of the 7th Annual Caribbean American Cultural Heritage Mass
to take place on Sunday, August 27, 1989 at 6:30pm at St.
Patrick's Cathedral. Attached is more information regarding this
event.
Please alert my staff when the letter is ready and they will be
happy to send the letter out.
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this request.
Clear final ulnsc
11:29
J.O.C.P.M.-U.N.
548 P02
PERMANENT MISSION OF GRENADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 SECOND AVENUE, 9TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TELEPHONE: (212) 599-0301
August 21, 1989
Mrs. Ruth Waller
c/o Mr. Steve Studdert's Office
The White House
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Mrs. Waller,
I have the honour to present my compliments, and
to respectfully request, that as customary, the President
be good and gracious enough to send a message on the
occasion of the 7th annual Caribbean American Cultural
Heritage Mass to take place on Sunday August 27, 1989 at
6:30 pm at St. Patrick's Cathedral.
This spiritual exercise is sponsored annually by the
Caribbean American Community Congress.
The Very Rev. Monsignor Cyril La Montagne, Vicar-General
of Grenada, will be the chief celebrant and homilist.
The following persons will be cited for distinguished
community service:- Mr. Gordon Daniel of Grenada, Mr. Denis
Jardine of St. Vincent, Mrs. Irma Tully of Jamaica and
Mrs. Hilda Benjamin Mendez of St. Kitts-Nevis parentage.
With anticipatory thanks and sincere good wishes.
Yours truly,
Raurian
Lamuel A. Stanislaus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Grenada to the United Nations
LAS:kg
Lida
your
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Rath
JADI
August 21, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN
FROM:
STEPHEN M. STUDDERTSM
SUBJECT:
POTUS LETTER TO CELEBRATE 7TH ANNUAL
CARIBBEAN AMERICAN CULTURAL HERITAGE
MASS
I would like to request that a Presidential message be sent in
honor of the 7th Annual Caribbean American Cultural Heritage Mass
to take place on Sunday, August 27, 1989 at 6:30pm at St.
Patrick's Cathedral. Attached is more information regarding this
event.
Please alert my staff when the letter is ready and they will be
happy to send the letter out.
Thank you in advance for your assistance with this request.
11:29
J.O.C.P.M.U.N.
548 P02
PERMANENT MISSION OF GRENADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
820 SECOND AVENUE, 9TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TELEPHONE: (212) 599-0301
August 21, 1989
Mrs. Ruth Waller
c/o Mr. Steve Studdert's Office
The White House
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Mrs. Waller,
I have the honour to present my compliments, and
to respectfully request, that as customary, the President
be good and gracious enough to send a message on the
occasion of the 7th annual Caribbean American Cultural
Heritage Mass to take place on Sunday August 27, 1989 at
6:30 pm at St. Patrick's Cathedral.
This spiritual exercise is sponsored annually by the
Caribbean American Community Congress.
The Very Rev. Monsignor Cyril La Montagne, Vicar-General
of Grenada, will be the chief celebrant and homilist.
The following persons will be cited for distinguished
community service:- Mr. Gordon Daniel of Grenada, Mr. Denis
Jardine of St. Vincent, Mrs. Irma Tully of Jamaica and
Mrs. Hilda Benjamin Mendez of St. Kitts-Nevis parentage.
With anticipatory thanks and sincere good wishes.
Yours truly,
Lamuel A. Stanislaus
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Grenada to the United Nations
LAS:kg
Santa Barbara :
August 22, 1988
I am delighted to send greetings to Bishop Reece,
Ambassador Stanislans of Grenada, and everyone
attending the Sixth Annual
Cultural Herfthge Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral in
New York City:
Americans of Caribbean descent have played 8 vital
role th U.S. society and your cultural heritage
continues to enrich us all. Occasions such as this
reaffirm the close ties that unite the United States
with the nations of the Caribbean in a bond of friend-
ship and a commitment to liberty
The flags assembled fn the sanctuary testify to your
faith in God, love of freedom, and desire for peace
- values that transcend national boundaries. As
you take part in this sacred event, I know you will
renew your commitment to those values, on which
the future of our world depends.
You have my best wishes today and for the years
to come. God bless you.
FAX to Tony Faillace, 212-415-4443
RR: : DMcL: DE:AVH:lsd LSD14
cc: K. Osborne/D McLaughlin/Pres. Msgs. Rm. 18/CF
EVENT: AUG 26
DUE: AUG 26
cachmass
OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES
REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE-COMMENTS
TO:
Paul Stevens, NSC
Date Due:
Date of Event:
AUG. 24, 1988, 2:00pm
AUG. 26, 1988
Subject:
Presidential message for the Sixth Annual Caribbean American
Cultural Heritage Mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral
in New York City
Requested by:
A. S. Faillace, Jr., Special Assistant to Ambassador Walters
Background:
May we please have your approval on the attached.
Copy of incoming request and last year's message attached, FYI.
Thank you.
Signature:
Date:
Linda Watson
Aug. 23, 1988
Presidential Messages
Old Executive Office Building
Room 18
(202) 456-2941
Your Recommendation/Comments:
SIGNATURE:
DATE:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
6642
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 23, 1989
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
CHRON FILE
FROM:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
SUBJECT:
Colombian Coffee Complaint
The Colombian's blame the U.S. for the collapse of the
International Coffee Agreement. We voted with the Central
Americans against a Colombian-Brazilian proposal that would have
delayed any decision on how to end discount sales of coffee and
how to change the allocation of coffee so that consumer countries
could get greater supplies of mild coffee.
The U.S. has been trying to resolve these problems since 1983,
and negotiated hard and in good faith during the negotiations
which began in November of 1988 and ended last June when we
refused to go along with the approach favored by the two giant
producers (Brazil and Columbia) Colombia which we felt would not
solve our problems in the near future. Colombia argued that
their approach would achieve a solution within three years. We
felt that the Colombian approach was too vague and would not
ensure a solution even in three years. U.S. industry would
prefer a free market, but was willing to go along with an
approach suggested by the Central Americans and supported by the
U.S. designed to solve the problem within a year.
When we reached the impass in June the International Coffee
Organization agreed to extend the coffee agreement for two years
without quotas. Coffee prices for Colombian type coffee have
dropped appreciably (from 1.30 a pound to .70-.80 a pound). This
has seriously hurt the Central Americans, as well as Colombia and
needs urgent attention.
STR is taking the appropriate steps, including consultations with
Congress (not yet done) for the U.S. to adhere to the extension.
STR says that they are willing to resume negotiations aimed at
solving the problems we have with the coffee agreement at any
time.
The President could say that we negotiated with the International
Coffee community including Colombia, in good faith but were
unable to reach a solution which addressed our problems,
principally that the previous agreement forced our consumers to
pay higher prices than non members; and that we stand ready to
resume negotiations.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PER NSC WAIVER, thou oz
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
By MC NARA, Date 7/10/21
063498
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Date 8-22-84
TO: PACELL:
CHRON FILE
NSC Secretariat has requested us
check with you to see whether to
to the attached sent to you for staffing, you want
draft reply.
