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    "title": "Second Debate: Defense Department Issue Papers",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder \"Second Debate: Defense Department\nIssue Papers\" of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the White House Special Files Unit Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nsys was 11/24/00\n1. cable\namembassy moscow to secstate washde 0118\n10/21/76\nA\n1 page\n2. report\nHollingsworth Report OCSA 92-76\n5 pages\n6/30/76\nA\nDeclassified with portions exempted\n3. memo\nSullivan to Secretary of Defense, re: FY 77 budget\n10/20/75\nA\n11 pages\nFILE LOCATION\nSpecial Files, Ford-Carter Debate Files\nSecond Debate--Defense Department Issue Papers (box 2)\nplc 3/28/84\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81)\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nTOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)\n(End of Fiscal Year . - 30 June)\nFY 52\n3,635,912\nFY 60\n2,476,435\nFY 64\n2,685,000\nFY 68\n3,547,902\nFY 69\n3,460,162\nFY 70\n3,066,294\nFY 71\n2,714,727\nFY 72\n2,323,079\nFY 73\n2,252,810\nFY 74\n2,162,005\nFY 76\n2,081,909\nFY 77\n2,100,000\nTOTAL ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (DRAFT)\n(As of Dates Given)\n31 August 74\n2,153,000 (rounded to nearest thousandth)\n31 July 76\n2,087,000\n\"\n\"\n\"\n(Note: This is latest data available)\nTHE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN\nANNUAL INDUCTIONS\n(End of Fiscal Year - 30 June)\nFY 75\n0\nFY 74\n0\nFY 73\n35,700\nFY 72\n27,100\nFY 71\n156,200\nFY 70\n206,800\nFY 69\n265,300\nFY 68\n339,600\nFY 67\n299,200\nFY 66\n339,700\nBrent suggests caution\nON these because they ReQuiRe\nsome explanation\nWashington Roundup\nHenry's Slant\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger directed the Central Intelligence Agency to\nslant U.S. estimates of the Sovict Tupolev Backfire bomber's range capability,\nWhite House officials are charging. Kissinger ordered that the range estimate be re-\nduced to coincide with the present U.S. position in the strategic arms negotiations\nnow under way behind the scenes by Kissinger, according to a White House staff\nmember. Other Administration officials corroborate the story. Kissinger already has\nconceded to the Soviets that the Backfire will not be considered in the heavy\nbomber category in the treaty negotiations and is making sure intelligence estimates\nconfirm his position, the White House official added.\nThe way in which the estimate was derived was through intelligence data pro-\nvided to McDonnell Douglas. The aerospace firm completed an analysis under con-\ntract for the CIA to determine the supersonic Backfire's capability. A 3,500-naut. mi.\nrange estimate reached by McDonnell Douglas was accurate, the White House offi-\ncial said, but the data provided were not all of the information available to U.S. in-\ntelligence officers. Only those data the CIA wanted to provide the company were\noffered to achieve the desired results supporting Kissinger's position, according to\nthe official.\nDifferent Approach\nSimilar study is now in progress for the Pentagon by McDonnell Douglas, but it is\nbased on a different set of data-all the information available to Defense Dept. in-\ntelligence officials. That study's preliminary results revealed the Backfire's range is\ncloser to the original U.S. intelligence estimate of 6,000 naut. mi., clearly marking\nthe aircraft in the heavy bomber category that would be counted in the 2,400 strategic\ndelivery vehicle limit set in the Ford-Brezhnev Vladivostok agreement. The Ford\nAdministration is preparing to consummate a treaty based on Vladivostok permit-\nting the Soviets to operate the Backfire as an intermediate-range bomber and\nthrough other concessions limiting U.S. cruise missiles.\nSince the McDonnell Douglas/CIA study, the Pentagon has pulled together top-\nranked propulsion and aerodynamic experts from around the nation to examine the\nstudy. They have concluded there is no validity in the estimate of the Backfire's range\nbeing only 3,500 naut. mi. McDonnell Douglas officials declined to talk to AVIATION\nWEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY about the studies, claiming national security is in-\nvolved.\nCost Growth\nDefense Dept. selected acquisition reports on the costs of 44 major weapon pro-\ngrams total $175.8 billion, an increase of $4.8 billion over the previous SARs sub-\nmitted to Congress on Mar. 31. The latest reports, based on June 30 estimates, re-\nflect the addition of a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a\nmajor escalation in program estimates for the Air Force/McDonnel Douglas F-15\nair-superiority fighter (AW&ST Aug. 2, p. 38). The June estimate for the F-15 acquisi-\ntion program totals $12.2 billion, up by $734.7 million from the March report. The\ngrowth includes a $3.8-million cost overrun in prior year funding and a projected\ncost growth of $730.9 million from Fiscal 1978 through Fiscal 1980.\nOther major cost growths since March include the Navy/Grumman F-14 air-su-\nperiority fighter, $162.9 million; the Navy/Lockheed S-3A carrier-based ASW pa-\ntrol aircraft, $111.1 million; the Navy/Lockheed Trident fleet ballistic missile,\n$358.6 million, and the USAF/Boeing Minuteman 3 ICBM, $257.6 million, largely\nreflecting an add-on buy of 60 missiles in Fiscal 1977.\nNoise Compromise\nVice President Nelson A. Rockefeller has been asked by President Ford to draft a\ncompromise proposal on aviation noise policy because of the severe split in posi-\ntions between Transportation Secretary William T. Coleman, Jr., on one side, and\nJames Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and James Cannon,\ndirector of the Domestic Council, on the other. The President met with Coleman,\nLynn and Cannon early last week but reached no decision on the vital retro-\nfit/replacement issue. Presidential indecisiveness forced Coleman to cancel an ap-\npearance before the House Public Works and Transportation aviation subcom-\nmittee last weck. Coleman met at least twice last week with the vice president on the\nissue, and those Administration officials who would like to see the issue decision de-\nlayed indefinitely were concerned a decision could be forthcoming from the Presi-\ndent in the next few days.\n-Washington Staff\nAviation Week & Space Technology, September 13, 1976\n13\nEditorial\nFumbling the Defense Issue\nNational defense has surfaced strongly as one of the\nThis is a genuine and fast-moving trend for which\nmajor issues of the 1976 presidential election cam-\nhard evidence can be found across the spectrum from\npaign between President Gerald Ford and his chal-\nunder the sea to outer space. Until Gov. Carter dem-\nlenger, Gov. Jimmy Carter. It is encouraging that\nonstrates some sign that he has some comprehension\nthis vital issue of defense has assumed such an im-\nof this problem, he will not merit his fellow citizens'\nportant role so early in what promises to be a spirited\nendorsement of his self-appraised leadership quali-\ncontest complete with national television debates. It\nfications.\nis discouraging, however, to see both candidates and\nIn the case of President Ford, the fumbling of the\ntheir parties fumbling the issue badly and shadow-\ndefense issue is both inexplicable and tragic. In many\nboxing with outdated rhetoric that indicates they\nways, he has tried to take the appropriate action to\nhave no real conception of the rapidly developing re-\ncounterbalance the massive Soviet threat externally\nalities of the Soviet technological threat.\nand to curb the Machiavellian manipulations of\nSen. Walter Mondale, the Democratic vice presi-\nHenry Kissinger internally.\ndential candidate, leaped into the defense debate\nIn addition, he has had a chilling demonstration of\nrecently in San Francisco with a series of cliches that\nwhat an orchestration of the defense issue did for his\nreflect faithfully the views of that band of liberal\nRepublican challenger, who carried him down to the\nDemocratic senators-Humphrey, Kennedy, Prox-\nKansas City convention eve and narrowly missed up-\nmire, Mansfield and McGovern-who regard most\nsetting the presidential incumbent. Ronald Reagan\ndefense matters as inherently bad and have an\nhad very little else in his repertoire besides the de-\napparently unbounded faith in the Soviet Union's\nfense issue.\ngood faith and goodwill. These senators, including\nHis amazing durability in the race for the Republi-\nSen. Mondale, by their votes on key defense issues\ncan nomination rested primarily on the response of\nover the past few years have inflicted more irrepa-\nmasses of American citizens, who are growing in-\nrable damage to the U.S. defense posture than any\ncreasingly uneasy over these plainly visible trends.\nforeign enemy. Their consistent votes to take the\nThe people of this country are far ahead of their po-\nU.S. defense posture even below the already unbal-\nlitical candidates in recognizing the dangers inherent\nanced SALT 1 levels have provided the Soviets with\nin the threat, and Reagan's success clearly demon-\nan incredible windfall and powerful new leverage for\nstrated it.\nongoing negotiations. Their vote to demolish unilat-\nAfter narrowly averting defeat for the nomination\nerally the sole U.S. anti-ballistic missile operational\nover the defense issue on which he could have run\ninstallation and cut ABM advanced research, while\nwith great strength, President Ford has now appar-\nextracting no similar actions from the Soviet, will go\nently quickly forgotten the lesson and is pursuing the\ndown in history as an act of incredible folly. Sen.\nmirage of a SALT 2 agreement containing the worst\nMondale and his cohorts cannot erase their votes on\nof the Kissinger concessions. This will make him\nthat measure and should be held accountable.\nguilty of every Reagan campaign charge and cost\nGov. Carter, who makes much of his youthful\nhim dearly in November votes he had won in Au-\nNavy service on the early nuclear submarines, indi-\ngust.\ncates by his recent speeches that he too has only a\nPresident Ford took decisive action last year to\nvague and flimsy grasp of the real defense issues fac-\ncurtail the unlimited national security powers of\ning this nation with its gravest foreign threat since\nHenry Kissinger and restore an element of legitimate\nthe War of 1812. Although he has some capable de-\ndebate inside the White House on national security\nfense advisers in Paul Nitze and Elino Zumwalt, he\naffairs. This prevented Kissinger's first attempt last\napparently has difficulty understanding what they\nJanuary at a complete sell-out to the Soviets on the\nare trying to tell him. Instead, he seems to be picking\nBackfire supersonic bomber, the U.S. cruise missiles\nup sheaves of defense position papers prepared by\nand nuclear throw weight to achieve a SALT 2 agree-\nthe armchair academic experts of the Brookings In-\nment. Now, inexplicably, President Ford has become\nstitution in Washington-the same people who think\nremesmerized by the State Dept. Svengali and is hur-\nthe B-52 fleet of the Strategic Air Command can fly\nrying to complete the same sell-out for a SALT 2\nforever.\nagreement before the election, with apparently no\nThere is certainly some merit in the case for some\nidea of the quantity of votes it will cost him or of the\nof the administrative military reforms echoed by Gov.\npotential damage to the future of his country.\nCarter and some defense budget savings can be ef-\nMeanwhile, the Soviets must be smirking at the\nfected by their implementation. But nowhere in his\ninability of the American political contenders to per-\nextensive discussion of the defense problem is there\nceive either the weight or direction of the massive\nany evidence that Gov. Carter understands the ex-\nRussian military thrust and their persistence in wal-\ntremely grave dangers from the Soviet Union's mas-\nlowing blindly along a path that can only lead to fu-\nsive quantitative and qualitative arms buildup that is\nture tragedy for the nation they are striving to lead.\ngrowing every hour he orates.\n-Robert Hotz\nAviation Week & Space Technology, September 13, 1976\n9\nINFORMENT OF DEFENSE\nNEWS RELEASE\nOFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nWASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301\nPLEASE NOTE DATE\nOX 7-3189 (COPIES)\nIMMEDIATE RELEASE\nSEPTEMBER 8, 1976\nOX 5-0192 (INFO.)\nNO. 402-76\n-FACT SHEET--\nU. S. MILITARY STRENGTH OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES\nJune 30, 1976\nMarine\nAir\nArmy\nNavy\nCorps\nForce\nTotal\nTotal Outside the United States\n237,200\n96,800\n29,500\n100,300\n463,800\nU.S. Territories and Possession\n(including Afloat)\n7,400\n15,400\n1,500\n5,800\n30,100\nForeign Countries\n229,800\n81,400\n28,000\n94,500\n433,700\nWestern Europe and\nRelated Areas\n190,100\n39,500\n4,600\n62,300\n296,500\nBelgium\n1,300\n100\n*\n600\n2,000\nGermany\n182,200\n300\n100\n25,900\n208,500\nGreece\n600\n500\n*\n2,100\n3,300\n*\nIceland\n2,000\n100\n1,000\n3,100\nItaly\n3,900\n3,600\n200\n3,900\n11,600\n#\nMorocco\n700\n200\n*\n900\n600\n#\n*\nNetherlands\n1,400\n2,000\n*\n300\n#\nPortugal/Azores\n1,000\n1,400\n#\n3,800\n200\nSpain\n5,200\n9,200\n1,000\n#\n*\nTurkey\n3,200\n4,400\nUnited Kingdom\n100\n2,300\n300\n17,500\n20,300\nOther\n100\n100\n200\n500\n900\nAfloat\n-\n25,700\n3,300\n-\n29,000\nSoutheast Asia\n800\n-\n-\n400\n1,200\nThailand\n800\n*\n#\n400\n1,200\nWestern Pacific\n37,800\n30,500\n22,500\n30,500\n121,300\nJapan (incl. Okinawa)\n4,300\n7,100\n20,500\n13,400\n45,300\n*\nPhilippines\n5,000\n900\n8,700\n14,600\n33,000\n200\n*\nSouth Korea\n7,100\n40,400\nTaiwan\n400\n400\n*\n1,300\n2,200\n-\n17,700\n1,200\n-\nAfloat\n18,900\n(OVER)\n2-\nMarine\nAir\nArmy\nNavy\nCorps\nForce\nTotal\nOther Areas\n8,500\n26,700\n2,300\n7,200\n44,600\nAustralia\n*\n400\n*\n300\n700\nBermuda\n-\n1,300\n100\n-\n1,400\nCanada\n*\n500\n*\n300\n800\nCuba\n-\n2,000\n500\n#\n2,500\nDiego Garcia\n-\n1,100\n-\n-\n1,100\nGuam\n100\n5,300\n400\n3,800\n9,600\nIran\n600\n100\n#\n400\n1,100\nMidway Island\n-\n800\n-\n-\n800\nPanama/Canal Zone\n6,800\n300\n100\n1,800\n9,100\nPuerto Rico\n400\n3,300\n500\n100\n4,200\nOther\n500\n1,200\n700\n500\n2,900\nAfloat\n-\n10,400\n-\n-\n10,400\nLess than 250\nLess than 1,000\nBahamas\nGreenland\nBahrain\nSaudi Arabia\nBarbados\nBrazil\nEthiopia (includes Eritrea)\nHong Kong\nJohnston Island\nLeeward Islands\nNorway\n*Under 100\nTotals may not add due to rounding.\nEND\nSeptember 15, 1976\nSUBJECT: Top-Heavy Military Structure\nQUESTION: There are frequent allegations that our present military\nstructure is top-heavy -- too many generals and admirals, more flag\nofficers now than at the end of World War II when our force level\nwas much higher -- more captains on the CNO's staff than serving\non ships, etc. Would you please comment?\nANSWER: Attached are statistics which describe the changes in\nmilitary manpower and the senior command/management structure of\nthe Department of Defense since 1950. Our total military strength\nhit 3.6 million in 1952 and again in 1968, two wartime peaks. Some\nobservations:\nThe officer strength of the US defense establishment\nis, like the total number of people in uniform, at\nits lowest point since before the Korean War. The\nofficer fraction of the total has been remarkably\nconstant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-\ntotal ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.\nThe number of flag/general officers has steadily\ndecreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The\nratio of flag/general officers-to-total-military\nis being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5\nper 10,000 total.\nCivilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have\nbeen reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel with\nsenior military grades. The ratio of flag/general\nofficers-to-supergrade civilians has remained\nconstant at 0.92.