State Dept., or other agencies for
Please indicate:
For Action
Refer to State Dept. or
Reply other agencies for Draft
Other
Ralph Bellamy
ID# 063498
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING
C0 001-09
DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 15, 1989
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. DAVID J. STEINBERG
SUBJECT: ENCLOSES COPY OF AN OP-ED PIECE IN THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR OF JUL 12 89 WHICH
HE WROTE AND BELIEVES IT MERITS MAJOR
ATTENTION FOR THE SPEECH TO BE GIVEN AT THE
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
SICHAN SIV
ORG 89/08/15
Phil Hughes NSC
REFERRAL NOTE:
A
89/08/1221
REFERRAL NOTE:
XB
/
/
7
/
7 7
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
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/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:
PL MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
63498
U.S. Council for an Open World Economy
INCORPORATED
7216 Stafford Road, Alexandria, Virginia 22307
(202)358-2068
(703) 765-2472
Dir
August 4, 1989
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I have no illusions about this letter reaching your desk.
But I hope someone in the chain of command who sees this letter
will share my view that the U.S. initiative I have advocated for
many years concerning Central America. -- most recently in an
op-ed piece in the Christian Science Monitor of July 12, 1989
(copy enclosed) -- merits major attention for the speech you
will make at the October conference you will attend in Central
America. As my article suggests, a properly orchestrated U.S.
initiative for Central American economic development would be
a greatly needed catalyst in the political chemistry of efforts
to achieve and sustain peace and democracy in those countries.
I hope you will make such a U.S. initiative (the "Bush Plan"?)
the centerpiece of the opportunity that awaits you in Central Amer-
ica. The strategy I propose will, I am confident, get overwhelming
support in Congress.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
David J. Steinberg
President
Encl
A 'Marshall Plan' Initiative in Central America
democracy. It can be an effective
Union and other countries pro-
government we have good reason
the world.
catalyst in the political chemistry
viding such assistance, and by a
to detest but no acceptable reason
While humanitarian reasons
By David J. Steinberg
of efforts to secure lasting peace
high state of US military pre-
to remove by force.
alone can justify such an initiative,
and democracy in Central Amer-
paredness.
How the US launched the Mar-
it is also a responsible way to ad-
ica - ultimately in Nicaragua.
If isolated from the regional
shall Plan in Europe over 40 years
dress the US security interest in
P
EACE and democracy are
The impetus for democracy
development strategy, the Sandin-
ago can be instructive for an eco-
thwarting communism in Central
the proclaimed objectives of
and human rights in Nicaragua
ista regime would, in time, be
nomic-development initiative in
America. Attacking the grinding
United States policy in Cen-
should not come from US military
pushed to extinction or radical re-
Central America today. The Mar-
injustices that afflict millions of
tral America. But to achieve them
efforts to oust the Sandinista re-
shall Plan, a reconstruction pro-
people in these countries, the
requires a third objective as much
gime or get it to change its ways.
gram in industrialized Europe, is
strategy would strike at the very
as a tripod requires three legs.
It should come from the standards
Can the US afford to
not the model for a development
source for extremist ideologies.
This third dimension is economic
and incentives of a Central Ameri-
program in underdeveloped Cen-
This strategy should be supple-
justice - land reform, major
can development strategy in
launch a 'Marshall Plan'
tral America. But the Marshall ini-
mented by a US commitment to
strides against poverty, and much
which all the countries of the re-
at this financially difficult
tiative that triggered it is applica-
protect these countries against
more.
gion are free to participate if they
ble. That initiative invited the
time?
foreign military assault. The basis
A well-structured program of
abide by the criteria conditioning
governments concerned to formu-
for such a commitment has been
regional economic development is
aid from the US and other
late their own program in national
in place for over 40 years in the
essential to this end. The
sources. If Nicaragua rejects these
and regional terms, and the US
Rio Pact of 1947, involving an
inseparability of peace, democra-
standards (or, nominally accepting
form by explosive domestic pres-
pledged to help ensure the pro-
obligation (within the framework
cy, and development has been rec-
them, does not honor its com-
sures. The inter-American and in-
gram's success. Unlike 40 years
of the Organization of American
ognized by US and international
mitment) it would be excluded
ternational communities should
ago, the US can now turn to other
States) to all Latin American coun-
study commissions on Central
from the regional compact. The
then be ready to help a democratic
developed countries and to inter-
tries.
America, and the recent accords of
result would be continuing dete-
Nicaragua (and any other coun-
national financial institutions for
Can the US afford to launch a
the five Central American presi-
rioration of its already tottering
tries initially excluded but now
assistance.
"Marshall Plan" initiative for Cen-
dents. However, there is still no
economy in contrast to the emerg-
qualified for entry) into produc-
It may be too much to expect a
tral American economic devel-
coherent initiative to link these
ing achievements of those of its
tive partnership with the rest of
US administration these days to
opment at this financially difficult
goals in a cohesive strategy.
neighbors who do participate - a
Central America. In the interim,
declare - as Secretary of State
time? If the fate of Central Amer
A dramatic initiative in eco-
contrast these countries should
whatever aid the US gives the con-
George C. Marshall did in his his-
ica or its member countries is as
nomic development should not
make every effort to communicate
tras (the armed Nicaraguan "free-
toric speech on June 5, 1947 that
important to our national security
await the arrival of peace and de-
to the Nicaraguan people.
dom fighters" encamped in Hon-
our motivation is not "against any
as our government says it is, can
mocracy. Peace and democracy
Any danger to US and Latin
duras) should be strictly
country or doctrine, but against
we afford not to?
are vital to successful economic
American security from Soviet
humanitarian within the frame-
hunger, poverty, desperation and
development. But progress to-
bloc military aid given to the San-
work of the regional development
chaos." But something approxi-
David J. Steinberg, a veteran of the
ward economic development, rais-
dinista government should be
program. Aid should not be given
mating this level of statesmanship
Marshall Plan, is president of the US
ing hopes for a decent standard of
countered through the gamut of
to preserve an "ace in the hole"
would win us considerable respect
Council for an Open World Economy
living, is no less vital to peace and
US relations with the Soviet
for a renewed attempt to topple a
in Latin America and throughout
based in Fairfax County, Va.
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Wednesday, July 12, 1989
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6487 Re do
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
CHRON FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
WTO
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI
DAB
SUBJECT:
Policy on Use of U.S. Military Shops by Panama
Canal Commission Employees
The Defense Department approved a policy in June regarding use of
military shoppettes in Panama by U.S. employees of the Panama
Canal Commission and requests that we inform the President and
the appropriate Congressional committees (Tab II). The policy
statement indicates that the shoppettes should expand their
supplies and that a plan be developed for distribution of food to
all P.C.C. employees in the event of an emergency.
The Defense memo explains very little and imposed an artificial
deadline for response. As background, the Panama Canal Treaty
provided that U.S. citizen P.C.C. employees would have access to
commissary and post exchange privileges for only 5 years. The
employees have been agitating ever since to get these privileges
restored. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee--a
bastian of support for the ex-Zonians--has supported their
position, arguing that the Treaty does not preclude access.
Early in the Panama crisis, to ensure that Canal operations were
not affected, we secured the permission of President Delvalle for
employee access to military shoppettes (7-11 type stores). This
has not satisfied the employees, and their friends in Congress
have introduced a bill (H.R. 2612) to authorize access to the
post exchanges. The attached policy statement attempts to short-
circuit that, which we view as a violation of the Treaty.