\nThe relevance of the various ratios in the attached table is\nsubject to question. There is every reason to expect officer-to-\nenlisted ratios to increase, for example, due to changes in the com-\nplexity of modern warfare -- more two-pilot aircraft, smaller more\nnumerous tactical units, new strategic nuclear missile system requirements\n-- since WW II.\n- 2 -\nSPECIFIC: The fact is that there are significantly fewer generals\nand admirals today than there were at the end of WW II. In 1945,\nwe had 2,068 general and flag officers compared to 1,184 today. At\nthe peak of the Vietnam War there were 1352. (We project a reduction\nto 1,170 at the end of FY 1977, further reducing to 1,157 by end-FY\n1978.)\nGeneral/Flag Officers\nActual (End Fiscal Year)\nPlanned\n1945\n1955\n1965\n1970\n1975\nToday\n1977\n1978\n2068\n1239\n1287\n1339\n1199\n1184\n1170\n1157\nAlthough the number of general/flag officers has been almost\nhalved, there are more compared to the total military population today\nthan was the case in WW II. The point is that the number of senior\nmilitary officers should not be expected to change in direct proportion\nto the overall size of the Armed Forces, but depends more on basic\norganization and functional needs.\nThe significant organizational changes since WW II include:\nestablishment of a separate Air Force, establishment of Unified Com-\nmands and International Headquarters, and strengthening the Office of\nthe SecDef and OJCS. Significant changes in functional requirements\nderive from the facts that procurement and distribution of material\nand equipment are more technically demanding and require a much higher\ndegree of economic control than was the case 30 years ago; further-\nmore, command and control systems are more elaborate.\n- 3 -\nSPECIFIC: Using the Navy as an example, the fact is that there are\nmore captains (0-6) at sea than on CNO's staff. Sea billets for\ncaptains include commanding officers of ships, squadrons, and air\ngroups as well as afloat staffs.\n262 0-6's on CNO staff; 369 0-6's on sea duty; 310\n0-6's in ships and squadrons; plus 59 on sea duty\nin maritime aircraft squadrons and staffs.\nIt is not unreasonable to find this number of the Navy's most experienced\nand capable officers assisting the CNO in fulfilling his statutory\nresponsibilities to the Secretary of the Navy.\n15 September 1976\nSELECTED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN STRENGTHS\nStrengths\nRatios\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nOff\nGen/Flag\nGen/Flag\nGen/Flag\nEnd\nMil\nEnl\nOff\nGen/\nCiv\nto\nper 1,000\nper 1,000\nto\na/\nFY\n(000)\n(000)\n(000)\nFlag\nSupergrades\nTot Mil\nTot Mil\nTot Enl\nSupergrades\n1950\n1,460\n1,279\n181\n881\n122b/\n.12\n.60\n.69\n7.22\n1951\n3,249\n2,926\n323\n1,047\n.10\n.32\n.36\n1952\n3,636\n3,260\n376\n1,142\n236b/\n.10\n.31\n.35\n4.84\n1953\n3,555\n3,178\n377\n1,197\n.11\n.34\n.38\n1954\n3,302\n2,948\n354\n1,205\n.11\n.36\n.41\n1955\n2,935\n2,583\n352\n1,239\n.12\n.42\n.48\n1956\n2,806\n2,456\n350\n1,279\n.12\n.46\n.52\n1957\n2,796\n2,453\n343\n1,276\n.12\n.46\n.52\n1958\n2,601\n2,275\n326\n1,282\n.13\n.49\n.56\n1959\n2,504\n2,185\n319\n1,268\n.13\n.51\n.58\n1960\n2,476\n2,160\n317\n1,260\n726b/\n.13\n.51\n.58\n1.74\n1961\n2,484\n2,169\n315\n1,254\n.13\n.50\n.58\n1962\n2,808\n2,465\n343\n1,303\n.12\n.46\n.53\n1963\n2,700\n2,365\n334\n1,292\n.12\n.48\n.55\n1964\n2,687\n2,350\n337\n1,294\n1,323\n.13\n.48\n.55\n.98\n1965\n2,655\n2,317\n339\n1,287\n.13\n.48\n.56\n1966\n3,094\n2,745\n349\n1,320\n.11\n.43\n.48\n1967\n3,377\n2,993\n384\n1,334\n.11\n.40\n.45\n1968\n3,546\n3,132\n416\n1,352\n1,490\n.12\n.38\n.43\n.91\n1969\n3,460\n3,041\n419\n1,336\n1,556\n.12\n.39\n.44\n.86\nComplete data on civilian supergrades (GS-16,17,18) not readily available for some years before 1968.\nb/\nAuthorizations.\nStrengths\nRatios\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nTotal\nOff\nGen/Flag\nGen/Flag\nGen/Flag\nEnd\nMil\nEnl\nOff\nGen/\nCiv\nto\nper 1,000\nper 1,000\nto\nFY\n(000)\n(000)\n(000)\nFlag\nSupergrades\nTot Mil\nTot Mil\nTot Enl\nSupergrades\n1970\n3,066\n2,664\n402\n1,339\n1,545\n.13\n.44\n.50\n.87\n1971\n2,715\n2,343\n371\n1,330\n1,503\n.14\n.49\n.57\n.88\n1972\n2,323\n1,987\n336\n1,324\n1,460\n.14\n.57\n.67\n.91\n1973\n2,253\n1,932\n321\n1,291\n1,415\n.14\n.57\n.67\n.91\n1974\n2,162\n1,860\n302\n1,249\n1,363\n.14\n.58\n.67\n.92\n1975\n2,128\n1,836\n292\n1,199\n1,303\n.14\n.56\n.65\n.92\n1976\n2,082\n1,801\n281\n1,184\n1,287\n.13\n.57\n.66\n.92\n1977\n2,102\n1,824\n278\n1,164\n1,267\n.13\n.55\n.64\n.92\nCOMMENTS\n1. The officer strength of the US defense establishment is, like the total number of people in uniform,\nat its lowest point since before the Korean War. The officer fraction of the total has been remarkably\nconstant (12-14%) for two decades. The officer-to-total ratio has leaned out under GRF/DHR.\n2. The number of flag/general officers has steadily decreased since the 1968 Vietnam War peak. The ratio\nof flag/general officers-to-total-military is being leaned out under GRF/DHR, from 5.8 to 5.5 per 10,000\ntotal.\n3. Civilian supergrade (GS-16 and above) numbers have been reduced steadily since 1969, in parallel\nwith senior military grades. The ratio of flag/general officers-to-supergrade civilians has remained\nconstant at 0.92.\nSeptember 16, 1976\nSUBJECT: Combat/Support Ratio\nQUESTION: It has been alleged that the military has too many support\ntroops per combat troop and that millions of dollars could be saved\nif this ratio were reduced. Would you please comment?\nANSWER: The balance between combat troops and support troops has\nfluctuated over time, as the complexity of ground warfare has changed\nand the emphasis has shifted between sustained combat and initial,\nforward defense. The following table summarizes, in consistent terms,\nthe distribution of Army manpower since 1945:\nApproximate Distribution of Army Manpower\nHST\nIhe\nLBJ\nKorea\nRN\n6\nRF\nWW II\nSE Asia\n1945\n1950\n1952\n1955\n1965\n1968\n1970\n1975\nPresent\nCombat\n42%\n38%\n38%\n28%\n47%\n35%\n50%\n50%\n53%\nSupport\n50%\n62%\n62%\n72%\n53%\n65%\n50%\n50%\n47%\nAs you can see, the ratio of combat troops to support troops has\nvaried widely, tending to lean out in wartime as additional troops\nbegin to use the sustaining base maintained during time of peace.\nToday we have the same number of combat divisions as before the SE Asia\nconflict, but much less support manpower. That does not mean necessarily\n/ In computing the distribution, divisions, separate combat brigades,\narmored cavalry regiments, nondivisional field and air defense\nartillery, combat engineer, assault and attack helicopter, special\nforces units and separate maneuver battalions have been considered\nin the combat tabulation. Nondivisional units -- such as communication,\nmaintenance, medical, support aviation, transportation, ordnance,\nmilitary police, and finance -- that supply and service combat\nforces are considered as support.\n- 2 -\nthat there is less need for support troops: it means that we have\nconsciously structured our active force to include as much readily\ndeployable combat power as possible, while recognizing that we\nwould have to rely more heavily than ever before on the Reserve\nComponents to provide the necessary support forces. We can't push\nthat too far, but I believe that we have been moving in the direction\nof the economies referred to in the question.\nOf course, our objective is a defense posture sufficient to\nmaintain -- in conjunction with our Allies -- the desired military\nbalance. To the extent that active forces assume a greater part of\nthe combat posture, and Reserve Components provide the requisite\nbase of support, there are not necessarily large reductions in the\nresources required. Dollars saved in the active force posture\nmust be reapplied to Reserve support base readiness and war reserve\nmaterials.\nFORD LIBRARY is 023410\nCOMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS\nUS ACTIVE ARMY\nWORLD WAR II\nKOREAN CONFLICT\n100\n80\n60\nPERCENT\nSUPPORT\n40\n20\n50\n46\n43\n42\n30\nCOMBAT\n38\n41\n38\n26\n28\n28\n28\n45\n0\n0\nYEARS\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n50\n51\n52\n53\n54\n55\n56\n57\n$ 3'\nRA\nCOMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIOS\nUS ACTIVE ARMY\n100\n80\nPERCENT\n60\nSUPPORT\n40\n35\n33\n32\n37\n15\n50\n53\n54\nCOMBAT\n20\n0\nYEAR\n64\n65\n66\n67\n68\n69\n70\n71\n72\n73\n74\n75\n76\n77\nSeptember 16, 1976\nSUBJECT: Implications of a $5-$7 Billion Cut in Defense\nQUESTION: The Democratic Party platform calls for reducing present\nDefense spending by $5-$7 billion. Could that be done by cutting\nfat and running the Department more efficiently, or would the impact\nbe more severe?\nANSWER: Let's begin by looking at some facts. Presidents from both\nparties have, over the past decade, proposed budgets they believed to\nbe adequate to meet the requirements of the nation's defense. Congresses\nhave -- almost ritually -- cut those defense requests each year by $3B to\n$8B. The result has been a series of budgets which, although they ap-\npeared to grow from $72B in 1967 to $106B in 1976, represented a steady\ndecrease in spending on national defense.\nIn real terms -- that is, in dollars applied to baseline capabilities,\ncorrected to cancel the effects of inflation -- the resources devoted to\nDefense decreased steadily by about 2% a year between 1967 and 1976. The\nbudget for 1976 was the first which did not involve a reduction in more than\na decade; the budget just approved for 1977 has established an upward trend.\nChart I (attached) depicts this upturning in constant FY 77 (not inflated)\ndollars.\nThe point is that a trend of decreasing US defense budgets, arrested\nonly this year, coincident with an upward trend (3%-4% annual growth) in\nspending on military programs on the part of the Soviet Union over the\npast decade, has been unmistakably adverse to US national security.\nThe question of how a $5 to $7 billion cut in the Defense budget\nwould affect us must be answered in that context.\nFORD\n- 2 -\nSuch a cut would put the U.S. once again on a downward\npath, aggravating already adverse trends.\nA cut of that magnitude could be accomplished, of course,\nmerely by transfering budget authority for some functions\nnow covered in the DOD budget to another appropriation.\nDone any other way, the impact would be severe. There\nis simply not that kind of flexibility in the Defense\nbudget.\nChart 2 illustrates the implications of such a cut. The\nDOD budget is displayed in terms of major function\nR&D, procurement, readiness, and manpower. The consequences\nof applying the cut in toto to any one of those categories\nare described, even though the more likely approach in\nCongress would bea chipping away at all four categories\nCHART I\nTHE CHANGING TREND\n1 FY77 BUDGET $ $ - -\n200\n0\n0\n150\nANNUAL\nO\nPRESIDENT'S REQUEST\nDOD\nBUDGETS\n0\n(TOA $B)\nAPPROPRIATIONS\na\n#####\nThe E. > 100\n50\n1967\n68\n69\n70\n71\n72\n73\n74\n75\n76\n1977\nFISCAL YEARS\nCHART 2\nIMPLICATIONS OF A $5-7 BILLION DEFENSE CUT\nA $5-7 Billion Cut in any\n% of DOD Budget\nof the Accounts Would:\n100%\nResearch & Development\nOur Investment\nResult in Loss of U.S.\n10%\nin the Future\nTechnological Leadership\nProcurement\nModernization to\nReduce Army, Navy, and\n25%\nKeep Pace with the\nAir Force Equipment\nMilitary Challenge\nModernization\nEnsure that our\nReadiness\nReduce Ship Overhauls,\n15%\nEquipment is\nSpare Parts, Equipment,\nCombat Ready\nand Base Maintenance\nManpower\nRelated\nMan our Equipment\nReduce 400-560,000\nand Forces\n50%\nPersonnel\nAND,\nIF TAKEN\nACROSS\nDOD\n0%\nPut us on the same course of reduced DOD\nexpenditures we have followed for the past\nseveral years prior to FY 76.\nSeptember 15, 1976\nSUBJECT: U.S. Forces Overseas\nQUESTION: It has been alleged that the U.S. has too many troops and\nbases overseas and that millions of dollars could be saved if the\noverseas troops and bases were reduced. Would you please comment on\nthe advantages and disadvantages of having the troops and bases in\nforeign lands?\nANSWER: Such allegations have been a recurrent theme in U.S. political\ncampaigns for several years. There is a certain superficial appeal\nto such calls to \"bring the boys home\" and \"save the taxpayers'\nmoney.\" These notions don't look so good when one begins to assess\nthe cost in terms of our national security interests and foreign\npolicy objectives what we would lose by seriously reducing current\nforward deployments and overseas basing facilities.\nOur overseas deployments are concentrated in two areas, both of\nwhich are of central importance to US national security objectives:\nNATO Europe and Northeast Asia. In Western Europe, deployed U.S.\ntroops constitute about one-tenth of the ground forces of the NATO Alliance,\nthe treaty which has been the centerpiece of US foreign policy since\nWorld War II. These forces -- both on land in the Central Region\nand seaborne in the Mediterranean -- contribute vitally to the\nAlliance's warfighting capability; moreover, they are regarded by\nour Allies as politically significant symbols of continuing U.S.\ncommitment to mutual security. In the past two years, we have\nstreamlined and modernized our forces in Europe, first, by converting\nsome 20,000 billets from support to combat functions and, in addition,\n- 2 -\nby various redeployments designed to improve NATO warfighting capa-\nbilities.\nSignificant reductions in the level of U.S. deployments would,\nthus, reduce total NATO military capabilities in Central Europe\nand the Mediterranean. It would also affect our political relationships,\nsince the Allies would inevitably interpret any such action on our\npart as a clear signal that our interest in Western Europe's security\nand our commitment to their support had been downgraded. It could\nalso give rise to a serious miscalculation on the part of the Soviets,\nwere they to conclude the same thing and seize the opportunity to\nexert pressure, either political or military, upon the NATO Allies\nto make them more pliant towards Soviet objectives in Europe. The\nUnited States has too many vital interests at stake in Western Europe ---\ndeep political and cultural ties, large investments, major national\nsecurity interests -- to invite Soviet adventurism there.\nIn Northeast Asia, the stakes are similarly high. Stability on\nthe Korean peninsula is vital to the security of Japan, our major\nally in Asia. Deployed US forces are a necessary addition to South\nKorean military forces, ensuring that, in the event of attack, the\nSouth Korean's will have the ground strength and air support they\nthemselves currently lack. The outbreak of renewed hostilities in\nKorea would be likely to force the Chinese and the Soviets, out of\npolitical rivalry and mutual mistrust, to vie in backing the North\nKoreans. This would tend, in turn, to bring the United States into\na face-to-face confrontation with one or both of these two powers.\n- 3 -\nAs in NATO Europe, therefore, the presence of US troops in South Korea\nserves a dual purpose: military and political. Reduction of US\ndeployed strength would suggest to allies and possible adversaries alike\nthat the US regards stability in Northeast Asia as less essential to\nour own national security and foreign policy objectives than before.\nIt is also worth noting that the total number of our troops over-\nseas is currently at a 20-year low. Attached is a table that shows\nassigned US troop strength overseas from 1955 to 1976. The present\nnumber is half what it was in 1955, and approximately a third of what\nit was at the peak of the Vietnam War in 1967. Interestingly enough,\ntotal overseas deployed strength steadily decreased during the Eisenhower\nAdministration, increased markedly during the Kennedy-Johnson period,\nand has steadily decreased since 1968.