DOD wants White House involvement but, we do not believe the
President needs to be directly involved although you may want to
inform him orally. The memo to DOD at Tab I is should be
sufficient to fill the bill.
Concurrence by: Bret Coulson WD
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, #2021.02
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21
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2
CONFIDENTIAL
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize Hughes to send the memo at Tab I to DOD.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memorandum to Cole
Tab II
Cole Memorandum to Hughes
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6487
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR COL GEORGE P. COLE
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Access to Military Shoppettes by U.S. Citizen
Employees of the Panama Canal Commission (U)
The National Security Adviser has been informed of the Defense
Department policy statement regarding use of military shoppettes
in Panama by U.S. citizen employees of the Panama Canal
Commission. The Defense Department should inform the relevant
Congressional committees. NSC Legislative Affairs will
informally communicate Administration support for this policy in
contacts with the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
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By MC NARA, Date7/16/21 /16/21
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
04c.
To: Executive Secretary From: George Cole
8/15/89
(b)(1)
C
Memorandum
Re: Coordination with Department of State on Proposed
Commissary and Post Exchange Privileges for American
Citizen Panama Canal Commission Employees (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2015-0017-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAJ
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENT IAL
6637
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CHRON FILE
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
THROUGH:
FROM:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS WIB
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation
between the President and Venezuelan President Perez on
August 22, 1989. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the record of
the telcon to the State Department.
RECOMMENDATION
That you file the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for record
purposes.
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the State Department.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memo to Roy
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL-
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6637
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Telephone Call to Venezuelan President
Perez (c)
The memorandum of conversation of the President's telephone call
to Venezuelan President Perez on August 22, 1989, attached at
Tab A should be forwarded to Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson
and to the Charge in Caracas. The transmittal must be handled in
NODIS channels.
()
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6637
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
SCS 8/21/09
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Carlos
Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of
Venezuela
Notetaker: William Pryce
DATE, TIME
August 22, 1989, 1:17-1:32 p.m., EDT
& PLACE:
Kennebunkport
The President telephoned President Perez regarding the
Organization of American States' action on Panama. (d)
The President: Hello Mr. President, how are you? (U)
President Perez: Fine, thank you. It's a pleasure to hear your
voice. (U)
The President: So glad to hear your voice. I'm sitting up here
in Maine by the seashore on a beautiful day, but I was calling
you on the matter of the Organization of American States and
Panama. (&)
President Perez: I'm very interested in hearing your views on
that Mr. President because I think the OAS has basically failed.
(&)
The President: Maybe so, but tomorrow there will be another
meeting, as you know. I would like to make a proposal that I
hope Venezuela could take the lead on or be supportive of. The
OAS Commission has a broad outline of a possible solution: (1)
Noriega out by September 1; (2) formation of a transition
government on September 1; and (3) new elections. And of course
if that takes place, the United States would, as I think I told
you, move immediately to lift our sanctions and try to be helpful
to the people of Panama. Like you, I am worried about the OAS as
you just said. I hope we do not have to say that it has failed
totally. But tomorrow we have a chance at the OAS meeting to
make it clear that if Noriega has not agreed to leave power by
September 1, that he is responsible for the lack of a solution.
Then, of course, we'd like to see sanctions which might include
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breaking diplomatic relations, withdrawal of Ambassadors or
military attaches, kicking Panama out of the OAS, or applying
further economic sanctions. (2)
And I have just hung up the phone from talking to your old friend
and my new friend, Michael Manley of Jamaica, who incidentally
asked me to convey his respects to you. I told him I was calling
you and he said Carlos Andres Perez is the most respected figure
in our hemisphere for this kind of matter. Manley said he is
urging his Ambassador to get the CARICOM Ambassadors, CARICOM
countries to strongly support what I have just said, a position
he has taken for a long time. We're back where we were. We need
a commitment from Noriega to get the hell out of there. There's
no point extending, in our view, the OAS Commission unless
there's a set date for Noriega. I was telling you this was our
view to see if you had any different thoughts, and to encourage
support for as strong a democratic action at the OAS tomorrow as
possible. (d)
President Perez: I fully agree with your viewpoints, Mr.
President. I have been talking with other Latin American
Presidents myself. I am worried because I know of a great deal
of vacillation and because I'm convinced it is absolutely
essential that a strong decision be taken in that meeting
tomorrow. The OAS must adopt a decision in the terms that you
have said -- that the failure of the OAS Commission mandate be
ascribed entirely to Noriega for his refusal to leave power by
the first of September and there must be an agreement to set up
an interim government acceptable to the opposition and that an
election be invoked this calendar year. What I do not see is
that there's very much spirit in the air for breaking relations.
(d)
The President: That would be a step that might encourage Noriega
to move out if we could get more support for breaking relations,
even though none of us want to hurt the people of Panama. (X)
President Perez: I understand what you' saying. That's why
I'm saying the situation is very difficult. But in the rest of
today I'm going to be talking to other Latin American Presidents
and to Washington to the OAS Commission to see if we can agree on
some formula. I agree with you I share your view that there has
got to be a strong resolution of condemnation tomorrow. (X)
The President: I appreciate that. I knew that you would be
working on this and I just wish we could think of a good
formulation to get this man out of there. Manley said "we've got
to get this thug out of office." Have you had any vacation this
summer? (C)
President Perez: It is hopelessly hard for me to take vacation
with the problem of the debt. (f)
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The President: Are we making any progress? I have talked with
my collaborators on this. We want to find a solution with
Venezuela. Do you feel there's any progress? (d)
President Perez: There's no progress yet. But I have talked to
Mr. Mulford and he told me that you were very interested in an
early solution to the problem. (&)
The President: We were pleased with the Mexican situation. I
think Salinas was pleased. I realize there are differences with
each country. If you see it getting hung up, if you feel they' re
not being fair to Venezuela's considerations, I would like to
hear about that. (&)
President Perez: Thank you, Mr. President. I know I can count
on your support in this. (&)
The President: My best to you my friend, and I mean friend. I
am pleased we have a good relationship where we can talk about
these problems. (U)
President Perez: Thank you so much. You can count on me. I'm
SO pleased with the way you are handling not only our problem but
the problem of Latin America in general. I hope to have
something specific on this Panama business by tonight, and if so
I will certainly let you know. (d)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6633
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
CHRON FILE
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI DAP
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica
Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation
between the President and Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley
on August 22, 1989. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the record
of the telcon to the State Department.
RECOMMENDATION
That you file the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for record
purposes.
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the State Department.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memo to Roy
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 13 NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6633
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Telephone Call to Jamaican Prime
Minister Michael Manley
(e)
The memorandum of conversation of the President's telephone call
to Jamaican Prime Minister Manley on August 22, 1989, attached at
Tab A should be forwarded to Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson
and our Charge in Jamaica, Steven Gibson. The transmittal must
be handled in NODIS channels.
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6633
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
MEMORANDUM FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
ses 8/21/09
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Michael Manley, Prime
Minister of Jamaica
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica
Notetaker: David A. Pacelli
Stenographer: Pat Battenfield
DATE, TIME
August 22, 1989, 1:07 - 1:16 p.m., EDT
AND PLACE:
Kennebunkport - Prime Minister's Office
The President telephoned Prime Minister Manley to discuss the OAS
meeting on Panama. (&)
The President began by saying, "Mr. President, how are you?" (U)
Prime Minister Manley replied, "Fine, thank you, Mr. President;
very nice to hear your voice." (f)
The President said that he remembered the Prime Minister's recent
visit with great pleasure and that he hoped things were going
well for him at home.
Prime Minister Manley replied that he was doing well; "not too
badly." (φ)
The President said, "That's good. The President then said he
was calling on the OAS matter in Panama, a subject that he had
not discussed with the Prime Minister before. The September 1
deadline established by the Panamanian Constitution for the
transfer of power was approaching. The Prime Minister knew our
position--we would like very much to see the transfer of power
take place and by that we mean Noriega leaving power by
September 1. The President asserted that the entire hemisphere
is being challenged by this man, who is trying to thwart the will
of the people. The election result was clear but Noriega is
holding up the election process to ridicule. The President said
he had tried to stay within the framework of multilateral
diplomacy. The United States, he said, is often viewed as a
military power with too much muscle. But we have stayed with the
OAS. The President said there was agreement in the OAS about the
departure of Noriega by September 1. There was also the idea of
forming a transition government, leading to new elections, even
though the previous election was certifiably true. If that would
take place, we would move rapidly about the business of helping
Panama. (&)
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2
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The President said he hoped to enlist the Prime Minister's
support to make it clear at the OAS meeting tomorrow that if
Noriega has not agreed to leave power by September 1, or shortly
thereafter, then he is the one responsible for the lack of a
solution. We would like to see sanctions. Noriega should not be
permitted to frustrate the will of the Panamanian people. The
President said he was calling to encourage the Prime Minister's
support, if possible, adding that he recognized that the Prime
Minister may look at it one way and we another, in terms of the
size of our countries. The President said that the Prime
Minister himself had been through a free election process which
everyone supported and recognized as totally free. If the Prime
Minister could be supportive at the OAS meeting tomorrow, it
would be helpful; that was the purpose of the call. (d)
Prime Minister Manley replied, "Thank you, Mr. President." Then
he said, "Can you spare a moment?" He said he did not know
whether the President was aware, but the Jamaican Government had
taken a very very strong position regarding Noriega. The Prime
Minister said he had personally mobilized the CARICOM group to
denounce the stealing of the election, that he had been a leader
at the Socialist International meeting in Stockholm, and
personally had been very active. So far as September 1 is
concerned, the Jamaican Ambassador in Washington, Keith Johnson,
on the Prime Minister's instructions, is trying to get the
CARICOM group at the very least to withdraw diplomatic
recognition from Panama if Noriega is not out by September 1 and
arrangements made for an election. We have the same perspective,
he asserted, not a different view. The thing that is sacred is
democracy -- "non-negotiable in my mind." We're taking a strong
view, he declared. He then asked the President to tell him
exactly the position the United States wished to take, saying, "I
would like to support you. (C)
The President replied that it was the position that the Prime
Minister had just articulated. We would like to say at this
meeting that it's time to go; September 1 is approaching. If
Noriega does not go and if there is not a subsequent election,
then those countries that value democracy, like Jamaica, will be
inclined to do what the Prime Minister just said and break
relations and pull back further from Panama. The President said,
"You're way ahead of us. That position is exactly what we'd like
to see come out of the meeting tomorrow." (f)
Prime Minister Manley responded, "We are of like mind.' He said
that he had been talking about it yesterday while getting the
Jamaican team ready. The Prime Minister said he had spoken to
his Foreign Minister to tell him that his own feeling was that if
we cannot get our CARICOM partners to go that far, he was
prepared to have Jamaica go that far. We need to make a
statement about it, he said.
(&)
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The President said that such a move, coming from Jamaica, has
much more significance than if it were to originate with the
United States. The President said he remembered earlier remarks
by the Prime Minister where he felt we were right in alignment.
This statement goes further. The President said he was going to
make a couple of other calls, including to Carlos Andres Perez,
who both the President and the Prime Minister respected. If we
can get 3 or 4 strong people together like yourself, the
President said, hopefully we might be able to send a signal to
Panama that the man must leave. (f)
Prime Minister Manley observed that it would be good if the
President could enlist Carlos Andres Perez since he was a very
old personal friend and had worked closely with him. The Prime
Minister asked the President to tell President Perez that this is
the way he is thinking and that he really would be very pleased
if President Perez could think in that direction himself. (d)
The President said that if that is agreeable to the Prime
Minister, he would tell President Perez that, adding that he
thought it would make a difference. If that's agreeable, the
President said, I will tell him that the United States and
Jamaica are totally in accord and hope that he will feel inclined
to be with us also. (d)
Prime Minister Manley said that the voice of President Perez
carries immense weight in Latin America, adding that his own
voice doesn't carry such weight, except in the Caribbean. If he
came along with us in that point of view, it would be tremendous,
he declared. "We have to get this nasty little man out." (&)
The President said that he would talk to President Perez and send
a telegram out after that phone call if the Prime Minister was
interested. (f)
Prime Minister Manley said he would be most interested if the
President would do that, adding, "I hope we get the brute out. "
The President said we' 11 see what we can do and he thanked the
Prime Minister for accepting the phone call. (C)
The Prime Minister said, "My pleasure, sir." (U)
The President and Prime Minister then exchanged goodbyes and the
phone call was concluded. (U)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6637
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
PRYCE
August 23, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Telephone Call to Venezuelan President
Perez
The memorandum of conversation of the President's telephone call
to Venezuelan President Perez on August 22, 1989, attached at
Tab A should be forwarded to Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson
and to the Charge in Caracas. The transmittal must be handled in
NODIS channels.
G. Philip Weblite Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF
6637
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
THROUGH:
FROM:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS WB
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation
between the President and Venezuelan President Perez on
August 22, 1989. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the record of
the telcon to the State Department.
RECOMMENDATION
That you file the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for record
purposes.
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the State Department.
Approve J
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memo to Roy
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6637
THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED
WASHINGTON
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000- 0429-F
SCS 8/21/09
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Carlos
Andres Perez, President of Venezuela
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Carlos Andres Perez, President of
Venezuela
Notetaker: William Pryce
DATE, TIME
August 22, 1989, 1:17-1:32 p.m., EDT
& PLACE:
Kennebunkport
The President telephoned President Perez regarding the
Organization of American States' action on Panama. (d)
The President: Hello Mr. President, how are you? (U)
President Perez: Fine, thank you. It's a pleasure to hear your
voice. (U)
The President: So glad to hear your voice. I'm sitting up here
in Maine by the seashore on a beautiful day, but I was calling
you on the matter of the Organization of American States and
Panama. (d)
President Perez: I'm very interested in hearing your views on
that Mr. President because I think the OAS has basically failed.
(d)
The President: Maybe so, but tomorrow there will be another
meeting, as you know. I would like to make a proposal that I
hope Venezuela could take the lead on or be supportive of. The
OAS Commission has a broad outline of a possible solution: (1)
Noriega out by September 1; (2) formation of a transition
government on September 1; and (3) new elections. And of course
if that takes place, the United States would, as I think I told
you, move immediately to lift our sanctions and try to be helpful
to the people of Panama. Like you, I am worried about the OAS as
you just said. I hope we do not have to say that it has failed
totally. But tomorrow we have a chance at the OAS meeting to
make it clear that if Noriega has not agreed to leave power by
September 1, that he is responsible for the lack of a solution.