\nFinally, there is considerable question as to how much money\nthe US would save by significant reductions to overseas deployment\nlevels. Assuming that the forces withdrawn were kept in the force\nstructure -- a necessity given the military balance in the world --\nextensive expansion of CONUS basing facilities would be needed to\naccommodate the returning forces. This would occasion a considerable\none-time expense which would require some years to amortize. Further-\nmore, to maintain the capability to return rapidly and reinforce Central\nEurope or Northeast Asia in the event of hostilities, we would need\nto expand our existing airlift and sealift capability considerably -\nanother expensive endeavor. On the other hand, if we chose to redefine\n- 4 -\nour overseas interests in terms much narrower than hitherto since\nWorld War II, we might choose to demobilize the homecoming forces\nand remove them from the force structure entirely. This would\nseverely reduce our conventional capabilities, almost certainly\nraising, rather than lowering, the nuclear threshold. We would then\nvery possibly find it necessary to invest more money in expanding and\nimproving our strategic forces to make up for the conventional capa-\nbility, forward deployed, we had sacrificed.\nGERALD FORDS\nU.S. Troop Strength - World-Wide and Overseas\n(Ashore and Afloat)\n(in thousands)\nAs of June\nOverseas\nWorld-Wide\n1950\n3252\n1,460\nHST\n1951\nNA\n3,249\n1952\n1,180\n3,636\n1953\n1,217.\n3,555\n1954\n1,031\n3,302\n1955\n867\n2,935\nIKE\n1956\n813\n2,806\n1957\n799\n2,796\n1958\n734\n2,601\n1959\n699\n2,504\n1960\n698\n2,476\n1961\n703\n2,484\nJFK\n1962\n770\n2,808\n1963\n762\n2,698\n1964\n755\n2,685\nLBJ\n1965\n778\n2,653\n1966\n1,013\n3,092\n1967\n1,247\n3,377\n1968\n1,241\n3,547\n1969\n1,195\n3,459\n1970\n1,071\n3,066\nRN\n1971\n842\n2,714\n1972\n628\n2,322\n1973\n585\n2,252\n1974\n519\n2,162\n1975\n517\n2,128\nGRF\n1976\n464\n2,082\n1/ Includes U.S. Territories and Possessions\n2/ Afloat excluded (not available)\n14 Sep 76\nI.\nTROOP WITHDRAWALS\nTrop Withdrawn UP 200, fall Down- are 1434,000. Pens. RM\nA. General Withdrawals\nCARTER. Carter always mentions troop withdrawals in the context\nof cutting the defense budget. He said, for example, \"we have\na bloated bureaucracy in the Pentagon, too many troops overseas,\ntoo many military bases overseas \" (11/23/75), and \"we' re wasting\nenormous quantities of money. We've got too many military bases\noverseas. (3/21/76).\nResponse. Generally you should try to emphasize the fact that\nCarter statements have been fuzzy, at times concradictory, and\ninvariably wrong when citing particular facts and figures. This\nshould be done in the context that he is ill-informed on defense\nmatters (because of lack of experience on national problems) and\nbadly served by all too sloppy staff work.\nWhen asked about troop withdrawals, you should ask if Carter\nmeans: (a) cutting the total number of U.S. troops by bringing\nhome and deactiviting some; or b) maintaining the overall number\nof troops yet deploying less overseas and more in the U.S.\nIf Carter means (a) or reducing the overall number of troops, a\nresponse is that we are at the lowest level since before the\nKorean War, going from a peak of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.1 million\ntoday. We just cannot afford to go any lower and maintain the\noverall military balance (the Soviet Union has 4.4 million under\narms).\nIf Carter means (b) or merely bringing home troops, a response is\nthat such a move would lower capabilities and deterrence without\nlowering costs in the near future. Troops stationed in the U.S.\njust do not have the deterrent effect of those stationed on the\nFORD is LIBRARY GERALD\nNATO or Korean borders. Should deterrence fail, such troops at\nhome do not have the capability for defense that those in place,\nwith equipment and facilities on hand, have. In terms of cost,\nthe savings of redeploying troops in the U.S. would be, at best,\nminimal. To bring home one-fourth or 50,000 of our ground forces\nassigned to NATO would cost an additional $700 in the first year,\nwith some type of capability in Europe maintained for such forces.\nNo savings at all would accrue for 15 years, at the least.\nDeferel no for lunch\n2\nB. Withdrawals from Asia\nCARTER. \"I think that to reduce our land forces in South\nKorea gradually over a period of years would be an appropriate\naction to take,\" (5/10/76): Carter would try to reassure Japan\nby \"ccnsultation\" that this withdrawal from Korea had no impact on\nour commitment to Japan (6/23/76). According to a Carter policy\nstatement in early 1976, he would advocate a gradual U.S. troop\nwithdrawal from Japan as well.\nRESPONSE. Events last month showed that the threat from North\nKorea is still a serious one. Our troops serve there, as they\nhave successfully for 25 years, for deterrence. Redeployment to\nthe U.S. would initially cost money and would save nothing for a\nnumber of years. Japan is concerned about our commitment to\nKorea, and we are concerned about our commitment to Japan, our\nsecond largest trading partner (after Canada), a good friend,\ndemocratic government, and an ally. All of Asia, indeed the\nworld, would be concerned about Japanese rearmament. As a nation,\nwe have guaranteed Japan's security since World War II in part to\ndiscourage such rearmament; lessening that commitment would surely\nwell:\nencourage more militaristic forces in Japan to rearm. If not\nrearming in such a situation, Japan could go neutral (like India?)\nwhich would also be a serious move for us as a Nation and for the\noverall balance in the world.\nII.\nECONOMY MOVES\n074839 FORD\nA. General Measures\nCARTER. Most of his remarks on defense focus on economy measures --\nto trim down the huge bureaucracy and flabby, \"frilled\" military\nestablishment. The Democratic Platform sets the tone:\n\"\nwith\nthe proper management, with the proper kind of investment of\ndefense dollars, and with the proper choice of military programs,\nwe believe we can reduce present defense spending by about $5\nbillion to $7 billion.' Carter has come down to this figure from\n$12-15 billion March, 1975; and $7 to $8 billion in January, 1976.\nRESPONSE. Generally five points should be made. (1) The way\nCarter is coming down on his defense cuts, pretty soon e'll\nbe supporting the President's budget. We are quite pleased with\nhis statements which -- though contradictory -- are showing an\nincreasing awareness of the threats to freedom, adverse trends,\netc. (2) Any government agency, indeed any business, can get\ngreater efficiency. The call for better management of the defense\nestablishment has been made since DoD began, and will be made as\nlong as it exists. It is a constant need deserving constant\nattention. In this post-Vietnam era, we are constantly making\nadjustments and modernizing. (3) Most if not all the specific\nproposals made by Carter have already been done, or at least are\nbeing done. It is easy to promise things already accomplished or\nunderway. Furthermore, the figures he gives as savings are consist-\ntently wrong. He is ill-informed and, as a result, is misleading\n3\nthe American public, not only on the general point that huge\nsums can be saved through better management, but also that\nsavings of specified amounts will accrue from his recommended\nactions. (4) The President has taken many more actions to\nimprove efficiency than ever mentioned by Carter. Under his\nown authority, the President has taken efficiency measures\nwhich save $2.2 billion in FY 1977 and will save $50\nbillion in the next 15 years. Other actions require legis-\nlation. Unfortunately, the Democratic Congress has yet to\nact on the whole package sent up last January which would save\nsome $800 million in FY 1977, and more than $70 billion over a\nfifteen year period (FY 1977-91). Rather than clamor for actions\nalready underway in DoD, he should push his party leaders in\nCongress to take new actions. (5) Although necessary, we feel\nthat there are more important national security issues facing\nAmerica than these management concerns. The real issue of\nnational security in 1976 is: How can we keep the peace in\nthe decades ahead while preserving our principles, maintaining\nour vital interests abroad, assuring our allies, etc? This\ninvolves a careful consideration of the threats to freedom\nwhich do exist in the world, the increasing power and\nappetite of the Soviet Union, the adverse trends, etc.