Then, of course, we'd like to see sanctions which might include
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2
breaking diplomatic relations, withdrawal of Ambassadors or
military attaches, kicking Panama out of the OAS, or applying
further economic sanctions. (c)
And I have just hung up the phone from talking to your old friend
and my new friend, Michael Manley of Jamaica, who incidentally
asked me to convey his respects to you. I told him I was calling
you and he said Carlos Andres Perez is the most respected figure
in our hemisphere for this kind of matter. Manley said he is
urging his Ambassador to get the CARICOM Ambassadors, CARICOM
countries to strongly support what I have just said, a position
he has taken for a long time. We're back where we were. We need
a commitment from Noriega to get the hell out of there. There's
no point extending, in our view, the OAS Commission unless
there's a set date for Noriega. I was telling you this was our
view to see if you had any different thoughts, and to encourage
support for as strong a democratic action at the OAS tomorrow as
possible. (&)
President Perez: I fully agree with your viewpoints, Mr.
President. I have been talking with other Latin American
Presidents myself. I am worried because I know of a great deal
of vacillation and because I'm convinced it is absolutely
essential that a strong decision be taken in that meeting
tomorrow. The OAS must adopt a decision in the terms that you
have said -- that the failure of the OAS Commission mandate be
ascribed entirely to Noriega for his refusal to leave power by
the first of September and there must be an agreement to set up
an interim government acceptable to the opposition and that an
election be invoked this calendar year. What I do not see is
that there's very much spirit in the air for breaking relations.
(&)
The President: That would be a step that might encourage Noriega
to move out if we could get more support for breaking relations,
even though none of us want to hurt the people of Panama. (c)
President Perez: I understand what you're saying. That's why
I'm saying the situation is very difficult. But in the rest of
today I'm going to be talking to other Latin American Presidents
and to Washington to the OAS Commission to see if we can agree on
some formula. I agree with you I share your view that there has
got to be a strong resolution of condemnation tomorrow. (C)
The President: I appreciate that. I knew that you would be
working on this and I just wish we could think of a good
formulation to get this man out of there. Manley said "we've got
to get this thug out of office." Have you had any vacation this
summer? (C)
President Perez: It is hopelessly hard for me to take vacation
with the problem of the debt. (C)
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The President: Are we making any progress? I have talked with
my collaborators on this. We want to find a solution with
Venezuela. Do you feel there's any progress? (&)
President Perez: There's no progress yet. But I have talked to
Mr. Mulford and he told me that you were very interested in an
early solution to the problem. (C)
The President: We were pleased with the Mexican situation. I
think Salinas was pleased. I realize there are differences with
each country. If you see it getting hung up, if you feel they' re
not being fair to Venezuela's considerations, I would like to
hear about that. (d)
President Perez: Thank you, Mr. President. I know I can count
on your support in this. (f)
The President: My best to you my friend, and I mean friend. I
am pleased we have a good relationship where we can talk about
these problems. (U)
President Perez: Thank you so much. You can count on me. I'm
so pleased with the way you are handling not only our problem but
the problem of Latin America in general. I hope to have
something specific on this Panama business by tonight, and if so
I will certainly let you know. (&)
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6487
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS DAP for
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI
DR
SUBJECT:
Policy on Use of U.S. Military Shops by Panama
Canal Commission Employees
The Defense Department approved a policy in June regarding use of
military shoppettes in Panama by U.S. employees of the Panama
Canal Commission and requests that we inform the President and
the appropriate Congressional committees (Tab II). The policy
statement indicates that the shoppettes should expand their
supplies and that a plan be developed for distribution of food to
all P.C.C. employees in the event of an emergency.
The Defense memo explains very little and imposed an artificial
deadline for response. As background, the Panama Canal Treaty
provided that U.S. citizen P.C.C. employees would have access to
commissary and post exchange privileges for only 5 years. The
employees have been agitating ever since to get these privileges
restored. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee--a
bastian of support for the ex-Zonians--has supported their
position, arguing that the Treaty does not preclude access.
Early in the Panama crisis, to ensure that Canal operations were
not affected, we secured the permission of President Delvalle for
employee access to military shoppettes (7-11 type stores). This
has not satisfied the employees, and their friends in Congress
have introduced a bill (H.R. 2612) to authorize access to the
post exchanges. The attached policy statement attempts to short-
circuit that, which we view as a violation of the Treaty.
Although DOD wants White House involvement, we see no reason to
raise this issue with the President and believe the memo to DOD
at Tab I is sufficient to fill the bill.
Concurrence by: Bret Bour Coulson
DECLASSIFIED
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By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21
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RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize Hughes to send the memo at Tab I to DOD.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes Memorandum to Cole
Tab II
Cole Memorandum to Hughes
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6487
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR COL. GEORGE P. COLE
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Access to Military Shoppettes by U.S. Citizen
Employees of the Panama Canal Commission (U)
The National Security Adviser, on behalf of the President, has
approved the proposed policy statement regarding use of military
shoppettes in Panama by U.S. citizen employees of the Panama
Canal Commission. The Defense Department is authorized to
communicate that approval to relevant Congressional committees.
NSC Legislative Affairs will informally communicate
Administration support for this policy in contacts with the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, #2021-02
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
05c.
To: Executive Secretary From: George Cole
8/15/89
(b)(1)
C
Memorandum
Re: Coordination with Department of State on Proposed
Commissary and Post Exchange Privileges for American
Citizen Panama Canal Commission Employees (1 pp.)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2015-0017-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile
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6609
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
CHRON FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
EERMO
FROM:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE WTP
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
President Barco of Colombia
Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of telephone conversation
between the President and Colombian President Barco on
August 21, 1989. The memorandum at Tab I transmits the record of
the telcon to the State Department.
RECOMMENDATION
That you file the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation for record
purposes.
That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the State Department.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Hughes to Roy Memorandum
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
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6609
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the
President's Telephone Call to Colombian President
Barco (U)
The memorandum of conversation of the President's telephone call
to Colombian President Barco on August 21, 1989, attached at
Tab A should be forwarded to Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson
and to the Ambassador McNamara in Colombia. The transmittal must
be handled in NODIS channels.
(C)
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
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6609
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Telephone Conversation with Virgilio Barco
Vargas, President of Colombia
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Virgilio Barco Vargas
Notetaker: William T. Pryce
DATE, TIME
August 21, 1989, 8:04 - 8:20 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Kennebunkport, Maine
The President: Mr. President, I am calling to express my
condolences on behalf of everybody in the U.S. on the loss of
Presidential candidate Galan. It is a terrible thing and we are
thinking of you and your courage. I want to work with you to
ensure that these Colombians and those before have not died in
vain. I want to tell you that we stand ready to help in any
responsible way you feel appropriate. It is strictly your call
as President of a friendly country. We are ready to respond as
quickly as possible to support your police and military in the
execution of your new decree laws. I want you to know you have
my strong support and admiration for the courageous and sweeping
decrees you have adopted. Frankly, from our standpoint, not only
is reinstitution of extradition an important move, but provision
for the seizure of traffickers' property is critical. And again,
if you request it, and only if you request it, we will try to
provide assistance to protect judges and other officials who are
threatened. (f)
President Barco: I appreciate very much your call and your
interest for helping our country. I appreciate very much your
expressions of solidarity with us, and by your government also.