\nB. Transfers of Personnel\nCARTER. \"We must recognize that our military personnel are\ntransferred too much. At any given moment, about one out of\nseven of those personnel is in the process of moving\nThis year,\n$2.5 billion will go simply to move service personnel, their\nfamilies\nSuch frequent moves not only eat up money, they undermine\nmorale. If we extend the average tour of duty by just two months,\nwe could save $400 million per year\" (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).\nResponse. (1) We are working on this problem with our PCS/\nTurbulence reduction efforts and have been working on it\nsince I took office ten months ago -- long before Mr. Carter\naddressed the issue. (2) His figures are inaccurate. He is\nill-informed by sloppy staff work and consequently misleading\nthe American people. The $2.5 billion figure includes some\ncivilian personnel as well as \"service personnel. \" Most\nimportant, a two-month extension of service would save less\nthan half the amount he presents ($186 million, not $400\nmillion as he states).\nC. Training Ratios\nCARTER. \"We need to reexamine our military training programs\nWe now have an average of one and a half military students for\neach instructor. By moving to a ratio of only three students\nto each instructor, we could save an estimated $1 billion per\nyear. \" (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).\nRESPONSE. (1) We have already taken action in this area as\nwell --- reducing training staff by 14% (or 31, 600) while in-\ncreasing the number of students trained 2% between FY 1975 and\n4\n1977. Flight training has been reduced by 44% and graduate\neducation by 36% between FY 1973 and 1977. (2) Again,\nCarter's figures are wrong; again the result of sloppy staff\nwork. At present there are five students per instructor, not\n1.5 as he states. Moving to three per student, as Carter\nadvocates, would only cost money, not save it. Does he wish\nto increase the number of instructors per students?\nD. Cost Overruns\nCARTER. \"Cost overruns have become chronic. The Pentagon itself\nestimates that the total current cost of overruns on the 45 weapons\nsystems now in the process of development in the three services\n-- exclusive of inflation -- is $10.7 billion. Over the next\nfive years that would approximate the cost of the proposed B-1\nbomber program over the same period.\" (VFW Speech, 8/24/76).\nRESPONSE. (1) Cost overruns are serious, but they are a problem\nof society in general -- both business and government -- rather\nthan one confined to the military. In fact, a recent GAO Report\nstates that the Pentagon is better in this regard than other\ngovernment agencies. Whereas military programs grew by 33%, non-\nmilitary acquisition programs in the government grew over 100%\nfrom base estimates. The Federal Highway Administration and\nAppalachian Regional Commission both grew by 100% and Department\nof Transportation by 50%. In private business, the Bay Area\nRapid Transit grew by 73%, the Washington Metro by 86% (and is\nstill growing), the John Hancock Building in Boston by 100%.\n(2) Carter's figures are actually low; the correct amount is\n$13.4 billion for 44 weapons systems.\nE. Officer to Non-Officer Ratio\nCARTER. \"What we have now are. too many major military officers\nand generals\" (8/23/75). \"Waste and inefficiency are both costly\nto taxpayers and a danger to our own national existence. Strict\nmanagement and budgetary control over the Pentagon should reduce\nthe ratio of officers to men\n\"\n(8/12/74).\n\"We'\nve\ngot\ntoo\ntop-\nheavy a layer of personnel assignments. We've got more admirals\nand generals than we had at the end of the Second World War.\"\n(3/21/76)\nRESPONSE. (1) Again, his facts are wrong, again because of sloppy\nstaff work. We do not now have more generals and admirals than\nat the end of WW II. In fact, today we have about half the\nnumber (1138 today VS. 2068 in 1945). (2) Efforts to reduce the\nofficer to non-officer ratio have been underway for some time.\nBetween FY 1973 and 1977, the reduction in senior officer personnel\nhas been nearly twice that of military personnel overall (13% vs\n7%). These cuts include an 8% reduction in admirals and generals,\nand a 12% reduction in colonels and lieutenant colonels. (3)\nWhile we are making progress, the amount of savings possible by\nreducing the number of officers is minimal. To fire all generals\n5\nand admirals outright would save DoD only $60 million\nper year. To replace them with colonel-level officers\nin the same positions would save only $10 million per\nyear. (4) The officer to non-officer ratio must remain\nhigher in peacetime than during war -- such as World War\nII -- in order to allow for rapid mobilization, should the\nneed arise.\nF. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio\nCARTER. \"We've got too many support troops per combat troop\"\n(3/21/76)\n\"What we have are\ntoo many support troops per\ncombat troop \" (11/23/75).\nRESPONSE. (1) We have taken action in this area, beginning\nfour years ago. From FY 1973-76, we reduced support forces\nby 244,000 while increasing combat strength by 29,000. (2)\nWe are now streamlining the entire military establishment,\nin part by eliminating or proposing for elimination 15\ncommand headquarters and 25,600 headquarters positions since\nFY 1974.\nG. Transferring Programs From DoD\nCARTER. \"The Defense Department now overlaps the functions of\ncivilian agencies, with a great waste of money\" (5/2/76). He\nadvocated transferring programs \"like education, training, housing,\nsocial programs, and transportation\" from DoD to civilian agencies.\nRESPONSE. It is misleading the American people to state that\nsuch transfers could save substantial sums of money if the functions\nof the various programs were maintained. This resembles Carter's\nwidely-heralded streamlining of the Georgia government by reducing\nthe overall number of agencies, etc. What he neglects to mention,\nhowever, is that while he was governor, state spending increased\n58% and the number of state employees increased 24%.\nIII. OTHER POINTS\nA. Eliminating Nuclear Weapons\nCARTER. \"The biggest waste and danger of all is the unnecessary\nproliferation of atomic weapons throughout the world. Our ultimate\ngoal should be the elimination of nuclear weapon capability among\nall nations\" (12/12/75). \"I think this nation ought to have\nas its ultimate goal zero nuclear weapons for any nations in the\nworld\" (12/15/74). \"\nwe (must) demonstrate meaningful progress\ntoward the goal of control and then reduction and ultimately\nelimination of nuclear arsenals\" (5/14/76).\nRESPONSE. This is a noble goal, one possible if the world were\na Garden of Eden with an absence of threat to freedom. However,\nas a serious proposal in the real world, it shows a lack of rigorous\n6\nanalysis and consideration of the repercussions. Since World War\nII, the U.S. has been able to deter aggression and maintain the\noverall military balance because of our nuclear weaponry, particularly\nour superiority in the number of nuclear warheads. Were we and\nthe Soviet Union to simply eliminate nuclear weapons in the near\nfuture, we would have to increase our conventional strength sub-\nstantially, perhaps doubling or tripling our forces, with all\nthat implies in terms of doubling or tripling the budget, reinstatement\nof the draft, etc., in order to meet the superior Soviet conventional\nforces. Alternatives to this vast increase of our conventional\nforces would be unthinkable: retreat to a form of isolationism or\naccommodation to the Soviet view of the world.\nB. Euro-Communism\nCARTER. \"I believe that we should support strongly the democratic\nforces in Italy, but still we should not close the doors to\nCommunist leaders in Italy for friendship with us. I just hate to\nbuild a wall around Italy in advance, should the Communists be\nsuccessful\" (5/10/76).