I am grateful for the offering of help that you have given. In
that respect, it occurs to me that I could order the Minister of
Justice, the Chief of the Narcotics Police, and some
representatives of the security organizations of Colombia, like
the Armed Forces and the investigative organization, DEAS, that
they could meet, if you believe it convenient, convene as soon as
possible with U.S. experts/government representatives. (2)
DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
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This, of course, as you understand -- it is very difficult for us
to accept military help if this requires the sending of troops.
We are able to accept your help. We are grateful for all
equipment such as helicopters and other electronic aids, etc.,
and of course, any of those armaments or articles of help will be
only for use by our Armed Forces not for anyone else. This is a
long time Colombian policy - which is very difficult to change.
But, as you stated, there is much help which you can lend to us
in many areas. (R)
The President: In terms of what you suggest, if it would be
useful, I would be prepared immediately to send a team to Bogota
to talk to you and law groups and I can get that team underway,
people who have my confidence - (f)
President Barco: Or I could send the Minister of Justice, the
head of the Narcotics Police, our people could come to
Washington. (X)
The President: I offer this support in a way that is most
beneficial to you I realize that you do not want, and must not
have, a big overwhelming U.S. presence. (φ)
President Barco: I don't want a problem -- if I send experts
they can come without press and can make a study of what things
can be done. We have this problem in the government with
elections beginning and this, as you suggested, this could be
used by people that prefer to make political points instead of
finding a solution. (d)
The President: I have great confidence in Ambassador McNamara.
You can work closely with him. (U)
We will instruct McNamara to be receptive to any ideas you may
have, and ask State and the National Security Advisor to prepare
to have a Colombian team come to the U.S. (c)
President Barco: There must be a low level of presence. (d)
The President: We will work it so your experts can come here and
receive a warm welcome at a high level. You tell McNamara what
you want. (C)
President Barco: I read this afternoon in the Daily Telegraph of
what your government has said and I am very grateful for your
expression and for what Thornburgh has said. I read the
International Herald Tribune (Fred Harris) said that the U.S.
might send troops. This would create a very difficult situation
we are very happy to receive help. (C)
The President: U.S. troops send a very difficult signal. We
want to do what you want. (X)
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President Barco: We are very appreciative of the help and we
will see how much and what type. (&)
The President: The problem we have is that U.S. press keeps
asking high level U.S. officials "What about troops -- what about
troops?", all the time. We say that if they are requested, that
is something we would consider. We don't want you to feel we are
pressing them on you. (c)
President Barco: The press is very similar everywhere in the
world. We will take care of that. I appreciate very much you
interest about our problem. You can be sure that we are very
grateful for your suggestions and for your help that we have
received from you in the UN and the OAS. Many countries have
sent messages of support, including the Pope. We think that the
world is beginning to understand that we have a very difficult
problem created several years ago when the previous government
congealed (froze) the budget of the Army and took back their
efficiency and morale. I can assure you people are now ready and
doing a good job. There are many things we might need-technical
devices and armament that you have.
(f)
The President: We want to cooperate. Thornburgh tells me that
we will be coordinating our indictments in connection with the
extradition question -- we will take those we can get extradited.
You tell our Ambassador there who you would like to send and
when. It would be useful to have high ranking experts talk to
your experts. We will call McNamara and tell him to coordinate
this matter. (f)
President Barco: I will begin tonight on this matter. (C)
The President: My respect to you. What a courageous President
you have been for your people. (C)
President Barco: I appreciate your interest and your words and
the interest you have shown and your prayers about the future of
Colombia; for your understanding and words of hope. We will try
to meet and find what things are urgent and necessary. (e)
The President: If you want to talk to me in confidence, there
are channels to do this, Ambassador McNamara is probably the
best. Good luck. (C)
President Barco: My Foreign Minister, a retired Colonel, is
leaving for Washington tomorrow for the OAS meeting. I will also
tell him to join the group to study what to do. (X)
The President: Thank you very much for all you are doing. (f)
President Barco: My regards to Mrs. Bush. Thank you on behalf
of all Colombians for the interest you have given and for your
personal interest. (U)
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6610
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
CHRON FILE
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
FROM:
WILLIAM T. PRYCE
NTP
SUBJECT:
Talking Points for Telephone Conversations with
Presidents of Venezuela and Uruguay and the Prime
Minister of Jamaica
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President with talking
points for use in seeking support from the Presidents of
Venezuela and Paraguay and the Prime Minister of Jamaica for our
position at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for
tomorrow afternoon.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Points to be Made
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
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6610
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 22, 1989
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Telephone Calls to President Carlos Andres Perez
of Venezuela, Prime Minister Michael Manley of
Jamaica, and President Julio Maria Sanguinetti
of Uruguay
Attached are talking points for your use in telephoning the
Presidents of Venezuela and Uruguay and the Prime Minister of
Jamaica to encourage them to support our position at the OAS
meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled to begin tomorrow
afternoon.
President Sanguinetti of Uruguay has asked to pay a brief call on
you around September 18 on his way home from an official visit to
Canada, and we are trying to set it up.
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (0), September 11, 2006
By MB NARA, Date 11/21/14
CONF IDENTIAL
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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ
Thank you for your leadership in the OAS effort to get
Noriega to relinquish power.
We have fully supported a multilateral diplomatic solution.
As a result of the OAS Commission's work, the broad outlines
of a possible solution have emerged. They are: the
departure of Noriega from power by September 1; formation of
a transition government on September 1; new democratic
elections within the shortest possible time; and lifting of
U.S. sanctions.
If a transfer of power is not achieved by September 1, all
governments will have to reconsider how to deal with
Noriega.
We need to make it clear at Wednesday's OAS meeting, that if
Noriega has not agreed to leave power by September 1st, or
shortly thereafter, he is responsible for the lack of a
solution.
Sanctions might include breaking diplomatic relations,
withdrawing Ambassadors or military attache's, suspending
Panama from the OAS, and applying economic sanctions.
If you will join us in letting this be known now, it might
help persuade Noriega to accept the OAS Commissions
proposals as his last best chance to exit with dignity.
2
If asked about extending the OAS effort past August 23,
--
We can't let Noriega use the OAS to stall for time; that is
what he is trying to do.
--
I would only feel comfortable extending the OAS Commission
if Noriega agreed publicly that he will leave power by a set
date in the very near future, and that all that needs to be
worked out are the details.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
JULIO SANGUINETTI
-- The September 1 deadline established by the Panamanian
Constitution for a genuine transfer of power in Panama is
fast approaching.
-- We are all being challenged by a corrupt dictator who is
trying to thwart the will of the Panamanian people and defy
basic principles of the OAS Charter.
--
We have fully supported a multilateral diplomatic solution.
--
As a result of the OAS Commission's work, the broad outlines
of a possible solution have emerged. They are: the
departure of Noriega from power by September 1; formation of
a transition government on September 1; new democratic
elections within the shortest possible time; and lifting of
U.S. sanctions.
--
If a transfer of power is not achieved by September 1, all
governments will have to reconsider how to deal with
Noriega.
-- We need to make it clear at Wednesday's OAS meeting, that if
Noriega has not agreed to leave power by September 1st, or
shortly thereafter, he is responsible for the lack of a
solution.
--
Sanctions might include breaking diplomatic relations,
withdrawing Ambassadors or military attache's, suspending
Panama from the OAS, and applying economic sanctions.
2
--
If you will join us in letting this be known now, it might
help persuade Noriega to accept the OAS Commissions
proposals as his last best chance to exit with dignity.
If asked about extending the OAS effort past August 23.
--
We can't let Noriega use the OAS to stall for time; that is
what he is trying to do.
--
I would only feel comfortable extending the OAS Commission
if Noriega agreed publicly that he will leave power by a set
date in the very near future, and that all that needs to be
worked out are the details.
POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
MICHAEL MANLEY
-- The September 1 deadline established by the Panamanian
Constitution for a genuine transfer of power in Panama is
fast approaching.
--
We are all being challenged by a corrupt dictator who is
trying to thwart the will of the Panamanian people and defy
basic principles of the OAS Charter.
|
We have fully supported a multilateral diplomatic solution.
--
As a result of the OAS Commission's work, the broad outlines
of a possible solution have emerged. They are: the
departure of Noriega from power by September 1; formation of
a transition government on September 1; new democratic
elections within the shortest possible time; and lifting of
U.S. sanctions.
--
If a transfer of power is not achieved by September 1, all
governments will have to reconsider how to deal with
Noriega.
-- We need to make it clear at Wednesday's OAS meeting, that if
Noriega has not agreed to leave power by September 1st, or
shortly thereafter, he is responsible for the lack of a
solution.
-- Sanctions might include breaking diplomatic relations,
withdrawing Ambassadors or military attache's, suspending
Panama from the OAS, and applying economic sanctions.
2
If you will join us in letting this be known now, it might
help persuade Noriega to accept the OAS Commissions
proposals as his last best chance to exit with dignity.
If asked about extending the OAS effort past August 23.
We can't let Noriega use the OAS to stall for time; that is
what he is trying to do.
--
I would only feel comfortable extending the OAS Commission
if Noriega agreed publicly that he will leave power by a set
date in the very near future, and that all that needs to be
worked out are the details.
21033
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
CHRON FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES
FROM:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
is
SUBJECT:
Request for Annual Leave
I should like to take annual leave from August 24 to September 4.
The Latin American Directorate will be adequately staffed during
this period of time.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve this leave.
Approve
Disapprove
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6617
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
ACTION
CHRON FILE
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS
SUBJECT:
Message from President to Prime Minister Manley
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President with
our suggestion for a telegram from him to Prime Minister Manley
reporting on his conversation with the President Carlos Andres
Perez. We were not as encouraged as the President was with
Perez' response, and believe that Venezuela will waffle. Perez
began his conversation with the President saying he thought the
OAS meeting on Noriega was going to be a failure. We have
nevertheless taken an upbeat approach.
Since talking with you, we have learned that Kennebunkport does
not plan on issuing a press state and we think this is a very
wise decision.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo from Scowcroft to the President
Tab A
Suggested Telegram to Prime Minister Manley
DECLASSIFIED
CONF IDENTIAL
PER NSC WAIVER, #2021-02
Declassify on: OADR
By Mc NARA, Date 7/16/21
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6617
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Message to Prime Minister Manley
Purpose
To inform Prime Minister Manley of your conversation with
President Perez, as you promised.
Background
In the course of your telephone conversation with Prime Minister
Manley you said you would let him know how your conversation with
President Perez came out.
Even though Perez was not nearly as forthcoming as Manley, the
suggested telegram at Tab A confirms his willingness to call for
a strong resolution condemning Noriega if he refuses to leave
power.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve sending the proposed message to Manley.
Attachment
Tab A
Suggested Telegram to Prime Minister Manley
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, #202402
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21
CONFIDENTIAL
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
(George Bush Library)
Document No.
Subject/Title of Document
Date
Restriction
Class.
and Type
07c. Letter
To: Prime Minister Manley From: President Bush (1 pp.)
n.d.
(b)(1)
Collection:
Record Group:
Bush Presidential Records
Office:
National Security Council
Series:
Latin American Affairs Directorate Files
Subseries:
Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location:
August 16, 1989-August 31, 1989 [2]
Date Closed:
11/21/2014
OA/ID Number:
CF00302-012
FOIA/SYS Case #:
2015-0017-S
Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:
Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:
Disposition Date:
AR Case #:
MR Case #:
AR Disposition:
MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:
MR Disposition Date:
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
PRM Removed as a personal record misfile.
061594
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Date 8-22-89
TO: PACELL:
CHRON FILE
NSC Secretariat has requested us to
check with you to see whether you
draft reply.
to State Dept., or other agencies for
the attached sent to you for staffing, want
Please indicate:
X
For Action
Refer to State Dept. or
other agencies for Draft
Reply
Other
Ralph Bellamy
ID# 061599
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
C0001-09
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 08, 1989
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CONNIE MACK
SUBJECT: EXPRESS CONCERN THAT, UNLESS IMMEDIATE ACTION
IS TAKEN, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES
MAY JOIN IN SIGNING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD
VITIATE THE BIPARTISAN ACCORD REGARDING THE
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
DATE
TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE
ORG 89/08/08 Fm A89,08
NS Sec REFERRAL Hugh
NOTE:
89/08/21
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
99DOS
# 89/08/22
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE: attn Sup
/
/
/ 7
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
5 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1210 1220
MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED
COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
August 18, 1989
Dear Connie:
Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned
by five of your colleagues, expressing concern about the
future of the Nicaraguan resistance.
President Bush appreciates the concern which prompted you to
write. Please know that your comments and suggestions have
been shared with the President's foreign policy advisors,
and are receiving close attention.
Thank you again for your interest in writing.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The Honorable Connie Mack
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
FDM/HGP/efr (8FDMGA)
Nicaraguan/S
CC: w/copy of inc to NSC - for appropriate action
CC: w/copy of inc to Department of State - FYI
61599
I
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
August 4, 1989
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We are extremely concerned that, unless immediate action is taken,
the Central American democracies, misreading the commitment of the
United States to the Bipartisan Accord, may join in signing an
agreement that would vitiate the Accord regarding the Nicaraguan
Resistance. In signing the Accord, the Executive and the Congress
made a commitment to support the Resistance "through February 28,
1990," the day of the scheduled elections.
We commend you for the steps you have taken to date on this issue,
but recommend that you publicly and unambiguously reaffirm the
United States commitment to democracy in Nicaragua and to
maintaining the Nicaraguan Resistance, at least until the February
elections.
As Senators who are committed to supporting real and lasting
democratization in Nicaragua, your clearly and publicly restating
our government's commitment to the Nicaraguan Resistance as called
for under the Bipartisan Accord is necessary to prevent an end to
the hope for democracy in Nicaragua. We thank you for sharing our
concerns in this matter, and look forward to working with you in
the future.
Sincerely,
Consie Mack
65
Box 39
Connie Mack
Bob Graham
67
83
John John
McCain M'Cusi
Chuck Robl
Chuck Robb
53
hangfands Kassebaum
John Breawy
!!