\nRESPONSE. Leaders in America just should not give the wrong\nsignals about the acceptability of a government with Communist\nleaders in NATO. Such signals are easily picked up and used\nfor legitimization, as was done by Italian Communist leader\nBerlinguer who (according to UPI dispatch, 6/16/76) said in\na nationally televised broadcast from Rome:\n\"\nothers,\nincluding\nPresidential hopefuls from the Democratic Party, have said\nthat although they don't like the idea of our participation in\na government, this should be viewed with relative tranquility.\"\nThe Communist newspaper, L'Unita, earlier praised Carter for\nsaying that the U.S. should not rule out cooperation in advance\nif the Communists entered a coalition government, according\nto the same dispatch.\nC. Other Points Mentioned by Carter\nFMS. \"Can we be both the world's leading champion of peace and\nthe world's leading supplier of the weapons of war? If I Lecome\nPresident, I will work with our allies and also seek to work\nwith the Soviets to increase the emphasis on peace and to reduce\nthe commerce in weapons of war\" (7/18/76) \" we (must) put a\nstop to the dubious practice of arms giveaway programs for\npotential adversaries\" (8/24/76).\nRESERVES.\n\"\nI have been concerned that our reserve forces, both\nthe regular reserve and the National Guard, do not play a strong\nenough role in our military preparedness. We need to shift toward\na highly trained, combat-worthy reserve, well-equipped and closely\ncoordinated with regular forces --- always capable of playing a\ncrucial role in the nation's defense\" (8/24/76).\n7\nLIMITED NUCLEAR WAR. \"Our Defense Secretary and Secretary of State\nhave talked about limited war. My belief is that if we ever start\na limited atomic war that it would very quickly escalate into an\nall-out war\nI\nthink we ought to be prepared to recognize\nthat\nonce a nuclear war starts\na very good likelihood is that it\nwould be an all-out nuclear war\" (7/7/76).\nB-1 BOMBER. \"We don't need the B-1 bomber\" (2/9/75). \"I believe\nwe should cancel the B-1 bomber. It's toò expensive and its an.\nunnecessary new system\" (12/2/75). After a visit to SAC Headquarters\nin Omaha, Carter stated he-would continue research and development:\non the plane because \"it might be after I become President I would\nchange my mind\" (5/10/76). The Democratic Platform states, \"Exotic\nweapons which serve no real function do not contribute to the defense\nof this country. The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed\nsystem which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers'\ndollars.\"\nDTR 210954Z Oct 76\nFM\nAMEMBASSY MOSCOW\nTO:\nSECSTATE WASHDC 0118\nINFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD\nCONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 16556 (or 0)\nSUBJECT:\nCOMMERCIAL CABLE REGARDING VLADIMIR SLEPAK\n1. EMBASSY OCTOBER 21 RECEIVED COMMERCIAL CABLE FROM\nATLANTA, GEORGIA WITH FOLLOWING TEXT:\nQUOTE: PLEASE DELIVER THIS CABLE ON BEHALF OF\nGOVERNOR CARTER TO VLADIMIR SLEPAK AND ACKNOWLEDGE\nDELIVERY:\nI HAVE READ WITH GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE TREATMENT\nTHAT YOU AND SOME OF YOUR COLLEAGUES SUFFERED\nRECENTLY. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE SPOKEN OUT ON THIS\nMATTER AS GOVERNOR AND DURING THIS CAMPAIGN AND HAVE\nREFERRED TO YOUR CASE BY NAME. I WANT YOU TO KNOW\nOF MY DEEP PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE TREATMENT THAT\nYOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES RECEIVE. SINCERELY, JIMMY CARTER.\nEND QUOTE.\n2. GIVEN PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY OF OUR DETERMINING AUTHENTICITY\nNow\nOF MESSAGE, WE WILL DEFER TAKING ANY ACTION PENDING CONFIRMA\nFROM DEPARTMENT AND GUIDANCE. WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH SLEPAK\nAND COULD DELIVER. PLEASE ADVISE.\nMATLOCK\nCONFIDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5\nBy\nTOP SECRET\nREPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN\nWHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT\nWITH FERMISSION OF ISSUING OFFICE,\nOR HIGHER AUTHORITY\nDon\nAN ASSESSMENT\nOF THE\nCONVENTIONAL WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY\nAND POTENTIAL\nOF THE\nUS ARMY IN CENTRAL EUROPE\nBY\nLTG JAMES F. HOLLINGSWORTH\nFORD\nLIBRARY\nVOLUME I - BASIC REPORT\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)\n30 JUN 1976\nMR 94-162, #3 OSD Hr. 11/5/96 5/23/97 Army\nBy KBH NARA, Date 10/16/97\nClassified bv LTG James F. Hollingsworth\nSUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION\nOCSA No.\n92-76\nSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652\n3\nAUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR\nCOPY No\nCOPIES\nINTERVALS\nRECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1986\nTOP SECRET\nRegraded UNCLASSIFIED\nwhen separated from\nCLASSIFIED Inclosures.\nto\nTOP SECRET\nSECTION I\nINTRODUCTION\n1.\n(TS) PROLOGUE: The defense of NATO is second only to the defense of\nthe United States as our national security objective. Over the last two\nand one half decades, our force structure and planning for the defense of\nCentral Europe evolved and now, in conjunction with our NATO allies, we\nmust stand ready to defend in Central Europe against the threat posed by the\nUSSR/Warsaw Pact. Advancements in military technology, weaponry and mana-\ngerial improvements have been incorporated into our structure and plans\nover the years while political and economic constraints within NATO, and\nmajor qualitative and quantitative Warsaw Pact improvements, have compli-\ncated the task of defense.\nWith the advent of nuclear parity between the U.S. and the USSR, the\nneed for a capable, viable conventional force in Central Europe has become\nparamount. This U.S./Allied force must serve as a real deterrent, and\nmust be capable of defeating a Warsaw Pact attack. As an alliance we should\nbe capable, with total mobilization, of fighting conventionally for as long\nas the Warsaw Pact can sustain conventional combat. Our emphasis, however,\nmust be placed on developing NATO's ability to win a quick, decisive, con-\nventional victory against a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact with no more\nthan 48 hours of warning. The forces and firepower in being in Central\nEurope, plus their immediate reinforcements must have that capability.\nWith it, NATO will be an effective deterrent; without that capability, we\ninvite disaster.\nIt is equally clear that the US Army must examine requirements for the\ndefense of Central Europe that go beyond the boundaries of V and VII US\nCorps. U.S. leadership and initiatives in this area must be encouraged\nand supported by the Department of Defense and the Congress.\nThe key is to have a credible conventional deterrent on the ground\nin Europe backed up by the ability to reinforce in hours and days, not\nweeks and months. This force must be capable of providing massive fire-\npower--tactical air force and artillery--so that we expend the cheap part\nof our society--materiel--against the cheap part of communism--people.\nThis is what it's all about, and what this assessment will examine.\n2.\n(8) PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to assess the threat\nand the war fighting capabilities and potential of US Army units in\nCentral Europe to defend, in conjunction with NATO allies, against the\nWarsaw Pact, and to make recommendations based on that assessment.\n3.\n(5)\nSCOPE: This report focuses on the strategy, operational plans,\ntactics, structure, doctrine and .S./Allied cooperation and interoper-\nability necessary to defeat a conventional Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in\nCentral Europe.\nTOP SECRET\n3\nI-1\nCCSA No.\n75\nSECRET\n4. (8) BACKGROUND: The Chief of Staff of the Army directed that an\nassessment be made of the war fighting capabilities of US Army units in\nCentral Europe. A study team was formed on 28 March 1976 and collected\ninformation in Europe from 30 March 1976 to 22 June 1976.\n5. (8) METHODOLOGY: A four-man study team visited every major US Army\nand NATO headquarters in Central Europe. Over a three month period, each\nUS Army corps, division and separate brigade or regiment was seen. Dis-\ncussions with senior officials and soldiers at each level occurred and\ndata were collected in a variety of areas. Additionally, NATO commands,\nto include SHAPE, AFCENT, NORTHAG, CENTAG, 2d ATAF and 4th ATAF, were\nvisited, as, well as each allied corps headquarters in AFCENT (except\nthe Netherlands Corps). Headquarters, USEUCOM and USAFE, to include 17th\nTactical Air Force, were visited as were USNAVEUR and the American\nAmbassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As a result of\nthese extensive visits during a concentrated period of time, and with\nfull examination of the facts and figures collected, a clear perception\nof the current capability and needed improvements was developed. This\nreport is not based on detailed analytical study but rather on an overall\nperception of the status of the situation in Europe. Some follow-on\ncomputer assisted analytical work by appropriate headquarters will be\nnecessary to refine some of the recommendations contained in this report.\nThis should be done on an expedited basis.\nSECRET\nI-2\nTOP SECRET\nSECTION VII\nASSESSMENT\n1.\n(8) GENERAL: As outlined in the introduction to this report, the\npurpose of this study effort has been to \"conduct an assessment of the\nwar fighting capabilities and potential of the US Army units in Central\nEurope\nTo accomplish this, it has been necessary to look not\nonly at the US Army's posture in Europe, but, perhaps more importantly,\nhow it fits into the Central Region battle--based on an on-the-ground\nappreciation of the terrain, the threat, the capabilities of our allies,\nand strategy. No assessment of the US Army's capabilities and potential\ncan be addressed in isolation. The following comments assess the US\nArmy in Europe in the context of a NATO war. This assessment is based on\nthe threat which clearly indicates the Warsaw Pact capability of conducting\na surprise attack with no more than 48 hours warning. Obviously, an asses-\nment based on a different scenario (e.g., 23/30) would result in different\nconclusions.\n2. (5) WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITY: In terms of soldier and junior leader\npotential, the war fighting capability of the US Army in Europe is excel-\nlent. In terms of quality of equipment and general availability and\nreadiness of equipment on hand, it is excellent. However, in view of the\nthreat described in Section II of this report, the ability of US Army Europe,\nas an organizational entity, to project its full potential in the defense of\nCentral Europe is severely constrained by:\n- Inadequate appreciation (at the policy making level) of the Warsaw\nPact's capability to launch a surprise attack.\n- Resultant force structure and strategic planning predicated on\nan unrealistic warning time--23/30.\n3. (IS) STRATEGY: The current \"flexible response\" strategy that balances\ndirect defense,\nfor the\ndefense of NATO is valid. There is, however, a need to emphasize and\nincrease the credibility of the first phase of that strategy. The direct\nconventional defense capability for Central Europe is not credible today.\nIt is based on \"in-place\" forces which are inadequate in terms of fire-\npower and location to stop a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact, and\nstrategic reinforcements which would require weeks and months to reinforce\nrather than hours and days.\nThe US strategic planning guidance for the direct conventional defense\nof NATO does not take into account the NATO agreed assessment that the\nWarsaw Pact is capable of attacking the Central Region with up to 54\ndivisions with no more than 48 hours warning. Forces and supplies are\npositioned in Europe without recognition that the most likely main\navenue of a Warsaw Pact attack would be in the north German plain. As\na result, our force structure, plans, and concepts for the conduct of\n3\nVII-90PY No\nTOP SECRET\nOCSA No.\n92-76\nIt'l OLONET\nthe defense against a surprise attack are inadequate.\n4.\n(S) ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL PLANS: With our current\nforce structuring and strategic planning dependent on adequate warning,\nany assessment of organization for combat and operational planning must\nreflect these major deficiencies:\n- Malpositioning of forces in Cetral Europe ready to respond to the\nmajor threat.\n- Acceptance of a \"transition to war\" concept rather than an immediate\nreadiness for war.\n- Inadequate in-place, hardened, and ready command, control and com-\nmunications capabilities.\n- Failure to properly emphasize the every day operational capability\nof NATO headquarters/staffs.\n- Inadequate fire support.\n- Tactical concepts and operational plans based on trading space for time.\n- Shortages in POMCUS and its malpositioning.\n5.\n(S) RATIONALIZATION: With a requirement for\nreadiness on the part\nof USAREUR to be ready to fight, rationalization becomes a strategic,\neconomic, and tactical necessity. We must take bold steps in this area.\nNational goals must be subordinated to the common NATO goal. The force\nStanda.edu\nto defend Central Europe should have common doctrine, tactics and equip-\nment. This is not the case now, and as a result millions of dollars are\nwasted annually by redundancy and duplication of effort in equipment\ndevelopment. NATO is doing a great deal to overcome the complex problem of\nrationalization, but until solutions are developed, NATO's full potential\nas a fighting force will not be realized.\n6. (IS) SUMMARY:\nThis is not\nprimarily the fault of USAREUR, but essentially a function of the scenario\nwithin which it has been told to live and plan, and the evolution of\nevents which have stationed our forces where they are today in Europe. It is\ntime to meet the problem head on and develop a conventional defense strategy\nand position our forces to meet the real capability of the Warsaw Pact. The\ntactical and strategic nuclear capability within NATO will continue to be a\nsignificant deterrent and must be maintained while a credible conventional\ndeterrent is developed.\nTOB\nto SEGRET\nVII-2\n9/13/76\nCARTER ON SCHLESINGER\nTAB\nQ.\nShould a President tolerate Cabinet members who dissent\nfrom Administration policy as heavily as Jame S R. Schlesinger\ndid as Secretary of Defense?\nA\nI believe I could pr event that disharmony occurring by being\nmore heavily involved in the evolution of basic commitments. I\nalways managed the affairs of Georgia on long-range goals and\nI can't imagine a basic strategic difference developing between\nmyself and one of my Cabinet members if the understanding were\nthat we worked toward the long-range goals. There might be\nsome differences on tactics. But I think I could tolerate the\ndegress of independence shown by James Schlesinger.\n*\n*\n*\nQ.\nOf the recent Secretaries of Defense, is there one that you\nhave found you admire the most as a model for the job --\nSchlesinger, Melvin Laird, Clark Clifford or Robert McNamara?\nA.\nWell, I'm a little reluctant to choose one because of the impled\ncriticism of the others. I think they all brought beneficial\ncharacteristics to the job -- McNamara was coldly analytical,\nand I think operated under very difficult circumstances in Vietnam.\n-2-\nLaird was much better able to work harmoniously with the\nCongress. I think Schlesinger was a brilliant strategists\nwho was very independent, who thought he didn't have quite\nclose enough relationships with the President and the Secretary\nof State to avoid public disharmonies, but I think a very competent,\nbrilliant man. I wouldn't want to say who was my favorite.\n(National Journal 7/17/76)\nGERALD R. FORD LIBRARY\nThis form marks the file location of item number\n3\nas listed on the pink form (GSA Form 7122, Withdrawal Sheet)\nat the front of the folder."
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