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
John Breaux
060780
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Date F-22-FS
TO: PACELLI
CHRON FILE
NSC Secretariat has requested us to
check with you to see whether you want
the attached sent to you for staffing,
to State Dept., or other agencies for
draft reply.
Please indicate:
X
For Action
Refer to State Dept. or
other agencies for Draft
NAK
Reply
Other
Ralph Bellamy
ID# 060783
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING
C0114
DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 07, 1989
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE DAVID DREIER
SUBJECT: WRITE REGARDING THEIR RECENT RETURN FROM
NICARAGUA AND THE SANDINISTA REGIME MAKING
EFFORTS TO PREVENT LEGITIMATE OBSERVERS FROM
DETERMINING DEMOCRACY'S PROGRESS, OR LACK
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
DATE
TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
FREDERICK MCCLURE
N/S Sec
C>
ORG 89/08/07 FM A89,08,189
REFERRAL NOTE:
R 89/08/21
/
/
REFERRAL NOTE:
99005
A 8908122
/
/
REFERRAL NOTE: alter
/
/
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
7 /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
3 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 1230
MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
August 18, 1989
Dear Congressman Dreier:
Thank you for your recent letter to the President, cosigned
by three of your colleagues, providing observations from
your recent trip to Nicaragua.
President Bush appreciated receiving your insights into
events in this region and he shares your concerns. I
have taken the liberty of sharing your comments with the
President's foreign policy advisors, so that they, too,
can have the benefit of your comments.
Thank you again for your interest in writing.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Frederick D. McClure
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
The Honorable David Dreier
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
FDM/HGP/efr (8FDMGA)
Nicaragua/H
CC: w/copy of inc to NSC - for direct response
CC: w/copy of inc to Department of State - FYI
60783
Congress of the United States
house of Representatives
Mashington, DC 20515
August 3, 1989
The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We have just returned from Nicaragua, and wish to make you
aware that the Sandinista regime is making efforts to prevent
legitimate observers from determining democracy's progress, or lack
thereof, as political campaigning for February's national elections
begins.
On Sunday, July 30, we traveled from Managua to Diriamba to
observe an opposition-party rally. Upon our arrival, an Interior
Ministry official ordered us out of the area. Not wishing to
provoke an incident, we complied -- even though the opposition
party had obtained the obligatory permission to hold the rally, and
even though we were in Nicaragua on valid visas. We were advised
that if we wished to know what happened, we could read about it in
the newspapers.
Obviously, the Sandinistas are concerned about losing a fair
election, and they are not anxious for American observers not under
their control to see what goes on during the campaign. Just as
obviously, their actions destroy any credibility of the electoral
process promised by the Sandinistas as part of the Arias Plan.
Our embassy in Managua is being stripped of manpower by visa
denials to applicants at all levels (the Marine contingent is down
to six men, who now do double- and triple-duty on the gates). Our
diplomats and all other Americans are being prohibited from
observing the campaign and the electoral process.
Despite encouraging signs that the 14 parties of the United
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) are showing some unity and a good
chance of success in a fair election, the Sandinistas have imposed
electoral and other laws which, if not dramatically altered, make
the goal of a free and fair election unattainable.
The Honorable George Bush
Page 2
August 3, 1989
We urge you to continue to apply pressure on the Sandinistas
to comply with the Arias Plan. In particular, the United States
must press for the kind of observers, and opportunities to observe,
that will ensure free and fair elections.
Daniel David Dreier 25 Sincerely, 98 JouryL Jon Kyl 209
160
Mike Parker
Mel Hancock
CC: Vice President Dan Quayle
Secretary of State Jim Baker
Speaker Tom Foley
Minority Leader Bob Michel
Chairman Dante Fascell
Representative William Broomfield
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6569
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
August 22, 1989
CHRON FILE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
EVERETT ELLIS BRIGGS DAS for
FROM:
DAVID A. PACELLI DAP
SUBJECT:
Request by the Prime Minister of Barbados for a
Photo-Op with the President
In early August, the Embassy of Barbados requested that you meet
with Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford during an unofficial visit
to the United States, and you agreed to an meeting on
September 20 at 3 p.m. (system log 5989). Now, Barbados is
requesting a brief meeting and photo-op with the President, which
the State Department has endorsed (Tab II). We have no
explanation for why this request was not made in the first place,
and you may want to adjust the time of your own meeting with the
Prime Minister if the meeting with the President is approved.
We endorse the request because, as the State memorandum notes, it
could help ease some of the bumps in our relations with Barbados
over recent years. The Prime Minister himself has noted that no
Barbadian leader has been invited to the White House in twenty
years.
During the short discussion following the photo-op, we would
propose that the President discuss his commitment to obtaining
new CBI legislation and how our new anti-narcotics strategy
relates to Barbados.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.
Attachments
Tab I
Schedule Proposal
Tab A
List of Participants
Tab II Roy Scowcroft Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER $7021.02
By MC NARA, Date 7/16/21
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
6569
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
JOSEPH HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
REQUEST:
That the President agree to the request of
Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford of Barbados
for a photo-op and brief discussion.
PURPOSE:
To underscore the friendly relations between
the United States and Barbados and our
commitment to democracy and economic
development in the Caribbean region.
BACKGROUND:
Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford plans an
unofficial visit to the United States on
September 19-29 and is already scheduled to
meet with me at 3 p.m. on September 20.
This would be a good opportunity to express
the President's commitment to CBI enhancement
legislation and our new drug strategy. A
meeting would be a major news story in
Barbados since no leader from that country
has been invited to the White House since
1968.
PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:
None
DATE & TIME:
September 20, afternoon; September 19,
morning; September 21, afternoon; or
September 22, morning.
DURATION: 10 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS:
See Participants List
OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo-op followed by brief discussion.
REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC will provide
MEDIA COVERAGE:
Open press
RECOMMENDED BY:
NSC, State Department
OPPOSED BY:
None
Attachment
Tab A
List of Participants
PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
John Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser
Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser
Richard Melton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
Joy Silverman, Ambassador-Designate to Barbados
David Pacelli, NSC (Notetaker)
Barbados
Erskine Sandiford, Prime Minister
Sir William Douglas, Ambassador to the United States
S/S 8919091
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
6569
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
August 18, 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:
Request for Brief Meeting with the President for
Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford of Barbados
Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford plans an unofficial
September 19-29 visit to Washington. He has requested a brief
meeting and photo opportunity with the President.
A brief meeting with the President would go far toward
improving the tone of U.S.-Barbadian relations, which are
generally good but have been strained in recent years by sugar
quota reduction, a unilateral U.S. change to the U.S.-Barbados
Tax Treaty, and perceived U.S. indifference to Barbados. The
Prime Minister has noted that no Barbadian leader has been
invited to the White House since 1968. He obliquely mentioned
his desire to meet the President in an April 1989 meeting with
the Secretary in Atlanta.
The Embassy of Barbados has already arranged a meeting for
Sandiford with you on Wednesday, September 20, 1989, at
3:00 pm. The Prime Minister will also be meeting with the
Secretary of the Treasury and with several members of Congress.
The Prime Minister's schedule is fairly flexible. He has
left open the morning of Tuesday, September 19; afternoon of
Wednesday, September 20, (either before or after his
appointment with you); afternoon of Thursday, September 21; and
morning of Friday, September 22.
for.
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE